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Tunisia: In Brief

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Political Transition in Tunisia Alexis Arieff Analyst in African Affairs Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs October 22, 2014February 10, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21666 Political Transition in Tunisia Summary Tunisia is in its fourth year of transition after the 2011 “Jasmine Revolution,” and it has so far continued to avoid the types of chaos and/or authoritarian resurrections that have affected other “Arab Spring” countries. Legislative and presidential elections scheduled for late 2014 are expected to put an end to a series of transitional governments. On January 26, 2014, Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly voted overwhelmingly to adopt a new constitution. This is widely viewed as a landmark accomplishment, given the difficulty of achieving political consensus, tensions between Islamists and secularists, and ongoing social and economic unrest. The new constitution asserts Tunisia’s Muslim identity, but its framing—creating a civil state and provisions on civil liberties—is seen as a victory for secularists. The vote followed a political agreement under which Tunisia’s main Islamist party, Al Nahda, agreed to give up its leadership of the government in favor of a technocratic prime minister in the lead-up to the elections. Tunisia has a small territory, a relatively well-educated and homogenous population, and a history of encouraging women’s freedoms. Still, Tunisians face significant challenges in reforming state institutions, addressing economic woes, and responding to security concerns. Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, was reportedly involved in an attack on the U.S. embassy and American school in Tunis on September 14, 2012—three days after the attacks in Benghazi, Libya. The military has targeted terrorist cells near the Algerian border and in the remote south, which reportedly serves as a regional transit point for weapons and fighters. Tunisian nationals also reportedly make up one of the largest contingents of Islamist “foreign fighters” in Syria. Tunisian authorities since the revolution have attempted to ensure public safety while not appearing to resort to authoritarian tactics associated with the former regime, but popular opinions are mixed regarding whether they have struck the right balance. Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funding and oversees U.S. policy toward Tunisia and the wider region. The Obama Administration has expressed strong support for Tunisia’s transition and, in consultation with Congress, has allocated over $570 million in aid since 2011. However, concerns over the security of U.S. personnel appeared to dampen U.S.Tunisian relations in the aftermath of the 2012 embassy attack. Tunisian authorities have welcomed U.S. assistance and called for it to increase, but the availability of resources is subject to policy concerns as well as larger U.S. debates over the federal budget and aid to transitional states. The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) allows additional funding for loan guarantees and the U.S.-Tunisia enterprise fund. However, it prohibits any funding for a planned Millennium Challenge Corporation “threshold” grant for Tunisia. U.S. policymakers have described Tunisia as a key test case for democratic transitions in Arab states. Yet Tunisia’s path is far from certain, and Tunisia’s example may, in any case, be less influential than larger or more central states such as Egypt and Syria. Still, Tunisia’s experience highlights region-wide issues relating to the struggle between reformists and former regime elements; the role and influence of Islamism in state and society; and the difficult balance—for the United States and others—of pursuing potentially divergent policy goals, particularly as postauthoritarian transitions are often accompanied by political instability and weakened security forces. U.S. policymakers continue to debate the degree to which aid and bilateral contacts provide leverage in pursuing goals such as countering terrorism and encouraging certain democratic values. Congressional Research Service Political Transition in Tunisia Contents Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1 Background................................................................................................................................ 2 A New Constitution ......................................................................................................................... 3 Islamist-Secularist Fault Lines .................................................................................................. 5 Security Concerns ............................................................................................................................ 6 Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform ............................................................................. 8 The Economy ................................................................................................................................... 9 Foreign Relations ........................................................................................................................... 11 U.S. Policy and Aid ....................................................................................................................... 11 U.S. Foreign Assistance ........................................................................................................... 13 Congressional Actions ............................................................................................................. 16 Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 16 Figures Figure 1. Tunisia at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 2 Tables Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia .................................................................................. 15 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 17 Congressional Research Service Political Transition in Tunisia Overview Tunisia is in its fourth year of transition since the January 2011 “Jasmine Revolution” ended the authoritarian regime of then-President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and sparked a wave of unrest in much of the Arab world. In practice, civil and political liberties have expanded, and Tunisia has experienced far less violence than some other transitional countries. However, structural reforms that would guarantee democratic institutions have been halting, and consensus on government priorities elusive. Recent public opinion polls show a stark downturn in optimism about the political transition and democracy itself, apparently reflecting frustrations with a lack of tangible benefits to date.1 Localized protests and strikes continue to reflect popular frustrations with governance and socioeconomic issues. Security threats have starkly increased as Tunisia’s authorities have attempted to confront domestic and regional Islamist militancy without recourse to the authoritarian methods of their predecessors. Many analysts view Tunisia as having the best hope of any “Arab Spring” country to complete a peaceful transition to fully democratic rule. Yet the process has advanced in fits and starts. A National Constituent Assembly was elected in October 2011 in Tunisia’s first-ever open, multiparty contest. The Islamist Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda) party won a plurality of seats and formed a so-called “Troika” coalition with two centrist, secular parties. The Assembly’s mandate, initially expected to last no more than a year, stretched into two as the Troika confronted a series of political crises. In January 2014, the Troika was dissolved in favor of a technocratic government that has overseen preparations for new elections. The Constituent Assembly then finalized and voted to adopt a new constitution (discussed below), which has been widely hailed as exemplary. National elections scheduled for late 2014 represent a key and arguably final step toward a democratic system. Legislative elections are set to take place on October 26, 2014, and presidential elections are slated to follow in November, with a run-off in December if necessary. If the elections are successful, Tunisia will have crossed one more threshold that has eluded other transitional states in the Middle East and North Africa. Attention may then turn toward the details of constitutional implementation and the advancement of economic and governance reforms. Alternately, the electoral process may be challenged and the anticipated transition set back if, for example, parties dispute the outcome, low turnout undermines the legitimacy of the vote, or terrorist threats overwhelm the country’s fragile security institutions. The leading contenders in the elections represent the two poles of Tunisian post-revolutionary politics: Al Nahda, whose leaders have called for the reconciliation of democracy and Islam, and the ardently secularist Nida Tounes party, which represents a mix of former regime figures and leftists. More stridently leftist parties may also make a strong showing. The return of former Ben Ali–era officials is contentious, but Tunisia has avoided adopting laws that would exclude them. Overall, a large range of parties are contesting the elections, and upsets also appear possible. A gulf of mistrust between Islamist and secularist ideological factions has been fed by rising insecurity and by mutual suspicions that each side seeks to manipulate the rules of the political process to exclude the other. Tensions reached a boiling point in mid-2013 after the assassinations 1 See, e.g., International Republican Institute (IRI), Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 22-July 1, 2014, which found that 67% of Tunisians felt that things in Tunisia were going in the “wrong direction” (compared to 48% in February 2014) and that 65% said they were “not satisfied at all” with democracy in Tunisia (8% in February). Congressional Research Service 1 Political Transition in Tunisia of two prominent secularist politicians in February and July, allegedly by Islamist militants, and in the wake of the military ouster of the elected president in Egypt. A standoff between the Nahda-led coalition government and its secularist critics effectively brought politics to a standstill until Tunisia’s trade union federation brokered a political agreement in January under which Al Nahda agreed to cede control of the government to a technocratic prime minister, Mehdi Jomaa. Broadly, Tunisian political and civic leaders have repeatedly been able to mediate their differences through dialogue, even when the transition process appeared to have been stymied. Stated U.S. policy priorities in Tunisia include encouraging a successful democratic transition, advancing trade and investment ties, and working with the Tunisian government to address terrorism and other security threats. The Obama Administration, in consultation with Congress, has allocated over $570 million in aid since 2011 (see Table 1). Figure 1. Tunisia at a Glance Background Prior to January 2011, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable, albeit authoritarian, regime that focused on economic growth while staving off political liberalization. It had had only two leaders since gaining independence from France in 1956: Habib Bourguiba, a secular nationalist and former independence activist, and Ben Ali, a former interior minister and prime minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. Ben Ali cultivated the internal security services Congressional Research Service 2 Political Transition in Tunisia and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party as his power base, and harshly repressed political participation, freedom of expression, and religious activism. This repression, along with the ruling elite’s corruption and nepotism, undermined the regime’s popular legitimacy, despite relatively effective state services and strong economic growth. Another factor driving popular dissatisfaction was the socioeconomic divide between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the poorer interior. Anti-government unrest, particularly rooted in labor and economic grievances, has often originated in the interior—as did the 2011 protest movement. While Tunisia (Figure 1) shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, some of its attributes are unique: a small territory, a relatively homogenous population, a relatively liberalized economy, a large and educated middle class, and a history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms. Tunisia’s population is overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking and Sunni Muslim (although tribal and ethnic divisions persist in some areas), while its urban culture reflects European influences. The legal and socioeconomic status of women is among Tunisia’s particularities within the Arab world. Polygamy is banned, and women enjoy equal citizenship rights and the right to initiate divorce. (Inheritance laws and practices are still disadvantageous toward women.) Women serve in the military and in many professions, and constitute more than half of university students; the first woman governor was appointed in 2004. Many credit the country’s relatively liberal Personal Status Code, promulgated in 1956 under then-President Bourguiba, as well as Bourguiba-era educational reforms, with these advances. The 2014 constitution provides for gender equality. Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” The 2011 popular uprising began in December 2010 with antigovernment protests in the interior. On January 14, 2011, it culminated in the decision by President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, in power since 1987, to flee the country for Saudi Arabia. Protests were first reported in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire. The protests quickly spread to nearby towns, and eventually reached the capital and wealthy coastal communities associated with the ruling elite. Police opened fire on protesters and made sweeping arrests; an estimated 338 people were killed.2 The army, however, reportedly refused an order to use force against demonstrations, and reportedly played a significant role in Ben Ali’s decision to step down. The early months of the post-Ben Ali transition were marked by ongoing waves of unrest, partly because street demonstrators rejected the continuing role of former regime officials in early interim governments. A security vacuum additionally raised fears of violence and chaos. In February 2011, a more stable, if weak, interim government took shape under Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman from the administration of founding President Habib Bourguiba. Caïd Essebsi introduced the idea, popular with protesters, of electing an assembly to write a new constitution—that is, forge a new political system—before holding parliamentary and/or presidential polls. A New Constitution On January 26, National Constituent Assembly members overwhelmingly voted in favor of adopting Tunisia’s new constitution, with 200 in favor, 12 against, and four abstaining. Assembly Speaker Mustapha Ben Jaafar stated that the constitution, “without being perfect, is one of consensus,” and that Tunisia had “a new rendezvous with history to build a democracy founded on rights and equality.”3 The text was the product of an iterative process, as Assembly drafting committees produced successive versions subject to feedback from members and outside groups. 2 3 Associated Press, “Report Raises Number of Killed During Tunisia’s Revolution to 338,” May 5, 2012. Associated Press, “Tunisia Finally Passes Progressive Constitution,” January 26, 2014. Congressional Research Service 3 Political Transition in Tunisia Ultimately, Assembly members debated each article and voted on whether to include it in the final text before taking a final vote on the full version. The new constitution’s framing and many of its provisions represent sizable victories for secularist parties and for pragmatists within Al Nahda. There is no reference to sharia, or Islamic law, in the constitution.4 Article 2, which cannot be amended, states that “Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship, the will of the people, and the supremacy of law.” Article 3 states that “the people are sovereign and the source of authority, which is exercised through the people’s representatives and by referendum.” These provisions appear to directly counter a foundational argument by many Islamists that religious law trumps civil law. “Freedom of conscience and belief” (Art. 6) is guaranteed, along with gender equality (Art. 21), freedom of expression and information (Art. 31-32), freedom of assembly, and individual property rights (Art. 41), and some aspects of due process (e.g., Art. 27). The constitution creates a mixed presidential system. A directly elected president/head of state exercises powers over defense and foreign affairs but shares executive authorities with the legislature, which selects a prime minister. This model was preferred by secularist parties, which saw it as creating balances of power, while Al Nahda officials had expressed preference for a fully parliamentary system.5 Some observers have expressed concern that the mixed system could prove unwieldy in practice or prone to political deadlock.6 Despite its secular framing, the constitution repeatedly asserts Tunisia’s Muslim identity, at times in ways that suggest tensions with its more liberal provisions. For example, Article 1—carried over from Tunisia’s first constitution—states that Tunisia’s “religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its system the Republic.” Along with a provision stating that “the state is the guardian of religion” (Art. 6), this has led some observers to fear that the state could proactively enforce religious beliefs, for example through the prosecution of blasphemy, a charge that could limit free expression. A prohibition against declarations of apostasy or takfir (Art. 6)—accusing a Muslim of leaving or denouncing Islam—has also been interpreted by some as a constraint on free expression, which could conflict with Article 31.7 Secularists had called for the ban, arguing that accusing someone of apostasy is an incitement to violence. Meanwhile, Article 73 states that only Muslims may run for president. (Tunisia has tiny Jewish and Christian minorities.) While Al Nahda leaders praised the constitution and voted for adoption, the party’s leadership overruled its own parliamentarians who had called for the inclusion of sharia, and hardliners criticized some aspects.8 Some Salafists, who appear to represent a small but vocal minority within Tunisia, have protested the constitution as a whole.9 4 Al Nahda leaders had earlier made a series of concessions to secularists regarding the content of the constitution, including an agreement in early 2012 not to reference sharia. During the amendment process in early 2014, amendments that would have referenced sharia were introduced but were voted down. 5 Duncan Pickard, “Reaching Consensus on the Tunisian Constitution,” Atlantic Council, July 3, 2013. 6 Pickard, “Identity, Islam, and Women in the Tunisian Constitution,” Atlantic Council, January 24, 2014. 7 See, e.g., Sarah Mersch, “Tunisia’s Compromise Constitution,” Sada, January 21, 2014. 8 Tunisia Live, “Religious Coalition Claims Draft Constitution Violates Principals of Islam,” January 15, 2014; AlArab, “Ennahda Hardliner MP Condemns Tunisia Draft Constitution as ‘Still-Born,’” January 18, 2014. 9 “Salafism” refers to a broad subset of Sunni Islamic reformist movements that seek to purify contemporary Islamic religious practices and societies by encouraging the application of practices and views associated with the earliest days of the Islamic faith. Salafist movements hold a range of positions on political, social, and theological questions. A subset of Salafists advocate violence in pursuit of their aims, but many instead pursue non-violent preaching, charity, and (for some) political activities. See CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, by Christopher M. Blanchard. Congressional Research Service 4 Political Transition in Tunisia Overall, the new constitution reflects a complex process of adjudicating stark policy differences over the future shape of state and society. Ultimately, the degree to which it lays the foundation for a democratic, stable political system is likely to depend on interpretation and implementation, the degree to which the judiciary and legislature leverage their new authorities, and whether additional steps are taken to reform state institutions. The new draft is unlikely to definitively settle ongoing debates regarding the state’s regulation of religious activities; the legal status of Salafist groups; and how to balance freedom of expression and religious sensitivities. Islamist-Secularist Fault Lines Al Nahda, which led the government in 2012-2013 after decades in exile and underground, is at the center of Tunisian debates over religion, state, and identity. The party’s leaders have expressed support for democratic participation, the separation of religion and state, and women’s freedoms. Yet the party’s decision-making appears to reflect internal divisions and potential competition with more radical Islamist constituencies for popular support. Secularist detractors accuse the party of purposefully displaying moderation to gain acceptance, while intending to gradually introduce restrictive laws and institutions. The party’s supporters, for their part, view some critics as immovably opposed to Islamists, and some argue that stringently secular elites have lost their claim to legitimacy or are seeking a return of the former regime. When Al Nahda was leading the government, secularists often argued that the movement was seeking to prolong its hold on power, encourage religiously conservative social change, and exercise partisan control over state institutions. Al Nahda leaders, on the other hand, pointed to their willingness on multiple occasions to make concessions to secularists—for example through a decision in 2012 not to support proposals to include sharia in the constitution—even when these have angered the party’s base and conservative rivals. Al Nahda leaders have criticized what they view as secularists’ efforts to bar religion from public life, and appear to fear that secularists seek to manipulate the electoral or political process to exclude them from government. A key challenger to Al Nahda is the Nida Tounes party, led by Béji Caïd Essebsi, who served as interim Prime Minister in 2011 and was a senior official under founding President Bourguiba and, briefly, under Ben Ali. Caïd Essebsi has positioned himself as leader of the centrist, secularist opposition. Critics, including some in Al Nahda, have portrayed Nida Tounes as a vehicle for “counter-revolutionary” figures from the Ben Ali era.10 Some opinion surveys have shown Nida Tounes rivaling Al Nahda in popularity; yet the two parties’ relative appeal and coherence remain to be seen in upcoming elections.11 Other parties may also challenge these two for preeminence. Tunisia’s main trade union federation, the UGTT, has also asserted its influence as a leftist and secularist counter-weight to Al Nahda, as a channel for popular economic grievances, and as a convener of “national dialogue” on key policy issues. Religiously conservative Salafists have become more visible in the post-Ben Ali era. Some openly support the creation of an Islamic state in Tunisia, and some have challenged the government—as well as artists, labor union activists, journalists, academics, and women deemed insufficiently modest—through protests, threats, and/or violence. A handful of Salafist groups have registered as political parties, but many appear to prefer to operate outside the formal 10 11 See, e.g., Al-Monitor, “Tunisia Party Fights Islamization, Raises Ire of Ruling Ennahda,” October 1, 2012. See, e.g., IRI, Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, December 19, 2012-January 7, 2013, February 14, 2013. Congressional Research Service 5 Political Transition in Tunisia political system. In some areas, Salafist groups reportedly control mosques and have set up security and service-provision networks.12 Arrests have followed periodic Salafist violence, but law-and-order actions do not appear to have been consistent or, necessarily, effective. Divergent interpretations of security threats and the means necessary to confront them have contributed to Islamist-secularist tensions. Salafist violence and other security incidents, some unsolved, have increased pressure on the government to ensure public order and weigh in on controversial social issues. When Al Nahda was leading the government, critics charged that the party lacked the capacity or will to confront extremists. Al Nahda leaders countered that they would crack down on violence but that isolating or arresting religiously conservative activists could further radicalize them. Al Nahda leaders also struggled to respond to Islamist critics (reportedly including figures within the party) who view counterterrorism efforts as repressive. Background on Al Nahda Al Nahda was founded in 1981 as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). It continues to be led by co-founder Rachid Ghannouchi, a political activist and widely read theorist of Islam and democracy. The Ben Ali government was among the most repressive of Islamist political activism in North Africa, forcing Al Nahda underground and into exile in the 1990s and 2000s. Al Nahda candidates ran as independents in parliamentary elections held in 1989, but the government cracked down when they won 15% of the national vote. Tensions escalated, culminating in an attack on a ruling party office in 1991 that the government blamed on Al Nahda. In 1992, hundreds of Al Nahda members were convicted of plotting against the government. Ghannouchi, who had left the country, was sentenced in absentia. Al Nahda leaders denied the accusations, and some rights advocates criticized the case as biased and lacking due process. Similar tensions between Islamists and government forces drove neighboring Algeria into civil war in the early 1990s. Al Nahda’s electoral success in 2011 appears to have stemmed from several factors, including its history of opposition activism and its message of reconciling Islam and democracy, as well as popular disaffection with Ben Ali’s stringently secularist form of authoritarian rule. Al Nahda did not play a significant role in the 2011 protest movement, but it subsequently engaged in effective grassroots mobilization and campaigning. The party may also have benefited from some secularist parties’ efforts to drive a wedge between Islamists and secularists, a strategy that may have backfired among Tunisians eager to reconcile democracy with their Arab/Muslim identity. Security Concerns13 Violent extremist groups across North and West Africa are exploiting porous borders and the weaknesses of security forces. These groups—such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), its affiliates and break-away factions, and movements referring to themselves as Ansar al Sharia (Supporters of Islamic Law)—also are capitalizing on divisive identity issues as well as popular frustrations with poor governance. Tunisia has not been overwhelmed by insecurity, as has arguably been the case in neighboring Libya, but it has not been immune to these trends. Several Tunisian-led extremist groups have emerged since 2011, including Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia (discussed below) and a cell known as the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which is reportedly linked to AQIM. Competition for followers between “core” Al Qaeda and the Islamic State has reportedly sparked debate within AQIM and other Islamist extremist groups in North and West Africa, which may influence these groups’ strategic choices. Tunisian nationals also reportedly make up a significant proportion of foreign fighters active in violent extremist groups elsewhere in North and West Africa and in Syria.14 According to figures 12 13 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar Al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2013. See also CRS Report R43756, Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. Congressional Research Service 6 Political Transition in Tunisia released by Tunisian authorities, at least 2,400 Tunisians have traveled to Syria as combatants since 2011, which would make Tunisia one of the largest known sources of foreign fighters there, while several thousand more Tunisians have been prevented from going. Tunisian authorities have expressed acute concerns that fighters will return to conduct attacks at home.15 Local Tunisian groups over the past two years have staged attacks against government, tourist, and Western targets within the country. A Tunisian suicide bomber blew himself up outside a hotel in the beach resort of Sousse in October 2013, and another bomber was apprehended by police the same day in the coastal city of Monastir before he could detonate his vest.16 Two secularist opposition politicians were killed by gunmen in February and July 2013 outside their homes.17 A mob attack on the U.S. embassy in September 2012 caused extensive damage to the building’s outer enclosure and killed four in subsequent clashes.18 Officials regularly claim to have broken up domestic terrorist plots, including plans to attack the upcoming elections.19 Tunisian authorities have accused the Tunisian Salafist group Ansar al Sharia of being involved or associated with many of the attacks to date, although the group has not claimed responsibility.20 Ansar al Sharia shares a name with other extremist organizations in North Africa, but the degree of coordination among them is uncertain. The Tunisia-based group, established in 2011 and initially focused on non-violent preaching and social works, has developed an increasingly acrimonious relationship with the state since 2013. Clashes between group members and security forces, followed by threats of violence from Ansar al Sharia’s leadership, led Tunisian officials in May 2013 to declare the group illegal. The State Department designated Ansar al Sharia as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2014, accusing it of involvement in the 2012 embassy attack and stating that the group “represents the greatest threat to US interests in Tunisia.”21 Media reports suggest that the group’s leader, Seifallah Ben Hassine (aka Abou Iyadh)—who is wanted in Tunisia and designated for U.N. and U.S. sanctions—may be in Libya. A number of smaller Salafist and jihadist groups also operate in Tunisia. Although less is known about their role, some may have ties to terrorist organizations and/or to foreign fighter pipelines to Syria, Mali, Algeria, and elsewhere.22 Tunisian security forces have repeatedly clashed with armed militants, reportedly including foreign fighters, in recent years. Recent military operations have targeted terrorist “training camps” and weapons depots along the mountainous border with Algeria, in an area known as Mount Chaambi, west of the town of Kasserine. Tunisian officials (...continued) 14 According to Algerian authorities, 11 Tunisian nationals—the largest group of any single nationality—participated in the hostage-seizure attack by an AQIM affiliate on a natural gas facility in the remote southeastern Algerian town of In Amenas in January 2013. See also Reuters, “Tunisia Islamists Seek Jihad in Syria with One Eye on Home,” November 18, 2013. 15 See, e.g., The Guardian, “Tunisia Becomes Breeding Ground for Islamic State Fighters,” October 13, 2014. 16 Al Arabiya, “Suicide Bombers in Tunisia, from One Decade to Another,” November 8, 2013. 17 New York Times, “Second Opposition Leader Assassinated in Tunisia,” July 25 2013. 18 State Department daily press briefing, September 14, 2012. 19 TAP, “Tunisian Interior Ministry Confirms Plans by Terrorist Group to Target Polls,” September 18, 2014. 20 See, e.g., The Economist, “The Salafist Struggle,” January 1, 2014. 21 State Department, “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar al-Shari'a Organizations and Leaders,” January 10, 2014. As a result of the designations, all property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which designated individuals and groups have any interest is blocked, and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions with them or to their benefit. 22 See Andrew Lebovich, “Confronting Tunisia’s Jihadists, Foreign Policy, May 16, 2013. Congressional Research Service 7 Political Transition in Tunisia have stated that Mount Chaambi cells are linked to AQIM and include individuals who fought in Mali.23 Insecurity along the Libyan border to the east and in the remote desert south is also of particular concern, as both areas appear to be transit zones for regional smuggling networks. Some observers trace jihadists’ presence in Tunisia to the release of over 1,000 “political” prisoners of various stripes in early 2013; security force disorganization in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution; and events since 2011 in Mali and Libya.24 Jihadist groups may also draw on support from Tunisian Salafist groups and communities.25 Terrorism in Tunisia: Background While Tunisia has not been subject to many large attacks, terrorism is a potential domestic threat and some Tunisian nationals have participated in plots abroad. Several are reportedly detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and officials in the current government have repeatedly sought their return to Tunisia.26 Two notable terrorist incidents on Tunisian soil during the Ben Ali era were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the island of Djerba (noted for its Jewish population) and a series of street battles between alleged militants and security forces in Tunis in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda’s then-deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri appeared to claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002; in all, 14 German tourists, 5 Tunisians, and 2 French citizens were killed in the attack.27 France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement. The nature of the 2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, was more opaque. In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated outside Tunisia, on a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.28 The TCG, reportedly founded in 2000, was primarily active in Afghanistan, where it was linked to the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, an anti-Taliban fighter, in September 2001. Its goals also reportedly included establishing an Islamic state in Tunisia. The TCG was suspected of plotting attacks on the U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001, prompting a multi-nation crackdown on the group. It has since been inactive, but one founder, Abou Iyadh, went on to found Ansar al Sharia, reportedly upon his release from Tunisian jail in early 2011. Another founder, Tarek Maaroufi, was released from prison in Belgium in 2011 and reportedly returned to Tunisia. Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform Tunisian authorities continue to debate how best to ensure accountability for past abuses while encouraging national reconciliation. Criminal charges were brought against Ben Ali (in absentia), members of his family, and former senior government and security officials in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 revolution in connection with allegations of corruption as well as violence against protesters. However, many of these officials have since been acquitted or otherwise cleared, which has been highly controversial.29 More broadly, there is a question of what approach to adopt toward mid- and low-level state employees and members of the security and intelligence services who may have been complicit in past abuses, but did not command them. 23 AFP, “Bomb Attack Kills Two Soldiers In Tunisia: Military,” June 6, 2013. Many of those released from prison during a general amnesty promulgated in late January 2011 had been held under Ben Ali’s sweeping anti-terrorism legislation. La Presse, “Enquête - Le jihadisme en Tunisie,” November 8, 2012. 25 International Crisis Group (ICG), Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge, February 13, 2013. 26 According to news reports, 12 Tunisians were at one time detained in Guatanamo, but only five remain in U.S. custody. Five were repatriated to third countries, partly due to concerns over their possible torture if returned to Tunisia, while two others were returned to Tunisia and imprisoned. 27 Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002. 28 See State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,” April 30, 2003; and U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee on Al Qaeda, “Tunisian Combatant Group,” 2002 designation. 29 Carlotta Gall, “Questions of Justice in Tunisia as Ousted Leaders Are Freed,” New York Times, July 16, 2014. 24 Congressional Research Service 8 Political Transition in Tunisia Many Tunisians are skeptical of the regular justice system, which was inherited from the Ben Ali regime and is reportedly viewed as ineffective, subject to political influence, and, in some cases, corrupt.30 In December 2013, the Constituent Assembly adopted a law creating a new Truth and Dignity Commission as well as “Specialized Judicial Chambers” that may initiate prosecutions under certain circumstances, but their work remains nascent.31 The new constitution contains provisions on judicial independence, but implementation remains to be seen. Whether those who served in government under Ben Ali should be barred from politics is another sensitive issue. In 2013, some Al Nahda figures backed a draft bill that would have prohibited a range of people associated with the former regime from seeking elected office.32 However, the bill, which might have been applied to leading politicians such as Béji Caïd Essebsi, was shelved as a result of the late-2013 political dialogue. The new constitution does not condition presidential or legislative candidacies on past political activity. As a result, several prominent former regime figures are running for office in the upcoming elections. Overall, a central policy challenge for Tunisian authorities is how to assert control over the size and mandate of the internal security services without creating a backlash or hollowing out capacity. The Interior Ministry oversees the security and intelligence services, along with the police; all were closely associated with Ben Ali and with abuses such as extrajudicial arrests, extensive surveillance, intimidation of political opponents, and torture. To date, little information has been made public regarding the security apparatus’s internal structure or staffing, or how these have changed since the so-called “political police” were officially dissolved in 2011. The Constituent Assembly initiated, but did not complete, an effort to amend a controversial 2003 anti-terrorism law promulgated under Ben Ali, which critics viewed as repressive. Tensions between the security forces and civilian leaders have also spiked at times as pressures have increased on the security forces to engage in life-threatening counterterrorism operations in the absence of structural reforms, and in an atmosphere of political distrust.33 Tunisia’s military, with about 35,000 personnel, has historically received fewer state resources than the internal security services, and Tunisians view it as relatively apolitical. During the transitional period, the military has led many internal security efforts amid attempts to establish police capacity and professionalism. The army remains popular, but its expanded role may be leading it to become overstretched.34 The Economy Tunisian politicians seeking to improve the economy face a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), along with private-sector analysts, argue that deep reforms are necessary to improve 30 See ICG, “Combating Impunity, Restoring Security,” May 9, 2012. See International Center for Transitional Justice, “Tunisia’s Specialized Judicial Chambers—Q&A with Judge Walid Melki,” September 4, 2014. 32 Magharebia, “Tunisia: Political Isolation Law Divides Ennahda,” June 21, 2013. 33 Tunisia Live, “Slow Progress in Police Reform Since Revolution,” March 19, 2013; Al Arabiya, “Protesters Force Tunisian Leaders From Police Memorial Ceremony,” October 18, 2013; Al Jazeera via BBC Monitoring, “Tunisia Security Personnel Lament ‘Campaign’ To Weaken Establishment,” October 19, 2013. 34 Reuters, “Overstretched Tunisian Army Must Focus On Militant Threat: Zbidi,” March 6, 2013. 31 Congressional Research Service 9 Political Transition in Tunisia Tunisia’s economic growth and job creation. Such reforms might target strict labor laws, the regulatory environment for foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs, and the fiscal weight of state subsidies for basic goods. Reforms have been openly discussed but repeatedly delayed by a series of transitional regimes that have argued that only a legitimately elected government can take such steps.35 However, few (if any) leading candidates for office have spelled out how they would approach the implementation of reforms, and any future effort to alter subsidies or job protections could bring greater economic hardships to local households in the short run. Some observers fear that a failure to deliver rapid economic benefits has led an impatient public to lose faith in the transition process. Socioeconomic grievances were a key factor in the 2011 popular uprising. However, far from delivering tangible benefits to an impatient public, the postrevolutionary period has been marked by economic hardships due to political instability, negative regional security trends, and the economic downturn in the European Union (EU), Tunisia’s largest trading partner. Declines in tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been particularly damaging. Social unrest over economic grievances has, in turn, contributed to economic difficulties by creating a perception of instability among would-be tourists and investors. According to the IMF, the economy contracted by 1.9% in 2011, compared to growth of 3.1% in 2010. It rebounded in 2012 with 3.7% growth but has since struggled to reach 3%.36 Tunisia’s international credit ratings have been repeatedly downgraded. While the unemployment rate has declined slightly since mid-2011, it remains high at 15.9%. The youth employment rate is reportedly significantly higher, particularly for college graduates. In June 2013, the IMF and Tunisia agreed to a two-year, $1.75 billion IMF loan program designed to provide Tunisia with a financing cushion in case of an adverse shock. The IMF has since warned of growing fiscal strains and the slow pace of economic reforms.37 Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and prior to 2011 had been one of the bestperforming non-oil-exporting Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Textile exports, tourism, and phosphate mining are key sectors. Tunisia has also attempted to attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. However, Tunisia’s economic record long masked disparities and structural problems. Wealth is concentrated in the capital and along the eastern coast, while the interior has suffered from poverty and a lack of investment. Tunisians are among the most educated people in North Africa, but the economy has generally created lowskilled and low-paid jobs, thus creating a large pool that is educated but underemployed. U.S. government analysis has found that despite Tunisia’s reputation for regulatory reforms and encouragement of foreign investment, structural barriers such as restrictive labor laws and “a lack of effective institutions to ensure public sector accountability ... resulting in weak protection of property rights” are the most significant constraints to growth.38 Prior to 2011, Ben Ali family members and in-laws owned or controlled many of Tunisia’s biggest companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure or corruption. Since the 2011 uprising, government agencies have seized various assets, including 35 Reuters, “Tunisia Economy Needs 3 Years of ‘Painful’ Reform, PM Says,” October 13, 2014. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014. 37 IMF staff report, Arab Countries in Transition: Economic Outlook and Key Challenges, October 10, 2013. 38 Millennium Challenge Corporation, Towards a New Economic Model for Tunisia: Identifying Tunisia’s Binding Constraints to Broad-Based Growth, January 2013. 36 Congressional Research Service 10 Political Transition in Tunisia shares of private companies, owned by members of the former first family. There is reportedly an ongoing debate among officials over how best to sell off the confiscated assets, and over how to prosecute or settle any related disputes with businessmen.39 Tunisian authorities have also identified several countries where Ben Ali officials reportedly stashed substantial assets. The process for asset recovery has proven complex and challenging. Foreign Relations The EU is Tunisia’s largest trading partner and provides trade benefits and aid. Since the 2011 uprising, Tunisian officials have also appealed to the United States for military, financial, and trade assistance. Under Al Nahda-led governments in 2012-2013, Tunisian officials stated a desire to increase ties to Middle East and African states, and they pursued closer relations with Qatar and Turkey, which provided aid and diplomatic support.40 The “Troika” government expressed support for the Syrian opposition, but opposition to foreign military intervention; the Interior Ministry has undertaken efforts to stop the flow of Tunisian combatants to Syria. Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia also hosted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia had an interests office in Israel from 1996 until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, or uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Criticism of Israel and Israeli policies is common across Tunisia’s political spectrum, although Tunisia has also annually welcomed Israeli tourists during a pilgrimage to a historic synagogue on Djerba Island. While in power, the Nahda-led government hosted visits by senior Hamas officials. Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors. Turmoil in Libya is both a security and an economic concern for Tunisian officials. Previously, work opportunities in Libya helped to absorb some of Tunisia’s low-skilled labor surplus, and some Tunisians believe that the large number of Libyan refugees has driven up prices in parts of Tunisia. Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki has attempted, with little practical impact, to revitalize the Arab Maghreb Union, which includes Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania but has long been inactive due to tensions between Morocco and Algeria. U.S. Policy and Aid The Obama Administration has stated strong support for Tunisia’s transition and a desire to advance bilateral economic ties and deepen security cooperation. Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Tunis in February 2014 to hold the first session of a new U.S.-Tunisia Strategy Dialogue. He publicly congratulated Tunisians on the new constitution, which he stated was “a model for others in the region and around the world,” and confirmed “on behalf of the American people and President Obama our commitment to stand with Tunisia ... to help move down this 39 See, e.g., Maghreb Confidential, “A High-Level Rift Over Confiscated Firms,” November 21, 2013; IHS Global Insight, “New Tunisian Legislation Opens Way for Wider Confiscation of Assets from Allies of Former President Ben Ali,” December 18, 2013. 40 AFP, “La Tunisie de l'après Ben Ali veut retrouver toute sa place en Afrique,” January 29, 2012; and, e.g., Reuters, “Economics, Politics Underpin Qatar Aid to North Africa,” August 16, 2012. Congressional Research Service 11 Political Transition in Tunisia road to democracy.”41 The United States has offered Tunisia a range of aid and new cooperation programs designed to support the transition and its stability and security. Still, U.S. policy attention has not focused as intensely on Tunisia as on Egypt and other states in the region. In May 2013, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones stated in congressional testimony that political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa are “the foreign policy challenge of our time.”42 She added that “the tension between democratic values of human rights, tolerance and pluralism and threats to those principles including extremism and persecution of minorities is growing,” arguing that “these dynamics present new challenges and opportunities for U.S. engagement.” Although both U.S. and Tunisian leaders continue to express appreciation for bilateral ties, relations appeared to cool following the violent attack on the U.S. embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012. Then-Interior Minister Ali Laraydh, an Al Nahda official (and subsequent prime minister), publicly apologized for having initially “failed” to protect the embassy; Presidential Guard members had to be dispatched by the presidency during the attack to provide emergency security.43 The Tunisian government arrested hundreds of suspects—many of them Salafists—after the attack, and both Tunisian and U.S. authorities have stated that Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia was involved (see “Security Concerns” above).44 However, most were later released, and U.S. officials have suggested that those who were tried were not those most responsible.45 In November 2013, FBI Director James Comey named Tunisia as one of two places, with Libya, where AQIM, its affiliates and allies “pose a high threat to U.S. and Western interests... especially at embassies, hotels, and diplomatic facilities.”46 U.S.-Tunisian relations date back over 200 years. A Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held regularly. Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls. Tunisia was the site of significant World War II battles, and its territory was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 in Operation Torch. A U.S. cemetery and memorial in Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy despite a brief experiment with leftist economic policy in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian ties were strained by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some Tunisians viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.47 Tunisian officials have called for a free trade agreement (FTA). Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed support for an FTA in testimony before Congress in 2012, but there has been 41 State Department, “Secretary of State Kerry Holds News Conference in Tunis, Tunisia,” February 18, 2014. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Hearing on the President’s FY2014 Budget Proposal for Middle East and North Africa Programs, May 22, 2013. 43 Associated Press, “Tunisia’s Ruling Islamist Party Condemns US Embassy Attack,” September 15, 2012. 44 State Department, “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar al-Shari'a Organizations and Leaders,” January 10, 2014. 45 On May 29, 2013, the U.S. embassy in Tunis released a public statement in which it criticized the relatively lenient sentences given to several low-level suspects in the Tunis embassy attack, called for a “full investigation,” and stated that the government of Tunisia had “failed” to uphold its stated commitment to oppose those who use violence. 46 Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on “Threats to the Homeland,” November 14, 2013. 47 Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987. 42 Congressional Research Service 12 Political Transition in Tunisia little public evidence of advancement toward such an end.48 A bilateral trade investment framework agreement was signed in 2002, and a bilateral investment treaty came into force in 1993. In 2013, U.S. bilateral exports totaled $870 million and imports $749 million.49 U.S. Foreign Assistance U.S. bilateral aid to Tunisia prior to 2011 was relatively limited and highly focused on military assistance. Changes in Tunisia have led the Administration to work with Congress to identify and reprogram hundreds of millions of dollars, including funding appropriated in prior years and for other purposes, to support new programs and initiatives. As a result, the Obama Administration has allocated over $570 million in aid to Tunisia since 2011 (see Table 1). The Administration has also increased security cooperation and arms sales in consultation with Congress. About $62.8 million in bilateral aid was appropriated and allocated for Tunisia in FY2014, which the Administration referred to as a “normalization” of aid after this initial, “urgent” reprogrammed funding.50 The Administration has requested $66 million in bilateral aid in FY2015. Aid for “transitional support” includes a $100 million cash transfer in 2012 to help Tunisia make its international loan payments, a total of $55 million for the cost of two separate sovereign loan guarantees—which enabled Tunisia to raise nearly $1 billion on the international bond markets— and $60 million to date for a bilateral “Enterprise Fund” to spur private investment. The latter two initiatives were authorized in the FY2012 Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Division I, P.L. 112-74). Additional funds for loan guarantees and enterprise fund financing were made available under the FY2014 Department of State, Foreign Operations, And Related Programs Appropriations Act (Sec. 7041(g), Division K, P.L. 113-76). Other U.S. “transitional support” programming has focused on strengthening civil society, political parties, the media, and electoral processes. U.S. programs have also promoted educational exchanges, technology training, and entrepreneurship, particularly among women and youth. In January 2014, Tunisia joined the Open Government Partnership, a U.S.-backed global effort to make governments more transparent and accountable.51 U.S. engagement with Tunisian security forces prior to 2011 was heavily focused on conventional military grants and sales. As terrorist threats have increased, and as the relationship between Tunisia’s government and its security services continues to evolve, the United States has provided counterterrorism- and maritime security-focused assistance, along with programs designed to help Tunisia reform its justice sector. Notable programs include some $44 million in State Departmentadministered police and justice sector assistance, as well as $32 million in Defense Department “Section 1206” funding focusing on counterterrorism and border security.52 Tunisia is also one of 11 countries in the U.S. interagency Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership. 48 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, February 28, 2012. Progress toward an FTA would be subject to an interagency process, among other factors. 49 U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ on October 21, 2014. 50 State Department, FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations; statement of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 22, 2013. 51 See State Department, “Open Government Partnership,” at http://www.state.gov/j/ogp/. 52 See CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino; see also Section 1201 of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 113-66. Congressional Research Service 13 Political Transition in Tunisia In July 2014, the Defense Department notified Congress of its intent to agree to sell Tunisia defense articles and services worth an estimated $700 million, including 12 Black Hawk helicopters. Congressional Research Service 14 Political Transition in Tunisia Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia $ Millions, Year of Appropriation and Account FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2014 (est.) FY2013 FY2015 (req.) TOTAL 14.60 41.97 139.82 244.98 106.64 67.38 65.98 Sub-Total, Bilateral Aida 14.60 21.95 78.60 210.14 47.20 62.78 65.98 ESF 0.80 2.00 57.85 154.8 14.47 30.00 30.00 FMF 12.00 18.00 17.12 29.5 20.55 20.00 25.00 IMET 1.70 1.95 1.95 1.84 2.16 2.30 2.00 INCLE - - 1.50 22.50 8.00 9.00 7.00 NADR 0.10 - 0.18 1.50 2.02 1.48 1.98 Regional/ Global Programs & Accounts - 20.02 61.22 34.83 59.44 4.60 - ESF - 12.78 23.67 8.53 55.00 [loan guarantees] - - Democracy Fund - 5.15 0.74 5.15 - - - DA - 0.03 0.07 - - - - Transition Initiatives - - 3.37 9.80 4.44 - - Complex Crisis Fund - - 5.00 - - - - INCLE - 2.06 0.98 0.05 - - - NADR - - 3.06 2.40 - - - Humanitarian (multiple accounts) - - 3.43 2.05 - - - Defense Department “Section 1206” - - 20.90 6.85 - 4.60 - Source: State Department, Bureau of Foreign Assistance, response to CRS, January 2014; Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2011-FY2015. Notes: Some allocations for FY2013 are still being determined. Other than “Section 1206,” does not include non-State Department/USAID foreign assistance resources. Multi-country programs that may, in part, benefit Tunisian participants are also excluded. Humanitarian assistance refers to fiscal year of obligation, not source fiscal year of funds. Totals may not reflect rounding. ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs; DA = Development Assistance; “-“ = none or to be determined. a. Includes funding appropriated for other countries and purposes and reprogrammed for Tunisia. Congressional Research Service 15 Political Transition in Tunisia International financial institutions, which receive substantial U.S. funding, have pledged aid for Tunisia, mostly in the form of concessional loans. Group of Eight (G8) member states, including the United States, initially sought to coordinate aid through the Deauville Partnership, initiated in May 2011, although the current status of the initiative is unclear.53 Tunisia has also received loans and grants from Gulf states, notably Qatar.54 Such support may contribute to U.S. policy goals of encouraging Tunisia’s stability and economic growth; it may also dilute U.S. influence. Congressional Actions Congress has shaped U.S. policy toward Tunisia through its authorization and appropriation of foreign assistance, its review of arms sales and other security cooperation efforts, and its oversight activities. Recently, the FY2014 Department of State, Foreign Operations, And Related Programs Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) prohibits any foreign assistance from being used to support a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) “threshold” program in a country that is not a candidate for a full MCC compact. The Administration had planned a roughly $20 million MCC “threshold” grant for Tunisia focusing on addressing constraints to economic growth and job creation.55 However, Tunisia’s relatively high income level currently makes it ineligible for a compact, although its income had dipped to an eligible level in FY2011, the year from which the MCC intended to draw funding. The Joint Explanatory Statement on P.L. 113-76 refers specifically to Tunisia, stating that, “Efforts by the Administration to provide MCC assistance to countries that do not meet MCC criteria undermine the integrity of the MCC model.” In 2012, some Members of Congress called for cutting U.S. aid over Tunisia’s handling of an alleged suspect in the Benghazi terrorist attack.56 The suspect, Ali Ani al Harzi, a Tunisian, was detained in Turkey and transferred to Tunisian custody in October 2012. U.S. investigators were reportedly initially denied permission to question Al Harzi in Tunisian custody (although permission was reportedly eventually granted), and he was released from detention in January 2013 due to a purported lack of evidence. Al Harzi was later reportedly implicated in the two political assassinations in 2013 and charged in Tunisia with belonging to a terrorist organization.57 Outlook As Congress continues to weigh the implications of ongoing political transitions and security challenges in North Africa for U.S. policy, foreign assistance, and counterterrorism practices, possible considerations and questions include the following: 53 The partnership includes a transition support fund administered by the World Bank. See testimony of Alina Romanowski, Deputy Assistant USAID Administrator, Middle East Bureau, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, November 21, 2013. 54 See, e.g., Reuters, “Qatar Bank Grants Tunisia $500 Mln To Support Currency Reserve,” November 24, 2013. 55 State Department, “U.S. Government Assistance to Tunisia,” December 14, 2012. On MCC threshold grants, see CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation, by Curt Tarnoff. 56 See, e.g., The Cable, “Graham Threatens Tunisia Over U.S. Access to Benghazi Suspect,” October 31, 2012; Representative Frank Wolf, “Cut Off Aid to Tunisia in Light of Obstructing Benghazi Investigation,” December 11, 2012; and The Washington Times, “Benghazi Attack Suspect’s Release Spurs Calls to Punish Tunisia,” January 9, 2013. 57 Al Jazeera, “The Benghazi Link to Tunisia’s Assassinations,” September 12, 2013. Congressional Research Service 16 Political Transition in Tunisia • To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. policy? What are the prospects for U.S. influence on the future evolution of events in Tunisia? How should the United States shape its future foreign aid programs? • To what degree do Tunisia-based extremist groups present a transnational security threat? What is the likely trajectory of Tunisia-based or Tunisian-led groups such as Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia? • How is Tunisia’s new constitution being interpreted and implemented? How is Tunisia approaching the issue of reforming the internal security services and providing for transitional justice? • Are the national elections scheduled for late 2014 likely to be free, fair, and nonviolent? • What groups or individuals are likely to perform well in these elections? Which individuals and groups currently enjoy popular credibility in Tunisia? Which types of coalitions among political and interest groups are likely to emerge from the elections, and what is their likely stance on issues such as foreign policy and domestic reforms? • What is the likely course of Tunisia’s economy and how is it likely to impact stability? What is the appropriate role of Tunisia’s international partners in helping Tunisia to promote economic growth and job creation, and to address regional inequalities? What steps, if any, can or should the United States take to promote bilateral trade and investment? Author Contact Information Alexis Arieff Analyst in African Affairs aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459 Congressional Research Service Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314 17has taken key steps toward democracy since the “Jasmine Revolution” in 2011, and has so far avoided the violent chaos and/or authoritarian resurrection seen in other “Arab Spring” countries. Tunisians adopted a new constitution in January 2014 and held national elections between October and December 2014, marking the completion of a four-year transitional period. A secularist party, Nidaa Tounes (“Tunisia’s Call”), won a plurality of seats in parliament, and its leader Béji Caïd Essebsi was elected president. The results reflect a decline in influence for the country’s main Islamist party, Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda, “Awakening” or “Renaissance”), which stepped down from leading the government in early 2014. Al Nahda, which did not run a presidential candidate, nevertheless demonstrated continuing electoral appeal, winning the second-largest block of legislative seats and joining a Nidaa Tounes-led coalition government. Although many Tunisians are proud of the country’s progress since 2011, public opinion polls also show anxiety over the country’s future. Tangible improvements in the economy or government service-delivery are few, while security threats have risen. Nidaa Tounes leaders have pledged to improve counterterrorism efforts and boost economic growth, but have not provided many concrete details on how they will pursue these ends. The party may struggle to achieve internal consensus on specific policies, as it was forged from disparate groups united largely in their opposition to Islamism. Tunisian politicians and civil society leaders may also debate how, and when, to move from a pattern of ad-hoc negotiations to achieve “consensus” on key political decisions, toward a greater reliance on formal political institutions. There have been several small-scale terrorist attacks in Tunisia since 2011, and Tunisian nationals are involved in violent extremist groups abroad. Notably, Tunisians reportedly constitute one of the largest contingents of Islamist “foreign fighters” in Syria. A domestic group known as Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia was formed in 2011 and appears to act variously as a charity, a recruitment pipeline for Islamist militants, and an armed group. It was reportedly involved in an attack on the U.S. embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012, prompting the Obama Administration to designate it a foreign terrorist organization. Terrorist cells near the Algerian border and in the remote south are the target of ongoing Tunisian military operations. Policy debates over the root causes of violent extremism and how best to approach the problem have entrenched mutual distrust between Islamist and secularist political factions. U.S. policymakers have praised Tunisia’s transition, and President Obama has invited newly elected President Béji Caïd Essebsi to visit Washington. Congress has shaped U.S. transitional support to Tunisia and new defense cooperation. The Administration, in consultation with Congress, has allocated over $610 million in aid since 2011—much of which was reprogrammed from appropriations made for other intended purposes—and has proposed to double the annual aid appropriation for Tunisia in FY2016. U.S. engagement and aid nonetheless remain modest compared to states such as Egypt and Jordan, which are regarded as more intertwined with U.S. national security interests. The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235) allows additional funding for loan guarantees and for the Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund, which seeks to strengthen Tunisia’s private sector. The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) also provided funding for these purposes, but prohibited a planned Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) “threshold” grant because Tunisia’s income level is too high to qualify for a full MCC compact. Congressional Research Service Political Transition in Tunisia Contents Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1 Potential Issues for Congress..................................................................................................... 2 Background................................................................................................................................ 4 Politics ............................................................................................................................................. 5 The 2014 Constitution ............................................................................................................... 7 Security Concerns ............................................................................................................................ 8 Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform ........................................................................... 11 The Economy ................................................................................................................................. 12 Foreign Relations ........................................................................................................................... 13 U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 13 U.S. Aid ................................................................................................................................... 15 Recent Legislation ................................................................................................................... 18 Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 18 Figures Figure 1. Tunisia: Selected Events since January 2011 ................................................................... 3 Figure 2. Tunisia at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 4 Figure 3. Party Distribution in Parliament ....................................................................................... 5 Tables Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Tunisia Since 2011 .............................................................. 17 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19 Congressional Research Service Political Transition in Tunisia Overview Tunisia’s 2011 popular uprising, known as the “Jasmine Revolution,” ended the 23-year authoritarian regime of then-President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and sparked a wave of unrest in much of the Arab world. Since then, Tunisia has taken key steps toward democracy. Civil and political liberties have expanded dramatically, and Tunisia has experienced far less violence than some other transitional countries. An elected National Constituent Assembly adopted a new constitution in early 2014, and presidential and parliamentary elections were held in late 2014, formally ending a series of transitional governments (see timeline, Figure 1). During the transitional period, leading political factions repeatedly overcame political crises by engaging in informal negotiations. The durability of such arrangements remains to be seen. The 2014 elections were largely peaceful, and all major political parties accepted the results.1 Nidaa Tounes (“Tunisia’s Call”), a secularist party founded in 2012, won the largest number of seats in the new parliament, and its founder, Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman who served as Interim Prime Minister in 2011, was elected president. The main Islamist party, Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda, “Renaissance”), its top political opponent, won the second-largest block of seats. After protracted negotiations, Nidaa Tounes formed a coalition that includes two other secularist parties as well as Al Nahda. Al Nahda leaders, who had publicly called for a “national unity” government, praised the coalition’s formation. It was controversial within Nidaa Tounes, however, with some leaders arguing that the decision to include Al Nahda would betray voters. Although many Tunisians are proud of their country’s progress toward democracy, opinion polls in 2014 revealed acute anxiety over the future.2 Government service-delivery has suffered since 2011, threats to public safety have increased, and unemployment remains high. The new government faces pressure to rapidly deliver economic gains, and has also identified counterterrorism as a key focus. Terrorist threats have grown as Tunisia’s previously repressive internal security apparatus has experienced bureaucratic disarray, and as neighboring Libya has unraveled. Tunisians also reportedly make up one of the largest contingents of “foreign fighters” in Syria, and have been implicated in terrorism in Mali and Algeria. Islamist-secularist tensions have been fed by disagreement over how to handle security threats, by regional divisions, and by mutual suspicion that each side seeks to manipulate the rules of politics to its advantage. There appears to be broad agreement across Tunisia’s political spectrum that reforms are needed to consolidate democratic gains and to unlock economic growth and job creation. Political parties provided few concrete details on their policy preferences during the 2014 campaigns, however, and the new coalition government may struggle to achieve internal agreement. Nidaa Tounes itself exhibits little internal cohesion. The kinds of structural economic reforms that Tunisia’s international partners have recommended would likely face significant opposition from key interest groups that supported Nidaa Tounes (see “The Economy”). Critics have also questioned Nidaa Tounes’s commitment to security sector reform, transitional justice, and government checks-and-balances, with some portraying it as a “soft restoration” of the Ben Ali era.3 1 Preliminary statements by international election observation missions praised the elections while noting potential areas for improvement. Tunisian civil society organizations also conducted national election-monitoring missions. 2 IRI’s Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 22-July 1, 2014, found that 67% of Tunisians felt that things in Tunisia were going in the “wrong direction” and that 65% were “not satisfied at all” with democracy in Tunisia. 3 Monica Marks, “Tunisia Opts for an Inclusive New Government,” The Washington Post [blog], February 3, 2015. Congressional Research Service 1 Political Transition in Tunisia Tunisia has a small territory, a relatively well-educated and homogenous population, and a history of state encouragement of women’s rights. These are arguably structural advantages that favor peaceful politics. At the same time, Tunisia has not escaped being “an echo chamber of the ideological conflicts that are shaking the region,” including contests between Islamists and secularists, economic leftists and pro-business groups, and libertarians and authoritarians.4 Its political accomplishments since 2011 are attributable, in part, to individual leaders’ willingness to make concessions at key moments, often at the expense of support from their respective bases. Backchannel negotiations have helped overcome several near-crises, but may be at odds with efforts to institutionalize democratic procedures and foster accountability to voters. Potential Issues for Congress Stated U.S. policy priorities in Tunisia include encouraging democracy, advancing trade and investment ties, and working with the Tunisian government to counter terrorism. Congress has shaped U.S. policy toward Tunisia through its authorization and appropriation of foreign aid, its review of arms sales and other security cooperation activities, and its oversight. U.S. engagement and aid have also been affected by debates within Congress over the size of the federal budget, the scale of U.S. foreign aid, and U.S. policy toward countries affected by the “Arab Spring.” The Administration has requested $134 million in aid for Tunisia in FY2016, more than double the FY2015 request, of which about 60% would be for security assistance. As Congress examines this request and U.S. engagement with Tunisia, Members may consider questions such as: 4 • Is Tunisia likely to experience greater political stability following the 2014 elections, or will the new coalition government fracture? Will the completion of the transition period translate into economic investment and growth? To what extent will the government be able to respond to popular pressures to improve service-delivery, address regional inequality, create jobs, and bolster security? • How will the Nidaa Tounes-led government approach sensitive issues such as regulatory reform, transitional justice, and security sector reform? How is Tunisia’s new constitution being interpreted and implemented, including provisions guaranteeing civil liberties and gender equality? • To what degree are Tunisia-based Islamist extremist groups a threat to U.S. national security? What factors explain domestic extremism and Tunisian participation in transnational terrorism? • To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. foreign policy? • What types of U.S. aid and engagement have been most effective at achieving U.S. and Tunisian policy goals? What has been the impact of U.S. democracypromotion assistance on Tunisia’s transition? • To what extent can or should U.S. aid seek to incentivize politically difficult economic reforms? What steps, if any, can or should the United States take to promote bilateral trade and investment? • To what extent should the United States seek to pair counterterrorism assistance with support for greater legislative and public oversight of the security sector? International Crisis Group, Tunisia’s Elections: Old Wounds, New Fears, December 2014. Congressional Research Service 2 Figure 1. Tunisia: Selected Events since January 2011 CRS-3 Political Transition in Tunisia Figure 2. Tunisia at a Glance Background While Tunisia shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, some of its attributes are unique: a small territory, a relatively homogenous population, a relatively liberalized economy, a large and educated middle class, and a history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms. Tunisia’s population is overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking and Sunni Muslim (although tribal and ethnic divisions persist in some areas), while its urban culture reflects European influences. The legal and socioeconomic status of women is among Tunisia’s particularities within the Arab world. Polygamy is banned, and women enjoy equal citizenship rights and the right to initiate divorce. (Inheritance laws and practices are nonetheless disadvantageous toward women.) Women serve in the military and in many professions, and constitute more than half of university students; the first woman governor was appointed in 2004. Many Tunisians attribute these advances to the country’s relatively liberal Personal Status Code, promulgated in 1956 under then-President Habib Bourguiba, as well as Bourguiba-era educational reforms. Prior to 2011, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable, albeit authoritarian, regime that focused on economic growth while staving off political liberalization. It had had only two leaders since independence from France in 1956: Bourguiba, a secular nationalist and independence activist, and Ben Ali, a former interior minister and prime minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. Ben Ali cultivated the internal security services and the Constitutional Democratic Rally Congressional Research Service 4 Political Transition in Tunisia (RCD) party as his power base, and harshly repressed political participation, freedom of expression, and religious activism. This repression, along with corruption and nepotism, undermined the regime’s popular legitimacy, despite relatively effective state services and economic growth. Another factor driving popular dissatisfaction was the socioeconomic divide between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the poorer interior. Anti-government unrest, particularly rooted in labor and economic grievances, has often originated in the interior—as did the 2011 protest movement. The “Jasmine Revolution” In December 2010, antigovernment protests broke out in Tunisia’s interior after a street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in an apparent protest against state repression and a lack of economic opportunities. Protests spread to neighboring towns and eventually to the capital, Tunis, and to wealthy coastal communities associated with the ruling elite. Police opened fire on protesters and made sweeping arrests; an estimated 338 people were killed.5 The army, however, reportedly refused an order to use force against demonstrations. On January 14, 2011, President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, in power since 1987, fled the country for Saudi Arabia, where he remains. Politics Dozens of parties contested the 2014 elections, but the top two have come to represent the two poles of Tunisian post-revolutionary politics. One is the Islamist party Al Nahda, which won Tunisia’s first free and fair elections in October 2011 after being banned under Ben Ali. The other is the ardently secularist Nidaa Tounes, which represents a mix of former regime figures, business interests, trade-unionists, and independents. Al Nahda’s electoral success in 2011 was grounded in its superior grassroots mobilization and its image as a principled opponent of the former regime. However, once in power, the party struggled to govern amid economic and security challenges. Nidaa Tounes was founded in 2012 to rally secularist opposition to the Nahda-led government. Nidaa Tounes won a the largest block of Figure 3. Party Distribution in Parliament parliamentary seats in the 2014 elections and its founder, Caïd Essebsi, was elected Other / Popular Indepepresident. Al Nahda won the second-largest Front ndents block of seats, reflecting a decrease in 7% 10% popularity since 2011 but still considerable Afek electoral appeal. Al Nahda did not run a Tounes Nidaa 4% presidential candidate and declined to endorse Tounes one. Many of its supporters, however, appear 40% UPL to have backed Caïd Essebsi’s top rival, then7% Interim President Moncef Marzouki, who had been part of the Nahda-led “Troika” coalition Al that governed in 2012-2013. In a multiNahda candidate contest in November 2014, Caïd 32% Essebsi came in first with 39% of the vote, followed by Marzouki, who won 33%, Coalition includes: Nidaa Tounes, Al Nahda, despite the fact that his Congress for the UPL, and Afek Tounes. Republic (CPR) party had won only four seats in parliament (2%). Caïd Essebsi won a December run-off against Marzouki with 56% of votes. 5 Associated Press, “Report Raises Number of Killed During Tunisia’s Revolution to 338,” May 5, 2012. Congressional Research Service 5 Political Transition in Tunisia Campaign rhetoric was heated ahead of the run-off, with Caïd Essebsi suggesting that Al Nahda supporters were terrorists, while Marzouki accused Caïd Essebsi of seeking to resurrect the Ben Ali regime.6 Although both Nidaa Tounes and Al Nahda both have national constituencies, the electoral results also pointed to an enduring regional divide among the electorate. Nidaa Tounes won majorities in most of the urban districts along the northern coast, while Al Nahda and Marzouki came in first in much of the south and interior. In January 2015, Nidaa Tounes proposed a cabinet that included only one other major party, the Free Patriotic Union (UPL after its French acronym). The UPL was founded by Slim Riahi, a wealthy businessman and soccer club owner, and has little apparent ideological underpinning. Al Nahda and other major parties signaled that they would vote against confirmation, forcing Nidaa Tounes to propose a more broad-based coalition. The new coalition and cabinet, which parliament confirmed in February 2015, includes the UPL; secularist party Afek Tounes (“Tunisia Horizons”), which has emphasized market liberalism and youth leadership; and Al Nahda, which was given the Ministry of Employment and three junior posts. The key ministries of interior, defense, and justice are headed by independents considered close to Nidaa Tounes. The Popular Front party opposes both Nidaa Tounes and Al Nahda, and appears positioned to lead the parliamentary opposition to the coalition government. It is secularist but more strongly leftist than Nidaa Tounes, and its leaders were activist opponents of the Ben Ali regime. Two Popular Front politicians were assassinated in 2013, reportedly by Islamist militants (see “Security Concerns”). Tunisia’s main trade union federation, known as the UGTT, has also asserted its influence as a leftist and secularist counter-weight to Al Nahda, as a channel for popular economic grievances, and as a convener of "national dialogue" on key policy issues. Al Nahda is at the center of Tunisian debates over religion, state, and identity. It emerged as a major political force in 2011 after its leaders had spent decades in exile, in prison, and underground. In 2012-2013, Al Nahda headed a “Troika” coalition with two smaller, secular parties. (See timeline, Figure 1.) During that time, secularists often argued that the movement was seeking to prolong its hold on power, encourage religiously conservative social change, and exercise partisan control over state institutions. Al Nahda leaders, for their part, pointed to their repeated willingness to make concessions to secularists—for example not supporting a reference to sharia in the new constitution, and agreeing to step down from the government in 2014—even when such decisions angered the party’s base. Al Nahda leaders continue to criticize what they view as secularists’ efforts to bar religion from public life, and appear to fear that secularists may seek to manipulate the electoral or political process to exclude them from government. Not all of Tunisia’s Islamists back Al Nahda, and the party’s willingness to compromise may have cost it some support among more radical factions of public opinion. Some religiously conservative Salafists7 openly support the creation of an Islamic state in Tunisia, and some have challenged government authorities—as well as artists, labor union activists, journalists, academics, and women deemed insufficiently modest—through protests, threats, and/or violence. 6 Le Monde, “Moncef Marzouki : « Béji Caïd Essebsi, c’est le retour de l’ancien régime »,” November 26, 2014; Christine Petré, “Tunisia’s Presidential Climate Heats Up,” Middle East Monitor, December 19, 2014. 7 “Salafism” refers to a broad subset of Sunni Islamic reformist movements that seek to purify contemporary Islamic religious practices and societies by encouraging the application of practices and views associated with the earliest days of the Islamic faith. Salafist movements hold a range of positions on political, social, and theological questions. A subset of Salafists advocate violence in pursuit of their aims, but many instead pursue non-violent preaching, charity, and (for some) political activities. See CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, by Christopher M. Blanchard. Congressional Research Service 6 Political Transition in Tunisia A handful of Salafist groups have registered as political parties, but many appear to prefer to operate outside the formal political system. In some areas, Salafist groups reportedly control mosques and have set up security and service-provision networks.8 A crackdown on unregistered mosques was initiated under the Nahda-led government and continued under the technocratic Mehdi Jomaa government in 2014, sparking concerns among some civil liberties advocates. Key Figures President Béji Caïd Essebsi. Caïd Essebsi, 88, won Tunisia’s first free and fair direct presidential election in 2014. Caïd Essebsi founded Nidaa Tounes in 2012, positioning the party as a big tent to rally diverse opponents of political Islam, and of the Nahda-led Troika government in particular. He campaigned in 2014 on improving the economy and countering terrorism, but has provided few detailed policy proposals. Despite his opposition to Al Nahda, Caïd Essebsi ultimately agreed to a coalition that includes the Islamist party. Caïd Essebsi is a lawyer and was a close aide to Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, serving in a variety of posts including Interior Minister and Defense Minister. He also held government positions under Ben Ali, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but was not at the forefront of the regime. In 2011, he served as Interim Prime Minister, overseeing the initiation of political reforms and the organization of the October 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections. Prime Minister Habib Essid. Essid, 65, was appointed Prime Minister by President Caïd Essebsi and was confirmed in a parliamentary vote in February 2015. In 2011, Essid served as Interior Minister in the post-revolution interim government headed by then-Prime Minister Caïd Essebsi. Some civil society leaders faulted him at the time for reportedly slowing ambitious reforms that were initiated immediately after the revolution. Previously, Essid served in a variety of state positions under President Ben Ali, including in the Ministries of Agriculture, Fishery, Environment— and, in the late 1990s, the Ministry of Interior, which was a pillar of the regime. Despite this history, Essid appears to have the backing of Al Nahda leaders; he served as an advisor on security issues in the Nahda-led Troika government. Assembly President Mohamed Ennaceur. Ennaceur, 80, of Nidaa Tounes, heads the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP), the 217-seat legislature created by the 2014 constitution. He was elected to his current position by a majority vote among MPs, including crucial support from Al Nahda. Ennaceur is a former government minister, diplomat, and civil society figure. Like President Caïd Essebsi, he began his career in government under founding President Bourguiba and also served in posts under Ben Ali. Foreign Minister Taïeb Baccouche. Baccouche, 70, Secretary-General and founding member of the Nidaa Tounes party, is a union activist, human rights advocate, and linguistics professor. He was among the Nidaa Tounes MPs who opposed including Al Nahda in the ruling coalition. Baccouche served as Minister of Education in the interim government in 2011—a period of intense contestation over Tunisia’s ban on the full face-veil (niqab) in educational settings, which he maintained and defended. Al Nahda Leader Rachid Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi, 73, is a political activist, author, and theorist of Islam and democracy. He co-founded and leads Tunisia’s main Islamist political party, Al Nahda (“Renaissance”). He has not held or sought any elected position, but has wielded substantial political influence through his ability to shape Al Nahda’s policy positions, and through his engagement in negotiations with other political leaders to overcome various government crises. Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia in 2011 under a general amnesty adopted soon after the revolution. He had lived in exile, mostly in London, for two decades, and had been sentenced to jail in absentia under Ben Ali. Ghannouchi has emphasized the importance of political “consensus” in advancing democracy while maintaining stability in Tunisia, and has often appeared to overrule the party’s base in order to reach agreements with other political interest groups. Secularist critics often accuse him of claiming to be moderate while intending to gradually introduce restrictive laws and institutions. The 2014 Constitution Tunisia’s new constitution is the product of extensive debate among leading political factions. It was adopted in an overwhelming vote in the National Constituent Assembly in January 2014. The text reflects a complex process of adjudicating stark policy differences over the future shape of state and society. The degree to which it lays the foundation for a stable democracy may depend 8 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar Al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2013. Congressional Research Service 7 Political Transition in Tunisia on interpretation and implementation, the degree to which the judiciary and legislature leverage their full authorities, and whether additional steps are taken to reform state institutions. Despite attracting both Islamist and secularist backing, the constitution is unlikely, by itself, to definitively settle debates regarding the role of religion in public life and the role of the state in regulating religious practice. The constitution was drafted by an elected body in which Al Nahda held by far the largest block of seats. Its framing and many of its provisions, however, may be viewed as victories for secularist parties, and/or for pragmatists within Al Nahda. There is no reference to sharia, or Islamic law.9 Instead, Article 2 states that “Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship, the will of the people, and the supremacy of law,” and Article 3 states that “the people are sovereign and the source of authority, which is exercised through the people’s representatives and by referendum.” These provisions appear to directly counter any argument that religious law trumps civil law. “Freedom of conscience and belief” (Art. 6) is guaranteed, along with gender equality (Art. 21), freedom of expression and information (Art. 31-32), freedom of assembly (Art. 37), individual property rights (Art. 41), and some aspects of due process (e.g., Art. 27). Despite its secular framing, the constitution asserts Tunisia’s Muslim identity, at times in ways that suggest tensions with its more liberal provisions. For example, Article 1—carried over from Tunisia’s first constitution—states that Tunisia’s “religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its system the Republic.” Along with a provision stating that “the state is the guardian of religion” (Art. 6), this has led some observers to fear that the state could proactively enforce practices based in religious customs. A prohibition against declarations of apostasy or takfir (Art. 6)— accusing a Muslim of leaving or denouncing Islam—has also been interpreted by some as a constraint on free expression.10 Secularists had favored the ban, arguing that accusing someone of apostasy is an incitement to violence. Article 73 states that only Muslims may run for president. (Tunisia has tiny Jewish and Christian minorities.) The constitution creates a mixed presidential system. The directly elected president/head of state exercises powers over defense and foreign affairs but shares executive authorities with a prime minister from the party with the largest number of seats in parliament. This model was preferred by secularist parties, which saw it as creating balances of power, while Al Nahda officials had expressed preference for a fully parliamentary system. Some observers have expressed concern that the mixed system could prove unwieldy in practice or prone to political deadlock.11 Security Concerns Violent extremist groups across North and West Africa are exploiting porous borders and the weaknesses of security forces.12 These groups—such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), its affiliates and break-away factions, and movements calling themselves Ansar al Sharia (Supporters of Islamic Law)—are also capitalizing on divisive identity issues as well as 9 Al Nahda leaders had in early 2012 committed not to reference sharia. During the amendment process, however, Al Nahda MPs introduced amendments that would have referenced sharia. These were voted down after Al Nahda’s leadership determined that the party would not support them. 10 See, e.g., Sarah Mersch, “Tunisia’s Compromise Constitution,” Sada, January 21, 2014. 11 Duncan Pickard, “Identity, Islam, and Women in the Tunisian Constitution,” Atlantic Council, January 24, 2014. 12 See CRS Report R43756, Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa, coordinated by Carla E. Humud. Congressional Research Service 8 Political Transition in Tunisia popular frustrations with poor governance. Tunisia has not been overwhelmed by insecurity, as in neighboring Libya, but it has not been immune to these trends. Competition between “core” Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) has sparked further divisions among Islamist extremists in North Africa, and may influence these groups’ strategic choices. Several Tunisia-based extremist groups have emerged since 2011, including Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia (discussed below) and a cell known as the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which is reportedly active in an area known as Mount Chaambi, near the Algerian border.13 Insecurity along the Libyan border to the east and in the remote desert south is also of concern, as both areas appear to be key transit zones for regional smuggling networks.14 Some observers attribute the increase in jihadist activity since 2011 to the release of over 1,000 “political prisoners” of various stripes in early 2011 (one of whom went on to found Ansar al Sharia); security force disorganization in the aftermath of the revolution; and events in Mali and Libya.15 Jihadist groups may also draw on support from Tunisian Salafist groups and communities.16 Tunisian nationals also reportedly make up a significant proportion of foreign fighters active in violent extremist groups elsewhere in North and West Africa and in Syria.17 Tunisian authorities stated in mid-2014 that at least 2,400 Tunisians had traveled to Syria as combatants since 2011, which would make Tunisia one of the largest known sources of foreign fighters there.18 Authorities have also stated that they have prevented several thousand more Tunisians from going—although they have not defined criteria for preventing individuals’ travel, such as whether restrictions are implemented on the basis of specific threats. Tunisian authorities have expressed acute concerns that fighters will return to conduct attacks at home.19 Local Tunisian groups have staged attacks against government, tourist, and Western targets within the country. A Tunisian suicide bomber blew himself up outside a hotel in the beach resort of Sousse in October 2013, and another bomber was apprehended by police the same day in the coastal city of Monastir before he could detonate his vest. Two secularist opposition politicians were killed by gunmen in February and July 2013 outside their homes. A mob attack on the U.S. embassy in September 2012 caused extensive damage to the building’s outer enclosure and four Tunisians were killed in subsequent clashes.20 Officials regularly claim to have broken up domestic terrorist plots, including some targeting the recent 2014 elections.21 In early 2015, the Interior Ministry announced two large-scale arrests of people suspected of planning assassinations and “spectacular attacks” against government targets, but it is unclear how 13 The group is named for a prominent figure in the 7th-century Arab conquest of North Africa. Tunisian authorities stated in 2012-2013 that Okba Ibn Nafaa was linked to AQIM, and that cells in Mount Chaambi included militants who had fought in Mali. Since 2014, news reports have suggested ties between the group and ISIL. See Andrew Lebovich, “Confronting Tunisia’s Jihadists,” ForeignPolicy.com, May 16, 2013. 14 See International Crisis Group, Tunisia’s Borders (II): Terrorism and Regional Polarisation, October 2014. 15 La Presse, “Enquête - Le jihadisme en Tunisie,” November 8, 2012. 16 International Crisis Group (ICG), Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge, February 13, 2013. 17 According to Algerian authorities, 11 Tunisian nationals—the largest group of any single nationality—participated in a hostage-seizure attack by an AQIM offshoot on a gas facility in the southeastern Algerian town of In Amenas in January 2013. The attack resulted in the deaths of 39 foreign hostages, including three U.S. citizens. 18 Tunis Afrique Presse [official], “Tunisia: 2,400 Tunisian Jihadists in Syria (Interior),” June 23, 2014. 19 See, e.g., The Guardian, “Tunisia Becomes Breeding Ground for Islamic State Fighters,” October 13, 2014. 20 State Department daily press briefing, September 14, 2012. 21 TAP, “Tunisian Interior Ministry Confirms Plans by Terrorist Group to Target Polls,” September 18, 2014. Congressional Research Service 9 Political Transition in Tunisia advanced any preparations may have been.22 A French-Tunisian militant was implicated in the 2013 oppositionist assassinations, and more recently has been linked to the Islamic State.23 He was reportedly a former member of a Paris-based Islamist cell which has also been tied to the January 2015 attack on Paris newspaper Charlie Hebdo.24 Tunisian authorities have accused the Tunisian Salafist group Ansar al Sharia of being involved in several domestic attacks, although the group has not claimed responsibility.25 Ansar al Sharia shares a name with other extremist organizations in North Africa, but the degree of coordination among them is uncertain. The Tunisia-based group, which was established in 2011 and initially focused on non-violent preaching and social works, has developed an increasingly acrimonious relationship with the state since 2013. Clashes between group members and security forces, followed by threats of violence from Ansar al Sharia’s leadership, led Tunisian officials in May 2013 to declare the group illegal. The U.S. State Department designated Ansar al Sharia a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2014, accusing it of involvement in the 2012 embassy attack and stating that the group “represents the greatest threat to US interests in Tunisia.”26 Media reports since then have suggested that the group’s leader, Seifallah Ben Hassine (aka Abou Iyadh)—who is wanted in Tunisia and designated for U.N. and U.S. sanctions—may be in Libya. Terrorism in Tunisia: Background While Tunisia has not experienced many large attacks, terrorism was considered a domestic threat prior to 2011, and Tunisian nationals have long been active in transnational Islamist extremist networks. At one time, a dozen Tunisian nationals were reportedly detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; most have been released to third countries, including two transferred to Kazakhstan in December 2014. Two notable terrorist incidents on Tunisian soil occurred during the Ben Ali era: the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on Djerba island (noted for its Jewish population), which killed Tunisians and European tourists, and street battles in Tunis between alleged militants and security forces in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda’s then-deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri (now head of Al Qaeda) appeared to claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002,27 and France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested several expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement. The nature of the 2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, was more opaque. In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated outside Tunisia, on a list of specially designated global terrorists subject to U.S. sanctions.28 The TCG, reportedly founded in 2000, was primarily active in Afghanistan, where it was linked to the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, an anti-Taliban fighter, in September 2001. Its goals also reportedly included establishing an Islamic state in Tunisia. The TCG was suspected of plotting attacks on the U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001, prompting a multi-nation crackdown on the group. It has since been inactive. However, a TCG founder, Seifallah Ben Hassine (Abou Iyadh), was released from jail in Tunisia in 2011 and went on to found Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia. Another founder, Tarek Maaroufi, reportedly returned to Tunisia in 2011 after being released from prison in Belgium. 22 Kuwait News Agency, “Tunisia dismantles terrorist cell targeting security, military officials,” January 25, 2015; Reuters, “Tunisia arrests 32 militant Islamists planning 'spectacular' attacks,” February 8, 2015. 23 The New York Times, “Tunisia: ISIS Fighters Claim 2 killings,” December 18, 2014. 24 The Washington Post, “Suspect in Paris attack had ‘long-term obsession’ carrying out terror attack,” January 8, 2015. 25 See, e.g., The Economist, “The Salafist Struggle,” January 1, 2014. 26 State Department, “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar al-Shari'a Organizations and Leaders,” January 10, 2014. As a result of the designations, all property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which designated individuals and groups have any interest is blocked, and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions with them or to their benefit. 27 Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002. 28 See State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,” April 30, 2003; and U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee on Al Qaeda, “Tunisian Combatant Group,” 2002 designation. Congressional Research Service 10 Political Transition in Tunisia Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform Tunisians continue to debate how best to ensure accountability for past abuses while encouraging national reconciliation. Criminal charges have been brought against former President Ben Ali in absentia (he remains in Saudi Arabia), and against members of his family and former senior officials, in connection with allegations of corruption and abusive security force actions. However, the courts—some headed by judges appointed under Ben Ali—have acquitted or otherwise dropped many of these prosecutions over the past year, sparking controversy.29 The families of protesters who were killed in 2011 continue to call for justice and compensation. More broadly, there is a question of what approach to adopt toward mid- and low-level state employees and security force members who may have been complicit in past abuses, but did not command them. After much debate, Al Nahda agreed during the 2013 “political dialogue” not to support draft legislation that would have barred former regime officials from political participation, effectively killing the bill and, arguably, enabling Nidaa Tounes’s subsequent electoral advances. In December 2013, the Constituent Assembly adopted a law creating a Truth and Dignity Commission and “Specialized Judicial Chambers” that may initiate prosecutions. Their work remains nascent.30 The 2014 constitution also aims to increase judicial independence. Many Tunisians remain skeptical of the justice system, which was inherited from the Ben Ali era and is reportedly viewed as ineffective, subject to political influence, and, in some cases, corrupt. Transitional governments between 2011 and 2014 made little concrete progress in ensuring greater transparency and public oversight of the Interior Ministry and its components.31 The ministry oversees internal security, the intelligence services, and the police, and under Ben Ali it was associated with abuses such as extrajudicial arrests, domestic surveillance, intimidation of political opponents, and torture. Whether the Nidaa Tounes-led government will pursue reforms is uncertain, given the party’s emphasis on cracking down on security threats and the fact that several of its officials served in Ben Ali’s government. The National Constituent Assembly initiated, but did not complete, an effort to amend the controversial 2003 anti-terrorism law, which critics view as overly broad and insufficiently concerned with due process. Tensions between the security forces and various civilian leaders also emerged during the transitional period as pressures increased on the security forces to engage in high-risk counterterrorism operations, in the absence of structural reforms and in an atmosphere of political distrust.32 Tunisia’s military, estimated at about 35,000 personnel, has historically received fewer state resources than the internal security services, and many observers view it as relatively apolitical. It reportedly played a key role in influencing Ben Ali’s decision to step down during the 2011 protests, and reportedly refused an order to open fire on demonstrators. Since 2011, the military has taken on a more prominent role in counterterrorism and border security. The army remains popular, but its expanded mandate may risk overstretch. 29 Carlotta Gall, “Questions of Justice in Tunisia as Ousted Leaders Are Freed,” New York Times, July 16, 2014. See International Center for Transitional Justice, “Tunisia’s Specialized Judicial Chambers—Q&A with Judge Walid Melki,” September 4, 2014. 31 See, e.g., Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Security Sector Reform in Tunisia Three Years into the Democratic Transition, Arab Reform Initiative, July 2014. 32 Tunisia Live, “Slow Progress in Police Reform Since Revolution,” March 19, 2013; Al Arabiya, “Protesters Force Tunisian Leaders From Police Memorial Ceremony,” October 18, 2013; Al Jazeera via BBC Monitoring, “Tunisia Security Personnel Lament ‘Campaign’ To Weaken Establishment,” October 19, 2013. 30 Congressional Research Service 11 Political Transition in Tunisia The Economy Tunisia is an upper-middle-income country, and prior to 2011 was considered one of the bestperforming non-oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Textile exports, tourism, and phosphate mining are key sectors. Tunisia also exports agricultural products and petroleum, although it is a net energy-importer. Strong annual growth prior to 2011, however, masked inequalities that fed discontent. Wealth is concentrated in the capital and along the eastern coast, while the interior has long suffered from relative poverty and a lack of investment. Many Tunisians are highly educated, but the economy has generally created low-skilled and low-paid jobs, thus creating a large pool that is educated but underemployed. Socioeconomic grievances were a key factor in the 2011 uprising, but efforts to address them have been undermined by new economic strains. These are attributable, in part, to investor perceptions of political instability, negative regional security trends, and the economic downturn in the European Union (EU), Tunisia’s largest trading partner. Declines in tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been particularly damaging, and Tunisia’s international credit ratings have been repeatedly downgraded. Protests and labor disputes, in turn, have hampered efforts to attract investment. Unemployment remains high at 15.3%, and is reportedly higher among youth, particularly college graduates. The economy grew by 2.8% in 2014, a rebound compared to its contraction in 2011 but still insufficient to generate substantial jobs.33 In 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Tunisia agreed to a two-year, $1.75 billion loan program, of which about $1.15 billion had been disbursed as of December 2014.34 Additional financial stabilization support has been provided by bilateral partners, including Gulf countries and the United States. The IMF, World Bank, and U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation analysts broadly agree that Tunisia requires deep reforms to promote growth and job creation. They have urged Tunisia, for example, to loosen currency restrictions, liberalize its labor laws, restructure the banking sector, and reform investment regulations to allow greater private sector competition and to attract more foreign investment.35 The IMF has also urged fiscal stability measures such as reductions in state pensions and subsidies. Some fiscal reforms were initiated during the transitional period, but a series of interim leaders between 2011 and 2014 generally argued that only a future directlyelected government would have the legitimacy to undertake deeper reform efforts.36 Nidaa Tounes leaders have promised rapid growth, but they may face political obstacles. For example, further reductions in subsidies and pensions could impose hardships on some Tunisian households, while any move to reduce labor protections could produce a backlash from the powerful trade unions, which are secularist political allies. Meanwhile, banking sector and investment code regulatory reforms could face opposition from business leaders who have vested interests in the current system, many of whom have also supported the party. 33 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014. IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes Fifth Review Under Stand-By Arrangement for Tunisia; Approves US$104.8 Million Disbursement,” December 12, 2014. 35 See, e.g., IMF, Tunisia: Fifth Review under the Stand-By Arrangement [...], December 29, 2014; World Bank, The Unfinished Revolution: Bringing opportunity, good jobs and greater wealth to all Tunisians, May 2014; and MCC, Identifying Tunisia's Binding Constraints to Broad-Based Growth, January 2013. 36 Reuters, “Tunisia Economy Needs 3 Years of ‘Painful’ Reform, PM Says,” October 13, 2014. 34 Congressional Research Service 12 Political Transition in Tunisia Prior to 2011, Ben Ali family members and in-laws owned or controlled many of Tunisia’s biggest companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure or corruption. Since 2011, government agencies have seized such assets, including shares of private companies, and have auctioned some of them off. The process for recovering assets allegedly stashed overseas, in countries such as France and Switzerland, has proven complex and challenging, however.37 Foreign Relations The EU is Tunisia’s largest trading partner, and it provides trade benefits and aid. France is a leading source of investment and tourism revenues, but bilateral relations suffered in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising due to close French ties with the Ben Ali regime, as well as a distrust of Islamist political movements among many French politicians. Since 2011, Tunisian officials have appealed for increased Western financial assistance—including from the United States—while also seeking to increase ties with other Arab and African states.38 Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its larger, energy-rich neighbors, Algeria and Libya. The first official state visit by newly elected President Béji Caïd Essebsi was to Algeria, where he lauded efforts to increase bilateral counterterrorism cooperation.39 With regard to Libya, Caïd Essebsi has expressed support for regional political mediation and opposition to external military intervention.40 Turmoil in Libya is an economic concern in addition to a security concern for Tunisian officials. Previously, work opportunities in Libya helped to absorb some of Tunisia’s low-skilled labor surplus, while today, in addition to bemoaning the loss of such jobs, some Tunisians blame cross-border smuggling and the large number of Libyan refugees in their country for driving up prices. Former Interim President Moncef Marzouki attempted to revitalize the Arab Maghreb Union, which includes Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, but the organization remains inactive due to tensions between Morocco and Algeria, among other factors. Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians, and Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia had an interests office in Israel from 1996 until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, or uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Criticism of Israel and Israeli policies is common across Tunisia’s political spectrum, although Tunisia has also annually welcomed Israeli tourists during a pilgrimage to a historic synagogue on Djerba Island. In 2012, the Nahda-led government hosted visits by senior Hamas officials. U.S. Policy U.S. officials have repeatedly referred to Tunisia’s democratic transition as a model for other states in the Arab world and beyond. The Obama Administration has stated strong support for 37 See, e.g., La Tribune de Genève, “La restitution de fonds à la Tunisie annulée,” December 11, 2014. Reuters, “Economics, Politics Underpin Qatar Aid to North Africa,” August 16, 2012; AFP, “La Tunisie de l'après Ben Ali veut retrouver toute sa place en Afrique,” January 29, 2012. 39 AFP, “La Tunisie pas préparée à affronter seule le terrorisme, dit son président,” February 4, 2015. 40 Tout sur l’Algérie, “Caïd Essebsi s’exprime sur les relations avec l’Algérie, le Printemps arabe, la Libye et le Sahara occidental,” February 4, 2015. 38 Congressional Research Service 13 Political Transition in Tunisia Tunisia, and a desire to advance bilateral economic ties and deepen security cooperation. President Obama’s new National Security Strategy, released in February 2015, states, “We will work with Tunisia to further progress on building democratic institutions and strengthening its economy.” President Obama has also invited President Caïd Essebsi to visit Washington.41 In February 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Tunis, where he pledged “our commitment to stand with Tunisia ... to help move down this road to democracy.”42 Kerry also announced a new U.S.-Tunisia Strategy Dialogue, the first session of which was held in Washington in April 2014. Then-Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa, who led Tunisia’s delegation, met with President Obama at the White House. A joint statement emphasized support for “Tunisia’s historic democratic transition” and cooperation on economic development, educational and cultural affairs, and security and counterterrorism.43 U.S. officials have supported Tunisian efforts to attract greater foreign investment through aid, trade delegations, and negotiations under the U.S.-Tunisia bilateral trade investment framework agreement (TIFA), which was signed in 2002. The two countries also have a bilateral investment treaty and an agreement to avoid double taxation. In 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed support for free trade agreement, but there have been few concrete steps toward one.44 Tunisia is the United States’ 88th-largest trading partner; in 2013, U.S. exports to Tunisia totaled $870 million and imports $749 million.45 Given limited U.S. aid resources and structural obstacles to deepening bilateral economic ties—including a language barrier, Tunisia’s small domestic market, and its trade orientation toward Europe—U.S. policymakers may also seek to encourage other partners, such as the EU, to commit resources for Tunisia. U.S. engagement with Tunisian security forces prior to 2011 was heavily focused on conventional military grants and sales. A Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held. As terrorist threats have increased, and as the relationship between Tunisia’s government and its security services continues to evolve, the United States has provided new types of security assistance (see “U.S. Aid” below). Tunisian officials have welcomed this increased engagement, but the presence of U.S. military personnel, including those engaged in training activities, is politically sensitive.46 Tunisia cooperates with NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls. The attack on the U.S. embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012 appeared to lead to a temporary cooling of relations. The embassy was reportedly not well defended by Tunisian security forces during the attack, and although both governments attributed the attack to Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia, U.S. officials criticized Tunisia’s handling of the investigation and prosecution of suspects.47 In November 2013, FBI Director James Comey named Tunisia as one 41 The White House, “Readout of the President's Call with President Caid Essebsi,” January 5, 2015. State Department, “Secretary of State Kerry Holds News Conference in Tunis, Tunisia,” February 18, 2014. 43 The White House, “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Tunisian Republic,” April 4, 2014. 44 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, hearing, “FY13 Department of State and Foreign Operations Budget Request,” February 28, 2012. Progress toward an FTA would be subject to an interagency process and congressional approval, among other factors. 45 U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ on February 6, 2015. 46 David S. Cloud, “U.S. Military Presence in Africa Growing in Small Ways,” LA Times, March 7, 2014. 47 Then-Interior Minister Ali Laraydh, an Al Nahda official (and subsequent prime minister), publicly apologized for (continued...) 42 Congressional Research Service 14 Political Transition in Tunisia of two places, along with Libya, where AQIM, its affiliates and allies “pose a high threat to U.S. and Western interests... especially at embassies, hotels, and diplomatic facilities.”48 The State Department’s decision in March 2014 to lift a travel warning for Tunisia, ahead of then-Prime Minister Jomaa’s visit, appeared to signal increased U.S. confidence. U.S.-Tunisian relations date back over 200 years. Tunisia was also the site of significant World War II battles, and a U.S. cemetery and memorial in Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, despite an experiment with leftist economic policy in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian ties were strained by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some Tunisians viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.49 U.S. Aid U.S. bilateral aid to Tunisia prior to 2011 was relatively limited and highly focused on military assistance, with relatively modest funding allocations by Middle East standards. Developments in 2011 led the Administration to work with Congress to identify and reprogram hundreds of millions of dollars for new programs and initiatives, using funding appropriated in prior years and for other purposes. As a result, despite relatively small bilateral aid appropriations, the United States has allocated over $610 million in aid to Tunisia since 2011 (see Table 1below)— equivalent to over forty times the bilateral aid appropriation in FY2009. Since 2014, the State Department has referred to a “normalization” of Tunisia aid after initial, “urgent” reprogrammed funding.50 Administration officials have also signaled that they intend to increase aid given the successful 2014 elections. The Administration is requesting that Congress appropriate $134 million for Tunisia for FY2016, more than double its FY2015 request. This proposes an increase in the Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriation, from $30 million requested in FY2015 to $55 million, and an increase in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) from $25 million to $62.5 million. (Total FY2015 allocations will likely surpass the request, due to additional Defense Department funding as well as reprogrammed funds; see Table 1.) Prominent elements of U.S. economic assistance since 2011 include51: • a $100 million cash transfer in 2012 to help Tunisia meet its international debt obligations; (...continued) having initially “failed” to protect the embassy. On May 29, 2013, the U.S. embassy in Tunis released a public statement criticizing the relatively lenient sentences given to several low-level suspects in the Tunis embassy attack. The statement called for a “full investigation” and accused Tunisia’s government of failing to uphold its stated commitment to oppose those who use violence. 48 Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on “Threats to the Homeland,” November 14, 2013. 49 Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987. 50 Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, “The Middle East and North Africa FY2014 Budget: Priorities and Challenges,” May 22, 2013. 51 State Department Bureau of Foreign Assistance, response to CRS query, February 2015. See also The White House, “FACT SHEET: The President's Framework for Investing in Tunisia,” April 4, 2014; and “USAID Tunisia: Fact Sheet,” released by the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia, November 20, 2014. Congressional Research Service 15 Political Transition in Tunisia • $85 million for the cost of two sovereign loan guarantees (in 2012 and 2014) that enabled Tunisia to raise nearly $1 billion on the international bond markets; • $80 million allocated to date for a Tunisian-American “Enterprise Fund,” which is designed to make transformative investments in certain sectors of Tunisia’s economy while also spurring economic reforms52; • $49 million for programs administered by the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), focusing on strengthening civil society, political parties, the media, electoral processes, and local entrepreneurship; and • $16 million allocated for a USAID “Information and Communications Technology Competitiveness Project.” U.S. bilateral educational and cultural exchanges have also expanded. The United States has also provided economic aid through multilateral channels. International financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank (AfDB), and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which receive U.S. financing, have provided concessional loans, support for development projects, and advice on reforms. Group of Eight (G8) member states, including the United States, have also coordinated some aid for Tunisia through the Deauville Partnership, initiated in May 2011.53 As noted above (“U.S. Policy”), the United States has increased its security assistance to Tunisia since 2011 to support counterterrorism and security sector reform. Notable bilateral security assistance programs to date include: • at least $51 million in State Department-administered International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds for police and justice-sector reforms (not counting FY2015 appropriations); and • $40 million in Defense Department “Section 1206” funding for counterterrorismrelated train-and-equip programs. In August 2014, during the U.S.-African Leaders Summit in Washington D.C., the Administration announced that Tunisia would be one of six African focus countries of a new “Security Governance Initiative” (SGI). The program’s scope and implementation in Tunisia remain to be seen.54 Tunisia is also one of 11 countries participating in the U.S. State Department-led TransSahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, although the initiative has focused more on the poorer Sahel states of West Africa. In July 2014, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to agree to sell Tunisia defense articles and services worth an estimated $700 million, including 12 Black Hawk helicopters, through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Tunisia has also purchased at least two U.S.-made C-130J military transport aircraft in recent years.55 52 A GAO report released in February 2015 stated that the Tunisia enterprise fund had made one investment to date, of over $2.4 million, in a private equity fund that invests in Tunisian small and medium-sized enterprises. The report also identified several “gaps in implementation” of the Tunisia fund and a fund established for Egypt, which, it said, could “pose challenges for USAID's oversight.” Egypt and Tunisia Funds Are Established; Additional Steps Would Strengthen Compliance with USAID Grant Agreements and Other Requirements, GAO-15-196, February 2, 2015. 53 See Deauville MENA Transition Fund portfolio in Tunisia, at http://www.menatransitionfund.org/content/portfolio. As of January 2015, the United States has provided $30 million to the fund. 54 See The White House, “Fact Sheet: Security Governance Initiative,” August 6, 2014. 55 AP, “US Delivers Tunisia 2nd Military Transport Plane to Bolster Fight Against Terrorism,” January 8, 2015. Congressional Research Service 16 Political Transition in Tunisia Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Tunisia Since 2011 $ Millions TOTAL FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 (req./est.) FY2016 (req.) 138.62 251.92 125.06 63.48 96.75 (see note b) 134.40 Subtotal, Bilateral Aida 81.48 211.34 107.70 57.78 65.98 (req.)b 134.40 ESF 57.85 154.80 74.47 25.00 30.00 55.00 FMF 17.12 29.50 20.55 20.00 25.00 62.50 IMET 1.95 1.84 2.16 2.30 2.00 2.30 INCLE 1.50 22.50 8.00 9.00 7.00 2.00 NADR 3.06 2.70 2.52 1.48 1.98 0.60 Subtotal, State & USAID regional, global, and centrallymanaged economic assistance (multiple accounts) 36.65 26.53 14.64 5.00 - - State Department MEPI (ESF) 23.47 8.63 12.50 5.00 - - Subtotal, State & Defense Department global and centrally managed security assistance (multiple accounts) 17.07 12.01 2.72 0.70 30.77 - Defense Department “Section 1206” 13.03 6.87 - - 20.77 - - - - 10.00 - 2.05 - - INCLE (prior-year) reprogrammed in Nov. 2014 Subtotal, humanitarian assistance (multiple accounts) - 3.43 - - Source: State Department, Bureau of Foreign Assistance, estimated allocations as of January 2015. Notes: Allocations do not necessarily correspond to appropriations by year, and are subject to shift. Other than “Section 1206,” does not include non-State Department/USAID foreign assistance resources. Multi-country programs that may, in part, benefit Tunisian participants are also excluded. Totals may not sum due to rounding. ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs; “-” = none or to be determined. a. Includes funding reprogrammed for Tunisia after being appropriated for other countries and/or purposes. b. FY2015 bilateral allocations not yet available. Congressional Research Service 17 Political Transition in Tunisia Recent Legislation Congress authorized loan guarantees and the creation of the Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund in the FY2012 Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Division I of P.L. 112-74). Some Members of Congress, however, called in 2012 for cutting U.S. aid over Tunisia’s handling of an alleged suspect in the terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya.56 Congress has made new funds available for loan guarantees and the enterprise fund in the FY2014 and FY2015 foreign aid appropriations acts (Sec. 7034 [r], Division J of P.L. 113-235; and Sec. 7041[g], Division K of P.L. 113-76). The explanatory statement accompanying PP.L. 113-235 specifically provides $30 million in ESF budget authority for Tunisia, the same as the Administration’s FY2015 request.57 The FY2014 Department of State, Foreign Operations, And Related Programs Appropriations Act (Division K of P.L. 113-76) prohibited any foreign assistance from being used to support a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) “threshold” program in a country that is not a candidate for a full MCC compact. The Administration had planned a roughly $20 million MCC threshold grant for Tunisia that was to focus on addressing constraints to economic growth and job creation.58 However, Tunisia’s relatively high income level currently makes it ineligible for a compact, although its income had dipped to an eligible level in FY2011, the year from which the MCC intended to draw funding. The Joint Explanatory Statement on P.L. 113-76 referred explicitly to Tunisia, stating that, “Efforts by the Administration to provide MCC assistance to countries that do not meet MCC criteria undermine the integrity of the MCC model.” Outlook Tunisia has peacefully achieved many milestones since 2011, prompting observers to portray it as the lone success story of the “Arab Spring.” Internal political tensions, socioeconomic pressures, terrorist threats, and regional dynamics are likely to pose ongoing challenges. Despite a relative lack of conflict, Tunisia remains a potential locus of regional struggles among rival political ideologies, and among violent extremist groups vying for prominence and recruits. Key questions include whether Tunisia’s new elected government is likely to remain cohesive, and whether it will advance political and economic reforms, foster civil liberties while engaging in counterterrorism, and satisfy popular demands for quality-of-life improvements. Tunisian leaders have welcomed U.S. assistance since 2011, but the local appetite for outside policy influence, now that the transitional period is formally over, remains to be seen. 56 See, e.g., The Cable, “Graham Threatens Tunisia Over U.S. Access to Benghazi Suspect,” October 31, 2012; Rep. Frank Wolf, “Cut Off Aid to Tunisia in Light of Obstructing Benghazi Investigation,” December 11, 2012; and The Washington Times, “Benghazi Attack Suspect’s Release Spurs Calls to Punish Tunisia,” January 9, 2013. The suspect, Ali Ani al Harzi, a Tunisian, was detained in Turkey and transferred to Tunisian custody in October 2012. U.S. investigators were reportedly initially denied permission to question him in Tunisian custody, and he was released from detention in January 2013 due to a purported lack of evidence. According to news reports, Al Harzi was later implicated in the two political assassinations in 2013 and charged in Tunisia with belonging to a terrorist organization. 57 State Department, FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, March 2014. 58 State Department, “U.S. Government Assistance to Tunisia,” December 14, 2012. On MCC threshold grants, see CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation, by Curt Tarnoff. Congressional Research Service 18 Political Transition in Tunisia Author Contact Information Alexis Arieff Analyst in African Affairs aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459 Congressional Research Service Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314 19