Contents

• Introduction
• Background: The "Jasmine Revolution" and Tunisia Prior to 2011
• Politics: A 2019 Electoral Reset?
• Terrorism Threats
• The Economy
• U.S. Policy and Aid

Summary

As of March 15, 2020, Tunisia had initiated travel restrictions and other emergency measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, having reported at least 20 confirmed domestic cases.

Tunisia remains the sole country to have made a durable transition to democracy as a result of the 2011 "Arab Spring." An elected assembly adopted a new constitution in 2014 and Tunisians have since held two competitive national elections—most recently in late 2019—resulting in peaceful transfers of power. Tunisia has also taken steps toward empowering local-level government, with landmark local elections held in 2018. Yet the economy has suffered due to domestic, regional, and global factors, driving public dissatisfaction with political leaders. High unemployment and inflation, unpopular fiscal austerity measures, and concerns about corruption have spurred protests, labor unrest, and a backlash against mainstream politicians in recent years.

Voters in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections largely rejected established parties and candidates in favor of independents and non-career politicians. The results unsettled Tunisia's previous political alliances and may have implications for the future contours of its foreign relations and economic policies. Newly elected President Kais Saïed, who ran as an independent, is a constitutional scholar known for his socially conservative views and critique of Tunisia's post-2011 political system. The self-described "Muslim democrat" party Al Nahda secured a slim plurality in parliament, but it has lost seats in each successive election since 2011. After protracted negotiations, a technocrat designated by President Saïed, Elyes Fakhfakh, secured parliamentary backing for a coalition government in late February 2020.

The Trump Administration has pledged to support Tunisia's security and economic reforms, while also proposing to decrease annual bilateral aid appropriations. Congress, which has not adopted such reductions to date, has shaped U.S. relations with Tunisia through legislation, oversight, and direct engagement with Tunisian leaders. The Administration's FY2021 aid budget proposal included $83.9 million in bilateral economic and security assistance for Tunisia, less than half of what Congress appropriated for Tunisia under the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020—which was which "not less than" $191.4 million (P.L. 116-94, §7041j of Division G). In addition, in the FY2020 measure, Congress directed "not less than" $50 million in prior-year Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriations for Tunisia. Congress has also made aid funds available for Tunisia under the State Department Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) and the Department of Defense (DOD) Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, and has authorized DOD to aid Tunisia's military in securing the border with Libya on a reimbursement basis. Tunisia has also been a top cumulative recipient within Africa of DOD "global train and equip" counterterrorism assistance (currently authorized under 10 U.S.C. §333).

Tunisia has expanded its acquisitions of U.S. defense materiel in recent years in order to maintain its U.S.-origin stocks and expand its counterterrorism capacity. The State Department has licensed the sale of Wolverine light attack aircraft with bombs and other supporting equipment, along with Black Hawk helicopters, and additional planned grant-based equipment transfers through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program including Kiowa helicopters and C-130 aircraft. (Tunisia's Major Non-NATO Ally status, granted by President Obama in 2015, provides priority access to EDA.) U.S. advisors have reportedly aided some Tunisian counterterrorism operations.

The U.S. Embassy in Tunis also hosts the U.S. Libya External Office, through which U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya. See CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

Introduction

Tunisia's 2011 popular uprising, known as the "Jasmine Revolution," ended the 23-year authoritarian rule of then-President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and sparked a wave of unrest across the Arab world. Tunisians elected a National Constituent Assembly later that year, after which Islamist and secularist political parties formed a transitional coalition government. In 2013, coalition leaders negotiated a peaceful way out of a political crisis sparked by the assassinations of two secularist leftist politicians by Islamist extremists. A quartet of local civil society groups who mediated the negotiations later won the Nobel Peace Prize for their role in this feat. The Assembly finalized and adopted a new constitution in 2014, and presidential and parliamentary elections later that year ended the formal transition period. Civil and political liberties have expanded dramatically since 2011, and Tunisia has experienced far less violence than other transitional countries in the region. (See Appendix for a chronology of key events since 2011.)

Socioeconomic grievances that helped fuel the 2011 uprising have yet to be addressed, however, while domestic, regional, and global challenges have placed new strains on Tunisia's economy. Growth has been anemic since contracting in 2011, unemployment is above 15%, inflation rose above 7% in 2018, and public debt rose to 77% of GDP (Figure 1).⁴ Fiscal austerity measures adopted at the urging of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western donors have sparked protests and a backlash by trade unions, a powerful domestic constituency. The Ben Ali family no longer monopolizes business opportunities, but many Tunisians perceive corruption to have flourished as new players have joined the political class.⁵

Between 2014 and 2018, a "consensus" political alliance among rival Islamist and secularist leaders helped quiet conflicts over identity and social mores, but arguably this came at the expense of ideological coherence or accountability to voters. Declining living standards, political power struggles, unpopular policy compromises, and perceived corruption apparently eroded support for those who led the government during this period. Authorities did, however, complete an orderly succession after the death in office of President Béji Caïd Essebsi in July 2019.

In general elections held in September and October 2019, newcomers and independents outperformed many established politicians, reflecting surging voter discontent and shaking up past political alliances. Protracted negotiations delayed the formation of a coalition government until late February, narrowly averting new parliamentary elections, but the coalition's stability is uncertain (see "Politics: A 2019 Electoral Reset?" below). International observers generally praised the 2019 election process as transparent and well-administered, while raising concerns about the timing and apparent political selectivity behind a leading presidential candidate's imprisonment (discussed below).⁶ Domestic observer groups reported some minor procedural irregularities, along with some violations of regulations regarding campaign finance and campaign activities.⁷

Figure 1. Tunisia at a Glance

Population: 11.7 million; Urban: 69% of total Religions: Muslim (official; Sunni) 99.1%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha'i) 1% Ethnicities: Arab 98%, European 1%, Jewish/other 1% Median Age: 32.7 years Life Expectancy: 76.3 years Literacy: 82%; male 90% / female 74% (2015 est.) GDP Growth / Per Capita: 1.5% / $3,287 (2019 est.) Unemployment: 15.5%; ages 15-24, 34.7% (2017; 2013)

Government Gross Debt (%GDP): 74.4% (2019) Key Exports: clothing, semi-finished goods and textiles, agricultural products, mechanical goods, phosphates and chemicals, hydrocarbons, electrical equipment Key Imports: textiles, machinery and equipment, hydrocarbons, chemicals, foodstuffs Top Trade Partners: France, Italy, Germany, China, Turkey, Algeria, Spain (2017)

Sources: CRS graphic; map boundaries from Esri (2013). Figures from CIA World Factbook, World Bank, IMF (World Economic Outlook database, October 2019, and staff report, July 2019); 2020 estimates unless noted.

In March 2020, the suicide bombing of a guard post near the U.S. Embassy in Tunis killed a local police officer and underscored enduring terrorist threats, despite general security gains since a string of large attacks in 2015-2016. In June 2019, twin suicide bombings targeted police posts in Tunis. Militant groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State remain active in border areas, and the return of Tunisian "foreign fighters" from Iraq, Syria, and Libya poses concerns.

It remains to be seen whether Tunisia's new leaders will be able to meet public demands to create jobs, improve living standards, counter corruption, ensure security, and advance accountability for abuses committed under the former regime. Turbulent events in neighboring Algeria and Libya may create additional headwinds for Tunisia's stability and economic prosperity.

Background: The "Jasmine Revolution" and Tunisia Prior to 2011

Prior to 2011, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable and authoritarian regime that focused on economic growth while staving off political liberalization. It had only two leaders since independence from France in 1956: Habib Bourguiba, a secular nationalist and independence activist, and Ben Ali, a former interior minister and prime minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. The country's pre-2011 economic model has since come under greater scrutiny; for example, the World Bank documented in 2014 that government regulations had apparently been manipulated to favor firms closely tied to the Ben Ali family.⁸

Ben Ali cultivated the internal security services and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party as his power base, and harshly repressed political participation, freedom of expression, and religious activism. This repression, along with corruption and nepotism, undermined the regime's popular legitimacy, despite relatively effective state services and economic growth. Another factor driving popular dissatisfaction was the enduring socioeconomic divide between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the poorer interior. Anti-government unrest rooted in labor and economic grievances has often originated in the interior—as it did in 2011.

Politics: A 2019 Electoral Reset?

Context. Between 2014 and 2019, two parties dominated Tunisian politics: Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda, "Renaissance"), a self-described "Muslim Democrat" party that has historically been viewed as moderate Islamist, and Nidaa Tounes ("Tunisia's Call"), a big-tent secularist party founded in 2012 in opposition to Al Nahda. Despite being rivals, the two parties agreed to share power in a series of coalition governments, an arrangement they referred to as "consensus" politics.¹⁰ The consensus coalition oversaw landmark local elections in 2018 and the adoption of a new law against gender-based violence in 2017.

The coalition did not, however, manage to respond effectively to public demands for job creation, investment in relatively impoverished interior regions, or improved living standards. A 2017 law granting amnesty for officials implicated in corruption under the former regime sparked public controversy,¹¹ as did a decision to disband Tunisia's post-2011 Truth and Dignity commission before its scheduled completion. (The commission's final report, issued in March 2019, may still be considered a landmark.) Partisan disagreements prevented the establishment of a constitutional court, one of several new institutions to be created under the 2014 constitution.

Election Results. In the 2019 general elections, newcomers and independents outperformed many established politicians. Newly elected President Kais Saïed, who ran as an independent, is a professor of constitutional law who is new to electoral politics (see text box below). President Saïed's landslide victory (73%) in the October 13 run-off vote against rival Nabil Karoui—a secularist media mogul and self-styled populist who spent most of the campaign period in jail on money laundering charges¹²—arguably provides him with a strong popular mandate and legitimacy, although many of his policy preferences remain to be publicly defined. The results apparently reflected "a groundswell of support from young voters."¹³ Enthusiasm was further reflected in turnout for the run-off—which, at 55% of registered voters, was over six percentage points higher than in the first round vote featuring 24 candidates—and in seemingly spontaneous public street-cleaning initiatives to express support after he won.¹⁴

Al Nahda secured a slim plurality in parliament (Figure 2 below), outperforming other established parties as well as newer ones.¹⁶ The party has lost seats in each election since 2011, however, and saw a wave of senior defections in early 2020—unusual for a movement that has generally prided itself on its internal democracy and discipline. The party's presidential nominee (its first ever) came in third in the first round, failing to qualify for a run-off vote. Party leader Rached Ghannouchi nevertheless won a seat in parliament (representing part of Tunis), and was elected Speaker. A large number of independents and small parties won one to two seats each in parliament, rendering coalition-building challenging.

Figure 2. Parliamentary Election Results: 2019 displayed left to right from most to fewest seats won per party/coalition/independent list

Source: CRS graphic, based on data released by Tunisia's High Independent Authority for Elections (ISIE, after its French acronym) on November 8, 2019. Note: Proportions are subject to shift over time, as under Tunisia's parliamentary rules, individual members of parliament can change party affiliation without losing their seats.

After the October 2019 legislative elections, Al Nahda tried but failed to form a government capable of garnering majority support in parliament.¹⁷ At that point, per his constitutional prerogatives, President Saïed designated Elyes Fakhfakh—a former finance minister generally viewed as a technocrat—to form a government. In late February 2020, Fakhfakh won a thin majority vote in parliament in support of a coalition comprising Al Nahda, the leftist party Harakat al Chaab, the social-democratic party Tayar al Dimuqrati, and the secularist centrist party Tahya Tounes (see Figure 2 above). The vote of confidence narrowly averted new parliamentary elections, were constitutional deadlines for government formation not met. Several cabinet members are relative unknowns, and the coalition's legitimacy and potential stability are subjects of debate.¹⁸ Fakhfakh himself won less than 1% of the vote as a candidate for president in 2019; his party, center-left Ettakatol, holds no seats in parliament.

Presidential runner-up Nabil Karoui's party, Qalb Tounes ("Heart of Tunisia") won the second-largest bloc in parliament with 38 seats, despite having been founded only months earlier. As of late February, Qalb Tounes was poised to lead the opposition bloc in parliament, although its internal discipline and ability to marshal other parties' support are in doubt. Also in parliamentary opposition are the religiously conservative and nationalist Karama ("Dignity") coalition, with 21 seats (although Karama endorsed Saïed during the presidential contest), and the arch-secularist Free Destourian ("Constitutional") Party (or PDL after its French acronym), with 17 seats. The PDL is headed by a former senior figure in Ben Ali's party, Abir Moussi, who has decried the 2011 uprising and subsequent political changes as a foreign plot.

Analysis. Voters' rejection of top political figures in the 2019 elections may reflect economic frustrations, anger at perceived corruption, local-level influences, and/or disenchantment with a series of ideologically incoherent coalition governments.¹⁹ The fracturing of Nidaa Tounes after its 2014 election victory, and the death of President Caïd Essebsi, also reshaped the political landscape. The results of the 2018 local elections, which were a key step toward political decentralization and thus a centerpiece of post-2014 political reforms, hinted at similar public disenchantment.²⁰ The 2019 parliamentary results confirmed the electoral demise of Nidaa Tounes, which won three parliamentary seats in 2019 compared to 86 in 2014.²¹ Some Nidaa Tounes supporters may have migrated to Qalb Tounes, as Karoui was at one time close to Caïd Essebsi and previously, to the Ben Ali regime.

In contrast to Nidaa Tounes, Al Nahda has historically exhibited strong internal discipline and wielded its political power cautiously, mindful of past repression (it was banned in the 1980s and many of its leading figures were jailed in the 1990s) and of the recent anti-Islamist backlash elsewhere in the region, such as Egypt. Perhaps because it feared isolation under a Karoui or Moussi presidency, the party ran a presidential candidate in 2019 for the first time (albeit unsuccessfully), and party leader Ghannouchi ran for the first time for national elected office.

The apparent dwindling of voter support and senior defections early 2020 suggest future challenges for Al Nahda, however. Its future leadership is in question, as Ghannouchi reportedly intends to step down from heading the party in 2020.²² Al Nahda's past alliances with secularist parties appear to have weakened its image as an incorruptible opposition force, and forced policy compromises that were ideologically unpopular with its base.²³ After the presidential first-round vote, Ghannouchi pledged that the party would seek to lead the government if it won and would only join a coalition with "the forces of the revolution" in parliament—presumably excluding Karoui. The announcement seemed to reflect an acknowledgement that "consensus" politics and Al Nahda's alliance with Nidaa Tounes (which included Ben Ali regime figures in its ranks) had damaged Al Nahda's relationship with its base. Al Nahda ultimately relied on support from Qalb Tounes for Ghannouchi's election as speaker, however, and later called for Qalb Tounes to be included in the ruling coalition under Fakhfakh, before ultimately reversing itself again.²⁴

Outlook. Tunisia's 2014 constitution divides executive powers between the president and prime minister.²⁵ Even with the recent vote of confidence, Prime Minister Fakhfakh will have to manage divisions in a fragmented legislature. His coalition may also face internal pressures due to ideological differences and/or maneuvering in anticipation of snap elections, should the coalition fracture. Al Nahda endorsed President Saïed in the run-off against Karoui, and the two may share views on certain social issues. The president and the leading party in parliament have yet to define their working relationship or formally identify joint priorities, however. What President Saïed's advocacy of significant constitutional changes will mean in practice is also in question.

Terrorism Threats

Domestic Islamist armed groups have emerged since 2011, along with threats from groups and individuals based in Libya, Mali, and Algeria. U.S. and Tunisian officials notably blamed a Tunisian-led Islamist extremist group known as Ansar al Sharia (AST) for an attack against the U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis in 2012.³² Armed Islamist cells are active in Tunisia's border areas, some of which have asserted affiliation with Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS, alt. ISIS/ISIL).

In 2015, terrorist attacks at the Bardo Museum in Tunis and the coastal city of Sousse killed dozens of foreign tourists, rattled Tunisians, and dealt an economic blow to the vital tourism industry. They were the largest attacks in Tunisia since an Al Qaeda bombing of a synagogue on the island of Djerba in 2002. In early 2016, Tunisian security forces and local inhabitants put down a militant assault on the border town of Ben Guerdane (located at the border with Libya) that prompted fears of a nascent IS-linked insurgency.³³ The 2015-2016 attacks were reportedly planned from Libya; a U.S. military strike on the Libyan town of Sabratha killed a number of Tunisian fighters in February 2016.³⁴

Internal security conditions appear broadly to have improved since then, notwithstanding the aforementioned attack near the U.S. Embassy in Tunis in March 2020 (see "Introduction") and near-simultaneous suicide bombings targeting two police posts in Tunis in June 2019, which the Islamic State claimed.³⁵ The State Department reported as of November 2019 that counterterrorism was a government priority for Tunisia, and that "Tunisia cooperated with the United States and other international partners to professionalize its security apparatus."³⁶

Turmoil in neighboring Libya, ongoing militant activity in border regions, and the return of Tunisian Islamist foreign fighters from Syria, Iraq, and Libya nonetheless continue to pose challenges. Authorities have repeatedly extended a state of emergency granting the security forces authority to prohibit strikes and public meetings, although many such activities have proceeded without impediment. The State Department warns U.S. citizens to avoid travel to parts of southern, western, and central Tunisia, citing terrorist threats.³⁷ Tunisia's southernmost desert area is a military zone, where foreign travel is officially restricted.

In early 2019, the head of Tunisia's National Counterterrorism Commission told members of parliament that 1,000 Tunisian foreign fighters had returned to the country between 2011 and 2018, and that authorities had prevented at least 17,000 others specifically from leaving the country for combat zones abroad.³⁸ Tunisia was a top global source of Islamist foreign fighters at the height of the Islamic State's territorial influence (2014-2015), with U.N. investigators reporting in 2015 that an estimated 4,000 Tunisians were fighting in Syria, plus as many as 1,500 in Libya, 200 in Iraq, 60 in Mali, and 50 in Yemen.³⁹ Several terrorist attacks in Europe have also been carried out by individuals of Tunisian descent. Youth marginalization and the release of terrorism suspects under a general amnesty in early 2011 may partly explain Tunisia's high number of foreign fighters—as well as the emergence of domestic Islamist extremist networks.⁴⁰ Perceptions among some Tunisian youth that despite political changes since 2011, state institutions and personnel remain corrupt, unresponsive, and/or abusive, may also be a driver.⁴¹

The Economy

Tunisia's economy has struggled since 2011, amid domestic political tensions, the war in Libya (previously a source of employment for many Tunisians), and continuing strains in Europe, its largest trade partner. Investor perceptions of political risk, terrorism threats, and labor unrest have challenged efforts to promote private sector growth, alleviate unemployment, and address the structural factors—such as corruption and inequalities—that fed discontent during the Ben Ali era. Wealth broadly remains concentrated along the urban and tourist-friendly coast, while the interior suffers from relative poverty and a lack of investment. Many Tunisians are highly educated, but the economy has generally created low-skilled and low-paid jobs, fueling unemployment and under-employment.

Textile exports, tourism, agriculture, and phosphate mining are key economic sectors. Tunisia also produces some petroleum, but is a net energy-importer. Economic growth was estimated at 2.5% in 2018, the highest rate since 2014, due to positive trends in tourism, agriculture, and phosphate production.⁴² Growth was expected to fall to 1.5% in 2019, however. The impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic on Tunisia's tourism sector and broader economy remains to be seen. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has expressed particular concerns about inflation, declining foreign exchange reserves, and vulnerability to spikes in global energy prices.⁴³

Tunisia has historically had a large middle class by regional standards, but economic challenges since 2011—and arguably, some fiscal austerity measures undertaken by the government in recent years at the urging of donors—have negatively impacted its size and purchasing power. Per-capita GDP has fallen (in nominal terms) every year since 2014, dipping below the upper middle-income threshold of $4,036 in 2015 and remaining below it since.⁴⁴ Unemployment, while below its peak of 18.9% in the wake of the uprising in 2011, remains over 15% and is more than double that among young people.⁴⁵ Although the transitional government oversaw the seizure and resale of assets controlled by individual Ben Ali family members, new corruption has apparently flourished, undermining public faith in institutions and further entrenching regional divisions.⁴⁶

Tunisia has participated in two IMF lending programs since the 2011 transition. Under the second, a $2.9 billion program initiated in 2016 and set to conclude in 2020, the government committed to take politically challenging steps to cut energy subsidies, public sector wages ("among the highest in the world as a share of GDP," per the IMF), and state pensions. Some policies undertaken as a result have faced opposition from powerful domestic constituencies, including labor unions and monopolistic business interests. For instance, Tunisia's powerful national trade union federation, the UGTT, decried efforts to end state subsidies for fuel and other consumer commodities in 2018, asserting that "rising prices will only accentuate the social and economic crisis."⁴⁷ Critics further allege that the devaluation of the dinar—urged by the IMF—has devastated households' purchasing power.⁴⁸ In 2017, the IMF temporarily suspended loan disbursements over concerns that Tunisia was not making sufficient progress. In mid-2019, the Fund agreed to disburse a $245 million tranche of financing, while noting that the government had not yet met its fiscal commitments.⁴⁹ Tunisian transparency advocates have called for economic reforms to focus less on austerity and more on countering high-level corruption.⁵⁰

U.S. Policy and Aid

U.S. diplomatic and military engagement have expanded significantly since 2011, and Congress has appropriated increased foreign aid and authorized new defense cooperation. Between FY2007 and FY2011, U.S. bilateral aid appropriations for Tunisia averaged about $17 million per year⁵¹; over the last five fiscal years, they have averaged over $179 million (Table 1, below). Substantial regionally and centrally allocated foreign assistance and security cooperation funding has also been provided to Tunisia. In 2018, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan affirmed that the United States "will continue to support Tunisia's efforts to improve security and modernize its economy."⁵² At the same time, the Trump Administration has repeatedly proposed to cut U.S. bilateral aid, in line with its global foreign aid proposals. Congress has not adopted the Administration's budget proposals for Tunisia to date.

For FY2021, the Administration proposed $83.9 million in bilateral State- and USAID-administered aid appropriations for Tunisia, less than half of FY2019 and FY2020 enacted levels. The FY2020 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (Division G of P.L. 116-94) directed $50 million in prior-year Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriations for Tunisia; the equivalent FY2019 measure (Division F, P.L. 116-6) directed $50 million in prior-year RRF appropriations for Tunisia.

The FY2020 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (Division A of P.L. 116-93 ) made funds appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD) Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) available to support Tunisia's border security, as in prior years. Congress also has authorized DOD to support Tunisia's military in securing the border with Libya on a reimbursement basis through CY2021 under the FY2019 national defense authorization act (§1213 of P.L. 115-232).

In mid-2019, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) elevated its presence to a full bilateral Mission. USAID and the government of Tunisia subsequently signed a five-year "Development Objective Agreement" under which USAID pledged to provide up to $352 million over the next five years.⁵³ Tunisia also is under consideration for a U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) multi-year development aid compact, possibly to be signed in 2020.⁵⁴

U.S. economic aid since 2011 has supported fiscal stabilization,⁵⁵ economic growth initiatives, good governance and political decentralization programs, civil society capacity building, and efforts to counter violent extremism. Congress appropriated $100 million between FY2012 and FY2018 to endow a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund, with a mandate to invest in small- and medium-sized enterprises, and also appropriated funds for three U.S. loan guarantees that have allowed Tunisia to access up to $1.5 billion in financing from international capital markets.⁵⁶

Bilateral State Department-administered military and police assistance has supported tactical capabilities as well as institutional reforms. Tunisia has also received State Department-administered security and stabilization assistance under global and regional programs, including the Counter-Terrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) and the Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF)—intended for assistance to areas "liberated or at risk from" the Islamic State—for Tunisia. Tunisia also participates in the State Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and was a focus country of the 2014-2017 interagency Security Governance Initiative.

Tunisia has expanded its acquisitions of U.S. defense materiel in recent years in order to maintain its U.S.-origin stocks and expand its counterterrorism capacities. For example, the State Department licensed the sale of four Wolverine light attack aircraft and related munitions in early 2020 and 12 Black Hawk helicopters in 2014. Significant additional grant-based equipment transfers have been approved through U.S. Excess Defense Articles (EDA), including Kiowa helicopters and C-130H aircraft. DOD has provided substantial military aid in addition to the State Department-administered funds reflected in Table 1, focusing on counterterrorism and border security. Much of this assistance has been delivered under DOD's "global train and equip" authority (currently authorized under 10 U.S.C. §333), of which Tunisia has been a top recipient in Africa since Congress first enacted the authority in FY2006. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency has also supported surveillance infrastructure along Tunisia's border with Libya.

President Obama designated Tunisia a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2015 after hosting then-President Caïd Essebsi at the White House. The U.S. military has, at times, conducted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities from a Tunisian facility, and U.S. soldiers have reportedly advised some local counterterrorism activities.⁵⁷ Tunisia cooperates with NATO's Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls.

Appendix. Chronology of Key Events, 2011-2020 to date

Author Contact Information

Footnotes