Updated December 2, 2022
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela, under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro,
unclear whether Maduro will make significant concessions
remains in a deep economic and humanitarian crisis.
without significant U.S. sanctions relief.
Maduro has consolidated power over all of Venezuela’s
institutions since his 2013 election after the death of
Economic and Humanitarian Crisis
President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). Maduro’s United
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) took control of the
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
National Assembly after flawed parliamentary elections in
exacerbating the effects of a decline in oil production.
December 2020; the PSUV and allies also won 19 of 23
Between 2014 and 2021, Venezuela’s economy contracted
gubernatorial races in November 2021 state-level elections.
by 80%, according to estimates by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). According to a February 2021
Maduro has quashed dissent and resisted U.S. and
Government Accountability Office report, sanctions
international pressure to step down since his reelection in a
imposed by the United States in response to Maduro’s
2018 presidential vote widely deemed fraudulent. Domestic
authoritarian actions, particularly sanctions targeting
and international support for opposition leader Juan Guaidó,
Venezuela’s oil industry, contributed to the economic crisis.
the former National Assembly president once regarded as
Since 2021, hyperinflation has abated and higher oil prices
interim president by nearly 60 other countries, has
driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appear to be driving
dissipated. Opposition parties, organized since 2021 under a
a nascent economic recovery.
Unitary Platform that includes Guaidó’s party among many
others, resumed negotiations with Maduro officials in
Well before the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
November 2022 to create better conditions for presidential
pandemic, Venezuelans were facing a lack of food,
elections due in 2024. The Biden Administration and other
medicine, health care, and access to social services. In
donors have offered limited sanctions relief to the Maduro
2022, an estimated 7.7 million Venezuelans required
government if those negotiations lead to improved
humanitarian assistance, according to the U.S. Agency for
humanitarian conditions and political and human rights.
International Development. Food insecurity remains a
challenge, mainly due to the price of food rather than a lack
Political Situation
of availability. Many households do not have reliable
Maduro has used security forces, buoyed by corrupt courts,
access to potable water, and interruptions in electrical
to quash dissent. His government has rewarded allies,
service and gas supplies are common. With a collapsed
particularly in the security forces, by allowing them to earn
health system, overall health indicators, particularly infant
income from illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and other
and maternal mortality rates, have worsened. Previously
illicit activities. Those forces have detained and abused
eradicated diseases such as diphtheria and measles also
Maduro’s opponents, including military officers, opposition
have become a major concern, along with COVID-19.
politicians, and civic leaders. As of November 22, 2022, the
government had imprisoned 268 political prisoners,
As of November 2022, U.N. agencies estimated that more
according to Foro Penal, a Venezuelan human rights group.
than 7.1 million Venezuelans had left the country (with
The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
26.9 million remaining). Some 6 million of these migrants
Rights has documented, and the International Criminal
fled to other Latin American and Caribbean countries, but a
Court is investigating, extrajudicial killings and other grave
record 187,700 arrived at the U.S. border in FY2022.
crimes committed by Venezuela’s security forces.
Migrants have faced obstacles keeping jobs and accessing
health care; they are vulnerable to human trafficking and
The Venezuelan opposition has been weak and divided,
other abuses. In 2021, Colombia and Peru began granting
with many of its leaders in exile. Guaidó challenged
temporary protected status to Venezuelans.
Maduro’s authority in 2019, but Guaidó’s support has since
faded. After Norway-led negotiations stalled in mid-2019,
International Response
the Maduro government persecuted Guaidó’s supporters. In
The international community, once divided on policies
April 2021, Guaidó called on opposition parties and civil
toward Venezuela, has coalesced behind support for
society to form a Unity Platform. In late November 2022,
Maduro-opposition negotiations.
the Unity Platform announced the resumption of Norway-
mediated talks with Maduro officials that had been
In 2019, the United States, European Union (EU), Canada,
suspended since October 2021. The two sides also
and most Western Hemisphere countries recognized Juan
announced an agreement to establish a $3 billion U.N.-
Guaidó as interim president. They exerted economic and
administered fund for humanitarian programs supported, in
diplomatic pressure on Maduro to leave office. Other
part, by Venezuelan assets frozen abroad. The Biden
countries, including China, Russia, Cuba, Turkey, and Iran,
Administration issued a new license for Chevron to begin
have supported the Maduro government. Russia has
limited operations in Venezuela after talks resumed. It is
supported the oil industry in Venezuela, helped Venezuela
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
skirt U.S. sanctions, and sent military personnel and
In March 2020, the Department of Justice indicted Maduro
equipment to the country. China has continued to purchase
and 14 top officials for narco-terrorism, drug trafficking,
Venezuelan oil and provided Maduro surveillance
and other crimes. U.S. agencies have worked with partner
equipment and technology. Turkey has purchased
countries to combat drug trafficking, money laundering,
Venezuela’s illegally mined gold. Since May 2020, Iran has
and illicit mining in Venezuela. In December 2021, the
shipped gasoline to Venezuela in exchange for gold,
Treasury Department designated two Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident groups that operate
As sanctions and diplomatic isolation have failed to
in Venezuela as foreign terrorist organizations.
dislodge Maduro and as domestic support for Guaidó has
waned, most countries, save the United States and the
U.S. Assistance. The United States has been providing
United Kingdom (UK), no longer recognize the Guaidó
assistance and helping coordinate the regional response to
government. The EU, Canada, the UK, and the United
the Venezuelan migration crisis. From FY2017 to FY2022,
States have issued joint statements, including most recently
the United States provided $1.94 billion in humanitarian aid
in November 2022, pledging to review sanctions if restarted
to Venezuela and countries sheltering Venezuelans. U.S.
negotiations yield improved conditions for the Venezuelan
democracy, development, and health support for the
people. Colombia, long a staunch Guaidó supporter, has
Venezuela crisis totaled $323 million through FY2021 (the
restored diplomatic relations with the Maduro government,
last year complete figures are available).
as have most neighboring countries. Most of Venezuela’s
neighbors now back a negotiated solution to the crisis.
Congressional Action. In March 2022, Congress enacted
the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-
U.S. Policy
103), which includes $40 million for democracy programs
The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as
in Venezuela ($7 million more than the FY2021 allocation).
Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019. The
The act directs U.S. agencies to continue providing support
Trump Administration discussed using military force in
to other countries hosting Venezuelans. The explanatory
Venezuela but ultimately sought to compel Maduro to leave
statement directs USAID to address violence against
office through diplomatic, economic, and legal pressure.
Venezuelan women and child migrants and requires a report
The Biden Administration has maintained most sanctions,
on how the U.S. government can repatriate illegally stolen
but U.S. officials also met with Maduro twice in 2022,
assets to the people of Venezuela.
negotiated an October 2022 U.S.-Venezuela prisoner swap,
and issued a license in late November to allow Chevron to
Congress is considering the Administration’s FY2023
restart some operations in the country.
request of $55 million for Venezuela. The FY2023 State
and Foreign Operations appropriations bill reported by the
In July 2022, the Administration announced an 18-month
House Appropriations Committee (H.R. 8282) would
extension of the temporary protected status for Venezuelans
provide $50 million in funds for Venezuela, including
announced in March 2021. U.S. officials began new
democracy funding. The Senate-introduced version, S.
policies in October 2022 aimed at addressing a significant
4662, would provide $40 million.
rise in apprehensions of Venezuelans at the Southwest
border. (See CRS Insight IN12040, New Immigration
Oversight has focused on the Administration’s approach to
Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants).Those policies
sanctions and negotiations. While some in Congress support
could change, however, due to ongoing legal challenges.
continued pressure on the Maduro government, others
assert that broad sanctions have hurt the Venezuelan
Sanctions and Indictments. Sanctions are key parts of
people. Whereas some Members of Congress expressed
U.S. policy toward Venezuela. They include the following:
support for U.S. talks with Maduro, others opposed those
talks and introduced legislation that would prohibit U.S.
Individual sanctions for terrorism, drug trafficking,
imports of Venezuelan oil (H.R. 6942, H.R. 7012, H.R.
antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, or
7023, H.R. 7207, S. 3798). Among other bills, H.R. 6539
corruption (see Executive Order [E.O.] 13692; P.L. 113-
and S. 688 (reported by the Senate Homeland Security and
278; P.L. 114-194)
Governmental Affairs Committee in March 2021) would
Financial sanctions restricting access to U.S. financial
prohibit contracting with persons who do business with the
markets by the Maduro government and state oil
Maduro regime. H.R. 6539 and S. 1417 would establish a
company PdVSA (E.O. 13808); prohibiting transactions
fund to help repatriate frozen Venezuelan assets in the
using cryptocurrency issued by the Maduro government
United States to the Venezuelan people.
(E.O. 13827); and prohibiting the purchase of
Venezuelan debt (E.O. 13835)
See also CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
U.S. Sanctions; CRS Report R44841, Venezuela:
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
Background and U.S. Relations; and CRS In Focus
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Humanitarian Crisis and
other entities (E.O. 13850)
COVID-19.
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
Affairs
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884).
IF10230
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 55 · UPDATED