Updated January 30, 2020
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under the authoritarian
production worsen social conditions (see CRS In Focus
rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of
IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis).
Venezuela (PSUV). On January 10, 2019, Maduro began a
second term that most Venezuelans and much of the
Interim Government vs. Maduro Regime
international community consider illegitimate. Congress has
On January 5, 2019, the National Assembly elected Guaidó,
closely followed developments in Venezuela, the Trump
a 35-year-old industrial engineer from the Popular Will
Administration’s policy responses, and international efforts
party, as its president. In mid-January, Guaidó announced
to broker a solution to the crisis.
he was willing to serve as interim president until new
presidential elections were held. Buoyed by a massive
Since January 2019, Juan Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s
turnout for anti-Maduro protests, Guaidó took the oath of
democratically elected, opposition-controlled National
office on January 23, 2019.
Assembly, has sought to form a transition government to
serve until internationally observed elections can be held.
A year later, Guaidó remains the most popular politician in
Although the United States and 56 other countries
Venezuela, according to Gallup polling, and retains broad
recognize Guaidó as interim president, he has been unable
diplomatic support, but he lacks political power. In 2019,
to wrest Maduro from power. Some observers believe that
Guaidó’s supporters organized two high-profile but
National Assembly elections, due in 2020, might start an
ultimately unsuccessful efforts to get security forces to
electoral path out of the current stalemate.
abandon Maduro—in February, Guaidó supporters sought
to bring emergency aid into the country across borders that
Background on the Political and Economic Crisis
Maduro had closed, and on April 30, Guaidó called for a
Maduro was narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of
civil-military uprising.
populist President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and reelected
in May 2018 in an election characterized by widespread
After those efforts failed, observers hoped that mediated
fraud. Maduro has used the Venezuelan courts, security
negotiations between Guaidó and Maduro could lead to an
forces, and electoral council to quash dissent. On January
electoral solution to the crisis. When those talks stalled,
27, 2020, the Maduro government held 390 political
Maduro increased persecution of Guaidó’s supporters while
prisoners, according to Foro Penal, a human rights
negotiating with a group of legislators from smaller parties,
organization. At the same time, Maduro has rewarded
one of whom he tried to install as head of the National
allies, including the military, with income from illegal gold
Assembly. Maduro may try to move up legislative elections
mining, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.
due by December 2020 to wrest control of that body, but
such a move could lead to strong international pushback.
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
Human rights abuses have increased as security forces and
exacerbating the effects of a decline in global oil prices and
civilian militias have violently quashed protests and
collapsing oil production on the country’s economy.
detained and abused those suspected of dissent. A July 2019
According to International Monetary Fund estimates,
report by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Venezuela’s economy contracted by 35% in 2019 and
Human Rights (OHCHR) estimated that security forces
inflation reached some 200,000%. Hyperinflation is
committed some 6,800 extrajudicial killings from January
forecast to continue in 2020, but the rate of economic
2018 through May 2019. OHCHR detailed how intelligence
decline may ease as oil production stabilizes (albeit at a low
agencies have arrested and tortured those perceived as
level) and remittances increase.
threats to Maduro, including military officers and
opposition politicians. Some fear Guaidó could face arrest.
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
International Response
humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, U.N. officials estimated
The international community remains divided over how to
that some 90% of Venezuelans were living in poverty and a
respond to the crisis in Venezuela. The United States,
quarter of the population needed humanitarian assistance.
Canada, most of the European Union (EU), and 16 Western
Health indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality
Hemisphere countries are among the 57 countries that
rates, have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases such
recognize Guaidó as interim president. The United States,
as diphtheria and measles have returned and spread. In
EU, Canada, and 11 Western Hemisphere countries that are
December 2019, U.N. agencies estimated that 4.8 million
states parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Venezuelans had left the country, most of whom were in
Assistance (Rio Treaty) have imposed targeted sanctions
Latin America and the Caribbean. Migrant flows could
and travel bans on Maduro officials. They generally oppose
increase, as electrical blackouts and U.S. sanctions on oil
any military intervention to oust Maduro. An International
Contact Group, backed by the EU and some Latin
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
American countries, endorsed 2019 negotiations led by
Financial sanctions restricting Maduro government and
Norway, but those efforts have not yet succeeded.
state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA),
access to U.S. financial markets (E.O. 13808);
Russia, Cuba (which has provided military and intelligence
prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency (E.O.
support), Turkey, Iran, and a few other countries support
13827); or purchasing Venezuelan debt (E.O. 13835);
Maduro. Russia and China have provided aid to Maduro
and blocked efforts at the U.N. Security Council to
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
recognize the Guaidó government. Russia has supported
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
Venezuela’s struggling oil industry, helped Venezuela skirt
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
U.S. oil sanctions, and sent military personnel and
other entities (E.O. 13850); and
equipment, a move that prompted U.S. condemnation.
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
Recent U.S. Policy
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
Since recognizing the Guaidó government on January 23,
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
2019, the United States has coordinated its efforts with
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884).
Interim President Guaidó. U.S. strategy has emphasized
diplomatic efforts to bolster support for Guaidó and isolate
The Administration has imposed sanctions on Cuba for its
Maduro, sanctions and visa revocations to increase pressure
support of Maduro but has not taken action against Rosneft
on Maduro and encourage officials to defect (as a former
(Russia) or other energy companies tied to PdVSA. (CRS In
intelligence chief did in May 2019), and humanitarian and
Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions.)
development assistance. In early 2019, President Trump
discussed the possibility of using U.S. military force to
Humanitarian and Development Assistance. The United
address the crisis in Venezuela, a policy option no longer
States is providing assistance and helping to coordinate and
publicly discussed. U.S. officials remain concerned about
support the regional response to the Venezuelan migration
the destabilizing impact on regional security of illegally
crisis. Since FY2017, the Administration has provided $472
armed groups that are active in Venezuela.
million in humanitarian and development assistance to
support countries sheltering Venezuelans, including $56
million for humanitarian relief activities in Venezuela. The
“We call on all nations to join us in supporting
U.S. military has twice deployed a naval hospital ship to the
Interim President Guaidó and the National Assembly
region. In October 2019, the Administration signed an
as they work peacefully to restore democracy.”
agreement with Guaidó officials to provide $98 million in
- Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, January 2020
development assistance for programs in Venezuela,
including direct support for the interim government.
As Maduro remains in power despite strong U.S. pressure,
the Administration recently has called for a political
Congressional Action. Congress has supported the
solution that would lead to the convening of free and fair
Administration’s efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela
elections in 2020. A January 2020 U.S. statement
and provide humanitarian aid to Venezuelans. Some
encourages a focus on convening elections (as did the 2019
Members have expressed concerns about the humanitarian
Norway-led talks) but also says those elections should be
effects of sanctions and about potential unauthorized use of
overseen by a “negotiated transitional government.” That
the U.S. military in Venezuela.
demand, currently not called for by other international
actors, may present a new challenge in negotiations.
In February 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-6, which
provided $17.5 million in FY2019 assistance for democracy
Diplomacy. The United States has worked to encourage
programs in Venezuela. In December 2019, Congress
countries to recognize the Guaidó government, sanction
enacted P.L. 116-94, which provides $30 million for
Maduro officials, and provide shelter (or humanitarian aid)
democracy programs in Venezuela and incorporates
to Venezuelans who have fled the country. This work has
provisions from other Senate- and House-passed measures
occurred at the Organization of American States, with the
to authorize $400 million in FY2020 humanitarian aid to
Lima Group of nations that recognize Guaidó, and through
Venezuela, codify several types of sanctions, restrict the
the Rio Treaty process. (CRS Insight IN11116, The Inter-
export of defense articles to Venezuela, and require a U.S.
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Crisis in
strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela. In
Venezuela.) At the same time, U.S. officials continue to
December 2019, Congress also enacted P.L. 116-92, which
denounce Cuban and Russian support of Maduro.
prohibits federal contracting with persons who do business
with the Maduro government.
Sanctions. Individual, financial, and sectoral sanctions are
key components of U.S policy toward Venezuela. They
In July 2019, the House passed H.R. 549, designating
include
Venezuela as a beneficiary country for temporary protected
status. On July 30, 2019, a Senate effort to pass H.R. 549
Individual sanctions for terrorism; drug trafficking;
by unanimous consent failed.
and those who have committed antidemocratic actions,
human rights violations, or corruption (see Executive
See also CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and
Order (E.O.) 13692; P.L. 113-278; P.L. 114-194);
U.S. Relations.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
IF10230
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 42 · UPDATED