Political Transition in Tunisia
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
December 16, 2011June 18, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21666
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Political Transition in Tunisia
Summary
On January 14, 2011, TunisianThe departure of longtime President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali fled the country after weeks of
mounting anti-government protests. Tunisia’s mass popular uprising, dubbed the “Jasmine
Revolution,” sparked anti-government movements in other countries across the region. Ben Ali’s
departure was greeted by widespread euphoria within Tunisia. Yet disputes over reform priorities,
economic crisis,in January 2011, in the face of
massive anti-government protests, was greeted with euphoria within Tunisia and sparked
opposition and reform movements across the region. Yet despite significant accomplishments
since that time, Tunisians today face a wide range of challenges, including economic hardship,
disputes over reform priorities, labor unrest, tensions between the privileged coastal region and relatively
relatively impoverished interior, and lingering insecurity are continuing challenges. The humanitarian and
the security impactimplications of events in neighboring Libya present additional difficulties.
National elections were held on October 23.
Domestic tensions between Islamists and secularists have also burgeoned. Elections held in
October 2011 to select a National Constituent Assembly. The
Assembly has put in place a transitional government and provided momentum to a transition
process that has at times appeared slow and unwieldy. The Assembly is expected to draft a new constitution,
ahead of new elections that have yet to be scheduled. Thousands of candidates competed for seats
in the Assembly, but the outcome showed popular support to be primarily focused on a handful of
political parties. Harakat al
constitution ahead of new elections currently slated for early 2013. Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda/An-NahdaAnNahda), a moderate Islamist party, won 41%
of the seats, and has formed a governing coalition with two center-left secular parties, the
Congress for the Republic (CPR) and the Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties
(FDTL/Ettakatol). Certain aspects of the Assembly’s mandate, duration, and internal structure are
still to be determined.
Prior to January 2011, Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party exerted
near-total control over parliament, state and local governments, and most political activity.
Tunisia cultivated strong ties with France and the European Union, its largest trading partner, and
with the United States. Despite many political and economic characteristics shared across the
region, Tunisia exhibits a number of unique attributes: a relatively small territory, a sizable and
well educated middle class, and a long history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms.
Some policymakers view these factors as advantageous, and Tunisia as a potential “test case” for
democratic transitions in the region.
Tunisia’s transition raises a wide range of questions for the future of the country and the region.
These pertain to the struggle between reformists and entrenched forces carried over from the
former regime; the potential shape of the new political order; the role and influence of Islamism
in the government and society; the question of how to transform the formerly repressive security
services; and the difficult diplomatic balance—for the United States and other actors—of
encouraging greater democratic openness while not undermining other foreign policy priorities.
Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funding and oversees U.S. foreign policy
toward Tunisia and the wider region. U.S.-Tunisian relations were, prior to 2011, highly focused
on military assistance and counterterrorism. The Obama Administration has allocated roughly $42
million in non-military “transition assistance,” along with a range of additional efforts aimed at
encouraging private sector investment and deepening U.S.-Tunisia relations. International
financial institutions, which receive significant U.S. monetary support, and the G8 have also
pledged aid for Tunisia. Some Members of Congress argue that additional bilateral aid should be
allocated for democracy promotion and economic recovery in Tunisia, while others contend that
budgetary cuts take precedence over new aid programs, or that economic stabilization may be
best addressed by the private sector or by other donors. Related legislation includes H.R. 2055, S.
618/ H.R. 2237, S. 1388, and S.Res. 316
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Contents
Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”....................................................................................................... 1
Background................................................................................................................................ 2
Key Issues in the Transition............................................................................................................. 3
A New Government ................................................................................................................... 5
Islam, Politics, and the State...................................................................................................... 6
The Security Forces................................................................................................................... 8
The Military ........................................................................................................................ 9
Security Concerns.................................................................................................................... 10
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background..................................................................................... 11
Anti-Corruption Efforts ........................................................................................................... 12
Recovery of State Assets ................................................................................................... 13
Key Actors ..................................................................................................................................... 13
Selected Profiles ...................................................................................................................... 13
The Economy................................................................................................................................. 16
Foreign Relations........................................................................................................................... 18
Israel and the Palestinians ....................................................................................................... 18
Europe ..................................................................................................................................... 18
Regional Relations................................................................................................................... 19
U.S.-Tunisian Relations ................................................................................................................. 20
U.S. Assistance ........................................................................................................................ 22
Military Assistance............................................................................................................ 24
Multilateral Assistance ...................................................................................................... 25
Congress and Aid to Tunisia.............................................................................................. 26
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 26
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Tunisia.................................................................................................................. 1
Tables
Table 1. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, Selected Accounts ........................................................... 24
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 27
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 27
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”
President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, in power
since 1987, fled Tunisia for Saudi Arabia on
January 14, 2011, following weeks of
mounting anti-government protests (see textbox below). Tunisia’s popular uprising,
dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution,” inspired
reform and opposition movements in Egypt,
Libya, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Algeria, and
elsewhere. The pro-democracy movement has
been internationally heralded, but the wave of
unrest across the Middle East has also
sparked international concern over stability in
a region associated with autocratic regimes
previously viewed as secure and pro-West.
Figure 1. Map of Tunisia
The early months of the post-Ben Ali
government were marked by continuing
unrest and popular contestation, partly in
response to the interim government’s initial
decision to retain several longtime officials of
the former ruling party. In addition, a security
vacuum—amid reports of sabotage by
unidentified militias, as police fled their posts
and citizens formed self-defense groups—
raised fears of violence and chaos.
On February 27, a more stable, if weak,
interim government took shape under newly
appointed Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi,
an elder statesman from the administration of
founding President Habib Bourguiba. Caïd
Essebsi replaced Mohamed Ghannouchi, who
had served as Ben Ali’s prime minister since
Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS
1999. Caïd Essebsi stated that his priorities
would be to address security, reverse the economic crisis, and “to restore the prestige of the
state.”1 Essebsi also introduced the idea, popular among members of the protest movement, of
holding elections for an assembly charged with writing a new constitution—and thus choosing a
new political system—before parliamentary and/or presidential polls would be held. Fouad
Mebazaa, the former head of parliament, assumed the largely ceremonial position of Interim
President upon Ben Ali’s departure throughout the interim period.
With the election on October 23, 2011, of a National Constituent Assembly, attention has now
turned to the process of constitution drafting, and to the mandates, structure, and authorities of the
Assembly and other transitional bodies.
1
Tarek Amara, “Tunisian Interim PM to Appoint New Government,” Reuters, March 4, 2011.
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The “Jasmine Revolution” Protests
Protests were first reported on December 17, 2010, in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street
vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest police interference and a lack of economic
opportunities. By late December, protests had spread to the nearby cities of Kasserine and Thala, and to other urban
centers. Feeding on local anger over high unemployment and a lack political and socioeconomic freedoms, as well as
an underground networks of activists, hackers, and dissidents, the demonstrations escalated into an unprecedented
popular challenge to the Ben Ali regime. Public demonstrations had previously been very rare in Tunisia, due to state
repression and pervasive surveillance. From the start, protesters appeared to lack a central leader and were not
necessarily aligned with a pre-existing political or ideological movement.
On January 12, riots erupted in the capital, Tunis. The military deployed to the streets and a national curfew was
imposed. Rioters ransacked private properties belonging to Ben Ali’s wealthy relatives along the central coast,
underscoring the deep antipathy many Tunisians felt toward members of the ruling elite. Authorities imposed a state
of emergency, prohibiting gatherings of over three people and authorizing the use of force against “any suspect
person who does not obey orders to stop.”2 Police repeatedly opened fire on crowds and arrested protesters,
journalists, opposition party members, lawyers, and rights advocates, some of whom were reportedly abused in
detention. Over 200 people were killed in the uprising.3
Prior to his exile, Ben Ali offered a widening series of concessions on political and civil rights in an effort to stem the
unrest. On January 13, the president gave an address on national television in which he pledged to step down when
his term was up in 2014, to allow fresh parliamentary elections before then, and to end state censorship. However,
these promises did not placate demonstrators, who continued to press for Ben Ali’s immediate resignation and the
dissolution of the ruling party. On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali fled in a private plane for Saudi Arabia.
Background
Prior to the January 2011 demonstrations, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable, albeit
authoritarian, regime that placed a higher priority on economic growth than on political
liberalization. It had only two leaders since gaining independence from France in 1956: the late
Habib Bourguiba, a secular nationalist who helped lead Tunisia’s independence movement, and
Ben Ali, a former Interior Minister and Prime Minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. Ben
Ali cultivated the internal security services and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party
as his power base, and placed severe restrictions on human rights, political participation, and
freedom of expression. The president and his family were also seen as highly corrupt.
While Tunisia shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, many of its attributes are
unique: a small territory, a relatively homogenous population (despite tribal and ethnic divisions
in some areas), a liberalized economy, a substantial and well educated middle class, and a history
of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms.4 Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims make up the
overwhelming majority of Tunisia’s population, but its urban culture and elite reflect a strong
European influence. The population is young compared with developed countries, but its youth
bulge is declining.5 As many as a million Tunisians reside abroad, mainly in Europe.
2
Tunisia 7 Television, “Tunisian Authorities Declare State of Emergency,” January 14, 2011, via Open Source Center.
As of February 1, the United Nations estimated that at least 219 people were killed, including 72 killed in prison fires.
Interim government investigators stated in July that they had documented 238 protesters killed and 1,380 wounded,
mostly by the security forces. Marie Colvin, “High Noon as Lawyer Closes in on Officials Behind Tunisia Killings,”
The Sunday Times, July 31, 2011.
4
Tunisia’s spending on education (7.2% of gross domestic product) is high by regional standards. CIA, The World
Factbook, updated January 3, 2011.
5
EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
3
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The legal and socioeconomic status of women
in Tunisia are among its particularities.
Polygamy is banned, and women enjoy equal
citizenship rights and the right to initiate
divorce. Women serve in the military and in
many professions, and constitute more than
50% of university students; the first woman
governor was appointed in 2004. Many credit
the country’s relatively liberal Personal Status
Code, promulgated under founding President
Bourguiba, for these advances.
Tunisia at a Glance
Population: 10.63 million (July 2011 est.)
Income Level: Lower middle income
Urbanization rate: 67% of the population (2010)
Life Expectancy: 75 years (2011 est.)
Religion: Muslim: 98%, Christian: 1%,
Jewish and other, 1%
Literacy: 78% (2008)
Key Exports: clothing, semi-finished goods (notably
spare automotive parts), textiles, agricultural products
Despite its apparent relative prosperity,
Key Imports: textiles, machinery and equipment,
Tunisia has long exhibited a divide between
hydrocarbons
rural and urban areas, and especially between
Major Trading Partners: France, Italy, Germany,
the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the
Libya, China, Spain
poorer interior. At least half of the population
Female Labor Participation Rate (% of female
lives in Tunis and coastal towns, and there is
population): 26%
6
population drift toward these areas. AntiSources: CIA, The World Factbook, September 2011;
government unrest, particularly when rooted
World Bank, World Development Indicators
in labor and economic grievances, has often
originated in the interior (which includes
hardscrabble mining areas)—as did the protests that unseated Ben Ali.
Key Issues in the Transition
Nearly a year into their country’s transition from authoritarian rule, Tunisians can point to a
number of significant achievements—not least, the holding of widely praised national elections in
October 2011 that put in place a National Constituent Assembly. Yet they and their new leaders
continue to face steep challenges. The interim government led by Prime Minister Caïd Essebsi
(February-December 2011) embarked upon a wide range of reforms, including the release of
political prisoners, the authorization of some 100 new political parties, and the lifting of many
online and media restrictions. The former ruling party, the RCD, was dissolved and its funds
liquidated, and a number of former party officials and Ben Ali associates and relatives were
arrested. Interim authorities initiated efforts (albeit limited) to dismantle the former regime’s
domestic security apparatus, and, with the help of the military, reinstated relative security in many
parts of the country. The government also took steps to adhere to international human rights
treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
With the election of the Constituent Assembly, government activities have turned to defining the
key issues inherent in drafting a new constitution and the processes through which they will be
addressed. Likely areas of focus for the drafting process include the future system of government
(parliamentary, presidential, or a combination), the shape of internal checks-and-balances within
that system, the role and structure of the judiciary, the level of protection for individual rights,
and the relationship between religion and state. Responding to pressing socioeconomic issues—
such as high unemployment and the collapse of the tourism industry, a key economic driver—and
6
EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
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addressing acute regional inequality may also be priorities for the new leaders. Heated debates
over the appropriate mechanisms to protect minority views while allowing efficient action by the
majority coalition will likely define much of the Constituent Assembly’s activity. Resurgent
public demonstrations and sporadic riots and labor unrest are also likely to pose challenges.
Some observers hope that the new government, put in place via an election instead of an ad-hoc
appointment process, will be able to act decisively under a popular mandate. At the same time,
discussions of constitutional issues were largely absent from the campaign period, and the policy
differences between parties and candidates were often opaque. While the main political factions
accepted the results of the election, the campaign also entrenched mutual suspicions among some
secularists and Islamists, and allegations of foul play—though difficult to verify—were made
from a variety of angles, particularly with regard to campaign finance. Tensions have also
burgeoned between representatives of the coastal elite and the disadvantaged interior, between the
activist youth who led the uprising and those selected for government positions, and among
political factions. “Economic stagnation, pent up social demands, and a combination of political
and cultural tensions” remain potent.7 Dissatisfaction and confusion over the transition process
could resurface as elites continue to confront challenges over who is empowered to act and how
to deliver tangible socioeconomic benefits to an impatient public. Vast and divided expectations
could also undermine Tunisia’s ability to make steady progress on institutional reforms.8
7
Christopher Alexander, “Suspicion and Strategy in Free Tunisia,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 20, 2011.
Marina Ottaway, “Tunisia: The Revolution is Over, Can Reform Continue?” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, July 13, 2011.
8
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The October 2011 Elections
The October 23, 2011, elections were widely viewed as fair, transparent, and well-conducted, despite preparations
having appeared disjointed at times and subject to delays. International observers stated that the voting process was
marked by peaceful and enthusiastic participation, generally transparent procedures, and confidence in the
independent electoral commission (known as the ISIE). At the same time, observers expressed some concerns
regarding insufficient information about the allocation of voters to polling stations; administrative difficulties
encountered by voters who had not formally registered, most of whom were eligible to vote at special polling
centers; limited voter education; and a lack of detailed procedures and training for key parts of the process, including
vote counting, tabulation, and election dispute resolution.9 Turnout was officially estimated at 54% of eligible voters; it
was much higher among those who had actively registered to vote in mid-2011.
A new electoral law promulgated in May 2011 set out a one-round voting system based on proportional
representation that was designed to make it difficult for any party to gain an absolute majority. The law included a
“parity” reservation for women on candidate lists.10 Tunisians in the diaspora were able to vote. The law barred from
candidacy certain senior officials of the former ruling party.11 Over 1,400 candidate lists competed for seats,
corresponding to over 11,600 candidates, including political party representatives, coalitions, and independents. The
May 2011 law will not necessarily serve as a basis for future elections, and the independent electoral commission is
expected to be dissolved pending new guidelines promulgated by the Constituent Assembly.
Despite the potentially high stakes of the election—determining who would shape the new political order through the
process of constitution-drafting—reports indicated that many Tunisians felt alienated by the complexity of the
transition process and a lack of understanding of the Constituent Assembly’s role.12 Only 52% of estimated eligible
voters registered to vote—although others were able to vote using their national identity cards—and two months
ahead of election day, roughly one in three Tunisians reported being undecided about whom to vote for.13 Efforts by
the electoral commission to ban certain types of media coverage and political advertizing during the campaign were
controversial, and may have contributed to confusion over policy differences among parties and candidates.14
The following sections discuss key issues in Tunisia’s transition.
A New Government
The 217-seat National Constituent Assembly is charged with drafting a new constitution and
preparing for future parliamentary and/or presidential elections, which will formally signal the
next step in the transition process. The Assembly has also selected a government and may
perform quasi-legislative functions. The main Islamist party, Harakat al Nahda (alt: Ennahda/AnNahda, “Renaissance”), controls 89 seats (41%): by far the largest block in the Assembly, but not
enough to rule without a coalition. It is followed by the center-left, secular Congress for the
Republic (CPR), with 29 seats; a populist, conservative, and fractious independent coalition, Al
9
See National Democratic Institute, “Tunisia Preliminary Election Statement,” October 24, 2011; International
Republican Institute, “Tunisian Elections Historic Step Forward,” October 24, 2011; and Carter Center, “Preliminary
Statement: Tunisian National Constituent Assembly Elections,” October 25, 2011.
10
Previously, Tunisia had a 25% female reservation requirement for party lists in parliamentary elections. Under the
“parity” requirement, each list had to alternate male and female candidates. However, since male candidates were
overwhelmingly placed at the top of lists, the requirement did not ensure an equal number of elected female candidates.
11
Art. 15 of Decree Law N. 35 on Election of the National Constituent Assembly, May 10, 2011. Senior officials were
defined as those who had occupied a “position of responsibility” in the government over the past ten years or who had
signed a petition supporting Ben Ali’s 2014 re-election bid.
12
U.S. Diplomatic Cable [UNCLASSIFIED], “Voter Registration Deadline Extended, Growing Frustration With Voter
Apathy,” August 1, 2011; Kaouther Larbi, “Tunisie: défiance ou myopie, la moitié des électeurs boudent l'inscription,”
AFP, August 14, 2011; Richard Valdmanis, “Confusion Reigns Ahead of Tunisia Vote,” Reuters, September 7, 2011.
13
Sigma Conseil, Baromètre Politique, Tunis, September 2011.
14
TunisieNews.com, “Les Partis Politiques Défient la Décision de l’ISIE et Poursuivent Leurs Compagnes
Publicitaires,” September 12, 2011.
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Aridha al Chaabia (Popular Petition), with 26 seats15; the center-left, secular Ettakatol (also
known as the Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties or FDTL), with 20 seats; and the leftist,
stringently secularist Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), with 16 seats. Twenty-two other
parties and independent groupings won at least one seat each. Forty-nine women were elected to
the Assembly, of whom 42 are Al Nahda delegates.
Following the election, Al Nahda formed a governing coalition with the CPR and Ettakatol,
popularly referred to as the “Troika.” The agreement paved the way for Assembly delegates to
elect Ettakatol’s leader, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, as president of the Assembly on November 22, and
CPR leader Moncef Marzouki as President (a largely ceremonial position) on December 12.
Marzouki, in turn, appointed Al Nahda’s secretary-general, Hamadi Jebali, as Prime Minister—
the head of government and most powerful of the three roles. The delay in Marzouki’s election
responded to demands among Assembly delegates that they first be able to debate a set of internal
procedures that define some of the roles, decision-making processes, and mandates of the
Assembly and its leadership. The procedures were adopted in a vote on December 10.
The “Troika” coalition may be subject to internal frictions, given the parties’ divergent histories,
potential policy differences, and outside pressures. Within the fragmented opposition, the PDP is
likely to lead a coalition of secularist parties opposed primarily to Al Nahda. The PDP led partial
opposition boycotts of the December 10 and December 12 votes in order to protest purported
efforts by Al Nahda to enhance the authorities of the Prime Minister at the expense of the
Presidency, and a lack of term limits for the current government. While most of the main political
parties—including Al Nahda and Ettakatol but not the CPR—had agreed in September to
complete the draft constitution within one year,16 Assembly delegates overruled PDP-led attempts
to enact a firm deadline. Assembly members have also contended with street demonstrations by
secularists and others opposed to Al Nahda’s growing influence, Islamists supportive of Al
Nahda, and a wide range of other interest groups.
Islam, Politics, and the State
The relationship between religion and the state is likely to be a key area of debate by members of
the Constituent Assembly. The main political parties have agreed not to significantly alter Article
1 of Tunisia’s current constitution: “Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state. Its religion
is Islam, its language is Arabic and its type of government is the Republic.” However, areas of
disagreement may include the mandate or continued existence of the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, which regulates religious activities; the continuation (or alteration) of limits on the ability
of religiously conservative Salafist groups to register as political parties; the legal status of
religious minorities (98% of Tunisians are Sunni Muslims, but there are tiny Jewish and Christian
communities); and how to balance freedom of expression and religious sensitivities.
15
The electoral success of the Al Aridha coalition, a previously little-known entity, was unforeseen by most observers
and Tunisian elites. The coalition’s campaign appears to have focused on a populist platform and a grassroots approach
that appealed to population segments in Tunisia’s interior that may have been ignored by the mainstream parties. Rivals
accused Hamdi of violating Tunisia’s campaign finance rules and of being close to former president Zine el Abidine
Ben Ali, who was deposed in January. Hamdi denies the allegations, and an attempt by the electoral commission to
overturn seven seats won by Al Aridha on campaign finance grounds was overruled by the courts.
16
Tunisia Watch, “Une ‘Déclaration du Processus Transitoire’ Signée par 12 Partis,” September 15, 2011.
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The October elections confirmed the political rise of Tunisia’s main Islamist party, Al Nahda. Al
Nahda leaders have portrayed themselves as moderates who seek to participate in a democratic
system, support the separation of mosque and state, and would not scale back women’s freedom.17
Ghannouchi has compared Al Nahda to Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Al
Nahda leaders, for example, have expressed support for preserving Tunisia’s personal status code,
which is a key focus of concern among secularists. The movement’s detractors, however, often
accuse Al Nahda of a “double discourse,” i.e., of portraying a moderate face in order to enter
government and gradually introduce more conservative, restrictive laws and institutions.
Conversely, Al Nahda members purport to feel threatened by “leftist” actors, whom they accuse
of seeking illegitimately to restrict Islamists’ political influence. Increasing polarization between
Islamists and secularists could portend gridlock within the Constituent Assembly.
Al Nahda’s electoral gains appear to have stemmed from a range of factors. Clearly, the
movement remained popular despite two decades of confinement to exile and underground
activities. In addition, the repression meted out to Al Nahda activists under Ben Ali appears to
have endeared the movement to many Tunisians and enhanced its popular legitimacy. Al Nahda
did not play a significant role in the “Jasmine Revolution” uprising, but the organization raised its
profile in 2011 through a series of politically savvy choices. For example, in early 2011, it joined
the Committee to Defend the Revolution, a loose coalition of political party activists, unionists,
and leftist groups that successfully called for the interim government to broaden consultation on
political reforms and dismiss senior officials from the former regime. Al Nahda also is widely
reported to have engaged in superior grassroots mobilization during the electoral campaign, and
may have benefitted from campaign missteps by the most vocally secularist parties, such as the
PDP and the Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM). These attempted to drive a wedge between
Islamists and secularists, a strategy that may have backfired among Tunisians eager to reconcile
democratic participation with what they view as their Arab/Muslim identity.18 Conversely, voters
appeared to reward secularist parties that signaled a willingness to work with Al Nahda, such as
the CPR and Ettakatol. Indeed, a significant percentage of Tunisians, who may or may not have
voted for Al Nahda, broadly desire Islam to play a more prominent role in public life.19 At the
same time, very few indicate that they prefer an Islamic system of government.20
Some Tunisians have expressed concerns that political power could become overly concentrated
in Al Nahda’s hands. At the same time, Al Nahda’s actions are likely to be limited by a number of
factors, including the party’s own broad constituency (who cast votes for the party for a wide
variety of reasons), the strategic constraints of vital state interests (such as security prerogatives
and economic ties), and the pressures exerted by other domestic actors, including via street
protests. Al Nahda may contend with internal divisions as it takes on a political leadership role,
and could also find itself competing with emergent, more radical Islamist groups for public
17
For example, a Nahda spokesman told a journalist in April that “there is no developed country that does not have
women’s rights, these things go together.” Le Monde, “En Tunisie, Les Multiples Visages d’Un Islamisme Qui
Réapparaît au Grand Jour,” April 10, 2011. See also Marc Lynch, “Tunisia’s New al-Nahda,” ForeignPolicy.com, June
29, 2011; and Al Nahda, “Address by the General-Secretary of ‘Ennahda’ Party : Positions and Dimensions,” Sousse
Business Forum, June 11, 2011. For a sympathetic account of Ghannouchi’s political and philosophical evolution, see
Azzam S. Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
18
CRS interviews with political observers in Tunis, October 2011.
19
Institut de Sondage et de Traitement de l'Information Statistique (ISTIS), "Sondage d'Opinion sur la Situation
Politique et l'Impact de la Révolution sur les Média Presse," April 2011.
20
State Department Office of Opinion Research, “Tunisians Up for Elections, But Down on Parties,” August 31, 2011;
Michael Robbins and Mark Tessler, “Tunisians Voted for Jobs, Not Islam,” ForeignPolicy.com, December 7, 2011.
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support. Al Nahda founder and president Rachid Ghannouchi, who was not a candidate in the
October elections, has said that he will soon step down, allowing party members to select a new
leader; this could place the future direction of the party in question.
Many analysts argue that Tunisia’s secular traditions, educated middle class, and history of
promoting women’s socioeconomic equality are bulwarks against extremism. Still, radical
Islamist groups, although marginal, have become more visible in the post-Ben Ali era, as previous
state restrictions have been rolled back. Recent demonstrations and violent attacks by Salafists,
including an assault on individuals attending the screening of a secularist film in Tunis in late
June 2011, an attack on a television station in October that had broadcast an animated film briefly
depicting God, and agitation on university campuses over bans on the niqab (full face veil), have
sparked concerns. Some observers fear that these incidents have chilled free expression.21
Background on Al Nahda
Al Nahda, presided over by Islamic scholar and activist Rachid Ghannouchi, was first formally organized by
Ghannouchi and Abdel Fattah Moro in 1981—soon after multiparty politics were legalized under President
Bourguiba—as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). Although the MTI was relatively moderate compared to other
Islamist groups, it was viewed as the most popular and therefore the most significant threat to the government.22 The
MTI organized demonstrations on university campuses, spurring arrests and clashes with the security forces and with
leftist groups. The growing unrest, combined with that orchestrated by trade unions, undermined support for
Bourguiba’s presidency and laid the groundwork for Ben Ali’s rise in 1987.23
Upon coming to power, Ben Ali promised greater pluralism and a dialogue with opposition groups. Hoping to gain
legal recognition, the MTI changed its name to Al Nahda to comply with the 1988 political party law, which barred
names based on religion. It was nonetheless denied legal status. Al Nahda candidates were permitted to run as
independents in the 1989 parliamentary elections, but when they garnered a high level of support—reportedly 15% of
the national vote—Ben Ali initiated a crackdown on the group. Ghannouchi left the country during this time.
Confrontations between the government and Al Nahda activists escalated, culminating in an attack on a ruling party
office in 1991 that was blamed on Al Nahda. Al Nahda leaders condemned the attack and denied that those
responsible belonged to their movement, an explanation that remains disputed. Ben Ali accused Al Nahda of plotting
to overthrow the government and launched a campaign to eradicate the group and all signs of conservative Islam. The
government subsequently claimed it had unearthed an Islamist plot to assassinate Ben Ali, and in 1992 Tunisian
military courts convicted 265 Al Nahda members on charges of planning a coup. Al Nahda denied the accusations, and
some rights advocates criticized the case as biased and lacking due process.24 Ghannouchi was sentenced in absentia.
Similar tensions between Islamists and government forces drove neighboring Algeria into civil war in the early 1990s.
The Security Forces
A central challenge facing Tunisia’s interim government is how to assert control over the size and
mandate of the domestic security services, which formed a vast and secretive network under Ben
Ali, without sowing the seeds of future instability. It may also take time before members of the
public are willing to trust the police to ensure their security. The security services under Ben Ali
were accused of abuses such as extrajudicial arrests, extensive internet surveillance, and torture.
The number of security agents remains unknown, although it is thought by some analysts to far
21
Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Police Inaction Allowed Assault on Film Screening; Action Needed to Curb Attacks
on Artists Deemed ‘Un-Islamic,’” June 30, 2011; see also OSC doc. GMP20110701405002, “‘Supporters of Shari’ah’
Condemn ‘Attacks’ on ‘Sanctities of Muslims in Tunisia,’” Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, June 30, 2011.
22
Henry Munson Jr., “Islamic Revivalism in Morocco and Tunisia,” The Muslim World, 76:3-4 (1986).
23
Munson 1986, op. cit.
24
Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, Routledge: New York, 2010.
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exceed the number of military personnel and could be as high as 200,000.25 Several dozen senior
security and Interior Ministry officials were fired in February, and in March 2011, the Interior
Ministry announced it was dissolving entities “akin to ‘political police.’”26 However, the number
of affected personnel and whether they would retain their employment with the government was
not made public. It is unclear to what extent the security services have been restructured.27
The interim government brought charges against a few senior security officials from the Ben Ali
regime. However, opinions are divided as to whether to pursue lower- and mid-ranking officials
and security officers. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture called on Tunisia in May 2011 to
“promote accountability for past abuses,” including by prosecuting perpetrators of torture and
other abusive acts; the rapporteur also suggested that torture may have continued, in a small
number of cases, since Ben Ali’s departure.28 Fears among police officers that they could be made
to shoulder the blame for the regime’s decision to open fire on demonstrators in January 2011
have led to several police demonstrations in recent months.29
The Military
There is a notable distinction between the security services, which were closely associated with
Ben Ali’s repressive internal security apparatus, and the military, which has received fewer state
resources and is viewed as relatively apolitical.30 The military comprises roughly 35,000
personnel; military service is compulsory for one year, but many Tunisians reportedly evade it.
Government spending on the military constitutes only 1.4% of GDP—a low proportion compared
to other countries in the region.31 The armed forces are positioned largely against external threats,
and also participate (to a limited extent) in multilateral peacekeeping missions.
The government’s initial, heavy-handed response to the 2011 protests was led by the police and
security services. The deployment of the military to the streets was a turning point, and military
leaders appear to have subsequently played a key role in ending Ben Ali’s presidency. Notably,
General Rachid Ammar, then army chief of staff (since promoted to the equivalent of joint chief
of staff) is widely reported to have refused orders to open fire on demonstrators.32 On January 23,
Ammar publicly addressed protesters and promised to safeguard Tunisia’s “revolution.” While
25
Eric Goldstein/Human Rights Watch, “Dismantling the Machinery of Oppression,” The Wall Street Journal,
February 16, 2011. Others note that inflated figures on the number of security agents may have been purposefully
tolerated (even circulated) by the former regime in order to exaggerate its ability to control the population.
26
TAP, “Interior Ministry Decides to Remove State Security Division,” March 7, 2011.
27
According to some human rights advocates, domestic intelligence services have not been dissolved, and may
continue to conduct surveillance activities—although whether they are following orders or merely habit is unclear. See
Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), La Tunisie Post Ben Ali Face aux Démons du
Passé: Transition démocratique et persistance des violations graves des droits de l’homme, July 2011.
28
AFP, “UN Torture Rapporteur Visits Tunisia,” and Reuters, “People Still Tortured in Tunisia—U.N. Rapporteur,”
May 21, 2011. Local rights groups have also since highlighted cases of ongoing mistreatment of police detainees.
29
See, e.g., AFP, “Tunisia Bans Police from Union Activities,” September 6, 2011. Divisions between police
commanders and the rank-and-file were exposed in the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s exit, as thousands of police
officers held their own demonstration to distance themselves from the RCD and call for better working conditions.
30
In the late 1970s and mid-1980s, the military led the repression of anti-government protests. However, this role was
largely relegated to the civilian security services under Ben Ali. Unlike in neighboring Algeria, the military leadership
did not play a major role in the independence movement or in early state formation.
31
Figures compared from the CIA World Factbook.
32
E.g., Abdelaziz Barrouhi, “Tunisie: L’Homme Qui A Dit Non,” Jeune Afrique, January 30-February 5, 2011.
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Ammar’s comments were welcomed by many Tunisians, they sparked concern among some
observers over whether the armed forces could interfere in domestic politics, particularly if the
security situation should worsen.33 Following Ben Ali’s exit, members of the military led efforts
to stabilize the security situation, including by pursuing elements of the domestic security
apparatus and unidentified armed elements seen as loyal to the old regime.
Security Concerns
Although the security situation has largely stabilized since the chaotic first few weeks after Ben
Ali’s departure, incidents of looting, theft, and destruction of property continue to occur. Incidents
of religiously motivated violence were reported in early 2011, including the murder of a Polish
priest on February 18 and harassment directed at Tunisia’s tiny Jewish population. There have
also reportedly been several large prison escapes, for unclear reasons.34 Authorities have had to
further contend with the influx of refugees from Libya, while inter-tribal violence has been
reported in the southwest. Suspicions remain that elements of the security services could be
seeking to provoke disorder, including by reportedly infiltrating demonstrations35; interim
government officials blamed an armed attack on the Interior Ministry, in February 2011, on a
conspiracy by members of the former regime’s security forces. The “state of emergency” imposed
by Ben Ali in early 2011 has been repeatedly extended (though many of its more draconian
provisions have not been enforced), and the military is assisting in internal security operations.
Some analysts fear that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional affiliate of Al
Qaeda with roots in Algeria’s 1990s civil conflict, could take advantage of political instability and
insecurity along Tunisia’s southern borders, particularly when combined with upheaval in
neighboring Libya.36 AQIM released a statement in January 2011 hailing the departure of Ben Ali
and warning against supposed U.S. and French efforts to subvert the revolution.37 Al Qaeda’s
second-in-command, Ayman Al Zawahri, has released at least two statements seeking to portray
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as motivated by Islamist sentiment and warning that the United
States would seek to manipulate the outcomes.38
In mid-May 2011, Tunisian authorities announced they had arrested two suspected armed AQIM
members near the Libyan border, described as an Algerian and a Libyan national.39 According to
33
Issandr El Amrani, “Tunisia Diary: Ammar’s Move?” TheArabist.net, January 24, 2011. In mid-2010, an analysis of
Tunisia’s political stability concluded that “a coup is a real possibility” should instability affect the transfer of power
after Ben Ali. Veritiss, Tunisia: Outlook 2011-2015 [UNCLASSIFIED], prepared For the Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office, August 2, 2010.
34
Le Monde, “Incertitudes en Tunisie sur la Tenue des Elections, le 24 Juillet,” May 10, 2011.
35
Tara Bahrampour, “In Tunisia, First Steps Toward Democracy,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2011; Jeune
Afrique, “Tunisie: l’Ex-RCD Soupçonné d’Avoir Commandité des Attaques de Postes de Police,” July 18, 2011.
36
See CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for
U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
37
OSC doc. GMP20110128836001, “AQLIM Warns Tunisians Against Western ‘Plots’ To ‘Abort’ Tunisian
Revolution,” Al-Mujahidin Electronic Network, January 28, 2011. For background on AQIM, see CRS Report R41070,
Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by
John Rollins.
38
Maamoun Youssef, “Al-Qaida’s No. 2 Incites Tunisians, Egyptians,” AP, February 28, 2011; OSC doc.
GMP20110913836004, “Al-Fajr Releases Al-Zawahiri Audio, Bin Ladin Video on 10th Anniversary of 9/11,” Ana Al
Muslim Network, September 13, 2011.
39
Radio Tunisienne, “Tunisian Interior Ministry Provides More Information on ‘Terrorists’ Arrest,” May 16, 2011, via
(continued...)
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Tunisian officials, this was the first arrest of AQIM militants within Tunisia. Days later, four
Tunisian soldiers were killed in the northern town of Rouhia by a group described as affiliated
with Al Qaeda. Two militants were also reported killed. In July, Tunisian authorities claimed to
have halted AQIM militants from entering Tunisia from Algeria, and in August security forces
engaged in skirmishes with “terrorists” at the Algerian border.40 In September 2011, the Defense
Ministry stated that an army air patrol exchanged fire with an unidentified, heavily armed convoy
of nine vehicles traversing a remote southwest border region. Reportedly, the Tunisian armed
forces, in a coordinated assault by ground troops and combat helicopters, destroyed seven of the
vehicles and stopped the remaining two, killing six individuals and taking others into custody.41
The State Department cited the incident in a travel alert to U.S. citizens in early October. Armed
groups have also reportedly been stopped at the Libyan border.42
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background
While Tunisia has not been subject to many large attacks, terrorism is a potential domestic threat
and Tunisians have participated in plots abroad. Two notable incidents of terrorism on Tunisian
soil were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba (noted for its tiny
Jewish population) and a series of street battles between alleged militants and security forces in
Tunis in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri appeared to
claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002. In all,
14 German tourists, five Tunisians, and two French citizens were killed in the attack.43 France,
Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement. The roots of the
2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, are more opaque.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated
outside Tunisia, on a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.44 The TCG
sought to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia and was considered to be a radical offshoot of Al
Nahda. The TCG was suspected of plotting, but not carrying out, attacks on U.S., Algerian, and
Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001. One founder, Tarek Maaroufi, was arrested in
Belgium the same month. The group appears to have since been inactive.
AQIM actively recruits Tunisians and reportedly had ties with the TCG.45 In January 2007,
following the aforementioned street battles, Tunisian security forces claimed that they had
discovered terrorists linked to the GSPC who had infiltrated from Algeria and possessed
homemade explosives, satellite maps of foreign embassies, and documents identifying foreign
envoys. Some 30 Tunisians were subsequently convicted of plotting to target U.S. and British
(...continued)
U.S. government Open Source Center (OSC).
40
BBC Monitoring, “Militants From Al-Qa'idah Try to Sneak into Tunisia, Official,” July 2, 2011; OSC doc.
GMP20110822280003, “Tunisian Sources Report Several Dead in Army Clashes with Terrorists Near Border,” Le
Temps d'Algerie, August 20, 2011.
41
AFP, “L’Armée Tunisienne Attaque un Convoi Armé dans le Sud, près de l’Algérie,” September 21, 2011; BBC
Monitoring, “Algerian Forces Clash with ‘Terrorists’ Infiltrated from Tunisia,” El Khabar, September 22, 2011; AFP,
“Six Killed in Tunisian Clashes Near Algeria: Diplomat,” September 23, 2011.
42
Le Temps, “Menace Terroriste sur la Tunisie,” September 10, 2011.
43
Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002.
44
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, released April 30, 2007.
45
Craig S. Smith, “Tunisia is Feared as New Islamist Base,” International Herald Tribune, February 20, 2007.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
interests in Tunisia. AQIM later claimed responsibility for kidnapping two Austrian tourists in
Tunisia in February 2008.
Tunisian expatriates suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been arrested in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, Western Europe, Mauritania, and the United States. Several are reportedly detained at the
U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and their possible return to Tunisia has proven to be
controversial.46 In April 2009, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of U.S. Central
Command, told a House Appropriations Committee subcommittee that the perpetrators of suicide
bombings in Iraq that month may have been part of a network based in Tunisia.47
Under Ben Ali, as many as 2,000 Tunisians were detained, charged, and/or convicted on
terrorism-related charges, including under a sweeping anti-terrorism law passed in 2003.48 Critics
claimed that the law “makes the exercise of fundamental freedoms ... an expression of
terrorism.”49 These criticisms were echoed in the December 2010 report of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, who concluded that “the current definition of terrorism is vague and broad,
hence deviating from the principle of legality and allowing for wide usage of counter-terrorism
measures in practice.”50 Rights advocates also accused anti-terror trials of relying on excessive
pretrial detention, denial of due process, and weak evidence.
Anti-Corruption Efforts
Tunisian authorities have brought dozens of criminal charges against Ben Ali and his wife, Leila
Trabelsi, both of whom remain outside the country; many of these cases pertain to alleged
corruption. Family members reportedly owned or controlled many of the country's biggest
companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure, and are thought
to have stashed away significant resources overseas. However, the decision to carry out multiple
and rapid trials of the former first couple in absentia, after Tunisian authorities unsuccessfully
sought Ben Ali’s extradition from Saudi Arabia, has been controversial.51 Dozens of family
members, along with former senior government and security officials, have also either been tried
or face charges. An ad-hoc national commission appointed during the interim government carried
out an eight-month investigation into corruption under the former regime, and submitted its final
report to the government in early November 2011. The report, accompanied by thousands of
documentary files, may lead to new prosecutions. While some Tunisian commentators have
46
According to recent news reports, 12 Tunisians were at one time detained in Guatanamo, but only five remain in U.S.
custody. Five were repatriated to third countries, partly due to concerns over their possible torture if returned to
Tunisia, while two others were returned to Tunisia and imprisoned. Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia to Send Mission to
US for Release of its Remaining Gitmo Detainees,” September 14, 2011.
47
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Holds
Hearing on the US Central Command, April 24, 2009, transcript via CQ.
48
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010.
49
Jeremy Landor, “Washington’s Partner,” Middle East International, March 5, 2004, pp. 23-24.
50
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur, December 28, 2010, op. cit.
51
The interim government had also issued an international arrest warrant through Interpol for Ben Ali, Leila Trabelsi,
and several close relatives who have fled the country. Amnesty International called the first trial of Ben Ali “unfair”
and warned that the Tunisian government “risks replicating the unfair justice system that was a hallmark of Tunisia
under Ben Ali.” “Accountability in Tunisia and Egypt,” August 3, 2011.
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welcomed a judicial approach, some are skeptical regarding the capacity and political leanings of
the justice system, which was inherited from the Ben Ali regime.52
Recovery of State Assets
Tunisian authorities have seized domestic assets belonging to the former president and his
associates, and have identified at least 12 countries overseas where these individuals stored
money, which could total billions of dollars. The financial and real estate holdings of the Ben Ali
and Trabelsi families have been of particular interest, and public inquiries into these areas could
continue. Western governments have cooperated with Tunisian efforts to freeze assets; however,
the process for recovering such assets on behalf of the Tunisian state is complex and
challenging.53 Interim authorities have also moved to expropriate shares of domestic companies
controlled by certain Ben Ali family members and associates accused of financial manipulation,
but have allowed most such companies to continue operating under appointed managers.54
Key Actors
Contenders for political influence in Tunisia include the political parties; trade unions; the
security forces; Islamist actors who remain outside the political system; and, potentially, former
RCD officials. The political party spectrum is fluid, but several broad groupings are emergent:
Islamist parties, of which the largest is Al Nahda; center-left/secular parties willing to work with
Al Nahda, such as the CPR and Ettakatol; stringently secularist parties, such as the PDP, the
Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM) coalition (led by the Ettajdid party), and Afek Tounes; and
parties whose founders were senior members of the former ruling RCD party, such as Al
Moubadara (The Initiative). The Al Aridha coalition does not easily fit into these categories, as its
candidates reportedly used both religious and populist messages in their campaigns; the
coalition’s membership also does not appear to be acting as a block. In addition to registered
parties, religiously conservative Salafist groups—which were not permitted to participate in the
elections—have expanded their activities and visibility. The internal and ideological cohesion of
many parties remains untested.
Selected Profiles
•
Hamadi Jebali, Prime Minister and Secretary-General of Al Nahda. Born
1949 in Sousse, Jebali is an engineer by training and a longtime activist in Al
Nahda (previously the Islamic Tendancy Movement), having become a member
of the group’s political bureau in 1981 and served as its president from 1981 until
1984. He also directed Al Nahda’s newspaper, Al Fajr. In the early 1990s, Jebali
52
Hamadi Redissi, “The Revolution Is Not Over Yet [op-ed],” The New York Times, July 15, 2011; Tarek Amara,
“Tunisia Pledges Tougher Line on Ex-Leader’s Allies,” Reuters, August 18, 2011.
53
Deborah Ball and Cassell Bryan-Low, “Arab Spring Regimes Face Long Slog to Recoup Assets,” The Wall Street
Journal, August 25, 2011. The Wall Street Journal reported in February that U.S. investigators had opened a
preliminary probe into assets controlled by Ben Ali and family members. Joseph Palazzolo, “FBI Probe to Target
Tunisia’s Ex-Leader,” The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2011.
54
Le Monde, “Orange Tunisie Passe Sous la Tutelle de l’Etat Tunisien,” March 30, 2011; David Gauthier-Villars,
“How ‘The Family’ Controlled Tunisia,” The Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2011.
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was sentenced to over 16 years in prison due to his association with Al Nahda,
and spent 10 years in solitary confinement. After being freed in 2006, he rejoined
Al Nahda and became the party’s secretary-general. Previously, Jebali lived for
10 years in France, where he completed an engineering degree and was a founder
of the French Muslim Association. Jebali has emphasized strong support for
individual freedoms, women’s rights, and foreign investment. He has rejected the
label “Islamist”—maintaining that Al Nahda is a “civil political party”—and is
viewed by some observers as the “moderate” or “reformist” face of the party.55
•
Moncef Marzouki, President and Leader of the Congress for the Republic
(CPR). Born in 1945, Marzouki is a medical doctor, author, and longtime human
rights activist. After receiving medical training in France, he taught medicine at
the University of Sousse from 1981 to 2000, while pursuing human rights
advocacy through the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH). In 2001,
Marzouki founded the leftist, secularist CPR party on a platform of establishing
the rule of law and promoting human rights. It was soon banned, leading
Marzouki to a decade of exile and diaspora activism in France. While outside the
country and during the electoral campaign, Marzouki signaled he was willing to
forge common cause with Al Nahda, at times criticizing stringent secularists for
being out of touch with ordinary Tunisians.56
•
Mustapha Ben Jaafar, President of the Constituent Assembly and Leader of
Ettakatol. Ben Jaafar, a medical doctor born in Tunis in 1940, founded the
center-left, secularist Ettakatol party in 1994. It became one of three “dissident”
opposition parties legally recognized under Ben Ali, which operated under
significant restrictions. After receiving his medical degree in France, Ben Jaafar
became engaged in political and human rights advocacy, including within the
LTDH, while also serving on the medical faculty at the University of Tunis. Ben
Jaafar has publicly expressed concern that the interim government of 2011 did
not represent a significant enough break with the past, and that Ben Ali loyalists
may continue to hold sway within various official structures.57
•
Ahmed Nejib el Chebbi, Founder of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)
and Member of the Constituent Assembly. Chebbi formally stepped down
from the leadership of the PDP, also a legal but repressed opposition party under
Ben Ali, in favor of longtime party activist Maya Jribi in 2006, but he continues
to be the party’s most prominent figure. Chebbi has portrayed himself as the most
vocally secularist alternative to Islamist parties, and he and Jribi are likely to lead
a secularist/left-leaning opposition block in the Constituent Assembly. A former
student activist for leftist and pan-Arabist causes and a lawyer by training,
Chebbi was imprisoned in the 1960s. The party directs a Tunis-based newspaper,
El Mawkif, and Chebbi provided legal defense for several journalists targeted by
the Ben Ali government.
55
“Profile: Tunisian Ennahdha Prime Minister Candidate Hammadi Jebali,” via OSC, October 28, 2011; Al Arabiya,
“Tunisia’s Hamadi Jebali: The Face of Moderate Islam?” November 18, 2011.
56
LePoint.fr, “L’Opposant Historique Moncef Marzouki Va Devenir Président,” November 21, 2011.
57
AFP, “‘Pour l’opinion, il n’y a pas eu de vrai rupture avec le passé’ (Ben Jaafar),” September 22, 2011; CRS
interview with Ben Jaafar, Tunis, October 2011.
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•
General Rachid Ammar, Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Ammar is widely
reported to have refused orders to fire on protesters in January 2011, and to have
subsequently influenced Ben Ali’s decision to step down. In the immediate
aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure, Ammar enjoyed massive popularity, and the
army continues to benefit from high public regard. On January 24, 2011, Ammar
publicly addressed protesters, promising to uphold Tunisia’s “revolution” and
guarantee stability ahead of elections. His comments were welcomed by
demonstrators, but sparked concern among some analysts over whether the
armed forces would seek a political role. Ammar was made chief of staff of the
27,000-person army in 2002, when his predecessor was killed in a helicopter
crash. In April 2011, he was promoted to chief of staff of the armed forces.
•
Rachid Ghannouchi, President and Co-Founder of Al Nahda. An Islamic
scholar, teacher, and activist, Ghannouchi, 70, has led Tunisia’s main Islamist
movement for three decades. Ghannouchi’s early focus was on religious and
moral issues, but he grew more politically active by the late 1970s. He spent two
decades in exile, largely in London, after Al Nahda was banned in 1991, but
returned to Tunisia in January 2011 following the interim government’s
announcement of a general amnesty. Ghannouchi has emphasized that Al
Nahda’s goal is to participate within a democratic political system and that the
party will not attempt to turn back women’s rights or other liberal aspects of
Tunisian society. However, Tunisian secularists view him with suspicion.
Ghannouchi has stated he will not run for president and that he will soon step
down from the leadership of the party.
Background on Tunisia’s Trade Unions
Since Tunisia’s independence, the labor movement has served as a rare legal conduit for expressing dissent, and the
main union federation, the Tunisian General Union of Labor (UGTT), wields political clout. The UGTT, which claims
over half a million members, played a key role in sustaining the “Jasmine Revolution” protests, which it framed as
rooted in economic grievances.58 Since Ben Ali’s departure, however, the UGTT has suffered from internal
fragmentation—notably between a more radical grassroots and a leadership that is seen by some as having been
subject to cooption by the Ben Ali regime. New unions and splinter movements have recently been formed, which
may compete with the UGTT for influence. Ongoing labor unrest has also sparked a backlash among some segments
of the middle class. UGTT activists formed candidate lists in the October 2011 election under the banner of the
Tunisian Labor Party (PTT), but did not win any seats.
The UGTT was organized in the mid-1940s and was a force in Tunisia’s independence movement. During the Cold
War, it positioned itself as pro-West (non-Communist) and formed links with the American labor movement.59
Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, strove to keep the unions under the government’s wing; during the 1960s,
former UGTT leader Ahmed Ben Salah led a decade-long period of socialist-oriented economic policy as minister for
finance and planning. By the late 1970s and into the mid-1980s, however, amid growing economic unease, the union’s
leadership turned to overt confrontation with the government, particularly over wages and food price inflation.60 The
UGTT led a series of strikes and demonstrations that were met with heavy state repression. During Ben Ali’s
presidency, the government again attempted to influence the UGTT, including by interfering in its leadership selection.
The UGTT nevertheless was a key instigator of anti-government unrest in recent years, including protests in the
mining region of Gafsa in 2008 and 2010 that were arguably a precursor to the “Jasmine Revolution” uprising.
58
UGTT, Déclaration de la Commission Administrative Nationale, January 4, 2011; see also http://www.ugtt.org.tn.
Global Security, “Union Génerale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT),” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/tunisia/ugtt.htm.
60
See Niger Disney, “The Working-Class Revolt in Tunisia,” Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
Reports, 67 (May 1978).
59
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The Economy
Damage from the December 2010-January 2011 unrest, political uncertainty, turmoil in
neighboring Libya (which caused the return of tens of thousands of migrant Tunisian workers and
the related loss of remittance revenues), and economic crisis in Europe have contributed to severe
economic difficulties. Tunisia experienced economic contraction in the first quarter of 2011, and
its central bank has predicted 0% growth in 2011, compared to 3.7% growth in 2010. Tourism
receipts were reportedly down by 40% and foreign direct investment by 60% in the first six
months of 2011.61 Ongoing labor unrest, particularly in the interior, including phosphate mining
areas, represents an additional challenge, as do rising food and fuel prices and recent flooding.
According to interim government estimates, up to 20% of the working-age population can’t find
work, and up to a quarter of them are university graduates.62 The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has suggested that future economic growth is probable if reforms provide “greater access
to opportunity and more competition.” However, in October 2011 the IMF projected that the
worsening global economic outlook would negatively affect Tunisia’s growth prospects in the
near future and warned of the potential for widening fiscal deficits due to social spending.63 A
significant challenge for post-Ben Ali authorities has been managing public expectations.
Officials have sought to encourage the return of tourists, garner donor support for economic
stabilization, and reassure investors, with mixed effects. Under the interim government, thenFinance Minister Jaloul Ayed led efforts to respond to socioeconomic pressures, including
through an increase in public sector hiring, new infrastructure construction in the interior,
expanded access to microcredit for poor families, the encouragement of public-private
partnerships, and social assistance programs for unemployed youth and others. Ayed appealed for
$4 billion in immediate foreign loans, while then-Prime Minister Caïd Essebsi stated in May 2011
that Tunisia would need at least $5 billion in aid per year for five years to finance infrastructure
and job creation.64 Interim authorities also indicated that some assets seized from the Ben Ali
family would be used as seed money for public-private development projects.
The interim government’s economic proposals were formalized in the September 2011 release of
a five-year “development strategy,” dubbed the “Jasmine Plan,” which was positively received by
Western donors. It emphasized pursuing greater exports and foreign investment; fostering a larger
role for the private sector in job creation; increasing public investment in infrastructure and
education, with a focus on addressing regional inequalities; reviving privatization programs; and
reducing public debt. The degree to which the Jasmine Plan will serve as a blueprint for economic
policy under the Constituent Assembly is unclear. Al Nahda leaders have stated their support for
private sector and foreign investment while calling for a more equal distribution of wealth.65
61
AFP, “Tunisie: Après le Retour au Calme, Place au Grand Chantier Economique,” March 9, 2011; Le Temps, “Appel
des 17 Pour Soutenir la Transition Démocratique en Tunisie,” May 19, 2011; Mark Tran, “Tunisia Offers Wake-Up
Call for Development,” The Guardian, June 9, 2011.
62
Peter Wonacott, “Tunisia’s Leadership Faces Restive Unemployed,” The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2011.
63
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2011; IMF Survey, “Mideast Outlook Varies
Markedly Across Regions,” October 26, 2011.
64
AP, “Tunisie: Adoption d’un Plan de Relance Economique,” April 1, 2011; Reuters, “Tunisia Will Need $4 Bln in
Loans in 2011—FinMin,” April 1, 2011; Reuters, “Tunisia Economy Needs Foreign Help to Recover—Minister,” May
20, 2011; David Gauthier-Villars, “Tunisia to Seek Backing for Aid,” The Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2011.
65
CRS interviews with Al Nahda officials, Tunis, October 2011; TAP, “Hamadi Jebali: ‘Les Hommes d’Affaires
Partenaires dans la Prise de Décision,’” November 2, 2011.
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During Ben Ali’s presidency, many analysts contended that there was an implicit social contract
between the government and its citizens, which promoted economic stability and middle-class
standards of living at the expense of political freedom. Prior to the “Jasmine Revolution,” this
strategy appeared to have contained latent dissatisfaction from disrupting the political status quo.
Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and one of the best-performing non-oil exporting
Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Despite the impact of the global
economic crisis in 2009—which produced a decrease in exports, a contraction in the industrial
sector, and a lower expansion in services, largely due to a decrease in market demand in
Europe—the economy quickly rebounded in 2010 with fiscal stimulus programs.
Textile exports and tourism have driven much of Tunisia’s economic growth in recent years. The
tourism sector is a major employer and previously provided some 11% of the country’s hard
currency receipts, up to 7% of GDP, and an estimated 400,000 jobs. Tunisia has also attempted to
attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. Phosphate ore reserves are significant
and are the basis of a chemicals industry, but their value is reduced by their low grade. In 2009,
the World Bank cited Tunisia as a “top regional reformer,” citing progress in the areas of starting
a business, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, and border defense.66 In September
2010, the IMF predicted that Tunisia’s growth could continue to increase gradually, “provided
that policies and reforms planned by the authorities aimed at enhancing Tunisia’s
competitiveness, developing new markets, and supporting new sources of growth in sectors with
high added value bear fruit.”67 In 2009, public debt stood at roughly $22 billion, or about 47% of
gross domestic product (GDP), according to the World Bank.
Tunisia’s strong economic record has long masked significant disparities. Wealth has long been
concentrated in the capital and along the eastern coast, while the interior has suffered from
poverty and government neglect. Unemployment and underemployment are major problems,
notably for recent college graduates. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the
unemployment rate among university graduates was over 20% in 2010 and “increased by a factor
of ten over the last two decades” due to “the youth bulge, high throughput in universities,
mismatch in the demand and supply of skilled workers, and the relatively low quality of training
received by many graduates.” Moreover, unemployment is over 22%, on average, in interior
regions such as Kasserine and Gafsa, which were epicenters of the early 2011 unrest.68 Blatant
official corruption under Ben Ali reinforced many Tunisians’ perceptions that the economic deck
was stacked against them, even if they enjoyed relatively high living standards within the region.
In light of these issues, analysts have debated the role that economic factors played in the
Tunisian uprising. While most agree that a desire for greater individual freedoms and “social
justice” was a driving force in the protests, socioeconomic grievances doubtless spurred demands
for change. Since then, numerous segments of the society have expressed demands for jobs,
higher wages, and wealth distribution. Indeed, such calls have soared even as political unrest has
contributed to severe economic contractions. Some observers fear that a failure to address such
grievances could lead an impatient public to lose faith in the transition process.
66
See World Bank, “Tunisia: A Top Regional Reformer According to Doing Business 2009,” September 2008.
Joël Toujas-Bernate and Rina Bhattacharya, International Monetary Fund, “Tunisia Weathers Crisis Well, But
Unemployment Persists,” September 10, 2010.
68
African Development Bank, The Revolution in Tunisia: Economic Challenges and Prospects, March 2011.
67
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Foreign Relations
Al Nahda officials and other political leaders have emphasized continuity in Tunisia’s foreign
relations, for instance regarding international agreements and commitments made under Ben Ali.
Al Nahda leaders have stated that they wish to protect and expand foreign direct investment and
international trade, including with traditional partners in the West. The party has also indicated a
desire to cultivate closer economic ties with other Arab and Muslim states.69 Rachid
Ghannouchi’s first foreign trip after the October elections was to Qatar, highlighting the
potentially increased influence of Arab Gulf states in post-Ben Ali Tunisia. Relations with Turkey
could also be bolstered. In September, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited
Tunisia as the first stop on a regional tour of countries affected by democratic uprisings; his
public remarks emphasized the compatibility of Islam and democracy.
Israel and the Palestinians
Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia had an interests office in
Israel until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah, or uprising against the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Under Ben Ali, Israeli and Tunisian foreign
ministers sometimes met. In September 2005, President Ben Ali sent a personal letter to then
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, praising his “courageous” withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
Israel’s then-foreign minister, who was born in Tunisia, and then-communications minister
attended the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunisia in 2005. (Then-Prime Minister
Sharon was invited along with leaders of all U.N. member states; his invitation provoked
demonstrations in Tunisia.)
Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi refers to Israel as an “occupying state,” and has indicated that the
creation of a Palestinian state is a prerequisite for discussing Tunisian-Israeli ties70; in November
2011, Al Nahda’s secretary-general, Hamadi Jebali, hosted a public meeting with a Hamas
official. At the same time, Al Nahda’s position on Israel and the Palestinians does not appear to be
very different from other political parties in Tunisia. Tunisia’s interim foreign ministry—led by
secularists—announced in September 2011 that it would support the Palestinians’ bid for a U.N.
recognition of statehood. Indeed, some domestic critics have accused Al Nahda of being too
conciliatory toward Israel.71
Europe
Tunisia and the European Union (EU) have cemented a close relationship by means of an
Association Agreement, aid, and loans.72 More than 60% of Tunisia’s trade is conducted with
69
CRS interviews with Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali, Tunis, October 2011.
CRS interviews with Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali, Tunis, October 2011; and Ghannouchi statements at the
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), November 30, 2011.
71
E.g., Al-Haqaiq editorial on Ghannouchi and Israel, December 9, 2011.
72
At the same time, EU leaders periodically expressed concerns over Tunisia’s record on human rights and political
freedom under Ben Ali.
70
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Europe.73 The Association Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1998,
eliminates customs tariffs and other trade barriers on manufactured goods, and provides for the
establishment of an EU-Tunisia free trade area in goods, but not in agriculture or services.
Negotiations on the provision of “advanced status” for Tunisia vis-à-vis the EU, which would
provide greater trade benefits, were restarted under the interim government.74 Tunisia receives aid
from the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) and soft loans from the European
Investment Bank, the financing arm of the EU. Europeans hope that aid will help Tunisia’s
economic growth and thereby reduce illegal immigration and Islamic fundamentalism.
EU officials have focused high-level attention on Tunisia’s political transition. The EU has
imposed targeted sanctions against individuals associated with the former regime and has
promised new economic, trade, and governance assistance, while seeking to ensure that Tunisia’s
previous commitments, such as the prevention of illegal emigration, will be maintained.75
Relations with Italy were strained in February 2011 when thousands of Tunisian migrants began
arriving by boat to Italy’s southern Lampedusa island; Tunisia rejected direct Italian intervention
but indicated it would cooperate with Italy and the EU on stemming illicit population flows. Italy
pledged over 200 million euros in aid and credit lines to help block departures and create jobs to
dissuade potential migrants, and also provided Tunisia with maritime patrol equipment.76
Relations with France were strained over French support for Ben Ali, which was extended even as
his security forces cracked down on pro-democracy protesters. French authorities have sought to
ingratiate themselves with post-Ben Ali authorities by replacing the French ambassador to
Tunisia, imposing an asset freeze on members of the Ben Ali family and associates, dispatching
senior officials on state visits, and pledging new bilateral aid, in addition to supporting
multilateral assistance.77 French officials congratulated Al Nahda on its election victory, but only
after two weeks had passed; suspicion of Islamists reportedly persists in French political circles.
Regional Relations
Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors, although Ben Ali’s
entente with neighboring Libya’s Muammar al Qadhafi was strained. Although it declined to
participate militarily in U.S. and NATO military operations in Libya, Tunisia’s interim
government has been strongly supportive of the transition there. Tunisia’s interim government
reportedly froze assets belonging to Qadhafi’s family, and recognized Libya’s Transitional
National Council (TNC) on August 21.78 Tunisian authorities hope that an end to turmoil in Libya
will stabilize border areas and, eventually, produce an economic rebound that would allow Libya
to reabsorb some of Tunisia’s low-skilled labor surplus. In December 2011, Al Nahda leader
Ghannouchi participated in a TNC-led Libyan reconciliation and reconstruction forum.
73
World Trade Organization, Tunisia Profile, October 2010.
Haykel Tlili, “Chômage: L’Union Européenne Prépare une Task Force pour la Tunisie,” Le Temps, August 23, 2011.
See European Commission, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, Tunisia, at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/
neighbourhood/country-cooperation/tunisia/tunisia_en.htm.
75
While some migrants are Tunisian, many are Sub-Saharan Africans who traverse Tunisia in search of passage to
Europe. Concerns over immigration have heightened with the flow of Libyans across the border and to southern Italy.
76
Reuters, “Italy, Tunisia Sign Deal to Ease Migrant Crisis,” April 5, 2011.
77
See G8 Summit, “The Deauville Partnership: Helping the Arab Countries in Their Transition to Free and Democratic
Societies,” Deauville, May 27, 2011.
78
The main political parties in Tunisia supported the interim government’s decision to recognize the CNT.
74
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Algeria and Morocco have been publicly supportive of Tunisia’s transition: Algeria has offered
financial assistance, while Morocco and Tunisia signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement
in May 2011. Tunisia is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union, established in 1989 by Tunisia,
Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, though the organization is inactive due to tensions
between Morocco and Algeria. Tunis is also the temporary headquarters location of the African
Development Bank (AfDB), which receives significant financial support from the United States.
It moved to Tunisia in 2005 due to unrest in Côte d’Ivoire, its permanent location.
U.S.-Tunisian Relations
Obama Administration officials have expressed strong support for Tunisia’s political transition
and have emphasized Tunisia’s role as an “important test case” for the region.79 In a speech in
May 2011 on U.S. policy toward Middle East, President Obama called on the United States “to
show that America values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of
the dictator,” and argued that Tunisia and Egypt “can set a strong example through free and fair
elections, a vibrant civil society, accountable and effective democratic institutions, and
responsible regional leadership.”80 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice has stated
that “it matters enormously to American national security and our national interests” that
democratic transitions in Tunisia and Egypt “succeed.”81 A number of senior U.S. officials have
visited Tunisia since Ben Ali’s departure, including Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
William Joseph Burns and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.82 Then-interim Prime Minister Caïd
Essebsi visited Washington DC in October 2011, where he met with President Obama at the
White House. In May 2011, President Obama and Caïd Essebsi had met on the sidelines of the
Group of Eight (G8) summit, where they discussed Tunisia’s democratic reforms.83
Regarding the October elections, U.S. officials repeatedly stated that they would work with the
new government, whatever its ideological leanings. With regard to Islamist parties such as Al
Nahda, Secretary Clinton stated that “what parties call themselves is less important to us than
what they actually do.”84 On October 23, President Obama congratulated the Tunisian people and
encouraged them to meet the challenges of “forming an interim government, drafting a new
Constitution, and charting a democratic course that meets the aspirations of all Tunisians.”85
The United States and Tunisia have enjoyed continuous relations since 1797. Tunisia was the site
of significant battles during World War II, and was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 in Operation
Torch. A U.S. cemetery and memorial near the ancient city of Carthage (outside Tunis) holds
79
House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, “Developments in Egypt and Lebanon,” February 10, 2011, Statement of
James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, Department of State.
80
The White House, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and Africa,” May 19, 2011.
81
“U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Rice Interviewed on CNN,” May 19, 2011, transcript via CQ.
82
Clinton expressed strong support for the Tunisian revolution and pressed for economic and political reforms. Her
visit was protested by several hundred demonstrators in Tunis who said they opposed American “interference.” John
Thorne, “Hillary Clinton Visits Tunisia to Press for Reform,” The National, March 18, 2011.
83
“Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes and National Security Council Senior
Director for European Affairs Liz Sherwood-Randall Hold Media Availability,” May 27, 2011, via CQ.
84
Bradley Klapper, “Championing Democracy, Clinton Says US Can Work with Islamist Parties Gaining from Arab
Spring,” November 8, 2011.
85
Barack Obama, “Statement on Elections in Tunisia,” October 23, 2011.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign
policy despite a brief experiment with leftist economic programs in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian
ties were strained by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
headquarters in Tunis, which some viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.86
Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism
surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows
NATO ships to make port calls at Tunis. U.S.-Tunisian relations during Ben Ali’s presidency
largely emphasized security cooperation. The United States considered Ben Ali to be an ally, a
moderate Arab ruler, and a partner in international counterterrorism efforts. Allegations have been
made that Tunisia cooperated in at least one case of U.S. “rendition” of a terrorist suspect, in
2004.87 However, Tunisia did not support the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 Iraq war.88
Despite generally positive bilateral ties with the Ben Ali regime, U.S. officials occasionally
voiced public criticism of Tunisia’s record on political rights, the conduct of elections, and
freedom of expression.89 Numerous international and regional news reports and analyses have
referenced internal communications among U.S. diplomats that were reportedly highly critical of
political repression and corruption among Ben Ali’s inner circle and family. Some analysts have
speculated that reports of such communications may have played a role in sparking the protests
that eventually unseated Ben Ali.90 In parallel with these criticisms, the United States continued to
provide military and economic assistance to the Tunisian government.
U.S.-Tunisian trade is relatively low in volume because Tunisia is a small country and conducts
most of its trade with Europe. In 2010, U.S. exports to Tunisia totaled $571 million and imports
totaled $405 million; in 2009, exports totaled $502 million and imports $326 million. While
Tunisian imports of U.S. goods did not fluctuate significantly due to the global economic
recession, U.S. imports from Tunisia have yet to rebound to 2008 levels, when they totaled $644
million.91 Tunisia is eligible for special trade preferences, i.e., duty-free entry for listed products,
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Program. A bilateral trade investment
framework agreement (TIFA) was signed in 2002, and a bilateral investment treaty entered into
force in 1993. TIFAs can be the first step toward a free-trade agreement (FTA). U.S. foreign
direct investment (FDI) in Tunisia totaled $220 million in 2009 (latest available).
86
Chicago Tribune Wires, “Bush Visits Tunisia to Patch Relations,” March 9, 1986; Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left
Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987.
87
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, December 28, 2010, U.N. document
A/HRC/16/51/Add.2.
88
Tunis Infotunisie, “Ben Ali Expresses ‘Deep Regret’ at Start of War Against Iraq,” March 20, 2003, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document AFP20030320000266.
89
See, e.g., U.S. State Department annual reports on human rights; State Department Daily News Briefing, October 26,
2009; U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks on Internet Freedom,” January 21, 2010;
U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, July 9, 2010.
90
Christopher Alexander, “Tunisia’s Protest Wave: Where It Comes From and What It Means,” ForeignPolicy.com,
January 3, 2011.
91
U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/query.asp.
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U.S. Reactions to the January 2011 Uprising
U.S. criticism of the government’s response to the January 2011 demonstrations was initially muted, but grew critical
as protests mounted. On January 11, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that “we are worried, in general, about
the unrest and the instability, and what seems to be the underlying concerns of the people who are protesting”; at the
same time, she stressed that “we are not taking sides,” and indicated that she had not been in direct communication
with Tunisian authorities since the protests began.92 In a speech in Doha, Qatar, on January 13, Secretary Clinton
challenged Middle Eastern leaders to address the needs of their citizens and provide channels for popular
participation, or else risk instability and extremism. Events in Tunisia provided a vivid backdrop to her remarks.
After Ben Ali’s departure on January 14, President Barack Obama stated, “I applaud the courage and dignity of the
Tunisian people,” and called on the Tunisian government to hold “free and fair elections in the near future that reflect
the true will and aspirations of the Tunisian people.”93 Secretary Clinton echoed the call for elections and encouraged
“economic, social, and political reforms,” adding that “the United States stands ready to help.”94 In his January 2011
State of the Union address, President Obama stated, “[W]e saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will
of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator…. The United States of America stands with the
people of Tunisia and supports the democratic aspirations of all people.”
Several Members of Congress expressed concerns that the United States appeared to lack sufficient intelligence on
Middle East protest movements and their potential to upset governments in the region, concerns which executive
branch officials have disputed.95
U.S. Assistance
Prior to 2011, U.S. bilateral assistance was highly focused on military aid and counterterrorism
cooperation. Since January 2011, the Obama Administration has identified a range of funding
sources for providing support to Tunisia’s unanticipated transition, notably including funds
appropriated for other purposes that have been reallocated for Tunisia. Transitional assistance
efforts have been led by the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), along
with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other agencies. MEPI has a
regional office in Tunis, responsible for programming to enhance political, economic, and
educational reforms in the region, but prior to 2011 implemented limited bilateral programs. In
early September, the Administration named William B. Taylor to coordinate U.S. development
and other civilian aid to transitional countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
The Administration in 2011 designated a total of roughly $42 million in bilateral, non-military
“transition support” for Tunisia (see Table 1).96 This includes:
•
Approximately $23.3 million in “transition support” assistance administered by
MEPI. This aid is aimed at helping Tunisia establish independent media, civil
society, political parties, and a new electoral framework, and implement
economic reforms.97
92
AFP, “US Concerned About Reports of ‘Excessive Force’ in Tunisia,” January 11, 2011; and U.S. State Department,
“Secretary of State Interviewed on Al Arabiya,” January 11, 2011, via Congressional Quarterly (CQ).
93
The White House, “Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
94
U.S. State Department, “Recent Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
95
Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on
Worldwide Threats, February 10, 2011, via CQ.
96
Figures based on CRS analysis of State Department and USAID congressional notifications, data provided to CRS by
the State Department, and public statements by the Administration.
97
State Department Congressional Notification Transmittal Sheets, March 11, 2011 and July 25, 2011. The MEPI
funding, which is drawn from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, has largely come from funding appropriated
(continued...)
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•
Approximately $10 million in USAID-administered funding, including $5
million in FY2010 Complex Crises Fund (CCF) funding, which is intended to
support planned community development projects and political reforms in the
interior and southeast, $2 million for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives,
and $3 million in support of the electoral process.98
•
Just under $3 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) funds, provisionally allocated for police and justice sector reform
initiatives.99
In addition, the Administration has indicated that it intends to initiate a Peace Corps program in
Tunisia; consider the provision of a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) “Threshold”
grant; re-launch trade and investment talks under the 2002 U.S.-Tunisia Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement; provide increased funding for academic and cultural exchanges; initiate
negotiations on a possible “Open Skies” agreement on direct air links; and consider a range of
additional technical assistance.100 The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
plans to offer regional financial support in the form of direct loans, guarantees, and political risk
insurance, and is already supporting two Tunisian private equity firms that are focused on small
and medium-size businesses. OPIC will also support visits by American business investors.101 The
Administration also supports the establishment of a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund and the
provision of U.S. loan guarantees, both of which require congressional authorization (“Congress
and Aid to Tunisia,” below).102
(...continued)
in FY2010 for other purposes and reallocated for programs in Tunisia, subject to congressional notification. MEPI also
plans to support partnerships between Tunisian civil society groups and U.S. technology companies to enhance
information and communications capacity.
98
USAID Congressional Notification, June 3, 2011; figures communicated to CRS by the State Department’s Office of
the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, September 2011.
99
State Department Congressional Notification, July 25, 2011; State Department, FY2012 Congressional Budget
Justification for Foreign Operations.
100
State Department, “Statement on U.S.-Tunisia Political and Economic Partnership,” September 22, 2011; White
House, “Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Framework for Investing in Tunisia,” October 7, 2011.
101
State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks with Tunisia Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi,”
March 17, 2011. Assistant Secretary of State Michael H. Posner has stated that OPIC would provide “up to $2 billion in
financial support for private-sector investments in the Middle East and North Africa.” Statement before the House
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, “Political Transitions in the Middle East,” May 5, 2011.
102
Testimony of William J. Burns before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on “U.S. Policy and
Uprisings in the Middle East,” March 17, 2011.
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Table 1. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, Selected Accounts
(appropriations, thousands of current dollars)
FY2009
FMF
FY2010
FY2011 Est.
FY2012 Request
12,000
18,000
17,124
4,900
800
2,000
5,000
0
ESF (MEPI)
-
18,324
5,000
ESF (USAID nonbilateral)
-
830
1,700
1,945
1,950
1,675
INCLE
0
1,427
1,500
0
NADR
100
1,200
175
0
DCHA
-
8,000
2,000
Not available
IDA
-
-
100
Not available
Section 1206
8,800
0
20,900
Not available
Total, above
allocations
23,400
51,726
53,749
6,575
ESF (Bilateral)
IMET
0
Not available
Not available
Notes: FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ESF=Economic Support Funds; IMET=International Military Education
and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; DCHA= Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance;
IDA=International Disaster Assistance; Section 1206=Defense Department funds authorized for use in training
and equipping foreign military forces for certain purposes.
Items in italics refer to funding appropriated in FY2010 for other countries and/or purposes, then reallocated
for Tunisia in 2011. This chart does not reflect aid allocated under regional counterterrorism initiatives.
Sources: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2009-FY2012;
communications from the State Department’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance; Defense
Department Congressional Notification; CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”
Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
Military Assistance
A U.S.-Tunisian Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held regularly.
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reports that Tunisia relies on U.S. Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) assistance to “maintain its aging 80s and early 90s era inventory of
U.S.-origin equipment, which comprises nearly 70% of Tunisia’s total inventory.”103 According to
private sector analysis, the United States is Tunisia’s primary supplier of military equipment,
largely purchased through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements.104 FMF and Defense
Department-administered “Section 1206”105 security assistance funds have also provided Tunisia
with equipment for border and coastal security, which the United States views as a key area of
103
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Tunisia Summary,” updated January 13, 2011.
Forecast International, International Military Markets—Middle East & Africa, “Tunisia: Section 3—Market
Overview,” May 2009.
105
P.L. 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2006, Section 1206 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. For more information, see CRS Report RS22855,
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
104
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counterterrorism prevention. Since 2003, this equipment has included helicopters, machine guns,
body armor and helmets, parachutes, and night vision devices for sniper rifles. Other equipment
has been provided through the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, with
plans to procure seven Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with $4.1 million in
FY2008 funds forfeited by Mauritania.106 Tunisia has also been one of the top 20 recipients of
International Military Education and Training (IMET) since FY1994.107 In May 2011, General
Carter Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), visited Tunisia on his first trip to
North Africa since assuming the position in March.
In August 2011, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its plans to provide three new
Section 1206 packages for Tunisia totaling $20.9 million, which the Department said would
“build the capacity of Tunisia’s national military forces to conduct CT [counterterrorism]
operations by providing equipment and training.” The assistance is intended to provide maritime
equipment, related operational training, land vehicles, and helicopter surveillance equipment.108
Tunisia is one of 10 countries participating in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership (TSCTP), an interagency regional program aimed at helping North and West African
countries better control their territory, strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities, and
cooperate regionally on security issues. The Defense Department allocated over $13 million
between FY2007 and FY2009 for TSCTP-related military cooperation with Tunisia, including
bilateral and multinational exercises, regional conferences, and Joint-Combined Exchange
Training programs conducted by U.S. special operations forces.109 Defense Department funds
have also been allocated for programs designed to counter violent extremist messages.
Multilateral Assistance
Several multilateral institutions that receive significant U.S. financial support have pledged
economic aid for Tunisia during its transition process. The World Bank and African Development
Bank (AfDB) have each pledged $500 million in budget support to Tunisia, which is aimed at
providing emergency financial reserves while addressing regional disparities, reducing youth
unemployment, and improving civil liberties and economic governance.110 AfDB President
Donald Kaberuka indicated in early June that there is an additional $500 million in Tunisia aid “in
the pipeline,” which he hoped would be disbursed by year’s end, while the World Bank said in
May that it envisaged an additional $1 billion.111 The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), which also receives U.S. financial support, is considering extending aid to
North African countries, potentially including Tunisia. In May 2011, G8 countries pledged $20
billion in aid for Tunisia and Egypt over three years, to be disbursed via multilateral financial
institutions.112 French President Nicolas Sarkozy indicated that an additional $10 billion would be
provided by Gulf states, and another $10 billion by the IMF.113 In September, the G8 pledged an
106
This assistance is described as supporting the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
DSCA, op. cit.
108
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Congressional Notification, August 25, 2011.
109
Funding figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.
110
African Development Bank (AfDB), “AfDB Supports Accountability in Tunisia,” May 20, 2011.
111
AfDB, “AfDB and Tunisia Formally Sign USD 500M Budget Support Accord at Annual Meetings,” June 10, 2011;
World Bank, “World Bank Group Announces Up to $6 Billion for Egypt and Tunisia,” May 30, 2011.
112
Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Springs, Deauville, May 26-27, 2011 (released on May 27, 2011).
113
Liz Alderman, “Group of 8 Pledges $20 Billion Aid to Egypt and Tunisia,” The New York Times, May 27, 2011.
107
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Political Transition in Tunisia
additional $38 billion in new aid to transitional countries in the region, although reports indicated
that little of the previously promised funding had materialized.114
Congress and Aid to Tunisia
Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees foreign assistance funding, and regularly
authorizes arms sale proposals. There is a congressional Tunisia Caucus. Some Members of
Congress have advocated new assistance to support Tunisia’s transition to democracy and
economic stabilization. Others contend that budgetary cuts take precedence over new assistance
programs, or that economic stability in Tunisia and elsewhere is best addressed via private sector
engagement and/or support from other donors. Some have additionally pointed to uncertainties
over the current and prospective nature of Tunisia’s government. The discussion regarding
potential new assistance has proceeded amid larger federal budget debates and disagreements
over funding priorities, including foreign aid. The FY2012 Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (Division I, H.R. 2055) authorizes up to
$30 million in FY2011 Economic Support Fund (ESF) for the cost of loan guarantees for Tunisia,
and authorizes and appropriates up to $20 million in ESF for a U.S.-Tunisia Enterprise Fund
aimed at promoting private sector investment and economic reforms.
Congress has been supportive of U.S. military assistance to Tunisia, including during the latter
years of Ben Ali’s presidency. In an explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 111-8, the
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (enacted on March 11, 2009), appropriators directed the State
Department to allocate $12 million in FMF assistance for Tunisia, far more than the State
Department’s budget request for $2.6 million. At the same time, appropriators wrote in the
explanatory statement that “restrictions on political freedom, the use of torture, imprisonment of
dissidents, and persecution of journalists and human rights defenders are of concern and progress
on these issues is necessary for the partnership between the United States and Tunisia to further
strengthen.”115 In the conference report accompanying P.L. 111-117, the FY2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (enacted on December 16, 2009), appropriators directed the State Department
to allocate $18 million in FMF for Tunisia, $3 million more than the requested amount. The
conference report also allocated $2 million in ESF—the amount requested—for “programs and
activities in southern Tunisia and to promote respect for human rights.”116
Outlook
Tunisians face a wide range of questions regarding their country’s future and that of the region.
Recent events, including widening political contestation and unrest across the Middle East and
North Africa, also raise potential issues for Congress pertaining to the oversight of U.S.-Tunisian
bilateral relations, foreign assistance, and broader U.S. policy priorities in the Middle East.
Questions include the following.
114
Alderman, “G-8 Nations Pledge New Aid to Arab Spring Economies,” The New York Times, September 11, 2011.
Congressional Record, February 23, 2009, p. H2417.
116
Congressional Record, December 8, 2009, p. H14350.
115
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Political Transition in Tunisia
•
To what extent is Tunisia a “test-case” for democratic transitions in the Middle
East? To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. policy in the region?
•
What are the key issues in constitution drafting, and how will Tunisians seek to
overcome strongly felt differences in policy preferences? Will the new
constitution provide protections and equality for religious, ethnic, and political
minorities? What will the new constitution say—if anything—regarding the
relation between Islam and the state, women’s rights, government
decentralization, and the ability of Salafist groups to participate in politics?
•
What will the future Tunisian government and political order look like? Is a
consensus among Islamist and secularist political factions possible? Will there be
a free and independent press and civil society in Tunisia?
•
Do continued protests and insecurity constitute significant threats? Do elements
of the former regime continue to influence events in Tunisia? How will
transitional authorities approach the question of reforming the security and
domestic intelligence services?
•
Which individuals and groups currently enjoy significant popular credibility in
Tunisia, and what are their likely courses of action? What coalitions among
political and interest groups are likely?
•
What is the potential medium-term impact of recent events on foreign investment
and economic growth in Tunisia and the region? What steps are being taken to
promote economic growth and job creation, and to address socioeconomic
grievances and regional economic disparities?
•
What has been the impact of U.S. statements and actions, and what are the
prospects for future U.S. influence on the evolution of events in Tunisia? How
should the U.S. government shape its future foreign aid programs? What course
of U.S. action is most likely to fulfill foreign policy and national security goals?
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Acknowledgments
This report includes analysis by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Congressional Research Service
27 of the seats in the October vote, and is ruling in a
coalition with two secular parties. The coalition is subject to internal frictions due to the three
parties’ divergent histories and policy preferences.
Tunisia’s transition raises a wide range of questions for the future of the country and the region.
These pertain to the struggle between reformists and entrenched forces carried over from the
former regime; the potential shape of the new political system; the role and influence of Islamism
in the government and society; the question of how to transform the formerly repressive security
services; and the difficult diplomatic balance—for the United States and other actors—of
encouraging greater democratic openness while not undermining other foreign policy priorities.
Tunisia exhibits a number of unique attributes within the region: a relatively small territory, a
sizable and well educated middle class, and a long history of encouraging women’s
socioeconomic freedoms. Some policymakers view these factors as advantageous, and describe
Tunisia as a potential “test case” for democratic transitions in the region. Tunisia’s example may
nonetheless be less influential than larger or more central states such as Egypt and Syria.
Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funding and oversees U.S. foreign policy
toward Tunisia and the wider region. The Obama Administration has indicated a desire to deepen
ties with Tunisia, including by encouraging increased trade and investment, and U.S. bilateral aid
has significantly expanded to assist the country with its transition. As part of this transition
support, the State Department is providing Tunisia with a $100 million cash transfer to help cover
its debt payments. Prior to 2011, U.S.-Tunisian relations were highly focused on military
assistance and counterterrorism. International financial institutions, which receive significant U.S.
funding, have also pledged aid for Tunisia. Some Members of Congress argue that additional aid
should be allocated for democracy promotion and economic recovery in Tunisia, while others
contend that budgetary cuts take precedence over new aid programs, or that economic
stabilization may be best addressed by the private sector or by other donors.
P.L. 112-74, the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, contains provisions relevant to
Tunisia. Relevant pending legislation includes H.Res. 527 (Murphy); S.Res. 316 (Lieberman); S.
1388 (Kerry); and S. 3241 and H.R. 5857, draft versions of the FY2013 Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. See also CRS Report R42153,
U.S. Trade and Investment in the Middle East and North Africa: Overview and Issues for
Congress, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson; and CRS Report R42393, Change in the Middle
East: Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Background................................................................................................................................ 3
Key Issues........................................................................................................................................ 4
Islam, Politics, and the State...................................................................................................... 4
Calls for Justice, Reform, and Accountability........................................................................... 6
Security Concerns...................................................................................................................... 7
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background....................................................................................... 8
Selected Profiles .............................................................................................................................. 9
The Economy................................................................................................................................. 11
Recovery of State Assets ......................................................................................................... 12
Foreign Relations........................................................................................................................... 13
Israel and the Palestinians ....................................................................................................... 13
Europe ..................................................................................................................................... 13
Regional Relations................................................................................................................... 14
U.S.-Tunisian Relations ................................................................................................................. 14
U.S. Foreign Assistance........................................................................................................... 16
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Tunisia.................................................................................................................. 1
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18
Congressional Research Service
Political Transition in Tunisia
Overview
In the second year of their country’s transition
from authoritarian rule, Tunisians can point to
a number of significant achievements—not
least, the holding of widely praised national
elections in October 2011 that put in place a
National Constituent Assembly.1 Since the
end of the regime of former President Zine el
Abidine Ben Ali, political prisoners have been
released, over 100 new political parties have
been authorized, and most online and media
restrictions have been lifted. The former
ruling party has been dissolved and its funds
liquidated, and a number of former officials
and Ben Ali associates and relatives have
been arrested or charged in absentia.
Figure 1. Map of Tunisia
Still, Tunisians face a wide range of
challenges, including economic hardship,
disputes over policy priorities, labor unrest,
tensions between the privileged coastal region
and relatively impoverished interior, and the
security implications of events in neighboring
Libya. Tunisian elites appear to agree on the
need to dismantle and reform authoritarian
structures while resisting a political witchhunt. Yet progress in some areas—notably
reform of the internal security services and
judiciary—has been slow.2 Tunisia’s leaders
are also trying to respond to pressing
socioeconomic problems—such as acute
regional inequality; high unemployment; and
the collapse of the tourism industry, a key
economic driver—while reassuring
Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS.
international partners that they will not pursue
overly populist or religiously conservative policies that could harm foreign investors. Tunisians
continue to grapple with how best to approach issues such as transitional justice, regional and
internal security threats, and the creation of new electoral institutions.3
1
The October 23, 2011, elections were widely viewed as fair, transparent, and well-conducted, despite earlier delays
and preparations that often appeared disjointed. Participation in the historic vote prompted deep emotions among many
voters, polling station workers, and domestic observers. Still, observers expressed concerns regarding the allocation of
voters to polling stations; administrative difficulties encountered by voters who had not formally registered, most of
whom were eligible to vote at special polling centers; limited voter education; and a lack of detailed procedures and
training for key parts of the process. Many Tunisians appeared to feel alienated by the complexity of the transition
process and a lack of understanding of the Constituent Assembly’s role.
2
See International Crisis Group (ICG), Tunisia: Combating Impunity, Restoring Security, May 9, 2012.
3
The independent commission that oversaw the October 2011 elections, known as the ISIE, has been dissolved
(continued...)
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The moderate Islamist party Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda/An-Nahda, “Renaissance”) won 89 seats in
the Constituent Assembly—by far the largest block—and is leading a ruling coalition with the
center-left, secular Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol (Democratic Forum of Labor
and Liberties or FDTL). Ettakatol leader Mustapha Ben Jaafar is serving as president of the
Assembly, CPR leader Moncef Marzouki as president, and Al Nahda’s secretary-general, Hamadi
Jebali, as prime minister—the head of government and most powerful of the three roles. This
“Troika” coalition is subject to internal frictions, given the leading figures’ divergent histories and
policy preferences. The left-leaning, stringently secularist Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) is
spear-heading the opposition to Al Nahda within the Assembly.
The 217-seat Constituent Assembly is charged with drafting a new constitution, performing
quasi-legislative functions, and preparing for future parliamentary and/or presidential elections,
which will formally signal the next step in the transition process. The government has indicated
that these elections will be held in early 2013, pending the completion of the constitution drafting
and adoption process. Areas of focus for the constitution include the future system of government
(parliamentary, presidential, or a combination), the shape of internal checks-and-balances, the
role and structure of the judiciary, the level of protection for individual rights, and the relationship
between religion and state. While parliamentarians have solicited some civil society input on the
constitution, the prospects for broad-based public consultation appear slim.4
Complex tensions among Islamists and secularists have escalated in recent months. Trade unions,
media advocates, and some civil society groups accuse Al Nahda of seeking to exert political
control over state institutions, restrict unflattering news coverage, and intimidate critics. Al Nahda
supporters, meanwhile, view some critics as immovably opposed to Islamist groups and argue
that stringently secular elites have lost their claim on popular legitimacy. Al Nahda leaders have
simultaneously struggled to respond to conservative critics who accuse them of abdicating their
responsibility to institute a greater public role for Islam. At the root of these debates are questions
of how Tunisia’s new democracy will interpret certain democratic principles such as freedom of
speech and define the role of religion in political life. Recent violence by Salafists has increased
pressure on the government to ensure public order and weigh in on controversial social issues.
Resurgent public demonstrations, strikes, and riots over economic conditions are ongoing
challenges, particularly in the interior. Tunisia’s main trade union federation, the UGTT, has
attempted to assert its influence by positioning itself as a channel for widespread economic
grievances and a counter-weight to Al Nahda. At times, police have cracked down violently on
political protests, including on several occasions this year. Government officials, for their part,
have unsuccessfully called for a social “truce,” blaming protests for obstructing economic
recovery. At times, the government’s internal divisions and the ambiguity of its mandate have
impeded its ability to react quickly and decisively to events. Dissatisfaction and confusion over
the transition process could resurface as elites continue to confront debates over who is
empowered to act and how to deliver tangible benefits to an impatient public with vast and
divided expectations. A recent analysis by the International Crisis Group warned that
socioeconomic insecurity and political instability could “negatively feed on each other and risk
snowballing into a legitimacy crisis” for the elected government.5
(...continued)
pending decisions on how to organize the next electoral process, and the future status of the electoral law is uncertain.
4
Duncan Pickard, “The Current Status of Constitution Making in Tunisia,” Carnegie Endowment, April 19, 2012.
5
ICG, Tunisia: Confronting Social and Economic Challenges, June 6, 2012.
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Background
Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” began with
mounting anti-government protests in the
country’s interior in December 2010 and
culminated in the decision of President Ben
Ali, in power since 1987, to flee the country
for Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011 (see
text-box below). Tunisia’s popular uprising
inspired reform and opposition movements
throughout the region. These democracy
movements have been internationally
heralded, but they have also complicated longstanding policies and assumptions.6
Tunisia at a Glance
Population: 10.7 million (July 2011 est.)
Income Level: Lower middle income
Urbanization rate: 67% of the population (2010)
Life Expectancy: 75 years (2011 est.)
Religion: Muslim: 98%, Christian: 1%,
Jewish and other, 1%
Literacy: 78% (2008)
Key Exports: clothing, semi-finished goods (notably
spare automotive parts), textiles, agricultural products
Key Imports: textiles, machinery and equipment,
hydrocarbons
The early months of Tunisia’s transition were
marked by ongoing unrest, partly in response
Major Trading Partners: France, Italy, Germany,
Libya, China, Spain
to the initial dominance of officials from the
former regime in the interim government. A
Female Labor Participation Rate (% of female
population): 25% (2009)
security vacuum additionally raised fears of
violence and chaos. In February 2011, a more
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; World Bank, World
stable, if weak, interim government took shape Development Indicators
under Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi, an
elder statesman from the administration of founding President Habib Bourguiba. Caïd Essebsi
introduced the idea, popular with protesters, of electing an assembly to write a new constitution—
that is, forge a new political system—before holding parliamentary and/or presidential polls.
Prior to January 2011, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable, albeit authoritarian,
regime that focused on economic growth while staving off political liberalization. It had had only
two leaders since gaining independence from France in 1956: the late Habib Bourguiba, a secular
nationalist who helped lead Tunisia’s independence movement, and Ben Ali, a former interior
minister and prime minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. Ben Ali cultivated the internal
security services and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party as his power base, and
placed severe restrictions on human rights, political participation, and freedom of expression. The
president and his family were also seen as highly corrupt.
While Tunisia shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, some are unique: a small
territory, a relatively homogenous population (despite tribal and ethnic divisions in some areas), a
liberalized economy, a large and educated middle class, and a history of encouraging women’s
socioeconomic freedoms.7 Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims make up the overwhelming majority
of Tunisia’s population, but its urban culture and elite reflect a strong European influence. The
population is young compared with developed countries, but its youth bulge is declining.8 As
many as 1 million Tunisians reside abroad, mainly in Europe.
6
See CRS Report R42393, Change in the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by Christopher M.
Blanchard.
7
Tunisia’s spending on education (7.2% of gross domestic product) is high by regional standards. CIA, The World
Factbook, updated January 3, 2011.
8
EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
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The legal and socioeconomic status of women in Tunisia are among its particularities. Polygamy
is banned, and women enjoy equal citizenship rights and the right to initiate divorce. (That said,
inheritance laws and practices are generally disadvantageous to women.) Women serve in the
military and in many professions, and constitute more than 50% of university students; the first
woman governor was appointed in 2004. Many credit the country’s relatively liberal Personal
Status Code, promulgated under founding President Bourguiba, with these advances.
Despite its apparent relative prosperity, Tunisia has long exhibited a significant divide between
rural and urban areas, and especially between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the poorer
interior. At least half of the population lives in Tunis and coastal towns, and there is population
drift toward these areas. Anti-government unrest, particularly rooted in labor and economic
grievances, has often originated in the interior—as did the protests that unseated Ben Ali.
The “Jasmine Revolution”
Protests were first reported on December 17, 2010, in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street
vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest police interference and a lack of economic
opportunities. Feeding on local anger over high unemployment and a lack political and socioeconomic freedoms, and
leveraged by underground networks of activists, hackers, and dissidents, the demonstrations escalated into an
unprecedented popular challenge to the Ben Ali regime. Public demonstrations had previously been very rare in
Tunisia, due to state repression and pervasive surveillance. From the start, protesters appeared to lack a central
leader and were not aligned with a pre-existing political or ideological movement.
Protests erupted in Tunis in early January, and rioters ransacked private properties belonging to Ben Ali's wealthy
relatives along the central coast, underscoring the deep antipathy many Tunisians felt toward members of the ruling
elite. Authorities imposed a state of emergency, and police repeatedly opened fire on crowds and arrested
protesters, journalists, opposition party members, lawyers, and rights advocates, some of whom were reportedly
abused in detention. According to recently released figures, 338 people were killed in the uprising.9
Prior to his exile, Ben Ali offered a series of concessions on political and civil rights in an effort to stem the unrest.
On January 13, the president gave an address on national television in which he pledged to step down when his term
was up in 2014, to allow fresh parliamentary elections before then, and to end state censorship. However, these
promises did not placate demonstrators. On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali fled in a private plane for Saudi Arabia.
Key Issues
Islam, Politics, and the State
Tunisian Islamists and secularists have grown increasingly polarized since the 2011 uprising. The
October 2011 election results confirmed the rise of Al Nahda, a moderate Islamist movement
founded in the 1980s by Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou.10 Al Nahda won 37% of
the popular vote, more than the next eight parties combined.11 The party has therefore found itself
at the center of emerging debates over religion, state, and identity. Al Nahda leaders portray
themselves as moderates who espouse democratic participation, support the separation of religion
and state, oppose religious extremism, and seek to preserve and expand women’s freedoms. Yet
9
Associated Press (AP), “Report Raises Number of Killed During Tunisia’s Revolution to 338,” May 5, 2012.
Ghannouchi remains president of the party, although he does not hold a position in government. Mourou has left the
party and was an (unsuccessful) independent candidate in the October elections.
11
The system of proportional representation adopted for the October elections was designed to preclude any single
party from easily gaining a majority. This resulted in parties such as the CPR, the PDP, and Ettakatol gaining a larger
proportion of seats than votes.
10
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Political Transition in Tunisia
the party appears to be facing internal divisions while also potentially competing with emergent,
more radical Islamist groups for popular support. Ghannouchi has said that he will soon step
down as Al Nahda’s president, placing its future direction in question. Secularist detractors accuse
the party of “double discourse,” that is, of displaying moderation in order to enter government
and reassure foreign partners, but intending to gradually introduce restrictive laws and
institutions. Critics have also accused Al Nahda of seeking to dominate the political system and
allege that Arab Gulf states—notably Qatar—are using the party as a tool to influence events in
Tunisia.12 Conversely, Al Nahda members purport to feel threatened by leftist and secular elite
actors, whom they accuse of seeking illegitimately to restrict Islamists’ political influence.
Debate over the role of sharia (Islamic law) illustrates the challenges inherent in navigating
Islamist/secularist divisions within the Constituent Assembly. In February, Al Nahda
parliamentarians proposed enshrining sharia as the source of Tunisian law, contrary to indications
from party leaders during the electoral campaign that they would instead retain Article 1 of
Tunisia’s old constitution (which states that Tunisia’s “religion is Islam, its language is Arabic,
and its type of government is the Republic”) as an unenforceable statement of Tunisian identity.
Conservative Islamists held large demonstrations in support of the proposal, while Assembly
Speaker Ben Jaafar threatened to resign if the proposal were adopted. In March, Al Nahda leaders
announced they would not support the reference to sharia, and reaffirmed their support for the
original Article 1 wording. This decision was cheered by secularist parties and was seen by some
as a victory for moderate voices within the party.13 Some conservatives, however, viewed the
outcome as a betrayal. Similar debates may emerge over the mandate of the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, which regulates religious activities; the legal status of religiously conservative Salafist
groups; the status of religious minorities (there are tiny Jewish and Christian communities); and
how to balance freedom of expression and religious sensitivities.
Religiously conservative Salafists have become more visible in the post-Ben Ali era, and have
challenged the government and liberals through protests, threats, and at times violence.14
Ghannouchi and other Al Nahda figures in early 2012 stated that the party was engaging Salafists
in a dialogue aimed at eventually bringing them into the political system, while emphasizing that
violence and jihadist ideology would not be tolerated.15 Al Nahda’s critics have accused it of not
doing enough to prevent and punish Salafists who seek to intimidate secular activists, university
professors, and political opponents. Such criticisms underscore the party’s difficult path between
mollifying moderate and secularist Tunisians—and international partners—while potentially
seeking to retain legitimacy among more radical segments of the population.
12
E.g., African Manager, "Tunisie: Ressemblances surprenantes, Ben Ali-RCD & Jbali-Ennahdha,” February 27, 2012.
Earlier, Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi had suggested the party had yet to reach an internal consensus on the issue.
Walid Khefifi, “Rached Ghannouchi, président du mouvement islamiste Ennahdha: ‘Le recours à une intervention
militaire ne sera pas au menu de la conférence des amis de la Syrie,’” Le Temps, February 24, 2012 ; Kareem Fahim,
"Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law," The New York Times, March 26, 2012 ; AFP, "Tunisie/Charia:
Ennahda a ‘levé l'ambiguité’, se félicitent des modernistes," March 27, 2012.
14
“Salafism” refers to a broad subset of Sunni revivalist movements that seek to purify contemporary Islamic religious
practices and societies by encouraging the application of practices and views associated with the earliest days of the
Islamic faith. Salafist movements hold a range of positions on political, social, and theological questions and include
both politically quietist and violent extremist groups. See CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, by
Christopher M. Blanchard.
15
For example, In February 2012, the government announced the arrest of 12 people linked to a violent Salafist cell
and the seizure of an arms depot, near the commercial city of Sfax. Soon afterward, the government delivered the first
ever political party license to a Salafist group.
13
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Political Transition in Tunisia
In recent months, Salafist agitation and violence have increased, while the government has taken
a harder line. In May 2012, thousands attended a “national conference” organized by the Salafist
group Ansar al Sharia in the Islamic holy city of Kairouan. Ansar al Sharia (which shares a name
with extremist groups based elsewhere) was founded by a former member of the Tunisian
Combatant Group, a recently dormant entity that was formerly a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
organization (see “Security Concerns,” below). The same month, Salafists attacked alcohol
vendors in the central town of Sidi Bouzid, and in mid-June, Salafist groups in and around Tunis
rioted, sacked leftist political party and union offices, and violently clashed with police following
an art exhibit they deemed offensive to Islam.16 In May, Prime Minister Jebali and Interior
Minister Ali Laraydh warned that the government would not hesitate to use force to instill order.
Following the June riots, the government threatened to use Tunisia’s anti-terror law (criticized for
its expansive use under Ben Ali) against those who employ violence. At the same time,
government officials condemned the art exhibit’s “attacks on religion,” and have suggested they
might include language barring offense to religion in the draft constitution.17
Background on Al Nahda
Led by Islamic scholar and activist Rachid Ghannouchi, Al Nahda was founded in 1981—soon after multiparty politics
were legalized under President Bourguiba—as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). The MTI organized
demonstrations on university campuses and engaged in clashes with security forces and with leftist groups. The
growing unrest, coming on the heels of mass protests and strikes by trade unions, undermined support for Bourguiba
and laid the groundwork for Ben Ali’s rise in 1987.18 Upon coming to power, Ben Ali promised greater pluralism and
a dialogue with opposition groups. Al Nahda candidates were permitted to run as independents in the 1989
parliamentary elections, but Ben Ali initiated a crackdown when they garnered 15% of the national vote. Clashes
between the government and Al Nahda activists escalated, culminating in an attack on a ruling party office in 1991 that
the government blamed on Al Nahda. The government subsequently claimed it had unearthed an Islamist plot to
assassinate Ben Ali, and in 1992 Tunisian military courts convicted hundreds of Al Nahda members. Al Nahda leaders
denied the accusations, and some rights advocates criticized the case as biased and lacking due process.19 Ghannouchi,
who had left the country, was sentenced in absentia. Similar tensions between Islamists and government forces drove
neighboring Algeria into civil war in the early 1990s.
Al Nahda’s electoral success in 2011 appears to have stemmed from several factors. Clearly, the movement remained
popular despite decades of confinement to exile and underground activities, and its message of reconciling Islam and
democracy appears to enjoy broad appeal in Tunisia. In addition, the repression meted out to the group under Ben
Ali appears to have endeared the movement to many Tunisians and enhanced its popular legitimacy. Al Nahda did not
play a significant role in the “Jasmine Revolution” uprising, but the organization raised its profile in 2011 through a
series of politically savvy choices. Al Nahda is widely reported to have engaged in superior grassroots mobilization
during the electoral campaign, and may have benefitted from campaign missteps by the most vocally secularist parties.
These parties attempted to drive a wedge between Islamists and secularists, a strategy that may have backfired among
Tunisians eager to reconcile democracy with their Arab/Muslim identity.
Calls for Justice, Reform, and Accountability
Tunisian authorities continue to grapple with how best to ensure accountability for past abuses
while encouraging national reconciliation. Some 2 million Tunisians were reportedly members of
the former ruling party; selecting who should face sanction is therefore a challenge. Numerous
criminal charges have been brought against Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi, both of whom
16
Reportedly, the exhibit featured a work in which the word “Allah” was displayed in the form of insects.
AP, “Minister Warns Tunisia’s Patience Is at an End After Hardline Islamist Violence,” May 31, 2012; AFP,
“Tunisia on Edge After Night of ‘Terrorist’ Attacks,” June 12, 2012.
18
Henry Munson Jr., “Islamic Revivalism in Morocco and Tunisia,” The Muslim World, 76:3-4 (1986).
19
Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, Routledge: New York, 2010.
17
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Political Transition in Tunisia
remain outside the country, along with dozens of family members and former government and
security officials. An ad-hoc commission appointed during the interim government carried out an
investigation into corruption under the former regime; its final report, submitted in November
2011, may lead to new prosecutions. Yet, many Tunisians are skeptical regarding the justice
system, which was inherited from the Ben Ali regime and is widely viewed as politicized,
ineffective, and in some cases corrupt.20 Meanwhile, the families of victims in the 2011 uprising
have become increasingly vocal in demanding state compensation and justice.
A central policy challenge facing Tunisia’s new leaders is the question of how to assert control
over the size and mandate of the internal security services, without sowing future instability. It
may also take time before members of the public are willing to trust the police to ensure their
security. The Interior Ministry oversees the security and intelligence services, along with the
police; all were closely associated with Ben Ali and with abuses such as extrajudicial arrests,
extensive internet surveillance, and torture. Progress on security sector reform has been slow, and
to date, little information has been made public regarding the security apparatus’s internal
structure or staffing. Moreover, signs of tension within the Interior Ministry, now headed by an Al
Nahda official but largely staffed by holdovers from the former regime, have emerged.21
Security Concerns
Although the security situation has largely stabilized in Tunis and other major urban centers,
protests, riots, and other disturbances have surged in recent months, particularly in the
dispossessed areas of the interior where the 2011 uprising started. Such episodes appear to
indicate widespread dissatisfaction with the lack of tangible socioeconomic benefits since the
revolution. Insecurity along the borders with Libya and Algeria is of additional concern amid
reports of increased regional weapons trafficking linked to the collapse of the Qadhafi regime,
and of increasingly armed smuggling operations in general.22 To some extent, policing Tunisia’s
sparse southern desert regions may present a security challenge for years to come.
Recent months have seen public appearances by Tunisian nationals implicated in terrorist
activities abroad, including Tarek Maaroufi of the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG, see below),
who returned to Tunisia in April 2012 after being released from prison in Belgium. News reports
have since linked Maaroufi to the participation of Tunisians in armed opposition activities in
Syria, although his current whereabouts are unclear.23 Another former TCG figure, Seif Allah ben
Hassine (alt: Sayf Allah Bin Hussayn, aka Abu Iyadh), is a leader in the Tunisian Salafist group
Ansar al Sharia (see “Islam, Politics, and the State” above). These individuals’ intentions are
uncertain. As mentioned above, Al Nahda officials have recently taken a harder tone toward
Tunisian Salafists who have used violence, but the handling of such groups remains a policy
challenge.
Some analysts fear that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional criminal/terrorist
group with roots in Algeria’s 1990s civil conflict, could take advantage of political instability,
20
Hamadi Redissi, “The Revolution Is Not Over Yet [op-ed],” The New York Times, July 15, 2011; Tarek Amara,
“Tunisia Pledges Tougher Line on Ex-Leader’s Allies,” Reuters, August 18, 2011; ICG, “Combating Impunity,” op. cit.
21
See, e.g., Richard Cochrane, “Dismissal of Security Chief Sparks Coup Rumors in Tunisia,” IHS Global Analysis,
January 12, 2012; and France24.com, “Leaked Video: ‘The Return of Ben Ali’s Porno-Politics,’” January 20, 2012.
22
Reuters, “Smuggling Stirs Trouble on Tunisia’s Libya Border,” May 2, 2012.
23
Aaron Y. Zelin, “Tarek Maaroufi: Tunisia’s Most Notorious Jihadist, Returns Home,” Tunisia Live, April 1, 2012.
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upheaval in Libya, and disorder among Tunisia’s security services. AQIM released a statement in
January 2011 hailing the departure of Ben Ali and warning against supposed U.S. and French
efforts to subvert the revolution.24 Tunisian forces have clashed with militants described as
affiliated with AQIM several times in the past year.25 Al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al
Zawahiri, has released at least two statements seeking to portray uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as
motivated by Islamist sentiment and warning that the United States would seek to manipulate the
outcomes; in June 2012, Zawahiri called on Tunisians to rise up against Al Nahda for accepting a
constitution not based on sharia.26 Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi responded that Zawahiri “has no
influence in Tunisia,” adding, “this man is a disaster for Islam and for Muslims.”27
Tunisia’s military, totaling roughly 35,000 personnel, has historically received fewer state
resources than the internal security services, and Tunisians view it as relatively apolitical. Senior
army officers—notably, General Rachid Ammar, then army chief of staff (since promoted to
military chief of staff)—reportedly refused orders to open fire on demonstrators during the
January 2011 uprising, thereby influencing Ben Ali’s decision to step down.28 On January 23,
Ammar publicly addressed protesters and promised to safeguard Tunisia’s “revolution.” While
Ammar’s comments were welcomed by many Tunisians, they sparked concern among some
observers over whether the armed forces might interfere in domestic politics, particularly if the
security situation should worsen.29 The military has since led internal and border security efforts
amid attempts to establish police capacity and professionalism. The army remains popular, but
this enlarged role could cause the relatively small armed forces to become overstretched.
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background
While Tunisia has not been subject to many large attacks, terrorism is a potential domestic threat
and some Tunisian nationals have participated in plots abroad. Two notable incidents on Tunisian
soil were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba (noted for its tiny
Jewish population) and a series of street battles between alleged militants and security forces in
Tunis in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri appeared to
24
OSC doc. GMP20110128836001, “AQLIM Warns Tunisians Against Western ‘Plots’ To ‘Abort’ Tunisian
Revolution,” Al-Mujahidin Electronic Network, January 28, 2011. For background on AQIM, see CRS Report R41070,
Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by
John Rollins.
25
Radio Tunisienne, “Tunisian Interior Ministry Provides More Information on ‘Terrorists’ Arrest,” May 16, 2011, via
U.S. government Open Source Center (OSC); BBC Monitoring, “Militants From Al-Qa'idah Try to Sneak into Tunisia,
Official,” July 2, 2011; AFP, “Six Killed in Tunisian Clashes Near Algeria: Diplomat,” September 23, 2011; AP,
“Armed Cell Is Tied to Al Qaeda, Official Says, as 12 Members Are Held,” February 13, 2012.
26
Maamoun Youssef, “Al-Qaida’s No. 2 Incites Tunisians, Egyptians,” AP, February 28, 2011; OSC doc.
GMP20110913836004, “Al-Fajr Releases Al-Zawahiri Audio, Bin Ladin Video on 10th Anniversary of 9/11,” Ana Al
Muslim Network, September 13, 2011; AP, “Ayman al Zawahri, Al Qaeda Leader, Incites Tunisians Against Ruling
Party,” June 10, 2012.
27
Middle East Online, “Gannouchi Describes Zawahiri as ‘Disaster for Islam and Muslims,’” June 13, 2012.
28
Recent news reports, based on purported revelations by former security officers, have alleged that there was an
incipient plot by the internal security services to take power upon Ben Ali’s departure in January 2011, which was
foiled when the military refused to go along. See, e.g., Financial Times, “Ben Ali Feared Betrayal by Inner Circle,”
January 12, 2012.
29
Issandr El Amrani, “Tunisia Diary: Ammar’s Move?” TheArabist.net, January 24, 2011. In mid-2010, an analysis of
Tunisia’s political stability concluded that “a coup is a real possibility” should instability affect the transfer of power
after Ben Ali. Veritiss, Tunisia: Outlook 2011-2015 [UNCLASSIFIED], prepared For the Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office, August 2, 2010.
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claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002. In all,
14 German tourists, 5 Tunisians, and 2 French citizens were killed in the attack.30 France, Spain,
Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement. The roots of the 20062007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, are more opaque.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated
outside Tunisia, on a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.31 The TCG
sought to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia and was suspected of plotting attacks on the U.S.,
Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001. One founder, Tarek Maaroufi, was
arrested in Belgium the same month. The group appears to have since been inactive. Maaroufi,
however, has since been released and recently returned to Tunisia (see above).
Tunisian expatriates suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been arrested in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, Western Europe, Mauritania, and the United States. Several are reportedly detained at the
U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and their possible return to Tunisia has proven to be
controversial.32 In April 2009, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of U.S. Central
Command, told a House Appropriations Committee subcommittee that the perpetrators of suicide
bombings in Iraq that month may have been part of a network based in Tunisia.33
Under Ben Ali, as many as 2,000 Tunisians were detained, charged, and/or convicted on
terrorism-related charges, including under a sweeping anti-terrorism law passed in 2003.34 Critics
claimed that the law “makes the exercise of fundamental freedoms ... an expression of
terrorism.”35 These criticisms were echoed in the December 2010 report of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, who concluded that “the current definition of terrorism is vague and broad,
hence deviating from the principle of legality and allowing for wide usage of counter-terrorism
measures in practice.”36 Rights advocates also accused anti-terror trials of relying on excessive
pretrial detention, denial of due process, and weak evidence. Current President Marzouki was a
prominent critic of the former regime’s anti-terrorism trials on human rights grounds. The
government’s approach to counterterrorism, and the status of the law, have yet to be seen amid
broader efforts to continue political and civil liberties reforms and to restructure the judiciary.
Selected Profiles
•
Hamadi Jebali, Prime Minister and Secretary-General of Al Nahda. Born
1949 in Sousse, Jebali is an engineer and a longtime Al Nahda activist, having
30
Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002.
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, April 30, 2007. The TCG is no longer so designated.
32
According to news reports, 12 Tunisians were at one time detained in Guatanamo, but only five remain in U.S.
custody. Five were repatriated to third countries, partly due to concerns over their possible torture if returned to
Tunisia, while two others were returned to Tunisia and imprisoned. Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia to Send Mission to
US for Release of its Remaining Gitmo Detainees,” September 14, 2011.
33
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Holds
Hearing on the US Central Command, April 24, 2009, transcript via CQ.
34
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010.
35
Jeremy Landor, “Washington’s Partner,” Middle East International, March 5, 2004, pp. 23-24.
36
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur, December 28, 2010, op. cit.
31
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served in the group’s political bureau in 1981 and as its president from 1981 until
1984. He also directed Al Nahda’s newspaper, Al Fajr. In 1992, Jebali was
sentenced to 16 years in prison in a mass trial of Al Nahda members. He spent 10
years in solitary confinement. Previously, Jebali lived for 10 years in France,
where he completed an engineering degree and was a founder of the French
Muslim Association. Jebali has rejected the label “Islamist”—maintaining that Al
Nahda is a “civil political party”—and is viewed by some observers as the
“moderate” or “reformist” face of the party.37
•
Moncef Marzouki, President and Leader of the Congress for the Republic
(CPR). Born in 1945, Marzouki is a medical doctor, author, and longtime human
rights activist. After medical school in France, he taught medicine at the
University of Sousse from 1981 to 2000, while increasingly becoming a leader in
national and regional human rights advocacy. He was jailed several times for his
activism and for attempting to run for president against Ben Ali. In 2001,
Marzouki founded the left-leaning, secularist CPR party on a platform of
establishing the rule of law and promoting human rights. It was banned, leading
Marzouki to a decade of exile and diaspora activism in France. While outside the
country and during the electoral campaign, Marzouki signaled that he was willing
to forge common cause with Islamists, at times criticizing more stringent
secularists for being out of touch with ordinary Tunisians.38
•
Mustapha Ben Jaafar, President of the Constituent Assembly and Leader of
Ettakatol. Ben Jaafar, 71, founded the center-left, secularist Ettakatol (alt:
Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties, or FDTL) party in 1994. It eventually
became one of three “dissident” opposition parties recognized under Ben Ali,
which operated under significant restrictions. Ben Jaafar tried to run for president
in 2009 but the government rejected his candidacy. A medical doctor trained in
France, Ben Jaafar became engaged in political and human rights activism in the
1970s, while serving on the medical faculty at the University of Tunis.
•
Maya Jribi, leader of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) and of the
Constituent Assembly secularist opposition. Jribi, 52, became the first female
secretary-general of a political party in 2006 when she assumed the PDP
leadership. Both Jribi and the PDP’s founder, Ahmed Najib Chebbi, won seats in
the National Constituent Assembly. A biologist by training and the first woman to
lead a major political party, Jribi has positioned herself as leader of the secularist
parliamentary opposition. Founded in the 1980s, the PDP (like Ettakatol) was one
of a small handful of legal but repressed opposition parties under Ben Ali.
•
Rachid Ghannouchi, President and Co-Founder of Al Nahda. An Islamic
scholar, teacher, and activist, Ghannouchi, 71, has led Tunisia’s main Islamist
movement for three decades but has no formal role in the current government.
Ghannouchi’s early focus was on religious and moral issues, but he grew more
politically active by the late 1970s. He spent two decades in exile, largely in
London, after Al Nahda was banned in 1991, returning to Tunisia in January 2011
upon the announcement of a general amnesty. Ghannouchi has emphasized that
37
“Profile: Tunisian Ennahdha Prime Minister Candidate Hammadi Jebali,” via OSC, October 28, 2011; Al Arabiya,
“Tunisia’s Hamadi Jebali: The Face of Moderate Islam?” November 18, 2011.
38
LePoint.fr, “L’Opposant Historique Moncef Marzouki Va Devenir Président,” November 21, 2011.
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Al Nahda seeks to participate within a democratic system and that the party will
not attempt to turn back women’s rights or other liberal aspects of Tunisian
society. However, Tunisian secularists view him and his party with suspicion.
Ghannouchi has stated that he will soon step down from the leadership of the
party and is not interested in running for president.
Background on Tunisia’s Trade Unions
Since Tunisia’s independence, the labor movement has served as a rare legal conduit for expressing dissent, and the
largest (and previously sole legal) union federation, the Tunisian General Union of Labor (UGTT), wields significant
political clout. The UGTT, which claims over half a million members, played a key role in sustaining the 2011 protest
movement, which it framed as rooted in economic grievances. The UGTT suffered from internal fracturing in the
aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure, but since early 2012 has sought to reposition itself as a key counterweight to Al
Nahda. New unions and splinter movements have recently been formed, which may compete with the UGTT for
influence. UGTT activists formed candidate lists in the October 2011 election under the banner of the Tunisian Labor
Party (PTT), but did not win any seats.
The UGTT was organized in the mid-1940s and was a force in Tunisia’s independence movement. During the Cold
War, it positioned itself as pro-West (non-Communist) and formed links with the American labor movement.39
Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, strove to keep the unions under the government’s wing; during the 1960s,
former UGTT leader Ahmed Ben Salah led a decade-long period of socialist-oriented economic policy as minister for
finance and planning. By the late 1970s and into the mid-1980s, however, amid growing economic unease, the union’s
leadership turned to overt confrontation with the government, particularly over wages and food price inflation.40 The
UGTT led a series of strikes and demonstrations that were met with heavy state repression. During Ben Ali’s
presidency, the government again attempted to influence the UGTT, including by interfering in its leadership selection.
The UGTT nevertheless was a key instigator of anti-government unrest in recent years, including protests in the
mining region of Gafsa in 2008 and 2010 that were arguably a precursor to the “Jasmine Revolution” uprising.
The Economy
For many Tunisians, the 2011 uprising was motivated by socioeconomic grievances as much as a
desire for political change. Some observers therefore fear that a failure to deliver rapid economic
benefits could lead an impatient public to lose faith in the transition process. Indeed, the
economic situation has worsened since 2011 due to perceived political uncertainty, turmoil in
neighboring Libya, and the debt crisis in the European Union, which is Tunisia’s largest trading
partner. Declines in tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been particularly damaging.
The economy contracted by 1.8% in 2011, compared to growth of 3.7% in 2010; unemployment
rose from 13% in 2010 to above 18% as of early 2012.41 In October 2011, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that the worsening global economic outlook would negatively
impact Tunisia’s growth prospects in 2012, and warned of widening fiscal deficits.42 Tunisia’s
credit ratings have been repeatedly downgraded. Still, international economic policymakers are
39
Global Security, “Union Génerale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT),” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/tunisia/ugtt.htm.
40
See Niger Disney, “The Working-Class Revolt in Tunisia,” Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
Reports, 67 (May 1978).
41
Bloomberg, “Arab Spring Turns to Economic Winter on More Joblessness,” March 27, 2012.
42
IMF Survey, “Mideast Outlook Varies Markedly Across Regions,” October 26, 2011. IMF Managing Director
Christine Lagarde echoed this analysis during a visit to Tunis; see IMF press release No. 12/32, February 2, 2012.
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optimistic about the country’s medium-term prospects,43 and this year has seen a slight rebound in
both growth and FDI.44
Most Tunisian politicians have embraced broad free-market principles while advocating state-led
efforts to reduce economic and regional inequality. Tunisian officials have pursued fiscally
expansive policies in an effort to boost employment and have appealed for outside financial
support to provide emergency relief before long-term reforms can be put in place. The
government recently threatened to remove the governor of the Central Bank, Kamel Nabli, who
has broad international support, following disputes over who has the authority to set monetary
policy—in particular, the target for inflation, which may be affected by fiscal expansion.45
Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and prior to 2011 had been one of the bestperforming non-oil-exporting Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Textile
exports and tourism have driven much of Tunisia’s economic growth in recent years. Tunisia has
also attempted to attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. Phosphate ore
reserves are significant and are the basis of a chemicals industry. However, Tunisia’s strong
economic record long masked significant disparities and structural problems. Wealth is
concentrated in the capital and along the eastern coast, while the interior has suffered from
poverty and a lack of investment. Tunisians are among the most educated people in North Africa,
but the economy has generally created low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Unemployment and
underemployment are major problems, notably for recent college graduates. Unemployment is
highest in interior regions, such as Kasserine and Gafsa, which were epicenters of the revolution
and which continue to see protests over perceived government neglect.46
Recovery of State Assets
Ben Ali and Trabelsi family members owned or controlled many of the country's biggest
companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure or corruption,
and are thought to have stashed away significant assets overseas. Tunisian authorities have
identified at least 12 countries where these individuals stored money, which could total billions of
dollars. Western governments have cooperated with Tunisian efforts to freeze assets; however, the
process for recovering them on behalf of the Tunisian state is complex and challenging.47 In early
2011, authorities seized shares of domestic companies controlled by Ben Ali family members and
close associates accused of financial manipulation. The list of assets touched upon every major
economic sector and included some of Tunisia’s largest companies. It is unclear what percentages
of shares in each company were appropriated by the state, but the total value may amount to $2
billion.48 The companies have continued to operate under state-appointed managers; how the
frozen assets are handled in the future may be determined by the courts.
43
CRS interviews with World Bank officials working on the North Africa region, January 2012.
Reuters, “Tunisia’s Economy Returns to Growth in Q1 2012,” May 24, 2012; TAP, “TIF [Tunisia Investment Forum]
2012 Opens,” June 14, 2012.
45
Reuters, “Tunisia Govt To Propose Firing Central Bank Governor,” May 27, 2012.
46
African Development Bank, The Revolution in Tunisia: Economic Challenges and Prospects, March 2011.
47
Deborah Ball and Cassell Bryan-Low, “Arab Spring Regimes Face Long Slog to Recoup Assets,” The Wall Street
Journal, August 25, 2011; Robert F. Worth, “Obstacles Mar Quest for Arab Dictators’ Assets,” The New York Times,
June 7, 2012. U.S. investigators reportedly opened a preliminary probe into assets controlled by Ben Ali and family
members in early 2011.
48
State Department, “2012 Investment Climate Statement – Tunisia,” June 2012.
44
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Foreign Relations
Al Nahda officials and other political leaders have emphasized continuity in Tunisia’s foreign
relations, for instance regarding international agreements made under Ben Ali. They have also
stated that they wish to protect and expand foreign direct investment and international trade,
including with traditional partners in the West. The party has simultaneously indicated a desire to
cultivate closer political and economic ties to other Arab and Muslim states, and to Sub-Saharan
Africa.49 In particular, relations with Arab Gulf states and with Turkey—which have offered aid
and public support to the current government—appear set to grow closer. The Tunisian
government is supportive of Syrian opposition forces, hosting a Syrian National Council meeting
in December 2011 and the first international “Friends of Syria” meeting in February 2012.
Israel and the Palestinians
Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia had an interests office in
Israel from 1996 until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah, or uprising against the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000; under Ben Ali, Israeli and Tunisian
foreign ministers sometimes met. Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi refers to Israel as an “occupying
state,” and has indicated that the creation of a Palestinian state is a prerequisite for discussing
Tunisian-Israeli ties.50 The government has hosted two visits by senior Hamas officials, as well as
a visit by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Al Nahda’s position on Israel and the
Palestinians does not appear to be very different from other political parties in Tunisia. Tunisia’s
then-interim Foreign Ministry—led at the time by secularists—announced in September 2011 that
it would support the Palestinians’ bid for U.N. recognition of statehood. Indeed, some domestic
critics have accused Al Nahda of being too conciliatory toward Israel.51
Europe
Tunisia and the European Union (EU) have cemented a close relationship by means of an
Association Agreement, aid, and loans.52 More than 62% of Tunisia’s trade is conducted with
Europe.53 The Association Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1998,
eliminates customs tariffs and other trade barriers on manufactured goods, and provides for the
establishment of an EU-Tunisia free trade area in goods, but not in agriculture or services. The
EU has focused high-level attention on Tunisia’s political transition, providing additional aid and
technical cooperation, and re-starting negotiations on the provision of “advanced status” for
49
CRS interviews with Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali, Tunis, October 2011; AFP, “La Tunisie de l’après Ben
Ali veut retrouver toute sa place en Afrique,” January 29, 2012.
50
CRS interviews with Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali, Tunis, October 2011; and Ghannouchi statements at the
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), November 30, 2011.
51
E.g., Al Jazeera, “Calls for Tunisia to Criminalize Normalization of Ties with Israel,” December 31, 2011, via BBC
Monitoring Middle East.
52
At the same time, EU leaders periodically expressed concerns over Tunisia’s record on human rights and political
freedom under Ben Ali.
53
World Trade Organization, Tunisia Profile, October 2011.
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Tunisia, which would provide greater trade benefits.54 Debt relief is also a possibility.55
Europeans hope that aid will help Tunisia’s growth and thereby reduce illegal immigration, and
that the promise of greater economic integration will incentivize democracy and human rights.
Relations with France were strained over French support for Ben Ali, which was extended even as
his security forces cracked down on pro-democracy protesters. France, the former colonial power,
had cultivated close ties with the Ben Ali regime, which it saw as ensuring regional stability and a
destination for French investment. French authorities have sought to ingratiate themselves with
post-Ben Ali authorities by replacing their ambassador, imposing an asset freeze on Ben Ali
family members and associates, dispatching senior officials on state visits, and pledging new
aid.56 French officials congratulated Al Nahda on its election victory, but later than other donors;
suspicion of Islamists persists in French political circles.
Regional Relations
Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors, although Ben Ali’s
entente with neighboring Libya’s Muammar al Qadhafi was strained. Although it declined to
participate militarily in U.S. and NATO military operations in Libya, Tunisia has been strongly
supportive of the transition there, and recognized Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) on
August 21, 2011. Tunisian authorities hope that an end to turmoil in Libya will stabilize border
areas and, eventually, produce an economic rebound that would allow Libya to reabsorb some of
Tunisia’s low-skilled labor surplus. In December 2011, Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi participated
in a TNC-led Libyan reconciliation and reconstruction forum.
Algeria and Morocco have been publicly supportive of Tunisia’s transition: Algeria has offered
financial assistance, while Morocco and Tunisia signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement
in May 2011. President Marzouki has led a high-profile campaign to revitalize the Arab Maghreb
Union, which was established in 1989 by Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, but
has been long inactive due to tensions between Morocco and Algeria. Tunis is also the temporary
headquarters location of the African Development Bank (AfDB), which receives significant
financial support from the United States; it moved to Tunisia in 2005 due to unrest in Côte
d’Ivoire, its permanent location.
U.S.-Tunisian Relations
During Ben Ali’s presidency, the United States balanced deep and persistent concerns about
political repression, corruption, and human rights abuses with a desire to cooperate with Tunisia’s
government on counterterrorism and regional security. Administration officials have since
emphasized strong support for Tunisia’s democratic transition, as well as a desire to advance
bilateral economic ties and enhance cooperation on regional policy concerns such as the crisis in
Syria and economic integration in the Maghreb. In a speech in May 2011 on U.S. policy toward
54
See European Commission, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, Tunisia, at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/
where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/tunisia/tunisia_en.htm.
55
AFP, “EU Opens Door to ‘Debt Relief’ for North African States,” February 22, 2012.
56
See G8 Summit, “The Deauville Partnership: Helping the Arab Countries in Their Transition to Free and Democratic
Societies,” Deauville, May 27, 2011.
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the Middle East, President Obama called on the United States “to show that America values the
dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of the dictator.”57 In February
2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tunis and stated that she was “a very strong
champion for Tunisian democracy and what has been accomplished here,” adding, “the challenge
is how to ensure the economic development of Tunisia matches the political development.”58
Then-Interim Prime Minister Caïd Essebsi met with President Obama at the White House in
October 2011, and President Obama called Prime Minister Jebali in December 2011 to
congratulate him on his appointment.59 Al Nahda president Rachid Ghannouchi—who does not
hold a formal government position—visited Washington, DC, in November 2011, but did not
make a public appearance with U.S. officials. In May 2011, prior to the elections and his
appointment as prime minister, Hamadi Jebali visited Washington on the invitation of a private
organization. On the Tunisian side, priorities appear to include U.S. economic and military aid,
U.S. technical and diplomatic support for recovering frozen assets linked to the former regime,
and the return of Tunisian nationals detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, among
other issues. The Administration has indicated that, with regard to working with regional Islamist
actors such as Al Nahda, “what parties call themselves is less important to us than what they
actually do.”60 This principle may be tested in the months ahead as Tunisia’s coalition
government seeks a way forward on complex domestic and foreign policy dilemmas.61
In February 2012, Secretary of State Clinton expressed support for negotiations toward a free
trade agreement (FTA) with Tunisia in testimony before Congress.62 Any progress on an FTA
would be subject to an interagency process, among other factors. U.S.-Tunisian trade is currently
relatively limited: in 2011, U.S. bilateral exports totaled $586 million and imports totaled $352
million.63 Tunisia is eligible for certain trade preferences under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) Program. A bilateral trade investment framework agreement (TIFA) was
signed in 2002, and a bilateral investment treaty entered into force in 1993. TIFAs can be the first
step toward an FTA.
U.S.-Tunisian relations date back over 200 years. Tunisia was the site of significant battles during
World War II, and was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 in Operation Torch. A U.S. cemetery and
memorial near the ancient city of Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead.
During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy despite a brief experiment
with leftist economic policy in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian ties were strained by the 1985
Israeli bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some
viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.64 Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s Operation
57
The White House, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and Africa,” May 19, 2011.
State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks Following Meeting with Tunisia President
Marzouki,” February 25, 2012.
59
White House, “Readout of the President’s Call with Tunisian Interim Prime Minister Jebali,” December 19, 2011.
60
Bradley Klapper, “Championing Democracy, Clinton Says US Can Work with Islamist Parties Gaining from Arab
Spring,” November 8, 2011.
61
For example, in May 2012, the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia stated that he was “disappointed” by a television station
owner’s blasphemy conviction; the government responded that his remarks constituted “interference in Tunisian
justice.” La Presse, “Le ministère des A.E. proteste contre les déclarations de l’ambassadeur US,” May 9, 2012.
62
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, February 28, 2012, transcript via Congressional Quarterly (CQ).
63
U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/.
64
Chicago Tribune Wires, “Bush Visits Tunisia to Patch Relations,” March 9, 1986; Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left
(continued...)
58
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates
in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls at Tunis.
U.S. Reactions to the January 2011 Uprising
U.S. criticism of the government’s response to the January 2011 demonstrations was initially muted, but grew as
protests mounted. On January 11, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that “we are worried, in general, about the
unrest and the instability, and what seems to be the underlying concerns of the people who are protesting”; at the
same time, she stressed that “we are not taking sides,” and indicated that she had not been in direct communication
with Tunisian authorities since the protests began.65 In a speech in Doha, Qatar, on January 13, Secretary Clinton
challenged Middle Eastern leaders to address the needs of their citizens and provide channels for popular
participation, or else risk instability and extremism. Events in Tunisia provided a vivid backdrop to her remarks.
After Ben Ali’s departure on January 14, President Barack Obama stated, “I applaud the courage and dignity of the
Tunisian people,” and called for “free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the true will and aspirations of
the Tunisian people.”66 In his January 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama stated, “The United States of
America stands with the people of Tunisia and supports the democratic aspirations of all people.”
Several Members of Congress expressed concerns that the United States appeared to lack sufficient intelligence on
Middle East protest movements and their potential to upset governments in the region, concerns which executive
branch officials have disputed.67
U.S. Foreign Assistance
Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees foreign assistance funding, and regularly
authorizes arms sale proposals. Prior to 2011, U.S. bilateral aid to Tunisia was modest by regional
standards and was highly focused on security cooperation. Tunisia has hosted the regional office
of the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) since 2004, but had not
previously received significant funds; in FY2010, Tunisia received $21.9 million in bilateral aid,
of which $20.2 million was security assistance. The Obama Administration has since offered a
range of new foreign assistance aimed broadly at “transition support,” as well as a reinvigoration
of the trade relationship (see above). The State Department has allocated over $300 million in
bilateral transition aid (broadly defined) and security assistance to Tunisia since early 2011.68 Aid
funding has drawn on monies appropriated in FY2010-FY2012, much of it reprogrammed from
other sources. Non-security aid is focused on civil society, political parties, the independent
media, election support, youth and women participation, and economic reforms. It includes two
programs authorized in P.L. 112-74, the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act:
•
$30 million for the cost of sovereign loan guarantees, which are expected to
enable Tunisia to raise some $400 million on the international bond market;69 and
•
$20 million for the creation of a bilateral “Enterprise Fund” designed to spur
private investment and encourage economic reforms.
(...continued)
Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987.
65
AFP, “US Concerned About Reports of ‘Excessive Force’ in Tunisia,” January 11, 2011; and U.S. State Department,
“Secretary of State Interviewed on Al Arabiya,” January 11, 2011, via CQ.
66
The White House, “Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
67
Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on
Worldwide Threats, February 10, 2011, via CQ.
68
State Department response to CRS inquiry, May 2012.
69
See State Department, “U.S. Loan Guarantee Supports Tunisia’s Democratic Transition,” June 11, 2012.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
The transition aid allocation also includes $100 million that is being provided as a cash transfer to
the Tunisian government for short-term fiscal relief, as notified to Congress in April 2012.70 An
additional Millennium Challenge “threshold” grant worth about $20 million is anticipated; a
Peace Corps program is also being re-established. U.S.-funded democracy assistance
organizations have not, to date, been the targets of official harassment as they have in Egypt. Still,
commentary published in the local press has highlighted public debates regarding the basis and
impact of U.S. democracy aid, and over whether such aid constitutes foreign interference.71
The Administration has requested $36.6 million in total bilateral aid for FY2013;72 however,
Tunisia is likely to receive much more in funding directed from regional allocations,
reprogrammed funds, and other sources. The State Department’s Office for Middle East
Transitions, established in September 2011 and led by Ambassador William Taylor, is
administering a Middle East Response Fund/Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund
(MERF/MENA-IF) constituted from unobligated FY2011 and FY2012 Economic Support Fund
(ESF) funding. The Office and Congress have identified an initial $185 million for the MERF,
including $50 million identified in the conference report on P.L. 112-74. Tunisia has been the
main beneficiary to date, with $71.2 million allocated as of early 2012. The Obama
Administration is requesting a further $770 million for the MENA-IF in FY2013. In addition to
bilateral assistance, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is “working to invest”
roughly $150 million in Tunisia.73
Multilateral financial institutions that receive U.S. financial support have also pledged significant
aid. The United States has been supportive of efforts by the Group of Eight (G8)—under the
banner of the 2011 “Deauville Partnership”—and by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development to provide aid to Tunisia and other countries affected by the “Arab Spring.”74
Security cooperation appears likely to increase due to interest on both sides. A Joint Military
Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held regularly. Tunisia relies on U.S. Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) assistance and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements to maintain
its aging inventory of U.S.-origin equipment, and the Tunisian military views International
Military Education and Training (IMET) as a key tool for officer training. Tunisia is set to receive
$29.5 million in FMF and $1.9 million in IMET in FY2012;75 the Administration has requested
$15 million and $2.3 million, respectively, for FY2013. The Administration has also requested $8
million in FY2013 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding for
police and justice sector assistance. The Administration allocated $13 million in Defense
Department-administered “Section 1206” funding for a maritime and border security package in
70
The transfer will fund payments on debt that Tunisia owes the World Bank and African Development Bank.
According to the State Department, this will allow the government “to instead use this money for its priority programs,
accelerating economic growth and job creation.” Secretary of State Clinton, “Assistance to Tunisia,” March 29, 2012.
The transfer will be paid for in FY2012 Economic Support Fund (ESF) funding originally appropriated for Overseas
Contingency Operations under the International Counter-Narcotics and Law Enforcement heading. U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), congressional notification #39, April 11, 2012.
71
See, e.g., Asma Ghribi, “State Department Program’s Funding of Tunisian Media Comes Under Scrutiny,” Tunisia
Live, January 20, 2012.
72
State Department, FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations.
73
State Department, “Tunisia: Overview of U.S. Economic Assistance,” February 25, 2012.
74
Fact-sheets on these multilateral initiatives can be found at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/190516.htm
(May 21, 2012).
75
State Department response to CRS inquiry, May 2012.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
FY2011.76 Tunisia is also among 10 countries participating in the U.S. Trans-Sahara CounterTerrorism Partnership (TSCTP), an interagency regional program that aims to enhance capacity
and cooperation on security issues in North and West Africa.
Outlook
Recent events, including political contestation and unrest across the Middle East and North
Africa, raise potential issues for Congress pertaining to the oversight of U.S.-Tunisian bilateral
relations, foreign assistance, and broader U.S. policy priorities in the Middle East. Possible
questions include the following:
•
To what extent is Tunisia a “test-case” for democratic transitions in the Middle
East? To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. policy in the region? What are
the prospects for U.S. influence on the future evolution of events in Tunisia?
How should the United States shape its future foreign aid programs? What course
of U.S. action is most likely to fulfill foreign policy and national security goals?
•
What are the key issues in constitution drafting, and how will Tunisians seek to
overcome differences in key policy preferences? What type of political system
will emerge in Tunisia? Will the new constitution protect individual rights and
ensure equality for religious, ethnic, and political minorities?
•
Do continued protests and border insecurity constitute significant threats? Do
elements of the former regime continue to influence events in Tunisia? How will
transitional authorities approach the question of reforming the internal security
services and providing for transitional justice?
•
Which individuals and groups currently enjoy significant popular credibility in
Tunisia? Which emergent coalitions among political and interest groups are
likely to endure?
•
What is the future trajectory of Tunisia’s economy? What is the appropriate role
of Tunisia’s international partners in helping Tunisia to promote economic
growth and job creation, and to address regional economic disparities?
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
76
The 1206 package was initially notified to Congress at $20 million but not all of it was obligated as planned. For
more information on Section 1206 funding, see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”
Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
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