Tunisia: In Brief

Political Transition in Tunisia Alexis Arieff Analyst in African Affairs April 15September 20, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21666 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Political Transition in Tunisia Summary On January 14, 2011, longtime President Zine Elel Abidine Ben Ali fled the country for Saudi Arabia following following weeks of mounting anti-government protests. Tunisia’s mass popular uprising, dubbed the the “Jasmine Revolution,” appears to have added momentum tosparked anti-government and pro-reform sentiment movements in other countries across the region, and some policy makers view Tunisia as an importanta potential “test case” for democratic transitions elsewhere transitions in the Middle East. Ben Ali’s departure was greeted by widespread euphoria within Tunisia. However, political instability, economic crisis, and insecurity are continuing challenges. On February 27, amid a resurgence in anti-government demonstrations, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi (a holdover from Ben Ali’s administration) stepped down and was replaced by Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman from the administration of the late founding President Habib Bourguiba. On March 3, the interim government announced a new transition “road map” that would entail the election on July 24 of a “National Constituent Assembly.” The Assembly would, in turn, be charged with promulgating a disputes over reform priorities, political instability, economic crisis, labor unrest, tensions between the privileged coastal region and relatively impoverished interior, and lingering insecurity are continuing challenges, while the humanitarian impact of refugee flows from Libya presents additional difficulties. National elections are scheduled for October 23 to select a transitional “National Constituent Assembly.” The Assembly will, in turn, be charged with promulgating a new constitution ahead of expected presidential and parliamentary elections, which have not yet been scheduled. Over 100 parties, most of them newly created, along with independents are competing for seats in the Assembly. However, the Constituent Assembly’s timeline of existence, its mandate, and its decision-making process remain largely undeterminedbeen scheduled. The protest movement has greeted the road map as a victory, but many questions remain concerning its implementation. Until January, Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party exerted near-total control over parliament, state and local governments, and most political activity. Tunisia has cultivated strong ties with France and the European Union, its largest trading partner, as well as and with the United States. Despite many political and economic characteristics shared across the region, Tunisia exhibits a number of unique attributes: it has a relatively small territory, a large and sizable and highly educated middle class, and a long history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms. Islamist parties were banned by Ben Ali, but some have now gained legal recognition. Tunisia’s unexpected and rapidThese factors have led some analysts to state that Tunisia is the best placed country in the region to successfully undergo a democratic transition—and that conversely, if it can’t, that this could have dire implications for other countries such as Egypt and Libya. Tunisia’s transition raises a wide range of questions for the future of the country and the region. These pertain to the struggle between reformists and entrenched forces carried over from the former regime; the potential shape of the new political order; the future role of Islamist and/or radical movements in the government and society; the role of the military and security servicesforces in steering political events; and the difficult diplomatic balance—for the United States and other actors—of encouraging greater democratic openness while not undermining other foreign policy priorities. Congress authorizes and appropriates funding for bilateral assistance and conducts oversight of U.S. policies foreign assistance funding and oversees U.S. foreign policy toward Tunisia and the wider region. U.S.-Tunisian relations have beenwere, prior to 2011, highly focused on military assistance and counterterrorism. Some Members of Congress argue that new aid should allocated for democracy promotion and economic recovery in Tunisia, while others contend that budgetary cuts take precedence over new aid programs, and that economic stabilization may be best addressed by the private sector or other donors. The Obama Administration has proposed $20 million in “transition support” for Tunisia to be administered by the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), as well as financial support through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. S. 618 (Kerry) would authorize the President to establish a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund to promote private sector investment and better corporate governance. Congress has been supportive of security assistance programs in Tunisia in the past, directing the State Department to allocate levels of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) that surpassed executive branch budget requests. Congressional Research Service Political Transition in Tunisia Contents Recent Developments The Obama Administration has proposed over $33 million in newly allocated funding for the promotion of democracy, good governance, and economic reforms, in addition to economic support through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. International financial institutions, which receive significant U.S. financial support, and the G8 have also pledged aid for Tunisia. Some Members of Congress argue that additional aid should allocated for democracy promotion and economic recovery in Tunisia, while others contend that budgetary cuts take precedence over new aid programs, or that economic stabilization may be best addressed by the private sector or by other donors. Related draft bills include S. 618/ H.R. 2237 and S. 1388. Congressional Research Service Political Transition in Tunisia Contents Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”....................................................................................................... 1 Background......................1 New Prime Minister and Transition “Road Map”...................................................................1 Reform Efforts .................................................. 2 Key Issues in the Transition....................................................................2 Security Concerns ......................................... 3 Elections ........................................................................4 Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”............................................................... 5 The Role of Islam in Politics ....................................5 Relations with the United States ................................................................. 7 The Security Forces.................................7 The U.S. Response to Recent Events .....................................................................................8 U.S. Assistance 9 The Military ........................................................................................................................ 109 Security Assistance Concerns....................................................................................................... 11 Congress and Bilateral Aid.................. 10 Terrorism in Tunisia: Background.......................................................................... 12 Emerging Actors ................... 11 Prosecuting Ben Ali and Associates ........................................................................................ 13 Recovery of State Assets ........................ 13 The Trade Unions....................................................................................... 13 Key Actors ......................... 13 The Security Forces ............................................................................................................ 14 Political Parties Selected Profiles ...................................................................................................................... 15 The Islamist MovementEconomy....................................................................................................... 16 Background on Tunisia ............................ 17 U.S.-Tunisian Relations ................................................................................. 21 The Ben Ali Government (1987-January 2011).................................. 19 U.S. Assistance .................................. 22 Human Rights .............................................................................................. 21 Security Assistance................. 23 Emergence of Discontent .............................................................................................. 23 Terrorism 22 Multilateral Assistance ...................................................................................................... 24 Congress and Aid to Tunisia...................... 24 The Economy........................................................................ 25 Foreign Relations.............................................. 25 Foreign Relations ............................................................................. 26 Israel and the Palestinians ................................... 27 Israel and the Palestinians .................................................................... 26 Europe ........................... 27 Europe .......................................................................................................... 26 Regional Relations................ 27 Regional Relations ................................................................................................... 27 Outlook .......... 28 Outlook..................................................................................................................................... 28 Figures Figure 1. Map of Tunisia .............................................................................................................5..... 1 Tables Table 1. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, Selected Accounts ..................................................... 11...... 24 Contacts Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................... 29 Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 29 Congressional Research Service Political Transition in Tunisia Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, in power since 1987, fled Tunisia for Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011, following weeks of mounting anti-government protests (see textbox, below). Tunisia’s popular uprising, dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution,” inspired reform and opposition movements in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, and other countries. The pro-democracy movement has been internationally heralded, but a wave of unrest across the Middle East has also sparked international concern over stability in a region associated with previously secure, autocratic, pro-Western regimes. Figure 1. Map of Tunisia The early months of the post-Ben Ali government were marked by continuing unrest and popular contestation, partly in response to the interim government’s initial decision to retain several longtime officials of the former ruling party. In addition, a security vacuum—amid reports of sabotage by unidentified militias, and as police fled their posts and citizens formed self-defense groups—raised fears of violence and chaos. On February 27, a more stable, if weak, interim government took shape under newly appointed Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman from the administration of founding President Habib Bourguiba. Essebsi replaced Mohamed Ghannouchi, who had served as Ben Ali’s prime minister since Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS 1999. Essebsi stated that his priorities would be to address security, reverse the economic crisis, and “to restore the prestige of the state.”1 The former speaker of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, was named interim president on January 15, in line with constitutional prerogatives, and he remains in that role.2 Attention is currently focused on national elections scheduled to take place in October. 1 Tarek Amara, “Tunisian Interim PM to Appoint New Government,” Reuters, March 4, 2011. Article 57 of Tunisia’s constitution states that “should the office of President of the Republic become vacant because of death, resignation, or absolute disability,” the President of the Chamber of Deputies “shall immediately be vested with the functions of interim president of the republic for a period ranging from 45 to 60 days.” The Article further stipulates that elections should be held during that time period to elect a new president for a five-year term, and that the interim president may not stand as a candidate. 2 Congressional Research Service 1 Political Transition in Tunisia The December-January Protests Anti-government protests began in Tunisia’s interior in mid-December 2010. Public demonstrations had previously been very rare in Tunisia, where state repression and the close surveillance of dissidents have traditionally been effective at curbing the expression of anti-government views. The demonstrations initially seemed to stem from discontent related to high unemployment, but quickly spiraled into an unprecedented popular challenge to Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime. From the start, protesters appeared to lack a central leader and were not necessarily aligned with a pre-existing political or ideological movement. Protests were first reported on December 17 in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street vendor set himself on fire to protest police interference and a lack of economic opportunities. By late December, the protests had spread to the nearby cities of Kasserine and Thala, as well as other urban centers. On January 12, riots erupted in the capital, Tunis. The military deployed to the streets and a national curfew was imposed. The following day, rioters ransacked a private home belonging to one of Ben Ali’s wealthy relatives in the beach community of Hammamet, underscoring the deep antipathy many Tunisians felt toward members of the ruling elite. Authorities imposed a state of emergency on January 14, prohibiting gatherings of over three people and authorizing the use of force against “any suspect person who does not obey orders to stop.”3 Police repeatedly opened fire on crowds and arrested protesters, journalists, opposition party members, lawyers, and rights advocates, some of whom were reportedly abused in detention. Over 200 people were killed in the uprising.4 Prior to his exile, Ben Ali offered a widening series of concessions on political and civil rights in an effort to stem the unrest. On January 13, the president gave an address on national television in which he pledged to step down when his term was up in 2014, to allow fresh parliamentary elections before then, and to end state censorship. However, these promises did not placate demonstrators, who continued to press for Ben Ali’s immediate resignation and the dissolution of the ruling party. Background Prior to the December-January demonstrations, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable, albeit authoritarian regime that placed a higher priority on economic growth than on political liberalization. It had only two leaders since gaining independence from France in 1956: the late Habib Bourguiba, a secular nationalist who helped lead Tunisia’s independence movement, and Ben Ali, a former Interior Minister and Prime Minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. Ben Ali cultivated the internal security services and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party as his power base, and placed severe restrictions on human rights, political participation, and freedom of expression. The president and his family were also seen as highly corrupt. While Tunisia shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, it also has a number of unique attributes: a small territory, a relatively homogenous population (despite tribal and ethnic divisions in some areas), a liberalized economy, a large and educated middle class, and a history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms.5 Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims make up the overwhelming majority of Tunisia’s population, but its urban culture and elite reflect a strong European influence. The population is young compared with developed countries, but its youth bulge is declining.6 As many as a million Tunisians reside abroad, mainly in Europe. 3 Tunisia 7 Television, “Tunisian Authorities Declare State of Emergency,” January 14, 2011, via Open Source Center. As of February 1, the United Nations estimated that at least 219 people were killed, including 72 killed in prison fires. Interim government investigators stated in July that they had documented 238 protesters killed and 1,380 wounded, mostly by the security forces. Marie Colvin, “High Noon as Lawyer Closes in on Officials Behind Tunisia Killings,” The Sunday Times, July 31, 2011. 5 Tunisia’s spending on education (7.2% of gross domestic product) is high by regional standards. CIA, The World Factbook, updated January 3, 2011. 6 EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008. 4 Congressional Research Service 2 Political Transition in Tunisia The legal and socioeconomic status of women in Tunisia is one of its particularities. Tunisia is the only Arab Muslim country that bans polygamy. Women serve in the military and in many professions, and constitute more than 50% of university students; the first woman governor was appointed in May 2004. Many Tunisians credit the country’s relatively liberal personal status code, promulgated under founding President Bourguiba, for these advances. Tunisia at a Glance Population: 10.63 million (July 2011 est.) Income Level: Lower middle income Urbanization rate: 67% of the population (2010) Life Expectancy: 75 years (2011 est.) Religion: Muslim: 98%, Christian: 1%, Jewish and other, 1% Literacy: 78% (2008) Key Exports: clothing, semi-finished goods and textiles, agricultural products Despite its apparent relative prosperity, Key Imports: textiles, machinery and equipment, Tunisia has long exhibited a vast divide hydrocarbons between rural and urban areas, and Major Trading Partners: France, Italy, Germany, particularly between the developed, touristLibya, China, Spain friendly coast and the far poorer interior. At Female Labor Participation Rate (% of female least half of the population lives in Tunis and population): 26% coastal towns, and there is population drift Sources: CIA, The World Factbook, September 2011; toward these areas.7 Anti-government World Bank, World Development Indicators demonstrations, in particular those rooted in labor and economic grievances, have often originated in the dispossessed interior (which includes hardscrabble mining areas)—as did the unrest that unseated Ben Ali. Key Issues in the Transition Nine months into Tunisia’s transition from authoritarian rule, the country faces steep challenges. Interim government officials have embarked on a wide range of reforms, including the release of political prisoners, the authorization of dozens of new political parties, and the lifting of many online and media restrictions. The former ruling party, the RCD, has been dissolved and its funds liquidated, and a number of former party officials and Ben Ali associates and relatives have been arrested. Efforts to dismantle the former regime’s security apparatus are ongoing. Authorities have announced their intention to adhere to international human rights treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Government activities are currently focused on preparing for national elections on October 23, which are expected to lead to a transitional government that will draft a new constitution. Yet the interim government has struggled to maintain public trust, despite its apparent efforts to act in good faith. Many perceive the interim authorities as acting too slowly on reforms, and there is a lack of clarity over who, within the government, is empowered to make key decisions.8 These and other factors have contributed to some Tunisians’ fears that former regime stalwarts could 7 EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008. See, e.g., National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), Imagining the Road Ahead: Citizen Attitudes About Tunisia and the Constituent Assembly Election Period, July 2011; and Marina Ottaway, “Transitional Failure in Egypt and Tunisia,” National Interest, August 10, 2011. 8 Congressional Research Service 3 Political Transition in Tunisia reemerge and consolidate power.9 Moreover, as one analyst noted, “the lack of revolutionary leadership and the late entry of the political parties into the revolution mean that there is no group able to negotiate political reforms in the revolution’s name. Groups claiming to represent the people have been proliferating, yet they offer significantly different visions.”10 Despite some progress toward elections and other reforms, reports indicate widespread dissatisfaction and confusion over the transition process.11 Moreover, tensions are burgeoning between representatives of the coastal elite and the disadvantaged interior, between Islamists and secularists, between the activist youth who led the uprising and the technocrats who run the interim government, and among political factions. As one longtime observer recently wrote, “economic stagnation, pent up social demands, and a combination of political and cultural tensions are generating deep suspicion and anxiety across the country.”12 At times, resurgent public demonstrations and sporadic riots have appeared to threaten the interim government’s ability to assert its authority, and some observers fear that vast and divided expectations could undermine Tunisia’s ability to make steady progress on institutional reforms.13 Since Ben Ali’s departure, the government’s response to protests has been relatively tempered, and the focus of security forces has turned toward containing disorder; however, in some instances, police have reportedly assaulted protesters and journalists. Public unrest has also sparked security concerns. In July, Prime Minister Essebsi accused rioters in Sidi Bouzid—where the protests that overthrew Ben Ali first originated—of trying to destabilize the country and derail elections, and in September, Essebsi stated that the government “will no longer tolerate practices that risk to paralyze the daily situation of Tunisians, such as road-blocks, attacks on police posts and regional sovereign establishments, and attacks on the national security forces and military.”14 Tunisians have wrestled over how to resolve differences of opinion over reform priorities, the relative legitimacy of various political actors, and the details of implementation. For example, the main Islamist party, Hizb al Nahda (alt: Ennahda/An-Nahda, “Renaissance”), withdrew from the interim government’s High Authority for the Realization of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and the Democratic Transition (henceforth, the political reforms commission) in June, citing a lack of “popular legitimacy.”15 Al Nahda’s withdrawal, which was followed by the 9 OSC doc. GMP20110817950023, “Tunisian Politicians Unite Against Ben Ali’s Loyalists Making Comeback,” Al Jazeera, August 16, 2011; OSC doc. GMP20110914950028, “Ousted Tunisian Regime’s Loyalists Said Trying to Regain Media Control,” Al Jazeera, September 13, 2011. 10 Asma Nouira, “Obstacles on the Path of Tunisia’s Democratic Transformation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Arab Reform Bulletin, March 30, 2011. 11 E.g., Le Monde, “Tunisie: L’Euphorie Est Partie,” June 15, 2011. 12 Christopher Alexander, “Suspicion and Strategy in Free Tunisia,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 20, 2011. 13 E.g., Marina Ottaway, “Tunisia: The Revolution is Over, Can Reform Continue?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 13, 2011. In May, for example, mass demonstrations erupted amid doubts over the interim government’s capacity and will to complete the next steps toward democracy, leading to violent clashes with the security forces and prompting the temporary reinstatement of a curfew. The unrest was spurred by remarks by former interim Interior Minister Farhat Rajhi—seen as a popular reformer, but relieved of his position in March—in which he accused elites of preparing a military coup should Islamists win the election. Interim authorities rejected Rajhi’s statement, which he subsequently retracted. Rajhi’s remarks, which he did not appear to have intended to be broadcast publicly, indirectly referenced the experience of Algeria, where parliamentary elections were canceled by the military in 1992 after Islamists appeared poised to gain a majority of seats, leading to a decade of civil war. 14 John Thorne, “Agitators ‘Derailing Elections’ in Tunisia, PM Claims,” The National, July 19, 2011; Le Temps, “Discours Martial de Béji Caïd Essebsi,” September 7, 2011 (CRS translation). 15 According to news reports, the party’s objections pertained to disagreements over attempts to limit campaign (continued...) Congressional Research Service 4 Political Transition in Tunisia withdrawal of at least one other prominent political party and similar criticism by other members, underscored the difficulties inherent in attempting to channel reformist sentiment while accommodating disparate groups, and threatened to further undermine the interim government’s ability to make decisions in the name of a broad political coalition. The interim authorities have generally privileged election preparations over addressing profound socioeconomic grievances (beyond appealing for additional external financial support), which were among the motivating factors behind the January uprising. While some Tunisians appear to accept this trade-off, labor strikes and localized demonstrations over wages, quality of life issues, and access to land and jobs are frequent. Interim President Mebazaa has appealed for “patience” from those demanding better living conditions, while Prime Minister Essebsi in April denounced “daily protests and sit-ins that undermine the government’s efforts to encourage foreign investment.”16 Further unrest could result if the National Constituent Assembly is seen to defer consideration of socioeconomic issues until a post-transitional government is in place. The following sections discuss key issues in Tunisia’s transition. Elections The organization of national elections is a key element of the transition process. The elections are expected to select a transitional, 218-seat “National Constituent Assembly,” which will, in turn, be charged with drafting a new constitution and preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections.17 However, the duration, mandate, authorities, and mode of operation of the Assembly, once it is elected, remain undefined. The potential stakes in the election are high: to determine which political actors may speak in the name of popular legitimacy, and to decide who will shape the new political order through the process of constitution-drafting. Yet reports indicate that the complexity of the transition process, and a lack of public understanding of the Constituent Assembly’s role, have led to political apathy—an unanticipated reaction for a country in which pride in the “revolution” still holds considerable sway.18 Only 52% of estimated eligible voters registered to vote—although others will be able to vote using their national identity cards—and roughly one in three Tunisians (...continued) financing and over potential overtures to Israel. 16 Reuters, “Tunisia Struggles to Tame Revolutionary Spirit,” February 15, 2011; Agence France Press (AFP), “Tunisie: Le Premier Ministre Dénonce des Excès dans les Manifestations et l’Emigration,” April 26, 2011. 17 The concept of electing a transitional government—instead of holding immediate presidential and/or legislative elections—was announced on March 3 by Interim President Fouad Mebazaa, and was initially greeted as a victory by Tunisia’s protest movement. In making this decision, interim authorities appeared to be sincerely attempting to respond to the public’s demands for a transformation of the political system based on broad consultations. The parliament, which was dominated by supporters of the former regime, voted on February 9 to allow Interim President Mebazaa to rule by decree and has since suspended its activities. 18 U.S. Diplomatic Cable [UNCLASSIFIED], “Voter Registration Deadline Extended, Growing Frustration With Voter Apathy,” August 1, 2011; Kaouther Larbi, “Tunisie: défiance ou myopie, la moitié des électeurs boudent l'inscription,” AFP, August 14, 2011; Richard Valdmanis, “Confusion Reigns Ahead of Tunisia Vote,” Reuters, September 7, 2011. Congressional Research Service 5 Political Transition in Tunisia reported, two months ahead of election day, that they were undecided about whom to vote for.19 Nearly a third have indicated they would vote for “none” of the parties.20 The independent electoral commission, known by the French acronym ISIE, is ostensibly the lead electoral management body. However, the ability to make key decisions on dates, logistics, and procurement is divided among the ISIE, several government ministries, and other entities, such as a “liaison committee” that answers to the Prime Minister.21 The ISIE is also reportedly internally divided. Some election experts have criticized the ISIE and interim government for a lack of transparency and of clarity on procedures. Furthermore, they note that the potential role of Interior Ministry officials in election management could be controversial.22 In June, the election date was pushed back from July to October 23 due to logistical hurdles— including delays in passing a new electoral law; establishing an electoral commission; and commencing voter registration, poll worker training, and the procurement of election materials. The delay followed a series of contradictory announcements by Prime Minister Essebsi and ISIE head Kemal Jendoubi. Several prominent political parties initially strongly opposed a delay— including Al Nahda and the largest legal opposition party during the former regime, Nejib el Chebbi’s Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)—but they subsequently largely accepted it. A new electoral law promulgated in May, which serves as the framework for the October election, sets out a one-round voting system based on proportional representation, and includes a “parity” reservation for women on the lists.23 Tunisians in the diaspora will be able to vote. Regional governors, judges, and local officials cannot run as candidates unless they first resign their posts. The law also bars from candidacy certain senior officials of the former ruling party.24 Over 100 political parties and a number of independent groupings are fielding candidates in the elections, resulting in nearly 10,000 candidates and over 1,600 party lists—a higher than expected number that could create logistical difficulties regarding ballots and counting.25 The Carter Center, which is observing the election process, stated that “Tunisia’s voter registration process was conducted smoothly, but important operational challenges remain ... particularly the allocation of voters to polling stations and a campaign to disseminate voter information to the public.”26 The formal campaign period begins on October 1. Efforts by the ISIE to ban public opinion surveys and political advertizing, starting on September 12, have been controversial.27 19 Sigma Conseil, Baromètre Politique, Tunis, September 2011. State Department Office of Opinion Research, “Tunisians Up for Elections, But Down on Parties,” August 31, 2011. 21 International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Elections in Tunisia: The 2011 Constituent Assembly, Frequently Asked Questions, July 2011. 22 CRS interviews with election experts, September 6-13, 2011. 23 Previously, Tunisia had a 25% female reservation requirement for party lists in parliamentary elections. According to news reports, the women’s representation provision was supported by Al Nahda. 24 Art. 15 of Decree Law N. 35 on Election of the National Constituent Assembly, May 10, 2011; provided by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Senior officials are defined as those who occupied a “position of responsibility” in the government over the past ten years or who signed a petition supporting the former president’s 2014 re-election bid. 25 Richard Cochrane, “Election 2011: Candidate Registration Completed as Tunisia Prepares for Election,” IHS Global Insight, September 13, 2011; CRS interview with election management expert, September 13, 2011. 26 “The Carter Center Welcomes Completion of Tunisia’s Voter Registration; Highlights Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Successful Polling,” September 1, 2011. 27 TunisieNews.com, “Les Partis Politiques Défient la Décision de l’ISIE et Poursuivent Leurs Compagnes Publicitaires,” September 12, 2011. 20 Congressional Research Service 6 Political Transition in Tunisia The Role of Islam in Politics The relationships between Islam, Islamic practice, and the Tunisian state are likely to be a core area of disagreement and contestation for members of the National Constituent Assembly as it tries to draft a new constitution. The rapid liberalization of the political sphere since January has led to the legalization of Al Nahda, Tunisia’s largest Islamist organization, which operated clandestinely and outside the country over the past two decades. Other Islamist groups have also proliferated (including some splinter factions of Al Nahda), and religiously conservative Salafist groups have expanded their activities and visibility.28 Recent public opinion surveys place the level of support for Al Nahda around 20%, which (if accurate) would make it by far the most popular political party but still presumably reliant on coalition-building.29 (The second most popular party appears to be Najib el Chebbi’s PDP.) A significant additional percentage of Tunisians, while they may not plan to vote for Al Nahda, reportedly broadly desire Islam to play a more prominent role in public life.30 However, very few indicate that they prefer an Islamic system of government.31 Most analysts argue that Tunisia’s secular traditions, educated middle class, and history of promoting women’s socioeconomic equality are bulwarks against extremism. Islamists and secularists have nonetheless grown increasingly polarized in recent months, potentially portending gridlock within the Constituent Assembly. Secular elites are particularly concerned with protecting Tunisia’s personal status code, which protects some socioeconomic rights for women. Recent demonstrations by radical Islamist groups, including an assault by Salafists on individuals attending the screening of a secularist film in Tunis in late June, have sparked additional concerns.32 Al Nahda leaders, including founder and president Rachid Ghannouchi, have generally portrayed themselves as moderates who seek to participate in a democratic political system, support the separation of mosque and state, and would not scale back women’s rights.33 The movement’s detractors, however, suspect it of a “double discourse,” i.e., portraying a moderate face to the public and to international audiences in order to enter government and gradually introduce more conservative, restrictive laws and institutions.34 On the other hand, 28 See, e.g., CTC Sentinel, “The Rise of Salafists in Tunisia After the Fall of Ben Ali,” August 1, 2011. See, e.g., Institut de Sondage et de Traitement de l’Information Statistique (ISTIS), “Sondage d’Opinion sur la Situation Politique et l’Impact de la Révolution sur les Média Presse,” April 2011; OSC doc. GMP20110706966178, “Al Jazeera.net: Tunisians Undecided Ahead of October Vote,” July 6, 2011; AFP, “Tunisie/Elections : 67% des Tunisiens Indécis, Ennahda (Islamistes) en Tête,” July 6, 2011; Sigma Conseil, Baromètre Politique, September 2011. 30 ISTIS, April 2011, op. cit. 31 State Department Office of Opinion Research, August 2011, op. cit. 32 Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Police Inaction Allowed Assault on Film Screening; Action Needed to Curb Attacks on Artists Deemed ‘Un-Islamic,’” June 30, 2011; see also OSC doc. GMP20110701405002, “‘Supporters of Shari’ah’ Condemn ‘Attacks’ on ‘Sanctities of Muslims in Tunisia,’” Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, June 30, 2011. 33 For example, a Nahda spokesman told a journalist in April that “there is no developed country that does not have women’s rights, these things go together.” Le Monde, “En Tunisie, Les Multiples Visages d’Un Islamisme Qui Réapparaît au Grand Jour,” April 10, 2011. See also Marc Lynch, “Tunisia’s New al-Nahda,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 29, 2011; and Al Nahda, “Address by the General-Secretary of ‘Ennahda’ Party : Positions and Dimensions,” Sousse Business Forum, June 11, 2011. For a sympathetic background on Ghannouchi’s political and philosophical evolution, see Azzam S. Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 34 See, e.g., remarks by Nabila Hamza at a Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, “What Kind of Democracy for the New Tunisia: Islamic or Secular,” May 9, 2011, in Washington, DC. Some Tunisians point to Ghannouchi’s remarks in Egypt in August 2011, in which he stated that the “ultimate objective” of Muslims was the installation of a caliphate, as proof of this phenomenon (see Le Temps, “Rached Ghannouchi en Egypte: ‘Le califat est notre objectif ultime,’” August 3, 2011). An Al Nahda spokesman told CRS, via email, that the party had “distanced itself from this (continued...) 29 Congressional Research Service 7 Political Transition in Tunisia many Al Nahda supporters purport to feel threatened by “leftist” actors, whom they accuse of dominating the interim government and of seeking to delay elections in order to restrict Islamists’ participation in politics.35 Ghannouchi has compared Al Nahda to Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, he espoused more radical rhetoric during confrontations with the government in the 1980s and early 1990s, and some Al Nahda supporters are also thought to be more conservative in their views. Al Nahda did not play a significant role in the December-January uprising, but the organization raised its national profile in early 2011 by helping to form the Committee to Defend the Revolution, a loose affiliation of political parties, activists, unionists, and leftist groups that successfully called for the interim government to dismiss senior officials from the former regime. At the same time, Al Nahda is contending with internal divisions and competing with emergent, more radical Islamist groups for public support.36 The party’s leadership has split and been reshuffled over various issues. Ghannouchi is not a candidate in the October elections; he has said that he will step down before the end of the year, following which party members may elect a new leader. When asked by a journalist whether national elections might reveal “a country closer to Islamism than people think,” Prime Minister Essebsi replied, “We will not authorize those who want to exploit freedom in order to crush it” but gave few further details.37 Background on Al Nahda Al Nahda, now presided by Islamic scholar and activist Rachid Ghannouchi, was first formally organized by Ghannouchi and Abdel Fattah Moro in 1981 (soon after multiparty politics were legalized under President Bourguiba) as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). (Moro has since left the party.) Although the MTI was relatively moderate compared to other Islamist groups, it was viewed as the most popular and therefore the most significant threat to the government.38 The MTI organized demonstrations on university campuses, spurring arrests and clashes with the security forces, and with leftist groups. The growing unrest, combined with that orchestrated by trade unions, undermined support for Bourguiba’s presidency and laid the groundwork for Ben Ali’s rise in 1987.39 Initially upon coming to power, Ben Ali promised greater pluralism and a dialogue with opposition groups. Hoping to gain legal recognition, the MTI changed its name to Hizb al Nahda to comply with the 1988 political party law, which barred names based on religion. It was nonetheless denied legal status. Al Nahda candidates were allowed to run as independents in the 1989 parliamentary elections, but when they garnered a high level of support—15% of the national vote—Ben Ali initiated a crackdown on the group. Ghannouchi left the country during this time. Violent confrontations between the government and Al Nahda activists escalated, culminating in an attack on a ruling party office in 1991 that was blamed on Al Nahda. Al Nahda leaders condemned the attack and denied that those responsible belonged to their movement, an explanation that remains disputed. Ben Ali accused Al Nahda of plotting to overthrow the government and launched a campaign to eradicate the group and all signs of conservative Islam. The government subsequently claimed it had unearthed an Islamist plot to assassinate Ben Ali, and in 1992 Tunisian military courts convicted 265 Al Nahda members on charges of planning a coup. Al Nahda denied the accusations, and some rights advocates criticized the case as biased and lacking due process.40 Ghannouchi was sentenced in absentia. Similar tensions between Islamists and government forces drove neighboring Algeria into civil war in the early 1990s. (...continued) statement,” which he portrayed as Ghannouchi’s opinion as a legal scholar, not a political leader. 35 Al Nahda spokesman email to CRS, June 28, 2011; and Marina Ottaway, “The Revolution is Over,” op. cit. 36 See Rajaa Basly, “The Future of al-Nahda in Tunisia,” Carnegie Endowment, April 20, 2011. 37 Paris Marianne, “Tunisia’s Essebsi: Libyan Crisis a ‘Domestic Matter’ for Tunisians,” March 23, 2011; via OSC. 38 Henry Munson Jr., “Islamic Revivalism in Morocco and Tunisia,” The Muslim World, 76:3-4 (1986). 39 Munson 1986, op. cit. 40 Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, Routledge: New York, 2010. Congressional Research Service 8 Political Transition in Tunisia The Security Forces A central challenge facing Tunisia’s interim government is how to assert control over the size and mandate of the domestic security services, which formed a vast and secretive network under Ben Ali, without sowing the seeds of future instability. It may also take time before members of the public are willing to trust the police to ensure their security. The security services under Ben Ali were accused of abuses including extrajudicial arrests, denial of due process, torture, and the mistreatment of detainees. While the exact number of domestic security agents is unknown, it is thought by some analysts to far exceed the number of military personnel and could be as high as 200,000.41 Several dozen senior security and Interior Ministry officials were fired in February, and in March, the Interior Ministry announced it was dissolving entities “akin to ‘political police.’”42 However, the number of affected personnel, and whether they will be permitted to retain their employment with the government, has not been made public. For now, it does not appear that a significant number of security officers have been dismissed, and it is unclear to what extent the domestic security services have been restructured. According to some human rights advocates, domestic intelligence services have not been dissolved, and may continue to conduct surveillance activities—although whether they are following orders or merely habit is unclear. 43 The interim government has brought charges against Ben Ali (in absentia) for ordering the killing of protesters in January, and against the former head of presidential security, Ali Seriati, who is in custody. However, opinions are divided as to whether to pursue lower- and mid-ranking officials and security officers for abuses committed under the former regime. The U.N. special rapporteur on torture called on Tunisia in May to “promote accountability for past abuses,” including by prosecuting perpetrators of torture and other abusive acts; the rapporteur also suggested that torture may have continued, in a small number of cases, since Ben Ali’s departure.44 Fears among police officers that they could be made to shoulder the blame for the regime’s decision to open fire on demonstrators in January escalated into police demonstrations against the interim government in early September.45 The Military There is a notable distinction between the internal security forces, which were closely associated with Ben Ali’s repressive security apparatus, and the military, which receives fewer state resources and is viewed as relatively apolitical.46 The military comprises roughly 35,000 personnel; military service is compulsory for one year, but many Tunisians reportedly evade it. 41 Eric Goldstein/Human Rights Watch, “Dismantling the Machinery of Oppression,” The Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2011. 42 TAP, “Interior Ministry Decides to Remove State Security Division,” March 7, 2011. 43 See Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), La Tunisie post Ben Ali face aux démons du passé: Transition démocratique et persistance des violations graves des droits de l’homme,” July 2011. 44 AFP, “UN Torture Rapporteur Visits Tunisia,” and Reuters, “People Still Tortured in Tunisia—U.N. Rapporteur,” May 21, 2011. 45 AFP, “Tunisia Bans Police from Union Activities,” September 6, 2011. Divisions between police commanders and the rank-and-file were exposed in the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s exit, as thousands of police officers held their own anti-government demonstration to distance themselves from the RCD and call for better working conditions. 46 In the late 1970s and mid-1980s, the military led the repression of anti-government protests. However, this role was largely relegated to the civilian security services under Ben Ali. Unlike in neighboring Algeria, the military leadership did not play a major role in the independence movement or in early state formation. Congressional Research Service 9 Political Transition in Tunisia Government spending on the military constitutes only 1.4% of GDP—a low proportion compared to other countries in the region, such as Algeria (3.3%), Egypt (3.4%), Libya (3.9%), and Morocco (5%).47 The armed forces are positioned largely against external threats, and also participate (to a limited extent) in multilateral peacekeeping missions. The government’s initial, heavy-handed response to the December-January protests was led by the police, who opened fire on demonstrators and reportedly conducted other abuses.48 The deployment of the military to the streets on January 12 was a turning point, and many analysts contend that military leaders subsequently played a key role in ending Ben Ali’s presidency. Notably, General Rachid Ammar, then army chief of staff (since promoted to the equivalent of joint chief of staff) is widely reported to have refused orders to open fire on demonstrators.49 On January 23, Ammar publicly addressed protesters and promised to safeguard Tunisia’s “revolution.” While Ammar’s comments were welcomed by many Tunisians, they sparked concern among some observers over whether the armed forces could interfere in domestic politics, particularly if the security situation should worsen.50 Following Ben Ali’s exit, members of the military led efforts to stabilize the security situation, including by pursuing elements of the domestic security apparatus and unidentified armed elements seen as loyal to the old regime.51 In August, a mid-ranking officer publicly stated that on January 14, as Ben Ali was fleeing the country, he had personally decided to arrest 28 members of the Ben Ali/Trabelsi family at the airport and declined to follow orders from the head of presidential security to release them.52 Security Concerns The rapid fall of the Ben Ali regime raised fears that the country could experience a security vacuum. Although the security situation has largely stabilized since the chaotic first few weeks after Ben Ali’s departure, incidents of looting, theft, and destruction of property continue to occur. Incidents of religiously motivated violence have been reported, including the murder of a Polish priest on February 18 and harassment directed at Tunisia’s tiny Jewish population. There have also reportedly been several large prison escapes, for unclear reasons.53 Authorities are further contending with the influx of refugees from Libya, which has created a humanitarian crisis along the border, while inter-tribal violence has been reported in the southwest. Suspicions remain that elements of the security services are seeking to provoke disorder, including by reportedly infiltrating demonstrations; interim government officials blamed an armed attack on the Interior 47 CIA, The World Factbook; figures dated 2006. Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Hold Police Accountable for Shootings,” January 29, 2011. 49 E.g., Abdelaziz Barrouhi, “Tunisie: L’Homme Qui A Dit Non,” Jeune Afrique, January 30-February 5, 2011. 50 Issandr El Amrani, “Tunisia Diary: Ammar’s Move?” TheArabist.net, January 24, 2011. In mid-2010, an analysis of Tunisia’s political stability concluded that “a coup is a real possibility” should instability affect the transfer of power after Ben Ali. Veritiss, Tunisia: Outlook 2011-2015 [UNCLASSIFIED], prepared For the Defense Intelligence Agency Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office, August 2, 2010. 51 In the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure, international media reports referenced violence by civilianclothed “militias” seen as allied to the former president, whose identity and relationship to formal security structures remains unclear. Angelique Chrisafis, “Confusion, Fear and Horror in Tunisia as Old Regime’s Militia Carries on the Fight,” The Guardian (UK), January 17, 2011. 52 La Presse, “L’Arrestation des Membres de la Famille du Président Déchu et son Epouse S’Est Effectuée Spontanément,” August 8, 2011. 53 Le Monde, “Incertitudes en Tunisie sur la Tenue des Elections, le 24 Juillet,” May 10, 2011. 48 Congressional Research Service 10 Political Transition in Tunisia Ministry, on February 1, on a conspiracy by members of the former regime’s security forces.54 The interim government has indefinitely extended the “state of emergency” imposed by Ben Ali in January (though its provisions barring the public assembly of more than three persons have not been enforced), and the military is assisting in security operations in the interior. Some analysts fear that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional affiliate of Al Qaeda, could take advantage of the uprising and related insecurity, particularly when combined with upheaval in neighboring Libya. AQIM released a statement in January hailing the departure of Ben Ali and warning against supposed U.S. and French efforts to subvert the revolution.55 Al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman Al Zawahri, has released at least two statements seeking to portray uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as motivated by Islamist sentiment and warning that the United States would seek to manipulate the outcomes.56 In mid-May, Tunisian authorities announced they had arrested two suspected AQIM members in the southeastern town of Nekrif, near the Libyan border. The two suspects were described as an Algerian and a Libyan national, and were said to be in possession of an “explosive belt,” an automatic weapon, a homemade bomb, and GPS equipment.57 According to Tunisian officials, this was the first arrest of AQIM militants within Tunisia. Several days later, four Tunisian soldiers were killed in a shoot-out in the northern town of Rouhia with a group described as affiliated with Al Qaeda. Two militants were also reported killed. In July, Tunisian authorities claimed to have halted AQIM militants from entering Tunisia from Algeria, and in August security forces engaged in skirmishes with “terrorists” at the Algerian border.58 Armed groups have also reportedly been stopped at the Libyan border.59 Terrorism in Tunisia: Background While Tunisia has not been subject to many significant attacks, terrorism is a potential domestic threat and Tunisians have participated in plots abroad. The two most significant recent incidents of terrorism on Tunisian soil were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba (noted for its tiny Jewish population) and a series of gun battles between alleged militants and security forces in Tunis in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri appeared to claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002. In all, 14 German tourists, five Tunisians, and two French citizens were killed in 54 Tara Bahrampour, “In Tunisia, First Steps Toward Democracy,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2011; Jeune Afrique, “Tunisie: l’Ex-RCD Soupçonné d’Avoir Commandité des Attaques de Postes de Police,” July 18, 2011. 55 OSC doc. GMP20110128836001, “AQLIM Warns Tunisians Against Western ‘Plots’ To ‘Abort’ Tunisian Revolution,” Al-Mujahidin Electronic Network, January 28, 2011. For background on AQIM, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins. 56 Maamoun Youssef, “Al-Qaida’s No. 2 Incites Tunisians, Egyptians,” AP, February 28, 2011; OSC doc. GMP20110913836004, “Al-Fajr Releases Al-Zawahiri Audio, Bin Ladin Video on 10th Anniversary of 9/11,” Ana Al Muslim Network, September 13, 2011. 57 Radio Tunisienne, “Tunisian Interior Ministry Provides More Information on ‘Terrorists’ Arrest,” May 16, 2011, via U.S. government Open Source Center (OSC). 58 BBC Monitoring, “Militants From Al-Qa'idah Try to Sneak into Tunisia, Official,” July 2, 2011; OSC doc. GMP20110822280003, “Tunisian Sources Report Several Dead in Army Clashes with Terrorists Near Border,” Le Temps d'Algerie, August 20, 2011. 59 Le Temps, “Menace Terroriste sur la Tunisie,” September 10, 2011. Congressional Research Service 11 Political Transition in Tunisia the attack.60 France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement in the attack. In January 2009, French authorities put two alleged culprits on trial. The roots of the 2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, are more opaque. In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated outside Tunisia, on a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.61 The TCG sought to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia and was considered to be a radical offshoot of Al Nahda. The TCG was suspected of plotting, but not carrying out, attacks on U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001. One founder, Tarek Maaroufi, was arrested in Belgium the same month. The group appears to have since been inactive. AQIM, an Algerian-led group formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), actively recruits Tunisians and reportedly had ties with the TCG.62 In January 2007, following the aforementioned gun battles, Tunisian security forces claimed that they had discovered terrorists linked to the GSPC who had infiltrated from Algeria and possessed homemade explosives, satellite maps of foreign embassies, and documents identifying foreign envoys. Some 30 Tunisians were subsequently convicted of plotting to target U.S. and British interests in Tunisia. AQIM later claimed responsibility for kidnapping two Austrian tourists in Tunisia in February 2008. Tunisian expatriates suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been arrested in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Western Europe, Mauritania, and the United States. Some are reportedly detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and their possible return to Tunisia has proven to be controversial.63 In April 2009, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of U.S. Central Command, told a House Appropriations Committee subcommittee that the perpetrators of suicide bombings in Iraq that month may have been part of a network based in Tunisia.64 Under Ben Ali, as many as 2,000 Tunisians were detained, charged, and/or convicted on terrorism-related charges, including a sweeping anti-terrorism law passed in 2003.65 Critics claimed that the law “makes the exercise of fundamental freedoms ... an expression of terrorism.”66 These criticisms were echoed in the December 2010 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, who concluded that “the current definition of terrorism is vague and broad, hence deviating from the principle of legality and allowing for wide usage of counter-terrorism measures in practice.”67 Rights advocates also accused anti-terror trials of relying on excessive pretrial detention, denial of due process, and weak evidence. The current interim government has 60 Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002. U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, released April 30, 2007. 62 Craig S. Smith, “Tunisia is Feared as New Islamist Base ... ,” International Herald Tribune, February 20, 2007. Note, GSPC renamed itself Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in January 2007. 63 According to recent news reports, 12 out of the total number of those detained at Guantanamo at one time are Tunisian, but only five currently remain in U.S. custody. Five were repatriated to third countries, partly due to concerns over their possible torture if returned to Tunisia, while two others were returned to Tunisia and imprisoned. Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia to Send Mission to US for Release of its Remaining Gitmo Detainees,” September 14, 2011. 64 House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Holds Hearing on the US Central Command, April 24, 2009, transcript via CQ. 65 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010. 66 Jeremy Landor, “Washington’s Partner,” Middle East International, March 5, 2004, pp. 23-24. 67 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur, December 28, 2010, op. cit. 61 Congressional Research Service 12 Political Transition in Tunisia promised to release all political prisoners, and there is ongoing debate about whether all individuals convicted under the anti-terrorism law fall into this category. Prosecuting Ben Ali and Associates Tunisian authorities have brought dozens of criminal charges against Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi, both of whom remain outside the country. The decision to carry out multiple and rapid trials of the former first couple in absentia, after Tunisian authorities unsuccessfully sought the former president’s extradition from Saudi Arabia, has been controversial.68 The former president, through his lawyers, denied the charges and criticized his first conviction (on charges of embezzlement and misuse of state funds), in June, as a “parody of justice.”69 He was subsequently convicted again, in July, on charges of illegal possession of drugs and weapons. He reportedly faces nearly 200 additional charges in the civilian courts. A separate trial before a military court, on charges related to killing and abusing protesters, is also anticipated. Dozens of family members, along with former senior government and security officials, have also either been tried or face charges. However, the ability of at least one suspect to flee the country in July after an investigation had been opened and the courts’ decision in August to free a former Justice Minister from custody (he was subsequently rearrested) led to widespread public criticism of the interim authorities.70 The judicial system was inherited from the Ben Ali regime, and although it has been ostensibly freed from executive branch interference, some observers view it as inept.71 Recovery of State Assets Further investigations into the financial and real estate holdings of the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families are ongoing. Family members reportedly owned or controlled many of the country’s biggest companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure, and are thought to have stashed away significant resources overseas.72 Tunisian authorities have seized domestic assets belonging to the former president and his associates, and have identified at least 12 countries overseas where these individuals stored money, which could total billions of dollars. Western governments have cooperated with Tunisian efforts to freeze these assets.73 However, the process for recovering frozen assets on behalf of the state is complex and challenging.74 Interim 68 See AFP, “Ben Ali Critics Oppose His Trial in Absentia in Tunisia,” June 14, 2011; “Tunisians Dissatisfied with Quick Ben Ali Verdict,” June 21, 2011; and Le Monde, “En Tunisie, la Difficile Justice Contre le Clan de l’Ancien Président Ben Ali,” July 9, 2011. The interim government had also issued an international arrest warrant through Interpol for Ben Ali, Leila Trabelsi, and several close relatives who have fled the country. Amnesty International called the trial “unfair” and stated, “The current Tunisian government must follow due process and fair trial standards, otherwise it risks replicating the unfair justice system that was a hallmark of Tunisia under Ben Ali.” “Accountability in Tunisia and Egypt,” August 3, 2011. 69 Philippe Sauvagnargues, “Ben Ali Slams Fast-Track Corruption Conviction as ‘Insane,’” AFP, June 21, 2011. 70 Tarek Amara, “Tunisia Pledges Tougher Line on Ex-Leader’s Allies,” Reuters, August 18, 2011. 71 Hamadi Redissi, “The Revolution Is Not Over Yet [op-ed],” The New York Times, July 15, 2011. 72 Colin Freeman, “Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and His Family’s ‘Mafia Rule,’” The Telegraph (UK), January 16, 2011. 73 The Wall Street Journal reported in February that U.S. investigators had opened a preliminary probe into assets controlled by Ben Ali and family members. Joseph Palazzolo, “FBI Probe to Target Tunisia’s Ex-Leader,” The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2011. 74 Deborah Ball and Cassell Bryan-Low, “Arab Spring Regimes Face Long Slog to Recoup Assets,” The Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2011. Congressional Research Service 13 Political Transition in Tunisia authorities have also moved to expropriate shares of companies controlled by certain Ben Ali family members and associates accused of financial manipulation, but have allowed such companies to continue operating (in most cases) under appointed managers.75 Key Actors As political uncertainty continues to characterize the situation in Tunisia, it remains difficult to distinguish which groups and individuals have the ability and popular credibility to decisively influence events. Contenders for influence include Tunisia’s trade union federation; the security forces; Islamist movements; the three older, secularist opposition political parties that were legal, albeit highly restricted, under the former regime; and a vast array of newer political parties that have proliferated since January, some reportedly headed by former RCD officials. The ideological cohesion and mass appeal of these new parties are untested. While trade unionists and the Islamist movement have, at different times, constituted the main vehicles for the mass expression of antigovernment dissent, the potential for either to present a cohesive political vision is unclear. Both groups, along with leftist movements, which also draw significant support from some segments of the population, have long been subject to government repression, harassment, and co-option. Influential political groups include the main trade union, known as the UGTT; the main Islamist party, Al Nahda; the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), a secular left-leaning party founded by Ahmed Nejib el Chebbi; the Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties (FDTL), a centrist party led by Mustafa Ben Jaafar that is now heading a coalition known as Ettakatol; Ettajdid, a leftist party led by Ahmed Brahim; the Tunisian Communist Workers’ Party (PCOT), founded by Hamma Hammami, which operated clandestinely under Ben Ali; the Congress for the People, headed by human rights activist Moncef Marzouki; and potentially the Patriotic Free Union (UPL), an emergent party headed by businessman Slim Riahi.76 Tunisia’s Trade Unions Since Tunisia’s independence, the labor movement has served as a rare legal conduit for expressing dissent, and many analysts view the main union federation, the Tunisian General Union of Labor (UGTT), as an important political force. The UGTT, which claims over half a million members, played a key role in sustaining the December-January protests, which its leadership framed as rooted in economic grievances.77 At the same time, the UGTT is highly fragmented, with a relatively conservative, pro-government leadership frequently diverging from its more activist middle-tier and grass-roots membership. In early February, some UGTT members protested against UGTT head Abdessalem Jrad, whom they accused of being estranged from the union’s base. New unions and splinter movements have also been formed, and labor unrest has continued, reportedly sparking a backlash among some segments of the middle class. The UGTT was formed in the mid-1940s and was a force in Tunisia’s independence movement. During the Cold War, 75 Le Monde, “Orange Tunisie Passe Sous la Tutelle de l’Etat Tunisien,” March 30, 2011; David Gauthier-Villars, “How ‘The Family’ Controlled Tunisia,” The Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2011. 76 The UPL, previously little-known, garnered widespread attention when it was listed in a September public opinion survey as the party that garnered the seventh highest number of supporters. Sigma Conseil, Baromètre Politique, Tunis, September 2011. 77 UGTT, Déclaration de la Commission Administrative Nationale, January 4, 2011; on membership, see the UGTT’s website, at [www.ugtt.org.tn]. 78 Global Security, “Union Génerale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT),” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/tunisia/ugtt.htm. 79 See Niger Disney, “The Working-Class Revolt in Tunisia,” Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) Reports, 67 (May 1978). Congressional Research Service 14 Political Transition in Tunisia it positioned itself as pro-Western (non-Communist) and formed links with the American labor movement.78 Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, strove to keep the unions under the government’s wing; during the 1960s, former UGTT leader Ahmed Ben Salah led a decade-long period of socialist-oriented economic policy as minister for finance and planning. By the late 1970s, however, amid growing economic unease, the union’s leadership turned to overt confrontation with the government, particularly over grievances related to low wages and food price inflation.79 The UGTT led a series of mass strikes and demonstrations—notably in 1978 and in the mid-1980s—which were met with heavy state repression. During Ben Ali’s presidency, the government again attempted to co-opt the UGTT, including by influencing its leadership selection process. The UGTT resurged as a key instigator of anti-government unrest in recent years, organizing protests in the mining region of Gafsa in 2008 and 2010 that were arguably a precursor to the December-January uprising. Selected Profiles • Béji Caïd Essebsi, Prime Minister. Essebsi, 84, was named interim prime minister on February 27 after then-Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi resigned. Ghannouchi had served in the position since appointed by Ben Ali in 1999; he was pushed to resign by growing numbers of demonstrators who objected to his continuation in office. Essebsi is a lawyer and was a close aide to Tunisia’s founding president, Habib Bourguiba. In the 1960s and early 1970s, he served in a variety of positions including interior minister and defense minister. In 1978, he joined the Movement of Democratic Socialists (MDS), an opposition party, before being reappointed to the cabinet as foreign minister in 1981. Essebsi was served in parliament from 1989 to 1991. • Habib Essid, Minister of the Interior. Interim President Mebazaa appointed Essid in March, replacing Farhat Rajhi, who was dismissed for unclear reasons. Essid’s appointment was controversial, as Rejhi had been seen as a popular reformist within the interim government, while Essid was viewed by some as close to Ben Ali. Essid, 52, is an agricultural economist who has spent his entire career in government administration, mostly in agricultural and development policy but also as chief of staff at the Interior Ministry from 1997 to 2000. • Yadh Ben Achour, Head of the High Authority for the Realization of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and the Democratic Transition. Ben Achour is a Tunisian lawyer and well known legal scholar who was formerly head of the law faculty at the University of Tunis. In January, he was appointed to head a political reforms commission charged with changing Tunisia’s laws ahead of national elections. In late March, Ben Achour roughly doubled the commission’s membership, to about 130, in response to criticism that it was insufficiently representative. Its authority continues to be challenged by some, including Al Nahda, which briefly participated in the commission but has since claimed that it pursued wide-ranging reforms without a sufficiently popular mandate and that it represents an overly leftist, secularist, viewpoint. • Ahmed Nejib el Chebbi, Founder of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP). Chebbi formally stepped down from the leadership of the PDP, one of three “dissident” opposition parties that were legally recognized during Ben Ali’s presidency, in 2006, but continues to represent the party. He has portrayed himself as the most prominent secular alternative to Islamist parties. Although Chebbi and the PDP boycotted the 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections, he is widely viewed as the most popular of the previously tolerated opposition figures, and potentially more credible than members of the opposition who left Congressional Research Service 15 Political Transition in Tunisia Tunisia for exile abroad. A former student activist for leftist and pan-Arabist causes, and a lawyer by training, Chebbi was imprisoned for several years in the 1960s. Chebbi directs a Tunis-based newspaper, El Mawkif, and provided legal defense for several journalists targeted by the Ben Ali government. • General Rachid Ammar, Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Ammar is widely reported to have refused to open fire on protesters during the December-January uprising, and to have subsequently influenced Ben Ali’s decision to step down. He consequently enjoys a high level of popularity. He has been chief of staff of the 27,000-person army since 2002, when his predecessor was killed in a helicopter crash. In April 2011, Ammar was promoted to chief of staff of the military. On January 24, Ammar publicly addressed protesters, promising to uphold Tunisia’s “revolution” and guarantee stability until elections are held. His comments, which were welcomed by demonstrators, sparked concern among some analysts over whether the armed forces, which were seen as relatively apolitical under Ben Ali, could become an arbiter of domestic politics. • Rachid Ghannouchi, President and Co-Founder of Hizb al Nahda (Renaissance). An Islamic scholar, teacher, and activist, Ghannouchi, 70, has led Tunisia’s main Islamist movement for three decades. Ghannouchi’s early focus was on religious and moral issues, but he grew more politically involved by the late 1970s. He spent two decades in exile, largely in London, after his party, Al Nahda, was banned in 1991, but returned to Tunisia in January following the interim government’s announcement of a general amnesty. Ghannouchi has portrayed himself as a moderate who would participate within a democratic political system and not attempt to overturn women’s rights. He espoused more radical rhetoric during confrontations with the government in the 1980s and early 1990s, however, and Tunisian secularists and some international observers view him with suspicion. He has stated he will not run for president and that he will soon step down from the leadership of the party. • Hamadi Jebali, Secretary-General of Al Nahda. Born 1949 in Sousse, Jebali is a longtime activist in Al Nahda, having become a member of the group’s political bureau in 1981 and served as its president from 1981 until 1984. He also served as director of Al Nahda’s newspaper, Al Fajr. Previously, Jebali lived for 10 years in France, where he completed an engineering degree and was one of the founders of the French Muslim Association. In 1990, he was sentenced to over 16 years in prison due to his association with Al Nahda, and spent 10 years in solitary confinement while in jail. After being freed in 2006, he rejoined Al Nahda and subsequently became the party’s secretary-general. • Moncef Marzouki, Advocate and Leader of the Congress for the Republic (CPR). Born in 1945, Marzouki is a medical doctor, author, and longtime human rights activist who was in exile in France for a decade before returning to Tunisia in January and announcing his intention to run for president. In 2001, Marzouki founded the CPR party on a platform of establishing the rule of law and promoting human rights. It was banned the following year. Congressional Research Service 16 Political Transition in Tunisia The Economy Damage from the December-January unrest, political uncertainty, turmoil in neighboring Libya (which caused the return of tens of thousands of migrant Tunisian workers and the related loss of remittance revenues), and economic stagnation in Europe have caused Tunisia’s estimated economic growth to plummet. Tunisia experienced a 3% economic contraction in the first quarter of 2011, and its central bank predicts an economic recession in 2011, compared to 3.7% growth in 2010.80 Credit rating agencies have severely lowered Tunisia’s ratings due to political uncertainty. The protests themselves reportedly caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, and officials estimate that the political transition has cost at least $2 billion in lost revenues; tourism receipts were reportedly down by 40% and foreign direct investment by 60% in the first six months of 2011.81 Ongoing labor unrest, particularly in regions of the interior, including phosphate mining areas, represents an additional potential economic obstacle, as do rising food and fuel prices. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) nonetheless suggested in April that improved economic growth was possible if reforms provide “greater access to opportunity and more competition.”82 Officials have sought to restart tourism, garner donor support for economic stabilization, and reassure investors by pledging greater economic transparency, with mixed effects. The interim government is also reportedly considering plans for greater economic decentralization. In April, Finance Minister Jalloul Ayed announced an “economic and social recovery plan” that aims to create 40,000 new jobs (through a combination of public sector hiring and pro-business measures), new infrastructure in the interior, access to microcredit for poor families, and a monthly stipend for unemployed young people. The finance minister has also appealed for $4 billion in immediate foreign loans, while Prime Minister Essebi stated in May that Tunisia would need at least $5 billion in aid per year over the next five years to finance infrastructure and job creation.83 Officials have suggested they will not seek to restructure Tunisia’s outside debt. Some commentators view donor perceptions of a weak interim government whose decision-making authorities are fragmented as an impediment to greater outside financial support.84 Authorities announced in June that they expect a strong domestic wheat crop in 2011, and that they plan to open up some land, particularly in the interior, to foreign investment. During Ben Ali’s presidency, many analysts contended that there was an implicit social contract between the government and its citizens, which promoted economic stability and middle-class standards of living at the expense of political freedom. Until the December-January protests, this strategy appeared to have contained latent dissatisfaction from disrupting the political status quo. Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and one of the best-performing non-oil exporting Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Despite the impact of the global 80 Bouazza ben Bouazza, “Tunisie: L’Economie a dépassé le cap dangereux, selon le gouverneur de la Banque centrale,” AP, July 9, 2011. 81 AFP, “Tunisie: Après le Retour au Calme, Place au Grand Chantier Economique,” March 9, 2011; Le Temps, “Appel des 17 Pour Soutenir la Transition Démocratique en Tunisie,” May 19, 2011; Mark Tran, “Tunisia Offers Wake-Up Call for Development,” The Guardian, June 9, 2011. 82 IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2011. 83 AP, “Tunisie: Adoption d’un Plan de Relance Economique,” April 1, 2011; Reuters, “Tunisia Will Need $4 Bln in Loans in 2011—FinMin,” April 1, 2011; Reuters, “Tunisia Economy Needs Foreign Help to Recover—Minister,” May 20, 2011; David Gauthier-Villars, “Tunisia to Seek Backing for Aid,” The Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2011. 84 OSC doc. GMP20110705966151, “Tunisia’s Economic Fallout,” July 5, 2011. Congressional Research Service 17 Political Transition in Tunisia economic crisis in 2009—which produced a decrease in exports, a contraction in the industrial sector, and a lower expansion in services, largely due to a decrease in market demand in Europe—the economy quickly rebounded with the government’s fiscal stimulus programs. Textile exports and tourism have driven much of Tunisia’s economic growth in recent years. The tourism sector is a major employer and provided some 11% of the country’s hard currency receipts, and an estimated 400,000 jobs, prior to recent unrest. Tunisia has also attempted to attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. Phosphate ore reserves are significant and are the basis of a chemicals industry, but their value is reduced by their low grade. In 2009, the World Bank cited Tunisia as a “top regional reformer,” citing progress in the areas of starting a business, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, and border defense.85 In September 2010, the IMF predicted that Tunisia’s growth could continue to increase gradually, “provided that policies and reforms planned by the authorities aimed at enhancing Tunisia’s competitiveness, developing new markets, and supporting new sources of growth in sectors with high added value bear fruit.”86 In 2009, public debt stood at roughly $22 billion, or about 47% of gross domestic product (GDP), according to the World Bank. At the same time, Tunisia’s strong economic record has long masked significant disparities. Wealth has long been concentrated in the capital and along the tourist-friendly eastern coast, while the interior has suffered from poverty and government neglect. Unemployment and underemployment are major problems, notably for recent college graduates: the official unemployment rate is high (over 13%) and the actual rate is believed to be even higher, particularly among young people. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the unemployment rate among university graduates was over 20% in 2010 and “increased by a factor of ten over the last two decades” due to “the youth bulge, high throughput in universities, mismatch in the demand and supply of skilled workers, and the relatively low quality of training received by many graduates.” Moreover, unemployment is over 22%, on average, in interior regions such as Kasserine and Gafsa, which were epicenters of the December-January unrest.87 Blatant official corruption under Ben Ali reinforced perceptions among many Tunisians that the economic deck was stacked against them, even if they enjoyed high living standards relative to others in the region. In light of these issues, analysts have debated the role that economic factors played in the Tunisian uprising. While most agree that a desire for greater democracy and individual freedoms was a driving force in the popular protests that drove Ben Ali from office, socioeconomic grievances doubtless spurred demands for change. In the aftermath of the uprising, numerous segments of the society have expressed economic demands, notably union organizers and residents in the interior. Indeed, demands for improvements in jobs and wages have soared even as political unrest has contributed to severe economic contractions. Some observers fear that a failure to address such grievances could lead an impatient public to lose faith in the transition process, while others contend that many Tunisians are willing to endure prolonged economic hardship in order to prioritize deep political reforms. 85 See World Bank, “Tunisia: A Top Regional Reformer According to Doing Business 2009,” September 2008. Joël Toujas-Bernate and Rina Bhattacharya, International Monetary Fund, “Tunisia Weathers Crisis Well, But Unemployment Persists,” September 10, 2010. 87 African Development Bank, The Revolution in Tunisia: Economic Challenges and Prospects, March 2011. 86 Congressional Research Service 18 Political Transition in Tunisia U.S.-Tunisian Relations Obama Administration officials have emphasized Tunisia’s role as an “important test case” of democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa, a process for which the Administration has expressed strong support.88 In a televised speech in May laying out a new framework for U.S. policy toward the region, President Obama cited Tunisia as the place where the “story of self-determination began” and called on the United States “to show that America values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of the dictator.” The President argued that “the stakes are high” in Tunisia and Egypt, but that “both nations can set a strong example through free and fair elections, a vibrant civil society, accountable and effective democratic institutions, and responsible regional leadership.”89 In congressional testimony in May, Assistant Secretary of State Michael H. Posner stated, “The United States is committed to helping secure a democratic transition that delivers results and sustainable economic development for all the people of Tunisia.”90 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice stated in an interview that “it matters enormously to American national security and our national interests” that democratic transitions in Tunisia and Egypt “succeed.”91 A number of senior U.S. officials have visited Tunisia since mid-January, including Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Joseph Burns and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.92 In May, President Obama met with Prime Minister Essebsi on the sidelines of the Group of Eight (G8) summit, where they discussed “the importance of moving forward with democratic reforms.”93 The United States and Tunisia have enjoyed continuous relations since 1797. Tunisia was the site of significant battles during World War II, and was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 in Operation Torch. A U.S. cemetery and memorial near the ancient city of Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a strongly pro-Western foreign policy despite a brief experiment with leftist economic policies in the 1960s. U.S.Tunisian ties were nonetheless strained in the mid-1980s by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.94 U.S.-Tunisian relations during Ben Ali’s presidency largely emphasized security cooperation. The United States considered Ben Ali to be an ally, a moderate Arab ruler, and a partner in 88 House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, “Developments in Egypt and Lebanon,” February 10, 2011, Statement of James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, Department of State. 89 The White House, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and Africa,” May 19, 2011. 90 Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, statement before the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia for a hearing on “Political Transitions in the Middle East,” May 5, 2011. 91 “U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Rice Interviewed on CNN,” May 19, 2011, transcript via CQ. 92 Clinton expressed strong support for the Tunisian revolution and pressed for economic and political reforms. Her visit was protested by several hundred demonstrators in Tunis who said they opposed American “interference.” John Thorne, “Hillary Clinton Visits Tunisia to Press for Reform,” The National, March 18, 2011. 93 “Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes and National Security Council Senior Director for European Affairs Liz Sherwood-Randall Hold Media Availability,” May 27, 2011, via CQ. 94 Chicago Tribune Wires, “Bush Visits Tunisia to Patch Relations,” March 9, 1986; Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987. Congressional Research Service 19 Political Transition in Tunisia international counterterrorism efforts. Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls at Tunis. Allegations have been made that Tunisia cooperated in at least one case of U.S. “rendition” of a terrorist suspect, in 2004.95 However, Tunisia did not support the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 Iraq war and, when the latter war began, Ben Ali expressed regret and fear that the conflict might destabilize the Middle East.96 Tunisian officials’ criticism was not voiced directly at the United States, and their stance did not significantly harm bilateral relations. Despite generally positive bilateral ties with the Ben Ali regime, U.S. officials occasionally voiced public criticism of Tunisia’s record on political rights and freedom of expression. The State Department was critical of the 2004 and 2009 elections and said the United States would continue to press for “political reform.”97 In a January 2010 speech on global Internet freedom, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton singled out Tunisia as one of five countries contributing to a “spike in threats to the free flow of information.”98 In July, the State Department expressed “deep” concern over “the decline in political freedoms, notably severe restrictions on freedom of expression in Tunisia,” particularly with regard to the sentencing of an independent journalist to four years in prison.99 In parallel with these criticisms, the United States continued to provide military and economic assistance to the Tunisian government (see “U.S. Assistance,” below). Numerous international and regional news reports and analyses have referenced internal communications among U.S. diplomats that were reportedly highly critical of political repression and corruption among Ben Ali’s inner circle and family. Some analysts have speculated that reports of such communications may have played a role in sparking the protests that eventually unseated Ben Ali.100 U.S.-Tunisian trade is relatively low in volume because Tunisia is a small country and conducts most of its trade with Europe. In 2010, U.S. exports to Tunisia totaled $571 million and imports totaled $405 million; in 2009, exports totaled $502 million and imports $326 million. While Tunisian imports of U.S. goods did not fluctuate significantly during the global economic recession, U.S. imports from Tunisia have yet to rebound to 2008 levels, when they totaled $644 million.101 Tunisia is eligible for special trade preferences, i.e., duty-free entry for listed products, under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Program. The United States and Tunisia have a trade investment framework agreement (TIFA) and a bilateral investment treaty. TIFAs can be the first step toward a free-trade agreement (FTA). 95 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, December 28, 2010, U.N. document A/HRC/16/51/Add.2. 96 Tunis Infotunisie, “Ben Ali Expresses ‘Deep Regret’ at Start of War Against Iraq,” March 20, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document AFP20030320000266. 97 U.S. State Department Daily News Briefing, October 26, 2009; U.S. State Department, “Tunisia,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004, released February 28, 2005. 98 U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks on Internet Freedom,” January 21, 2010. 99 U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, July 9, 2010. For further background on Boukadous’ sentencing, see Committee to Protect Journalists, “Tunisia Must Release Ailing Journalist on Hunger Strike,” October 21, 2010. 100 Christopher Alexander, “Tunisia’s Protest Wave: Where It Comes From and What It Means,” ForeignPolicy.com, January 3, 2011. 101 U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/query.asp. Congressional Research Service 20 Political Transition in Tunisia U.S. Reactions to the January 2011 Uprising U.S. criticism of the government’s response to the December-January demonstrations, although initially muted, grew increasingly critical of Ben Ali as the protests escalated. On January 11, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an interview with the Saudi-funded Arabic-language satellite television channel Al Arabiya that “we are worried, in general, about the unrest and the instability, and what seems to be the underlying concerns of the people who are protesting.”102 At the same time, Clinton stressed that “we are not taking sides,” and indicated that she had not been in direct communication with senior authorities since the protests began. In a speech in Doha, Qatar, on January 13, Secretary Clinton challenged Middle Eastern leaders to address the fundamental needs of their citizens and provide channels for popular participation, or else risk instability and extremism. Events in Tunisia provided a vivid backdrop to her remarks. After Ben Ali’s departure on January 14, President Barack Obama stated, “I condemn and deplore the use of violence against citizens peacefully voicing their opinion in Tunisia, and I applaud the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people.” He also called on the Tunisian government to hold “free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the true will and aspirations of the Tunisian people.”103 Secretary Clinton echoed the president’s call for elections and encouraged the Tunisian government to “build a stronger foundation for Tunisia’s future with economic, social, and political reforms,” adding that “the United States stands ready to help.”104 In his January 25 State of the Union address, President Obama stated, “[W]e saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator…. The United States of America stands with the people of Tunisia and supports the democratic aspirations of all people.” Several Members of Congress have expressed concerns that the United States appeared to lack sufficient intelligence on Middle East protest movements and their potential to upset governments in the region, concerns which executive branch officials have disputed.105 U.S. Assistance U.S. bilateral aid is modest by regional standards and was, until recently, highly focused on military assistance and counterterrorism cooperation (Table 1, below).106 The Obama Administration, which submitted its proposed FY2012 foreign assistance budget in early 2011, did not initially request any democracy and governance funding for Tunisia in FY2011 or FY2012, but the Administration subsequently identified a range of potential funding sources for providing support for Tunisia’s transition. The State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is currently leading related assistance efforts, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and others also administering new programs. MEPI has a regional office in Tunis, responsible for programming to enhance political, economic, and educational reforms in the region, but prior to 2011 implemented limited programs within Tunisia. The Administration also supports draft legislation that would authorize the President to establish a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund (see “Congress and Aid to Tunisia,” below).107 In early September, the Administration named William B. Taylor to coordinate U.S. development and other civilian aid to transitional countries in the Middle East and North Africa. 102 AFP, “US Concerned About Reports of ‘Excessive Force’ in Tunisia,” January 11, 2011; and U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Interviewed on Al Arabiya,” January 11, 2011, via Congressional Quarterly (CQ). 103 The White House, “Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011. 104 U.S. State Department, “Recent Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011. 105 Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on Worldwide Threats, February 10, 2011, via CQ. 106 U.S. State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2011 and FY2012. 107 Testimony of William J. Burns before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on “U.S. Policy and Uprisings in the Middle East,” March 17, 2011. Congressional Research Service 21 Political Transition in Tunisia Administration assistance initiatives include the following: • Approximately $23.3 million in “transition support” assistance administered by MEPI. This aid is aimed at helping Tunisia establish independent media, civil society, political parties, and a new electoral framework, and implement economic reforms.108 • USAID-administered funding in support of Tunisia’s political transition totals approximately $10 million.109 This includes $5 million in FY2010 Complex Crises Fund (CCF) funding, which is intended to support planned community development projects and political reforms in the interior and southeast.110 It also includes $2 million for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives and $3 million in support of the electoral process.111 • The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) plans to offer financial support in the form of direct loans, guarantees, and political risk insurance, and is already supporting two Tunisian private equity firms that are focused on small and medium-size businesses. OPIC will also support visits by American business investors.112 • The Administration has also provided humanitarian aid in response to the massive influx of refugees from neighboring Libya. Security Assistance In late May, General Carter Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), visited Tunisia on his first trip to North Africa since taking command in March. A U.S.-Tunisian Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held regularly. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reports that Tunisia relies on U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance to “maintain its aging 80s and early 90s era inventory of U.S.-origin equipment, which comprises nearly 70% of Tunisia’s total inventory.”113 According to private sector analysis, the United States is Tunisia’s primary supplier of military equipment, largely purchased through 108 State Department Congressional Notification Transmittal Sheets, March 11, 2011 and July 25, 2011. The MEPI funding, which is drawn from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, has partly come from funding appropriated in FY2010 for other purposes and reallocated for programs in Tunisia, subject to congressional notification ($18.3 million). MEPI also plans to support partnerships between Tunisian civil society groups and U.S. technology companies to enhance information and communications capacity. 109 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Michael H. Posner, May 5, 2011, op. cit. This figure appears to refer to FY2010 and FY2011 Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) funding that has been allocated toward Tunisia democracy and governance programming in 2011 (see Tunisia aid table, below). DCHA is generally not appropriated bilaterally. 110 CN#56, “United States Agency for International Development Advice of Program Change,” June 3, 2011. The notification referred to “an unanticipated opportunity to advance the Arab world’s first, and historic, democratic transition.” 111 Figures communicated to CRS by the State Department’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, September 2011. 112 U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks with Tunisia Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi,” March 17, 2011, via CQ. In congressional testimony, Assistant Secretary of State Michael H. Posner said OPIC would provide “up to $2 billion in financial support for private-sector investments in the Middle East and North Africa.” Statement before the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, “Political Transitions in the Middle East,” May 5, 2011. 113 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Tunisia Summary,” updated January 13, 2011. Congressional Research Service 22 Political Transition in Tunisia Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements.114 FMF and Defense Department-administered “Section 1206”115 security assistance funds have also provided Tunisia with equipment for border and coastal security, which the United States views as a key area of counterterrorism prevention. Since 2003, this equipment has included helicopters, machine guns, body armor and helmets, parachutes, and night vision devices for sniper rifles. Other equipment has been provided through the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, with plans to procure seven Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with $4.1 million in FY2008 PKO funds forfeited by Mauritania (which had been temporarily rendered ineligible for security assistance due to a military coup).116 Tunisia has also been one of the top 20 recipients of International Military Education and Training (IMET) since FY1994.117 In August 2011, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its plans to provide three new Section 1206 packages for Tunisia, which are intended to “build the capacity of Tunisia’s national military forces to conduct CT [counterterrorism] operations by providing equipment and training.” The assistance, totaling $20.9 million, is intended to provide maritime equipment and related operational training, land vehicles, and helicopter surveillance equipment.118 In July 2011 the State Department notified Congress of its intention to provide Tunisia with $1.43 million in FY2010 International Counter-Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds that were originally notified for Jordan. The Department plans to use the funds “to strengthen the criminal justice sector’s ability to combat corruption, implement judicial reforms and promote prison reforms.”119 Prior to 2011, Tunisia had not benefitted from significant INCLE funding. Tunisia is one of 10 countries participating in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), an interagency regional program aimed at helping North and West African countries better control their territory and strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities. The Defense Department allocated over $13 million between FY2007 and FY2009 for TSCTP-related military cooperation with Tunisia, including bilateral and multinational exercises, regional conferences, and Joint-Combined Exchange Training programs, which are conducted by U.S. special operations forces.120 Defense Department funds have also been allocated for programs designed to counter violent extremist messages. 114 Forecast International, International Military Markets—Middle East & Africa, “Tunisia: Section 3—Market Overview,” May 2009. 115 P.L. 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2006, Section 1206 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. For more information, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino. 116 This assistance is described as supporting the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). 117 DSCA, op. cit. 118 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Congressional Notification, August 25, 2011. 119 State Department Congressional Notification Transmittal Sheet, July 25, 2011. 120 Funding figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010. Congressional Research Service 23 Political Transition in Tunisia Table 1. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, Selected Accounts (appropriations, thousands of current dollars) FY2009 FMF FY2010 FY2011 Est. FY2012 Request 12,000 18,000 17,124 4,900 800 2,000 5,000 0 ESF (MEPI) - 18,324 5,000 ESF (USAID nonbilateral) - 830 1,700 1,945 1,950 1,675 INCLE 0 1,427 1,500 0 NADR 100 1,200 175 0 DCHA - 8,000 2,000 Not available IDA - - 100 Not available Section 1206 8,800 0 20,900 Not available Total, above allocations 23,400 51,726 53,749 6,575 ESF (Bilateral) IMET 0 Not available Not available Notes: FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ESF=Economic Support Funds; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; DCHA= Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance; IDA=International Disaster Assistance; Section 1206=Defense Department funds authorized for use in training and equipping foreign military forces for certain purposes. Items in italics refer to funding appropriated in FY2010 for other countries and purposes, then reallocated for Tunisia in 2011. This chart does not reflect funding allocated under TSCTP. Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2009-FY2012; communications from the State Department’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance; Defense Department Congressional Notification; CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino. Multilateral Assistance Several multilateral institutions that receive significant U.S. financial support have pledged economic aid for Tunisia during its transition process. The World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) have each pledged $500 million in budget support to Tunisia, which is aimed at providing emergency financial reserves while addressing regional disparities, reducing youth unemployment, and improving civil liberties and economic governance.121 AfDB President Donald Kaberuka indicated in early June that there is an additional $500 million in Tunisia aid “in the pipeline,” which he hoped would be disbursed by year’s end, while the World Bank said in May that it envisaged an additional $1 billion.122 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which also receives U.S. financial support, is considering extending aid to North African countries, potentially including Tunisia. In May, G8 countries pledged $20 billion 121 African Development Bank, “AfDB Supports Accountability in Tunisia,” May 20, 2011. African Development Bank, “AfDB and Tunisia Formally Sign USD 500M Budget Support Accord at Annual Meetings,” June 10, 2011; World Bank, “World Bank Group Announces Up to $6 Billion for Egypt and Tunisia,” May 30, 2011. 122 Congressional Research Service 24 Political Transition in Tunisia in aid for Tunisia and Egypt over three years, to be disbursed via multilateral banks such as the European Investment Bank.123 French President Nicolas Sarkozy indicated that an additional $10 billion would be provided for the two countries by Gulf states, and another $10 billion by the IMF.124 In September, the G8 pledged an additional $38 billion in new aid to transitional countries in the region, although reports indicated that little of the previously promised funding had materialized.125 Prime Minister Essebsi attended part of the G8 summit, where he appealed for “economic support for our march towards democracy.”126 Congress and Aid to Tunisia Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees foreign assistance funding and regularly authorizes arms sale proposals. There is also a congressional Tunisia Caucus. Some Members of Congress have advocated new assistance to support Tunisia’s transition to democracy and economic stabilization. For example, S. 618 (Kerry) and H.R. 2237 (Schiff) would authorize the President to establish a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund to promote private sector investment and improve corporate governance, among other aims. S. 1388 (Kerry) would express support for certain types of multilateral aid to North African countries undergoing political transitions that meet certain criteria, among other provisions. Other Members contend that budgetary cuts take precedence over new assistance programs, or that economic stability in Tunisia and elsewhere is best addressed via private sector engagement and/or support from other donors. Some have additionally pointed to uncertainties over the current and prospective nature of Tunisia’s government. The discussion regarding potential new assistance has proceeded amid larger federal budget debates and disagreements over funding priorities. The Senate report accompanying S. 1253, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, states that “expanded military assistance and cooperation with the Tunisian Armed Forces is an important component of a comprehensive U.S. policy to support the people and Government of Tunisia in its transition to democracy” and “urges the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to enhance and expand U.S. security assistance to Tunisia in order to strengthen the capacity of the Tunisian Armed Forces, in particular with regard to securing Tunisia’s land and maritime borders.”127 Congress was supportive of U.S. military assistance to Tunisia during the latter years of Ben Ali’s presidency. In an explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (enacted on March 11, 2009), appropriators directed the State Department to allocate $12 million in FMF assistance for Tunisia, far more than the State Department’s budget request for $2.6 million. At the same time, appropriators wrote in the explanatory statement that “restrictions on political freedom, the use of torture, imprisonment of dissidents, and persecution of journalists and human rights defenders are of concern and progress on these issues is necessary for the partnership between the United States and Tunisia to further strengthen.”128 In the 123 Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Springs, Deauville, May 26-27, 2011 (released on May 27, 2011). Liz Alderman, “Group of 8 Pledges $20 Billion Aid to Egypt and Tunisia,” The New York Times, May 27, 2011. 125 Liz Alderman, “G-8 Nations Pledge New Aid to Arab Spring Economies,” The New York Times, September 11, 2011. 126 Sebastian Moffett and William Horobin, “Tunisia’s Leaders Call for Aid to Maintain Momentum of ‘Arab Spring,’” May 27, 2011. 127 S.Rept. 112-26 (Title XII, Subtitle C, “United States-Tunisia Military-to-Military Cooperation,” June 22, 2011. 128 Congressional Record, February 23, 2009, p. H2417. 124 Congressional Research Service 25 Political Transition in Tunisia conference report accompanying P.L. 111-117, the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (enacted on December 16, 2009), appropriators directed the State Department to allocate $18 million in FMF for Tunisia, $3 million more than the requested amount. The conference report also allocated $2 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF)—the amount requested—for “programs and activities in southern Tunisia and to promote respect for human rights.”129 Foreign Relations Israel and the Palestinians Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia’s foreign ministry announced in September that it would support the Palestinians’ bid for a U.N. recognition of statehood.130 Tunisia had an interests office in Israel until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah, or uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Israelis of Tunisian descent are allowed to travel to Tunisia on Israeli passports, and the Israeli and Tunisian foreign ministers sometimes meet. In September 2005, President Ben Ali sent a personal letter to then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, praising his “courageous” withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Israel’s then-foreign minister, who was born in Tunisia, and thencommunications minister attended the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunisia in 2005. (Then-Prime Minister Sharon was invited along with leaders of all U.N. member states; his invitation provoked demonstrations in Tunisia.) Europe Tunisia and the European Union (EU) have cemented a close relationship by means of an Association Agreement, aid, and loans. At the same time, EU leaders periodically expressed concerns over Tunisia’s record on human rights and political freedom under Ben Ali.131 More than 60% of Tunisia’s trade is conducted with Europe.132 The Association Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and went into effect on January 1, 2008, eliminates customs tariffs and other trade barriers on manufactured goods, and provides for the establishment of an EU-Tunisia free trade area in goods, but not in agriculture or services. Negotiations on the provision of “advanced status” for Tunisia vis-à-vis the EU, which would provide greater trade benefits, are expected to be taken up again after elections.133 Tunisia receives aid from the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) program and soft loans from the European Investment Bank, the financing arm of the EU. The Europeans hope that their aid will help Tunisia to progress economically, and thereby eliminate some causes of illegal immigration and Islamic fundamentalism. 129 Congressional Record, December 8, 2009, p. H14350. UMCI News, “Tunisia Strongly Supports The Palestinian-UN Bid,” September 12, 2011. 131 See, e.g., AFP, “EU Calls for Release of Tunisian Protesters,” January 10, 2011. 132 World Trade Organization, Tunisia Profile, October 2010. 133 Haykel Tlili, “Chômage: L’Union Européenne Prépare une Task Force pour la Tunisie,” Le Temps, August 23, 2011. See European Commission, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, Tunisia, at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/tunisia/tunisia_en.htm. 130 Congressional Research Service 26 Political Transition in Tunisia EU officials have focused high-level attention on Tunisia since Ben Ali’s departure. The EU has imposed targeted sanctions against 48 individuals associated with the former regime (many of them members of the extended Ben Ali and Trabelsi families)134 and has promised new economic, trade, and governance assistance while seeking to ensure that Tunisia’s previous commitments, such as the prevention of illegal emigration, will be maintained in the post-Ben Ali era.135 Relations with Italy were strained in February when thousands of Tunisian migrants began arriving by boat to Italy’s southern Lampedusa island; Tunisia rejected direct Italian intervention but indicated it would cooperate with Europe on stemming illicit population flows. In early April, Tunisia and Italy agreed to increase police cooperation and ease compulsory repatriations. Italy also pledged over 200 million euros in aid and credit lines to help block departures and create jobs to dissuade potential migrants; Italy has also provided Tunisia with maritime patrol equipment.136 The EU, meanwhile, in April approved agreements relaxing tariffs on imports from certain North African countries, including Tunisia. Relations between the interim government and France were strained over French support for Ben Ali, which was extended even as his security forces cracked down on pro-democracy protesters. French authorities have sought to reassure the interim government by refusing to offer Ben Ali exile, replacing the French ambassador to Tunisia, announcing an asset freeze targeting members of the Ben Ali family, dispatching senior officials on state visits, and pledging €425 million (over $600 million) in bilateral aid, in addition to French support for multilateral assistance.137 Regional Relations Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors, although Ben Ali’s entente with neighboring Libya’s Muammar al Qadhafi was strained. Although it declined to participate militarily in U.S. and NATO military operations in Libya, Tunisia’s interim government has been supportive of the transition there. Tunisia reportedly froze assets belonging to Qadhafi’s family, and the interim government recognized Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) on August 21.138 Tunisian authorities appear to hope that an end to turmoil in Libya will stabilize border areas (which were shelled by Qadhafi’s forces during the conflict, and which are the site of massive refugee flows) and, eventually, produce an economic rebound that would allow Libya to reabsorb some of Tunisia’s low-skilled labor surplus.139 Algeria and Morocco have been supportive of Tunisia’s post-Ben Ali government: Algeria has offered financial assistance, while Morocco and Tunisia signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement in May 2011. Tunisia is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union, established in 1989 by 134 See Council Regulation (EU) No. 101/2011 of 4 February 2011 Concerning Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons, Entities and Bodies in View of the Situation in Tunisia.” 135 While some migrants are Tunisian, many are Sub-Saharan Africans who traverse Tunisia in search of passage to Europe. Concerns over immigration have heightened with the flow of Libyans across the border and to southern Italy. 136 Reuters, “Italy, Tunisia Sign Deal to Ease Migrant Crisis,” April 5, 2011. 137 On French bilateral aid, see G8 Summit, “The Deauville Partnership: Helping the Arab Countries in Their Transition to Free and Democratic Societies,” Deauville, May 27, 2011. 138 The previous week, Tunisia reportedly hosted Libyan rebel-government talks.U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, August 15, 2011. The main political parties in Tunisia supported the government’s decision to recognize the CNT. AFP, “Tunisie: Des Parties Politiques Saluent la ‘Nouvelle Libye,’” August 22, 2011. 139 Marie-Christine Corbier, “En Tunisie, le Patronat Voit la Libye Nouvelle comme une ‘Bouffée d’Oxygène,’” Les Echos, August 30, 2011. Congressional Research Service 27 Political Transition in Tunisia Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, though the organization is inactive due to tensions between Morocco and Algeria. Tunisia has free-trade agreements with Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Libya.140 In September, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Tunisia as the first stop on a tour of countries affected by democratic uprisings. Tunis is also the temporary headquarters location of the African Development Bank (AfDB), which receives significant financial support from the United States. It was moved to Tunisia in 2005 due to civil unrest in Côte d’Ivoire, its permanent location. Outlook Tunisians face a wide range of questions regarding their country’s future and that of the region. Recent events, including widening political contestation and unrest across the Middle East and North Africa also raise potential issues for Congress pertaining to the oversight of U.S.-Tunisian bilateral relations, foreign assistance, and broader U.S. policy priorities in the Middle East. Questions include 140 • To what extent is Tunisia a “test-case” for democratic transitions in the Middle East? To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. policy in the region? • What is the potential for free, fair, and well-managed elections? What is to be the mandate, mode of operation, and duration of the National Constituent Assembly, which is expected to be elected on October 24? • Is Tunisia likely to experience political stability in the medium term, or do continued protests and insecurity remain significant threats? Do Ben Ali and/or elements of the former regime continue to influence events in Tunisia? What is the role of the military in steering political developments? • What will the future Tunisian government and political order look like? Is a consensus among Islamist and secularist political factions possible? Will there be a free and independent press and civil society in Tunisia? • Which individuals and groups currently enjoy significant popular credibility in Tunisia, and what are their likely courses of action? What steps are various groups doing to position themselves in the public eye ahead of elections? What coalitions among political and interest groups are likely? • What is the potential medium-term impact of recent events on foreign investment and economic growth in Tunisia and the region? Are the interim government’s economic policies appropriate and effective? What steps are being taken to address regional economic disparities within Tunisia? • What has been the impact of U.S. public statements and actions related to Tunisia, and what are the prospects for future U.S. influence on the evolution of events? How, if at all, should the U.S. government reshape its assistance programs for Tunisia in response to recent and continuing events? What course of U.S. action is most likely to fulfill foreign policy and national security goals? EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008. Congressional Research Service 28 Political Transition in Tunisia Author Contact Information Alexis Arieff Analyst in African Affairs aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459 Acknowledgments This report includes analysis by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle 29 Congressional Research Service Political Transition in Tunisia Recent Developments New Prime Minister and Transition “Road Map” On February 27, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi (a holdover from the former regime) stepped down amid a resurgence of anti-government demonstrations. He was replaced by Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman from the administration of founding President Habib Bourguiba. Several other government ministers also announced their resignations, including the two last remaining holdovers from the former regime as well as two opposition party leaders. During the week, tens of thousands of protesters had rallied in Tunis to call for Ghannouchi’s dismissal and a new interim government. Some reportedly shouted, “We don’t want the friends of Ben Ali!”1 The protests turned violent on February 26, and rioters attacked the Interior Ministry with knives and stones, according to news reports. Five protesters were reportedly killed and 16 security officers injured. In his first public appearance as prime minister, Essebsi stated that his priorities would be to address security, reverse the economic crisis, and “to restore the prestige of the state.”2 His is Tunisia’s third interim government since Ben Ali’s departure on January 14, 2011. On March 3, Interim President Fouad Mebazaa announced a new transition “road map,” in which Tunisians will vote on July 24 to select a “National Constituent Assembly.” The Assembly will, in turn, be responsible for promulgating a new constitution ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections, which have not been scheduled. The parliament, which was dominated by supporters of the former regime, voted on February 9 to allow Interim President Mebazaa to rule by decree and has since suspended its activities. Mebazaa is expected to step down after the July vote. 3 On April 12, the members of the government’s High Commission on Political Reform adopted a new electoral law, pending Interim President Mebazaa’s signature, which is expected to serve as the framework for the July 2011 election. The law sets out a one-round voting system based on proportional representation, and includes a 50% reservation for women on party lists.4 Members of the government, regional governors, judges, and local officials cannot run as candidates unless they resign their posts. The law also bars former senior RCD officials (defined as those who occupied a “position of responsibility” in the Ben Ali government or who signed a petition supporting Ben Ali’s bid for the 2014 presidential election) from running.5 Interim authorities appear to be sincerely attempting to respond to the public’s demands for a transformation of the political system based on broad consultations, and the announcement of the transition road map was greeted as a victory by the protest movement. However, many questions remain concerning its implementation. These include the duration, mandate, authorities, and mode of operation of the Constituent Assembly once it is elected. As discussed below (“Reform Efforts”), debates over the implementation of reforms continue. Another central challenge facing 1 Reuters, “Tunisia Forces Fire in Air, Fail to End Rally,” February 20, 2011. Tarek Amara, “Tunisian Interim PM to Appoint New Government,” Reuters, March 4, 2011. 3 CRS communications with Tunisian government representative, April 2011. 2 4 Previously, Tunisia had a 25% female reservation requirement for party lists in parliamentary elections. According to news reports, the women’s representation provision was supported by the main Islamist party, Al Nahda. 5 TAP, “Decree-Law on Constituent Assembly’s Election Adopted,” April 12, 2011. Congressional Research Service 1 Political Transition in Tunisia Tunisia’s interim government is how to assert control over the size and mandate of the domestic security services, which formed a vast and repressive network under Ben Ali, without sowing the seeds of future instability (see “The Security Forces,” below). In late March, Interior Minister Ferhat Rajhi, who had been seen as a popular reformist in the interim government, was dismissed and replaced with Habib Essid, a longtime civil servant who served in the Interior Ministry under Ben Ali. The decision sparked controversy, as Essid was seen by some as too close to Ben Ali. Prime Minister Essebsi defended the appointment as “in the general interest” and disputed the idea that Essid “constitutes a symbol of the former regime,” without further explanation.6 While the number of protesters in Tunis has declined since late February, public demonstrations over various issues remain common. Labor strikes and localized demonstrations over wages, quality of life issues, and access to land and jobs have also surged, and some have led to rioting and violence.7 Islamist groups have demonstrated for the repeal of secularist regulations (such as those barring women from wearing the headscarf in public buildings) and against prostitution (which, unusually for the region, is legal in Tunisia). Although ongoing protests are evidence that Tunisians are exploring new-found freedoms of expression and assembly, they have also led some to fear that vast and divided expectations could undermine Tunisia’s ability to make steady process on institutional reforms. 8 Mebazaa has appealed for “patience” from those demanding wage increases and better living conditions. 9 Since Ben Ali’s departure, the government’s response to protests has been relatively tempered, with security forces largely relying on nonlethal crowd-control tactics, and the focus of security forces has turned toward containing disorder. However, in some instances, police have reportedly assaulted protesters and journalists. Reform Efforts Government officials have promised a range of reforms. Thousands of individuals identified as political prisoners have been released from prison, including over a thousand released under an amnesty decree approved on February 18, and prisons have been opened up to international human rights observers.10 Dozens of new political parties have been authorized. Many online restrictions have been lifted, and the media (along with citizen activists) are exploring vast new freedoms. The dismantling of the former regime’s security apparatus is ongoing, and the Interior Ministry announced on March 7 that it was dissolving the State Security Division and other elements of the “political police.” The number of affected personnel and their future status have not been made public. The former ruling party, the Rally for Constitutional Democracy (RCD), has been dissolved and its funds liquidated, and several former party officials and Ben Ali associates have been arrested.11 As noted above, the electoral law is being significantly revised. 6 Kapitalis, “Caid Essebsi S’Explique sur la Nomination de Habib Essid,” April 6, 2011; CRS communications with Tunisian government representative, April 2011. 7 Some rights advocates have accused members of the former regime’s security apparatus of infiltrating demonstrations to provoke violence. See Eric Goldstein/Human Rights Watch, “Dismantling the Machinery of Oppression,” The Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2011. 8 Soumaya Ghannoushi, “The Story of Tunisia Today,” The Guardian, February 16, 2011. 9 Reuters, “Tunisia Struggles to Tame Revolutionary Spirit,” February 15, 2011. 10 Analysts have pointed to the difficulty in distinguishing prisoners of conscience from suspects who may have been sentenced without due process, including under Tunisia’s heavy-handed terrorism laws. Many former terrorist suspects have been released, but an unknown number, estimated at “a dozen” in one news report, continue to be detained. Le Monde, “Tunisie: Tous les Prisonniers Politiques Auraient Eté Libérés,” March 2, 2011. 11 Agence Tunis Afrique Presse (TAP), :Former RCD Party SG Arrested,” April 12, 2011; TAP, "Committal Order (continued...) Congressional Research Service 2 Political Transition in Tunisia The interim government has formed working committees to: 1. Advise on political and legal reforms; 2. Investigate recent human rights violations, including those committed by security forces during the December-January protests; and 3. Investigate corruption by the former ruling elite. While broad propositions of political reform have been welcomed, Tunisians have struggled with how to resolve differences of opinion over reform priorities, the relative legitimacy of various leaders, and the details of implementation. A persistent question is whether the interim authorities have sufficient space and credibility to sell proposed reforms to the public, as political and civic factions regularly threaten to return to street demonstrations if their demands are not met. Some political parties have contested the electoral timetable contained in the transition roadmap, which they fear won’t allow sufficient time to organize. One analyst recently noted that “the lack of revolutionary leadership and the late entry of the political parties into the revolution mean that there is no group able to negotiate political reforms in the revolution’s name. Groups claiming to represent the people have been proliferating, yet they offer significantly different visions.”12 The reform committees thus continue to face contestation over their membership, perceived representativeness, and mandate. For example, the work of the political reform commission was suspended twice, once due to disputes over its composition and the second time after members clashed with the chairman over whether to issue a statement condemning the appointment of the new Interior Minister in March.13 Some press freedom advocates have criticized a draft press law circulated by the political reform commission, which they say was drawn up without sufficient consultation with journalists. The work of the anti-corruption commission was suspended in March, pending challenges to its legal status, although investigations led by prosecutorial officials are ongoing. The public prosecutor has announced an investigation into the financial and real estate holdings of Ben Ali; his wife, Leila Trabelsi; and selected family members. Members of the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families reportedly own or control many of the country’s biggest companies, and are thought to have stashed away significant resources overseas.14 On January 26, the interim government issued an international arrest warrant through Interpol for Ben Ali, his wife Leila Trabelsi, and several close relatives who have fled the country.15 Dozens of extended family members have reportedly been arrested inside Tunisia since January; in March, a brother-in-law of the former president was convicted to two months in prison and a $32 million fine for customs violations related to his clothing business. 16 These efforts are perceived to be widely popular (...continued) Against Former Minister Under Ben Ali Abderrahim Zouari,” April 13, 2011; AFP, “Tunisie: Détention de Trois Proches Collaborateurs de Ben Ali,” March 12, 2011. 12 Asma Nouira, “Obstacles on the Path of Tunisia’s Democratic Transformation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Arab Reform Bulletin, March 30, 2011. 13 AFP, “Tunisia’s New Electoral Chief Threatens to Resign,” March 30, 2011. 14 Colin Freeman, “Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and His Family’s ‘Mafia Rule,’” The Telegraph (UK), January 16, 2011. 15 In mid-April, Tunisian prosecutors announced at least 18 charges against Ben Ali, including murder, conspiracy, trafficking, and drug use. Congressional Research Service 3 Political Transition in Tunisia among ordinary Tunisians; in the days before Ben Ali’s exit, protesters attacked and looted luxury homes belonging to members of the ruling elite. Individuals targeted in corruption probes have been restricted from foreign travel. Western governments are cooperating with Tunisian efforts to pursue members of the former president’s family: France, Switzerland, and the European Union have initiated asset freezes, while Canada has revoked the citizenship of Ben Ali’s brother-in-law. It is unclear what position Saudi Arabia, which granted sanctuary to Ben Ali and some members of his family, will take; Tunisian authorities have sought his extradition to face charges related to the crackdown on protesters, so far unsuccessfully. On February 18, news reports alleged that Ben Ali was in a Saudi hospital after suffering a stroke. Security Concerns Although the security situation has stabilized relative to the chaotic days that immediately followed Ben Ali’s departure, there continue to be reports of vandalism, looting, and activities by armed gangs. As noted above, anti-government protests turned violent on February 26 and culminated in an assault on the Interior Ministry building. Interim government officials blamed a previous attack on the Interior Ministry, on February 1, on a conspiracy by members of the former regime’s security forces. Authorities are also struggling with the influx of tens of thousands of refugees from Libya, which has created a humanitarian crisis along the border. The police leadership was purged following the February 1 attack. However, suspicions remain that elements of the security services are seeking to provoke disorder. 17 The interim government has extended the “state of emergency” imposed by Ben Ali during the initial wave of protests (though its provisions barring the public assembly of more than three persons have not been enforced), and has called up military reservists to assist with security operations. Over 11,300 “delinquents” have been arrested since February 1, 2011, for looting, theft, destruction of property, drug trafficking, or “terrorizing civilians,” according to the Interior Ministry.18 Incidents of religiously motivated violence have also been reported, including the murder of a Polish priest on February 18 and harassment directed at Tunisia’s tiny Jewish population. These acts were condemned by the interim authorities and leaders of Tunisia’s main Islamist movement, Hizb Al Nahda, as well as by hundreds of Tunisians who demonstrated on February 19 in favor of a secular state. The Interior Ministry stated that the priest’s killing appeared to have been carried out by “extremist terrorist fascists,” and that those responsible would be severely punished. 19 Some analysts fear that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional affiliate of Al Qaeda (see “Terrorism,” below), could take advantage of the uprising and subsequent insecurity. AQIM released a statement in January hailing the departure of Ben Ali and warning against (...continued) 16 Reuters, “Factbox—Tunisia’s Ex-First Family and Its Vast Riches,” January 19, 2011; AP, “Two Killed in New Protest Violence in Tunisia; Brother-in-Law of Ousted President Convicted,” March 11, 2011; Reuters, “Ben Ali Brother Arrested in Tunisia: Report,” April 10, 2011. 17 Tara Bahrampour, “In Tunisia, First Steps Toward Democracy,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2011. 18 AP, “Tunisie: Arrestations de Plus de 11.300 Délinquents Ayant ‘Terrorisé’ la Population,” April 12, 2011. 19 Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia: Government, Islamist Party Condemn Grisly Slaying of Catholic Priest,” The Associated Press (AP), February 19, 2011. Congressional Research Service 4 Political Transition in Tunisia supposed U.S. and French efforts to subvert the revolution. Al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman Al Zawahri, also released a statement that sought to portray uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as motivated by Islamist sentiment and warned that the United States would seek to manipulate the outcomes. 20 Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in power since 1987, fled the country for Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011, following weeks of mounting anti-government protests. Tunisia’s popular uprising, dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution,” appears to have inspired reform and opposition movements in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, and other countries. The pro-democracy movement has been internationally heralded, but the wave of protests across the Middle East has also sparked international concern over stability in a region associated with previously secure, autocratic, pro-Western regimes. Figure 1. Map of Tunisia The unexpected and rapid transition in Tunisia raises a wide range of questions for the future of the country and the region. Questions for U.S. policy include: 20 • To what extent is Tunisia a “testcase” for democratic transitions in the Middle East? • To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. policy in the region? • How, if at all, should the U.S. government reshape its assistance programs for Tunisia in response to recent and continuing events? • What has been the impact to date of U.S. public statements and actions? • What are the prospects for future U.S. influence on the evolution of events? • What course of U.S. action will be most likely to fulfill foreign policy and national security goals? Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS Maamoun Youssef, “Al-Qaida's No. 2 Incites Tunisians, Egyptians,” AP, February 28, 2011. Congressional Research Service 5 Political Transition in Tunisia The December-January Protests Anti-government protests began in Tunisia’s interior in mid-December 2010. Public demonstrations had previously been very rare in Tunisia, where state repression and the close surveillance of dissidents have traditionally been effective at curbing the expression of anti-government views. The demonstrations initially seemed to stem from discontent related to high unemployment, but quickly spiraled into an unprecedented popular challenge to Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime. From the start, protesters appeared to lack a central leader and were not necessarily aligned with a pre-existing political or ideological movement. Unrest was first reported on December 17 in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street vendor set himself on fire to protest police interference and a lack of economic opportunities. He died in early January in a Tunis hospital. By late December, the protests had spread to the nearby cities of Kasserine and Thala, as well as other urban centers. On January 12, riots erupted in the capital, Tunis. The military deployed to the streets and a national curfew was imposed. The following day, rioters ransacked a private home belonging to one of Ben Ali’s wealthy relatives in the beach community of Hammamet, underscoring the deep antipathy many Tunisians felt toward members of the ruling elite. Authorities imposed a state of emergency on January 14, prohibiting gatherings of over three people and authorizing the use of force against “any suspect person who does not obey orders to stop.”21 As the demonstrations mounted in early January, police repeatedly opened fire on crowds and arrested protesters, journalists, opposition party members, lawyers, and rights advocates. Some detainees were reportedly tortured.22 According to the United Nations, over 200 people were killed in the uprising.23 On January 18, then-Prime Minister Ghannouchi said on television that he had instructed the security forces not to open fire on demonstrators, and promised that “all those who initiated this massacre, this carnage, will be brought to justice.”24 Interim President Mebazaa has referred to those who died in the uprising as “the martyrs of dignity and freedom,” and three days of national mourning were held in their honor.25 The government has also pledged to compensate victims’ families. Prior to his exile, Ben Ali offered a widening series of concessions on political and civil rights in an effort to stem the anti-government uprising. The president reshuffled his cabinet, replaced the governor of the Sidi Bouzid region and the interior minister, and promised 300,000 new jobs. At the same time, he initially maintained that police had used their weapons only in “legitimate defense” against attacks by demonstrators, and accused protest leaders of being foreign-influenced “extremists” and terrorists.26 On January 13, Ben Ali gave an address on national television in which he pledged to step down when his term was up in 2014, to allow fresh parliamentary elections before then, and to end state censorship. However, these promises did not placate demonstrators, who continued to press for Ben Ali’s immediate resignation and the dissolution of the ruling party. Mohamed Ghannouchi, who had served as prime minister since 1999, initially assumed power in Ben Ali’s absence. On January 15, Ghannouchi turned over the role of acting president to the speaker of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, in line with constitutional prerogatives.27 The first interim cabinet, which was announced on January 17, was immediately revealed to be unstable as members of the public accused opposition leaders and civil society members of being overly conciliatory to elements of the former regime. A day after being appointed, the trade union members of the interim government withdrew, along with an opposition party leader, and demonstrators called for the complete dissolution of Ben Ali’s RCD party. Mebazaa, Ghannouchi, and other RCD members in the cabinet formally resigned from the party, but this did not bring an end to demonstrations. In late January, new waves of protesters streamed 21 Tunisia 7 Television, “Tunisian Authorities Declare State of Emergency,” January 14, 2011, via Open Source Center. Reuters, “Interview-UN Rights Boss Urges Tunisia to Probe Killings,” January 13, 2011. 23 As of February 1, the United Nations estimated that at least 219 people were killed, including 72 killed in prison fires. 24 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Tunisia Unity Government Fractures,” The New York Times, January 18, 2011. 22 25 National Tunisian TV (Tunis), “Tunisian Acting President Promises to ‘Protect Will of the People,’” January 19, 2011, via Open Source Center. 26 Global Insight, “Unrest in Tunisia Highlights Underlying Troubles,” January 7, 2011; Agence France Presse (AFP), “Tunisia Leader Slams ‘Terrorist Acts,’ Pledges More Jobs,” January 10, 2011. 27 Article 57 of Tunisia’s constitution states that “should the office of President of the Republic become vacant because of death, resignation, or absolute disability,” the President of the Chamber of Deputies “shall immediately be vested with the functions of interim president of the republic for a period ranging from 45 to 60 days.” The Article further stipulates that elections should be held during that time period to elect a new president for a five-year term, and that the interim president may not stand as a candidate. Congressional Research Service 6 Political Transition in Tunisia into the capital from poorer, rural areas—including the town of Sidi Bouzid, where demonstrations first began—and organized a sit-in around the prime minister’s office. This pressure prompted the announcement of a new cabinet on January 27, which initially quieted anti-government unrest, until its resurgence in mid-February over Ghannouchi’s continuation as prime minister. Relations with the United States The United States and Tunisia have enjoyed continuous relations since 1797. Tunisia was the site of significant battles during World War II, and was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 as part of Operation Torch. A U.S. cemetery and memorial near the ancient city of Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a strongly proWestern foreign policy despite a brief experiment with leftist economic policies in the 1960s. U.S.-Tunisian ties were nonetheless strained in the mid-1980s by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.28 U.S.-Tunisian relations during Ben Ali’s presidency largely emphasized security cooperation. The United States considered Ben Ali to be an ally, a moderate Arab ruler, and a partner in international counterterrorism efforts. Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls at Tunis. Allegations have been made that Tunisia cooperated in at least one case of U.S. “rendition” of a terrorist suspect, in 2004.29 However, Tunisia did not support the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 war against Iraq and, when the 2003 war in Iraq began, Ben Ali expressed regret and fear that the conflict might destabilize the Middle East.30 Tunisian officials’ criticism was not voiced directly at the United States, and their stance did not significantly harm bilateral relations. Despite generally positive bilateral ties with the Ben Ali regime, U.S. officials occasionally publicly criticized Tunisia’s record on political rights and freedom of expression. The State Department was critical of the 2004 and 2009 elections and said the United States would continue to press for “political reform.”31 In a January 2010 speech on global Internet freedom, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton singled out Tunisia as one of five countries contributing to a “spike in threats to the free flow of information.”32 In July, the State Department expressed “deep” concern over “the decline in political freedoms, notably severe restrictions on freedom of expression in Tunisia,” particularly with regard to the sentencing of an independent journalist to four years in 28 Chicago Tribune Wires, “Bush Visits Tunisia to Patch Relations,” March 9, 1986; Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987. 29 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, December 28, 2010, U.N. document A/HRC/16/51/Add.2. 30 Tunis Infotunisie, “Ben Ali Expresses ‘Deep Regret’ at Start of War Against Iraq,” March 20, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document AFP20030320000266. 31 U.S. State Department Daily News Briefing, October 26, 2009, via CQ; U.S. State Department, “Tunisia,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004, released February 28, 2005. 32 U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks on Internet Freedom,” January 21, 2010; via CQ. Congressional Research Service 7 Political Transition in Tunisia prison.33 In parallel with these expressions of concern, the United States continued to provide military and economic assistance to the Tunisian government (see “U.S. Assistance,” below). Numerous international and regional news reports and analyses have referenced internal communications among U.S. diplomats that were reportedly highly critical of political repression and corruption among Ben Ali’s inner circle and family. Some analysts have speculated that reports of such communications may have played a role in sparking anti-government protests that eventually unseated Ben Ali. 34 The United States criticized Tunisia’s repression of the protesters, and since Ben Ali’s departure has conveyed support for the uprising and new interim government (see “The U.S. Response to Recent Events,” below). In March 2011, Tunisia’s interim government, while not explicitly opposing U.S. and NATO military operations in Libya, stated that it would be “out of the question” for Tunisia to contribute militarily.35 Tunisia reportedly froze assets belonging to family of Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi, and its overall stance does not appear to have harmed U.S. ties. U.S.-Tunisian trade is relatively low in volume because Tunisia is a small country and conducts most of its trade with Europe. In 2009, the United States imported $325.8 million in goods from Tunisia and exported $502.1 million in goods to Tunisia. While Tunisian imports of U.S. goods did not fluctuate significantly due to the global economic recession, U.S. imports from Tunisia nearly halved between 2008 and 2009.36 Tunisia is eligible for special trade preferences, that is, duty-free entry for listed products, under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Program. The United States and Tunisia have a trade investment framework agreement (TIFA) and a bilateral investment treaty. TIFAs can be the first step toward a free-trade agreement (FTA). The U.S. Response to Recent Events U.S. criticism of the government’s response to the December-January demonstrations, although initially muted, mounted as the protests grew. On January 7, the State Department released a statement relaying concern about the demonstrations and government Internet surveillance. The statement called on “all parties to show restraint as citizens exercise their right of public assembly” and noted that U.S. officials had “conveyed our views directly to the Tunisian government.”37 In response, the Tunisian government summoned U.S. Ambassador Gordon Gray to protest the United States’ characterization of events. On January 11, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an interview with the Saudi-funded Arabic-language satellite television channel Al Arabiya that “we are worried, in general, about the unrest and the instability, and what seems to be the underlying concerns of the people who are protesting.”38 At the same time, Clinton stressed that “we are not taking sides,” and indicated that 33 U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, July 9, 2010. For further background on Boukadous’ sentencing, see Committee to Protect Journalists, “Tunisia Must Release Ailing Journalist on Hunger Strike,” October 21, 2010. 34 Christopher Alexander, “Tunisia’s Protest Wave: Where It Comes From and What It Means,” ForeignPolicy.com, January 3, 2011. 35 Reuters, “Tunisia Won’t Join Military Intervention in Libya,” March 18, 2011. 36 U.S. International Trade Commission data. 37 U.S. State Department, “Recent Protests and Website Hackings in Tunisia,” January 7, 2011. 38 AFP, “US Concerned About Reports of ‘Excessive Force’ in Tunisia,” January 11, 2011; and U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Interviewed on Al Arabiya,” January 11, 2011, via Congressional Quarterly (CQ). Congressional Research Service 8 Political Transition in Tunisia she had not been in direct communication with senior authorities since the protests began. In a speech in Doha, Qatar, on January 13, Secretary Clinton challenged Middle Eastern leaders to address the fundamental needs of their citizens and provide channels for popular participation, or else risk facing instability and extremism. Events in Tunisia provided a vivid backdrop to her remarks. After Ben Ali’s departure on January 14, President Barack Obama stated, “I condemn and deplore the use of violence against citizens peacefully voicing their opinion in Tunisia, and I applaud the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people.” He also called on the Tunisian government to hold “free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the true will and aspirations of the Tunisian people.”39 Secretary Clinton echoed the president’s call for elections and encouraged the Tunisian government to “build a stronger foundation for Tunisia’s future with economic, social, and political reforms,” adding that “the United States stands ready to help.”40 On January 22, the State Department announced it had revoked the diplomatic visas of former Tunisian government officials and their family members, who were no longer entitled to them. 41 In his January 25 State of the Union address, President Obama stated: [W]e saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator…. The United States of America stands with the people of Tunisia and supports the democratic aspirations of all people. In testimony on February 10 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg noted that Tunisia would “serve as an important test case…. the people of the region are watching closely to see how Tunisia navigates the challenging transition to democratic governance.” He added, “We fully support this effort,” and listed free and fair elections, “vibrant” political parties, and free media as key ingredients in a successful transition. 42 The State Department has maintained close contact with interim authorities since Ben Ali’s departure. On January 22, Secretary of State Clinton called then-Prime Minister Ghannouchi to express support for reforms. 43 From January 24 through January 26, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, traveled to Tunisia to meet with government officials, political party leaders, and civil society members. This was followed by a visit in late February by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Joseph Burns. In mid-March, Hillary Clinton visited Tunisia and met with Mebazaa and other senior officials. 44 Several Members of Congress have expressed concerns that the United States appeared to lack sufficient intelligence on Middle East protest movements and their potential to upset governments in the region, concerns which executive branch officials have disputed.45 Congressman Howard 39 The White House, “Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011. U.S. State Department, “Recent Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011. 41 U.S. Embassy, Tunisia, “Revocation of Diplomatic Visas,” January 22, 2011. 42 House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, “Developments in Egypt and Lebanon,” February 10, 2011, Statement of James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, Department of State. 43 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Clinton’s Call to Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi,” January 23, 2011. 44 Clinton expressed strong support for the Tunisian revolution and pressed for economic and political reforms. Her visit was protested by several hundred demonstrators in Tunis who said they opposed American “interference.” John Thorne, “Hillary Clinton Visits Tunisia to Press for Reform,” The National, March 18, 2011. 45 Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on (continued...) 40 Congressional Research Service 9 Political Transition in Tunisia Berman, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has urged the executive branch to assist Tunisia’s interim authorities in locating and seizing assets linked to the Ben Ali regime, as several other governments have pledged to do.46 The Wall Street Journal reported on February 9 that U.S. investigators had opened a preliminary probe into assets controlled by Ben Ali and family members, though U.S. officials have not confirmed whether this is true.47 U.S. Assistance U.S. aid is modest by regional standards and has focused on military assistance and counterterrorism cooperation (Table 1, below), with small amounts allocated in FY2009 and FY2010 ($300,000 and $500,000, respectively) for “governing justly and democratically” programs. 48 The Obama Administration, which submitted its proposed FY2012 foreign assistance budget in early 2011, did not initially request any democracy and governance funding for Tunisia in FY2011 or FY2012, but the Administration currently intends to provide support through a range of potential funding sources. Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg indicated in congressional testimony that “global democracy funds,” the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and the Complex Crises Fund could be vehicles for short-term assistance. 49 The Administration also supports S. 618 (Kerry), which would authorize the President to establish a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund50 (see “Congress and Bilateral Aid,” below). Administration assistance initiatives include the following: • MEPI announced on March 22 that it would provide $20 million in “transition support” assistance to help Tunisia establish independent media, civil society, political parties, a new electoral framework, and economic reforms. The funding would come from unspent money appropriated for other purposes, subject to congressional notification. MEPI will also support partnerships between Tunisian civil society groups and U.S. technology companies to enhance information and communications capacity.51 • The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) plans to offer financial support in the form of direct loans, guarantees, and political risk insurance, and is already supporting two Tunisian private equity firms that are (...continued) Worldwide Threats, February 10, 2011, via CQ. 46 Office of Congressman Berman, “Rep. Berman Urges Quick U.S. Action to Seize Stolen Tunisian Funds,” February 8, 2011. 47 Joseph Palazzolo, “FBI Probe to Target Tunisia’s Ex-Leader,” The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2011. 48 U.S. State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2011 and FY2012. 49 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, “Developments in Egypt and Lebanon,” February 10, 2011, Statement of James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, Department of State. 50 Testimony of William J. Burns before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on “U.S. Policy and Uprisings in the Middle East,” March 17, 2011, via CQ. 51 State Department, “New Initiatives to Support Tunisia’s Democratic Transition,” March 22, 2011; Mary Beth Sheridan, “U.S. to Give $20 Million to Help Tunisia’s Fledgling Democracy,” The Washington Post, March 23, 2011. As of early April, Senator Richard Lugar had placed a hold on the MEPI assistance package, citing concerns that it would involve re-programming funds originally intended to support scholarships. See Josh Rogin, “Lugar Holding Up State Department Funds for Tunisian Democracy,” The Cable, April 6, 2011. Congressional Research Service 10 Political Transition in Tunisia focused on small and medium-size businesses. OPIC will also support visits by American business investors.52 • The Administration has also provided humanitarian aid in response to the massive influx of refugees from neighboring Libya.53 MEPI has a regional office in Tunis, responsible for programming to enhance political, economic, and educational reforms in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco as well as Tunisia, but has implemented limited bilateral programs in Tunisia to date. Table 1. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, Selected Accounts Annual and Supplemental Appropriations, $ Thousands FY2008 Actual FY2009 Actual FY2010 Enacted FY2011 Request FY2012 Request FMF 8,300 12,000 18,000 4,900 4,900 ESF 1,200 800 2,000 0 0 IMET 1,700 1,700 1,950 2,300 1,675 INCLE 198 0 0 0 0 NADR 100 425 200 Not Available Section 1206 10,000 8,800 0 Not Available Not Available Total, above accounts 21,498 23,725 22,150 7,200 6,575 0 Notes: FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ESF=Economic Support Funds; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; Section 1206=Defense Department funds authorized for use in training and equipping foreign military forces for certain purposes. This table does not reflect assistance disbursed through accounts administered by agencies other than the State Department and USAID (other than Section 1206 funds), or through State Department- or USAID-administered regional accounts. Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2009-FY2012; CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino. Security Assistance A U.S.-Tunisian Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held regularly. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reports that Tunisia relies on U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance to “maintain its aging 80s and early 90s era inventory of U.S.-origin equipment, which comprises nearly 70% of Tunisia’s total inventory.”54 According to private sector analysis, the United States is Tunisia’s primary supplier of military equipment, 52 U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks with Tunisia Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi,” March 17, 2011, via CQ. 53 U.S. State Department Daily News Briefing, February 28, 2011, via CQ. 54 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Tunisia Summary,” updated January 13, 2011. Congressional Research Service 11 Political Transition in Tunisia largely purchased through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements.55 FMF and Defense Department-administered “Section 1206”56 security assistance funds have also provided Tunisia with equipment for border and coastal security, which the United States views as a key area of counterterrorism prevention. Since 2003, this equipment has included helicopters, machine guns, body armor and helmets, parachutes, and night vision devices for sniper rifles. Other equipment has been provided through the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, with plans to procure seven Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with $4.1 million in FY2008 PKO funds forfeited by Mauritania (which had been temporarily rendered ineligible for security assistance due to a military coup).57 Tunisia has also been one of the top 20 recipients of International Military Education and Training (IMET) since FY1994.58 Tunisia is one of 10 countries participating in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a State Department-led, interagency regional program aimed at helping North and West African countries better control their territory and strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities. The Defense Department allocated over $13 million between FY2007 and FY2009 for TSCTP-related military cooperation with Tunisia, including bilateral and multinational exercises, regional conferences, and Joint-Combined Exchange Training programs, which are conducted by U.S. special operations forces. 59 This is in addition to Section 1206 funds allocated in FY2008 and FY2009, which supported the provision of equipment (as discussed above) and training related to counterterrorism. Congress and Bilateral Aid Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees foreign assistance funding and regularly authorizes arms sale proposals. There is also a congressional Tunisia Caucus. Some Members of Congress have advocated new assistance to support Tunisia’s transition to democracy and economic stabilization. Others contend that budgetary cuts take precedence over new assistance programs, and that economic stability in Tunisia and elsewhere is best addressed via private sector engagement and/or support from other donors. The discussion regarding potential new assistance has proceeded amid larger budgetary debates and disagreements over funding priorities. S. 618 (Kerry), introduced on March 17, 2011, would authorize the President to establish a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund to promote private sector investment and improve corporate governance, among other aims. Congress has been supportive of U.S. military assistance to Tunisia in recent years. In an explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (enacted on March 11, 2009), appropriators directed the State Department to allocate $12 million in FMF assistance for Tunisia, far more than the State Department’s budget request for $2.62 million. At the same time, appropriators wrote in the explanatory statement that “restrictions on political freedom, the use of torture, imprisonment of dissidents, and persecution of journalists and human 55 Forecast International, International Military Markets—Middle East & Africa, “Tunisia: Section 3—Market Overview,” May 2009. 56 P.L. 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2006, Section 1206 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. For more information, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino. 57 This assistance is described as supporting the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). 58 DSCA, op. cit. 59 Funding figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010. Congressional Research Service 12 Political Transition in Tunisia rights defenders are of concern and progress on these issues is necessary for the partnership between the United States and Tunisia to further strengthen.”60 In the conference report accompanying P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (enacted on December 16, 2009), appropriators directed the State Department to allocate $18 million in FMF for Tunisia, $3 million more than the requested amount. The conference report also allocated $2 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF)—the amount requested—for “programs and activities in southern Tunisia and to promote respect for human rights, as proposed by the Senate.”61 Emerging Actors As political uncertainty continues to characterize the situation in Tunisia, it is difficult to distinguish which groups and individuals have the ability and popular credibility to decisively influence events. Emerging contenders for influence include Tunisia’s trade union federation; the security forces; the “legal” opposition parties; and the formerly banned Islamist movement, which appears poised to re-enter the political sphere. Background on these entities is provided below. Other formerly banned groups include the Tunisian Workers’ Communist Party (PCOT), which was founded in the 1980s and operated clandestinely under Ben Ali, and the Congress for the Republic (CPR), led by Moncef Marzouki, who recently returned to Tunisia from exile and announced his intention to run for president. Further background on selected individuals is given in the “Profiles” text-box, below. While Tunisia’s trade union federation and the banned Islamist movement have, at different times, constituted the main vehicles for the mass expression of anti-government dissent, the potential for either group to present a cohesive political vision is unclear. Both, along with registered political parties and leftist movements, have long been subject to government repression, harassment, and co-option. Although they have at times collaborated in organizing protests, as during a series of general strikes in the mid-1980s, their leaders reportedly view each other with suspicion.62 The Trade Unions Since Tunisia’s independence, the labor movement has served as a rare legal conduit for expressing dissent, and many analysts view the main union federation, the Tunisian General Union of Labor (UGTT), as an important political force. The UGTT, which claims over half a million members, reportedly played a key role in sustaining the December-January protests, which its leadership framed as rooted in economic grievances.63 At the same time, the UGTT is highly fragmented, with a relatively conservative, pro-government leadership frequently diverging from its more radical middle-tier and grass-roots membership. This tension may explain the decision by three UGTT representatives to accept, then immediately 60 61 Congressional Record, February 23, 2009, p. H2417. Congressional Record, December 8, 2009, p. H14350. 62 Christopher Alexander, “Opportunities, Organizations, and Ideas: Islamists and Workers in Tunisia and Algeria,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 32 (2000). 63 UGTT, Déclaration de la Commission Administrative Nationale, January 4, 2011; on membership, see the UGTT’s website, at [www.ugtt.org.tn]. Congressional Research Service 13 Political Transition in Tunisia resign from, cabinet positions in the first transitional government. In early February, some UGTT members protested against UGTT head Abdessalem Jrad, whom they accused of being estranged from the union’s base. New unions and splinter movements have also been formed, and labor unrest has continued, reportedly sparking a backlash among some segments of the middle class. The UGTT was formed in the mid-1940s and was a force in Tunisia’s independence movement. During the Cold War, it positioned itself as pro-Western (non-Communist) and formed links with the American labor movement. 64 Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba (in power from 1956 through 1987), strove to keep the unions under the government’s wing; during the 1960s, former UGTT leader Ahmed Ben Salah led a decade-long period of socialist-oriented economic policy as minister for finance and planning. By the late 1970s, however, amid growing economic unease, the union’s leadership turned to overt confrontation with the government, particularly over grievances related to low wages and food price hikes.65 The UGTT led a series of mass strikes and demonstrations—notably in 1978 and in the mid-1980s—which were met with heavy state repression. During Ben Ali’s presidency, the government again attempted to co-opt the UGTT, including by influencing its leadership selection process. The UGTT resurged as a key instigator of anti-government unrest in recent years, organizing protests in the mining region of Gafsa in 2008 and 2010 that were the nearest precursor to the December-January uprising. The Security Forces Ben Ali’s unexpected departure led analysts to examine the role and cohesion of Tunisia’s security forces. There is a notable distinction between the internal security forces, elements of which were closely associated with Ben Ali, and the military, which receives fewer state resources and has been seen as relatively apolitical. 66 The government’s initial, heavy-handed response to the December-January protests was led by the police, who opened fire on demonstrators and reportedly conducted other abuses.67 The deployment of the military to the streets on January 12 turned out to be a turning point, and many analysts contend that military leaders subsequently played a key role in ending Ben Ali’s presidency; General Rachid Ammar, the army chief of staff, is widely reported to have refused orders to open fire on demonstrators. On January 23, Ammar publicly addressed protesters and promised to safeguard Tunisia’s “revolution.”68 While Ammar’s comments were welcomed by many members of the public, they sparked concern among some observers over whether the armed forces could interfere in domestic politics, particularly if the security situation fails to stabilize. 64 Global Security, “Union Génerale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT),” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/tunisia/ugtt.htm. 65 See Niger Disney, “The Working-Class Revolt in Tunisia,” Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) Reports, 67 (May 1978). 66 In the late 1970s and mid-1980s, the military led the repression of anti-government protests. However, this role was largely relegated to the civilian security services under Ben Ali. Unlike in neighboring Algeria, the military leadership did not play a role in the independence movement or in early state formation. 67 Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Hold Police Accountable for Shootings,” January 29, 2011. 68 Issandr El Amrani, “Tunisia Diary: Ammar’s Move?” TheArabist.net, January 24, 2011. As recently as mid-2010, an analysis of Tunisia’s political stability concluded that “a coup is a real possibility” should instability affect the transfer of power after Ben Ali. Veritiss, Tunisia: Outlook 2011-2015 [UNCLASSIFIED], prepared For the Defense Intelligence Agency Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office, August 2, 2010. Congressional Research Service 14 Political Transition in Tunisia The military comprises roughly 35,000 personnel; military service is compulsory for one year, but many Tunisians reportedly evade it. Government spending on the military constitutes only 1.4% of GDP—a low proportion compared to other countries in the region, such as Algeria (3.3%), Egypt (3.4%), Libya (3.9%), and Morocco (5%). 69 The armed forces are positioned largely against external threats, and also participate (to a limited extent) in multilateral peacekeeping missions. Civilian-led security services are primarily responsible for domestic security and have been accused of a wide range of abuses, including extrajudicial arrests, denial of due process, torture, and the mistreatment of detainees. While the exact number of domestic security agents is unknown, it is thought by some analysts to far exceed the number of military personnel and could be as high as 200,000.70 Divisions between police commanders and the rank-and-file were exposed in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s exit, as thousands of police officers held their own antigovernment demonstration to distance themselves from the RCD and call for better working conditions.71 Members of the military have led efforts to stabilize the security situation in recent weeks, including by pursuing elements of the domestic security apparatus seen as loyal to the old regime. In the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure, international media reports referenced violence by civilian-clothed “militias” seen as allied to the former president, whose identity and relationship to formal security structures remains unclear.72 On January 16, the government announced arrest warrants for the former head of presidential security, Ali Seriati, and several of his “accomplices,” for allegedly plotting against the state. 73 The police leadership has also been purged, and on March 7, the Interior Ministry announced it was dissolving the State Security Division and other entities “akin to ‘political police,’” according to the official news agency.74 The number of affected personnel, and whether they will be permitted to retain their employment with the government, has not been made public. Efforts to assert control over the security situation are ongoing, and debate continues over the best way for interim authorities to alter the size and mandate of the domestic security services without leading to future instability. Political Parties A number of political parties were legally recognized under Ben Ali and participated in electoral politics. However, many of these—including those with the highest numbers of seats in the legislature after the RCD—were seen, in effect, as loyal offshoots of the ruling party, and hewed close to official government policies. Only three previously legal parties constitute the “dissident” opposition: 69 • the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), founded by Ahmed Nejib El Chebbi; • Ettajdid (a leftist, former Communist party), led by Ahmed Brahim; and CIA World Factbook; figures dated 2006. 70 Eric Goldstein/Human Rights Watch, “Dismantling the Machinery of Oppression,” The Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2011. 71 Hadeel Al-Shalchi, “Tunisia’s Police Also Protest,” AP, January 23, 2011. 72 Angelique Chrisafis, “Confusion, Fear and Horror in Tunisia as Old Regime’s Militia Carries on the Fight,” The Guardian (UK), January 17, 2011. 73 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Military Backs New Leaders in Tunisia,” The New York Times, January 16, 2011. 74 TAP, “Interior Ministry Decides to Remove State Security Division,” March 7, 2011. Congressional Research Service 15 Political Transition in Tunisia • the Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties (FDTL), led by Mustafa Ben Jaafar. The PDP is thought to be the largest of these three parties, but the degree of popular support for any of them is difficult to gauge. Only Brahim’s Ettajdid competed in the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections, in 2009; Ettajdid won three parliamentary seats but Brahim garnered less than 2% of the presidential vote. In the run-up to the 2009 election, Chebbi decided not to compete in order not to give the authorities what he termed “fake legitimacy”; his candidacy may not have been accepted, anyway, under Tunisia’s restrictive electoral code.75 The Constitutional Council rejected Ben Jaafar’s candidacy because he allegedly had not been selected at least two years before the date of submission of his candidacy as required by a 2008 law. The FDTL was also barred from participating in the 2009 parliamentary campaign. Tunisia’s interim authorities have authorized dozens of new political parties, including the main Islamist movement (discussed below). The ideological cohesion and potential mass appeal of these new parties are as yet untested. The Islamist Movement The status of Islamist groups is the subject of ongoing debate among Tunisians, many of whom are proud of the country’s secularist traditions. Thousands of suspected Islamists were detained during Ben Ali’s presidency, during which time Islamist groups were banned and all signs of religious devotion were considered grounds for surveillance or prosecution under the 2003 antiterrorism law (see “Terrorism,” below). Some, as with other detainees, were reportedly tortured or disappeared in custody. A number of new Islamist groups have surfaced or been created since January and are vying for popular support; some have been denied political party recognition on the grounds that the 1988 party law forbids those based uniquely on religion. Some political liberalization steps undertaken by the interim government are controversial because they are considered to reflect Islamist preferences, such as Interior Ministry announcements that women may be pictured in a headscarf, and men in a beard, on their national identity cards.76 Ben Ali routinely emphasized the threat of Islamist extremism in order to justify his authoritarian rule. Despite the number of detentions (which may have been amplified through questionable trial procedures), and apparent signs of growing personal religiosity among some segments of the population, the full extent of popular support for Islamist political platforms is unknown. Islamists did not play a prominent role in the protests that unseated Ben Ali, and some analysts believe Tunisia’s relative prosperity, effective social services, and well-educated population weigh against the potential influence of radical Islamist movements. At the same time, movements that were repressed under the former regime may enjoy greater credibility in the postBen Ali era. When asked by a journalist whether the July 2011 vote might reveal “a country closer to Islamism than people think,” Prime Minister Essebsi replied, “We will not authorize those who want to exploit freedom in order to crush it” but gave few further details.77 75 Chebbi’s candidacy reportedly did not fulfill Article 66 of Tunisia’s electoral code, which stipulated that presidential candidates must be supported by at least thirty members of the legislature or municipal council chairs. 76 Le Monde, “En Tunisie, Les Multiples Visages d’Un Islamisme Qui Réapparaît au Grand Jour,” April 10, 2011. 77 Paris Marianne, “Tunisia’s Essebsi: Libyan Crisis a ‘Domestic Matter’ for Tunisians,” March 23, 2011; via OSC. Congressional Research Service 16 Political Transition in Tunisia The Islamist group thought to be Tunisia’s largest is the formerly banned Hizb Al Nahda party, which is led by Rachid Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi, who was in exile (mostly in London) for the past two decades, returned to Tunisia on January 30 following the interim government’s announcement of a general amnesty. Tunisia’s interim authorities granted Al Nahda legal status as a political party in March 2011, and have included it (along with other parties) in the interim commission on political reforms. Ghannouchi has generally portrayed himself as a moderate who would participate in the political system and not seek to scale back women’s rights, and has compared Al Nahda to Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).78 However, he espoused more radical rhetoric during confrontations with the government in the 1980s and early 1990s, and his return is reportedly viewed with some trepidation by some Tunisian secularists. Some activists in the movement are also thought to be relatively more extremist in their views. Ghannouchi has said he will not run for president and that he will step down before the end of the year, following which party members may elect a new leader. Al Nahda was first formally organized as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in 1981—soon after multiparty politics were legalized by then-President Bourguiba—by Ghannouchi and Abdel Fattah Moro, who became the party’s secretary-general. Although the MTI was relatively moderate compared to other Islamist groups in operation, it was viewed as the most popular and therefore the most significant threat to the government. Soon after the MTI applied for legal recognition as a political party, over 100 of its most prominent activists were arrested.79 Clashes with the security forces (and with leftist groups) mounted, as the MTI organized mass demonstrations and protests on university campuses. In an effort to appease the movement, the government of Habib Bourguiba had its leaders released from jail in 1984, and in 1985 permitted the MTI to form a “cultural society,” while continuing to reject its attempts to gain political party status.80 MTI-orchestrated demonstrations nonetheless escalated and Ghannouchi was again arrested in early 1987 along with dozens of other party members. The unrest, combined with that orchestrated by trade unions, undermined popular support for Bourguiba’s presidency and laid the groundwork for Ben Ali’s palace coup in November 1987.81 Initially upon coming to power, Ben Ali promised greater pluralism and a dialogue with Islamist and other opposition groups. Hoping to gain legal recognition, the MTI changed its name to Hizb Al Nahda to comply with the 1988 law, which barred party names based on explicitly religious references. In the 1989 parliamentary elections, Al Nahda candidates were allowed to run as independents. However, when Al Nahda garnered a high level of support—15% of the national vote, 30% in Tunis, according to official statistics—Ben Ali denied the party legal status and initiated a crackdown targeting suspected Islamists. Ghannouchi left the country during this time. Violent confrontations between the government and Al Nahda activists escalated, culminating in an alleged Islamist attack on a ruling party office in 1991. Al Nahda leaders condemned the attack and denied that those responsible belonged to their movement. Whether this was true or not, Ben 78 For example, a Nahda spokesman told a journalist in April that “there is no developed country that does not have women’s rights, these things go together.” Le Monde, “En Tunisie, Les Multiples Visages d’Un Islamisme Qui Réapparaît au Grand Jour,” April 10, 2011. See also David D. Kirkpatrick, “Opposition in Tunisia Finds Chance for Rebirth,” January 21, 2011; Lin Noueihed, “Analysis—What Role for the Islamists in the New Tunisia?” Reuters, January 22, 2011. For a sympathetic background on Ghannouchi’s political and philosophical evolution, see Azzam S. Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 79 Henry Munson Jr., “Islamic Revivalism in Morocco and Tunisia,” The Muslim World, 76:3-4 (1986). 80 Munson 1986, op. cit. 81 Jonathan Randal, “Tunisia at the Brink,” The Washington Post, May 31, 1987. Congressional Research Service 17 Political Transition in Tunisia Ali accused Al Nahda of plotting to violently overthrow the government and launched a campaign to eradicate the group and all signs of fundamentalist Islam. The government subsequently claimed it had unearthed an Islamist plot to assassinate Ben Ali and topple the government, and in 1992 Tunisian military courts convicted 265 Al Nahda members on charges of planning a coup. Al Nahda denied the accusations, and rights advocates criticized the case as biased and insufficiently protective of due process. 82 Ghannouchi was sentenced in absentia. 82 Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, Routledge: New York, 2010. Congressional Research Service 18 Political Transition in Tunisia Selected Profiles of Key Figures83 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Former President (See also “The Ben Ali Government (1987-January 2011),” below.) Ben Ali, who left the country on January 14, 2011, and is now living in exile in Saudi Arabia, spent much of his career in intelligence and security. He assumed the presidency in November 1987 by sidelining ailing former President Habib Bourguiba, in what many observers viewed as a palace coup. Bourguiba had named Ben Ali interior minister in 1986 and promoted him to prime minister in October 1987, placing him in line for the presidential succession. Previously, Ben Ali had served as director of military security and head of the national security service. He reportedly played a key role in coordinating military and police crackdowns on trade union and Islamist unrest in the late 1970s and mid1980s.84 A military general, Ben Ali trained at France’s elite St. Cyr military academy and reportedly received intelligence and security training in the United States.85 On February 18, news reports alleged that Ben Ali was in a Saudi hospital after suffering a stroke. Béji Caïd Essebsi, Prime Minister Essebsi, 84, was named interim prime minister on February 27 after then-Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi resigned. Ghannouchi had served in the position since 1999 and was originally appointed by Ben Ali; he was pushed to resign by growing numbers of demonstrators who objected to his continuation in office. Essebsi is a lawyer and was a close aide to Tunisia’s founding president, Habib Bourguiba. In the 1960s and early 1970s, he served in a variety of positions including interior minister and defense minister. In 1978, he joined the Movement of Democratic Socialists (MDS), an opposition party, before being reappointed to the cabinet as foreign minister in 1981. Essebsi was elected to parliament in 1989 and served until 1991. Abdelkrim Zbidi, Minister of Defense Zbidi, 60, was appointed defense minister in the cabinet reshuffle of January 27.86 He replaced Ridha Grira, who was seen as too close to Ben Ali. Zbidi has a background in medicine. He received his medical degree from Lyon, France, and he previously served in several ministerial positions under Ben Ali, including as minister of public health (2001) and minister of research (1999-2000 and again in 2002). Zbidi also headed several government councils and committees on science and public health. In the early 1990s, prior to serving in the government, he worked for a time for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Mouldi Kefi, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kefi, 65, is Tunisia’s third foreign minister since Ben Ali’s departure. He was appointed on February 21, a week after his predecessor, Ahmed Ounaies (who had himself been appointed on January 27), quit amid public criticism that he had praised a French government minister seen as too close to Ben Ali. A career diplomat, Kefi entered the foreign service in 1967 and served in a variety of positions within the Foreign Ministry and in Prague, Berlin, and London. He was also Tunisia’s ambassador to Nigeria, Indonesia, and Russia. He has a master’s in philosophy from France. Habib Essid, Minister of the Interior Interim President Mebazaa appointed Essid Interior Minister in late March, replacing Ferhat Rejhi, who was dimissed for unclear reasons. Essid’s appointment was controversial, as Rejhi had been seen as a popular reformist within the interim government, while Essid was viewed by some as close to Ben Ali. Essid, 52, is an agricultural economist who has spent his entire career in government administration, mostly in agricultural and development policy but also as chief of staff in the Interior Ministry from 1997 to 2000. He reportedly has a masters degree in agricultural economics from the University of Minnesota. Yadh Ben Achour, Head of the High Commission on Political Reform Ben Achour is a Tunisian lawyer and legal scholar, the former head of the law faculty at the University of Tunis, and a member of the Institute for International Law. On January 17, then-Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi appointed him to head the entity responsible for legal and political reforms. The High Commission’s current mandate is to 83 Drawn from international news articles, profiles compiled by BBC Monitoring and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), political party websites, and other open-source documents. 84 William G. Blair, “Strong Hand for Tunisia: Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali,” The New York Times, November 8, 1987. 85 Edward Cody, “Tunisian President, ‘Senile,’ Is Removed by His Deputy; Habib Bourguiba's 30-Year Rule Ends,” The Washington Post, November 8, 1987. 86 Mr. Zbidi’s official biography is available on the website of Tunisia’s defense ministry: http://www.defense.tn. Congressional Research Service 19 Political Transition in Tunisia reform Tunisia’s electoral laws ahead of elections scheduled for July 2011 and to propose constitutional revisions that may be adopted after that date. In late March, the Commission’s membership doubled in size, to roughly 130 members, in response to criticism that it was insufficiently representative; it now includes representatives from across the political spectrum and civil society, as well as legal and constitutional experts. Ahmed Nejib El Chebbi, Founder of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) Chebbi, who was appointed to the interim cabinet on January 17 (albeit in a minor role) but resigned on March 1, is a founding member of the PDP, one of three “dissident” opposition parties that were legally registered during Ben Ali’s presidency. (Chebbi formally stepped down as PDP leader in 2006, but continues to represent the party.) Although Chebbi and the PDP boycotted the 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections, and his current popularity is untested, he is viewed by many observers as the most credible of the “legal” opposition figures, and potentially more credible than members of the opposition who left Tunisia for exile abroad.87 In resigning from the interim government, Chebbi stated that he was protesting the Essebsi’s appointment as prime minister and a government measure requiring cabinet ministers to abstain from running in the upcoming presidential elections. A former student activist for leftist and pan-Arabist causes, Chebbi was imprisoned for several years in the 1960s. He founded the Socialist Progressive Rally (RSP) in the 1980s, renaming it the PDP in 2001. A lawyer by training, Chebbi directs a Tunis-based newspaper, El Mawkif, and provided legal defense for several journalists targeted by the Ben Ali government.88 General Rachid Ammar, Army Chief of Staff Ammar, 63, has been chief of staff of the 27,000-person army since 2002, when his predecessor was killed in a helicopter crash. French press reports indicate that he received at least a year of military training in France.89 Ammar is widely reported to have refused to open fire on protesters during the December-January uprising, and to have subsequently influenced Ben Ali’s decision to step down. Due to these reports, he currently enjoys a high level of popularity. On January 24, Ammar publicly addressed protesters, promising to uphold Tunisia’s “revolution” and guarantee stability until elections are held. His comments sparked concern among some analysts over whether the armed forces, which were seen as relatively apolitical under Ben Ali, could become an arbiter of domestic politics. Rachid Ghannouchi, Leader ofHizb Al Nahda (Renaissance) A former Islamic scholar, teacher, and activist, Ghannouchi has led Tunisia’s main Islamist movement for over three decades. He spent the last two in exile, largely in London, after his party, Al Nahda, was banned in 1991. Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia on January 30 following the interim government’s announcement of a general amnesty. Ghannouchi has portrayed himself as a moderate who would participate within a democratic political system and not attempt to overturn women’s rights. He espoused more radical rhetoric during confrontations with the government in the 1980s and early 1990s, and Tunisian secularists and some international observers view him with suspicion. He has stated he will not run for president. Ghannouchi’s early focus was on religious and moral issues, but he became increasingly politically radical by the late 1970s.90 He was imprisoned several times in the 1980s after he co-founded Al Nahda’s predecessor movement, the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), which clashed with the government of then-President Bourguiba. When Ben Ali came to power, he initially appeared to seek reconciliation with the Islamist movement; however, the president cracked down on Al Nahda after claiming to unearth an Islamist anti-government plot. Moncef Marzouki, Advocate and Leader of the Congress for the Republic (CPR) Born in 1945, Marzouki is a medical doctor, author, and human rights advocate who has been living in exile in France.91 He returned to Tunisia on January 18 and announced his intention to run for president. Marzouki trained as a doctor in France and taught at the medical school of Sousse before rising through the ranks the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH), which was among the first independent human rights organizations in the Middle East. (...continued) 87 Al Jazeera English, “Ben Ali’s Possible Successors,” January 15, 2011. 88 France24.com, “Ahmed Néjib Chebbi, l’Homme Qui Cherche à Rassembler l’Opposition,” January 15, 2011. 89 Le Point, "Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, un Saint-Cyrien Très Discret," January 18, 2011. 90 Munson 1986, op. cit. 91 Marzouki’s official biography is at [www.moncefmarzouki.com]. 92 Abdelaziz Barrouhi, "LTDH : Ça Passe ou Ça Casse...," Jeune Afrique, October 6, 2010. Congressional Research Service 20 Political Transition in Tunisia Marzouki was elected president of the LTDH in 1989. During the height of confrontation between the Ben Ali regime and Al Nahda, he criticized Islamist political thought as insufficiently protective of human rights, while also advocating on behalf of Islamists’ civil liberties. He also criticized Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait, which provoked a public backlash in Tunisia and elsewhere in the region. Marzouki was arrested several times during the 1990s, and the LTDH leadership was subsequently somewhat co-opted by the regime.92 In 2001, Marzouki founded the CPR party on a platform of establishing the rule of law and promoting human rights. It was banned the following year. Abdessalem Jrad, Secretary-General of the Tunisian General Trade Union (UGTT) Jrad has been involved in Tunisia’s labor movement since the 1960s, and was imprisoned in 1978 amid a government crackdown on massive UGTT-led strikes. He became secretary-general of the UGTT, Tunisia’s main union federation, in 2000 when the union’s former leader was forced out over accusations of mismanagement. Jrad, who was seen as relatively conservative and conciliatory toward Ben Ali’s government, was re-elected to his position during the UGTT convention of February 2002. In early February, dozens of UGTT members protested against Jrad, reportedly accusing the union’s leadership of “betraying its base.” Background on Tunisia Prior to the December-January demonstrations, Tunisia was viewed as having a stable, authoritarian government that placed a higher priority on economic growth than on political liberalization. It had only two leaders since gaining independence from France in 1956: the late Habib Bourguiba, a secular nationalist whose political rise was tied to Tunisia’s independence movement, and Ben Ali, a former minister of the interior and prime minister who became president in 1987. Tunisia at a Glance Population: 10.6 million (2010 est.) GDP Growth Rate: 3% (2009 est.) Income Level: Lower Middle Income Unemployment rate: 13.3% (2009 est.); reportedly much higher in the interior and among young people Urbanization rate: 67% of the population (2008) Life Expectancy: 76 years Religion: Muslim 98%, Christian 1%, Jewish and other 1% Literacy: 78% (2008) While Tunisia shares many political and economic characteristics with neighboring Key Exports: clothing, semi-finished goods and textiles, countries, it also exhibits a number of unique agricultural products attributes: a small territory, an ethnically Key Imports: textiles, machinery and equipment, homogenous population, a liberalized hydrocarbons economy, a large and highly educated middle Major Trading Partners: France, Italy, Germany, class, and a long history of encouraging Libya, China, Spain women’s socioeconomic freedoms. Tunisia’s Female Labor Participation Rate (% of female spending on education (7.2% of gross population): 26% domestic product) is high by regional 93 Source: CIA, The World Factbook, January 3, 2011; standards. Arabic-speaking, Sunni Muslims World Bank, World Development Indicators make up the overwhelming majority of Tunisia’s population, but its urban culture and elite reflect a strong European influence. 94 The population is young compared with developing countries, but its youth bulge is declining: 26% of the population was under 15 in 2007, compared 93 94 CIA, The World Factbook, updated January 3, 2011. Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform, op. cit. Congressional Research Service 21 Political Transition in Tunisia to 37% in 1990.95 An estimated 700,000 Tunisians (nearly 7% of the population) reside abroad, mainly in Europe. The legal and socioeconomic status of women in Tunisia is one of its particularities. Tunisia is the only Arab Muslim country that bans polygamy. Women serve in the military and in many professions, and constitute more than 50% of university students; the first woman governor was appointed in May 2004. In 2006, the government banned the headscarf from public places, claiming that it was protecting women’s rights and preventing religious extremism. Critics charged that it was violating individual rights. Despite its apparent prosperity, Tunisia has long exhibited a vast divide between rural and urban areas, and particularly between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the far poorer interior. At least half of the population lives in Tunis and coastal towns, and there is population drift toward these areas.96 Anti-government demonstrations, in particular those rooted in labor and economic grievances, have often originated in the dispossessed interior (which includes hardscrabble mining areas)—as did the unrest that unseated Ben Ali. Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, was a stringently secularist and nationalist independence leader who has been compared to Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in terms of his modernizing influence. He is credited with promoting women’s rights and with starting a tradition of providing effective government services. He attempted to moderate the influence of Islam on daily life, and famously tried to convince Tunisians not to practice the Ramadan fast by drinking a glass of orange juice live on national television.97 However, he also stifled political liberalization: he maintained a monolithic political system controlled by his Socialist Destourian Party (the successor to his pro-independence, nationalist Neo-Destour Party; destour means constitution in Arabic) and proclaimed himself president-for-life. Confrontations with trade unions and the budding Islamist movement grew increasingly violent in the 1980s, leading to widespread civil unrest. The Ben Ali Government (1987-January 2011) Ben Ali became president in 1987 in what some viewed as a palace coup, sidelining the aging Bourguiba a month after being promoted to prime minister. He renamed the ruling party the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) and initially promised political reforms, abolishing the lifetime presidency and opening a process of “dialogue” with the opposition. The new president also ordered the release of thousands of political prisoners, allowed the legalization of new political parties, and relaxed the press laws. However, the 1989 parliamentary elections—in which Al Nahda candidates, running as independents, won 15% of the national vote, surprising the ruling authorities—were a turning point. As tensions between the government and the Islamist movement heightened, Ben Ali attempted to eradicate Al Nahda and instituted tighter political controls. Similar tensions between Islamists and government forces drove neighboring Algeria into civil war in the early 1990s. Tunisia’s repression of Islamists came at the cost of an increasingly authoritarian political system. 95 EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008. EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008. 97 On early interactions between Bourguiba and the Islamist movement, see Norma Salem, Habib Bourguiba, Islam and the Creation of Tunisia, Croom Helm: UK, 1984. 96 Congressional Research Service 22 Political Transition in Tunisia Ben Ali cultivated the domestic security services and the RCD as his power base. The government banned some potential challengers and restricted or co-opted others, including a handful of opposition parties, human rights organizations, unions, and other civil society entities. Ben Ali maintained that he was ushering in democratic reforms in a “measured way” so that religious extremists could not exploit freedoms. 98 Still, most observers saw no evidence of even a gradual reform program. Constitutional amendments approved in May 2002 lifted term limits for the presidency and raised the age allowed for a candidate to 75. Ben Ali easily won a fourth fiveyear term on October 24, 2004, with 94.49% of the vote and a 91% voter turnout. He won yet another term on October 25, 2009, with 89.62% of the vote and an 89.4% voter turnout. Even under the revised age limits, Ben Ali was not eligible to run again unless the constitution were revised once more. Human Rights Ben Ali effectively used the fear of an Islamist threat and the example of civil conflict in neighboring Algeria to systematically suppress human rights and fail to carry out political reforms. The government routinely infringed on citizens’ privacy rights and imposed severe restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. It was intolerant of public criticism and used intimidation, criminal investigations, the court system, arbitrary arrests, residential restrictions, and travel controls to discourage human rights and opposition activists.99 In a 2010 report, Amnesty International accused Tunisian authorities of “subverting” human rights organizations and other dissenting groups “by infiltrating them and provoking turmoil.”100 The security services under Ben Ali were accused of a wide range of abuses, including torture. In June 2008, an Amnesty International report, In the Name of Security: Routine Abuses in Tunisia, detailed concerns “regarding serious human rights violations being committed in connection with the government’s security and counterterrorism policies.” International media advocacy groups routinely cited Ben Ali’s government as one of the world’s most repressive toward freedom of expression. 101 Journalists, bloggers, and dissidents were subject to surveillance, harassment, physical assault, and prison. All Internet cafes were statecontrolled; authorities aggressively filtered Internet websites and reportedly conducted surveillance at Internet cafes. The current status of this censorship regime is in flux. Emergence of Discontent Although Ben Ali’s government was widely viewed as stable, signs of increasing public discontent emerged in recent years. These signs were often portrayed as economically motivated, although this may have been because the regime tolerated the limited vocalization of economic, but not political, grievances. In 2008, social unrest broke out in the impoverished mining region of Gafsa, where unemployment is particularly high. The government sent in the army to aid the 98 AP, “Tunisian President Says He Wants to Share Experience in Handling Islamic Extremism with Bush,” February 13, 2004. 99 U.S. State Department, “Tunisia,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2009, released March 11, 2010. 100 Amnesty International, “Tunisia Urged to End Subversion of Groups Critical of the Authorities,” July 12, 2010. 101 See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Press Freedom “Predators,” updated May 3, 2010, at http://en.rsf.org/predators,21.html; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “10 Most Censored Countries,” May 2, 2006. Congressional Research Service 23 Political Transition in Tunisia police, who were unable to contain the demonstrations. Some 38 people were imprisoned in connection with the protests on charges of forming a criminal group with the aim of destroying public and private property, armed rebellion, and assault on officials during the exercise of their duties. Unrest was again reported in Gafsa in early 2010. In retrospect, the Gafsa riots have been interpreted by some analysts as a precursor to the December-January protests, which originated in the nearby town of Sidi Bouzid. Some have argued that the key difference was that in December 2010, images and reporting on the Sidi Bouzid unrest quickly emerged through social media and on Al Jazeera, which drew ever-wider groups of people into the demonstrations and made it more difficult for the government to suppress news of what was happening. Terrorism Tunisian authorities have emphasized terrorism as a potential domestic threat. The two most recent incidents were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba (noted for its tiny Jewish population) and a series of gun battles between alleged militants and security forces in Tunis in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri appeared to claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002. In all, 14 German tourists, five Tunisians, and two French citizens were killed in the attack.102 France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement in the attack. In January 2009, French authorities put two alleged culprits on trial. The roots of the 2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, are much less clear. In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated outside Tunisia, on a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.103 The TCG sought to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia and was considered to be a radical offshoot of Al Nahda. The TCG was suspected of plotting, but not carrying out, attacks on U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001. One founder, Tarek Maaroufi, was arrested in Belgium the same month. The group appears to have since been inactive. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly known as the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), actively recruits Tunisians and reportedly had ties with the TCG.104 In January 2007, following the aforementioned mentioned gun battles, Tunisian security forces claimed that they had discovered terrorists linked to the GSPC who had infiltrated from Algeria and possessed homemade explosives, satellite maps of foreign embassies, and documents identifying foreign envoys. Eastern Algeria is an AQIM/GSPC stronghold. Some 30 Tunisians were subsequently convicted of plotting to target U.S. and British interests in Tunisia. AQIM later claimed responsibility for kidnapping two Austrian tourists in Tunisia in February 2008. Algerian and Tunisian authorities have arrested Tunisians along their border, going in both directions. 102 Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002. U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, released April 30, 2007. 104 Craig S. Smith, “Tunisia is Feared as New Islamist Base...,” International Herald Tribune, February 20, 2007. Note, GSPC renamed itself Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in January 2007. For further background on AQIM, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins. 103 Congressional Research Service 24 Political Transition in Tunisia Tunisian expatriates suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been arrested in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Western Europe, and the United States. Some are reportedly detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and their possible return to Tunisia has proven to be somewhat controversial. 105 On April 24, 2009, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), told a House Appropriations Committee subcommittee that the perpetrators of suicide bombings in Iraq that month may have been part of a network based in Tunisia.106 In December 2003, the Tunisian parliament passed a sweeping anti-terrorism law. The U.S. State Department called it “a comprehensive law to ‘support the international effort to combat terrorism and money laundering.’”107 Since passage of the law, as many as 2,000 Tunisians have been detained, charged, and/or convicted on terrorism-related charges.108 Critics claim that the law “makes the exercise of fundamental freedoms ... an expression of terrorism.”109 These criticisms were echoed in the December 2010 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, who concluded that “the current definition of terrorism is vague and broad, hence deviating from the principle of legality and allowing for wide usage of counter-terrorism measures in practice.”110 Rights advocates have also accused anti-terror trials of relying on excessive pretrial detention, denial of due process, and weak evidence. While the current interim government has promised to release all political prisoners, there is an ongoing debate about whether individuals convicted under the anti-terrorism law fall under this category, and many such detainees have not been released. The Economy During the presidency of Ben Ali, many analysts contended that there was an implicit social contract between the government and its citizens, which promoted economic stability and middleclass standards of living at the expense of political freedom. Until the December-January protests, this strategy appeared to have contained latent disaffection from disrupting the political status quo. Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and one of the best-performing non-oil exporting Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Unemployment and underemployment remain a major problem, however; the official unemployment rate is high (over 13%) and the unofficial rate is believed to be even higher, particularly among young people. 105 An editorial in the Orange Country Register on November 16, 2008, stated, “In 2006, the U.S. sent two prisoners (from Guantanamo) to Tunisia with the explicit understanding that they would not be tortured or mistreated. The Tunisian government broke its promise and inflicted cruel treatment and kangaroo-court trials.” In May 2009, the United States asked Italy to receive two Tunisian detainees who objected to their return to Tunisia for fear that they would be subjected to torture. On May 26, 2009, the Tunisian Minister of Justice said that his government was prepared to receive another 10 Guantanamo detainees. Al Jazeera TV, “Tunisia asks US to Hand Over two Guantanamo Detainees,” May 29, 2009. 106 House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Holds Hearing on the US Central Command, April 24, 2009, transcript via CQ. 107 U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, released April 29, 2004. 108 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010. 109 Jeremy Landor, “Washington’s Partner,” Middle East International, March 5, 2004, pp. 23-24. 110 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur, December 28, 2010, op. cit. Congressional Research Service 25 Political Transition in Tunisia The economic impact of the December-January protests is still being determined, as is the potential impact of perceived political instability. The protests themselves reportedly caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, and credit rating agencies have severely lowered Tunisia’s ratings due to political uncertainty.111 Government officials estimated, as of February 2011, that the political transition had caused total economic losses of over $3.6 billion; tourism revenues were reportedly down by 45% in January and February compared to the previous year.112 Government officials have sought to restart tourism, garner additional donor support for economic stabilization, and reassure investors by pledging greater economic transparency. 113 Ongoing labor unrest represents an additional potential obstacle, though the main union federation, the UGTT, has expressed support for Prime Minister Essebsi’s leadership. In April, Finance Minister Jalloul Ayed announced an “economic and social recovery plan” that aims to create 40,000 new jobs (through a combination of public sector hiring and pro-business measures), new infrastructure in the interior, access to microcredit for poor families, and a monthly stipend for unemployed young people. The finance minister also appealed for $4 billion in foreign loans.114 The interim government has also moved to expropriate shares of companies controlled by certain Ben Ali family members and associates suspected of financial manipulation.115 Ben Ali’s 2004 election manifesto called for diversification, that is, ending reliance on textiles (which have been a primary engine of economic growth), due to increased competition from China; modernization by providing investment incentives to foreign businesses and passing legal reforms; liberalization with an anticipated free-trade zone with the EU; and greater privatization. The textile sector has since shifted to higher quality goods. The tourism sector also has been emphasized; it is a major employer and earns some 11% of the country’s hard currency receipts.116 Tunisia has also attempted to attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. Phosphate ore reserves are significant and are the basis of a chemicals industry, but their value is reduced by their low grade.117 The European recession in 2009 affected the Tunisian economy, producing a decrease in exports, a contraction in the industrial sector, and a lower expansion in services. Tunisia’s economy nevertheless fared relatively well given the severity of the global economic crisis, and the country did not experience a recession. The government responded to the economic setback with fiscal stimulus emphasizing development projects, the creation of more state jobs, and increases in state payrolls.118 In September 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that economic growth would reach 3.8% in 2010, after having slowed to 3% in 2009; the Fund predicted that Tunisia’s growth could continue to increase gradually, “provided that policies and reforms 111 AFP, “Fitch Downgrades Tunisia’s Sovereign Debt,” March 2, 2011; Maher Chmaytelli, “Tunisia Revolt Caused $637 Million of Damage, Assabah Reports,” Bloomberg, February 1, 2011; Reuters, “Moody’s Cuts Tunisia Credit Rating, Could Lower it Further,” January 19, 2011; Alyssa Rallis, “S&P Puts Tunisia on Credit Watch Negative Following Continued Unrest,” Global Insight, January 19, 2011. 112 AFP, “Tunisie: Après le Retour au Calme, Place au Grand Chantier Economique,” March 9, 2011. 113 Paul Taylor, “Davos—Stay in Our Economy and Out of Our Politics—Tunisia,” Reuters, January 29, 2011. 114 AP, “Tunisie: Adoption d’un Plan de Relance Economique,” April 1, 2011; Reuters, "Tunisia Will Need $4 Bln in Loans in 2011—FinMin," April 1, 2011. 115 Le Monde, “Orange Tunisie Passe Sous la Tutelle de l’Etat Tunisien,” March 30, 2011. 116 U.S. State Department, “Background Note: Tunisia,” October 13, 2010. 117 EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008. 118 TransArabia, “Tunisia Continues Fiscal Stimulus in 2010 Budget,” November 14, 2009. Congressional Research Service 26 Political Transition in Tunisia planned by the authorities aimed at enhancing Tunisia’s competitiveness, developing new markets, and supporting new sources of growth in sectors with high added value bear fruit.”119 Foreign Relations Israel and the Palestinians Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982-1993 and still hosts some PLO offices today. Tunisia had an interests office in Israel until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah, or uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Israelis of Tunisian descent are allowed to travel to Tunisia on Israeli passports, and the Israeli and Tunisian foreign ministers sometimes meet. In September 2005, President Ben Ali sent a personal letter to then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, praising his “courageous” withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Israel’s then-foreign minister, who was born in Tunisia, and then-communications minister attended the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunisia in 2005. (Then-Prime Minister Sharon was invited along with leaders of all U.N. member states; his invitation provoked demonstrations in Tunisia.) Tunisia’s interim government has criticized Israeli efforts to encourage its tiny Jewish community to emigrate because of economic instability as “an attempt by Israel to tarnish the post-revolutionary image of Tunisia.”120 Europe Tunisia and the European Union (EU) have cemented a close relationship by means of an Association Agreement, aid, and loans. More than 60% of Tunisia’s trade is conducted with Europe. 121 The Association Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and went into effect on January 1, 2008, eliminates customs tariffs and other trade barriers on manufactured goods, and provides for the establishment of an EU-Tunisia free trade area in goods, but not in agriculture or services. Negotiations on the provision of “advanced status” for Tunisia vis-à-vis the EU, which would provide even greater trade benefits, are ongoing.122 Tunisia receives aid from the EU’s EuroMediterranean Partnership (MEDA) program and soft loans from the European Investment Bank, the financing arm of the EU. The Europeans hope that their aid will help Tunisia to progress economically, and thereby eliminate some causes of illegal immigration and Islamic fundamentalism. The EU and Tunisia have discussed additional cooperation to control illegal immigration and manage legal immigration flows, an issue that probably is of greater interest to Europe than to Tunisia. At the same time, EU leaders periodically expressed concerns over Tunisia’s record on human rights and political freedom under Ben Ali. 123 EU officials have focused high-level attention on Tunisia since Ben Ali’s departure. The EU has promised new economic and governance assistance while seeking to ensure that Tunisia’s 119 Joël Toujas-Bernate and Rina Bhattacharya, International Monetary Fund, “Tunisia Weathers Crisis Well, But Unemployment Persists,” September 10, 2010. 120 AP, “Tunisia Slams Israeli Efforts to Lure Tunisian Jews to Emigrate,” March 28, 2011. 121 World Trade Organization, Tunisia Profile, October 2010. 122 See European Commission, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, Tunisia, at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/tunisia/tunisia_en.htm. 123 See, e.g., AFP, “EU Calls for Release of Tunisian Protesters,” January 10, 2011. Congressional Research Service 27 Political Transition in Tunisia previous commitments, such as the prevention of illegal immigration to Europe, will be maintained under the new government. Relations with Italy were strained in mid-February when thousands of Tunisian migrants began arriving by boat to Italy’s southern Lampedusa island; Tunisia rejected direct Italian intervention but indicated it would cooperate with Europe on stemming illicit population flows. In early April, Tunisia and Italy agreed to increase police cooperation and ease compulsory repatriations. Italy also pledged over 200 million euros in aid and credit lines to help block departures and create jobs to dissuade potential migrants.124 Relations with France have recently been strained due to French support for Ben Ali even as his security forces cracked down on pro-democracy protesters. During the last week of Ben Ali’s presidency, France’s then-Foreign Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, publicly suggested that France could help Tunisia control the protests, remarks for which she was widely criticized in both countries. (Alliot-Marie subsequently resigned under pressure related to her alleged ties to the Ben Ali regime.) Press reports additionally revealed that France had authorized shipments of teargas to Tunisia in December 2010.125 French authorities have since sought to reassure the interim government by refusing to offer Ben Ali exile, replacing the French ambassador to Tunisia, and announcing an asset freeze targeting members of the Ben Ali family. On January 24, French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that he had “underestimated” the Tunisian crisis. France has since promised new economic and humanitarian aid. Regional Relations Tunisia has sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors, Algeria and Libya, and participates in Algerian-led regional counterterrorism. Relations with Libya were extremely strained in the 1980s, but patched under Ben Ali; they are again in flux amid the popular uprising that is threatening to unseat Libyan leader Muammar Al Qaddhafi. Algeria and Morocco have been supportive of Tunisia’s post-Ben Ali government, and Algeria has offered financial assistance. Tunisia participates in the Arab Maghreb Union, established in 1989 by Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, though the organization is inactive due to tensions between Morocco and Algeria. Tunisia has free-trade agreements with Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Libya.126 Tunis is also the temporary headquarters location of the African Development Bank (AfDB), which receives significant financial support from the United States. It was moved to Tunisia in 2005 due to civil unrest in Côte d’Ivoire, its permanent location. Outlook The unexpected and rapid turn of events in Tunisia raises a wide range of questions for the future of the country and the region. Recent events also raise potential issues for Congress pertaining to the oversight of U.S.-Tunisian bilateral relations and assistance, and to broader U.S. policy priorities in the Middle East. The latter category of issues has become more salient with the mass protest movement that is currently sweeping the Middle East and which appears to have been partly inspired by Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution. 124 Reuters, "Italy, Tunisia Sign Deal to Ease Migrant Crisis," April 5, 2011. 125 Le Monde, “La France a Autorisé, Fin 2010, Quatre Livraisons de Grenades Lacrymogènes à la Tunisie," January 27, 2011. 126 EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008. Congressional Research Service 28 Political Transition in Tunisia Questions include: • Is Tunisia likely to experience political stability in the medium term, or do continued protests and persistent insecurity remain significant threats? Do Ben Ali and/or elements of the former regime continue to influence events in Tunisia? • What are the prospects for genuine reform under the interim government? What is the potential for free and fair elections? What is the role of the military in steering political developments? • What will the future Tunisian government and political order look like? What will be the nature and role of previously banned groups, such as Islamist and leftist political parties? Will there be a free and independent press and civil society in Tunisia? • Which individuals and groups currently enjoy significant popular credibility in Tunisia, and what are their likely courses of action? Has Tunisians’ experience of secular authoritarianism made the public more likely to place their trust in extremist groups? • What is the potential impact of the unrest on foreign investment and economic growth in Tunisia and the region? • What lessons are neighboring countries drawing from Tunisia’s example, and how have these impressions been affected by “counter-examples” in countries such as Libya and Syria? What are the medium- to long-term implications for the region? • What has been the impact to date of U.S. public statements and actions related to Tunisia, and what are the prospects for future U.S. influence on the evolution of events? How, if at all, should the U.S. government reshape its assistance programs for Tunisia in response to recent and continuing events? What position should the United States take vis-à-vis popular anti-government demonstrations in the region? What course of U.S. action will be most likely to fulfill foreign policy and national security goals? Author Contact Information Alexis Arieff Analyst in African Affairs aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459 Acknowledgments This report draws on research and analysis by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Congressional Research Service 29