Updated September 15, 2020
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under the authoritarian
February 2020 World Food Program assessment estimated
rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of
that 9 million Venezuelans were food insecure. Health
Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after
indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality rates,
the death of President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), began a
have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases such as
second term on January 10, 2019, that is widely considered
diphtheria and measles have returned and spread.
illegitimate. Since January 2019, Juan Guaidó, president of
Venezuela’s democratically elected, opposition-controlled
The government reported only 485 deaths from COVID-19
National Assembly, has sought to form a transition
(as of September 14), but experts maintain that the actual
government to serve until internationally observed elections
number is much higher and that the pandemic could
can be held. The United States and 57 other countries
decimate Venezuela’s hollowed-out health system. Some
recognize Guaidó as interim president, but he has been
70% of Venezuelan hospitals surveyed in 2019 lacked
unable to use that support to wrest power from Maduro.
access to clean water. A Maduro-Guaidó agreement
negotiated in June 2020 has allowed the Pan American
Guaidó’s term as National Assembly president, a position
Health Organization to lead relief efforts.
that enabled his recognition as interim president, is to end
in January 2021. Although Guaidó and many of his allies
In August 2020, U.N. agencies estimated 5.2 million
have called for a boycott of legislative elections scheduled
Venezuelans had left the country; most have relocated to
for December 6, 2020, other sectors of the opposition,
other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
including two-time presidential candidate Henrique
Migrants face obstacles maintaining employment and
Capriles, have discussed fielding candidates. The Trump
accessing health care, as neighboring countries have
Administration and many Members of Congress continue to
implemented quarantines and border closures to prevent the
support Guaidó, but divisions within the opposition could
spread of COVID-19.
enable Maduro to consolidate more power.
Political Situation
Background
Guaidó retains diplomatic support abroad but lacks power
Maduro, reelected in May 2018 in a fraudulent election, has
at home. In 2019, Guaidó’s supporters organized two
used the Venezuelan courts, security forces, and electoral
unsuccessful efforts to encourage security forces to
council to quash dissent. Security forces have detained and
abandon Maduro. After those efforts failed, observers
abused Maduro’s opponents, including military officers and
hoped negotiations between Guaidó and Maduro could lead
opposition politicians. Police have violently enforced a
to an electoral solution to the crisis. When talks stalled,
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) quarantine and
Maduro increased persecution of Guaidó’s supporters.
arrested those who have criticized the government’s
Guaidó has lost domestic support since reports emerged that
response to the pandemic. As of September 7, 2020, the
he may have condoned a plan that resulted in a botched raid
government held 333 political prisoners even after
against Maduro in early May 2020.
pardoning 110 people following negotiations with Capriles ,
according to Foro Penal, a human rights organization.
Maduro now seeks to take control of the National Assembly
by convening elections. In June 2020, the Supreme Court
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
ruled that because efforts to select a National Electoral
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
Council (CNE) had stalled in the National Assembly, it
exacerbating the effects of a decline in global oil prices and
would name new CNE rectors to oversee legislative
oil production on the country’s economy. Maduro has
elections. The Supreme Court then disbanded the leadership
rewarded allies, including the military, with income
of three major opposition parties, and the CNE scheduled
siphoned from state industries and from illegal gold mining,
elections for December 6, 2020. While Guaidó and 37
drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. The
opposition parties are boycotting due to concerns the
International Monetary Fund estimates the Venezuelan
elections would be neither free nor fair, Maduro has offered
economy contracted by 35% in 2019 and inflation reached
concessions, including dismissing charges against some
9,585%. Economic conditions have deteriorated further in
political opponents and an openness to international
2020 because of gasoline shortages, COVID-19, and
election observers, to entice Henrique Capriles and his
broadened U.S. sanctions.
allies to participate. Capriles wants the elections to be
postponed and observed by the European Union (EU)—
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
conditions that appear unlikely to occur.
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
humanitarian crisis. According to a 2019-2020 household
International Response
survey, the percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty
The international community remains divided over how to
increased to 96% in 2019 (80% in extreme poverty). A
respond to the crisis in Venezuela. The United States,
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Canada, most of the EU, and 16 Western Hemisphere
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
countries recognize Guaidó as interim president. The
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
United States, EU, Canada, and 11 Western Hemisphere
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
countries that are parties to the Inter-American Treaty of
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884).
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) have imposed targeted
sanctions and travel bans on Maduro officials. The EU and
Other U.S. Pressure. In March 2020, the Department of
most Western Hemisphere countries oppose military
Justice indicted Maduro and 14 top officials for narco-
intervention to oust Maduro. The EU and some Latin
terrorism, drug trafficking, and other crimes . The State
American countries endorsed 2019 negotiations led by
Department offered a $15 million reward for information
Norway, but those efforts did not prove successful.
leading to Maduro’s arrest. On April 1, President Trump
announced the deployment of additional U.S. naval
Russia, Cuba (which has provided military and intelligence
counterdrug assets to the Caribbean to curb drug trafficking
support), Turkey, Iran, and a few other countries support
emanating from Venezuela. Both actions target Maduro’s
Maduro. Russia and China have provided aid to Maduro
illicit revenue.
and blocked efforts at the U.N. Security Council to
recognize the Guaidó government. Russia has supported
U.S. Assistance. The United States is providing assistance
Venezuela’s struggling oil industry, helped Venezuela skirt
and helping to coordinate and support the regional response
U.S. oil sanctions, and sent military personnel and
to the Venezuelan migration crisis. Since FY2017, the
equipment, a move that prompted U.S. condemnation.
Administration has provided $610.6 million in
Since May 2020, Iran has shipped gasoline to Venezuela in
humanitarian assistance to support countries sheltering
violation of U.S. sanctions.
Venezuelans, including $76 million for humanitarian relief
activities in Venezuela and $13.7 million for COVID-19.
Recent U.S. Policy
Since FY2018, USAID has provided some $125 million for
The U.S. government ceased to recognize Maduro as
new democracy, development, and global health programs.
Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019. Although
the Administration initially discussed the possibility of
Congressional Action. Congress has supported most of the
using military force in Venezuela, to date, it has sought to
Trump Administration’s efforts to restore democracy in
compel Maduro to leave office through economic pressure.
Venezuela and provide humanitarian assistance. Some
In March 2020, the Administration issued a “democratic
Members have expressed concerns about the humanitarian
transition framework” backed by Guaidó. The framework
effects of sanctions and called for their suspension due to
would lift certain sanctions in exchange for Maduro
COVID-19. Others are concerned about a potential
releasing political prisoners, expelling foreign security
unauthorized use of the U.S. military in Venezuela.
forces, and creating a Council of State (which would not
include Maduro or Guaidó) to carry out presidential duties
In December 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, which
until elections can be held. In July, the United States and
provided $30 million in FY2020 assistance for democracy
many EU and Latin American countries pledged to support
programs in Venezuela. The act incorporated provisions
Guaidó regardless of the December election results.
from S. 1025, the VERDAD Act, authorizing $400 million
in FY2020 humanitarian aid, codifying some sanctions, and
Diplomacy. The United States has encouraged countries to
authorizing $17.5 million to support elections in Venezuela.
recognize the Guaidó government, sanction Maduro
P.L. 116-94 included language from House-approved bills
officials, hold the Maduro government responsible for
(H.R. 854, H.R. 920, and H.R. 1477). Congress also
human rights violations, and provide humanitarian aid to
enacted P.L. 116-92, which prohibits federal contracting
Venezuelans who have fled. U.S. officials continue to
with persons doing business with the Maduro government.
denounce Cuban, Russian, and Iranian support of Maduro.
In July 2019, the House passed H.R. 549, designating
Venezuela as a beneficiary country for temporary protected
Sanctions. Sanctions are key parts of U.S policy toward
status. On July 30, 2019, a Senate effort to pass H.R. 549
Venezuela. They include
by unanimous consent failed.
Individual sanctions for terrorism; drug trafficking;
The Administration requested $205 million for Venezuela
and those who have committed antidemocratic actions,
in its FY2021 budget request. The House-passed version of
human rights violations, or corruption (see Executive
the FY2021 foreign aid measure (H.R. 7608, H.Rept. 116-
Order (E.O.) 13692; P.L. 113-278; P.L. 114-194);
444) would provide $30 in democracy aid and support

additional aid if a democratic transition occurs. The House-
Financial sanctions restricting Maduro government and
passed version of the FY2021 National Defense
state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA),
Authorization Act (H.R. 6395, H.Rept. 116-442) would
access to U.S. financial markets (E.O. 13808);
require a report on the crises in Venezuela. (See also CRS
prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency (E.O.
Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S.
13827); or purchasing Venezuelan debt (E.O. 13835);
Relations; CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19; CRS In Focus
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions.)
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
other entities (E.O. 13850); and
Affairs
IF10230
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy


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