Political Transition in Tunisia
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
May 22, 2013Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
January 29, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21666
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Political Transition in Tunisia
Summary
Tunisia faces significant challenges in its third year of political transition from authoritarian rule.
Elections held in October 2011 brought to power a coalition led by an Islamist party, Al Nahda
(also spelled Ennahda), in partnership with two secularist parties. International and domestic
observers praised the vote, which provided temporary momentum to a transition process that has
often appeared slow and unwieldy. In the intervening months, political consensus has remained
elusive, economic grievances have continued to stir social unrest, and tensions between Islamists
and secularists have escalated. The timeline for constitution drafting, initially expected to take a
year, has been repeatedly extended. The assassination of a leftist politician in early 2013 sparked
a political crisis and a government reshuffle, without altering the ruling coalition. Elections to put
an end to the transitional period are currently slated for late 2013, but can take place only after a
constitution is adopted. Key aspects of electoral administration also have yet to be determined.
Security threats have heightened amid ongoing regional instability and signs of jihadist activity
on Tunisian soil. The U.S. Embassy was attacked by a mob on September 14, 2012, three days
after the terrorist attacks in Benghazi, Libya. Tensions have escalated between the government
and a Salafist group known as Ansar al Sharia, whose leader is wanted for arrest in connection
with the U.S. Embassy attack. Ansar al Sharia recently threatened the government with violence,
to which the government responded by declaring the organization illegal, an apparent turning
point for Ansar al Sharia and for Al Nahda’s approach to extremists. Tunisian military operations
have meanwhile targeted alleged terrorist cells near the Algerian border and in the remote south,
which reportedly serves as a regional transit point for weapons and fighters. Tunisian nationals
are reported to have fought with terrorist or insurgent groups in Mali, Algeria, and Syriais entering its fourth year of transition after the 2011 “Jasmine Revolution.” On January
26, 2014, Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly voted overwhelmingly to adopt a new
constitution. This is widely viewed as a landmark accomplishment, given the difficulty of
achieving political consensus, tensions between Islamists and secularists, and ongoing social and
economic unrest. The new constitution asserts Tunisia’s Muslim identity, but its framing creating
a civil state and provisions on civil liberties are seen as a victory for secularists. The vote
followed a political agreement under which Tunisia’s main Islamist party, Al Nahda, agreed to
give up its leadership of the government in favor of a technocratic prime minister. This agreement
ended a months-long political crisis after the assassinations of two secularist politicians in 2013.
Tunisia has a small territory, a relatively well-educated and homogenous population, and a history
of encouraging women’s freedoms. Still, Tunisians face significant challenges in reforming state
institutions, addressing economic woes, and responding to security concerns. Islamist extremist
violence has increased within Tunisia amid ongoing regional instability. The military has targeted
terrorist cells near the Algerian border and in the remote south, which reportedly serves as a
regional transit point for weapons and fighters. Tunisian nationals have also been implicated in
violent extremism in Mali, Algeria, and Syria. In early 2014, the United States designated a
Tunisian group known as Ansar al Sharia as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The group was
reportedly involved in an attack on the U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis on
September 14, 2012, three days after the attacks in Benghazi, Libya. Tunisian authorities have
declared Ansar al Sharia illegal and a terrorist organization. However, the state’s response to
extremists has been criticized both as overly timid (by secularists) and overly harsh (by members
of Tunisia’s Islamist community), underscoring the challenge, for Tunisian leaders, of countering
terrorism while not appearing to resort to authoritarian tactics associated with the Ben Ali regime.
Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funding and oversees U.S. policy toward
Tunisia and the wider region. The Obama Administration has expressed strong support for
Tunisia’s transition, and and, in consultation with Congress, has allocated over $364450 million in bilateral aid since 2011. International
financial institutions, which receive significant U.S. funding, have also pledged aid. Yet the
Embassy attacks may have constrained U.S.-Tunisian relations and undermined U.S. officials’
trust in Tunisian authorities’ ability to ensure security. The availability of funding resources to
continue or increase aid to Tunisia may also be limited in the years ahead, due to larger debates
over the federal budget and congressional debates over aid to transitional countries in the Middle
East and North Africa. Some Members of Congress have advocated cutting aid to Tunisia in
response to Tunisia’s handling of a reported suspect in the Benghazi attacks.
Some policymakers describe Tunisia as a “test case” for democratic transitions in the regionaid
since 2011. However, U.S.-Tunisian relations appear to remain strained by concerns over security
threats to U.S. personnel and what U.S. officials have deemed an insufficient response by the
Tunisian government to the 2012 Embassy attack. The availability of resources to assist Tunisia is
also subject to larger U.S. policy debates over the federal budget and aid to transitional Arab
states. The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) allows additional funding for
loan guarantees and the U.S.-Tunisia enterprise fund. However, it prohibits any funding for a
planned Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) “threshold” grant for Tunisia.
Some policymakers describe Tunisia as a test case for democratic transitions in Arab states. Yet
Tunisia’s path is far from certain, and Tunisia’s example may, in any case, be less influential than
larger or more central states such as Egypt and Syria. Still, Tunisia’s experience highlights regionwide issues relating to the struggle between reformists and entrenched former regime elements;
the role and
influence of Islamism in state and society; and the difficult balance—for the United
States and
others—of pursuing potentially divergent policy goals, particularly as transitions to
democracypost-authoritarian
transitions are often accompanied by significant political instability and weakened security
forces. U.S.
policymakers continue to debate the degree to which aid and bilateral contacts
provide leverage in
pursuing goals such as countering terrorism and encouraging certain
democratic values. See also CRS Report R42153, U.S. Trade and Investment in the Middle East
and North Africa: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar. democratic values.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Background................................................................................................................................ 3
Government and Politics2
A New Constitution ......................................................................................................................... 4
Islam, Politics, and the State .3
Islamist-Secularist Fault Lines ..................................................................................................... 6 5
Security Concerns ............................................................................................................................ 8
The Role of the Security Forces .6
Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform ............................................................................................. 10 8
The Economy ................................................................................................................................... 9 11
Foreign Relations ........................................................................................................................... 13
U.S. Relations .........11
U.S. Policy and Aid ....................................................................................................................... 1311
U.S. Foreign Assistance ........................................................................................................... 15
Outlook13
Congressional Actions ............................................................................................................. 15
Outlook ............................. 17
Figures
Figure 1. Tunisia at a Glance ............................................................................................................. 315
Figures
Figure 2. Balance of Power in the Constituent Assembly 1. Tunisia at a Glance ......................................................................................................... 5.. 2
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia .................................................................................. 1614
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 1816
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Overview
Tunisia is in its thirdentering its fourth year of transition since the January 2011 “Jasmine Revolution”
ended the
authoritarian regime of then-President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and sparked a wave of
unrest in
much of the Arab world. Since then, Tunisians can point to a number of significant achievements.
Widely praised elections in October 2011 put in place a National Constituent Assembly tasked
with drafting a new constitution, along with a coalition government made up of an Islamist party,
previously banned under the former regime, and two secularist parties.1 New political parties,
media outlets, public debates, and civil society organizations have burgeoned. However, structural
reforms that would guarantee democratic institutions have been limited and halting. Consensus on
government priorities has often been elusive, and Tunisians continue to grapple with how best to
approach issues such as domestic extremism, transitional justice, security sector and judicial
reforms, and the appropriate balance between individual freedoms and religious sensitivities.
Popular dissatisfaction and confusion over the transition process are likely to continue as
Tunisians debate who is empowered to act, who wields popular legitimacy, and how the
government much of the Arab world. In practice, civil and political liberties have expanded, and
Tunisia has experienced far less violence than some other transitional countries. However,
structural reforms that would guarantee democratic institutions have been halting, and consensus
on government priorities elusive. Tunisians continue to debate elemental questions, such as who
is empowered to act in the name of popular or revolutionary legitimacy, and how the government
can or should deliver tangible benefits to an impatient public with vast and divided
expectations.2 The timeline for drafting and adopting a new constitution was initially expected to
take a year, but has stretched into two (or more).3 Protests and strikes, though often small and
highly localized, reflect popular frustrations with a range of governance and socioeconomic
issues, such as regional economic disparities and high unemployment. At times, the government’s
internal divisions and ambiguous mandate as a caretaker regime have impeded its ability to react
quickly and decisively to events, or to make progress on institutional reforms. Still, Tunisian
political and civic leaders have been able to navigate their way through periodic crises through
dialogue and consensus, even when the transition process has seemed to be stymied.
Regional and domestic security threats have become more prominent over the past year, creating
concerns and new policy dilemmas for Tunisia and its Western partners. Attacks on the U.S.
Embassy and American school in Tunis on September 14, 2012, temporarily prompted the
relocation of some U.S. government personnel. The government has identified suspects and made
some arrests, but the motive and degree of premeditation behind the attacks remain unclear. A
Salafist4 leader, formerly active in a U.S.-designated terrorist group, is wanted for arrest in
1
The October 23, 2011, elections were widely viewed as fair, transparent, and well-conducted, despite earlier delays
and preparations that often appeared disjointed. Participation in the historic vote prompted deep emotions among many
Tunisians. Still, observers expressed concerns regarding some elements of electoral administration; limited voter
education; and a lack of detailed procedures and poll worker training for key parts of the process. Many Tunisians
furthermore appeared to feel alienated by the complexity of the transition process and a lack of understanding of the
Constituent Assembly’s anticipated role. CRS observations during the election; see also, e.g., Carter Center, National
Constituent Assembly Elections in Tunisia, October 23, 2011, May 24, 2012; and National Democratic Institute, Final
Report on the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly Election, February 17, 2012.
2
See, e.g., International Crisis Group (ICG), Tunisia: Confronting Social and Economic Challenges, June 6, 2012; and
International Republican Institute (IRI), “IRI Poll: Tunisians Look for Improvements in Government Performance,”
February 14, 2013, which found that “Tunisian citizens are unhappy with the current state of their economy and are
losing confidence in their current government.”
3
On the eve of the October 2011 elections, most of the main political parties signed a non-binding statement indicating
their intent that the National Constituent Assembly would remain in place for no longer than a year.
4
“Salafism” refers to a broad subset of Sunni Islamic reformist movements that seek to purify contemporary Islamic
religious practices and societies by encouraging the application of practices and views associated with the earliest days
of the Islamic faith. Salafist movements hold a range of positions on political, social, and theological questions. A
subset of Salafists advocate violence in pursuit of their aims, but many instead pursue non-violent preaching, charity,
(continued...)
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connection with the attacks, but he remains at large (see “Security Concerns,” below). Recently,
Ansar al Sharia has publicly threatened the government with violence, to which the government
has responded by declaring the group illegal, an apparent turning point in Ansar al Sharia’s
trajectory and in Al Nahda’s approach to domestic extremism. Tunisian nationals also reportedly
participated in the January 2013 terrorist attack on a remote natural gas facility in southeastern
Algeria, which resulted in the deaths of three Americans (and at least 34 others). These incidents
have prompted U.S. officials to call for greater security measures and counterterrorism
cooperation, and concerns over Tunisia’s handling of the Embassy attack may have harmed U.S.Tunisian relations. More broadly, U.S. officials have been increasingly troubled by rising terrorist
activity and instability across North Africa.
Divergent interpretations of security threats and the necessary means to confront them have
contributed to Islamist-secularist tensions. Leaders from the ruling Islamist Al Nahda party have
pledged to crack down on violence, while arguing that isolating or arresting religiously
conservative activists could further radicalize them. Secularist critics often charge that Al Nahda
lacks the capacity or will to confront extremists. Al Nahda leaders have simultaneously struggled
to respond to critics (reportedly including figures within the party) who accuse them of failing to
institute a greater public role for Islam. At the root of these debates are questions of how Tunisia’s
future political system will interpret democratic principles such as freedom of speech, shape the
relationship between political authorities and state security forces, and define the role of religion
in political life. Salafist violence and other security incidents, some unsolved, have increased
pressure on the government to ensure public order and weigh in on controversial social issues.
Committees in the Constituent Assembly have completed a draft constitution, which is under
review within the Assembly and being discussed by key political and civil society leaders.
Following debate and possible amendments, the draft may be put to a vote within the Assembly in
the coming months. If the final draft is not adopted by a two-thirds vote after two tries, it must go
to a popular referendum. Contentious elements of the drafting process have included the nature
and structure of the future political system, as well as provisions defining civil liberties and labor
rights protections. Previous draft clauses suggesting less-than-full gender equality, prohibiting
blasphemy, and criminalizing relations with Israel are not part of the draft currently under
discussion. However, Human Rights Watch has criticized what it views as insufficient protections
for civil liberties and freedom of conscience.5 National elections, which may take place only after
a new constitution is adopted, are currently expected to take place at year’s end. However, key
elements of electoral administration, such as a new electoral commission and electoral law, have
yet to be agreed upon or instituted, and the precise timeline for election preparation is unclear.
U.S. priorities in Tunisia include encouraging steps toward full democracy and political stability,
advancing trade and investment ties, and working with the Tunisian government to address
terrorism and regional insecurity. The Obama Administration has expressed strong support for
Tunisia’s transition, and has allocated over $364 million in bilateral aid since 2011. International
financial institutions, which receive significant U.S. funding, have also pledged aid. The
Administration requested $36.6 million in total bilateral aid for Tunisia for FY2013, and has
requested $61.8 million in FY2014.
(...continued)
and (for some) political activities. See CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
5
Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Tunisia: Revise the Draft Constitution,” May 13, 2013.
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Some policymakers describe Tunisia as a “test case” for democratic transitions in the region. Yet
Tunisia’s path is far from certain, and Tunisia’s example may, in any case, be less influential than
larger or more central states such as Egypt and Syria. As elsewhere, U.S. policymakers have
debated the degree to which aid and diplomatic contacts provide leverage—e.g., to pursue
counterterrorism or to encourage certain democratic values.
Figure 1. Tunisia at a Glance
Sources: CRS Graphics, CIA World Factbook, World Bank.
Background
Prior to January 2011, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable, albeit authoritarian,
regime that focused on economic growth while staving off political liberalization. It had had only
two leaders since gaining independence from France in 1956: Habib Bourguiba, a secular
nationalist and former independence activist, and Ben Ali, a former interior minister and prime
expectations.
Localized protests and strikes continue to reflect popular frustrations with governance and
socioeconomic issues. Meanwhile, security threats have starkly increased as Tunisia’s transitional
authorities confront growing domestic and regional Islamist militancy without recourse to the
authoritarian methods of their predecessors.
Many analysts and Western officials view Tunisia as having the best hope of any “Arab Spring”
country to complete a peaceful transition to fully democratic rule. Yet, the process has advanced
in fits and starts. In October 2011, elections widely praised as free and fair put in place a 217member National Constituent Assembly, a legislative body tasked with drafting and adopting a
new constitution.1 An Islamist party, Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda), previously banned under Ben Ali,
won a plurality of seats in the Assembly and formed a coalition government with two secularist
parties.2 The Nahda-led coalition then faced recurrent ideological frictions among the three
parties, as well as tensions between party leaders and their respective grassroots.
A gulf of mistrust between Islamist and secularist political factions has been fed by rising
insecurity and by mutual suspicions that each side seeks to manipulate the rules of the political
process to exclude the other. Such suspicions grew in the wake of the July 2013 military ouster of
the elected president in Egypt. Recurrent political crises have occurred. The government and
Constituent Assembly were politically paralyzed for months after the assassinations of two leftist,
secularist politicians, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, on February 6 and July 25, 2013. The
government blamed Islamist extremists for the killings, but the perpetrators have yet to be
apprehended. Still, Tunisian political and civic leaders have repeatedly been able to reach (albeit
fragile) consensus through dialogue, even when the transition process has seemed to be stymied.
Tunisia has recently made significant advances. In late 2013, following protracted negotiations,
Al Nahda agreed to relinquish its leadership of the government in favor of a technocratic Prime
Minister, Mehdi Jomaa, an engineer then serving as Minister of Industry. Jomaa was sworn in on
January 10, 2014, after Al Nahda Prime Minister Ali Laraydh stepped down. On January 26, the
Constituent Assembly voted to adopt a new constitution (discussed below). Presidential and
parliamentary elections are anticipated in mid-2014 and considered the next major stage in the
1
The elections were widely viewed as fair, transparent, and well-conducted, despite earlier delays and preparations that
often appeared disjointed. Still, observers expressed concerns regarding some elements of electoral administration;
limited voter education; and a lack of detailed procedures and poll worker training for key parts of the process. Many
Tunisians furthermore appeared to feel alienated by the complexity of the transition process and a lack of
understanding of the Assembly’s role. CRS observations in Tunis and Sousse during the election; see also National
Democratic Institute, Final Report on the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly Election, February 17, 2012.
2
These were Ettakatol (“The Forum”), formerly a small opposition party under Ben Ali; and the Congress for the
Republic (CPR, after its French acronym), which was previously banned.
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transition process. On January 8, 2014, the Constituent Assembly selected the members of a new
electoral commission, overcoming a series of legal and political hurdles.3
Stated U.S. policy priorities in Tunisia include encouraging a successful democratic transition,
advancing trade and investment ties, and working with the Tunisian government to address
terrorism and other security threats. The Obama Administration, in consultation with Congress,
has allocated over $450 million in aid since 2011. The Administration has requested $61.8 million
for FY2014, referred to as a “normalization” of aid after initial, “urgent” funding was
reprogrammed from other intended recipients (see Table 1).4
Figure 1. Tunisia at a Glance
Background
Prior to January 2011, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable, albeit authoritarian,
regime that focused on economic growth while staving off political liberalization. It had had only
two leaders since gaining independence from France in 1956: Habib Bourguiba, a secular
nationalist and former independence activist, and Ben Ali, a former interior minister and prime
3
See International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Elections in Tunisia: Selection of the New Independent
High Authority for Elections, January 24, 2014.
4
State Department, FY2014 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations; Statement of Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 22, 2013.
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minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. Ben Ali cultivated the internal security services
and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party as his power base, and harshly repressed
political participation, freedom of expression, and religious activism. This repression, along with
the ruling elite’s corruption and nepotism, severely undermined the regime’s popular legitimacy,
despite despite
relatively effective state services and strong economic growth. Another factor driving
popular popular
dissatisfaction was the significant socioeconomic divide between rural and urban areas,
and especially between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and
the poorer interior. Anti-
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government unrest, particularly rooted in labor and economic grievances,
has often originated in
the interior—as did the 2011 protest movement.
While Tunisia shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, some of its attributes are
unique: a small territory, a relatively homogenous population (despite tribal and ethnic divisions
in some areas), a , a relatively liberalized economy, a
large and educated middle class, and a history of
encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms.
Tunisia’s population is overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking and Sunni Muslim (although tribal and
ethnic divisions persist in some areas), while its urban culture reflects European influences. The
median age, 31, is high compared to most Arab states.5Sunni Muslims make up the
overwhelming majority of Tunisia’s population, while its urban culture reflects a strong European
influence. The population is young compared with developed countries, but its median age is high
compared to most Arab states.6
The legal and socioeconomic status of women is among Tunisia’s particularities within the Arab
world. Polygamy is banned, and women enjoy equal citizenship rights and the right to initiate
divorce. (Still, inheritanceInheritance laws and practices are disadvantagestill disadvantageous toward women.) Women serve
in the
military and in many professions, and constitute more than half of university students; the first
first woman governor was appointed in 2004. Many credit the country’s relatively liberal Personal
Status Code, promulgated in 1956 under then-President Bourguiba, as well as Bourguiba-era
educational reforms, with these advances.
Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”
The 2011 popular uprising began in December 2010 with anti-government protests in the interior. On January 14,
2011, it culminated in the decision by President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, in power since 1987, to flee the country for
Saudi Arabia. Protests were first reported in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street vendor
named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire. The protests quickly spread to nearby towns, and eventually reached
the capital and wealthy coastal communities associated with the ruling elite. Police opened fire on protesters and
made sweeping arrests; an estimated 338 people were killed.76 The army, however, reportedly refused an order to use
force against demonstrations, and reportedly played a significant role in Ben Ali’s decision to step down.
The early months of the post-Ben Ali transition were marked by ongoing waves of unrest, partly in response to the
fact that early interim governments were dominated by officials from the former regime. A security vacuum
because street
demonstrators rejected the continuing role of former regime officials in early interim governments. A security
vacuum additionally raised fears of violence and chaos. In February 2011, a more stable, if weak, interim government took
took shape under Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman from the administration of founding President Habib
Habib Bourguiba. Caïd Essebsi introduced the idea, popular with protesters, of electing an assembly to write a new
constitution—that is, forge a new political system—before holding parliamentary and/or presidential polls.
Government and Politics
Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda/An-Nahda, “Renaissance”) has 89 seats in the National Constituent
Assembly—41%, by far the largest block—and heads a ruling coalition with the centrist Congress
for the Republic (CPR) and left-leaning Ettakatol (Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties or
FDTL).8 Ettakatol leader Mustapha ben Jaafar is Speaker of the Assembly; CPR leader Moncef
Marzouki is President, a largely ceremonial post; and Al Nahda senior figure Ali Laraydh serves
as Prime Minister, the most powerful of the three positions. This “Troika” coalition is subject to
6A New Constitution
Drafting and adopting a new constitution was initially expected to take place in the first year that
followed the 2011 elections, but was repeatedly delayed. Throughout 2012 and the first half of
2013, committees within the Constituent Assembly drafted the provisions of various sections.
Following the release of a final draft in June 2013, a “consensus commission” worked to resolve
5
Richard Cincotta, “Tunisia’s Shot at Democracy: What Demographics and Recent History Tell Us,” New Security
Beat, January 25, 2011.
7
Associated Press (AP), “Report Raises Number of Killed During Tunisia’s Revolution to 338,” May 5, 2012.
8
Al Nahda won 37% of the vote, more than the next eight parties combined. The system of proportional representation
adopted for the elections was designed to preclude any party from easily gaining a majority. This resulted in the main
secularist parties, which each won far fewer votes than Al Nahda, winning a larger proportion of seats than votes.
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internal frictions, given the leading figures’ divergent histories and policy preferences. While Al
Nahda remains dominant in the Assembly, the blocks of seats controlled by CPR and Ettakatol
have been eroded by defections, many of them spurred by secularist discontent over the parties’
continuing alliance with Al Nahda (see Figure 2). Still, the Troika has held together, despite
opposition advocacy in favor of a “technocratic,” less politically polarized government.
Figure 2. Balance of Power in the Constituent Assembly
Seats (% of 217 Total)
Source: CRS; Data from National Democratic Institute, Final Report on the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly
Elections, October 23, 2011, May 24, 2012; and Marsad, http://www.marsad.tn.
Notes: The CPR and Ettakatol parties have lost seats due to changes of allegiance by party members. The ruling
“Troika” coalition currently appears to control about 54% of seats.
In February 2013, a prominent leftist politician, Chokri Belaid, was assassinated, raising fears
over public safety and political violence.9 A political crisis sparked by the assassination led thenPrime Minister Hamadi Jebali to resign after Al Nahda, his own party, rejected his proposal to
respond by forming a non-partisan cabinet of technocrats. Jebali was replaced by Ali Laraydh,
who had previously served as Interior Minister. In March, Prime Minister Laraydh appointed a
new government with nonpartisan figures heading four key ministries (Interior, Justice, Defense,
and Foreign Affairs), but the ruling coalition did not expand beyond the original Troika parties.
These developments highlighted the gulf of mistrust among various political factions, and also
drew attention to apparent internal divisions within Al Nahda. Still, Rachid Ghannouchi, Al
Nahda’s president and co-founder, who holds no official government position, appears to wield
ultimate decision-making authority within the party.10 Ghannouchi was re-elected as party
president in 2012, despite earlier promises to step down. Whether Al Nahda can contain its
divisions ahead of the next round of elections is uncertain. Whether Laraydh’s cabinet proves
9
Arrests have reportedly been made in connection with the killing, and the Ministry of the Interior has released the
names of certain suspects, but the incident remains largely unexplained and, to some Tunisians, unprobed. Belaid’s
family has accused Al Nahda of assassinating Belaid, but there is little apparent evidence to suggest this is true.
10
Ghannouchi has denied this, contending that party decisions are made via internal democratic institutions. See BBC
Monitoring, “Tunisia’s Ghannouchi Interviewed on Key Domestic Challenges, Foreign Ties,” May 22, 2013.
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more affective at advancing the political transition and addressing rising security concerns also
remains to be seen.
Tunisia’s main trade union federation, the UGTT, has asserted its influence as a channel for
widespread economic grievances, as a leftist and secularist counter-weight to Al Nahda, and as a
convener of “national dialogue” on key policy issues. Another key challenger to Al Nahda is the
recently created Nida Tounes party, led by Béji Caïd Essebsi, a politician and former senior
official under founding President Bourguiba (and briefly under Ben Ali), who served as interim
Prime Minister in 2011. Caïd Essebsi has tried to position himself as leader of the centrist,
secularist opposition. Critics, including some in Al Nahda, have portrayed Nida Tounes as a
vehicle for “counter-revolutionary” acolytes of the former regime.11 Some public opinion surveys
have shown Nida Tounes rivaling Al Nahda in popularity; yet, the relative appeal and unity of
various political blocks remains to be seen ahead of elections.12
Tunisian authorities continue to debate how best to ensure accountability for past abuses while
encouraging national reconciliation. Some 2 million Tunisians were reportedly members of the
former ruling party; selecting who should face sanction is therefore a challenge. Criminal charges
have been brought against Ben Ali (in absentia), members of his family, and former senior
government and security officials. However, the government has not settled on an approach
toward mid- and low-level state employees and members of the security and intelligence services
who may have been complicit in or aware of abuses, but did not command them. Many Tunisians
are also skeptical of the justice system, which was inherited from the Ben Ali regime and is
reportedly viewed as subject to political influence, ineffective and, in some cases, corrupt.13
Background on Al Nahda
Led by Rachid Ghannouchi, Al Nahda was founded in 1981 as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). Al Nahda
candidates were permitted to run as independents in the 1989 parliamentary elections, but the Ben Ali government
cracked down when they won 15% of the national vote. Tensions escalated, culminating in an attack on a ruling party
office in 1991 that the government blamed on Al Nahda. In 1992, hundreds of Al Nahda members were convicted of
a supposed anti-government plot. Ghannouchi, who had left the country, was sentenced in absentia. Al Nahda leaders
denied the accusations, and some rights advocates criticized the case as biased and lacking due process. Similar
tensions between Islamists and government forces drove neighboring Algeria into civil war in the early 1990s.
Al Nahda’s electoral success in 2011 appears to have stemmed from several factors, including its history of opposition
activism and its message of reconciling Islam and democracy, as well as popular disaffection with Ben Ali’s stringently
secularist form of authoritarian rule. Al Nahda did not play a significant role in the 2011 protest movement, but it
subsequently engaged in effective grassroots mobilization and campaigning. The party may also have benefited from
some secularist parties’ efforts to drive a wedge between Islamists and secularists, a strategy that may have backfired
among Tunisians eager to reconcile democracy with their Arab/Muslim identity.
Islam, Politics, and the State
Al Nahda, which is leading the government after decades in exile and underground, is at the
center of Tunisian debates over religion, state, and identity. The party’s leaders portray
themselves as moderates who favor democratic participation, the separation of religion and state,
and women’s freedoms. Yet the party’s decision-making has seemingly reflected internal
11
See, e.g., Al-Monitor, “Tunisia Party Fights Islamization, Raises Ire of Ruling Ennahda,” October 1, 2012.
IRI, Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, December 19, 2012-January 7, 2013, February 14, 2013.
13
See ICG, “Combating Impunity, Restoring Security,” May 9, 2012.
12
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divisions as well as potential competition with more radical, emergent Islamist groups for popular
support. Secularist detractors accuse the party of “double discourse,” that is, of displaying
moderation in order to enter government and reassure foreign partners, but intending to gradually
introduce restrictive laws and institutions. Critics also accuse Al Nahda of seeking to dominate
the political system and state institutions. Some further contend that foreign actors, such as Qatar,
are using the party as a tool of influence in Tunisia.14 The party’s supporters view some critics as
immovably opposed to Islamists, and argue that stringently secular elites have lost their claim to
popular legitimacy or are seeking a return of the former authoritarian regime.15
Al Nahda leaders determined in early 2012 that the party would not support a constitutional
reference to sharia, thereby overruling proposals by Al Nahda’s parliamentary block. Instead, the
draft constitution retains Article 1 of Tunisia’s old constitution, which states that Tunisia’s
“religion is Islam, its language is Arabic, and its type of government is the Republic,” a
presumably unenforceable statement of Tunisian identity. This was hailed by some observers as a
victory for moderates within Al Nahda, but religious conservatives may have viewed the outcome
as a betrayal.16 Similar debates are ongoing regarding the state’s regulation of religious activities;
the legal status of Salafist groups; whether senior elected positions should be reserved for
Muslims (there are tiny Jewish and Christian minorities); and how to balance freedom of
expression and religious sensitivities.
Religiously conservative Salafists have become more visible in the post-Ben Ali era, and some
have challenged the government—as well as artists, labor union activists, journalists, academics,
and women deemed insufficiently modest—through protests, threats, and sometimes violence. A
handful of Salafist groups have registered as political parties, but many are either primarily
concerned with personal behavior, or prefer to operate outside the formal political system. In
some areas, Salafist groups reportedly control mosques and have set up security and serviceprovision networks.17 Policy challenges include how to offer alternative opportunities to
unemployed youths, how to satisfy demands that Tunisia’s religious identity be protected while
also protecting civil liberties and independent institutions, and how to counter what appears to be
a jihadist threat within Tunisia that may draw on support from Salafist groups and communities.18
Opposition figures and other critics charge that Al Nahda has protected Salafists due to
ideological sympathy, and/or because Salafists can be used to intimidate opponents and provide
future electoral support. Similar allegations have focused on the Leagues for the Protection of the
Revolution (LPR), ostensibly independent grassroots groups focused on vanquishing individuals
seen as linked to the former regime.19 Al Nahda leaders counter that Salafism is a product of past
state repression under secularist authoritarian regimes, that non-violent Salafists are a legitimate
component of Tunisian society, and that a crackdown could push them toward greater extremism.
President Marzouki, a secularist who has worked closely with Al Nahda, has likewise stated that
14
E.g., African Manager, "Tunisie: Ressemblances surprenantes, Ben Ali-RCD & Jbali-Ennahdha,” February 27, 2012.
Le Point, “Tunisie: critiqué, Ennahda brandit le spectre de Ben Ali,” September 7, 2012.
16
Kareem Fahim, "Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law," The New York Times, March 26, 2012 ;
Agence France Presse (AFP), "Charia: Ennahda a ‘levé l'ambiguité,’ se félicitent des modernistes," March 27, 2012.
17
Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia's Ansar Al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2013.
18
See ICG, Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge, February 13, 2013.
19
BBC Monitoring, “Analysis: What Are Tunisia's Revolutionary Protection Leagues Protecting?” via U.S.
government Open Source Center (OSC), February 7, 2013.
15
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peaceful Salafists must be accepted under the principles of free belief and expression.20 Al Nahda
leader Rachid Ghannouchi argues that he is engaging Salafists in a “dialogue” to bring them into
the political system, while prosecuting those who violate the law.21 Large-scale arrests have
followed periodic Salafist rioting, but these have not always led to prosecutions; whether law and
order actions have been consistently applied or effective is debatable. Meanwhile, some Salafist
groups openly support the creation of an Islamic caliphate in Tunisia, and appear increasingly
willing to challenge the government directly (see below). These delicate dilemmas are being
navigated amid political polarization and distrust, regional turbulence, and economic difficulties.
Security Concerns
Daily life in Tunisia is not dominated by insecurity, unlike in neighboring Libya. Still, security
threats have increased over the past year. Western concerns over terrorist activity in North Africa
have grown following the surge in regional activity by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
and associated violent extremist groups in 2012, particularly in Mali; the September 2012 terrorist
attacks against U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya; and the January 2013 hostage crisis at the
remote In Amenas natural gas facility in southeastern Algeria, for which an AQIM splinter faction
claimed responsibility. According to Algerian authorities, 11 Tunisian nationals, i.e. the largest
group of any single nationality, participated in the In Amenas attack.22
On September 14, the U.S. Embassy in Tunis and nearby American school were attacked by a
mob during a protest against a film viewed as insulting Islam. The outer enclosure of the
Embassy (not the secure interior chancery) and the school building were badly damaged.23
Hundreds of suspects—many of them Salafists—were arrested after the attack. However, the
precise motivations behind the attack and level of premeditation are largely unclear.24 The
Tunisian government dispatched extra security to the Embassy after the attack began, and four
people were killed in subsequent clashes. Then-Interior Minister (now Prime Minister) Laraydh
publicly apologized for having initially “failed” to protect the Embassy.25 The leader of a Tunisian
Salafist group known as Ansar al Sharia, Saifallah Ben Hassine, a.k.a. Abu Iyadh, is wanted for
arrest for having allegedly commanded the attack, but he remains at large. Abu Iyadh was a cofounder of the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG; discussed below), which was designated for
U.S. terrorism sanctions in 2002. Ansar al Sharia shares a name with violent extremist groups
elsewhere, including in Libya, but the nature and extent of ties are uncertain.
Ansar al Sharia may be among a small number of Tunisian Salafist groups with ties to terrorist
organizations and/or to foreign fighter pipelines to Syria, Mali, Algeria, and elsewhere. Ansar al
20
Tunisia Live, “President’s Support for Niqab in Schools Angers Civil Society Groups,” May 16, 2013.
Al Hayat via BBC Monitoring, Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi, October 1, 2012; Robin Wright, “Interview with
Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi,” Wilson Center, November 2, 2012.
22
Algerian Press Service (APS), “11 Tunisians, 3 Algerians Among Terrorist Group That Attacked Tiguentourine Gas
Complex,” January 21, 2013.
23
State Department daily press briefing, September 14, 2012.
24
The Chairman of the U.S. House Select Committee on Intelligence, Mike Rogers, has stated that “probably an
affiliate of Al Qaida” carried out the attacks, but no other senior U.S. officials appear to have stated such a claim
publicly. CQ Transcripts, “Rep. Mike Rogers Interviewed on CNN,” October 24, 2012.
25
Associated Press (AP), “Tunisia’s Ruling Islamist Party Condemns US Embassy Attack,” September 15, 2012.
21
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Sharia also appears increasingly willing to threaten the state with violence.26 The group, which
emerged in 2011, initially appeared to adopt a strategy of non-violent preaching and social works
within Tunisia, coupled with support to jihadist activities overseas, notably in Syria.27 However,
tensions with the government have escalated since early 2013. In May, after the government
broke up Ansar al Sharia meetings on the grounds that it did not have a permit to hold public
gatherings, members called Al Nahda leaders “tyrants,” accused them of doing the bidding of the
United States and France, and alluded to the willingness of followers to “sacrifice themselves for
their religion” as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.28 Security forces subsequently prevented a
planned Ansar al Sharia rally in the city of Kairouan, and clashed with the group’s supporters in a
Tunis suburb. A statement attributed to AQIM then referred to Ansar al Sharia as “beloved.”29
After these events, the government declared the group illegal, signaling a turning point in its
approach. The group’s future trajectory remains to be seen; it could be disrupted, driven further
underground or abroad, or driven into a violent confrontation with security forces.
These developments may be connected to growing indications that jihadist groups are active on
Tunisian soil.30 Some observers trace jihadists’ presence to the release of over 1,000 “political”
prisoners of various stripes in early 2013, security force disorganization in the aftermath of the
2011 revolution, and events in Mali and Libya.31 Tunisian security forces have clashed with
armed militants of uncertain nationality multiple times since 2011, and have claimed to uncover
“training camps” and weapons depots. Recent military operations have focused on the
mountainous border with Algeria and the remote desert south. Insecurity along the Libyan border
is also of particular concern amid increased weapons trafficking and combatant flows after the
fall of the Qadhafi regime. Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jedou recently stated that groups currently
being targeted near Algeria are connected to AQIM, and include individuals who fought in Mali.
AQIM, a seemingly decentralized criminal and terrorist network, appears to be exploiting security
gaps and instability across North Africa. It has also attempted to capitalize on divisive identity
issues and popular frustrations with the slow pace of reforms in transitional states. In January
2011, the group positioned itself on the side of Tunisian protesters, hailing the departure of Ben
Ali and warning against supposed U.S. and French efforts to subvert the revolution.32 In October
2012, amid large-scale arrests connected to the U.S. Embassy attacks, AQIM accused Al Nahda
of resorting to authoritarian methods against Salafists.33 In March 2013, in a sign that AQIM may
26
The total number of potentially violent Tunisian Salafists is unclear; Tunisian authorities have estimated it at 3,000
but Ansar al Sharia gatherings have suggested a higher number. Tunisians may also join or support Ansar al Sharia for
many reasons, including an interest in conservative Islamic preaching, not necessarily because they are willing to
commit violence. Reuters, “Muslim Militants Shifting Focus To N.Africa -Tunisia Leader,” October 2, 2012; see also
Habib Sayah, “The Next Insurgency in Tunisia,” Fikra Forum, February 12, 2013; and Aaron Y. Zelin, “Standoff
Between the Tunisian Government and Ansar al-Sharia,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 14, 2013.
27
The issue of Tunisians traveling to fight against the Assad regime in Syria, including possibly within Al Qaedalinked groups, has been particularly contentious in Tunisia. After initially suggesting that the government would not
seek to restrict such combatant flows, Al Nahda leaders have recently reportedly taken steps to stem them. See, e.g., Al
Arabiya, “Tunisia PM Says Country Cannot Legally Prevent Citizens From Going To Syria,” March 24, 2013.
28
Middle East Online, “Abu Iyadh Threatens to ‘Afghanize’ Tunisia in Most Serious Salafist Menace,” May 13, 2013.
29
AFP, “Qaeda Warns Tunisians Salafists of Govt Provocations: SITE,” May 19, 2013.
30
See Andrew Lebovich, “Confronting Tunisia's Jihadists, Foreign Policy, May 16, 2013.
31
Mohsen Zribi, “Enquête - Le jihadisme en Tunisie,” November 8, 2012.
32
Al Mujahidin Electronic Network, January 28, 2011, “AQLIM Warns Tunisians Against Western ‘Plots’ To ‘Abort’
Tunisian Revolution,” via OSC.
33
AFP, “Tunisie: Aqmi demande à Ennahda de renoncer à la répression des extrémistes,” October 13, 2012.
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fear the loss of potential recruits to Syria, the group called on Tunisians and other North Africans
to stay at home to fight “secularists and other expatriates,” instead of traveling abroad.34 In
response to extremist attacks and warnings in May 2013, Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi made the
opposite argument, suggesting jihad should take place in Palestine and not in Tunisia.35
“Core” Al Qaeda has also referred to Tunisia in its statements. In June 2012, for instance, Al
Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al Zawahiri, called on Tunisians to rise up against Al Nahda for accepting
a constitution not based on sharia.36 Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi responded that Zawahiri “has
no influence in Tunisia,” adding, “this man is a disaster for Islam and for Muslims.”37
Under Ben Ali, thousands of Tunisians were reportedly detained, charged, and/or convicted on
terrorism-related charges, including under a sweeping 2003 anti-terrorism law.38 The current
status of that law, and its role in the government’s approach to counterterrorism, is ambiguous
amid efforts to protect civil liberties and reform the judiciary.39 Critics claimed that the law
rendered “the exercise of fundamental freedoms ... an expression of terrorism,” and that its
definition of terrorism was “vague and broad.”40 Rights advocates also accused anti-terror trials
under Ben Ali of relying on excessive pretrial detention, denial of due process, and weak
evidence. President Marzouki was a prominent critic of the former regime’s anti-terrorism trials
on human rights grounds, and prominent Al Nahda leaders were direct targets of the law and
other Ben Ali-era politicized security measures.
The Role of the Security Forces
A central policy challenge facing Tunisia’s new leaders is how to assert control over the size and
mandate of the internal security services without creating a backlash or hollowing out capacity.
The Interior Ministry oversees the security and intelligence services, along with the police; all
were closely associated with Ben Ali and with abuses such as extrajudicial arrests, extensive
surveillance, intimidation of political opponents, and torture. Progress on security sector reform
has been slow, and to date, little information has been made public regarding the security
apparatus’s internal structure or staffing, or how these have changed since the so-called “political
police” were officially dissolved in 2011. Moreover, signs of tension within the Interior Ministry,
now ostensibly controlled by Al Nahda, a former target, have periodically emerged.41 Meanwhile,
34
Ansar al Mujahideen Network, “AQIM Calls On Muslim Youths To Wage Jihad in Islamic Maghreb Countries,”
March 17, 2013, via OSC.
35
Middle East Monitor, “Al-Ghannouchi: Jihad is in Palestine not Tunis,” May 7, 2013.
36
Maamoun Youssef, “Al-Qaida’s No. 2 Incites Tunisians, Egyptians,” AP, February 28, 2011; Ana Al Muslim
Network, “Al-Fajr Releases Al-Zawahiri Audio, Bin Ladin Video on 10th Anniversary of 9/11,” September 13, 2011,
via OSC; AP, “Ayman al Zawahri, Al Qaeda Leader, Incites Tunisians Against Ruling Party,” June 10, 2012.
37
Middle East Online, “Gannouchi Describes Zawahiri as ‘Disaster for Islam and Muslims,’” June 13, 2012.
38
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010.
39
Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights and terrorism, Mission to Tunisia, March 14, 2012, U.N. doc.
A/HRC/20/14/Add. 1. The report suggested that arrests were still occasionally being made on the basis of the law,
despite the 2011 declaration of a general amnesty that “made the 2003 anti-terrorism law de facto obsolete.” In May
2013, Tunisia’s Interior Minister stated that the legislation remained in force but would be revised by the Assembly.
40
Jeremy Landor, “Washington’s Partner,” Middle East International, March 5, 2004; Report of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on human rights and terrorism, Mission to Tunisia, December 28, 2010, U.N. doc. A/HRC/16/51/Add.2.
41
See, e.g., Richard Cochrane, “Dismissal of Security Chief Sparks Coup Rumors in Tunisia,” IHS Global Analysis,
January 12, 2012; and France24.com, “Leaked Video: ‘The Return of Ben Ali’s Porno-Politics,’” January 20, 2012.
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police unions have regularly protested against poor working conditions, unclear rules of
engagement, and political influence.42 Even with reforms, it may take time before members of the
public are willing to trust the police to ensure their security.
Tunisia’s military, totaling roughly 35,000 personnel, has historically received fewer state
resources than the internal security services, and Tunisians view it as relatively apolitical. During
the transitional period, the military has led many internal security efforts amid attempts to
establish police capacity and professionalism. The army remains popular, but its expanded role
may be leading it to become overstretched. In March 2013, Defense Minister Abdelkarim Zbidi—
a non-partisan figure—stepped down, expressing concern that “readiness has decreased because
of the lack of continuous training” due to the army’s nationwide deployment since 2011. He
called for the military to return to its “normal place,” “in the barracks and on the frontiers.”43
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background
While Tunisia has not been subject to many large attacks, terrorism is a potential domestic threat and some Tunisian
nationals have participated in plots abroad. Several are reportedly detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, and officials in the current government have repeatedly sought their return to Tunisia.44 Two notable terrorist
incidents on Tunisian soil were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba (noted for its
Jewish population) and a series of street battles between alleged militants and security forces in Tunis in December
2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda’s then-deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri appeared to claim responsibility for the Djerba
bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002; in all, 14 German tourists, 5 Tunisians, and 2 French citizens
were killed in the attack.45 France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement.
The nature of the 2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, was more opaque.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated outside Tunisia, on
a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.46 The TCG, reportedly founded in 2000, was
primarily active in Afghanistan, where it was linked to the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, an anti-Taliban
fighter, in September 2001. Its goals also reportedly included establishing an Islamic state in Tunisia. The TCG was
suspected of plotting attacks on the U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001, prompting a
multi-nation crackdown on the group. It has since been inactive, but its founders—Abu Iyadh and Tarek Maaroufi,
who was released from prison in Belgium in 2011—currently appear to be at large.
The Economy
For many Tunisians, the 2011 uprising was motivated by socioeconomic grievances as much as a
desire for political change. Some observers therefore fear that a failure to deliver rapid economic
benefits is leading an impatient public to lose faith in the transition process. The economy
continues to face obstacles to growth, such as perceived political uncertainty, turmoil in
neighboring Libya (which formerly hosted Tunisian expatriate workers), and the economic crisis
in the European Union, Tunisia’s largest trading partner. Declines in tourism and foreign direct
investment (FDI) have been particularly damaging. Social unrest over economic grievances, in
42
AFP, “Tunisie: la police manifeste pour refuser son instrumentalisation politique,” January 31, 2013; Tunisia Live,
“Slow Progress in Police Reform Since Revolution,” March 19, 2013.
43
Reuters, “Overstretched Tunisian Army Must Focus On Militant Threat: Zbidi,” March 6, 2013.
44
According to news reports, 12 Tunisians were at one time detained in Guatanamo, but only five remain in U.S.
custody. Five were repatriated to third countries, partly due to concerns over their possible torture if returned to
Tunisia, while two others were returned to Tunisia and imprisoned.
45
Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002.
46
See State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,” April 30, 2003; and U.N. Security Council Sanctions
Committee on Al Qaeda, “Tunisian Combatant Group,” 2002 designation.
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turn, has contributed to economic difficulties. According to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the economy contracted by 1.9% in 2011, compared to growth of 3.1% in 2010; the
official unemployment rate rose from 13% in 2010 to 19% in 2011, and is currently estimated at
17%.47 Tunisia’s credit ratings have also repeatedly been downgraded. In 2012, the country saw a
slight rebound with growth estimated at 3.6%, but the economic implications of perceptions of
domestic and regional insecurity remain to be seen.
Most Tunisian politicians have embraced free-market principles while advocating state-led efforts
to reduce economic and regional inequality. Tunisian officials have pursued fiscally expansive
policies in an effort to boost employment and have appealed for outside financial support to
provide emergency relief before long-term reforms can be put in place. In April 2013, the IMF
reached a “staff-level” agreement with Tunisia on a two-year, $1.75 billion loan, a potential
precursor to the start of IMF financial support.48 In 2012, the government replaced the governor
of the Central Bank, Kamel Nabli, who had benefitted from broad international support, after
Nabli reportedly opposed government interference in monetary policy; this raised concerns over
the Bank’s independence, but the issue has not recently been salient.
Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and prior to 2011 had been one of the bestperforming non-oil-exporting Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Textile
exports and tourism have driven much of Tunisia’s economic growth in recent years. Phosphate
ore reserves are significant and are the basis of a chemicals industry. Tunisia has also attempted to
attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. However, Tunisia’s strong economic
record long masked significant disparities and structural problems. Wealth is concentrated in the
capital and along the eastern coast, while the interior has suffered from poverty and a lack of
investment. Tunisians are among the most educated people in North Africa, but the economy has
generally created low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Unemployment and underemployment are major
problems, notably for recent college graduates and in interior regions that were epicenters of the
2011 uprising, and which continue to see protests over perceived government neglect.49 U.S.
government analysis has found that despite Tunisia’s reputation for regulatory reforms and
encouragement of foreign investment, structural barriers such as restrictive labor laws and “a lack
of effective institutions to ensure public sector accountability... resulting in weak protection of
property rights” are the most significant constraints to growth.50
Prior to 2011, Ben Ali family members and in-laws owned or controlled many of Tunisia’s
biggest companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure or
corruption. Tunisian authorities have identified several countries where these individuals
reportedly stashed substantial assets. Western governments have cooperated with Tunisian efforts
to freeze these assets and possibly return them to Tunisia; however, the process for asset recovery
has proven complex and challenging.51 Tunisia has also started to sell off assets previously
controlled by Ben Ali family members that were seized by the state in 2011.52
47
IMF, World Economic Outlook data, accessed on May 21, 2013.
IMF negotiations with Egypt during that country’s political transition have been contentious; see CRS Report
R43053, Egypt and the IMF: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Jeremy M. Sharp.
49
African Development Bank, The Revolution in Tunisia: Economic Challenges and Prospects, March 2011.
50
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Towards a New Economic Model for Tunisia: Identifying Tunisia’s Binding
Constraints to Broad-Based Growth, January 2013.
51
Robert F. Worth, “Obstacles Mar Quest for Arab Dictators’ Assets,” The New York Times, June 7, 2012.
52
Eileen Byrne, “Tunisia Aims To Ease Financial Crisis With Ben Ali Bling Sale,” The Guardian, December 22, 2012.
48
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Foreign Relations
Government officials have indicated a desire to maintain and expand close diplomatic and
commercial relations with Western partners, while also seeking increased ties to Arab and Muslim
states, and within Africa.53 The European Union (EU) is Tunisia’s largest trading partner and
source of tourists, and Tunisia benefits from EU trade benefits and aid. France remains the largest
source of foreign investment in Tunisia, although bilateral relations since 2011 appear to have
been strained over past French support for Ben Ali, and possibly due to a suspicion of Islamist
movements in some French political circles. Relations with Qatar and Turkey, which have
provided aid and public support to the current government, have grown significantly closer during
the transitional period.54 The Tunisian government is supportive of the Syrian opposition, but
opposes foreign military intervention against Syrian President Bashar al Asad; officials have
recently taken steps to stop the flow of Tunisian combatants to Syria despite initial reticence.
President Marzouki criticized France’s January 2013 decision to intervene militarily in Mali,
emphasizing support for African-led efforts and political dialogue instead.
Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia also hosted the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia had an interests office in
Israel from 1996 until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah, or uprising against the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi refers
to Israel as an “occupying state,” and has indicated that the creation of a Palestinian state is a
prerequisite for discussing Tunisian-Israeli relations.55 The government has hosted several visits
by senior Hamas officials. Al Nahda’s position on Israel does not differ significantly from other
parties; indeed, some domestic critics have accused Al Nahda of being overly conciliatory.56
Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors. Tunisian officials
have been strongly supportive of the transition in Libya, hoping that an end to turmoil in Libya
will stabilize border areas and produce an economic rebound that would allow Libya to reabsorb
some of Tunisia’s low-skilled labor surplus. Libya has also recently provided aid. President
Marzouki has led a campaign to revitalize the Arab Maghreb Union, which was established in
1989 by Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, but has been long inactive due to
tensions between Morocco and Algeria. Tunis is also the temporary headquarters location of the
African Development Bank (AfDB), which receives significant financial support from the United
States; it moved to Tunisia in 2005 due to unrest in Côte d’Ivoire, its permanent location.
U.S. Relations
Administration officials have stated strong support for Tunisia’s transition, as well as a desire to
advance bilateral economic ties and deepen security cooperation. U.S. policy attention, however,
53
CRS interviews with Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali, Tunis, October 2011; AFP, “La Tunisie de l’après Ben
Ali veut retrouver toute sa place en Afrique,” January 29, 2012.
54
See, among others, Reuters, “Economics, Politics Underpin Qatar Aid to North Africa,” August 16, 2012.
55
CRS interviews with Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali, Tunis, October 2011; and Ghannouchi statements at the
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), November 30, 2011.
56
Al Nahda also opposed a proposed draft constitutional provision that would have criminalized normalization of
relations with Israel. See, e.g., OSC Analysis, “Hardened Foreign Policy Toward Israel Likely,” November 21, 2012.
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has not been as intensely focused on Tunisia as on Egypt and other transitional states. In February
2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tunis and stated that she was “a very strong
champion for Tunisian democracy and what has been accomplished here,” adding, “the challenge
is how to ensure the economic development of Tunisia matches the political development.”57 Still,
relations may have cooled in the aftermath of the attack on the U.S. Embassy in September 2012,
which prompted the temporary departure of some U.S. personnel. U.S. officials have expressed
rising concerns over security threats and urged Tunisian authorities to address them.58 In March
2013, Secretary of State John Kerry called on the new government of Prime Minister Laraydh to
“foster an environment of justice and accountability.”59 During Ben Ali’s presidency, the United
States balanced concerns about political repression, corruption, and human rights abuses with a
desire to cooperate with Tunisia’s government on counterterrorism and regional security. 60
The Administration has indicated that, with regard to working with Islamist actors such as Al
Nahda, “what parties call themselves is less important to us than what they actually do.”61 As
elsewhere in the region, this principle is being tested as Tunisians seek a path forward on complex
domestic and foreign policy dilemmas. Al Nahda president Rachid Ghannouchi—who does not
hold a formal government position—has visited Washington, DC, several times, as have other
senior Al Nahda officials, but none has made a public appearance with U.S. officials.
In February 2012, then-Secretary of State Clinton expressed support for negotiations toward a
free trade agreement (FTA) with Tunisia in testimony before Congress.62 H.Res. 719 (Dreier),
introduced in the 112th Congress, similarly supported this idea. However, progress toward an FTA
is subject to an interagency process, among other factors. U.S.-Tunisian trade is currently
relatively limited: in 2012, U.S. bilateral exports totaled $594 million and imports totaled $738
million.63 Tunisia is eligible for certain trade preferences under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) Program. A bilateral trade investment framework agreement (TIFA) was
signed in 2002, and a bilateral investment treaty entered into force in 1993.
U.S.-Tunisian relations date back over 200 years. Tunisia was the site of significant battles during
World War II, and was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 in Operation Torch. A U.S. cemetery and
memorial near the ancient city of Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead.
During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy despite a brief experiment
with leftist economic policy in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian ties were strained by the 1985
Israeli bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some
Tunisians viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.64 Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s
Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean;
participates in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls.
57
State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks Following Meeting with Tunisia President
Marzouki,” February 25, 2012.
58
AP, “US General Warns of Al-Qaeda Threat in Tunisia,” March 27, 2013.
59
State Department, “Secretary Kerry on the Formation of New Tunisian Government,” March 13, 2013.
60
U.S. reactions to the January 2011 protest movement were initially muted, and U.S. officials expressed public
support for the “Jasmine Revolution” only after Ben Ali had been forced from office. The White House, “Statement by
the President on Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
61
Clinton remarks at the National Democratic Institute, Washington DC, November 7, 2011.
62
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, February 28, 2012.
63
U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/.
64
Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance
Since 2011, the Obama Administration has offered a range of new foreign assistance aimed
broadly at “transition support,” as well as a reinvigoration of the bilateral commercial relationship
(see above). The State Department has allocated over $364 million in foreign aid for Tunisia since
early 2011 (see Table 1, below). Aid funding has drawn on monies appropriated in FY2010FY2012, much of it reprogrammed from other sources. Congressional committees have reviewed
these reprogramming decisions.
Aid identified as transition support has included:
•
$30 million for the cost of sovereign loan guarantees (authorized in P.L. 112-74,
the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act), which enabled Tunisia to raise
$485 million on the international bond market;
•
$20 million for the creation of a bilateral “Enterprise Fund” (also authorized in
P.L. 112-74) to spur private investment and encourage economic reforms; and
•
$100 million provided as a cash transfer for short-term fiscal relief.65
Other aid for Tunisia has focused on civil society, political parties, the independent media,
election support, youth and women participation, and economic reforms, as well as new military
and counterterrorism assistance. Tunisia is also expected to receive a $20 million Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold grant.66 The anticipated reestablishment of a Peace
Corps program, however, has been delayed following the Embassy attack in September 2012.
U.S.-funded democracy assistance organizations have not, to date, been the targets of official
harassment as they have in Egypt. Still, local media commentary points to debates regarding the
basis and impact of U.S. democracy aid, and whether such aid constitutes foreign interference.67
A large part of U.S. assistance in support of Tunisia’s transition has been allocated from resources
identified as the Middle East Response Fund (MERF), constituted by the State Department with
consultation from Congress, using unobligated FY2011 and FY2012 Economic Support Fund
(ESF) and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding. Tunisia has
been allocated over $103 million in MERF funds, out of an initial total of $240 million identified
for the MERF.68 The MERF funds are in addition to other regional and global funds from flexible
programs or accounts, and funds reprogrammed from other sources, that have been allocated in
response to the Arab Spring. The Administration requested $36.6 million in total bilateral aid for
Tunisia for FY2013, and has requested $61.8 million in FY2014, which the State Department has
referred to as a proposed “normalization” of U.S. aid after initial funding for “urgent” needs.69
65
The transfer has funded payments on debt that Tunisia owes the World Bank and African Development Bank.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Assistance to Tunisia,” March 29, 2012.
66
State Department, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Assistance to Tunisia,” July 27, 2012.
67
Tunisia Live, “State Department Program’s Funding of Tunisian Media Comes Under Scrutiny,” January 20, 2012.
68
State Department response to CRS query, December 2012. The Administration has requested $580 million in
FY2014 for a Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA IF) to complement traditional bilateral and
regional programs, address emerging needs, and provide a framework to support lasting reform in the region.
69
State Department, FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations; Statement of Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 22, 2013.
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia
$ Millions, Year of Appropriation and Account, Estimates as of December 2012
FY2009
FY2010
FY2012
(est.)
FY2011
FY2013
(req.)
FY2014
(req.)
TOTAL
14.60
30.36
121.39
213.79
36.60
61.78
Sub-Total,
Bilateral Aid
14.60
21.95
78.60
89.35
36.60
61.78
ESF
0.80
2.00
57.85
35.00
10.00
30.00
FMF
12.00
18.00
17.12
29.5
15.00
20.00
IMET
1.70
1.95
1.95
1.85
2.40
2.30
INCLE
-
-
1.50
22.50
8.00
8.00
NADR
0.10
-
0.18
0.50
1.30
1.48
Sub-Total,
Reprogrammed Funds,
Regional/
Global
Programs &
Accounts
-
30.36a
42.79
124.44
-
-
ESF
-
20.37
12.55
100.00
-
-
Democracy
Fund
-
5.15
0.74
5.15
-
-
DA
-
0.03
0.07
-
-
-
Humanitarian
Assistance
(multiple
accounts)
-
-
3.43
2.05
-
-
Transition
Initiatives
-
-
3.85
7.93
-
-
Complex
Crisis Fund
-
-
5.00
-
-
-
Defense
Dept.
“Section
1206”
-
-
13.03
6.85
-
-
INCLE
-
2.06
0.98
0.05
-
-
NADR
-
2.75
3.15
2.40
-
-
Source: State Department, Bureau of Foreign Assistance, December 2012, and Congressional Budget
Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2011-FY2014.
Notes: Aid allocations for FY2013 are still being determined. Totals do not reflect rounding.
ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and
Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs; DA=Development Assistance; “-“=none or to be determined.
On the Defense Department’s “Section 1206” global train-and-equip authority, see CRS Report RS22855,
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
a.
FY2010 non-bilateral funds were allocated after January 2011.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Security cooperation, which was moderate under the former regime, has increased due to interest
on both sides, in what then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta referred to in mid-2012 as “a new
chapter in our defense relationship.”70 A Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint
exercises are held regularly. Tunisia has long relied on U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements to maintain its aging inventory of U.S.origin equipment, and the Tunisian military views International Military Education and Training
(IMET) as a key tool for officer training. Tunisia also benefits from a State Partnership Program
with the Wyoming National Guard, which has provided training in civil affairs and other areas.
U.S. defense officials view security assistance as a tool to improve Tunisia’s counterterrorism
capabilities and coordination, and as part of broader U.S. support for Tunisia’s political
transition.71 In addition to bilateral cooperation, Tunisia is also among 10 countries participating
in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a State Department-led,
interagency program that aims to enhance regional counterterrorism capacity and coordination in
north-west Africa. However, Tunisia has not received significant funding through the program.
In late 2012, some Members of Congress called for cutting aid to Tunisia over the country’s
handling of an alleged suspect in the Benghazi terrorist attacks.72 The suspect, Ali Ani al Harzi,
was transferred to Tunisian custody in October 2012, after he was detained in Turkey. U.S.
investigators were reportedly initially denied permission to question Al Harzi in Tunisian custody
(although permission was reportedly eventually granted), and he was released from detention in
January 2013 due to a purported lack of evidence.
Outlook
Congress continues to weigh the implications of ongoing political transitions and insecurity in
North Africa for U.S. policy, foreign assistance, and counterterrorism practices. Possible
considerations and questions for Congress include the following:
•
To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. policy? To what extent is Tunisia a
“test-case” for democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa? What
are the prospects for U.S. influence on the future evolution of events in Tunisia?
How should the United States shape its future foreign aid programs?
•
To what degree do extremist groups based in Tunisia present a domestic and/or
transnational security threat? What is the likely trajectory of potentially violent
Salafist groups like Ansar al Sharia?
•
How will Tunisians seek to overcome differences of opinion on key
constitutional issues, and in what timeframe? What type of political system will
be adopted? Will the new constitution protect individual rights and ensure
equality for religious, ethnic, and political minorities? How is Tunisia
70
Defense Department, “Secretary of Defense Panetta Holds News Conference En Route to Tunisia,” July 29, 2012.
Testimony of General David M. Rodriguez, Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), before the House
Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, April 25, 2013.
72
See, e.g., The Cable, “Graham Threatens Tunisia Over U.S. Access to Benghazi Suspect,” October 31, 2012;
Representative Frank Wolf, “Cut Off Aid to Tunisia in Light of Obstructing Benghazi Investigation,” December 11,
2012; and Ashish Kumar Sen, “Benghazi Attack Suspect’s Release Spurs Calls to Punish Tunisia,” The Washington
Times, January 9, 2013.
71
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Political Transition in Tunisia
approaching the question of reforming the internal security services and
providing for transitional justice?
•
Is the next round of elections likely to be free, fair, and nonviolent?
•
Which individuals and groups currently enjoy popular credibility in Tunisia?
Which emergent coalitions among political and interest groups are likely to
endure? What groups or individuals are likely to perform well in future elections?
•
What is the likely course of Tunisia’s economy? What is the appropriate role of
Tunisia’s international partners in helping Tunisia to promote economic growth
and job creation, and to address regional inequalities? What steps, if any, can or
should the United States take to promote bilateral trade and investment?
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Congressional Research Service
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Associated Press (AP), “Report Raises Number of Killed During Tunisia’s Revolution to 338,” May 5, 2012.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
political differences over content. A political crisis triggered by the July 2013 assassination of
Assembly member Mohamed Brahmi dramatically slowed these efforts.
Political negotiations in late 2013 culminated in the resignation of Prime Minister Laraydh—a
key demand of secularist parties—in mid-January 2014. The Assembly then debated and
amended the constitution article by article. Each article required a majority vote to be retained.
The amended text, with 149 articles, was then put to a vote in the Assembly, with a two-thirds
majority required for passage.7 On January 26, Assembly members overwhelmingly voted for
adoption, with 200 in favor, 12 against, and four abstaining. Assembly Speaker Mustapha Ben
Jaafar said that the constitution, “without being perfect, is one of consensus,” and that Tunisia had
“a new rendezvous with history to build a democracy founded on rights and equality.”8
The new constitution’s framing and many of its provisions represent sizable victories for
secularist parties and for pragmatists within Al Nahda. Notably, Article 2, which cannot be
amended, states that “Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship, the will of the people, and the
supremacy of law.” Article 3 states that “the people are sovereign and the source of authority,
which is exercised through the people’s representatives and by referendum.” These provisions
appear to directly counter a foundational argument by many Islamists that religious law trumps
civil law. There is no reference to sharia, or Islamic law, in the constitution.9 “Freedom of
conscience and belief” (Art. 6) is guaranteed, along with gender equality (Art. 21), freedom of
expression and information (Art. 31-32), freedom of assembly, and individual property rights
(Art. 41), and some aspects of due process (e.g., Art. 27).
The constitution also creates a mixed presidential system, with a directly elected president/head
of state who exercises certain powers—notably over defense and foreign affairs—but shares
executive authorities with the legislature. This model was preferred by secularist parties, which
saw it as creating balances of power, while Al Nahda officials had expressed preference for a
legislative system, with a president selected by the legislature.10 Some observers have expressed
concern that the mixed system could prove unwieldy in practice or prone to political deadlock.11
At the same time, the constitution repeatedly asserts Tunisia’s Muslim identity, at times in ways
that suggest tensions with its more liberal provisions. For example, Article 1—carried over from
Tunisia’s first constitution—states that Tunisia’s “religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its
system the Republic.” Along with a provision stating that “the state is the guardian of religion”
(Art. 6), this has led some observers to fear that the constitution could lead the state to proactively
enforce religious beliefs, for example through the prosecution of blasphemy, a charge that could
limit free expression. A prohibition against declarations of apostasy or takfir (Art. 6), i.e.,
accusing a Muslim of leaving or denouncing Islam, has also been interpreted by some as a
constraint on free expression, which could conflict with Article 31.12 Secularists had called for the
ban, arguing that accusing someone of apostasy is an incitement to violence. Meanwhile, Article
7
Unofficial translation of the new constitution issued by the U.N. Development Program, January 27, 2014.
Associated Press, “Tunisia Finally Passes Progressive Constitution,” January 26, 2014.
9
Al Nahda leaders had earlier made a series of concessions to secularists regarding the content of the constitution,
including an agreement in early 2012 not to reference sharia. During the amendment process in early 2014,
amendments that would have referenced sharia were introduced but were voted down.
10
Duncan Pickard, “Reaching Consensus on the Tunisian Constitution,” Atlantic Council, July 3, 2013.
11
Pickard, “Identity, Islam, and Women in the Tunisian Constitution,” Atlantic Council, January 24, 2014.
12
See, e.g., Sarah Mersch, “Tunisia’s Compromise Constitution,” Sada, January 21, 2014.
8
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Political Transition in Tunisia
73 states that only Muslims may run for president. (Tunisia has tiny Jewish and Christian
minorities.) While Al Nahda leaders praised the text and voted for adoption, hardliners criticized
some aspects, such as the prohibition on declarations of apostasy.13 Some Salafists, who appear to
represent a small but vocal minority within Tunisia, have protested the constitution as a whole.14
Overall, the new constitution reflects a complex process of adjudicating stark policy differences
over the future shape of state and society. Ultimately, the degree to which it lays the foundation
for a democratic, stable political system is likely to depend on interpretation and implementation,
the degree to which the judiciary and legislature leverage their new authorities, and whether
additional steps are taken to reform state institutions. The new draft is unlikely to definitively
settle ongoing debates regarding the state’s regulation of religious activities; the legal status of
Salafist groups; and how to balance freedom of expression and religious sensitivities.
Islamist-Secularist Fault Lines
Al Nahda, which led the government in 2012-2013 after decades in exile and underground, is at
the center of Tunisian debates over religion, state, and identity. The party’s leaders have expressed
support for democratic participation, the separation of religion and state, and women’s freedoms.
Yet the party’s decision-making reflects internal divisions and potential competition with more
radical Islamist constituencies for popular support. Secularist detractors accuse the party of
purposefully displaying moderation to gain acceptance, while intending to gradually introduce
restrictive laws and institutions. The party’s supporters, for their part, view some critics as
immovably opposed to Islamists, and argue that stringently secular elites have lost their claim to
legitimacy or are seeking a return of the former regime.15
When Al Nahda was leading the government, secularists often pointed to what they viewed as its
efforts to prolong its hold on power, encourage religiously conservative social change, and
exercise partisan control over state institutions.16 Al Nahda leaders, on the other hand, pointed to
their willingness on multiple occasions to make concessions to secularists—for example through
a decision in 2012 not to support proposals to include sharia in the constitution—even when
these have angered the party’s base and conservative rivals. Al Nahda leaders have criticized what
they view as secularists’ efforts to bar religion from public life, and appear to fear that secularists
seek to manipulate the electoral or political process to exclude them from government.
A key challenger to Al Nahda is the Nida Tounes party, led by Béji Caïd Essebsi, who served as
interim Prime Minister in 2011 and was a senior official under founding President Bourguiba and,
briefly, under Ben Ali. Caïd Essebsi has positioned himself as leader of the centrist, secularist
opposition. Critics, including some in Al Nahda, have portrayed Nida Tounes as a vehicle for
13
Tunisia Live, “Religious Coalition Claims Draft Constitution Violates Principals of Islam,” January 15, 2014; AlArab, “Ennahda Hardliner MP Condemns Tunisia Draft Constitution as ‘Still-Born,’” January 18, 2014.
14
"Salafism" refers to a broad subset of Sunni Islamic reformist movements that seek to purify contemporary Islamic
religious practices and societies by encouraging the application of practices and views associated with the earliest days
of the Islamic faith. Salafist movements hold a range of positions on political, social, and theological questions. A
subset of Salafists advocate violence in pursuit of their aims, but many instead pursue non-violent preaching, charity,
and (for some) political activities. See CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
15
Le Point, “Tunisie: critiqué, Ennahda brandit le spectre de Ben Ali,” September 7, 2012.
16
E.g., African Manager, "Tunisie: Ressemblances surprenantes, Ben Ali-RCD & Jbali-Ennahdha,” February 27, 2012.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
“counter-revolutionary” figures from the Ben Ali era.17 Some opinion surveys have shown Nida
Tounes rivaling Al Nahda in popularity; yet, the two parties’ relative appeal and coherence remain
to be tested in elections.18 Tunisia’s main trade union federation, the UGTT, has asserted its
influence as a leftist and secularist counter-weight to Al Nahda, as a channel for popular
economic grievances, and as a convener of “national dialogue” on key policy issues.
Religiously conservative Salafists have become more visible in the post-Ben Ali era. Some
openly support the creation of an Islamic state in Tunisia, and some have challenged the
government—as well as artists, labor union activists, journalists, academics, and women deemed
insufficiently modest—through protests, threats, and/or violence. A handful of Salafist groups
have registered as political parties, but many appear to prefer to operate outside the formal
political system. In some areas, Salafist groups reportedly control mosques and have set up
security and service-provision networks.19 Arrests have followed periodic Salafist violence, but
law-and-order actions do not appear to have been consistent or, necessarily, effective.
Divergent interpretations of security threats and the means necessary to confront them have
contributed to Islamist-secularist tensions. Salafist violence and other security incidents, some
unsolved, have increased pressure on the government to ensure public order and weigh in on
controversial social issues. Al Nahda leaders repeatedly pledged to crack down on violence, but
some argue that isolating or arresting religiously conservative activists could further radicalize
them. Al Nahda leaders have also struggled to respond to Islamist critics (reportedly including
figures within the party) who view counterterrorism efforts as overly broad and repressive.
Secularist critics often charge that Al Nahda lacks the capacity or will to confront extremists.
Background on Al Nahda
Al Nahda was founded in 1981 as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). It continues to be led by co-founder Rachid
Ghannouchi, a political activist and widely read theorist of Islam and democracy. The Ben Ali government was among
the most repressive of Islamist political activism in North Africa, forcing Al Nahda underground and into exile in the
1990s and 2000s. Al Nahda candidates ran as independents in parliamentary elections held in 1989, but the
government cracked down when they won 15% of the national vote. Tensions escalated, culminating in an attack on a
ruling party office in 1991 that the government blamed on Al Nahda. In 1992, hundreds of Al Nahda members were
convicted of plotting against the government. Ghannouchi, who had left the country, was sentenced in absentia. Al
Nahda leaders denied the accusations, and some rights advocates criticized the case as biased and lacking due process.
Similar tensions between Islamists and government forces drove neighboring Algeria into civil war in the early 1990s.
Al Nahda’s electoral success in 2011 appears to have stemmed from several factors, including its history of opposition
activism and its message of reconciling Islam and democracy, as well as popular disaffection with Ben Ali’s stringently
secularist form of authoritarian rule. Al Nahda did not play a significant role in the 2011 protest movement, but it
subsequently engaged in effective grassroots mobilization and campaigning. The party may also have benefited from
some secularist parties’ efforts to drive a wedge between Islamists and secularists, a strategy that may have backfired
among Tunisians eager to reconcile democracy with their Arab/Muslim identity.
Security Concerns
Violent extremist groups across North and West Africa are exploiting porous borders and the
weaknesses of security forces. These groups—such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
17
See, e.g., Al-Monitor, “Tunisia Party Fights Islamization, Raises Ire of Ruling Ennahda,” October 1, 2012.
See, e.g., IRI, Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, December 19, 2012-January 7, 2013, February 14, 2013.
19
Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia's Ansar Al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2013.
18
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Political Transition in Tunisia
its affiliates and break-away factions, and movements referring to themselves as Ansar al Sharia
(Supporters of Islamic Law)—also are capitalizing on divisive identity issues as well as popular
frustrations with the slow pace of reforms in transitional states. For example, AQIM released a
statement criticizing Tunisia’s crackdown on Salafists after an attack on the U.S. Embassy in
Tunis (see below). In March 2013, the group called on North Africans to stay at home to fight
“secularists and other expatriates” instead of traveling abroad to fight in conflicts such as the one
in Syria, possibly indicating a concern about losing out on potential recruits.20
Local Tunisian groups over the past two years have staged attacks against government, tourist,
and Western targets. A Tunisian suicide bomber blew himself up outside a hotel in the beach
resort of Sousse in October 2013 and another bomber was apprehended by police the same day in
the coastal city of Monastir before he could detonate his vest.21 Two secularist opposition
politicians were killed by gunmen in February and July 2013 outside their homes.22 A mob attack
on the U.S. Embassy in September 2012 caused extensive damage to the building’s outer
enclosure and killed four in subsequent clashes.23
Tunisian authorities have accused the Tunisian Salafist group Ansar al Sharia of being involved or
associated with many of the attacks, although the group has not publicly claimed responsibility.24
Ansar al Sharia shares a name with other extremist organizations in North Africa, but the degree
of coordination among them is uncertain. The Tunisia-based group, established in 2011 and
initially focused on non-violent preaching and social works, has developed an increasingly
acrimonious relationship with the state since 2013. Clashes between group members and security
forces, followed by threats of violence from Ansar al Sharia’s leadership, led Tunisian officials in
May 2013 to declare the group illegal. The State Department designated Ansar al Sharia as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2014, accusing it of involvement in the 2012
Embassy attack and stating that the group “represents the greatest threat to US interests in
Tunisia.” 25 Tunisian state media reported in late December that U.S. and Libyan forces had
captured the group’s leader, Seifallah Ben Hassine (a.k.a. Abou Iyadh), a former combatant in
Afghanistan (see text-box below), but the U.S. military denied playing a role in the operation.26
A number of smaller Salafist and jihadist groups also operate in Tunisia. Although less is known
about their role, some may have ties to terrorist organizations and/or to foreign fighter pipelines
to Syria, Mali, Algeria, and elsewhere.27 Tunisian security forces have repeatedly clashed with
armed militants, reportedly including foreign fighters, in recent years. Recent military operations
have targeted terrorist “training camps” and weapons depots along the mountainous border with
Algeria, in an area known as Mount Chaambi, west of the town of Kasserine. Tunisian officials
have stated that Mount Chaambi cells are linked to AQIM and include individuals who fought in
20
Ansar al Mujahideen Network, “AQIM Calls On Muslim Youths To Wage Jihad in Islamic Maghreb Countries,”
March 17, 2013, via U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC).
21
Al Arabiya, “Suicide bombers in Tunisia, From One Decade to Another,” November 8, 2013.
22
New York Times, “Second Opposition Leader Assassinated in Tunisia,” July 25 2013.
23
State Department daily press briefing, September 14, 2012.
24
See, e.g., The Economist, “The Salafist Struggle,” January 1, 2014.
25
State Department, “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar al-Shari'a Organizations and Leaders,” January 10, 2014.
As a result of the designations, all property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which designated individuals and groups have
any interest is blocked and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions with them or to their benefit.
26
Al Arabiya, “U.S. denies role in arrest of Tunisian militant,” December 30, 2013.
27
See Andrew Lebovich, “Confronting Tunisia's Jihadists, Foreign Policy, May 16, 2013.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Mali.28 Insecurity along the Libyan border to the east and in the remote desert south is also of
particular concern, as both areas appear to be transit zones for regional smuggling networks.
Some observers trace jihadists’ presence in Tunisia to the release of over 1,000 “political”
prisoners of various stripes in early 2013; security force disorganization in the aftermath of the
2011 revolution; and events since 2011 in Mali and Libya.29 Jihadist groups may also draw on
support from Tunisian Salafist groups and communities.30 In addition to militancy within Tunisia,
Tunisian nationals reportedly make up a significant proportion of foreign fighters active in violent
extremist groups elsewhere in North-West Africa and in Syria.31
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background
While Tunisia has not been subject to many large attacks, terrorism is a potential domestic threat and some Tunisian
nationals have participated in plots abroad. Several are reportedly detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, and officials in the current government have repeatedly sought their return to Tunisia.32 Two notable terrorist
incidents on Tunisian soil were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba (noted for its
Jewish population) and a series of street battles between alleged militants and security forces in Tunis in December
2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda’s then-deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri appeared to claim responsibility for the Djerba
bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002; in all, 14 German tourists, 5 Tunisians, and 2 French citizens
were killed in the attack.33 France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement.
The nature of the 2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, was more opaque.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated outside Tunisia, on
a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.34 The TCG, reportedly founded in 2000, was
primarily active in Afghanistan, where it was linked to the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, an anti-Taliban
fighter, in September 2001. Its goals also reportedly included establishing an Islamic state in Tunisia. The TCG was
suspected of plotting attacks on the U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001, prompting a
multi-nation crackdown on the group. It has since been inactive, but one founder, Abou Iyadh, went on to found
Ansar al Sharia, reportedly upon his release from Tunisian jail in early 2011. Another founder, Tarek Maaroufi, was
released from prison in Belgium in 2011 and reportedly returned to Tunisia.
Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform
Tunisian authorities continue to debate how best to ensure accountability for past abuses while
encouraging national reconciliation. Criminal charges have been brought against Ben Ali (in
absentia), members of his family, and former senior government and security officials. However,
the government has not settled on an approach toward mid- and low-level state employees and
28
AFP, “Bomb Attack Kills Two Soldiers In Tunisia: Military,” June 6, 2013.
Many of those released from prison during a general amnesty promulgated in late January 2011 had been held under
Ben Ali’s sweeping anti-terrorism legislation. La Presse, “Enquête - Le jihadisme en Tunisie,” November 8, 2012.
30
See International Crisis Group, Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge, February 13, 2013.
31
According to Algerian authorities, 11 Tunisian nationals, i.e. the largest group of any single nationality, participated
in the hostage-seizure attack by an AQIM affiliate on a natural gas facility in the remote southeastern Algerian town of
In Amenas in January 2013. See also Reuters, “Tunisia Islamists Seek Jihad In Syria With One Eye On Home,”
November 18, 2013.
32
According to news reports, 12 Tunisians were at one time detained in Guatanamo, but only five remain in U.S.
custody. Five were repatriated to third countries, partly due to concerns over their possible torture if returned to
Tunisia, while two others were returned to Tunisia and imprisoned.
33
Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002.
34
See State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,” April 30, 2003; and U.N. Security Council Sanctions
Committee on Al Qaeda, “Tunisian Combatant Group,” 2002 designation.
29
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Political Transition in Tunisia
members of the security and intelligence services who may have been complicit in or aware of
abuses, but did not command them. Many Tunisians are skeptical of the justice system, which
was largely inherited from the Ben Ali regime and is reportedly viewed as ineffective, subject to
political influence, and, in some cases, corrupt.35
Whether those who served in government under Ben Ali should be barred from politics is a
sensitive issue. In 2013, some Al Nahda leaders backed a draft bill that would have prohibited a
range of people associated with the former regime from seeking elected office.36 The bill, which
might have been applied to leading opposition figures such as Béji Caïd Essebsi, appears to have
been shelved, for now, as a result of the late-2013 political dialogue. The new constitution does
not condition presidential or legislative candidacies on past political activity.
Another central policy challenge for Tunisian authorities is how to assert control over the size and
mandate of the internal security services without creating a backlash or hollowing out capacity.
The Interior Ministry oversees the security and intelligence services, along with the police; all
were closely associated with Ben Ali and with abuses such as extrajudicial arrests, extensive
surveillance, intimidation of political opponents, and torture. To date, little information has been
made public regarding the security apparatus’s internal structure or staffing, or how these have
changed since the so-called “political police” were officially dissolved in 2011. The status of a
controversial 2003 anti-terrorism law promulgated under Ben Ali, which critics viewed as
repressive, is ambiguous amid efforts to protect civil liberties and reform the judiciary.37 Tensions
between the security forces and political leaders have also risen as pressures have increased on
the security forces to engage in life-threatening counterterrorism operations in the absence of
structural reforms, and in an atmosphere of political distrust.38
Tunisia’s military, with about 35,000 personnel, has historically received fewer state resources
than the internal security services, and Tunisians view it as relatively apolitical. During the
transitional period, the military has led many internal security efforts amid attempts to establish
police capacity and professionalism. The army remains popular, but its expanded role may be
leading it to become overstretched.39
The Economy
For many Tunisians, the 2011 uprising was motivated by socioeconomic grievances as much as a
desire for political change. However, political instability, regional developments, and the
economic downturn in the European Union, Tunisia’s largest trading partner, have had a negative
impact on Tunisia’s economy. Declines in tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been
35
See ICG, “Combating Impunity, Restoring Security,” May 9, 2012.
See, e.g., Magharebia, “Tunisia: Political Isolation Law Divides Ennahda,” June 21, 2013.
37
Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights and terrorism, Mission to Tunisia, March 14, 2012, U.N. doc.
A/HRC/20/14/Add. 1. The report suggested that arrests were still occasionally being made on the basis of the law,
despite the 2011 declaration of a general amnesty that “made the 2003 anti-terrorism law de facto obsolete.” In May
2013, Tunisia’s Interior Minister stated that the legislation remained in force but would be revised by the Assembly.
38
Tunisia Live, “Slow Progress in Police Reform Since Revolution,” March 19, 2013; Al Arabiya, “Protesters Force
Tunisian Leaders From Police Memorial Ceremony,” October 18, 2013; Al Jazeera via BBC Monitoring, “Tunisia
Security Personnel Lament ‘Campaign’ To Weaken Establishment,” October 19, 2013.
39
Reuters, “Overstretched Tunisian Army Must Focus On Militant Threat: Zbidi,” March 6, 2013.
36
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Political Transition in Tunisia
particularly damaging. Social unrest over economic grievances has, in turn, contributed to
economic difficulties by creating a perception of instability among would-be tourists and
investors. Some observers fear that a failure to deliver rapid economic benefits has led an
impatient public to lose faith, at times, in the transition process.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the economy contracted by 1.9% in 2011,
compared to growth of 3.1% in 2010. It rebounded in 2012 with 3.6% growth, but perceived
political instability and regional insecurity led the IMF to reduce its growth projection for 2013 to
2.7%.40 Tunisia’s international credit ratings have been repeatedly downgraded. While the
unemployment rate has declined slightly since mid-2011, it remains high at 15.9%. The youth
employment rate has generally been significantly higher, particularly for college graduates.
In June 2013, the IMF and Tunisia agreed to a two-year, $1.75 billion IMF loan program designed
to provide Tunisia with a financing cushion in case of an adverse shock. The IMF has since
warned of growing fiscal strains and the slow pace of economic reforms, stating in October 2013
that “the most immediate challenge for Tunisia is to maintain macroeconomic stability while
moving ahead with the reform agenda in a difficult political environment.”41
Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and prior to 2011 had been one of the bestperforming non-oil-exporting Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Textile
exports, tourism, and phosphate mining are key sectors. Tunisia has also attempted to attract
foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. However, Tunisia’s economic record long
masked disparities and structural problems. Wealth is concentrated in the capital and along the
eastern coast, while the interior has suffered from poverty and a lack of investment. Tunisians are
among the most educated people in North Africa, but the economy has generally created lowskilled and low-paid jobs, thus creating a large pool that is educated but underemployed. U.S.
government analysis has found that despite Tunisia’s reputation for regulatory reforms and
encouragement of foreign investment, structural barriers such as restrictive labor laws and “a lack
of effective institutions to ensure public sector accountability... resulting in weak protection of
property rights” are the most significant constraints to growth.42
Prior to 2011, Ben Ali family members and in-laws owned or controlled many of Tunisia’s
biggest companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure or
corruption. Since the 2011 uprising, government agencies have seized various assets, including
shares of private companies, owned by members of the former first family. There is reportedly an
ongoing debate among officials over how best to sell off the confiscated assets, and over how to
prosecute or settle any related disputes with businessmen.43 Tunisian authorities have also
identified several countries where Ben Ali officials reportedly stashed substantial assets. Western
governments have cooperated with Tunisian efforts to freeze these assets and possibly return
them to Tunisia; however, the process for asset recovery has proven complex and challenging.
40
IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013; and “Statement by the IMF Mission at the End of a Visit to
Tunisia,” December 2, 2013.
41
IMF staff report, Arab Countries in Transition: Economic Outlook and Key Challenges, October 10, 2013.
42
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Towards a New Economic Model for Tunisia: Identifying Tunisia’s Binding
Constraints to Broad-Based Growth, January 2013.
43
See, e.g., Maghreb Confidential, “A High-Level Rift Over Confiscated Firms,” November 21, 2013; IHS Global
Insight, “New Tunisian Legislation Opens Way for Wider Confiscation of Assets from Allies of Former President Ben
Ali,” December 18, 2013.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Foreign Relations
The European Union (EU) is Tunisia’s largest trading partner, and provides trade benefits and aid.
France remains the largest bilateral source of foreign investment in Tunisia, despite recent
frictions over France’s support for Ben Ali and a suspicion of Islamist movements in some French
political circles. Under Al Nahda-led governments in 2012-2013, Tunisian officials stated a desire
to increase ties to Middle East and African states, and they pursued closer relations with Qatar
and Turkey, which provided aid and diplomatic support.44 The government expressed support for
the Syrian opposition, but opposition to foreign military intervention; the Interior Ministry has
reportedly undertaken efforts to stop the flow of Tunisian combatants to Syria.45
Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia also hosted the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia had an interests office in
Israel from 1996 until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, or uprising against the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi refers
to Israel as an “occupying state,” and has indicated that the creation of a Palestinian state is a
prerequisite for discussing Tunisian-Israeli relations.46 The Nahda-led government also hosted
visits by senior Hamas officials. Al Nahda’s position on Israel does not differ significantly from
other parties; indeed, some domestic critics accused Al Nahda of being overly conciliatory.47
Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors. Tunisian officials
appear to hope that an end to turmoil in Libya will stabilize border areas and produce an
economic rebound that would allow Libya to reabsorb some of Tunisia’s low-skilled labor
surplus. Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki has led a campaign to revitalize the Arab Maghreb
Union, established in 1989 by Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania and long inactive
due to tensions between Morocco and Algeria. Tunis is also the current headquarters location of
the African Development Bank (AfDB), which receives financial support from the United States.
U.S. Policy and Aid
Obama Administration officials have stated strong support for Tunisia’s transition and a desire to
advance bilateral economic ties and deepen security cooperation. In 2012, for example, thenSecretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tunis and stated that she was “a very strong champion
for Tunisian democracy and what has been accomplished here.”48 She also expressed support in
testimony before Congress for negotiations toward a bilateral free trade agreement.49 Still, U.S.
44
AFP, "La Tunisie de l'après Ben Ali veut retrouver toute sa place en Afrique," January 29, 2012; and, e.g., Reuters,
“Economics, Politics Underpin Qatar Aid to North Africa,” August 16, 2012.
45
Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou reportedly stated during a parliamentary session in September 2013 that the
government had prevented 6,000 Tunisians from fighting in Syria. Tunisia Live, “Minister of Interior Says Government
Failed to Protect Brahmi,” September 19, 2013.
46
CRS interviews with Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali, Tunis, October 2011; and Ghannouchi statements at the
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), November 30, 2011.
47
Al Nahda leaders opposed a proposed draft constitutional provision that would have criminalized normalization of
relations with Israel. See, e.g., OSC Analysis, “Hardened Foreign Policy Toward Israel Likely,” November 21, 2012.
48
State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks Following Meeting with Tunisia President
Marzouki,” February 25, 2012.
49
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, February 28, 2012.
(continued...)
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Political Transition in Tunisia
policy attention has not focused as intensely on Tunisia as on Egypt and other states in the region.
President Obama reportedly met with Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki in New York City in
September 2013, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, but the President has not made a
public appearance with Tunisian leaders.
In May 2013, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones stated
in congressional testimony that political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa are “the
foreign policy challenge of our time.”50 She stated that “the tension between democratic values of
human rights, tolerance and pluralism and threats to those principles including extremism and
persecution of minorities is growing,” arguing that “these dynamics present new challenges and
opportunities for U.S. engagement.” During the 2013 political crisis in Tunisia, the State
Department indicated that “our diplomats in Tunisia are in touch with Tunisians from across the
political spectrum, including politicians, business leaders, and civil society actors, encouraging
Tunisians to resolve their outstanding issues through dialogue and peaceful means to build a safe,
prosperous future.”51
Despite this diplomatic outreach, bilateral relations appeared to cool following the violent attack
on the U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012. Then-Interior Minister
Ali Laraydh, an Al Nahda official (and subsequent Prime Minister), publicly apologized for
having initially “failed” to protect the Embassy; Presidential Guard members had to be dispatched
during the attack to provide emergency security.52 The Tunisian government arrested hundreds of
suspects—many of them Salafists—after the attack, and both Tunisian and U.S. authorities have
stated that Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia was involved (see “Security Concerns” above).53 However,
most suspects were released, and U.S. officials have suggested that those who were tried were not
those most responsible.54 In November 2013, FBI Director James Comey named Tunisia as one of
two places, with Libya, where AQIM, its affiliates and allies “pose a high threat to U.S. and
Western interests... especially at embassies, hotels, and diplomatic facilities.”55
U.S.-Tunisian relations date back over 200 years. A Joint Military Commission meets annually
and joint exercises are held regularly. Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor,
which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s
Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls. Tunisia was the site of
significant World War II battles, and its territory was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 in
Operation Torch. A U.S. cemetery and memorial in Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000
U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy despite a
brief experiment with leftist economic policy in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian ties were strained
(...continued)
Progress toward an FTA is subject to an interagency process, among other factors.
50
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Hearing on the President’s FY2014
Budget Proposal for Middle East and North Africa Programs, May 22, 2013.
51
State Department daily press briefing, August 7, 2013.
52
Associated Press (AP), “Tunisia’s Ruling Islamist Party Condemns US Embassy Attack,” September 15, 2012.
53
State Department, “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar al-Shari'a Organizations and Leaders,” January 10, 2014.
54
On May 29, 2013, the U.S. Embassy in Tunis released a public statement in which it criticized the relatively lenient
sentences given to several low-level suspects in the Tunis Embassy attack, called for a “full investigation,” and stated
that the government of Tunisia had “failed” to uphold its stated commitment to oppose those who use violence.
55
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on “Threats to the
Homeland,” November 14, 2013.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis,
which some Tunisians viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.56
Tunisia is eligible for certain trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) Program. A bilateral trade investment framework agreement (TIFA) was signed in 2002,
and a bilateral investment treaty entered into force in 1993. In 2012, U.S. bilateral exports totaled
$594 million and imports totaled $738 million.57
U.S. Foreign Assistance
U.S. bilateral aid to Tunisia prior to 2011 was relatively limited and highly focused on military
assistance. Changes in Tunisia have led the Administration to work with Congress to identify and
reprogram hundreds of millions of dollars, including funding appropriated in prior years and for
other purposes, to support new programs and initiatives. As a result, the Obama Administration
has allocated over $450 million in aid to Tunisia since 2011 (see Table 1, below).
Aid for “transitional support” to Tunisia includes a $100 million cash transfer in 2012 to help
Tunisia make its international loan payments; $30 million for the cost of sovereign loan
guarantees, which enabled Tunisia to raise $485 million on the international bond markets; and
$40 million for a bilateral “Enterprise Fund” to spur private investment. The latter two initiatives
were authorized in the FY2012 Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act
(Division I, P.L. 112-74). Additional funds for new loan guarantees and enterprise fund financing
are made available under the FY2014 Department of State, Foreign Operations, And Related
Programs Appropriations Act (Sec. 7041(g), Division K, P.L. 113-76).
Other U.S. “transitional support” programming has focused on strengthening civil society,
political parties, the media, and electoral processes. U.S. programs have also promoted
educational exchanges, technology training, and entrepreneurship, particularly among women and
youth. In January 2014, Tunisian joined the Open Government Partnership, a U.S.-backed global
effort to make governments more transparent and accountable.58
U.S. engagement with Tunisian security forces prior to 2011 was heavily focused on conventional
military grants and sales. As terrorist threats have increased, and as the relationship between
Tunisia’s government and its security services continues to evolve, the United States has provided
counterterrorism- and maritime security-focused assistance, along with programs designed to help
Tunisia reform its justice sector. Notable programs include at least $35 million in new State
Department-administered police and justice sector assistance, as well as $28 million in new
Defense Department “Section 1206” funding focusing on counterterrorism and border security.59
Tunisia is also one of ten countries in the U.S. interagency Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership (TSCTP), but it has not been a major recipient of funding under the initiative to date.
56
Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987.
U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/.
58
See State Department, “Open Government Partnership,” at http://www.state.gov/j/ogp/.
59
See CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by
Nina M. Serafino; see also Section 1201 of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 113-66.
57
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia
$ Millions, Year of Appropriation and Account, Estimates as of December 2013
FY2009
FY2010
FY2012
(est.)
FY2011
FY2013
(est.)
FY2014
(req.)
TOTAL
14.60
41.97
139.82
244.98
51.63
61.78
Sub-Total,
Bilateral Aida
14.60
21.95
78.60
210.14
47.2
61.78
ESF
0.80
2.00
57.85
154.8
14.47
30.00
FMF
12.00
18.00
17.12
29.5
20.55
20.00
IMET
1.70
1.95
1.95
1.84
2.16
2.30
INCLE
-
-
1.50
22.50
8.00
8.00
NADR
0.10
-
0.18
1.50
2.02
1.48
Regional/
Global
Programs &
Accounts
-
20.02
61.22
34.83
4.44
-
ESF
-
12.78
23.67
8.53
-
-
Democracy
Fund
-
5.15
0.74
5.15
-
-
DA
-
0.03
0.07
-
-
-
Transition
Initiatives
-
-
3.37
9.80
4.44
-
Complex Crisis
Fund
-
-
5.00
-
-
-
INCLE
-
2.06
0.98
0.05
-
-
NADR
-
-
3.06
2.40
-
-
Humanitarian
Assistance
(multiple
accounts)
-
-
3.43
2.05
-
-
Defense
Department
“Section
1206”
-
-
20.90
6.85
-
-
Source: State Department, Bureau of Foreign Assistance, response to CRS, January 2014; Congressional Budget
Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2011-FY2014.
Notes: Some allocations for FY2013 are still being determined. Other than “Section 1206,” does not include
non-State Department/USAID foreign assistance resources. (See CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform:
“Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.) Multi-country programs that may, in part,
benefit Tunisian participants are also excluded. Humanitarian assistance refers to fiscal year of obligation, not
source fiscal year of funds. Totals may not reflect rounding.
ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and
Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs; DA=Development Assistance; “-“=none or to be determined.
a.
Includes funding appropriated for other countries and purposes and reprogrammed for Tunisia.
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International financial institutions, which receive substantial U.S. funding, have pledged aid for
Tunisia, mostly in the form of concessional loans. Group of Eight (G8) member states, including
the United States, have sought to coordinate aid through the Deauville Partnership, initiated in
May 2011.60 Separately, Tunisia has received loans and grants from Gulf states, notably Qatar.61
Such support may contribute to U.S. policy goals of encouraging Tunisia’s stability and economic
growth; it may also dilute U.S. diplomatic influence.
Congressional Actions
Congress has recently restricted anticipated Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
programming in Tunisia. The Administration had planned a roughly $20 million MCC
“threshold” grant for Tunisia focusing on addressing constraints to economic growth and job
creation.62 However, P.L. 113-76 states that “none of the funds made available by this Act or prior
Acts... shall be available for a threshold program in a country that is not currently a candidate
country,” i.e., eligible for MCC assistance. Tunisia’s relatively high income level currently makes
it ineligible, although its income had dipped to an eligible level in FY2011, the year from which
the MCC intended to draw funding. The Joint Explanatory Statement on P.L. 113-76 refers
specifically to Tunisia, stating that, “Efforts by the Administration to provide MCC assistance to
countries that do not meet MCC criteria undermine the integrity of the MCC model.”
In 2012, some Members of Congress called for cutting U.S. aid over Tunisia’s handling of an
alleged suspect in the Benghazi terrorist attack.63 The suspect, Ali Ani al Harzi, a Tunisian, was
detained in Turkey and transferred to Tunisian custody in October 2012. U.S. investigators were
reportedly initially denied permission to question Al Harzi in Tunisian custody (although
permission was reportedly eventually granted), and he was released from detention in January
2013 due to a purported lack of evidence. Al Harzi was later reportedly implicated in the two
political assassinations in 2013 and charged in Tunisia with belonging to a terrorist organization.64
Outlook
As Congress continues to weigh the implications of ongoing political transitions and security
challenges in North Africa for U.S. policy, foreign assistance, and counterterrorism practices,
possible considerations and questions include the following:
•
To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. policy? What are the prospects for
U.S. influence on the future evolution of events in Tunisia? How should the
United States shape its future foreign aid programs?
60
The Partnership includes a transition support fund administered by the World Bank; see Alina Romanowski, Deputy
Assistant USAID Administrator, Middle East Bureau, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, November 21, 2013.
61
See, e.g., Reuters, “Qatar Bank Grants Tunisia $500 Mln To Support Currency Reserve,” November 24, 2013.
62
State Department, “U.S. Government Assistance to Tunisia,” December 14, 2012. On MCC threshold grants, see
CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation, by Curt Tarnoff.
63
See, e.g., The Cable, "Graham Threatens Tunisia Over U.S. Access to Benghazi Suspect," October 31, 2012;
Representative Frank Wolf, "Cut Off Aid to Tunisia in Light of Obstructing Benghazi Investigation," December 11,
2012; and The Washington Times, "Benghazi Attack Suspect's Release Spurs Calls to Punish Tunisia," January 9, 2013.
64
Al Jazeera, “The Benghazi Link to Tunisia's Assassinations,” September 12, 2013.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
•
To what degree do Tunisia-based extremist groups present a transnational
security threat? What is the likely trajectory of groups like Ansar al Sharia?
•
How is Tunisia’s new constitution being interpreted and implemented? How is
Tunisia approaching the issue of reforming the internal security services and
providing for transitional justice?
•
Is the next round of elections likely to be free, fair, and nonviolent?
•
Which individuals and groups currently enjoy popular credibility in Tunisia?
Which emergent coalitions among political and interest groups are likely to
endure? What groups or individuals are likely to perform well in future elections?
•
What is the likely course of Tunisia’s economy? What is the appropriate role of
Tunisia’s international partners in helping Tunisia to promote economic growth
and job creation, and to address regional inequalities? What steps, if any, can or
should the United States take to promote bilateral trade and investment?
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Congressional Research Service
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314
16