Updated September 15, 2021
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela, under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro,
failed negotiation efforts, Russia is accompanying the
remains in a deep economic and humanitarian crisis
Maduro team and the Netherlands is accompanying the
worsened by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
opposition. Most opposition parties also are fielding
pandemic. Maduro has consolidated power over all of
candidates in November’s state and local elections, even
Venezuela’s democratic institutions since his narrow 2013
though the elections are unlikely to be free or fair.
election following the death of President Hugo Chávez
(1999-2013). His United Socialist Party of Venezuela
Economic and Humanitarian Crisis
(PSUV) took de facto control of the National Assembly, the
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
last independent branch of government, in January 2021.
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
exacerbating the effects of a decline in oil prices and
Maduro has quashed dissent and resisted international
production on the country’s economy. In September 2021,
pressure to step down since his reelection in a May 2018
the Economist Intelligence Unit estimated Venezuela’s
presidential vote that was widely condemned as fraudulent.
economy has contracted by more than 77% since 2013. In
Meanwhile, international support for opposition leader Juan
2020, the economy shrank by 30%, according to the
Guaidó, the former National Assembly president once
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF predicts 3.8%
regarded as interim president by the United States and
growth for 2021, partially due to higher global oil prices.
nearly 60 other countries, has dissipated. The Biden
Administration and Congress have maintained pressure on
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
Maduro and support for Guaidó. U.S. policy could change,
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
however, if recently restarted negotiations between the
humanitarian crisis. According to a 2019-2020 household
opposition and Maduro officials bring meaningful progress
survey (the most recent available), the percentage of
toward democracy.
Venezuelans living in poverty increased to 96% in 2019. A
February 2020 World Food Program (WFP) assessment
Political Situation
estimated that 9 million Venezuelans were food insecure. In
Maduro has used security forces, buoyed by corrupt courts,
April 2021, Maduro allowed the WFP to launch a school
to quash dissent. His government has rewarded allies,
lunch program that aims to reach 1.5 million children.
particularly in the security forces, with income earned from
Health indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality
illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and other illicit
rates, have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases such
activities. Those forces have detained and abused Maduro’s
as diphtheria and measles have returned and spread.
opponents, including military officers, opposition
politicians, humanitarian actors, and civic leaders. As of
According to data from Johns Hopkins University (JHU),
September 13, 2021, the government held 261 political
Venezuela reported 4,200 deaths from COVID-19 (as of
prisoners, according to Foro Penal, a Venezuelan human
September 15, 2021), but experts maintain the actual
rights group. The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner
number is much higher. The pandemic has strained
for Human Rights has documented thousands of
Venezuela’s hollowed-out health system. JHU suggests that
extrajudicial killings and other abuses committed by
15% of Venezuelans were vaccinated as of mid-September.
security forces that it describes as crimes against humanity.
Venezuela has contracted to receive Russian and Cuban
vaccines and has received Chinese vaccines through the
The Venezuelan opposition has been weak and divided,
COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility.
with many of its leaders in exile. Guaidó challenged
Maduro’s authority in 2019; his support has since faded.
As of September 2021, U.N. agencies estimated 5.7 million
After Norway-led negotiations stalled in mid-2019, the
Venezuelans had left the country; some 28 million remain.
Maduro government increased persecution of Guaidó’s
Some 4.6 million migrants fled to other Latin American and
supporters. Guaidó and other opposition legislators face
Caribbean countries. Migrants have faced obstacles keeping
prosecution by judicial authorities, who assert the
jobs and accessing health care during the pandemic. In
legislators no longer have immunity because their terms
2021, Colombia began granting 10-year temporary
ended in January.
protective status to Venezuelan migrants.
In April 2021, Guaidó called on opposition parties, labor
International Response
and civic groups, and business leaders to form a Unity
The international community is divided on policies toward
Platform to negotiate with Maduro officials. The Unity
Venezuela, potentially hindering the effectiveness of efforts
Platform seeks better human rights, humanitarian, and
to restore democratic processes. The United States has
electoral conditions; Maduro’s team seeks sanctions relief
encouraged other countries to continue recognizing the
and international recognition. Mediated by Norway, the
Guaidó government, sanction Maduro officials, hold the
negotiations began in Mexico in September. Unlike in past
Maduro government responsible for human rights
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
violations, and provide humanitarian aid to Venezuelans.
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
The United States, European Union (EU), Canada, and 11
other entities (E.O. 13850)
Western Hemisphere countries that are parties to the Inter-
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance have imposed
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
targeted sanctions and travel bans on Maduro officials. The
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
United Kingdom and some Western Hemisphere countries
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884)
still recognize Guaidó as interim president, although EU
countries have not recognized him as such since January
In March 2020, the Department of Justice indicted Maduro
2021. The EU and Canada have issued joint statements with
and 14 top officials for narco-terrorism, drug trafficking,
the United States pledging to review sanctions policies if
and other crimes.
negotiations yield “enduring agreements” to improve
conditions for the Venezuelan people.
U.S. Assistance. The United States is providing assistance
and helping to coordinate the regional response to the
Other countries, including China, Russia, Cuba, Turkey,
Venezuelan migration crisis. From FY2017 through the
and Iran, support Maduro. Russia and China have blocked
third quarter of FY2021, the United States had provided
anti-Maduro initiatives at the U.N. Security Council. Russia
some $1.4 billion of humanitarian aid to Venezuela and
also has supported Venezuela’s oil industry, helped
countries sheltering Venezuelans. The United States has
Venezuela skirt U.S. sanctions, and sent military personnel
provided at least $13.7 million for the COVID-19 response
and equipment to the country. China continues to purchase
in Venezuela. From FY2017 to FY2021, U.S. funds
Venezuelan oil and has provided surveillance equipment
dedicated to democracy, development, and health programs,
and other technology. Since May 2020, Iran has shipped
which are implemented by nongovernmental organizations
gasoline to Venezuela in exchange for gold.
in Venezuela, have totaled an estimated $234 million.
Recent U.S. Policy
Congressional Action. Congress has supported U.S. efforts
The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as
to promote a return to democracy in Venezuela without the
Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019. The
use of military force and to provide humanitarian assistance
Trump Administration discussed using military force in
to Venezuelans. Some Members have expressed concerns
Venezuela but ultimately sought to compel Maduro to leave
about the humanitarian impact of broad U.S. sanctions.
office through diplomatic, economic, and legal pressure.
U.S. efforts have failed to dislodge Maduro, raising
The 117th Congress has continued close oversight of U.S.
questions for the Biden Administration about whether to
policy toward Venezuela through hearings, legislation, and
change U.S. policy.
letters to the Administration. In March 2021, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee reported S.Res. 44, which
Thus far, the Biden Administration has sought to support
would denounce fraudulent legislative elections in
the Venezuelan people while engaging in multilateral
Venezuela. Also in March, the Senate Homeland Security
diplomacy to press for a return to democracy and hold
and Governmental Affairs Committee reported S. 688,
corrupt and abusive Maduro officials accountable. As part
which would prohibit contracting with persons who have
of its efforts to support the Venezuelan people, on March 8,
business operations with the Maduro government. In July,
2021, the Biden Administration designated Venezuela as a
the House passed its version of the FY2022 foreign aid
beneficiary country for Temporary Protected Status (TPS);
appropriations bill, H.R. 4373, which would provide $50
the Trump Administration had ended removals of
million for democracy programs in Venezuela (up from $33
Venezuelans eligible for Deferred Enforced Departure in
million in FY2021) and would ensure humanitarian
January 2021. Biden officials are reviewing U.S. sanctions
assistance to countries hosting Venezuelan migrants.
as they relate to both Maduro-opposition negotiations and
humanitarian conditions in Venezuela.
Oversight has focused on the Biden Administration’s
approach to sanctions, negotiations, and humanitarian relief
Sanctions and Indictments. Sanctions are key parts of
for the Venezuelan people. Many Members of Congress
U.S. policy toward Venezuela. They include the following:
praised the March 2021 designation of TPS for Venezuela.
Although some in Congress support continued pressure on
Individual sanctions for terrorism; drug trafficking;
the Maduro government, others favor a more targeted
and those who have committed antidemocratic actions,
approach, arguing that broad sanctions have not prompted
human rights violations, or corruption (see Executive
political change but have hurt the Venezuelan people. Some
Order [E.O.] 13692; P.L. 113-278; P.L. 114-194)
Members have advocated for an end to any sanctions that
Financial sanctions restricting access to U.S. financial
have worsened the humanitarian crisis, whereas others have
markets by the Maduro government and state oil
called for more targeted sanctions relief.
company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA) (E.O.
13808); prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency
See also CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and
issued by the Maduro government (E.O. 13827); and
U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela
prohibiting the purchase of Venezuelan debt (E.O.
Regional Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19; CRS In
13835)
Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions;
and CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela: International
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis.
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
IF10230
Disclaimer
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