Updated May 24, 2019
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
The political situation in Venezuela is at a stalemate. High-
interim president of Venezuela and view the National
level military leaders did not back interim President Juan
Assembly as Venezuela’s only democratic institution.
Guaidó’s April 30, 2019, call for an uprising against
Nicolás Maduro. Clashes between pro-Guaidó protesters
Under Guaidó’s leadership, the National Assembly has
and security forces resulted in four deaths and hundreds of
since enacted resolutions declaring Maduro’s mandate
injuries. While some observers maintain that Maduro is
illegitimate, establishing a framework for a transition
weak politically, others fear a prolonged, potentially violent
government, drafting a proposal to offer amnesty for
standoff between the respective supporters of Maduro and
officials who support the transition, and creating a strategy
Guaidó. Both sides recently sent envoys to Norway for
for receiving humanitarian assistance.
exploratory talks, but actions taken against the opposition
Guaidó’s supporter
by Maduro could hinder a negotiated solution to the crisis.
s have organized two high-profile efforts
to encourage security forces to abandon the regime, neither
Background on the Political and Economic Crisis
of which has succeeded. On February 23, they sought to
Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under Maduro’s
bring emergency supplies donated from the United States
authoritarian rule. Maduro, leader of the United Socialist
and others positioned on the Colombia- and Brazil-
Party of Venezuela (PSUV), was narrowly elected in 2013
Venezuela borders into the country. Security forces loyal to
after the death of populist President Hugo Chávez, who had
Maduro killed seven individuals and injured hundreds, as
served since 1999. Most Venezuelans and much of the
forces prevented the aid convoys from crossing the border.
international community considered Maduro’s May 2018
While that aid remains blocked, both Guaidó and Maduro
reelection illegitimate. Maduro has used the courts, security
agreed to allow the International Committee of the Red
forces, and electoral council to quash dissent. According to
Cross to begin providing aid.
the human rights organization Foro Penal, the regime held
On April 30, 2019, Guaidó and Leopoldo López, a former
857 political prisoners as of early May 2019.
political prisoner and head of the VP party who had been
Maduro’s regime has mismanaged the economy and
released from house arrest by pro-Guaidó military officials,
engaged in massive corruption, exacerbating the impact of a
called for a civil-military rebellion against Maduro. Forces
decline in global oil prices and collapsing oil production on
loyal to Maduro violently put down pro-Guaidó supporters
the country’s economy. According to the International
and attacked journalists. As the day ended, López sought
Monetary Fund, Venezuela’s economy contracted by 18%
refuge in the Spanish Embassy.
in 2018. Inflation may exceed 10 million percent in 2019.
Many observers regard the military’s participation as
essential for the opposition’s transition plan to work. For
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
now, however, aside from the former head of the national
humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, U.N officials estimated
intelligence agency, the military high command appears to
that some 90% of Venezuelans are living in poverty and 7
remain loyal to Maduro. Many military leaders have
million are in need of humanitarian assistance. Health
enriched themselves through corruption, drug trafficking,
indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality rates,
and other illicit industries. Some military leaders may fear
have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases like
that they could face prosecution for human rights abuses
diphtheria and measles have returned and spread. In March
under a new government, even though the opposition has
2019, U.N. agencies estimated that at least 3.7 million
proposed amnesty for those who join their side.
Venezuelans had left the country, 3 million of whom were
Human Rights Concerns
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Migrant flows could
increase, as recent electrical blackouts have worsened
Human rights abuses have increased as security forces and
conditions, including access to potable water, considerably.
civilian militias have violently quashed protests and
detained and abused those suspected of dissent. In 2017,
Interim Government Challenges Maduro Regime
security forces committed serious human rights violations
The National Assembly elected Juan Guaidó as its president
during clashes with protesters that left more than 130 killed
on January 5, 2019; he is a 35-year-old industrial engineer
and thousands injured. Maduro has ordered the arrest and
from the Popular Will (VP) party. In mid-January, Guaidó
torture of those perceived as threats, including military
announced he was willing to serve as interim president until
officers and opposition politicians, such as Guaidó’s chief
new presidential elections are held. Buoyed by a massive
of staff. Analysts predict increasing repression as Maduro
turnout for protests he called for, Guaidó took the oath of
has called for the arrest of López and opposition lawmakers
office on January 23, 2019. The United States and 53 other
involved in the April 30 uprising. After Maduro loyalists
countries (including most of the European Union [EU] and
arrested the vice president of the National Assembly in
15 Western Hemisphere countries) recognize Guaidó as
early May, some fear Guaidó could also face arrest or exile.
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
International Response
signed E.O. 13850, creating a framework to sanction those
The international community remains divided over how to
who operate in Venezuela’s gold sector or are complicit in
respond to the crisis in Venezuela. The Lima Group of
corrupt transactions involving the government. On January
Western Hemisphere countries and the EU support the
28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Administration
Guaidó government but oppose any military intervention to
imposed sanctions on PdVSA to prevent Maduro and his
oust Maduro. An International Contact Group, backed by
regime from benefitting from Venezuela’s oil revenue.
the EU and some Latin American countries, has endorsed
Secondary sanctions are being applied to entities and
negotiations leading to the convening of internationally
individuals doing business with the Maduro regime. Some
observed elections. Russia, Cuba (which has provided
observers are concerned that the stronger economic
military and intelligence support), Turkey, and a few other
sanctions are worsening the humanitarian situation.
countries support Maduro. Russia and China have provided
aid to Maduro and blocked efforts at the U.N. Security
Humanitarian Assistance. The United States is providing
Council to recognize the Guaidó government. Russia has
assistance and helping to coordinate and support the
supported Venezuela’s struggling oil industry and sent
regional response to the Venezuelan migration crisis. The
military personnel and equipment, prompting U.S.
United States has committed to providing more than $213.3
condemnation. (See CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela:
million since FY2017 for Venezuelans who have fled to
International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis).
other countries and for the communities hosting them.
Recent U.S. Policy
Congressional Action. Congress provided $17.5 million
Since recognizing the Guaidó government on January 23,
for democracy and rule of law programs in Venezuela in
2019, the United States has coordinated its efforts with
FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and required a strategy on how U.S.
Interim President Guaidó and encouraged other countries to
agencies are supporting countries sheltering Venezuelans.
recognize his government. The Trump Administration has
The Administration’s proposed FY2020 budget asks for $9
imposed more targeted sanctions (visa bans and financial
million in democracy aid and authority to transfer up to
sanctions) on Maduro officials and their families and
$500 million to support a transition or respond to a crisis in
blocked the Maduro regime’s access to revenue from
Venezuela. On May 20, 2019, the House Appropriations
Venezuela’s state oil company. In addition to increasing
Committee reported its version of the FY2020 Department
humanitarian aid to countries sheltering Venezuelans, the
of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R.
Administration has pre-positioned emergency aid for the
2389); it would provide $17.5 million in democracy and
Venezuelan people in Brazil, Colombia, and Curaçao. As
human rights aid to Venezuela.
the situation deteriorated, the State Department withdrew its
remaining diplomatic personnel from Caracas in March.
On May 22, 2019, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
ordered S. 1025 to be reported with an amendment to
President Trump and top Administration officials have
include three House-passed measures (H.R. 854 would
repeatedly asserted, “all options are on the table” to address
authorize expanded humanitarian aid to Venezuela; H.R.
the Venezuela situation, including using U.S. military force.
920 would restrict arms transfer to Maduro government;
The Administration has denounced Cuba and Russia’s
and H.R. 1102 would require an assessment of the threat
support of the Maduro regime and threatened additional
posed by Russian-Venezuelan security cooperation). S.
sanctions on Cuba over Venezuela.
1025 supports the Guaidó government; it would increase
humanitarian assistance to Venezuela and countries
Targeted Sanctions. In 2015, President Obama issued
sheltering Venezuelans, and provide support for
Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, authorizing targeted
Venezuela’s democratic transition and reconstruction. On
sanctions against individuals who inhibit democratic
May 22, 2019, the House Judiciary Committee ordered
processes, commit violence or human rights abuses, or
reported H.R. 549 to make certain Venezuelans in the
engage in corruption. The Trump Administration has
United States eligible for Temporary Protected Status; a
imposed sanctions on 75 Venezuelan officials pursuant to
companion bill (S. 636) has been introduced in the Senate.
E.O. 13692. They include Maduro and his wife; Vice
On April 9, 2019, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First Vice President
ordered reported H.R. 1004 to prohibit the use of U.S.
Diosdado Cabello; Supreme Court members; the leaders of
military forces in combat operations in Venezuela. Other
Venezuela’s army, national guard, and national police; and
initiatives introduced include H.R. 2204/S. 1151, to prohibit
governors. In May 2019, the Administration removed
federal contracting with persons who have business ties to
sanctions on a general that broke ranks with Maduro and
the Maduro regime, and S.J.Res. 11, to prohibit the
said that it would do the same for others. The United States
unauthorized use of the U.S. military in Venezuela.
also has imposed sanctions on at least 22 individuals and 27
entities for drug trafficking.
Also see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of
U.S. Sanctions; CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela
Broader Sanctions (Including Oil Sanctions). The
Regional Migration Crisis; and CRS Report R44841,
Administration has issued executive orders restricting the
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations.
ability of the government and of Venezuela’s state oil
company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), to access
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
the U.S. financial system (E.O. 13808), barring U.S.
purchases of Venezuela’s new digital currency (
Affairs
E.O.
13827), and barring U.S. purchases of Venezuelan debt
IF10230
(E.O. 13835). On November 1, 2018, President Trump
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Disclaimer
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