Tunisia: In Brief
Changes from July 5, 2018 to November 1, 2019
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Tunisia: In Brief
Contents
- Introduction
- Background: The "Jasmine Revolution" and Tunisia Prior to 2011
- Politics : A 2019 Electoral Reset? Terrorism
TerroristThreats- The Economy
- U.S. Policy and Aid
- Outlook
Tables
TableFigure 1. Tunisia at a Glance
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance forFigure 2. Tunisia's New ParliamentSummary
Tunisia remains the sole country to have made a durable transition to democracy as a result of the 2011 "Arab Spring." Tunisians adopted a new constitution in 2014 and have since held two competitive national elections resulting in peaceful transfers of power. At the same time, living standards have worsened for many Tunisians, increasing pressure on political leaders. High unemployment and inflation, unpopular fiscal austerity measures, and concerns about corruption have spurred protests, labor unrest, and a backlash against political elites in recent years.
In September-October 2019 general elections, voters largely rejected established parties and candidates in favor of independents and non-career politicians. Newly elected President Kais Saïed, who ran as an independent, is a constitutional scholar known for his socially conservative views and pointed critique of Tunisia's post-2011 political system. His stern personal demeanor, anti-corruption message, pledges of systemic change, and outsider credentials appear to have endeared him to voters—including otherwise politically disenchanted young people. The self-described "Muslim democrat" party Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda, "Renaissance") secured a slim plurality in parliament even as it lost some seats, outperforming established secularist parties as well as new contenders. Several recently founded parties and independents performed well. The results leave the future contours of Tunisia's domestic political alliances, foreign relations, and economic policies uncertain.
The Trump Administration has pledged to support Tunisia's security and economic reforms, while also proposing to decrease bilateral aid administered by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Congress has shaped U.S. relations with Tunisia through legislation, oversight, and direct engagement with Tunisian leaders. FY2020 aid appropriations bills (Division D of H.R. 2740 and S. 2583) would provide "not less than" $191.4 million in bilateral aid for Tunisia, equivalent to the FY2019 enacted level under P.L. 116-6; S. 2583 would also make available for Tunisia $50 million in prior-year Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriations. Congress has also made aid funds available for Tunisia under the State Department Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) and the Department of Defense (DOD) Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, and has authorized DOD to aid Tunisia's military in securing the border with Libya on a reimbursement basis. Tunisia has been a top cumulative recipient within Africa of DOD "global train and equip" counterterrorism assistance, authorized by Congress since FY2006 (most recently under 10 U.S.C. 333).
Tunisia has expanded its acquisitions of U.S. defense materiel in recent years in order to maintain its U.S.-origin stocks and expand its counterterrorism capacity. The State Department has licensed the sale of Black Hawk helicopters, and Tunisia has been approved to receive additional grant-based equipment transfers through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, including Kiowa helicopters and C-130 aircraft. (Tunisia's Major Non-NATO Ally status, granted by President Obama in 2015, provides priority access to EDA.) The U.S. military has acknowledged conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities from a Tunisian facility and U.S. advisors have reportedly played a role in some Tunisian counterterrorism operations.
The U.S. Embassy in Tunis also hosts the U.S. Libya External Office, through which U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya. See CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
Introduction
Tunisia's 2011 popular uprising, known as the "Jasmine Revolution," ended the 23-year authoritarian rule of then-President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and sparked a wave of unrest across the Arab world. Tunisians elected a National Constituent Assembly later that year, and Islamist and secularist political parties formed a transitional coalition government. In 2013, they negotiated a peaceful way out of a political crisis sparked by the assassinations of two secularist leftist politicians by Islamist extremists. A quartet of Tunisian civil society groups who mediated the negotiations later won the Nobel Peace Prize for their role in this feat. The Assembly adopted a new constitution in 2014, and presidential and parliamentary elections later that year ended the formal transition period. Civil and political liberties have expanded dramatically since 2011, and Tunisia has experienced far less violence than some other transitional countries. (See Appendix for a chronology of key events since 2011.) Various socioeconomic grievances that helped fuel the 2011 uprising have yet to be addressed, however. The Ben Ali family no longer monopolizes business opportunities, but many Tunisians perceive corruption to have flourished as new players have joined the political class.1 Economic growth has been anemic since contracting in 2011, unemployment is above 15%, inflation rose to over 7% in 2018, and public debt rose to 77% of GDP (Figure 1).2 Fiscal austerity measures adopted at the urging of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western donors have sparked protests and a backlash by trade unions, a powerful domestic constituency.The pragmatic political alliance among rival political leaders that emerged from the 2014 elections helped quiet conflicts over identity and social mores that raged during the transitional period, but arguably at the expense of ideological coherence or accountability to voters. The leading parties in the "consensus coalition" have emerged weakened by internal divisions and by the loss of supporters who questioned the policy compromises that consensus politics entailed. Several policy initiatives prompted significant pushback from local civil society groups, including a 2017 law granting amnesty for officials implicated in corruption under the former regime and a decision to disband Tunisia's post-2011 Truth and Dignity commission before its scheduled completion. (The commission's final report, issued in March 2019, may still be considered a landmark for human rights accountability.)
The coalition nonetheless oversaw several reform initiatives, including landmark local elections in May 2018 and a new law against gender-based violence. The government oversaw a peaceful succession process after the death in office of President Béji Caïd Essebsi in July 2019, which also triggered changes to the calendar for national elections, ultimately held in September and October 2019. The coalition did not, however, respond effectively to public demands to create jobs, address regional inequalities, and counter corruption. Power struggles between President Caïd Essebsi and two successive Prime Ministers (technocrat Habib Essid, followed by then-ruling party figure Youssef Chahed) further divided the coalition, which also failed to establish a constitutional court, one of several new institutions to be created under the 2014 constitution.
Security conditions have improved since large attacks in 2015-2016, although militant groups that have pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State remain active in border regions, and the return of Tunisian "foreign fighters" poses concerns. The Islamic State claimed twin suicide bombings targeting police posts in the capital, Tunis, in June 2019.
Although many Tunisians are proud of their country's progress, an opinion poll conducted in early 2019 found that 87% (the highest rate recorded since 2011) thought the country was headed in the wrong direction.3 In the 2019 elections, voters largely rejected established parties and candidates in favor of independents and first-time politicians. Whether newly elected leaders will be able to meet demands to create jobs, bolster living standards, counter corruption, advance accountability for abuses committed under former regimes, and ensure security is in question. Turbulent events in neighboring Algeria and Libya may create additional headwinds for Tunisia's stability and economic prosperity.
Figure 1. Tunisia at a GlancePopulation: 11.5 million; Urban: 69% of total
Religions: Muslim (official; Sunni) 99.1%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha'i) 1%
Ethnicities: Arab 98%, European 1%, Jewish/other 1%
Median Age: 31.6 years
Life Expectancy: 75.7 years
Literacy: 82%; male 90% / female 74% (2015 est.)
GDP Growth / Per Capita: 2.5% / $3,422
Unemployment: 15.4%; ages 15-24, 35.8% (2017)
Government Gross Debt (% of GDP): 77%
Key Exports: clothing, semi-finished goods and textiles, agricultural products, mechanical goods, phosphates and chemicals, hydrocarbons, electrical equipment
Key Imports: textiles, machinery and equipment, hydrocarbons, chemicals, foodstuffs
Top Trade Partners: France, Italy, Germany, China, Turkey, Algeria, Spain (2017Tunisia
Summary
Tunisia has taken key steps toward democracy since its 2011 "Jasmine Revolution," and has so far avoided the violent chaos and/or authoritarian resurrection seen elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa region. Tunisians adopted a new constitution in 2014 and held national elections the same year, marking the completion of a four-year transitional period. In May 2018, Tunisia held elections for newly created local government posts, a move toward political decentralization that activists and donors have long advocated. The government has also pursued gender equality reforms and enacted a law in 2017 to counter gender-based violence.
Tunisians have struggled, however, to address steep economic challenges and overcome political infighting. Public opinion polls have revealed widespread anxiety about the future. Tunisia's ability to counter terrorism appears to have improved since a string of large attacks in 2015-2016, although turmoil in neighboring Libya and the return of some Tunisian foreign fighters from Syria and Libya continue to pose threats. Militant groups also operate in Tunisia's border regions.
U.S. diplomatic contacts and aid have expanded significantly since 2011. President Trump spoke on the phone with Tunisian President Béji Caïd Essebsi soon after taking office in early 2017, and Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan visited Tunisia in November 2017. President Obama designated Tunisia a Major Non- North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ally in 2015 after meeting with President Caïd Essebsi at the White House. United States Aid for International Development opened an office in Tunis in 2014, reflecting increased bilateral economic aid allocations. The U.S. Embassy in Tunis also hosts the U.S. Libya External Office, through which U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya. (The State Department suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in 2014.)
U.S. bilateral aid administered by the State Department and USAID totaled $205.4 million in FY2017. The Trump Administration requested $54.6 million for FY2018, proposing to eliminate bilateral Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to cut bilateral economic aid by more than half. The FY2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018 (Division K of P.L. 115-141), however, provided "not less than" $165.4 million in aid for Tunisia. The Department of Defense (DOD) has provided substantial additional military aid focused on counterterrorism and border security. For FY2019, the Administration has requested $94.5 million in State Department and USAID-administered bilateral funds for Tunisia. In addition, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has requested $292 million for an anticipated multi-year development compact with Tunisia.
Much of Tunisia's defense materiel is U.S.-origin, and it has pursued U.S. arms sales to maintain its stocks and expand its capabilities. The State Department licensed the sale of 12 Black Hawk helicopters in 2014, and Tunisia has received significant equipment through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, including 24 Kiowa helicopters and 24 guided missile "Hellfire" launchers notified to Congress in 2016. The U.S. military has acknowledged conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities from a Tunisian facility, and U.S. military advisors have reportedly played a role in some Tunisian counterterrorism operations.
Congress has focused on Tunisia's democratic progress, economic stability, and counterterrorism efforts through legislation, oversight, and direct engagement with Tunisian leaders. There is a bipartisan Tunisia Caucus. Relevant bills in the 115th Congress include the FY2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, and the Combatting Terrorism in Tunisia Emergency Support Act of 2017 (H.R. 157).
Introduction
Tunisia's 2011 popular uprising, known as the "Jasmine Revolution," ended the 23-year authoritarian rule of then-President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and sparked a wave of unrest in much of the Arab world. Since then, Tunisia has taken key steps toward democracy. Civil and political liberties have expanded dramatically, and Tunisia has experienced far less violence than some other transitional countries. An elected National Constituent Assembly adopted a new constitution in 2014, and presidential and parliamentary elections were held the same year, formally ending a series of transitional governments. During the transitional period, Islamist and secularist political factions overcame repeated political crises through consensual negotiations, a feat for which a mediator quartet of Tunisian civil society groups subsequently won the Nobel Peace Prize.
President Béji Caïd Essebsi, who founded the secularist ruling party Nidaa Tounes ("Tunisia's Call"), is a 92-year-old political veteran. Prime Minister Youssef Chahed (41), in office since 2016, leads a broad coalition government that includes Tunisia's main Islamist party, Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda, "Renaissance"), the country's other leading political force. (Al Nahda leaders do not refer to themselves as Islamist, preferring the term "Muslim Democrats."). The coalition has advanced some economic reforms, political decentralization, and efforts to improve gender equality, including a gender-based violence law enacted in 2017. Fiscal austerity efforts and a stalled transitional justice process remain divisive, however. Prime Minister Chahed has struggled to retain political support within the coalition in the face of a public backlash against austerity measures, as well as a power struggle within Nidaa Tounes ahead of elections due in 2019.
Leaders in Nidaa Tounes and Al Nahda have referred to their pragmatic partnership as necessary for stability in a fragile new democracy, and the alliance has arguably quieted the overt Islamist-secularist polarization that characterized the transitional period. Some critics view the two parties' entente as "grounded in mutual self-preservation," however, and assert that it is alienating party leaders from their respective bases.1 Some observers have expressed concern at the slow pace of constitutional implementation, the appointment of former-regime figures to top posts, the government's sometimes antagonistic relationship with critical civil society groups, and a years-long state of emergency that suspends some civil liberties.2 As one journalist wrote in 2016, "To many Tunisians, Nidaa Tounes feels like the return of the old regime: some of the same politicians, the same business cronies, the same police practices."3
Although many Tunisians are proud of their country's progress, opinion polls have repeatedly revealed anxiety over the future.4 The country suffered several large terrorist attacks in 2015-2016, and continues to confront threats along its borders with Libya and Algeria. Per-capita GDP has fallen every year since 2014, leading Tunisia to lose its "upper middle income" status in 2015. Efforts to address the socioeconomic grievances that fueled the 2011 uprising have not made significant progress, and corruption is perceived to have expanded.5
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Population: 11.1 million; Urban: 66.8% of total Religions: Muslim (official; Sunni) 99.1%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha'i) 1% Ethnicities: Arab 98%, European 1%, Jewish/other 1% Median Age: 31.6 years Life Expectancy: 75.7 years Literacy: 82%; male 90% / female 74% (2015 est.) GDP Per Capita: $3,463 GDP Growth: 2.4% |
Unemployment: 13% (2017); ages 15-24, 38% (2012) Gross Debt as % of GDP: 73% Key Exports: clothing, semi-finished goods and textiles, agricultural products, mechanical goods, phosphates and chemicals, hydrocarbons, electrical equipment Key Imports: textiles, machinery and equipment, hydrocarbons, chemicals, foodstuffs Top Trade Partners: France, Italy, Germany, China, Spain, Libya, Algeria (2016) |
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map)
Sources: CRS graphic; map boundaries from Esri (2013). Figures drawn from CIA World Factbook, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMFIMF (World Economic Outlook database, October 2019, and staff report, July 2019); 2018 estimates unless otherwise noted.
Background: Tunisia Prior to 2011
While Tunisia shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, some of its attributes are unique: a small territory, a relatively homogenous population, a relatively liberalized economy, a large and educated middle class, and a history of encouraging women's socioeconomic freedoms. Tunisia's population is overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking and Sunni Muslim (although tribal and ethnic divisions persist in some areas), while its urban culture reflects European influences.
The legal and socioeconomic status of women is among Tunisia's particularities within the Arab world. Polygamy is banned, and women enjoy equal citizenship rights and the right to initiate divorce. (Inheritance laws and practices are nonetheless disadvantageous toward women.) Women serve in the military and in many professions, and constitute more than half of university students; the first woman governor was appointed in 2004. Many Tunisians attribute these advances to the country's relatively liberal Personal Status Code, promulgated in 1956 under then-President Habib Bourguiba, as well as Bourguiba-era educational reforms.
Prior to 2011, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable and authoritarian regime that focused on economic growth while staving off political liberalization. It had had only two leaders since independence from France in 1956: Habib Bourguiba, a secular nationalist and independence activist, and Ben Ali, a former interior minister and prime minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. The country's pre-2011 economic model has since come under greater scrutiny; for example, the World Bank documented in 2014 that government regulations had apparently been manipulated to favor firms closely tied to the Ben Ali family.4
Ben Ali cultivated the internal security services and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party as his power base, and harshly repressed political participation, freedom of expression, and religious activism. This repression, along with corruption and nepotism, undermined the regime's popular legitimacy, despite relatively effective state services and economic growth. Another factor driving popular dissatisfaction was the enduring socioeconomic divide between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the poorer interior. Anti-government unrest rooted in labor and economic grievances has often originated in the interior—as it did in 2011.
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Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution" In December 2010, antigovernment protests broke out in Tunisia's interior after a street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in |
Politics
The 2014 constitution, adopted by an overwhelming margin by a transitional parliamentary body, lays out a semi-presidential political system with a directly elected president and relatively strong legislature. Dozens of parties contested elections held later that year, but the top two—Al Nahda and Nidaa Tounes—have come to dominate Tunisia's post-2011 politics. Nidaa Tounes, a big-tent secularist party, was formed in 2012 in opposition to a transitional government led by Al Nahda, an Islamist party that reentered national politics in 2011 after being banned under Ben Ali. Nidaa Tounes won a plurality of seats in the 2014 elections but defections have drained its ranks, leaving Al Nahda with the largest bloc of seats, 69 out of 217. The secularist leftist Popular Front (FP after its French acronym) is the largest opposition party in parliament with 15 seats. The FP includes prominent activists from parties banned under Ben Ali, and two of its members were assassinated in 2013, reportedly by Islamist militants.
Today, Al Nahda and Nida Tounes remain wary rivals but have agreed to share power in an arrangement referred to as "consensus politics." Al Nahda has simultaneously sought to separate its political party activities from religious proselytization, embracing the label of "Muslim Democrats."7 Leaders in both parties have asserted that a government of "national unity" regrouping parties across the political spectrum is necessary to ensure stability and push through difficult economic reforms. In practice, both institutional and economic reforms have been slow to advance. The alliance appears to have been motivated, in part, by Nidaa Tounes's need to cultivate allies given its internal divisions, and by fears on each side that further Islamist-secularist polarization could fuel political exclusion of, respectively, former-regime figures or Islamists.8
For some observers and Tunisian civil society activists, developments in 2017 sparked concerns about Tunisia's democratic trajectory.9 In September 2017, parliament voted narrowly to adopt an extremely controversial "administrative reconciliation law" drafted by President Caïd Essebsi, which grants amnesty for state employees implicated in corruption. A local protest movement and international human rights groups had characterized the bill as a threat to democratic accountability and a blow to Tunisia's transitional justice mechanism.10 A cabinet reshuffle the same month saw the appointment of new ministers with ties to the Ben Ali regime. President Caïd Essebsi later suggested on national television that he was considering changing the constitution, deepening some observers' concerns that his apparent efforts to strengthen the presidency could undermine democratic consolidation.11
In May 2018, Tunisia held landmark local elections to fill posts created under a new political decentralization law. The accomplishment of holding elections, which had been repeatedly delayed, arguably restored a sense of momentum on political reforms. The elections are viewed by many observers as a key step toward more accountable governance as well as a means to address "long-standing issues of dramatic regional disparity" in health care, education, poverty, and infrastructure—although the concrete devolution of policymaking and fiscal authority is likely to be a long-term process at best.12 Turnout was low at 34%, which some attributed to political apathy among young people. Al Nahda won 29% of votes, followed by Nidaa Tounes at 21%, but independent lists collectively outpolled both leading parties, garnering 32% nationally.
The contours of future political competition are uncertain ahead of national elections due in 2019. Nidaa Tounes, whose base includes business leaders, trade unionists, Arab nationalists, and former-regime figures, has struggled to contain its ideological and individual fractures. The president, 92, has not stated whether he will run for another five-year term in 2019. The decision to ally with Al Nahda was controversial within the party, leading several senior figures to leave and form a breakaway parliamentary group. Prime Minister Youssef Chahed, who has sought to impose fiscal austerity measures, has come under pressure from trade unions to resign, and as of mid-2018 he appeared to be in a power struggle with President Caïd Essebsi.13 Perceptions that the president is positioning his son, Hafedh, currently head of Nidaa Tounes, to succeed him have also sparked public backlash and splits within the ruling party.
Not all Tunisian Islamists back Al Nahda, and the party's willingness to compromise may have cost it some support among some of its supporters as well as more radical factions of public opinion. Some religiously conservative Salafists,14 who became more visible in the wake of the 2011 uprising, openly support the creation of an Islamic state, and some have challenged government authorities—as well as artists, labor union activists, journalists, academics, and women deemed insufficiently modest—through protests, threats, and/or violence. A handful of Salafist groups have registered as political parties, but many operate outside the political system.
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Key Figures President Béji Caïd Essebsi. Caïd Essebsi, 92, won Tunisia's first free and fair direct presidential election in 2014. Caïd Essebsi founded Nidaa Tounes in 2012, positioning the party to rally diverse opponents of political Islam and of the Nahda-led Troika government in particular. He campaigned in 2014 on improving the economy and countering terrorism. Caïd Essebsi is a lawyer and was a close aide to Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba, serving in various posts including Interior Minister and Defense Minister. He also held government posts under Ben Ali in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but was not at the forefront of the regime. In 2011, he served as Interim Prime Minister, overseeing initial political reforms and the organization of the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections. Prime Minister Youssef Chahed. Chahed, 41, was appointed by President Caïd Essebsi in August 2016 after then-Prime Minister Habib Essid stepped down following a parliamentary vote of no-confidence. Essid had failed to undertake effective economic and security reforms. An agricultural engineer, Chahed's only prior political experience was as a junior minister in Essid's cabinet. Assembly President Mohamed Ennaceur. Ennaceur, 84, a member of of Nidaa Tounes, heads the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP), the 217-seat single-chamber legislature. He was elected by a majority vote among MPs, including crucial support from Al Nahda. Ennaceur is a former government minister, diplomat, and civil society figure. Like President Caïd Essebsi, he began his career in government under founding President Bourguiba and also served in posts under Ben Ali. Al Nahda Leader Rachid Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi, 77, is a political activist, author, and theorist of Islam and democracy. He co-founded and heads Al Nahda ("Renaissance") and has spearheaded both its tactical alliance with Nidaa Tounes and its embrace of the label "Muslim democrats." He has not held or sought any elected position, but wields substantial political influence through his ability to shape Al Nahda's policy positions. Ghannouchi was in exile for two decades under Ben Ali, returning to Tunisia in 2011 under a general amnesty adopted after the revolution. Ghannouchi has emphasized the importance of "consensus" in post-revolutionary Tunisia, and has often appeared to overrule the party's base in order to reach agreements with other political interest groups. Secularist critics often accuse him of claiming to be moderate while intending to gradually introduce more restrictive laws and institutions. |
Chronology: Key Events January 2011-June 2018
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2011: January |
Authoritarian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali flees amid mounting protests. |
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February |
Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman, is appointed interim Prime Minister and promises constitutional reforms by an elected assembly. |
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October |
Formerly banned Al Nahda wins a plurality in elections for a National Constituent Assembly and forms a "Troika" coalition government with two secularist parties. |
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December |
Religiously conservative Salafists begin a sit-in at Manouba University to protest a ban on the full face veil or niqab. |
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2012: April |
Caïd Essebsi launches Nidaa Tounes as a secularist opposition movement. |
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June |
Salafists riot in Tunis and other cities. |
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September |
The U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis are violently attacked by Islamist extremists, three days after the Benghazi attacks in neighboring Libya. |
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2013: February-July |
Two secularist leftist politicians are assassinated, reportedly by Islamist militants, sparking a political crisis and large protests. |
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August |
The government bans the Tunisian-led Islamist extremist group Ansar al Sharia. |
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October |
A suicide bomber blows himself up near a hotel in the beach town of Sousse. |
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December |
After protracted negotiations mediated by a quartet of civil society groups, Al Nahda agrees to cede control of the government to a technocrat Prime Minister. |
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2014: January |
The draft constitution is adopted by an overwhelming majority in the Assembly. |
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June |
A national Truth and Dignity Commission is launched to investigate human rights violations committed by the state, and to provide compensation to victims. |
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July |
15 Tunisian soldiers are killed in an ambush near the Algerian border, reportedly the heaviest military death toll in decades. |
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October-December |
Nidaa Tounes wins elections for the presidency and a plurality in parliament. Béji Caïd Essebsi becomes president. Al Nahda, which does not run a presidential candidate, wins the second-largest bloc of seats and joins the ruling coalition. |
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2015: March |
Gunmen kill 21 foreigner tourists and a Tunisian at the Bardo museum in Tunis. |
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June |
A gunman kills 39 tourists, mostly British, on the beach in Sousse. |
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November |
A suicide attacker kills 12 Presidential Guard members in downtown Tunis. |
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2016: March |
Militants claiming affiliation with the Islamic State launch a coordinated assault on the border town of Ben Guardane. The attack is put down by security forces. |
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July-August |
Prime Minister Habib Essid resigns after a no-confidence vote in parliament. Nidaa Tounes and Al Nahda, along with several smaller parties and three civil society groups, agree to a broad political coalition aimed at addressing social, economic, and security challenges. President Caïd Essebsi names Youssef Chahed Prime Minister. |
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2017: February |
The IMF postpones loan disbursements, citing a lack of progress on reforms. |
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May |
Prime Minister Chahed announces anti-corruption arrests and investigations targeting high-profile businessmen, politicians, police, and customs officials. |
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September |
Parliament passes a controversial "administrative reconciliation law" that grants amnesty to civil servants implicated in corruption pre-2011. |
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2018: January |
Large protests erupt in opposition to planned fiscal austerity measures. |
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March |
Parliament votes, controversially, to end the mandate of Tunisia's Truth and Dignity Commission. |
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April |
Powerful UGTT trade union federation calls for a cabinet reshuffle. |
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May |
Long-delayed local elections are held. Al Nahda wins the most votes, followed by Nidaa Tounes, but independent lists collectively outpace both leading parties. |
Terrorist Threats
Since 2011, armed Islamist extremist groups across North and West Africa have exploited porous borders, security sector weaknesses, and access to Libyan weapons stockpiles to expand their activities. These groups have also capitalized on divisive identity issues as well as popular frustrations with poor governance. Some have sought affiliation with Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS, alt. ISIS/ISIL), including the Algerian-led regional network Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its various offshoots, as well as several IS-linked cells operating along Tunisia's borders with Algeria and Libya.15 Many, however, appear primarily focused on local or regional objectives. The degree of competition or coordination between Al Qaeda- and IS-linked factions in North Africa is debated.
Tunisia has seen the rise of local violent extremist organizations since 2011, and has also faced threats from groups and individuals based in Libya. U.S. and Tunisian officials notably blamed a Tunisian-led group known as Ansar al Sharia (AST) for an attack against the U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis in 2012. Tunisia declared AST a terrorist group in 2013, and the U.S. State Department designated it a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2014. The group's leader, known as Abou Iyadh, relocated to Libya, where he was reportedly killed in a U.S. airstrike in June 2015.16
In 2015, deadly terrorist attacks in Tunis and the coastal city of Sousse rattled Tunisians and dealt a blow to the tourism sector. In early 2016, an IS-linked assault on the border town of Ben Guerdane prompted fears of a nascent domestic insurgency. Tunisian officials affirmed that these attacks were planned at least partly from Libya; a 2016 U.S. military strike in the Libyan town of Sabratha reportedly killed a number of Tunisian fighters.17 Internal security conditions have since improved, seemingly due to changes within the security apparatus as well as donor assistance.
Tunisia has been a top source of Islamist foreign fighters in Syria and Libya, and several terrorist attacks in Europe have been carried out by individuals of Tunisian origin. In April 2017, then-Interior Minister Hadi Majdoub stated that some 3,000 Tunisian militants remained active abroad and 760 had been killed, adding that the authorities had prevented over 27,000 Tunisian youths from joining their ranks since 2012.18 Majdoub added that some 800 fighters had returned to Tunisia at that point. Youth marginalization and the mass release of terrorism suspects in 2011 may partly explain Tunisia's high number of foreign fighters, as well as perceptions that state institutions remain corrupt, unresponsive, and/or abusive.19
The Economy
Tunisia has a diverse economy and large middle class. Textile exports, tourism, agriculture, and phosphate mining are key sectors. Tunisia also produces some petroleum, but is a net energy-importer. Until recently, Tunisia was an upper-middle-income country. Strong annual growth prior to 2011, however, masked corruption and inequalities that fed discontent. Notably, after President Ben Ali was pushed out of office in 2011, the World Bank documented that government regulations had been manipulated to favor firms closely tied to the Ben Ali family.20 More broadly, wealth is concentrated along the urban and tourist-friendly coast, while the interior suffers from relative poverty and a lack of investment. Many Tunisians are highly educated, but the economy has generally created low-skilled and low-paid jobs, fueling unemployment.
Efforts since 2011 to promote private sector-led growth and create jobs have faced challenges, including investor perceptions of political risk, terrorist attacks on tourist sites, partisan disputes, and labor unrest that has periodically shut down mining operations. Per-capita GDP has fallen every year since 2014, dipping below the upper middle-income threshold of $4,036 in 2015 and remaining below it since.21 Youth unemployment, estimated at 38% in 2012, reportedly remains high.22 Corruption has apparently flourished since the political transition, undermining public faith in institutions and further entrenching regional divisions.23
Economic growth is projected to reach 2.4% in 2018, the highest rate since 2014, due to strong agricultural production and exports.24 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has expressed concerns, however, about Tunisia's rising inflation (7.7% in April 2018, the highest rate since 1991), declining foreign exchange reserves, and vulnerability to rising global energy prices. The IMF has urged Tunisian policymakers to cut costs stemming from energy subsidies, which "disproportionately benefit the better-off"; public sector wages, described as "among the highest in the world as a share of GDP"; and pensions.
Such austerity measures, which have been embraced by Prime Minister Chahed, sparked large protests in early 2018. Tunisia's powerful national trade union federation, the UGTT, has since decried efforts to end state subsidies for fuel and other consumer commodities, asserting that "rising prices will only accentuate the social and economic crisis."25 Domestic constituencies are also likely to oppose other economic structural reforms advocated by donors, including protectionist trade policies and the liberalization of labor laws. Tunisian transparency advocates, meanwhile, have called for economic reforms to focus more on changing laws and state practices that they view as enabling high-level corruption.26
U.S. Policy and Aid
U.S. high-level contacts and aid have expanded significantly since 2011, as U.S. officials have hailed the country's peaceful political transition and as Congress has appropriated increased bilateral assistance funding. President Trump and President Caïd Essebsi spoke over the phone in February 2017 and discussed Tunisia's democratic transition and continued security threats. The two presidents "reaffirmed the historic United States-Tunisia relationship and agreed to maintain close cooperation...and seek additional ways to expand cooperation between the two countries."27 Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan visited Tunisia in 2017, and in early 2018 he affirmed that the United States "will continue to support Tunisia's efforts to improve security and modernize its economy, amid formidable challenges."28
The U.S. military conducts intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities at a Tunisian facility and U.S. Special Operations Forces have reportedly played an advisory role in Tunisian counterterrorism operations.29 President Obama designated Tunisia a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ally in 2015, after meeting with President Caïd Essebsi at the White House.30 Tunisia cooperates with NATO's Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls. United States Agency for International Development opened an office in Tunis in 2014, reflecting increased bilateral economic aid allocations. The U.S. Embassy in Tunis also hosts the U.S. Libya External Office, through which U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya.31 (The State Department suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in 2014.)
U.S. bilateral aid—totaling $205.4 million in FY2017—has provided support for fiscal stabilization, economic growth initiatives, good governance, civil society capacity-building, and assistance to the police and military. A U.S.-endowed Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund invests in small- and medium-sized enterprises, and three U.S. loan guarantees for which Congress directed funds have allowed Tunisia to access up to $1.5 billion in affordable financing from international capital markets.32 U.S. economic assistance has also supported the political decentralization process, as well as efforts to address youth marginalization and counter violent extremist ideology. State Department-administered military and police assistance has supported tactical capabilities as well as institutional reforms. The Department of Defense (DOD) has provided substantial additional military aid, focused on counterterrorism and border security (Table 2, below). Tunisia is one of 12 countries participating in the State Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and is one of six focus countries of the U.S. interagency Security Governance Initiative (SGI), initiated in 2014.
The Trump Administration proposed $54.6 million in bilateral aid for Tunisia in its FY2018 budget request, proposing to eliminate bilateral Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to cut bilateral economic aid by more than half. The FY2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018 (Division K of P.L. 115-141), however, provided "not less than" $165.4 million in aid for Tunisia. The Act also made available DOD funds from the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund to support border security programs for Tunisia. The Administration's FY2019 aid budget request for Tunisia totals $94.5 million. In addition, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) FY2019 budget proposal includes $292 million for an anticipated multi-year development compact with Tunisia that would aim to reduce water scarcity and address regulations seen as constraining job creation.33
Tunisia has expanded its acquisitions of U.S. defense materiel in order to maintain its U.S.-origin stocks and expand its counterterrorism capacity. The State Department licensed the sale of 12 Black Hawk helicopters in 2014, and Tunisia has also received significant equipment through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, including 24 Kiowa helicopters.
U.S.-Tunisian relations date back over 200 years. Tunisia was also the site of significant World War II battles, and a U.S. cemetery and memorial in Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, despite an experiment with leftist economic policy in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian ties were strained by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some Tunisians viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.34 More recently, the 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy and American school, days after the Benghazi attacks in Libya, temporarily cooled relations as U.S. officials criticized the interim government's handling of the investigation and prosecution of suspects.35
|
FY2014 |
FY2015 |
FY2016 |
FY2017 |
FY2018 (est.) |
FY2019 (req.) |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bilateral State Dept + USAID |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
ESF / ESDF |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
FMF |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
INCLE |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
IMET |
|
|
|
|
|
Karoui won 16% in the first round presidential contest despite being in jail and thus unable to campaign in person, participate in historic televised presidential debates, or give media interviews. Appreciation for Karoui's charitable activities—often highlighted on Nessma TV, a private station that he owns—appear to have driven popular support.14 He was released from pre-trial detention four days before the October 13 presidential run-off, after which he participated in a televised debate against Saïed. Karoui's lawyers alleged that his imprisonment was "a political decision," and Tunisia's independent electoral commission expressed concern about the lack of "equal opportunity" among candidates during the campaign period.15 The charges against Karoui remain pending. The case stems from an investigation by a credible local anti-corruption organization, iWatch, into the financial structure and taxation of Karoui's Nessma media company. A judicial inquiry was initiated in 2016 due to the iWatch findings.16 Karoui was arrested ten days before the start of the presidential campaign period, in August 2019, after the leading parties in parliament sought unsuccessfully to amend the electoral law to exclude candidates who, like him, owned media outlets or engaged in charitable giving.17 Parliament passed the bill, but President Caïd Essebsi declined to sign it into law before he passed away. Al Nahda nominated a presidential candidate for the first time in 2019, selecting then-deputy speaker of parliament and party co-founder Abdelfattah Mourou. After he came in third in the first round and thus failed to advance to the run-off, Al Nahda endorsed Saïed. Nidaa Tounes did not run a presidential candidate but backed former Defense Minister Abdelkrim Zbidi, an independent, who came in fourth. Prime Minister Youssef Chahed, who split from Nidaa Tounes during a struggle over party leadership and was at one time considered a presidential front-runner, came in fifth. The first-round results broadly reflected pre-election polling showing independents and first-time candidates who had not served in government surging in the presidential race. Parliament. Al Nahda secured a slim plurality in parliament with 52 seats out of 217 (24%; see Figure 2). The party's founder and leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, also ran for elected office for the first time, securing a seat in parliament representing part of Tunis. The results nonetheless reflected a continuing decline for the party: Al Nahda previously won 89 seats in the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections and 69 seats in 2014. After the presidential first-round vote, Ghannouchi pledged that the party would seek to lead the government if it won (versus selecting a technocrat to be prime minister) and would only join a coalition with "the forces of the revolution" in parliament (presumably excluding Karoui, known for his previously cozy ties with the Ben Ali regime). The announcement seemed to reflect acknowledgement that "consensus" politics and alliance with Nidaa Tounes (which included former-regime figures in its ranks) had damaged Al Nahda's relationship with its base.The parliamentary results confirmed the demise of Nidaa Tounes, which won three parliamentary seats in 2019 compared to 86 in 2014. Karoui's party, Qalb Tounes ("Heart of Tunisia") won the second-largest bloc in parliament with 38 seats, despite having been founded only months earlier. The Free Destourian ("Constitutional") Party, a new arch-secularist party headed by a former senior figure in Ben Ali's party, Abir Moussi, who has decried the 2011 uprising and subsequent political changes, won 17 seats. Prime Minister Chahed's party, Tahya Tounes ("Long Live Tunisia"), founded after he split from Nidaa Tounes, won 14 seats, the seventh-largest bloc. Figure 2. Tunisia's New Parliament Preliminary results as of October 9, 2019; subject to legal challenges.
|
Source: CRS graphic, based on preliminary parliamentary results released by Tunisia's High Independent Authority for Elections (ISIE, after its French acronym); shown from most (left) to fewest (right) seats per list. Analysis. The 2019 election results constituted a broad rejection of the parties and politicians who led the government between 2014 and 2019, in favor of newcomers, independents, and non-career politicians. This may be a result of economic frustrations, anger at perceived corruption, local-level influences, and/or disenchantment with a series of ideologically incoherent coalition governments.18 Nidaa Tounes' fracturing and the death of Caïd Essebsi also reshaped the political landscape. The 2018 local elections, which were a key step toward political decentralization and thus a centerpiece of post-2014 political reforms, hinted at similar trends. Turnout was relatively low at 34% and was reportedly particularly low among young people (although candidates under 35 years old won over a third of the seats).19 Al Nahda won the largest share of the vote (29%), followed by Nidaa Tounes (21%), but independents collectively outpolled both, garnering 32%. In contrast to Nidaa Tounes, which fractured almost immediately after winning the 2014 elections, Al Nahda has historically exhibited strong internal discipline and wielded its political power cautiously, mindful of past repression (it was banned in the 1990s) and of the recent anti-Islamist backlash elsewhere in the region, such as Egypt. Perhaps because it feared isolation under a Karoui or Moussi presidency, the party ran a presidential candidate in 2019 for the first time (albeit unsuccessfully), and party leader Ghannouchi ran for the first time for elected office. The party appears to retain the loyalty of many longstanding members, along with an organizational capacity that few can match. One might question, however, whether it can sustain its political influence and cohesion in the face of new competition. Al Nahda's past alliances with secularist parties appear to have weakened its image as an incorruptible opposition force, and forced policy compromises that were ideologically unpopular with its base. For example, party leaders decided not to support a reference to sharia (Islamic law) during the constitution drafting process, and backed the controversial 2017 administrative reconciliation law, reportedly over objections within the party.20 An initiative of then-President Caïd Essebsi, the law effectively granted amnesty for state employees implicated in corruption during the former regime.21 For its part, Nidaa Tounes was split by internal power struggles and frictions over the decision to form a coalition with Al Nahda. Some of President Caïd Essebsi's initiatives also sparked public controversy, such as his efforts to elevate his unpopular son, Hafedh Caïd Essebsi, as party leader, as well as the 2017 administrative reconciliation initiative. Finally, Karoui, a former backer of Nidaa Tounes turned critic of Chahed, may have drained some support from both. Outlook. Tunisia's 2014 constitution divides executive powers between the president and prime minister. The leader of the largest party or coalition in parliament is granted the first shot at nominating a cabinet that can garner majority support in parliament.22 If Al Nahda is able to form a durable governing coalition, it will have to manage divisions in a fragmented legislature. It may also face internal pressures stemming from ideological differences and recriminations over its performance in the 2019 elections. Al Nahda endorsed President Saïed in the run-off against Karoui, and the two may share conservative views on certain social issues. The president and the leading party in parliament have yet to define their working relationship or formally identify joint priorities, however. What President Saïed's advocacy of significant constitutional changes will mean in practice is also in question.
Internal security conditions appear broadly to have improved since 2016, notwithstanding near-simultaneous suicide bombings targeting two police posts in Tunis in June 2019, which the Islamic State claimed.30 The State Department reported in November 2019 that counterterrorism was a government priority for Tunisia, and that "Tunisia cooperated with the United States and other international partners to professionalize its security apparatus."31 Turmoil in neighboring Libya, ongoing militant activity in border regions, and the return of Tunisian Islamist foreign fighters from Syria, Iraq, and Libya nonetheless continue to pose challenges. Authorities have repeatedly extended a state of emergency granting the security forces authority to prohibit strikes and public meetings, although many such activities have proceeded without impediment. The State Department warns U.S. citizens to avoid travel to parts of southern, western, and central Tunisia, citing terrorist threats.32 Tunisia's southernmost desert area is a military zone, where foreign travel is officially restricted. In February 2019, the head of Tunisia's National Counterterrorism Commission told members of parliament that 1,000 Tunisian foreign fighters had returned to the country between 2011 and 2018, and that authorities had prevented at least 17,000 others specifically from leaving the country for combat zones abroad.33 Tunisia was a top global source of Islamist foreign fighters at the height of the Islamic State's territorial influence (2014-2015), with U.N. investigators reporting in 2015 that an estimated 4,000 Tunisians were fighting in Syria, plus as many as 1,500 in Libya, 200 in Iraq, 60 in Mali, and 50 in Yemen.34 Several terrorist attacks in Europe have also been carried out by individuals of Tunisian descent. Youth marginalization and the release of terrorism suspects under a general amnesty in early 2011 may partly explain Tunisia's high number of foreign fighters. Youth perceptions that despite political changes since 2011, state institutions and personnel remain corrupt, unresponsive, and/or abusive, may also be a driver.35 The EconomyTunisia has struggled since 2011 to address economic challenges amid domestic political tensions and continuing strains in Europe, its largest trade partner. Investor perceptions of political risk, terrorism threats, and labor unrest have further challenged efforts to promote private sector growth, alleviate unemployment, and address the structural factors—such as corruption and inequalities—that fed discontent during the Ben Ali era. (For example, after the 2011 uprising, the World Bank documented that authorities under Ben Ali had manipulated government regulations to favor firms closely tied to members of the president's family and in-laws.36) Wealth broadly remains concentrated along the urban and tourist-friendly coast, while the interior suffers from relative poverty and a lack of investment. Many Tunisians are highly educated, but the economy has generally created low-skilled and low-paid jobs, fueling unemployment. Tunisia has historically had a large middle class by regional standards, but the economic downturn since 2011 has had a detrimental impact on its size and purchasing power. Per-capita GDP has fallen (in nominal terms) every year since 2014, dipping below the upper middle-income threshold of $4,036 in 2015 and remaining below it since.37 Unemployment, while below its peak of 18.9% in the wake of the uprising in 2011, remains over 15% and is more than double that among young people.38 Although the transitional government oversaw the seizure and resale of assets controlled by individual Ben Ali family members, new corruption has apparently flourished, undermining public faith in institutions and further entrenching regional divisions.39 Textile exports, tourism, agriculture, and phosphate mining are key economic sectors. Tunisia also produces some petroleum, but is a net energy-importer. Economic growth was estimated at 2.5% in 2018, the highest rate since 2014, due to positive trends in tourism, agriculture, and phosphate production.40 Growth is expected to fall to 1.5% in 2019, however. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has expressed particular concerns about inflation, declining foreign exchange reserves, and vulnerability to rising global energy prices.41 Tunisia has participated in two IMF lending programs since the 2011 transition. Under the second, a four-year $2.9 billion program initiated in 2016, the government committed to take politically challenging steps to cut energy subsidies, public sector wages ("among the highest in the world as a share of GDP," per the IMF), and state pensions. Local critics allege that the devaluation of the dinar—urged by the IMF—has devastated households' purchasing power.42 Other structural reforms face opposition from powerful domestic constituencies, including labor unions and monopolistic business interests.43 In 2017, the IMF temporarily suspended loan disbursements over concerns that Tunisia was not making sufficient progress on structural reforms. In mid-2019, the Fund agreed to disburse a $245 million tranche of financing, while noting that the government had not yet met its fiscal commitments.44 Tunisian transparency advocates have called for economic reforms to focus more on countering high-level corruption.45 U.S. Policy and AidU.S. diplomatic and military engagement have expanded significantly since 2011, and Congress has appropriated increased foreign aid and authorized new defense cooperation. In 2018, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan affirmed that the United States "will continue to support Tunisia's efforts to improve security and modernize its economy."46 At the same time, the Trump Administration has repeatedly proposed to cut U.S. bilateral aid, in line with its global foreign aid proposals. Congress has not adopted the Administration's budget proposals for Tunisia to date. Between FY2007 and FY2011, U.S. bilateral aid appropriations for Tunisia averaged about $17 million per year47; over the last five fiscal years, they have averaged over $153 million (Table 1). U.S. economic aid since 2011 has provided support for fiscal stabilization, economic growth initiatives, good governance and political decentralization, civil society capacity building, and efforts to counter violent extremist ideology. Congress has appropriated funds for an endowed Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund to invest in small- and medium-sized enterprises, and for three U.S. loan guarantees that have allowed Tunisia to access up to $1.5 billion in affordable financing from international capital markets.48In mid-2019, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) elevated its presence to a full bilateral Mission. USAID and the government of Tunisia subsequently signed a five-year "Development Objective Agreement" under which USAID pledged to provide about $352 million over the next five years.49 Tunisia also is under consideration for a U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) multi-year development aid compact, with signature anticipated in 2020.50 State Department-administered bilateral military and police assistance has supported tactical capabilities as well as institutional reforms. Tunisia has also received State Department-administered security and stabilization assistance under global and regional programs. In the FY2019 aid appropriations act, Congress directed $50 million in prior-year Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) appropriations—intended for assistance to areas "liberated or at risk from" the Islamic State—for Tunisia (§7071[b] of Division F, P.L. 116-6). Tunisia also participates in the State Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and was an initial focus country of the U.S. interagency Security Governance Initiative (SGI), launched in 2014.51 For FY2020, the Administration proposed $86.4 million in bilateral State- and USAID-administered aid for Tunisia, less than half the FY2019 enacted level. FY2020 aid appropriations bills passed by the House and reported out of committee in the Senate (Division D of H.R. 2740 and S. 2583, respectively) would mirror FY2019 enacted levels, providing "not less than" $191.4 million in economic and security assistance for Tunisia. The Senate bill would make available for Tunisia an additional $50 million in prior-year Economic Support Fund appropriations. Congress did not adopt Administration proposals to cut aid to Tunisia in FY2018-2019. Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, State Department and USAIDcurrent $ millions, appropriations
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FY2015
|
FY2016
|
FY2017
|
FY2018
|
FY2019 (enact.)
|
FY2020 (req.)
|
H.R.2470 (FY2020)
|
S. 2583 (FY2020)
|
Total
|
ESF
|
DA
|
FMF
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
NADR |
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IMET |
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| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Additional State + USAID |
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|
|
INCLE |
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| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Defense Department |
|
Tunisia has peacefully achieved many political milestones since 2011, prompting observers to portray it as the lone success story of the "Arab Spring." The public's rejection of much of the political class in the 2019 elections nonetheless suggests ongoing challenges. At issue is whether Tunisia's newly elected leaders can deliver growth, counter corruption, bolster the justice system, and make government more responsive and accountable to voters, all while maintaining security gains in the face of continued threats. If not, public faith in the ability of peaceful political participation to deliver positive change may be further shaken. Tunisian leaders have welcomed U.S. and other Western assistance since 2011, but local concerns over sovereignty have periodically arisen, and donor-backed fiscal austerity measures remain unpopular. President Saïed has yet to define in full his foreign policy approach or posture toward the United States. Appendix. Chronology of Key Events, 2011-2019Chronology: Key Events January 2011-September 2019
|
2011
|
January
|
Authoritarian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali flees amid mounting protests.
|
February
|
Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman associated with the administration of founding president Habib Bourguiba, is appointed interim Prime Minister and promises constitutional reforms by an elected assembly.
|
October
|
Formerly banned Islamist party Al Nahda wins a plurality of seats in a new National Constituent Assembly and forms a "Troika" coalition government with two secularist parties.
|
December
|
Religiously conservative Salafists conduct a sit-in at Manouba University to protest a ban on the full face veil or niqab.
|
2012
|
April
|
Caïd Essebsi launches Nidaa Tounes as a secularist opposition movement.
|
May-June
|
Salafists riot in Tunis and other cities.
|
September
|
The U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis are violently attacked by Islamist extremists, three days after the Benghazi attacks in neighboring Libya.
|
2013
|
February-July
|
Two secularist leftist politicians are assassinated, reportedly by Islamist militants, sparking a political crisis, general strike, and large protests.
|
August
|
The government bans the Tunisian-led Islamist extremist group Ansar al Sharia.
|
October
|
A suicide bomber blows himself up near a hotel in the beach town of Sousse.
|
December
|
After protracted negotiations mediated by a quartet of civil society groups, Al Nahda agrees to cede control of the government to a technocrat Prime Minister.
|
2014
|
January
|
The draft constitution is adopted by an overwhelming majority in the Assembly. Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa forms a transitional cabinet.
|
June
|
A national Truth and Dignity Commission is launched to investigate human rights violations committed by the state, and to provide compensation to victims.
|
July
|
Fifteen Tunisian soldiers are killed in an ambush near the Algerian border, reportedly the heaviest military death toll in decades.
|
October-December
|
Nidaa Tounes wins elections for the presidency and a plurality in parliament. Béji Caïd Essebsi becomes president. Al Nahda, which does not run a presidential candidate, wins the second-largest bloc of seats and joins the ruling coalition.
|
2015
|
March
|
Gunmen kill 21 foreigner tourists and a Tunisian at the Bardo museum in Tunis. The Islamic State claims the attack.
|
June
|
A gunman aligned with the Islamic State kills 39 tourists, mostly British, on the beach in Sousse.
|
November
|
A suicide attacker kills 12 Presidential Guard members in downtown Tunis.
|
2016
|
March
|
Militants claiming affiliation with the Islamic State launch a coordinated assault on the border town of Ben Guardane. The attack is put down by security forces.
|
July-August
|
Prime Minister Habib Essid resigns after a no-confidence vote in parliament. Nidaa Tounes and Al Nahda, along with several smaller parties and civil society groups, agree to a broad political coalition aimed at addressing social, economic, and security challenges. President Caïd Essebsi names Youssef Chahed Prime Minister.
|
2017
|
February
|
The IMF postpones loan disbursements, citing a lack of progress on reforms.
|
May
|
Prime Minister Chahed announces sweeping anti-corruption arrests and investigations of high-profile businessmen, politicians, police, and customs officials.
|
September
|
Parliament passes a controversial "administrative reconciliation law" that grants amnesty to civil servants implicated in corruption pre-2011.
|
2018
|
January
|
Large protests erupt in opposition to planned fiscal austerity measures.
|
March
|
Parliament votes, controversially, to end the mandate of Tunisia's Truth and Dignity Commission.
|
April
|
Powerful UGTT trade union federation calls for a cabinet reshuffle.
|
May
|
Long-delayed local elections are held. Al Nahda wins the most votes, followed by Nidaa Tounes, but independent lists collectively outpace both leading parties.
|
June
|
A presidentially-appointed commission issues a set of recommended legal reforms to expand women's rights and LGBT rights and abolish the death penalty.
|
September
|
Caïd Essebsi announces that the "consensus" alliance with Al Nahda is over, amid strains between Prime Minister Chahed and President Caïd Essebsi over control of Nidaa Tounes, Al Nahda's decision to maintain support for Chahed, and Al Nahda's rejection of the president's proposal to introduce greater gender equality into Tunisia's inheritance laws,
|
2019
|
June
|
The Islamic State claims two near-simultaneous suicide bombings that kill at least one police officer in Tunis.
|
July
|
President Caïd Essebsi unexpectedly dies in office, leading to a constitutional succession in which the speaker of parliament, Mohamed Ennaceur, becomes interim leader for a 90-day period. In response, the electoral commission shifts the order and sequence of national elections planned for later in the year.
|
September-October
|
Kais Saïed wins the presidential election and Al Nahda wins a slim plurality of seats in parliament.
Author Contact Information Alexis Arieff, Analyst in African Affairs
([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed])
Footnotes1.
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|
See, e.g., International Republican Institute (IRI), "Tunisia: Poll Reveals Persistent Dissatisfaction with Economy and Corruption," January 13, 2017; International Crisis Group (ICG), Blocked Transition: Corruption and Regionalism in Tunisia, May 2017. 2.
|
|
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook database, October 2019. 3.
|
|
IRI, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Tunisia, January 25-February 11, 2019. 4.
|
|
World Bank, The Unfinished Revolution, May 2014. 5.
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|
Associated Press, "Report Raises Number of Killed During Tunisia's Revolution to 338," May 5, 2012. 6.
|
|
See Sarah Yerkes and Zeineb Ben Yahmed, "Tunisia's Political System: From stagnation to competition," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 28, 2019. 7.
|
|
See, e.g., Carter Center, "Preliminary Statement on Tunisia's Parliamentary Elections," October 8, 2019; and International Republican Institute/National Democratic Institute, "Preliminary Statement of the IRI-NDI Election Observation Mission to Tunisia's October 13, 2019, Presidential Runoff Election," October 14, 2019. 8.
|
|
HuffPost Tunisie, "Élection Législative: L'ISIE et la société civile relèvent plusieurs infractions électorales," October 6, 2019; TAP, "Second tour du scrutin présidentiel : Les dispositions réglementaires respectées à 98%, selon Mourakiboun," October 13, 2019. 9.
|
|
Ramy Allahoum, "Kais Saied: Who is Tunisia's new president?" October 23, 2019. 10.
|
|
Al-Monitor, "Painting the town: How Kais Saied inspires change on Tunisian streets," October 23, 2019. The total number of votes cast in the 2019 run-off was higher than in 2014, although the percentage turnout was lower, due to new voter registration in the lead-up to the vote. 11.
|
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Drawn from: Al-Monitor, "Tunisia's 'Poker-Face' President Sworn In," October 23, 2019; Al Jazeera, "Tunisia's Kais Saied: 'He's just not interested in power,'" October 11, 2019; Nouvelobs, "'Ai-je l'air d'un salafiste?': Kaïs Saïed, favori de la présidentielle tunisienne, s'explique," September 20, 2019; Project on Middle East Democracy, A Guide to Tunisia's 2019 Presidential Election, September 2019; Business News, "Kaïs Saïed: j'éliminerai les élections législatives et je suis pour la peine de mort," June 11, 2019. 12.
|
|
Al-Monitor, "Tunisia's 'Poker-Face' President Sworn In," October 23, 2019. 13.
|
|
In an interview with a French media outlet on September 20, Saïed asserted, "If I cite Voltaire and Victor Hugo, how can I be a Salafist? […] I am independent and will remain so." Nouvelobs, "'Ai-je l'air d'un salafiste?'" op. cit. 14.
|
|
See Project on Middle East Democracy, A Guide to Tunisia's 2019 Presidential Election, September 2019; and 15.
|
|
New York Times, "Tunisia's Presidential Runoff: Two Candidates, and One Is in Jail," October 6, 2019; Réalités, "Arrestation provisoire de Nabil Karoui: la situation est 'préoccupante' selon le président de l'ISIE," September 29, 2019. 16.
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IWatch has also lodged corruption complaints against several other prominent politicians, including Prime Minister Chahed, who have not faced formal charges to date. 17.
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The bill also would have prohibited candidates who denigrate democracy, an apparent swipe at presidential candidate Abir Moussi, a former high-level figure in Ben Ali's party who has called the 2011 uprising a foreign plot. See Middle East Eye, "Why did Tunisian MPs limit who can run for office? Depends on who you ask," June 23, 2019. 18.
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Yerkes and Ben Yahmed, "Tunisia's Political System: From Stagnation to Competition," op. cit. 19.
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Emir Sfaxi, "Sustaining Democracy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 11, 2018. |
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Global Train + Equip |
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Defense Threat Reduction Agency |
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TOTAL |
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Source: State Department annual Congressional Budget Requests (FY2016-FY2019); State Department response to CRS query, May 2018; Defense Department congressional notifications and response to CRS query, May 2017.
Notes: May not include funding allocated under multi-country programs. Defense Department Global Train + Equip refers to planned funding under §1206, §2282, and §333 as notified to Congress. ESF=Economic Support Fund; ESDF=Economic Support + Development Fund (proposed by Trump Administration); FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control + Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related; TBD=to be determined. Includes funds designated as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).
a. Includes ESF, DA, Democracy Fund (DF), Transition Initiatives (TI), Complex Crises Fund (CCF), and Global Health Programs (GHP) funds not reflected in the State Department bilateral aid budget request.
b. Includes INCLE and NADR funds not reflected in the State Department's bilateral aid budget request.
Outlook
Tunisia has peacefully achieved many political milestones since 2011, prompting observers to portray it as the lone success story of the "Arab Spring." Internal political tensions, socioeconomic pressures, security threats, and regional dynamics nonetheless pose ongoing challenges. Despite a relative lack of conflict, Tunisia remains a potential locus of regional struggles among rival political ideologies, and among violent extremist groups vying for prominence and recruits. Key questions include whether Tunisia's broad-based coalition government is likely to remain cohesive, and how it will respond to terrorist threats, advance political and economic reforms, foster civil liberties, and satisfy popular demands for quality-of-life improvements. Tunisian leaders have welcomed U.S. assistance since 2011, but the local appetite for outside policy influence has also been shown to be limited in cases where donors have advocated economic reforms that domestic constituencies view as harmful.
Author Contact Information
Footnotes
| 1. |
Monica Marks, "Why do Tunisia's Islamists support an unpopular law forgiving corruption?" Washington Post Monkey Cage blog, May 5, 2017. |
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| 2. |
See, e.g., International Crisis Group (ICG), Stemming Tunisia's Authoritarian Drift, January 2018. |
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| 3. |
George Packer, "Exporting Jihad," The New Yorker, March 28, 2016. |
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| 4. |
For example, a late-2018 poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI) found over 80% thought Tunisia was headed in the wrong direction. "Tunisia Poll Confirms Deep Economic Unease; Satisfaction with Anticorruption Campaign," January 20, 2018. |
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| 5. |
IRI, "Tunisia: Poll Reveals Persistent Dissatisfaction with Economy and Corruption," January 13, 2017. |
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| 6. |
Associated Press, "Report Raises Number of Killed During Tunisia's Revolution to 338," May 5, 2012. |
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| 7. |
Monica Marks and Sayida Ounissi, Ennahda from within: Islamists or "Muslim Democrats"? A conversation, March 23, 2016. |
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| 8. |
ICG, Stemming Tunisia's Authoritarian Drift, January 2018. |
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| 9. |
See, e.g., Sarah Feuer, "Tunisia, a Success Story?" July 6, 2017; Monica Marks, "'Letting go of every principle': Tunisia's democratic gains under threat," Middle East Eye, July 23, 2017; and Sarah Yerkes, "Democracy Derailed? Tunisia's Transition Veers Off Course," Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2017. |
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| 10. |
HRW, "Tunisia: Amnesty Bill Would Set Back Transition," July 14, 2016; International Center for Transitional Justice, "ICTJ Comments on Draft Organic Bill Number 49/2015 Pertaining to Reconciliation in the Administrative Field," September 14, 2017. |
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| 11. |
Yerkes, "Democracy Derailed?" op. cit. |
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| 12. |
Sarah Yerkes and Marwan Muasher, Decentralization in Tunisia: Empowering Towns, Engaging People, Carnegie Endowment, May 17, 2018. |
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| 13. |
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| 14. |
"Salafism" refers to a broad subset of Sunni Islamic reformist movements that seek to purify contemporary Islamic religious practices and societies by encouraging the application of practices and views associated with the earliest days of the Islamic faith. Salafist movements hold a range of positions on political, social, and theological questions. A subset of Salafists advocate violence in pursuit of their aims, but many instead pursue non-violent preaching, charity, and (for some) political activities. See CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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| 15. |
See CRS In Focus IF10172, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Related Groups, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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| 16. |
New York Times, "Jihadist from Tunisia died in strike in Libya, U.S. official says," July 2, 2015. Another Tunisian was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Iraq in June 2015: Ali Ani al Harzi, a U.S. "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" accused of involvement in the 2012 Benghazi attacks. Al Harzi was detained in Tunisia in 2012 but released in 2013. |
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| 17. | For critical analysis of the law, see, e.g., HRW, "Tunisia: Amnesty Bill Would Set Back Transition," July 14, 2016; International Center for Transitional Justice, "ICTJ Comments on Draft Organic Bill Number 49/2015 Pertaining to Reconciliation in the Administrative Field," September 14, 2017. If he or she fails to do so within two months, the president is to appoint an alternative prime minister after broad political consultations. If that person fails, the president can dissolve parliament and call snap elections. Sarah Collins, Research Assistant for the Middle East and Africa, contributed to this text box. Project on Middle East Democracy, A Guide to Tunisia's 2019 Parliamentary Election, September 2019. Le Monde, "#EnaZeda, le #metoo tunisien est né," October 15, 2019. New York Times, "'I Can Finally Dream': Tunisia Expands Protection for Battered Women," May 12, 2018. See, e.g., HuffPost, "Tunisia's Violence Against Women Law Seemed Perfect on Paper. In Practice, It Hasn't Been.," December 13, 2018; Time, "One Year Ago, Tunisia Passed a Groundbreaking Law to Protect Women. Has It Worked?" July 26, 2018. U.S. and Tunisian officials notably blamed a Tunisian-led Islamist extremist group known as Ansar al Sharia (AST) for an attack against the U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis in 2012. Tunisia declared AST a terrorist group in 2013, and the U.S. State Department designated it a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2014. The group's leader, known as Abou Iyadh, relocated to Libya, where he was reportedly killed in a U.S. airstrike in June 2015. AST no longer operates openly in Tunisia and appears to have decreased in size since its peak in 2012-2013. See CTC Sentinel, "The Islamic State's Libyan External Operations Hub: The Picture So Far," December 2017. At least one police officer was killed and at least eight other people were wounded in the attacks. |
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| 33.
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TAP, "A thousand Tunisians have returned from conflict zones from 2011 until October 2018, says Mokthar Ben Nasr," February 18, 2019. 34.
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U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNOHCHR), "Foreign fighters: Urgent measures needed to stop flow from Tunisia – UN expert group warns," July 10, 2015. |
IRI, Understanding Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Tunisia, Winter 2016. |
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World Bank, The Unfinished Revolution, May 2014. |
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International Crisis Group (ICG), Blocked Transition: Corruption and Regionalism in Tunisia, May 10, 2017. |
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| 24. |
IMF, "Statement on Tunisia," May 30, 2018. |
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| 25. | IMF, "Fifth Review Under the Extended Fund Facility," op. cit. IMF, "Statement on Tunisia," May 30, 2018; see also IMF, "Key Questions on Tunisia," July 18, 2019. Middle East Eye, "'Two classes left - rich and poor': Sinking Tunisia's currency," May 4, 2018. |
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"On the Occasion of Tunisia's National Day," statement released by the State Department on March 20, 2018. |
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Jonathan C. Randal, "Raid Left Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties," The Washington Post, March 5, 1987. |
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On May 29, 2013, the U.S. embassy in Tunis released a public statement criticizing the relatively lenient sentences given to several low-level suspects in the Tunis embassy attack. The statement called for a "full investigation" and accused Tunisia's government of failing to uphold its stated commitment to oppose those who use violence. |