Updated August 26, 2019
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
The political situation in Venezuela has been in flux since
Under Guaidó’s leadership, the National Assembly has
Juan Guaidó, head of the National Assembly, announced
since enacted resolutions declaring Maduro’s mandate
that he would become became interim president of
illegitimate, establishing a framework for a transition
Venezuela in January 2019. Although the United States and
government, drafting a proposal to offer amnesty for
54 other countries recognize Guaidó’s government, he has
officials who support the transition, and creating a strategy
been unable to wrest Nicolás Maduro from power and form
for receiving humanitarian assistance.
a transition government to convene free and fair elections.
Guaidó and Maduro have engaged in talks to end the
Guaidó’s supporters organized two high-profile efforts to
standoff since May, but prospects for a negotiated solution
encourage security forces to abandon the regime, but
to the crisis remain uncertain.
neither succeeded. On February 23, they sought to bring
emergency supplies donated by the United States and others
Background on the Political and Economic Crisis
positioned on the borders into the country. Security forces
Maduro, leader of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
loyal to Maduro killed seven individuals and injured
(PSUV), was narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of
hundreds, as forces prevented aid convoys from crossing
populist President Hugo Chávez, who had served since
the border. Some of that aid is being given to Venezuelans
1999. Most Venezuelans and much of the international
and host communities in Colombia. Separately, Guaidó and
community considered Maduro’s May 2018 reelection
Maduro agreed to allow the International Committee of the
illegitimate. Maduro has used the courts, security forces,
Red Cross to provide aid within Venezuela.
and electoral council to quash dissent. The human rights
organization Foro Penal estimated that the regime held 522
On April 30, 2019, Guaidó and Leopoldo López, a former
political prisoners as of August 19, 2019.
political prisoner and head of the VP party who had been
released from house arrest by pro-Guaidó military officials,
Maduro’s government has mismanaged the economy and
called for a civil-military rebellion against Maduro. Forces
engaged in massive corruption, exacerbating the impact of a
loyal to Maduro violently put down pro-Guaidó supporters
decline in global oil prices and collapsing oil production on
and attacked journalists. Resulting clashes resulted in four
the country’s economy. According to the International
deaths and hundreds of injuries and arrests. As the day
Monetary Fund, Venezuela’s economy contracted by 18%
ended, López sought refuge in the Spanish Embassy.
in 2018. Inflation may exceed 10 million percent in 2019.
Many observers regard the military’s participation as
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
essential for the opposition’s transition plan to work. For
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
now, however, most of the military high command appears
humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, U.N officials estimated
to remain loyal to Maduro. Many military leaders have
that some 90% of Venezuelans are living in poverty and 7
enriched themselves through corruption, drug trafficking,
million are in need of humanitarian assistance. Health
and other illicit industries. Some military leaders may fear
indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality rates,
that they could face prosecution for human rights abuses
have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases like
under a new government, even though the opposition has
diphtheria and measles have returned and spread. In August
proposed amnesty for those who join their side.
2019, U.N. agencies estimated that 4.3 million Venezuelans
had left the country, 3.2 million of whom were in Latin
Human Rights Concerns
America and the Caribbean. Migrant flows could increase,
Human rights abuses have increased as security forces and
as electrical blackouts and the impact of U.S. sanctions on
civilian militias have violently quashed protests and
declining oil production worsen social conditions.
detained and abused those suspected of dissent. In 2017,
security forces committed serious human rights violations
Interim Government Challenges Maduro Regime
during clashes with protesters that left more than 130 killed
The National Assembly elected Juan Guaidó as its president
and thousands injured. A July 2019 report by the Office of
on January 5, 2019; he is a 35-year-old industrial engineer
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
from the Popular Will (VP) party. In mid-January, Guaidó
estimates that security forces committed some 6,800
announced he was willing to serve as interim president until
extrajudicial killings from January 2018 through May 2019.
new presidential elections are held. Buoyed by a massive
OHCHR also details how intelligence agencies have
turnout for protests he called for, Guaidó took the oath of
arrested and tortured those perceived as threats to Maduro,
office on January 23, 2019. The United States and 54 other
including military officers and opposition politicians. In
countries (including most of the European Union [EU] and
June 2019, a naval officer died after being tortured in
15 Western Hemisphere countries) recognize Guaidó as
custody. Maduro loyalists arrested Guaidó’s chief of staff in
interim president of Venezuela and view the National
March and the vice president of the National Assembly in
Assembly as Venezuela’s only democratic institution.
May. Some fear Guaidó could face arrest.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
International Response
government (E.O. 13850). Under E.O. 13850, the
The international community remains divided over how to
Administration imposed sanctions on PdVSA, the central
respond to the current stalemate in Venezuela. The Lima
bank, persons (individuals and entities) that laundered
Group of Western Hemisphere countries and the EU
billions of dollars using the currency exchange system, and
support the Guaidó government but oppose any military
persons who stole from the emergency food program.
intervention to oust Maduro. An International Contact
Group, backed by the EU and some Latin American
On August 5, 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884
countries, has endorsed negotiations led by Norway leading
blocking Maduro government assets in the United States,
to the convening of internationally observed elections.
prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with
the Maduro government unless specifically exempted (such
Russia, Cuba (which has provided military and intelligence
as humanitarian aid), and authorizing secondary sanctions
support), Turkey, and a few other countries support
on persons that assist or support the Maduro government.
Maduro. Russia and China have provided aid to Maduro
and blocked efforts at the U.N. Security Council to
Humanitarian Assistance. The United States is providing
recognize the Guaidó government. Russia has supported
assistance and helping to coordinate and support the
Venezuela’s struggling oil industry and sent military
regional response to the Venezuelan migration crisis. The
personnel and equipment, prompting U.S. condemnation.
United States has committed to providing more than $213.3
million since FY2017 for Venezuelans who have fled to
Recent U.S. Policy
other countries and for the communities hosting them.
Since recognizing the Guaidó government on January 23,
Congressional Action. Congress provided $17.5 million
2019, the United States has coordinated its efforts with
for democracy and rule of law programs in Venezuela in
Interim President Guaidó and encouraged other countries to
FY2019 (P.L. 116-6). The Administration’s FY2020 budget
recognize his government. The Trump Administration has
asked for $9 million in democracy aid and authority to
imposed more targeted sanctions (visa bans and financial
transfer up to $500 million to respond to events in
sanctions), as well as broader sanctions on the Maduro
Venezuela. The House-passed FY2020 minibus, H.R. 2740,
government and persons doing business with that
would provide $20.5 million in democracy aid.
government. In response to the humanitarian crisis, in
Venezuela, the United States has supported U.N. and other
House-passed legislation includes H.R. 549, to make certain
entities working in Venezuela; increased humanitarian aid
Venezuelans in the United States eligible for Temporary
to countries sheltering Venezuelans; and pre-positioned
Protected Status (TPS). A related bill, S. 636, has been
emergency aid in Brazil, Colombia, and Curaçao.
introduced in the Senate. A Senate effort to pass H.R. 549
President Trump and top Administration officials have
by unanimous consent on July 30 failed. Both the House
repeatedly asserted, “all options are on the table” to address
and Senate-passed versions of the FY2020 National
the Venezuela situation, including using U.S. military force.
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R. 2500 and S.
The Administration has denounced Cuba and Russia’s
1790, include language similar to H.R. 2204 and S. 1151
support of the Maduro regime and imposed additional
that would prohibit federal contracting with persons who do
sanctions on Cuba over its support for Venezuela.
business with the Maduro government. Initiatives that
Secondary sanctions on other foreign companies are likely.
would prohibit the unauthorized use of the U.S. military in
Venezuela are House-reported H.R. 1004 and S.J.Res. 11.
Targeted Sanctions. In 2015, President Obama issued
Other House-passed legislation includes H.R. 854, which
Executive Order (E.O.) 13692 authorizing targeted
would authorize expanded humanitarian aid to Venezuela;
sanctions against individuals who inhibit democratic
H.R. 920, which would restrict arms transfers to the
processes, commit violence or human rights abuses, or
Maduro government; and H.R. 1477, which would require
engage in corruption. The Trump Administration has
an assessment of Russian-Venezuelan security cooperation.
imposed sanctions on 82 Venezuelan officials pursuant to
E.O. 13692. They include Maduro, his wife, and his son;
In May 2019, the Senate reported S. 1025, a bill that would,
Vice President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV leader Diosdado
among other provisions, codify U.S. sanctions, authorize
Cabello; Supreme Court members; and the heads of
humanitarian aid, and authorize funds to support elections
Venezuela’s army, national guard, and police. In May 2019,
and a democratic transition in Venezuela. The bill was
the Administration removed sanctions on a general who
reported with an amendment to include language similar,
broke ranks with Maduro and said that it would do so for
but not identical, to H.R. 854, H.R. 920, and H.R. 1477.
others. The United States also has imposed sanctions on at
least 22 individuals and 27 entities for drug trafficking.
See CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S.
Sanctions; CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background
Broader Sanctions. The Administration has issued
and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela:
executive orders restricting the ability of the government
International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis; CRS In
and of Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de
Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis.
Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), to access the U.S. financial
system (E.O. 13808), barring U.S. purchases of
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Venezuela’s digital currency (E.O. 13827), barring U.S.
Affairs
purchases of Venezuelan debt (E.O. 13835), and creating a
framework to sanction those operating in Venezuela’s gold
IF10230
sector or complicit in any corrupt transactions with the
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 41 · UPDATED