Political Transition in Tunisia
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
March 4, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21666
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Political Transition in Tunisia
Summary
On January 14, 2011, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country for Saudi Arabia
following weeks of mounting anti-government protests. Tunisia’s mass popular uprising, dubbed
the “Jasmine Revolution,” appears to have added momentum to anti-government and pro-reform
sentiment in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Jordan, and other countries. Although Tunisia’s pro-
democracy movement has been internationally heralded, it has also contributed to concern over
stability in a region long associated with seemingly secure, autocratic, pro-Western regimes.
Ben Ali’s departure was greeted by widespread euphoria within Tunisia. However, political
instability, economic crisis, and insecurity are continuing challenges. On February 27, amid a
resurgence in anti-government demonstrations, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi (a
holdover from Ben Ali’s administration) stepped down and was replaced by Béji Caïd Essebsi, an
elder statesman from the administration of the late founding President Habib Bourguiba. On
March 3, the interim government announced a new transition “road map” that would entail the
election on July 24 of a “National Constituent Assembly.” The Assembly would, in turn, be
charged with reforming Tunisia’s constitution ahead of expected presidential and parliamentary
elections, which have not been scheduled. The protest movement has greeted the road map as a
victory, but many questions remain concerning its implementation.
Until January, Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party exerted near-total
control over parliament, state and local governments, and most political activity. The government
cultivated strong ties with France and the European Union, its largest trading partner, as well as
with the United States. Despite many political and economic characteristics shared across the
region, Tunisia exhibits a number of unique attributes: it has a relatively small territory, a large
and highly educated middle class, and a long history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic
freedoms. Tunisia’s Islamist movement has not played a leading role in the expression of
domestic dissent in recent years, although it did in the 1980s before it was banned by Ben Ali.
Tunisia’s unexpected and rapid transition raises a wide range of questions for the future of the
country and the region. These pertain to the struggle between reformists and entrenched forces
carried over from the former regime; the potential shape of the new political order; the future role
of Islamist and/or radical movements in the government and society; the role of the military and
domestic security services; and the difficult diplomatic balance—for the United States and other
actors—of encouraging greater democratic openness while not undermining other foreign policy
priorities. Congress may play a role in developments through its foreign assistance policies and
through its oversight of U.S.-Tunisia relations and broader U.S. policy toward the Middle East.
U.S.-Tunisian relations are highly focused on military assistance and counterterrorism. The
Obama Administration, which grew increasingly critical of Ben Ali’s government as protests
mounted, has since pledged to support Tunisia’s democratic transition and has called for free and
fair elections. However, Administration officials have not specified what types of democracy-
related assistance may be forthcoming, and the Administration’s FY2012 bilateral aid request
does not include any non-military funding. Congress has been supportive of security assistance
programs in Tunisia, directing the State Department in FY2009 and FY2010 to allocate levels of
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) that surpassed budget requests by the executive branch.
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Contents
Recent Developments.................................................................................................................. 1
New Prime Minister and Transition “Road Map”................................................................... 1
Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”................................................................................................... 2
Reforms Pledged................................................................................................................... 4
Security Concerns ................................................................................................................. 5
Relations with the United States .................................................................................................. 6
The U.S. Response to Recent Events ..................................................................................... 7
U.S. Assistance ..................................................................................................................... 9
Congress and Bilateral Aid............................................................................................ 10
Emerging Actors ....................................................................................................................... 12
The Trade Unions................................................................................................................ 12
The Security Forces ............................................................................................................ 13
The “Legal” Opposition Parties ........................................................................................... 14
The Islamist Movement....................................................................................................... 15
Background on Tunisia ............................................................................................................. 19
The Ben Ali Government (1987-January 2011).................................................................... 20
Human Rights ............................................................................................................... 21
Emergence of Discontent .............................................................................................. 21
Terrorism ............................................................................................................................ 22
The Economy...................................................................................................................... 23
Foreign Relations ................................................................................................................ 24
Israel and the Palestinians ............................................................................................. 24
Europe .......................................................................................................................... 24
Regional Relations ........................................................................................................ 25
Outlook..................................................................................................................................... 26
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Tunisia ............................................................................................................. 2
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Aid to Tunisia, Selected Accounts......................................................................... 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 27
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 27
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Recent Developments
New Prime Minister and Transition “Road Map”
On February 27, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi (a holdover from the former regime)
stepped down amid a resurgence of anti-government demonstrations. He was replaced by Béji
Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman from the administration of founding President Habib Bourguiba.
Several other government ministers also announced their resignations, including the two last
remaining holdovers from the former regime as well as two opposition party leaders. During the
week, tens of thousands of protesters had rallied in Tunis to call for Ghannouchi’s dismissal and a
new interim government. Some reportedly shouted, “We don’t want the friends of Ben Ali!”1 The
protests turned violent on February 26, and rioters attacked the Interior Ministry with knives and
stones, according to news reports. Five protesters were reportedly killed and 16 security officers
injured. In his first public appearance as prime minister, Essebsi stated that his priorities would be
to address security, reverse the economic crisis, and “to restore the prestige of the state.”2 His is
Tunisia’s third interim government since Ben Ali’s departure on January 14, 2011.
On March 3, Interim President Mebazaa announced a new transition “road map,” in which
Tunisians will vote on July 24 to select a “National Constituent Assembly.” The Assembly will, in
turn, be charged with reforming the constitution ahead of expected presidential and parliamentary
elections, which have not been scheduled. Mebazaa stated that new electoral laws would be
promulgated by late March to serve as the legal framework for the July 24 vote.3 Tunisia’s
parliament, which was dominated by supporters of the former regime, voted on February 9 to
allow Interim President Mebazaa to rule by decree and has since suspended its activities.
Interim authorities appear to be sincerely attempting to respond to the public’s demands for a
transformation of the political system based on broad consultations, and the announcement of the
transition road map has reportedly been greeted as a victory by the protest movement. However,
many questions remain concerning its implementation. These include the duration, mandate,
authorities, and mode of operation of the Constituent Assembly once it is elected. Another central
challenge facing Tunisia’s interim government is how to assert control over the size and mandate
of the domestic security services, which formed a vast and repressive network under Ben Ali,
without sowing the seeds of future instability. (See “The Security Forces,” below.)
Labor strikes and localized demonstrations over wages, quality of life issues, and access to land
have also surged in recent weeks, and some have led to rioting and violence. Some rights
advocates have accused members of the former regime’s security apparatus of infiltrating
demonstrations to provoke violence.4 Since Ben Ali’s departure, the government’s response to
protests has been relatively tempered, with security forces largely relying on nonlethal crowd-
control tactics, and the focus of security forces has turned toward containing disorder. However,
1 Reuters, “Tunisia Forces Fire in Air, Fail to End Rally,” February 20, 2011.
2 Tarek Amara, “Tunisian Interim PM to Appoint New Government,” Reuters, March 4, 2011.
3 Agence Tunis Afrique Presse (TAP), “Interim President Announces Election of National Constituent Assembly on
July 24,” March 3, 2011.
4 Eric Goldstein/Human Rights Watch, “Dismantling the Machinery of Oppression,” The Wall Street Journal, February
16, 2011.
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in some instances, police have reportedly assaulted protesters and journalists. Although ongoing
protests are evidence that Tunisians are exploring new-found freedoms of expression and
assembly, they have also led analysts to fear that vast expectations of immediate change could
undermine Tunisia’s ability to make steady process on institutional reforms.5 Mebazaa has
appealed for “patience” from those demanding wage increases and better living conditions.6
Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in power
Figure 1. Map of Tunisia
since 1987, fled the country for Saudi Arabia
on January 14, 2011, following weeks of
mounting anti-government protests. Tunisia’s
popular uprising, dubbed the “Jasmine
Revolution,” appears to have inspired reform
and opposition movements in Egypt, Libya,
Yemen, Jordan, Algeria, and other countries.
The pro-democracy movement has been
internationally heralded, but the wave of
protests across the Middle East has also
sparked international concern over stability in
a region associated with previously secure,
autocratic, pro-Western regimes.
The unexpected and rapid transition in
Tunisia raises a wide range of questions for
the future of the country and the region.
Questions for U.S. policy include:
• To what extent is Tunisia a “test-
case” for democratic transitions in the
Middle East?
• To what extent is Tunisia a priority
for U.S. policy in the region?
• How, if at all, should the U.S.
government reshape its assistance
programs for Tunisia in response to
recent and continuing events?
• What has been the impact to date of
U.S. public statements and actions?
Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS
• What are the prospects for future U.S.
influence on the evolution of events?
5 Soumaya Ghannoushi, “The Story of Tunisia Today,” The Guardian, February 16, 2011.
6 Reuters, “Tunisia Struggles to Tame Revolutionary Spirit,” February 15, 2011.
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• What course of U.S. action will be most likely to fulfill foreign policy and
national security goals?
Mohamed Ghannouchi, who had served as prime minister since 1999, initially assumed power in
Ben Ali’s absence. On January 15, Ghannouchi turned over the role of acting president to the
speaker of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, in line with constitutional prerogatives.7 The first interim
cabinet, which was announced on January 17, was immediately revealed to be unstable as
members of the public accused opposition leaders and civil society members of being overly
conciliatory to elements of the former regime. A day after being appointed, the trade union
members of the interim government withdrew, along with an opposition party leader, and
demonstrators called for the complete dissolution of Ben Ali’s Rally for Constitutional
Democracy (RCD) party. Mebazaa, Ghannouchi, and other RCD members in the cabinet formally
resigned from the party, but this did not bring an end to demonstrations. In late January, new
waves of protesters streamed into the capital from poorer, rural areas—including the town of Sidi
Bouzid, where demonstrations first began—and organized a sit-in around the prime minister’s
office. This pressure prompted the announcement of a new cabinet on January 27, which initially
quieted anti-government unrest, until its resurgence in mid-February over Ghannouchi’s
continuation as prime minister.
The rapid and unexpected transition in Tunisia has prompted many analysts to examine the roles
and views of Tunisia’s security forces, of which some members led the crackdown on
demonstrators while others reportedly influenced Ben Ali’s decision to resign. Speculation
centered, in particular, around General Rachid Ammar, the army chief of staff, who is widely
reported to have refused orders to open fire on demonstrators and to have subsequently pushed
for Ben Ali’s departure. On January 24, Ammar publicly addressed demonstrators, promising to
uphold Tunisia’s “revolution” and that the military would guarantee stability until elections are
held. While Ammar’s comments were welcomed by many members of the public, they sparked
concern among some observers over whether the armed forces, which were seen as relatively
apolitical under Ben Ali, could become an arbiter of domestic politics, particularly if the security
situation fails to stabilize (see “The Security Forces,” below).8
The December-January Protests
Anti-government protests began in Tunisia’s interior in mid-December 2010. Public demonstrations had previously
been very rare in Tunisia, where state repression and the close surveillance of dissidents have traditionally been
effective at curbing the expression of anti-government views. The demonstrations initially seemed to stem from
discontent related to high unemployment, but quickly spiraled into an unprecedented popular challenge to Ben Ali’s
authoritarian regime. From the start, protesters appeared to lack a central leader and were not necessarily aligned
with a pre-existing political or ideological movement.
Unrest was first reported on December 17 in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street vendor set
himself on fire to protest police interference and a lack of economic opportunities. He died in early January in a Tunis
hospital. By late December, the protests had spread to the nearby cities of Kasserine and Thala, as well as other
urban centers. On January 12, riots erupted in the capital, Tunis. The military deployed to the streets and a national
curfew was imposed. The following day, rioters ransacked a private home belonging to one of Ben Ali’s wealthy
relatives in the beach community of Hammamet, underscoring the deep antipathy many Tunisians felt toward
7 Article 57 of Tunisia’s constitution states that “should the office of President of the Republic become vacant because
of death, resignation, or absolute disability,” the President of the Chamber of Deputies “shall immediately be vested
with the functions of interim president of the republic for a period ranging from 45 to 60 days.” The Article further
stipulates that elections should be held during that time period to elect a new president for a five-year term, and that the
interim president may not stand as a candidate.
8 Richard Valdmanis, “Tunisia’s Turmoil Raises Risk of Army Takeover,” Reuters, March 2, 2011.
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members of the ruling elite. Authorities imposed a state of emergency on January 14, prohibiting gatherings of over
three people and authorizing the use of force against “any suspect person who does not obey orders to stop.”9
As the demonstrations mounted in early January, police repeatedly opened fire on crowds and arrested protesters,
journalists, opposition party members, lawyers, and rights advocates. Some detainees were reportedly tortured.10
According to the United Nations, over 200 people were killed in the uprising.11 On January 18, then-Prime Minister
Ghannouchi said on television that he had instructed the security forces not to open fire on demonstrators, and
promised that “all those who initiated this massacre, this carnage, will be brought to justice.”12 Interim President
Mebazaa has referred to those who died in the uprising as “the martyrs of dignity and freedom,” and three days of
national mourning were held in their honor.13 The government has also pledged to compensate victims’ families.
Prior to his exile, Ben Ali offered a widening series of concessions on political and civil rights in an effort to stem the
anti-government uprising. The president reshuffled his cabinet, replaced the governor of the Sidi Bouzid region and
the interior minister, and promised 300,000 new jobs. At the same time, he initially maintained that police had used
their weapons only in “legitimate defense” against attacks by demonstrators, and accused protest leaders of being
foreign-influenced “extremists” and terrorists.14 On January 13, Ben Ali gave an address on national television in
which he pledged to step down when his term was up in 2014, to al ow fresh parliamentary elections before then, and
to end state censorship. However, these promises did not placate demonstrators, who continued to press for Ben
Ali’s immediate resignation and the dissolution of the ruling party.
Reforms Pledged
Government officials have promised a range of political reforms, including freedom of
expression, the lifting of controls on the Internet, the recognition of formerly banned political
movements, a general amnesty for their members, the release of political prisoners, and the lifting
of restrictions on the Tunisian League for Human Rights.
The interim government has formed working committees to:
1. Advise on political and legal reforms, including a new electoral law;
2. Investigate recent human rights violations, including those reportedly committed
by security forces during the December-January protests; and
3. Investigate corruption by the former ruling elite.
In connection with the latter, the public prosecutor has announced an investigation into the
financial and real estate holdings of Ben Ali; his wife, Leila Trabelsi; and selected family
members. Members of the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families reportedly own or control many of the
country’s biggest companies, and are thought to have stashed away significant resources
overseas.15 On January 26, the interim government issued an international arrest warrant through
(...continued)
9 Tunisia 7 Television, “Tunisian Authorities Declare State of Emergency,” January 14, 2011, via Open Source Center.
10 Reuters, “Interview-UN Rights Boss Urges Tunisia to Probe Killings,” January 13, 2011.
11 As of February 1, the United Nations estimated that at least 219 people were killed, including 72 killed in prison
fires.
12 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Tunisia Unity Government Fractures,” The New York Times, January 18, 2011.
13 National Tunisian TV (Tunis), “Tunisian Acting President Promises to ‘Protect Will of the People,’” January 19,
2011, via Open Source Center.
14 Global Insight, “Unrest in Tunisia Highlights Underlying Troubles,” January 7, 2011; Agence France Presse (AFP),
“Tunisia Leader Slams ‘Terrorist Acts,’ Pledges More Jobs,” January 10, 2011.
15 Colin Freeman, “Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and His Family’s ‘Mafia Rule,’” The Telegraph (UK),
January 16, 2011.
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Interpol for Ben Ali and several close relatives who have fled the country. At least 33 members of
the extended family have reportedly been arrested inside Tunisia.16 These efforts are perceived to
be widely popular among ordinary Tunisians; in the days before Ben Ali’s exit, protesters trashed
and looted luxury homes belonging to members of the ruling elite.
Western governments are cooperating with Tunisian efforts to pursue members of the former
president’s family: France, Switzerland, and the European Union have initiated asset freezes,
while Canada has revoked the citizenship of Ben Ali’s brother-in-law. It is unclear what position
Saudi Arabia, which granted sanctuary to Ben Ali and some members of his family, will take;
Tunisian authorities have sought his extradition to face charges related to the crackdown on
protesters, so far unsuccessfully. On February 18, news reports alleged that Ben Ali was in a
Saudi hospital after suffering a stroke.
Reports indicate several signs of progress in implementing reforms. Thousands of individuals
identified as political prisoners have been released from jail, including over a thousand released
under an amnesty decree approved on February 18, and prisons have been opened up to
international human rights observers.17 Many online restrictions have been lifted, and the media
are exploring vast new freedoms. The dismantling of the former regime’s security apparatus is
ongoing. Most recently, the Interior Ministry announced on March 7 that it was dissolving the
State Security Division and other entities that functioned as “political police.” The number of
affected personnel and their future status within the government have not been made public.
Observers have questioned whether those in charge of reform committees and official
investigations will be able to work independently and whether their conclusions will be
implemented.18 Another question is whether the interim authorities, who continue to face
opposition, have sufficient space and credibility to sell proposed reforms to the public.
Security Concerns
Although the situation has stabilized relative to the chaotic days that immediately followed Ben
Ali’s departure, concerns over security remain. There have been reports of vandalism, looting,
and activities by armed gangs. Tunisia is also struggling with an influx of tens of thousands of
refugees from neighboring Libya and a mounting humanitarian crisis along the Libyan border to
the southeast. As noted above, anti-government protests turned violent on February 26 and
culminated in an assault on the Interior Ministry building. Interim government officials blamed a
previous attack on the Interior Ministry, on February 1, on a conspiracy by members of the former
regime’s security forces.
The police leadership was purged following the February 1 attack. However, suspicions remain
that elements of the security services are seeking to provoke disorder. The interim government
has extended the “state of emergency” imposed by Ben Ali during the initial wave of protests
16 Reuters, “Factbox—Tunisia’s Ex-First Family and Its Vast Riches,” January 19, 2011.
17 Analysts have pointed to the difficulty in distinguishing prisoners of conscience from suspects who may have been
sentenced without due process, including under Tunisia’s heavy-handed terrorism laws. Many former terrorist suspects
have been released, but an unknown number, estimated at “a dozen” in one news report, continue to be detained. Le
Monde, “Tunisie: Tous les Prisonniers Politiques Auraient Eté Libérés,” March 2, 2011.
18 Lin Noueihed, "Une Commission Enqêtera sur les Forces de Sécurité en Tunisie," Reuters, January 22, 2011.
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(though its provisions barring the public assembly of more than three persons have not been
strictly enforced), and has called up military reservists to assist with security operations.
Incidents of religiously motivated violence have also been reported, including the murder of a
Polish priest on February 18 and harassment directed at Tunisia’s tiny Jewish population. These
acts were condemned by the interim authorities and Tunisia’s main Islamist movement, as well as
by hundreds of Tunisians who demonstrated on February 19 in favor of a secular state. The
Interior Ministry stated that the priest’s killing appeared to have been carried out by “extremist
terrorist fascists,” and vowed that those responsible would be severely punished.19 Islamist
activists have also staged demonstrations in front of brothels, which police have dispersed;
unusually for the region, prostitution is legal in Tunisia.
Some analysts fear that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional affiliate of Al
Qaeda (see “Terrorism,” below), could take advantage of the uprising and subsequent insecurity.
AQIM released a statement in January hailing the departure of Ben Ali and warning against
supposed U.S. and French efforts to subvert the revolution. Al Qaeda’s second-in-command,
Ayman Al Zawahri, also released a statement that sought to portray uprisings in Tunisia and
Egypt as motivated by Islamist sentiment and warned that the United States would seek to
manipulate the outcomes.20
Relations with the United States
The United States and Tunisia have enjoyed continuous relations since 1797, prior to French
colonization. Tunisia was the site of major battles during World War II, and was liberated by
Allied forces in 1943 as part of the Allied campaign known as Operation Torch. A U.S. cemetery
and memorial near the ancient city of Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military
dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a strongly pro-Western foreign policy despite a brief
experiment with leftist economic policies in the 1960s. U.S.-Tunisian ties were nonetheless
strained in the mid-1980s by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
headquarters in Tunis, which some viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.21
U.S.-Tunisian relations largely emphasize security cooperation. The United States considered Ben
Ali to be an ally, a moderate Arab ruler, and a partner in international counterterrorism efforts.
Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism
surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows
NATO ships to make port calls at Tunis. Allegations have been made that Tunisia cooperated in at
least one case of U.S. “rendition” of a terrorist suspect, in 2004.22 However, Tunisia did not
support the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 war against Iraq and, when the 2003 war in Iraq began,
19 Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia: Government, Islamist Party Condemn Grisly Slaying of Catholic Priest,” The
Associated Press (AP), February 19, 2011.
20 Maamoun Youssef, “Al-Qaida's No. 2 Incites Tunisians, Egyptians,” AP, February 28, 2011.
21 Chicago Tribune Wires, “Bush Visits Tunisia to Patch Relations,” March 9, 1986; Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left
Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987.
22 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, December 28, 2010, U.N. document
A/HRC/16/51/Add.2.
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Ben Ali expressed regret and fear that the conflict might destabilize the Middle East.23 Tunisian
officials’ criticism was not voiced directly at the United States, and their stance did not
significantly harm bilateral relations.
Despite generally positive bilateral ties, U.S. officials occasionally publicly expressed concern
over Tunisia’s record on political rights and freedom of expression. The State Department was
critical of the 2004 and 2009 elections and said the United States would continue to press for
“political reform.”24 In a January 2010 speech on global Internet freedom, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton singled out Tunisia as one of five countries contributing to a “spike in threats to
the free flow of information.”25 In July, the State Department expressed “deep” concern over “the
decline in political freedoms, notably severe restrictions on freedom of expression in Tunisia,”
particularly with regard to the sentencing of an independent journalist to four years in prison.26 In
parallel with these expressions of concern, the United States continued to provide military and
economic assistance to the Tunisian government (see “U.S. Assistance,” below).
Numerous international and regional news reports and analyses have referenced internal
communications among U.S. diplomats that were reportedly highly critical of political repression
and corruption among Ben Ali’s inner circle and family. Some analysts have speculated that
reports of such communications may have played a role in sparking anti-government protests that
eventually unseated Ben Ali.27 The United States criticized Tunisia’s repression of the protesters,
and since Ben Ali’s departure has conveyed support for the uprising and new interim government
(see “The U.S. Response to Recent Events,” below).
U.S.-Tunisian trade is relatively low in volume because Tunisia is a small country and conducts
most of its trade with Europe. In 2009, the United States imported $325.8 million in goods from
Tunisia and exported $502.1 million in goods to Tunisia. While Tunisian imports of U.S. goods
did not fluctuate significantly due to the global economic recession, U.S. imports from Tunisia
nearly halved between 2008 and 2009.28 Tunisia is eligible for special trade preferences, that is,
duty-free entry for listed products, under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Program.
The United States and Tunisia have a trade investment framework agreement (TIFA) and a
bilateral investment treaty. TIFAs can be the first step toward a free-trade agreement (FTA).
The U.S. Response to Recent Events
U.S. criticism of the government’s response to the December-January demonstrations, although
initially muted, mounted as the protests grew. On January 7, the State Department released a
statement relaying concern about the demonstrations and government Internet surveillance. The
23 Tunis Infotunisie, “Ben Ali Expresses ‘Deep Regret’ at Start of War Against Iraq,” March 20, 2003, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document AFP20030320000266.
24 U.S. State Department Daily News Briefing, October 26, 2009, via CQ; U.S. State Department, “Tunisia,” Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004, released February 28, 2005.
25 U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks on Internet Freedom,” January 21, 2010; via
CQ.
26 U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, July 9, 2010. For further background on Boukadous’ sentencing, see
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Tunisia Must Release Ailing Journalist on Hunger Strike,” October 21, 2010.
27 Christopher Alexander, “Tunisia’s Protest Wave: Where It Comes From and What It Means,” ForeignPolicy.com,
January 3, 2011.
28 U.S. International Trade Commission data.
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statement called on “all parties to show restraint as citizens exercise their right of public
assembly” and noted that U.S. officials had “conveyed our views directly to the Tunisian
government.”29 In response, the Tunisian government summoned U.S. Ambassador Gordon Gray
to protest the United States’ characterization of events.
On January 11, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an interview with the Saudi-funded
Arabic-language satellite television channel Al Arabiya that “we are worried, in general, about the
unrest and the instability, and what seems to be the underlying concerns of the people who are
protesting.”30 At the same time, Clinton stressed that “we are not taking sides,” and indicated that
she had not been in direct communication with senior authorities since the protests began. In a
speech in Doha, Qatar, on January 13, Secretary Clinton challenged Middle Eastern leaders to
address the fundamental needs of their citizens and provide channels for popular participation, or
else risk facing instability and extremism. Events in Tunisia provided a vivid backdrop to her
remarks.
Following Ben Ali’s departure on January 14, President Barack Obama stated, “I condemn and
deplore the use of violence against citizens peacefully voicing their opinion in Tunisia, and I
applaud the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people.” He also called on the Tunisian
government to hold “free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the true will and
aspirations of the Tunisian people.”31 Secretary Clinton echoed the president’s call for free and
fair elections and also called for the Tunisian government to “build a stronger foundation for
Tunisia’s future with economic, social, and political reforms.” She added, “On my trip to the
Middle East this week, I heard people everywhere yearning for economic opportunity, political
participation and the chance to build a better future. Young people especially need to have a
meaningful role in the decisions that shape their lives. Addressing these concerns will be
challenging, but the United States stands ready to help.”32
In his January 25 State of the Union address, President Obama stated:
[W]e saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more
powerful than the writ of a dictator…. The United States of America stands with the people
of Tunisia and supports the democratic aspirations of all people.
In testimony on February 10 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Deputy Secretary of
State James Steinberg noted that Tunisia would “serve as an important test case…. the people of
the region are watching closely to see how Tunisia navigates the challenging transition to
democratic governance.” He added, “We fully support this effort,” and listed free and fair
elections, “vibrant” political parties, and free media as key ingredients in a successful transition.33
The State Department has maintained close contact with interim authorities since Ben Ali’s
departure. On January 22, Secretary of State Clinton called then-Prime Minister Ghannouchi to
29 U.S. State Department, “Recent Protests and Website Hackings in Tunisia,” January 7, 2011.
30 AFP, “US Concerned About Reports of ‘Excessive Force’ in Tunisia,” January 11, 2011; and U.S. State Department,
“Secretary of State Interviewed on Al Arabiya,” January 11, 2011, via Congressional Quarterly (CQ).
31 The White House, “Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
32 U.S. State Department, “Recent Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
33 House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, “Developments in Egypt and Lebanon,” February 10, 2011, Statement of
James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, Department of State.
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express support for reforms.34 From January 24 through January 26, the State Department’s
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, traveled to Tunisia to meet with
government officials, political party leaders, and civil society members. This was followed by a
visit in late February by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Joseph Burns. On
January 22, the State Department announced it had revoked the diplomatic visas of former
Tunisian government officials and their family members, who were no longer entitled to them.35
Several Members of Congress have expressed concern that the United States appeared to lack
sufficient intelligence on Middle East protest movements and their potential to upset governments
in the region, concerns which executive branch officials have disputed.36 Congressman Howard
Berman, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has urged the executive
branch to assist Tunisia’s interim authorities in locating and seizing assets linked to the Ben Ali
regime, as several other governments have pledged to do.37 On February 9, the Wall Street
Journal reported that U.S. investigators had opened a preliminary probe into assets controlled by
Ben Ali and family members, though U.S. officials have not confirmed whether this is true.38
U.S. Assistance
U.S. aid is modest by regional standards and focuses on military assistance, arms sales, and
counterterrorism cooperation. Obama Administration officials have indicated that they will
provide support for Tunisia’s democratic transition, but have not specified what types of aid may
be forthcoming. Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg indicated in congressional
testimony that “global democracy funds,” the State Department’s Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI), and the Complex Crises Fund could be vehicles for short-term assistance.39
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner stated in a press conference that “we’re going to be very
active in working with the international community to lend a hand to those governments in
helping support that process of reform,” but declined to give concrete examples or identify
potential funding resources.40 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) stated
that it would send an “expert humanitarian team” to Tunisia to assist in responding to the massive
influx of refugees from neighboring Libya.41 The State Department’s FY2012 Congressional
Budget Request for Foreign Operations, if enacted, represents a decrease in bilateral assistance
for Tunisia compared to FY2010 levels and includes no non-military aid (see Table 1, below).
MEPI has a regional office in Tunis, responsible for programming to enhance political, economic,
and educational reforms in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Morocco as well as Tunisia, which
opened in August 2004. However, MEPI has implemented very few bilateral programs in Tunisia.
34 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Clinton’s Call to Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi,” January 23,
2011.
35 U.S. Embassy, Tunisia, “Revocation of Diplomatic Visas,” January 22, 2011.
36 Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on
Worldwide Threats, February 10, 2011, via CQ.
37 Office of Congressman Berman, “Rep. Berman Urges Quick U.S. Action to Seize Stolen Tunisian Funds,” February
8, 2011.
38 Joseph Palazzolo, “FBI Probe to Target Tunisia’s Ex-Leader,” The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2011.
39 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, “Developments in Egypt and Lebanon,” February 10, 2011, Statement of
James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, Department of State.
40 “Secretary of the Treasury Geithner Discusses Economy with Reporters,” February 23, 2011, via CQ.
41 State Department Daily News Briefing, February 28, 2011, via CQ.
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Critics suggested that the United States sent mixed signals to Ben Ali by aiding the military while
not strongly supporting democratizing elements, despite expressing a desire to see reform in the
Middle East.
A U.S.-Tunisian Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held regularly.
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reports that Tunisia relies on U.S. Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) assistance to “maintain its aging 80’s and early 90’s era inventory of
U.S.-origin equipment, which comprises nearly 70% of Tunisia’s total inventory.”42 According to
private sector analysis, the United States is Tunisia’s primary supplier of military equipment,
largely purchased through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements.43 FMF and “Section 1206”44
security assistance funds have also provided Tunisia with equipment for border and coastal
security, which the United States views as a key area of counterterrorism prevention. Since 2003,
this equipment has included helicopters, machine guns, body armor and helmets, parachutes, and
night vision devices for sniper rifles. Other equipment has been provided through the State
Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, with plans to procure seven Scan Eagle
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with $4.1 million in FY2008 PKO funds forfeited by
Mauritania (which had been temporarily rendered ineligible for security assistance due to a
military coup).45 Tunisia has also been one of the top 20 recipients of International Military
Education and Training (IMET) since FY1994.46
Tunisia is one of 10 countries participating in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP), a State Department-led, interagency regional program aimed at helping North African
and Sahelian countries better control their territory and strengthen their counterterrorism
capabilities. The Defense Department allocated over $13 million between FY2007 and FY2009
for TSCTP-related military cooperation with Tunisia, including bilateral and multinational
exercises, regional conferences, and Joint-Combined Exchange Training programs, which are
conducted by U.S. special operations forces.47 This is in addition to nearly $19 million in Section
1206 funds allocated in FY2008 and FY2009, which have supported the provision of equipment
(as discussed above) and training related to counterterrorism. Under P.L. 111-322 (Continuing
Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, December 22, 2010), the
Obama Administration can provide Tunisia aid at FY2010 levels until March 4, 2011, or the
passage of superseding FY2011 appropriations legislation.
Congress and Bilateral Aid
Congress reviews appropriation and authorization requests and arms sale proposals regularly in
support of U.S. assistance programs. Recently, some Members of Congress have pushed for
additional assistance in support of pro-democracy movements in the Middle East, potentially
including Tunisia. Others contend that budgetary cuts take precedence over new assistance
42 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Tunisia Summary,” updated January 13, 2011.
43 Forecast International, International Military Markets—Middle East & Africa, “Tunisia: Section 3—Market
Overview,” May 2009.
44 P.L. 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2006, Section 1206 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. For more information, see CRS Report RS22855,
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
45 This assistance is described as supporting the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
46 DSCA, op. cit.
47 Funding figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.
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programs, and that economic stabilization in Tunisia and elsewhere is best addressed via private
sector engagement and/or support from other donors. The discussion regarding potential new
assistance has proceeded amid larger budgetary debates and disagreements over funding
priorities.
Congress has been supportive of U.S. military assistance to Tunisia in recent years. In an
explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (enacted
on March 11, 2009), appropriators allocated $12 million for FMF assistance for Tunisia, far more
than the State Department’s budget request for $2.62 million. At the same time, appropriators
wrote in the explanatory statement that “restrictions on political freedom, the use of torture,
imprisonment of dissidents, and persecution of journalists and human rights defenders are of
concern and progress on these issues is necessary for the partnership between the United States
and Tunisia to further strengthen.”48 In the conference report accompanying P.L. 111-117, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (enacted on December 16, 2009), appropriators directed
the State Department to allocate $18 million in FMF for Tunisia, $3 million above the requested
amount. The conference report also allocated $2 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF)—the
amount requested—for “programs and activities in southern Tunisia and to promote respect for
human rights, as proposed by the Senate.”49
Table 1. U.S. Aid to Tunisia, Selected Accounts
Annual and Supplemental Appropriations, $ thousands
FY2011
FY2012
FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
Request
Request
FMF 8,300
12,000 18,000 4,900 4,900
ESF
1,200
800
2,000 - -
IMET 1,700
1,700 1,945 2,300 1,675
INCLE
198
- - - -
NADR 100 425
200
unavailable
unavailable
1206
10,000 8,800
-
unavailable
unavailable
(Defense
Department)
Notes: FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ESF=Economic Support Funds; IMET=International Military Education
and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-Proliferation, Anti-
Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; 1206=Defense Department funds authorized for use in training and
equipping foreign military forces for certain purposes.
This table does not reflect assistance disbursed through accounts administered by agencies other than the State
Department and USAID, or through State Department- or USAID-administered regional accounts.
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2009-FY2012; CRS
Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M.
Serafino.
48 Congressional Record, February 23, 2009, p. H2417.
49 Congressional Record, December 8, 2009, p. H14350.
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Emerging Actors
As political uncertainty continues to characterize the situation in Tunisia, it is difficult to
distinguish which groups and individuals have the ability and popular credibility to decisively
influence events. Although the former ruling RCD party has been suspended, former members
remain in control of various administrative institutions. Emerging contenders for influence
include Tunisia’s trade union federation; the security forces; the “legal” opposition parties; and
the formerly banned Islamist movement, which appears poised to re-enter the political sphere.
Background on these entities is provided below. Other formerly banned groups include the
Tunisian Workers’ Communist Party (PCOT), which was founded in the 1980s and operated
clandestinely under Ben Ali, and the Congress for the Republic (CPR), led by Moncef Marzouki,
who recently returned to Tunisia from exile and announced his intention to run for president.
Further background on selected individuals is given in the “Profiles” text-box, below.
While Tunisia’s trade union federation and the banned Islamist movement have, at different
times, constituted the main vehicles for the mass expression of anti-government dissent, the
potential for either group to present a cohesive political vision is unclear. Both, along with
registered political parties and leftist movements, have long been subject to government
repression, harassment, and co-option. Although they have at times collaborated in organizing
protests, as during a series of general strikes in the mid-1980s, their leaders reportedly view each
other with suspicion.50
The Trade Unions
The influence of Tunisia’s main union federation, the Tunisian General Union of Labor (UGTT)
extends beyond its formal role of representing Tunisia’s workers through an institutionalized
system of collective bargaining. Since Tunisia’s independence, the UGTT has served as a rare
legal conduit for expressing dissent, and many analysts view it as an important political force.
The UGTT, which claims over half a million members, reportedly played a key role in sustaining
the December-January protests, which its leadership framed as rooted in economic and labor
grievances.51 At the same time, the union movement is reportedly highly fragmented, with a
relatively conservative, pro-government leadership frequently diverging from its more radical
middle-tier and grass-roots membership. This tension may explain the decision by three UGTT
representatives to accept, then immediately resign from, cabinet positions in the post-Ben Ali
interim government. Union leaders have since called for wage increases in certain sectors and
labor unrest has increased.
In early February, some UGTT members protested against UGTT head Abdessalem Jrad, whom
they accused of being estranged from the union’s base. A new union was also formed, the General
Confederation of Tunisian Workers (CGTT); its stance and future relationship to the UGTT are
undetermined.
50 Christopher Alexander, “Opportunities, Organizations, and Ideas: Islamists and Workers in Tunisia and Algeria,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 32 (2000).
51 UGTT, Déclaration de la Commission Administrative Nationale, January 4, 2011; on membership, see the UGTT’s
website, at [www.ugtt.org.tn].
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The UGTT was formed in the mid-1940s and was a force in Tunisia’s independence movement.
During the Cold War, it positioned itself as pro-Western (non-Communist) and formed links with
the American labor movement.52 Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba (in power from 1956
through 1987), strove to keep the unions under the government’s wing; during the 1960s, former
UGTT leader Ahmed Ben Salah led a decade-long period of socialist-oriented economic policy as
minister for finance and planning. By the late 1970s, however, amid growing economic unease,
the union’s leadership turned to overt confrontation with the government, particularly over
grievances related to low wages and food price hikes.53 The UGTT led a series of mass strikes
and demonstrations—notably in 1978 and in the mid-1980s—which were met with heavy state
repression. During Ben Ali’s presidency, the government again attempted to co-opt the UGTT,
including by influencing its leadership selection process. The UGTT resurged as a key instigator
of anti-government unrest in recent years, organizing protests in the mining region of Gafsa in
2008 and 2010 that were the nearest precursor to the December-January uprising.
The Security Forces
Ben Ali’s unexpected departure led analysts to examine the role and cohesion of Tunisia’s
security forces. Notably, there is a divide between the internal security forces—such as the police,
the national security service (sûreté nationale), and the national guard—which fall under the
purview of the Interior Ministry and were closely associated with Ben Ali, and the military, which
receives fewer state resources and is seen as relatively apolitical.54 The government’s initial,
heavy-handed response to the December-January protests was led by the police, who opened fire
on demonstrators and reportedly conducted other abuses.55 The deployment of the military to the
streets on January 12 turned out to be a turning point, and many analysts contend that military
leaders subsequently played a key role in ending Ben Ali’s presidency; General Rachid Ammar,
the army chief of staff, is widely reported to have refused orders to open fire on demonstrators.
On January 23, Ammar publicly addressed protesters and promised to safeguard Tunisia’s
“revolution,” which raised his public profile and popularity while sparking concerns among some
analysts that he could be pursuing a role as a political power-broker.56
The military comprises roughly 35,000 personnel; military service is compulsory for one year, but
many Tunisians reportedly evade it. Government spending on the military constitutes only 1.4%
of GDP—a low proportion compared to other countries in the region, such as Algeria (3.3%),
Egypt (3.4%), Libya (3.9%), and Morocco (5%).57 The armed forces are positioned largely
against external threats, and also participate (to a limited extent) in multilateral peacekeeping
52 Global Security, “Union Génerale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT),” at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/tunisia/ugtt.htm.
53 See Niger Disney, “The Working-Class Revolt in Tunisia,” Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
Reports, 67 (May 1978).
54 In the late 1970s and mid-1980s, the military led the repression of anti-government protests. However, this role was
largely relegated to the civilian security services under Ben Ali. Unlike in neighboring Algeria, the military leadership
did not play a role in the independence movement or in early state formation.
55 Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Hold Police Accountable for Shootings,” January 29, 2011.
56 Issandr El Amrani, “Tunisia Diary: Ammar’s Move?” TheArabist.net, January 24, 2011. As recently as mid-2010, an
analysis of Tunisia’s political stability concluded that “a coup is a real possibility” should instability affect the transfer
of power after Ben Ali. Veritiss, Tunisia: Outlook 2011-2015 [UNCLASSIFIED], prepared For the Defense
Intelligence Agency Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office, August 2, 2010.
57 CIA World Factbook; figures dated 2006.
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missions. Civilian-led security services are primarily responsible for domestic security and have
been accused of a wide range of abuses, including extrajudicial arrests, denial of due process,
torture, and the mistreatment of detainees. While the exact number of domestic security agents is
unknown, it is thought by some analysts to far exceed the number of military personnel and could
be as high as 200,000.58 Divisions between police commanders and the rank-and-file were
exposed in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s exit, as thousands of police officers held their own anti-
government demonstration to distance themselves from the RCD and call for better working
conditions.59
Members of the military have led efforts to stabilize the security situation in recent weeks,
including by pursuing elements of the domestic security apparatus seen as loyal to the old regime.
In the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure, international media reports referenced
violence by civilian-clothed “militias” seen as allied to the former president, whose identity and
relationship to formal security structures remains unclear.60 On January 16, the government
announced arrest warrants for the former head of presidential security, Ali Seriati, and several of
his “accomplices,” for allegedly plotting against the state.61 The police leadership has also been
purged, and on March 7, the Interior Ministry announced it was dissolving the State Security
Division and other entities “akin to ‘political police,’” according to the official news agency.62
The number of affected personnel, and whether they will be permitted to retain their employment
with the government, has not been made public. Efforts to assert control over the security
situation are ongoing, and debate continues over the best way for interim authorities to alter the
size and mandate of the domestic security services without leading to future instability.
The “Legal” Opposition Parties
A number of political parties were legally recognized under Ben Ali and participated in electoral
politics. However, many of these—including those with the highest numbers of seats in the
legislature after the RCD—were seen, in effect, as loyal offshoots of the ruling party, and hewed
close to official government policies. Only three previously legal parties constitute the “dissident”
opposition:
• the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), founded by Ahmed Nejib El Chebbi;
• Ettajdid (a leftist, former Communist party), led by Ahmed Brahim; and,
• the Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties (FDTL), led by Mustafa Ben
Jaafar.
The PDP is thought to be the largest of the three parties, but the degree of popular support for any
of them is difficult to gauge. Only Brahim’s Ettajdid competed in the most recent presidential and
parliamentary elections, in 2009; Ettajdid won three parliamentary seats but Brahim garnered less
than 2% of the presidential vote. In the run-up to the 2009 election, Chebbi decided not to
58 Eric Goldstein/Human Rights Watch, “Dismantling the Machinery of Oppression,” The Wall Street Journal,
February 16, 2011.
59 Hadeel Al-Shalchi, “Tunisia’s Police Also Protest,” AP, January 23, 2011.
60 Angelique Chrisafis, “Confusion, Fear and Horror in Tunisia as Old Regime’s Militia Carries on the Fight,” The
Guardian (UK), January 17, 2011.
61 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Military Backs New Leaders in Tunisia,” The New York Times, January 16, 2011.
62 TAP, “Interior Ministry Decides to Remove State Security Division,” March 7, 2011.
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compete in order not to give the authorities what he termed “fake legitimacy”; his candidacy may
not have been accepted, anyway, under Tunisia’s restrictive electoral code.63 The Constitutional
Council rejected Ben Jaafar’s candidacy because he allegedly had not been selected at least two
years before the date of submission of his candidacy as required by a 2008 law. The FDTL was
also barred from participating in the 2009 parliamentary campaign.
The Islamist Movement
Tunisia’s main Islamist group is the formerly banned Hizb Al Nahda party, which is led by
Rachid Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi, who was in exile, mostly in London, for the past two decades,
returned to Tunisia on January 30 following the interim government’s announcement of a general
amnesty. Tunisia’s interim authorities have so far navigated a delicate path, allowing Al Nahda to
operate while not welcoming it into the government. On March 1, Al Nahda was granted legal
status as a political party. Some analysts have noted that government attempts to restrict Al Nahda
could backfire.
Ghannouchi has generally portrayed himself as a moderate who would participate in the political
system and not seek to scale back women’s rights, and has compared Al Nahda to Turkey’s ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP).64 However, he espoused more radical rhetoric during
confrontations with the government in the 1980s and early 1990s, and his return is reportedly
viewed with some trepidation by Tunisian secularists. Some activists in the movement are also
thought to be relatively more extremist in their views. Ghannouchi has said he will not run for
president and that he will step down before the end of the year, following which party members
may elect a new leader.
Ben Ali routinely emphasized the threat of Islamist extremism in order to justify his authoritarian
rule, and hundreds—perhaps thousands—of suspected Islamists were convicted under Ben Ali’s
2003 anti-terrorism law (see “Terrorism,” below). Despite these numbers (which may have been
amplified through questionable trial procedures), and apparent signs of growing personal
religiosity among some segments of the population, the full extent of popular support for Islamist
political platforms is unknown. Islamists did not play a prominent role in the protests that
unseated Ben Ali, and some analysts believe Tunisia’s relative prosperity, effective social
services, and well-educated population weigh against the potential influence of radical Islamist
movements. At the same time, movements that were repressed under the former regime may
enjoy greater credibility in the post-Ben Ali era.
Al Nahda was first formally organized as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in 1981—soon
after multiparty politics were legalized by then-President Bourguiba—by Ghannouchi and Abdel
Fattah Moro, who became the party’s secretary-general. Although the MTI was relatively
moderate compared to other Islamist groups in operation, it was viewed as the most popular and
therefore the most significant threat to the government. Soon after the MTI applied for legal
63 Chebbi’s candidacy reportedly did not fulfill Article 66 of Tunisia’s electoral code, as amended, which stipulates that
presidential candidates must be supported by at least thirty members of the legislature or municipal council chairs.
64 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Opposition in Tunisia Finds Chance for Rebirth,” January 21, 2011; Lin Noueihed,
“Analysis—What Role for the Islamists in the New Tunisia?” Reuters, January 22, 2011. For a sympathetic
background on Ghannouchi’s political and philosophical evolution, see Azzam S. Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A
Democrat within Islamism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
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recognition as a political party, over 100 of its most prominent activists were arrested.65 Clashes
with the security forces (and with leftist groups) mounted, as the MTI organized mass
demonstrations and protests on university campuses. In an effort to appease the movement, the
government of Habib Bourguiba had its leaders released from jail in 1984, and in 1985 permitted
the MTI to form a “cultural society,” while continuing to reject its attempts to gain legal
recognition.66 MTI-orchestrated demonstrations nonetheless escalated and Ghannouchi was again
arrested in early 1987 along with dozens of other party members. The unrest, combined with that
orchestrated by trade unions, undermined popular support for Bourguiba’s presidency and laid the
groundwork for Ben Ali’s palace coup in November 1987.67
Initially upon coming to power, Ben Ali promised greater pluralism and a dialogue with Islamist
and other opposition groups. Hoping to gain legal recognition, the MTI changed its name to Hizb
Al Nahda to comply with a law forbidding party names containing religious references. In the
1989 parliamentary elections, Al Nahda candidates were allowed to run as independents.
However, when Al Nahda garnered a surprisingly high level of support—15% of the national
vote, 30% in Tunis, according to official statistics—Ben Ali denied the party legal status and
initiated a crackdown targeting suspected Islamists. Ghannouchi left the country during this time.
Violent confrontations between the government and Al Nahda activists escalated, culminating in
an alleged Islamist attack on a ruling party office in 1991. Al Nahda leaders condemned the attack
and denied that those responsible belonged to their movement. Whether this was true or not, Ben
Ali accused Al Nahda of plotting to violently overthrow the government and launched a campaign
to eradicate the group and all signs of fundamentalist Islam. The government subsequently
claimed it had unearthed an Islamist plot to assassinate Ben Ali and topple the government, and in
1992 Tunisian military courts convicted 265 Al Nahda members on charges of planning a coup.
Al Nahda denied the accusations, and rights advocates criticized the case as biased and
insufficiently protective of due process.68 Ghannouchi was sentenced in absentia.
65 Henry Munson Jr., “Islamic Revivalism in Morocco and Tunisia,” The Muslim World, 76:3-4 (1986).
66 Munson 1986, op. cit.
67 Jonathan Randal, “Tunisia at the Brink,” The Washington Post, May 31, 1987.
68 Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, Routledge: New York, 2010.
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Selected Profiles of Key Figures69
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Former President (See also “The Ben Ali Government (1987-January 2011),” below.)
Ben Ali, who left the country on January 14, 2011, and is now living in exile in Saudi Arabia, spent much of his career
in intelligence and security. He assumed the presidency in November 1987 by sidelining ailing former President Habib
Bourguiba, in what many observers viewed as a palace coup. Bourguiba had named Ben Ali interior minister in 1986
and promoted him to prime minister in October 1987, placing him in line for the presidential succession. Previously,
Ben Ali had served as director of military security and head of the national security service. He reportedly played a
key role in coordinating military and police crackdowns on trade union and Islamist unrest in the late 1970s and mid-
1980s.70 A military general, Ben Ali trained at France’s elite St. Cyr military academy and reportedly received
intelligence and security training in the United States.71 On February 18, news reports al eged that Ben Ali was in a
Saudi hospital after suffering a stroke.
Béji Caïd Essebsi, Prime Minister
Essebsi, 84, was named interim prime minister on February 27 after then-Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi
resigned. Ghannouchi had served in the position since 1999 and was original y appointed by Ben Ali; he was pushed to
resign by growing numbers of demonstrators who objected to his continuation in office. Essebsi is a lawyer and was a
close aide to Tunisia’s founding president, Habib Bourguiba. In the 1960s and early 1970s, he served in a variety of
positions including interior minister and defense minister. In 1978, he joined the Movement of Democratic Socialists
(MDS), an opposition party, before being reappointed to the cabinet as foreign minister in 1981. Essebsi was elected
to parliament in 1989 and served until 1991.
Abdelkrim Zbidi, Minister of Defense
Zbidi, 60, was appointed defense minister in the cabinet reshuffle of January 27.72 He replaced Ridha Grira, who was
seen as too close to Ben Ali. Zbidi has a background in medicine. He received his medical degree from Lyon, France,
and he previously served in several ministerial positions under Ben Ali, including as minister of public health (2001)
and minister of research (1999-2000 and again in 2002). Zbidi also headed several government councils and
committees on science and public health. In the early 1990s, prior to serving in the government, he worked for a time
for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Mouldi Kefi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kefi, 65, is Tunisia’s third foreign minister since Ben Ali’s departure. He was appointed on February 21, a week after
his predecessor, Ahmed Ounaies (who had himself been appointed on January 27), quit amid public criticism that he
had praised a French government minister seen as too close to Ben Ali. A career diplomat, Kefi entered the foreign
service in 1967 and served in a variety of positions within the Foreign Ministry and in Prague, Berlin, and London. He
was also Tunisia’s ambassador to Nigeria, Indonesia, and Russia. He has a master’s in philosophy from France.
Ahmed Nejib El Chebbi, Founder of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)
Chebbi, who was appointed to the interim cabinet on January 17 (albeit in a minor role) but resigned on March 1, is a
founding member of the PDP, one of three “dissident” opposition parties that were legally registered during Ben Ali’s
presidency. (Chebbi formal y stepped down as PDP leader in 2006, but continues to represent the party.) Although
Chebbi and the PDP boycotted the 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections, and his current popularity is
untested, he is viewed by many observers as the most credible of the “legal” opposition figures, and potential y more
credible than members of the opposition who left Tunisia for exile abroad.73 In resigning from the interim
government, Chebbi stated that he was protesting the Essebsi’s appointment as prime minister and a government
measure requiring cabinet ministers to abstain from running in the upcoming presidential elections. A former student
activist for leftist and pan-Arabist causes, Chebbi was imprisoned for several years in the 1960s. He founded the
Socialist Progressive Ral y (RSP) in the 1980s, renaming it the PDP in 2001. A lawyer by training, Chebbi directs a
69 Drawn from international news articles, profiles compiled by BBC Monitoring and the Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU), political party websites, and other open-source documents.
70 William G. Blair, “Strong Hand for Tunisia: Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali,” The New York Times, November 8, 1987.
71 Edward Cody, “Tunisian President, ‘Senile,’ Is Removed by His Deputy; Habib Bourguiba's 30-Year Rule Ends,”
The Washington Post, November 8, 1987.
72 Mr. Zbidi’s official biography is available on the website of Tunisia’s defense ministry: http://www.defense.tn.
73 Al Jazeera English, “Ben Ali’s Possible Successors,” January 15, 2011.
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Tunis-based newspaper, El Mawkif, and provided legal defense for several journalists targeted by the Ben Ali
government.74
General Rachid Ammar, Army Chief of Staff
Ammar, 63, has been chief of staff of the 27,000-person army since 2002, when his predecessor was killed in a
helicopter crash. French press reports indicate that he received at least a year of military training in France.75 Ammar
is widely reported to have refused to open fire on protesters during the December-January uprising, and to have
subsequently influenced Ben Ali’s decision to step down. Due to these reports, he currently enjoys a high level of
popularity. On January 24, Ammar publicly addressed protesters, promising to uphold Tunisia’s “revolution” and
guarantee stability until elections are held. His comments sparked concern among some analysts over whether the
armed forces, which were seen as relatively apolitical under Ben Ali, could become an arbiter of domestic politics.
Rachid Ghannouchi, Leader ofHizb Al Nahda (Renaissance)
A former Islamic scholar, teacher, and activist, Ghannouchi has led Tunisia’s main Islamist movement for over three
decades. He spent the last two in exile, largely in London, after his party, Al Nahda, was banned in 1991. Ghannouchi
returned to Tunisia on January 30 fol owing the interim government’s announcement of a general amnesty.
Ghannouchi has portrayed himself as a moderate who would participate within a democratic political system and not
attempt to overturn women’s rights. He espoused more radical rhetoric during confrontations with the government
in the 1980s and early 1990s, and Tunisian secularists and some international observers view him with suspicion. He
has stated he will not run for president.
Ghannouchi’s early focus was on religious and moral issues, but he became increasingly politically radical by the late
1970s.76 He was imprisoned several times in the 1980s after he co-founded Al Nahda’s predecessor movement, the
Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), which clashed with the government of then-President Bourguiba. When Ben Ali
came to power, he initially appeared to seek reconciliation with the Islamist movement; however, the president
cracked down on Al Nahda after claiming to unearth an Islamist anti-government plot.
Moncef Marzouki, Advocate and Leader of the Congress for the Republic (CPR)
Born in 1945, Marzouki is a medical doctor, author, and human rights advocate who has been living in exile in
France.77 He returned to Tunisia on January 18 and announced his intention to run for president. Marzouki trained as
a doctor in France and taught at the medical school of Sousse before rising through the ranks the Tunisian League for
Human Rights (LTDH), which was among the first independent human rights organizations in the Middle East.
Marzouki was elected president of the LTDH in 1989. During the height of confrontation between the Ben Ali regime
and Al Nahda, he criticized Islamist political thought as insufficiently protective of human rights, while also advocating
on behalf of Islamists’ civil liberties. He also criticized Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait, which provoked a public
backlash in Tunisia and elsewhere in the region. Marzouki was arrested several times during the 1990s, and the LTDH
leadership was subsequently somewhat co-opted by the regime.78 In 2001, Marzouki founded the CPR party on a
platform of establishing the rule of law and promoting human rights. It was banned the following year.
Abdessalem Jrad, Secretary-General of the Tunisian General Trade Union (UGTT)
Jrad has been involved in Tunisia’s labor movement since the 1960s, and was imprisoned in 1978 amid a government
crackdown on massive UGTT-led strikes. He became secretary-general of the UGTT, Tunisia’s main union federation,
in 2000 when the union’s former leader was forced out over accusations of mismanagement. Jrad, who was seen as
relatively conservative and conciliatory toward Ben Ali’s government, was re-elected to his position during the UGTT
convention of February 2002. In early February, dozens of UGTT members protested against Jrad, reportedly
accusing the union’s leadership of “betraying its base.”
(...continued)
74 France24.com, “Ahmed Néjib Chebbi, l’Homme Qui Cherche à Rassembler l’Opposition,” January 15, 2011.
75 Le Point, "Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, un Saint-Cyrien Très Discret," January 18, 2011.
76 Munson 1986, op. cit.
77 Marzouki’s official biography is at [www.moncefmarzouki.com].
78 Abdelaziz Barrouhi, "LTDH : Ça Passe ou Ça Casse...," Jeune Afrique, October 6, 2010.
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Background on Tunisia
Prior to the December-January
Tunisia at a Glance
demonstrations, Tunisia was viewed as having
Population: 10.6 million (2010 est.)
a stable, authoritarian government that placed
GDP Growth Rate: 3% (2009 est.)
a higher priority on economic growth than on
political liberalization. It had only two leaders
Income Level: Lower Middle Income
since gaining independence from France in
Unemployment rate: 13.3% (2009 est.); reportedly
1956: the late Habib Bourguiba, a secular
much higher in the interior and among young people
nationalist whose political rise was tied to
Urbanization rate: 67% of the population (2008)
Tunisia’s independence movement, and Ben
Life Expectancy: 76 years
Ali, a former minister of the interior and prime
minister who became president in 1987.
Religion: Muslim 98%, Christian 1%, Jewish and other
1%
While Tunisia shares many political and
Literacy: 78% (2008)
economic characteristics with neighboring
Key Exports: clothing, semi-finished goods and textiles,
countries, it also exhibits a number of unique
agricultural products
attributes: a small territory, an ethnically
Key Imports: textiles, machinery and equipment,
homogenous population, a liberalized
hydrocarbons
economy, a large and highly educated middle
Major Trading Partners: France, Italy, Germany,
class, and a long history of encouraging
Libya, China, Spain
women’s socioeconomic freedoms. Tunisia’s
Female Labor Participation Rate (% of female
spending on education (7.2% of gross
population): 26%
domestic product) is high by regional
standards.79 Arabic-speaking, Sunni Muslims
Source: CIA, The World Factbook, January 3, 2011;
World Bank, World Development Indicators
make up the overwhelming majority of
Tunisia’s population, but its urban culture and
elite reflect a strong European influence.80 The population is young compared with developing
countries, but its youth bulge is declining: 26% of the population was under 15 in 2007, compared
to 37% in 1990.81 An estimated 700,000 Tunisians (nearly 7% of the population) reside abroad,
mainly in Europe.
The legal and socioeconomic status of women in Tunisia is one of its particularities. Tunisia is the
only Arab Muslim country that bans polygamy. Women serve in the military and in many
professions, and constitute more than 50% of university students; the first woman governor was
appointed in May 2004. In 2006, the government banned the headscarf from public places,
claiming that it was protecting women’s rights and preventing religious extremism. Critics
charged that it was violating individual rights.
Despite its apparent prosperity, Tunisia has long exhibited a vast divide between rural and urban
areas, and particularly between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the far poorer interior. At
least half of the population lives in Tunis and coastal towns, and there is population drift toward
these areas.82 Anti-government demonstrations, in particular those rooted in labor and economic
79 CIA, The World Factbook, updated January 3, 2011.
80 Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform, op. cit.
81 EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
82 EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
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grievances, have often originated in the dispossessed interior (which includes hardscrabble
mining areas)—as did the unrest that unseated Ben Ali.
Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, was a stringently secularist and nationalist
independence leader who has been compared to Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in terms of his
modernizing influence. He is credited with promoting women’s rights and with starting a tradition
of providing effective government services. He attempted to moderate the influence of Islam on
daily life, and famously tried to convince Tunisians not to practice the Ramadan fast by drinking
a glass of orange juice live on national television.83 However, he also stifled political
liberalization: he maintained a monolithic political system controlled by his Socialist Destourian
Party (the successor to his pro-independence, nationalist Neo-Destour Party; destour means
constitution in Arabic) and proclaimed himself president-for-life. Confrontations with trade
unions and the budding Islamist movement grew increasingly violent in the 1980s, leading to
widespread civil unrest.
The Ben Ali Government (1987-January 2011)
Ben Ali became president in 1987 in what some viewed as a palace coup, sidelining the aging
Bourguiba a month after being promoted to prime minister. He renamed the ruling party the
Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) and initially promised political reforms, abolishing the
lifetime presidency and opening a process of “dialogue” with the opposition. The new president
also ordered the release of thousands of political prisoners, allowed the legalization of new
political parties, and relaxed the press laws. However, the 1989 parliamentary elections—in
which Al Nahda candidates, running as independents, won 15% of the national vote, surprising
the ruling authorities—were a turning point. As tensions between the government and the Islamist
movement heightened, Ben Ali attempted to eradicate Al Nahda and instituted tighter political
controls. Similar tensions between Islamists and government forces drove neighboring Algeria
into civil war in the early 1990s. Tunisia’s repression of Islamists came at the cost of an
increasingly authoritarian political system.
Ben Ali cultivated the domestic security services and the RCD as his power base. The
government banned some potential challengers and restricted or co-opted others, including a
handful of opposition parties, human rights organizations, unions, and other civil society entities.
Ben Ali maintained that he was ushering in democratic reforms in a “measured way” so that
religious extremists could not exploit freedoms.84 Still, most observers saw no evidence of even a
gradual reform program. Constitutional amendments approved in May 2002 lifted term limits for
the presidency and raised the age allowed for a candidate to 75. Ben Ali easily won a fourth five-
year term on October 24, 2004, with 94.49% of the vote and a 91% voter turnout. He won yet
another term on October 25, 2009, with 89.62% of the vote and an 89.4% voter turnout. Even
under the revised age limits, Ben Ali was not eligible to run again unless the constitution were
revised once more.
83 On early interactions between Bourguiba and the Islamist movement, see Norma Salem, Habib Bourguiba, Islam and
the Creation of Tunisia, Croom Helm: UK, 1984.
84 AP, “Tunisian President Says He Wants to Share Experience in Handling Islamic Extremism with Bush,” February
13, 2004.
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Human Rights
Ben Ali effectively used the fear of an Islamist threat and the example of civil conflict in
neighboring Algeria to systematically suppress human rights and fail to carry out political
reforms. The government routinely infringed on citizens’ privacy rights and imposed severe
restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. It was intolerant of public
criticism and used intimidation, criminal investigations, the court system, arbitrary arrests,
residential restrictions, and travel controls to discourage human rights and opposition activists.85
In a 2010 report, Amnesty International accused Tunisian authorities of “subverting” human
rights organizations and other dissenting groups “by infiltrating them and provoking turmoil.”86
The security services under Ben Ali were accused of a wide range of abuses, including torture. In
June 2008, an Amnesty International report, In the Name of Security: Routine Abuses in Tunisia,
detailed concerns “regarding serious human rights violations being committed in connection with
the government’s security and counterterrorism policies.”
International media advocacy groups routinely cited Ben Ali’s government as one of the world’s
most repressive toward freedom of expression.87 Journalists, bloggers, and dissidents were subject
to surveillance, harassment, physical assault, and prison. All Internet cafes were state-controlled;
authorities aggressively filtered Internet websites and reportedly conducted surveillance at
Internet cafes. The current status of this censorship regime is in flux.
Emergence of Discontent
Although Ben Ali’s government was widely viewed as stable, signs of increasing public
discontent emerged in recent years. These signs were often portrayed as economically motivated,
although this may have been because the regime tolerated the limited vocalization of economic,
but not political, grievances. In 2008, social unrest broke out in the impoverished mining region
of Gafsa, where unemployment is particularly high. The government sent in the army to aid the
police, who were unable to contain the demonstrations. Some 38 people were imprisoned in
connection with the protests on charges of forming a criminal group with the aim of destroying
public and private property, armed rebellion, and assault on officials during the exercise of their
duties. Unrest was again reported in Gafsa in early 2010.
In retrospect, the Gafsa riots have been interpreted by some analysts as a precursor to the
December-January protests, which originated in the nearby town of Sidi Bouzid. Some have
argued that the key difference was that in December 2010, images and reporting on the Sidi
Bouzid unrest quickly emerged through social media and on Al Jazeera, which drew ever-wider
groups of people into the demonstrations and made it more difficult for the government to
suppress news of what was happening.
85 U.S. State Department, “Tunisia,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2009, released March 11, 2010.
86 Amnesty International, “Tunisia Urged to End Subversion of Groups Critical of the Authorities,” July 12, 2010.
87 See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Press Freedom “Predators,” updated May 3, 2010, at
http://en.rsf.org/predators,21.html; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “10 Most Censored Countries,” May 2,
2006.
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Terrorism
Tunisian authorities have emphasized terrorism as a potential domestic threat. The two most
recent incidents were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba (noted
for its tiny Jewish population) and a series of gun battles between alleged militants and security
forces in Tunis in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri
appeared to claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in October
2002. In all, 14 German tourists, five Tunisians, and two French citizens were killed in the
attack.88 France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement
in the attack. In January 2009, French authorities put two alleged culprits on trial. The roots of the
2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, are much less clear.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated
outside Tunisia, on a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.89 The TCG
sought to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia and was considered to be a radical offshoot of Al
Nahda. The TCG was suspected of plotting, but not carrying out, attacks on U.S., Algerian, and
Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001. One founder, Tarek Maaroufi, was arrested in
Belgium the same month. The group appears to have since been inactive.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly known as the Algerian Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC), actively recruits Tunisians and reportedly had ties with the
TCG.90 In January 2007, following the aforementioned mentioned gun battles, Tunisian security
forces claimed that they had discovered terrorists linked to the GSPC who had infiltrated from
Algeria and possessed homemade explosives, satellite maps of foreign embassies, and documents
identifying foreign envoys. Eastern Algeria is an AQIM/GSPC stronghold. Some 30 Tunisians
were subsequently convicted of plotting to target U.S. and British interests in Tunisia. AQIM later
claimed responsibility for kidnapping two Austrian tourists in Tunisia in February 2008. Algerian
and Tunisian authorities have arrested Tunisians along their border, going in both directions.
Tunisian expatriates suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been arrested in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, Western Europe, and the United States. Some are reportedly detained at the U.S. Naval Base
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and their possible return to Tunisia has proven to be somewhat
controversial.91 On April 24, 2009, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM), told a House Appropriations Committee subcommittee that the
88 Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002.
89 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, released April 30, 2007.
90 Craig S. Smith, “Tunisia is Feared as New Islamist Base...,” International Herald Tribune, February 20, 2007. Note,
GSPC renamed itself Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in January 2007. For further background on AQIM, see CRS
Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy,
coordinated by John Rollins.
91 An editorial in the Orange Country Register on November 16, 2008, stated, “In 2006, the U.S. sent two prisoners
(from Guantanamo) to Tunisia with the explicit understanding that they would not be tortured or mistreated. The
Tunisian government broke its promise and inflicted cruel treatment and kangaroo-court trials.” In May 2009, the
United States asked Italy to receive two Tunisian detainees who objected to their return to Tunisia for fear that they
would be subjected to torture. On May 26, 2009, the Tunisian Minister of Justice said that his government was prepared
to receive another 10 Guantanamo detainees. Al Jazeera TV, “Tunisia asks US to Hand Over two Guantanamo
Detainees,” May 29, 2009.
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perpetrators of suicide bombings in Iraq that month may have been part of a network based in
Tunisia.92
In December 2003, the Tunisian parliament passed a sweeping anti-terrorism law. The U.S. State
Department called it “a comprehensive law to ‘support the international effort to combat
terrorism and money laundering.’”93 Since passage of the law, as many as 2,000 Tunisians have
been detained, charged, and/or convicted on terrorism-related charges.94 Critics claim that the law
“makes the exercise of fundamental freedoms ... an expression of terrorism.”95 These criticisms
were echoed in the December 2010 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, who
concluded that “the current definition of terrorism is vague and broad, hence deviating from the
principle of legality and allowing for wide usage of counter-terrorism measures in practice.”96
Rights advocates have also accused anti-terror trials of relying on excessive pretrial detention,
denial of due process, and weak evidence. While the current interim government has promised to
release all political prisoners, there is an ongoing debate about whether individuals convicted
under the anti-terrorism law fall under this category, and many such detainees have not been
released.
The Economy
During the presidency of Ben Ali, many analysts contended that there was an implicit social
contract between the government and its citizens, which promoted economic stability and middle-
class standards of living at the expense of political freedom. Until the December-January protests,
this strategy appeared to have contained latent disaffection from disrupting the political status
quo. Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and one of the best-performing non-oil
exporting Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Unemployment and
underemployment remain a major problem, however; the official unemployment rate is high
(over 13%) and the unofficial rate is believed to be even higher, particularly among young people.
Ben Ali’s 2004 election manifesto called for diversification, that is, ending reliance on textiles
(which have been a primary engine of economic growth), due to increased competition from
China; modernization by providing investment incentives to foreign businesses and passing legal
reforms; liberalization with an anticipated free-trade zone with the EU; and greater privatization.
The textile sector has since shifted to higher quality goods. The tourism sector also has been
emphasized; it is a major employer and earns some 11% of the country’s hard currency receipts.97
Tunisia has also attempted to attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector.
Phosphate ore reserves are significant and are the basis of a chemicals industry, but their value is
reduced by their low grade.98
92 House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Holds
Hearing on the US Central Command, April 24, 2009, transcript via CQ.
93 U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, released April 29, 2004.
94 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010.
95 Jeremy Landor, “Washington’s Partner,” Middle East International, March 5, 2004, pp. 23-24.
96 U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur, December 28, 2010, op. cit.
97 U.S. State Department, “Background Note: Tunisia,” October 13, 2010.
98 EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
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The European recession in 2009 affected the Tunisian economy, producing a decrease in exports,
a contraction in the industrial sector, and a lower expansion in services. Tunisia’s economy
nevertheless fared relatively well given the severity of the global economic crisis, and the country
did not experience a recession. The government responded to the economic setback with fiscal
stimulus emphasizing development projects, the creation of more state jobs, and increases in state
payrolls.99 In September 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that economic
growth would reach 3.8% in 2010, after having slowed to 3% in 2009; the Fund predicted that
Tunisia’s growth could continue to increase gradually, “provided that policies and reforms
planned by the authorities aimed at enhancing Tunisia’s competitiveness, developing new
markets, and supporting new sources of growth in sectors with high added value bear fruit.”100
The economic impact of the December-January protests is still being determined, as is the
potential impact of perceived political instability. News reports indicate that the protests caused
hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, and credit rating agencies have severely lowered
Tunisia’s ratings due to political uncertainty.101 The interim government sent a delegation to
Davos on January 29 to urge world leaders and investors to retain confidence; the delegation also
pledged greater economic transparency.102
Foreign Relations
Israel and the Palestinians
Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982-1993 and still hosts some PLO offices today.
Tunisia had an interests office in Israel until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah, or
uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Israelis of
Tunisian descent are allowed to travel to Tunisia on Israeli passports, and the Israeli and Tunisian
foreign ministers sometimes meet. In September 2005, President Ben Ali sent a personal letter to
then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, praising his “courageous” withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip. Israel’s then-foreign minister, who was born in Tunisia, and then-communications minister
attended the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunisia in 2005. (Then-Prime Minister
Sharon was invited along with leaders of all U.N. member states; his invitation provoked
demonstrations in Tunisia.)
Europe
Tunisia and the European Union (EU) have cemented a close relationship by means of an
Association Agreement, aid, and loans. More than 60% of Tunisia’s trade is conducted with
99 TransArabia, “Tunisia Continues Fiscal Stimulus in 2010 Budget,” November 14, 2009.
100 Joël Toujas-Bernate and Rina Bhattacharya, International Monetary Fund, “Tunisia Weathers Crisis Well, But
Unemployment Persists,” September 10, 2010.
101 AFP, “Fitch Downgrades Tunisia’s Sovereign Debt,” March 2, 2011; Maher Chmaytelli, “Tunisia Revolt Caused
$637 Million of Damage, Assabah Reports,” Bloomberg, February 1, 2011; Reuters, “Moody’s Cuts Tunisia Credit
Rating, Could Lower it Further,” January 19, 2011; Alyssa Rallis, “S&P Puts Tunisia on Credit Watch Negative
Following Continued Unrest,” Global Insight, January 19, 2011.
102 Paul Taylor, “Davos—Stay in Our Economy and Out of Our Politics—Tunisia,” Reuters, January 29, 2011.
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Europe.103 The Association Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and went into effect on January
1, 2008, eliminates customs tariffs and other trade barriers on manufactured goods, and provides
for the establishment of an EU-Tunisia free trade area in goods, but not in agriculture or services.
Negotiations on the provision of “advanced status” for Tunisia vis-à-vis the EU, which would
provide even greater trade benefits, are ongoing.104 Tunisia receives aid from the EU’s Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) program and soft loans from the European Investment Bank,
the financing arm of the EU. The Europeans hope that their aid will help Tunisia to progress
economically, and thereby eliminate some causes of illegal immigration and Islamic
fundamentalism. The EU and Tunisia have discussed additional cooperation to control illegal
immigration and manage legal immigration flows, an issue that probably is of greater interest to
Europe than to Tunisia. At the same time, EU leaders periodically expressed concerns over
Tunisia’s record on human rights and political freedom under Ben Ali.105
EU officials have focused high-level attention on Tunisia since Ben Ali’s departure. The EU has
promised new economic and governance assistance while seeking to ensure that Tunisia’s
previous commitments, such as the prevention of illegal immigration to Europe, will be
maintained under the new government. Relations with Italy were strained in mid-February when
thousands of Tunisian migrants began arriving by boat to Italy’s southern Lampedusa island;
Tunisia rejected direct Italian intervention but indicated it would cooperate with Europe on
stemming illicit population flows.
Relations with France have recently been strained due to French support for Ben Ali even as his
security forces cracked down on pro-democracy protesters. During the last week of Ben Ali’s
presidency, France’s then-Foreign Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, publicly suggested that France
could help Tunisia control the protests, remarks for which she was widely criticized in both
countries. (Alliot-Marie subsequently resigned under pressure related to her alleged ties to the
Ben Ali regime.) Press reports additionally revealed that France had authorized shipments of tear-
gas to Tunisia in December 2010.106 French authorities have since sought to reassure the interim
government by refusing to offer Ben Ali exile, replacing the French ambassador to Tunisia, and
announcing an asset freeze targeting members of the Ben Ali family. On January 24, French
President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that he had “underestimated” the Tunisian crisis. France has
since promised new emergency economic aid to help assuage Tunisia’s continuing socioeconomic
unrest.
Regional Relations
Tunisia has sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors, Algeria and Libya, and
participates in Algerian-led regional counterterrorism. Relations with Libya were extremely
strained in the 1980s, but patched under Ben Ali; they are again in flux amid the popular uprising
that is threatening to unseat Libyan leader Muammar Al Qaddhafi. Tunisia participates in the
Arab Maghreb Union, established in 1989 by Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania,
103 World Trade Organization, Tunisia Profile, October 2010.
104 See European Commission, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, Tunisia, at
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/tunisia/tunisia_en.htm.
105 See, e.g., AFP, “EU Calls for Release of Tunisian Protesters,” January 10, 2011.
106 Le Monde, “La France a Autorisé, Fin 2010, Quatre Livraisons de Grenades Lacrymogènes à la Tunisie," January
27, 2011.
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though the organization is largely inactive due to tensions between Morocco and Algeria. Tunisia
has free-trade agreements with Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Libya.107
Tunis is the temporary headquarters location of the African Development Bank (AfDB), which
receives significant financial support from the United States.108 The headquarters was moved to
Tunisia in 2005 due to civil unrest in Côte d’Ivoire, its permanent location.
Outlook
The unexpected and rapid turn of events in Tunisia raises a wide range of questions for the future
of the country and the region. Recent events also raise potential issues for Congress pertaining to
the oversight of U.S.-Tunisian bilateral relations and assistance, and to broader U.S. policy
priorities in the Middle East. The latter category of issues has become more salient with the mass
protest movement that is currently sweeping the Middle East and which appears to have been
partly inspired by Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution.
Questions include:
• Is Tunisia likely to return to stability in the medium term, or do continued
protests and persistent insecurity remain significant threats? Do Ben Ali and/or
elements of the former regime continue to influence events in Tunisia?
• What are the prospects for genuine reform under the interim government? What
is the potential for free and fair elections? What is the role of the military in
steering political developments?
• What will the future Tunisian government and political order look like? What
will be the nature and role of previously banned groups, such as Islamist and
leftist political parties? Will there be a free and independent press and civil
society in Tunisia?
• Which individuals and groups currently enjoy significant public credibility in
Tunisia, and what are their likely courses of action? Has Tunisians’ experience of
secular authoritarianism made the public more likely to place their trust in
extremist groups?
• What is the potential impact of the unrest on foreign investment and economic
growth in Tunisia and the region?
• To what extent have events in Tunisia inspired protests in Egypt, Libya, Algeria,
Yemen, Jordan, Sudan, and other countries? What lesson are neighboring
countries drawing from Tunisia’s example? What are the medium- to long-term
implications for the region?
• What has been the impact to date of U.S. public statements and actions related to
Tunisia, and what are the prospects for future U.S. influence on the evolution of
events? How, if at all, should the U.S. government reshape its assistance
programs for Tunisia in response to recent and continuing events? What position
107 EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
108 See CRS Report RS22690, The African Development Bank Group, by Martin A. Weiss, for further background.
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should the United States take vis-à-vis popular anti-government demonstrations
in the region? What course of U.S. action will be most likely to fulfill foreign
policy and national security goals?
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Acknowledgments
This report draws on research and analysis by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
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