Political Transition in Tunisia
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
September 20December 16, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21666
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Political Transition in Tunisia
Summary
On January 14, 2011, longtimeTunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali fled the country following
after weeks of
mounting anti-government protests. Tunisia’s mass popular uprising, dubbed the
“Jasmine
Revolution,” sparked anti-government and pro-reform movements in other countries
across the region, and some policy makers view Tunisia as a potential “test case” for democratic
transitions in the Middle East.
across the region. Ben Ali’s
departure was greeted by widespread euphoria within Tunisia. However,Yet disputes over
reform priorities, political instability,
economic crisis, labor unrest, tensions between the
privileged coastal region and relatively
impoverished interior, and lingering insecurity are
continuing challenges, while the humanitarian impact of refugee flows from Libya presents
. The humanitarian and
security impact of events in neighboring Libya present additional difficulties.
National elections are scheduled forwere held on October 23 to select a transitional
“National Constituent Assembly.” The Assembly will, in turn, be charged with promulgating a
new constitution ahead of expected presidential and parliamentary elections, which have not yet
been scheduled. Over 100 parties, most of them newly created, along with independents are
competing for seats in the Assembly. However, the Constituent Assembly’s timeline of existence,
its mandate, and its decision-making process remain largely undetermined.
Until January, Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party exerted near-total
control over parliament, state and local governments, and most political activity. Tunisia
cultivated strong ties with France and the European Union, its largest trading partner, and with the
United States. Despite many political and economic characteristics shared across the region,
Tunisia exhibits a number of unique attributes: it has a relatively small territory, a sizable and
highly educated middle class, and a long history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic
freedoms. These factors have led some analysts to state that Tunisia is the best placed country in
the region to successfully undergo a democratic transition—and that conversely, if it can’t, that
this could have dire implications for other countries such as Egypt and Libya
Assembly has put in place a transitional government and is expected to draft a new constitution,
ahead of new elections that have yet to be scheduled. Thousands of candidates competed for seats
in the Assembly, but the outcome showed popular support to be primarily focused on a handful of
political parties. Harakat al Nahda (alt: Ennahda/An-Nahda), a moderate Islamist party, won 41%
of the seats, and has formed a governing coalition with two center-left secular parties, the
Congress for the Republic (CPR) and the Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties
(FDTL/Ettakatol). Certain aspects of the Assembly’s mandate, duration, and internal structure are
still to be determined.
Prior to January 2011, Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party exerted
near-total control over parliament, state and local governments, and most political activity.
Tunisia cultivated strong ties with France and the European Union, its largest trading partner, and
with the United States. Despite many political and economic characteristics shared across the
region, Tunisia exhibits a number of unique attributes: a relatively small territory, a sizable and
well educated middle class, and a long history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms.
Some policymakers view these factors as advantageous, and Tunisia as a potential “test case” for
democratic transitions in the region.
Tunisia’s transition raises a wide range of questions for the future of the country and the region.
These pertain to the struggle between reformists and entrenched forces carried over from the
former regime; the potential shape of the new political order; the future role of Islamist
movements role and influence of Islamism
in the government and society; the role of the security forces in steering political
eventsquestion of how to transform the formerly repressive security
services; and the difficult diplomatic balance—for the United States and other actors—of
encouraging greater democratic openness while not undermining other foreign policy priorities.
Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funding and oversees U.S. foreign policy
toward Tunisia and the wider region. U.S.-Tunisian relations were, prior to 2011, highly focused
on military assistance and counterterrorism. The Obama Administration has proposed over $33
million in newly allocated funding for the promotion of democracy, good governance, and
economic reforms, in addition to economic support through the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation. International allocated roughly $42
million in non-military “transition assistance,” along with a range of additional efforts aimed at
encouraging private sector investment and deepening U.S.-Tunisia relations. International
financial institutions, which receive significant U.S. financialmonetary support,
and the G8 have also
pledged aid for Tunisia. Some Members of Congress argue that additional
bilateral aid should be
allocated for democracy promotion and economic recovery in Tunisia, while others
contend that
budgetary cuts take precedence over new aid programs, or that economic
stabilization may be
best addressed by the private sector or by other donors. Related draft bills
include S. legislation includes H.R. 2055, S.
618/ H.R. 2237, S. 1388, and S.Res. 316 and S. 1388.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Contents
Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”....................................................................................................... 1
Background................................................................................................................................ 2
Key Issues in the Transition............................................................................................................. 3
Elections ........A New Government ............................................................................................................................ 5
The Role of Islam in Politics 5
Islam, Politics, and the State...................................................................................................... 76
The Security Forces................................................................................................................... 98
The Military ........................................................................................................................ 9
Security Concerns.................................................................................................................... 10
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background..................................................................................... 11
Prosecuting Ben Ali and Associates Anti-Corruption Efforts ........................................................................................................... 1312
Recovery of State Assets ................................................................................................... 13
Key Actors ..................................................................................................................................... 1413
Selected Profiles ...................................................................................................................... 1513
The Economy................................................................................................................................. 17
U.S.-Tunisian16
Foreign Relations ................................................................................................................. 19
U.S. Assistance .................. 18
Israel and the Palestinians ....................................................................................................... 18
Europe .................. 21
Security Assistance............................................................................................................ 22
Multilateral Assistance ................ 18
Regional Relations...................................................................................... 24
Congress and Aid to Tunisia............................... 19
U.S.-Tunisian Relations ............................................................... 25
Foreign Relations................................................... 20
U.S. Assistance ........................................................................ 26
Israel and the Palestinians ................................................ 22
Military Assistance....................................................... 26
Europe ..................................................... 24
Multilateral Assistance ................................................................................. 26
Regional Relations..................... 25
Congress and Aid to Tunisia.............................................................................................. 2726
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 2826
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Tunisia.................................................................................................................. 1
Tables
Table 1. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, Selected Accounts ........................................................... 24
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 2927
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 2927
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution”
President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, in power
since 1987, fled Tunisia for Saudi Arabia on
January 14, 2011, following weeks of
mounting anti-government protests (see textbox, below). Tunisia’s popular uprising,
dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution,” inspired
reform and opposition movements in Egypt,
Libya, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, and other
countriesAlgeria, and
elsewhere. The pro-democracy movement has
been internationally heralded, but athe wave of
unrest across the Middle East has also
sparked international concern over stability in
a region associated with previously secure,
autocratic, pro-Western regimesautocratic regimes
previously viewed as secure and pro-West.
Figure 1. Map of Tunisia
The early months of the post-Ben Ali
government were marked by continuing
unrest and popular contestation, partly in
response to the interim government’s initial
decision to retain several longtime officials of
the former ruling party. In addition, a security
vacuum—amid reports of sabotage by
unidentified militias, and as police fled their
posts posts
and citizens formed self-defense
groups—
raised fears of violence and chaos.
On February 27, a more stable, if weak,
interim government took shape under newly
appointed Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi,
an elder statesman from the administration of
founding President Habib Bourguiba. Essebsi
Caïd
Essebsi replaced Mohamed Ghannouchi, who had
had served as Ben Ali’s prime minister since
Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS
1999. Caïd Essebsi stated that his priorities would
would be to address security, reverse the economic crisis, and “to restore the prestige of the state.”1 The
former speaker of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, was named interim president on January 15, in
line with constitutional prerogatives, and he remains in that role.2 Attention is currently focused
on national elections scheduled to take place in October.
1
Tarek Amara, “Tunisian Interim PM to Appoint New Government,” Reuters, March 4, 2011.
Article 57 of Tunisia’s constitution states that “should the office of President of the Republic become vacant because
of death, resignation, or absolute disability,” the President of the Chamber of Deputies “shall immediately be vested
with the functions of interim president of the republic for a period ranging from 45 to 60 days.” The Article further
stipulates that elections should be held during that time period to elect a new president for a five-year term, and that the
interim president may not stand as a candidate.
2
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The December-January Protests
Anti-government protests began in Tunisia’s interior in mid-December 2010. Public demonstrations had previously
been very rare in Tunisia, where state repression and the close surveillance of dissidents have traditionally been
effective at curbing the expression of anti-government views. The demonstrations initially seemed to stem from
discontent related to high unemployment, but quickly spiraled into an unprecedented popular challenge to Ben Ali’s
authoritarian regime. From the start, protesters appeared to lack a central leader and were not necessarily aligned
with a pre-existing political or ideological movement.
Protests were first reported on December 17 in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street vendor
set himself on fire to protest police interference and a lack of economic opportunities. By late December, the
protests had spread to the nearby cities of Kasserine and Thala, as well as other urban centers. On January 12, riots
erupted in the capital, Tunis. The military deployed to the streets and a national curfew was imposed. The following
day, rioters ransacked a private home belonging to one of Ben Ali’s wealthy relatives in the beach community of
Hammamet, underscoring the deep antipathy many Tunisians felt toward members of the ruling elite. Authorities
imposed a state of emergency on January 14, prohibiting gatherings of over three people and authorizing the use of
force against “any suspect person who does not obey orders to stop.”3 Police repeatedly opened fire on crowds and
arrested protesters, journalists, opposition party members, lawyers, and rights advocates, some of whom were
reportedly abused in detention. Over 200 people were killed in the uprising.4
state.”1 Essebsi also introduced the idea, popular among members of the protest movement, of
holding elections for an assembly charged with writing a new constitution—and thus choosing a
new political system—before parliamentary and/or presidential polls would be held. Fouad
Mebazaa, the former head of parliament, assumed the largely ceremonial position of Interim
President upon Ben Ali’s departure throughout the interim period.
With the election on October 23, 2011, of a National Constituent Assembly, attention has now
turned to the process of constitution drafting, and to the mandates, structure, and authorities of the
Assembly and other transitional bodies.
1
Tarek Amara, “Tunisian Interim PM to Appoint New Government,” Reuters, March 4, 2011.
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The “Jasmine Revolution” Protests
Protests were first reported on December 17, 2010, in the interior town of Sidi Bouzid, after a 26-year-old street
vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest police interference and a lack of economic
opportunities. By late December, protests had spread to the nearby cities of Kasserine and Thala, and to other urban
centers. Feeding on local anger over high unemployment and a lack political and socioeconomic freedoms, as well as
an underground networks of activists, hackers, and dissidents, the demonstrations escalated into an unprecedented
popular challenge to the Ben Ali regime. Public demonstrations had previously been very rare in Tunisia, due to state
repression and pervasive surveillance. From the start, protesters appeared to lack a central leader and were not
necessarily aligned with a pre-existing political or ideological movement.
On January 12, riots erupted in the capital, Tunis. The military deployed to the streets and a national curfew was
imposed. Rioters ransacked private properties belonging to Ben Ali’s wealthy relatives along the central coast,
underscoring the deep antipathy many Tunisians felt toward members of the ruling elite. Authorities imposed a state
of emergency, prohibiting gatherings of over three people and authorizing the use of force against “any suspect
person who does not obey orders to stop.”2 Police repeatedly opened fire on crowds and arrested protesters,
journalists, opposition party members, lawyers, and rights advocates, some of whom were reportedly abused in
detention. Over 200 people were killed in the uprising.3
Prior to his exile, Ben Ali offered a widening series of concessions on political and civil rights in an effort to stem the
unrest. On January 13, the president gave an address on national television in which he pledged to step down when
his term was up in 2014, to allow fresh parliamentary elections before then, and to end state censorship. However,
these promises did not placate demonstrators, who continued to press for Ben Ali’s immediate resignation and the
dissolution of the ruling party. On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali fled in a private plane for Saudi Arabia.
Background
Prior to the December-JanuaryJanuary 2011 demonstrations, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable,
albeit authoritarian albeit
authoritarian, regime that placed a higher priority on economic growth than on political
liberalization. It had only two leaders since gaining independence from France in 1956: the late
Habib Bourguiba, a secular nationalist who helped lead Tunisia’s independence movement, and
Ben Ali, a former Interior Minister and Prime Minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. Ben
Ali cultivated the internal security services and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party
as his power base, and placed severe restrictions on human rights, political participation, and
freedom of expression. The president and his family were also seen as highly corrupt.
While Tunisia shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, it also has a number of
unique attributesmany of its attributes are
unique: a small territory, a relatively homogenous population (despite tribal and ethnic
divisions divisions
in some areas), a liberalized economy, a large and substantial and well educated middle class, and a history
of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms.54 Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims make up the
overwhelming majority of Tunisia’s population, but its urban culture and elite reflect a strong
European influence. The population is young compared with developed countries, but its youth
bulge is declining.65 As many as a million Tunisians reside abroad, mainly in Europe.
3
2
Tunisia 7 Television, “Tunisian Authorities Declare State of Emergency,” January 14, 2011, via Open Source Center.
As of February 1, the United Nations estimated that at least 219 people were killed, including 72 killed in prison fires.
Interim government investigators stated in July that they had documented 238 protesters killed and 1,380 wounded,
mostly by the security forces. Marie Colvin, “High Noon as Lawyer Closes in on Officials Behind Tunisia Killings,”
The Sunday Times, July 31, 2011.
54
Tunisia’s spending on education (7.2% of gross domestic product) is high by regional standards. CIA, The World
Factbook, updated January 3, 2011.
65
EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
43
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The legal and socioeconomic status of women
in Tunisia is one of its particularities. Tunisia
is the only Arab Muslim country that bans
polygamyare among its particularities.
Polygamy is banned, and women enjoy equal
citizenship rights and the right to initiate
divorce. Women serve in the military and in
many professions, and constitute more than
50% of university students; the first woman
governor was appointed in May 2004. Many
Tunisians credit
the country’s relatively liberal
personal status code Personal Status
Code, promulgated under
founding President
Bourguiba, for these
advances.
Tunisia at a Glance
Population: 10.63 million (July 2011 est.)
Income Level: Lower middle income
Urbanization rate: 67% of the population (2010)
Life Expectancy: 75 years (2011 est.)
Religion: Muslim: 98%, Christian: 1%,
Jewish and other, 1%
Literacy: 78% (2008)
Key Exports: clothing, semi-finished goods and textiles,
(notably
spare automotive parts), textiles, agricultural products
Despite its apparent relative prosperity,
Key Imports: textiles, machinery and equipment,
Tunisia has long exhibited a vast dividedivide between
hydrocarbons
between rural and urban areas, and especially between
Major Trading Partners: France, Italy, Germany,
particularly between the developed, touristLibya, China, Spain
friendly coast and the far poorer interior. At
Female Labor Participation Rate (% of female
least half of the population lives in Tunis and
population): 26%
coastal towns, and there is population drift
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook, September 2011;
toward these areas.7 Anti-government
World Bank, World Development Indicators
demonstrations, in particular those rooted in
labor and economic grievances, have often
originated in the dispossessed interior (which includes hardscrabble mining areas)—as did the
unrest that unseated Ben Ali.
Key Issues in the Transition
Nine months into Tunisia’s transition from authoritarian rule, the country faces steep challenges.
Interim government officials have embarked on a wide range of reforms, including the release of
political prisoners, the authorization of dozens ofthe developed, tourist-friendly coast and the
Libya, China, Spain
poorer interior. At least half of the population
Female Labor Participation Rate (% of female
lives in Tunis and coastal towns, and there is
population): 26%
6
population drift toward these areas. AntiSources: CIA, The World Factbook, September 2011;
government unrest, particularly when rooted
World Bank, World Development Indicators
in labor and economic grievances, has often
originated in the interior (which includes
hardscrabble mining areas)—as did the protests that unseated Ben Ali.
Key Issues in the Transition
Nearly a year into their country’s transition from authoritarian rule, Tunisians can point to a
number of significant achievements—not least, the holding of widely praised national elections in
October 2011 that put in place a National Constituent Assembly. Yet they and their new leaders
continue to face steep challenges. The interim government led by Prime Minister Caïd Essebsi
(February-December 2011) embarked upon a wide range of reforms, including the release of
political prisoners, the authorization of some 100 new political parties, and the lifting of many
online and media restrictions. The former ruling party, the RCD, has beenwas dissolved and its funds
liquidated, and a number of former party officials and Ben Ali associates and relatives have beenwere
arrested. EffortsInterim authorities initiated efforts (albeit limited) to dismantle the former regime’s
domestic security apparatus are ongoing. Authorities
have announced their intention, and, with the help of the military, reinstated relative security in many
parts of the country. The government also took steps to adhere to international human rights
treaties, including the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Government activities are currently focused on
preparing for national elections on October 23, which are expected to lead to a transitional
government that will draft a new constitution.
Yet the interim government has struggled to maintain public trust, despite its apparent efforts to
act in good faith. Many perceive the interim authorities as acting too slowly on reforms, and there
is a lack of clarity over who, within the government, is empowered to make key decisions.8 These
and other factors have contributed to some Tunisians’ fears that former regime stalwarts could
7
EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
See, e.g., National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), Imagining the Road Ahead: Citizen Attitudes
About Tunisia and the Constituent Assembly Election Period, July 2011; and Marina Ottaway, “Transitional Failure in
Egypt and Tunisia,” National Interest, August 10, 2011.
8
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reemerge and consolidate power.9 Moreover, as one analyst noted, “the lack of revolutionary
leadership and the late entry of the political parties into the revolution mean that there is no group
able to negotiate political reforms in the revolution’s name. Groups claiming to represent the
people have been proliferating, yet they offer significantly different visions.”10
Despite some progress toward elections and other reforms, reports indicate widespread
dissatisfaction and confusion over the transition process.11 Moreover, tensions are burgeoning
between representatives of the coastal elite and the disadvantaged interior, between Islamists and
secularists, between the activist youth who led the uprising and the technocrats who run the
interim government, and among political factions. As one longtime observer recently wrote,
“economic stagnation, pent up social demands, and a combination of political and cultural
tensions are generating deep suspicion and anxiety across the country.”12
At times, resurgent public demonstrations and sporadic riots have appeared to threaten the interim
government’s ability to assert its authority, and some observers fear that vast and divided
expectations could undermine Tunisia’s ability to make steady progress on institutional reforms.13
Since Ben Ali’s departure, the government’s response to protests has been relatively tempered,
and the focus of security forces has turned toward containing disorder; however, in some
instances, police have reportedly assaulted protesters and journalists. Public unrest has also
sparked security concerns. In July, Prime Minister Essebsi accused rioters in Sidi Bouzid—where
the protests that overthrew Ben Ali first originated—of trying to destabilize the country and derail
elections, and in September, Essebsi stated that the government “will no longer tolerate practices
that risk to paralyze the daily situation of Tunisians, such as road-blocks, attacks on police posts
and regional sovereign establishments, and attacks on the national security forces and military.”14
Tunisians have wrestled over how to resolve differences of opinion over reform priorities, the
relative legitimacy of various political actors, and the details of implementation. For example, the
main Islamist party, Hizb al Nahda (alt: Ennahda/An-Nahda, “Renaissance”), withdrew from the
interim government’s High Authority for the Realization of the Goals of the Revolution, Political
Reforms, and the Democratic Transition (henceforth, the political reforms commission) in June,
citing a lack of “popular legitimacy.”15 Al Nahda’s withdrawal, which was followed by the
9
OSC doc. GMP20110817950023, “Tunisian Politicians Unite Against Ben Ali’s Loyalists Making Comeback,” Al
Jazeera, August 16, 2011; OSC doc. GMP20110914950028, “Ousted Tunisian Regime’s Loyalists Said Trying to
Regain Media Control,” Al Jazeera, September 13, 2011.
10
Asma Nouira, “Obstacles on the Path of Tunisia’s Democratic Transformation,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Arab Reform Bulletin, March 30, 2011.
11
E.g., Le Monde, “Tunisie: L’Euphorie Est Partie,” June 15, 2011.
12
Christopher Alexander, “Suspicion and Strategy in Free Tunisia,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 20, 2011.
13
E.g., Marina Ottaway, “Tunisia: The Revolution is Over, Can Reform Continue?” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, July 13, 2011. In May, for example, mass demonstrations erupted amid doubts over the interim
government’s capacity and will to complete the next steps toward democracy, leading to violent clashes with the
security forces and prompting the temporary reinstatement of a curfew. The unrest was spurred by remarks by former
interim Interior Minister Farhat Rajhi—seen as a popular reformer, but relieved of his position in March—in which he
accused elites of preparing a military coup should Islamists win the election. Interim authorities rejected Rajhi’s
statement, which he subsequently retracted. Rajhi’s remarks, which he did not appear to have intended to be broadcast
publicly, indirectly referenced the experience of Algeria, where parliamentary elections were canceled by the military
in 1992 after Islamists appeared poised to gain a majority of seats, leading to a decade of civil war.
14
John Thorne, “Agitators ‘Derailing Elections’ in Tunisia, PM Claims,” The National, July 19, 2011; Le Temps,
“Discours Martial de Béji Caïd Essebsi,” September 7, 2011 (CRS translation).
15
According to news reports, the party’s objections pertained to disagreements over attempts to limit campaign
(continued...)
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withdrawal of at least one other prominent political party and similar criticism by other members,
underscored the difficulties inherent in attempting to channel reformist sentiment while
accommodating disparate groups, and threatened to further undermine the interim government’s
ability to make decisions in the name of a broad political coalition.
The interim authorities have generally privileged election preparations over addressing profound
socioeconomic grievances (beyond appealing for additional external financial support), which
were among the motivating factors behind the January uprising. While some Tunisians appear to
accept this trade-off, labor strikes and localized demonstrations over wages, quality of life issues,
and access to land and jobs are frequent. Interim President Mebazaa has appealed for “patience”
from those demanding better living conditions, while Prime Minister Essebsi in April denounced
“daily protests and sit-ins that undermine the government’s efforts to encourage foreign
investment.”16 Further unrest could result if the National Constituent Assembly is seen to defer
consideration of socioeconomic issues until a post-transitional government is in place.
The following sections discuss key issues in Tunisia’s transition.
Elections
The organization of national elections is a key element of the transition process. The elections are
expected to select a transitional, 218-seat “National Constituent Assembly,” which will, in turn,
be charged with drafting a new constitution and preparing for presidential and parliamentary
elections.17 However, the duration, mandate, authorities, and mode of operation of the Assembly,
once it is elected, remain undefined.
The potential stakes in the election are high: to determine which political actors may speak in the
name of popular legitimacy, and to decide who will shape the new political order through the
process of constitution-drafting. Yet reports indicate that the complexity of the transition process,
and a lack of public understanding of the Constituent Assembly’s role, have led to political
apathy—an unanticipated reaction for a country in which pride in the “revolution” still holds
considerable sway.18 Only 52% of estimated eligible voters registered to vote—although others
will be able to vote using their national identity cards—and roughly one in three Tunisians
(...continued)
financing and over potential overtures to Israel.
16
Reuters, “Tunisia Struggles to Tame Revolutionary Spirit,” February 15, 2011; Agence France Press (AFP),
“Tunisie: Le Premier Ministre Dénonce des Excès dans les Manifestations et l’Emigration,” April 26, 2011.
17
The concept of electing a transitional government—instead of holding immediate presidential and/or legislative
elections—was announced on March 3 by Interim President Fouad Mebazaa, and was initially greeted as a victory by
Tunisia’s protest movement. In making this decision, interim authorities appeared to be sincerely attempting to respond
to the public’s demands for a transformation of the political system based on broad consultations. The parliament,
which was dominated by supporters of the former regime, voted on February 9 to allow Interim President Mebazaa to
rule by decree and has since suspended its activities.
18
U.S. Diplomatic Cable [UNCLASSIFIED], “Voter Registration Deadline Extended, Growing Frustration With Voter
Apathy,” August 1, 2011; Kaouther Larbi, “Tunisie: défiance ou myopie, la moitié des électeurs boudent l'inscription,”
AFP, August 14, 2011; Richard Valdmanis, “Confusion Reigns Ahead of Tunisia Vote,” Reuters, September 7, 2011.
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reported, two months ahead of election day, that they were undecided about whom to vote for.19
Nearly a third have indicated they would vote for “none” of the parties.20
The independent electoral commission, known by the French acronym ISIE, is ostensibly the lead
electoral management body. However, the ability to make key decisions on dates, logistics, and
procurement is divided among the ISIE, several government ministries, and other entities, such as
a “liaison committee” that answers to the Prime Minister.21 The ISIE is also reportedly internally
divided. Some election experts have criticized the ISIE and interim government for a lack of
transparency and of clarity on procedures. Furthermore, they note that the potential role of
Interior Ministry officials in election management could be controversial.22
In June, the election date was pushed back from July to October 23 due to logistical hurdles—
including delays in passing a new electoral law; establishing an electoral commission; and
commencing voter registration, poll worker training, and the procurement of election materials.
The delay followed a series of contradictory announcements by Prime Minister Essebsi and ISIE
head Kemal Jendoubi. Several prominent political parties initially strongly opposed a delay—
including Al Nahda and the largest legal opposition party during the former regime, Nejib el
Chebbi’s Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)—but they subsequently largely accepted it.
A new electoral law promulgated in May, which serves as the framework for the October election,
sets out a one-round voting system based on proportional representation, and includes a “parity”
reservation for women on the lists.23 Tunisians in the diaspora will be able to vote. Regional
governors, judges, and local officials cannot run as candidates unless they first resign their posts.
The law also bars from candidacy certain senior officials of the former ruling party.24 Over 100
political parties and a number of independent groupings are fielding candidates in the elections,
resulting in nearly 10,000 candidates and over 1,600 party lists—a higher than expected number
that could create logistical difficulties regarding ballots and counting.25 The Carter Center, which
is observing the election process, stated that “Tunisia’s voter registration process was conducted
smoothly, but important operational challenges remain ... particularly the allocation of voters to
polling stations and a campaign to disseminate voter information to the public.”26 The formal
campaign period begins on October 1. Efforts by the ISIE to ban public opinion surveys and
political advertizing, starting on September 12, have been controversial.27
19
Sigma Conseil, Baromètre Politique, Tunis, September 2011.
State Department Office of Opinion Research, “Tunisians Up for Elections, But Down on Parties,” August 31, 2011.
21
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Elections in Tunisia: The 2011 Constituent Assembly,
Frequently Asked Questions, July 2011.
22
CRS interviews with election experts, September 6-13, 2011.
23
Previously, Tunisia had a 25% female reservation requirement for party lists in parliamentary elections. According to
news reports, the women’s representation provision was supported by Al Nahda.
24
Art. 15 of Decree Law N. 35 on Election of the National Constituent Assembly, May 10, 2011; provided by the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Senior officials are defined as those who occupied a “position
of responsibility” in the government over the past ten years or who signed a petition supporting the former president’s
2014 re-election bid.
25
Richard Cochrane, “Election 2011: Candidate Registration Completed as Tunisia Prepares for Election,” IHS Global
Insight, September 13, 2011; CRS interview with election management expert, September 13, 2011.
26
“The Carter Center Welcomes Completion of Tunisia’s Voter Registration; Highlights Additional Steps Needed to
Ensure Successful Polling,” September 1, 2011.
27
TunisieNews.com, “Les Partis Politiques Défient la Décision de l’ISIE et Poursuivent Leurs Compagnes
Publicitaires,” September 12, 2011.
20
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Political Transition in Tunisia
The Role of Islam in Politics
The relationships between Islam, Islamic practice, and the Tunisian state are likely to be a core
area of disagreement and contestation for members of the National Constituent Assembly as it
tries to draft a new constitution. The rapid liberalization of the political sphere since January has
led to the legalization of Al Nahda, Tunisia’s largest Islamist organization, which operated
clandestinely and outside the country over the past two decades. Other Islamist groups have also
proliferated (including some splinter factions of Al Nahda), and religiously conservative Salafist
groups have expanded their activities and visibility.28 Recent public opinion surveys place the
level of support for Al Nahda around 20%, which (if accurate) would make it by far the most
popular political party but still presumably reliant on coalition-building.29 (The second most
popular party appears to be Najib el Chebbi’s PDP.) A significant additional percentage of
Tunisians, while they may not plan to vote for Al Nahda, reportedly broadly desire Islam to play a
more prominent role in public life.30 However, very few indicate that they prefer an Islamic
system of government.31
Most analysts argue that Tunisia’s secular traditions, educated middle class, and history of
promoting women’s socioeconomic equality are bulwarks against extremism. Islamists and
secularists have nonetheless grown increasingly polarized in recent months, potentially
portending gridlock within the Constituent Assembly. Secular elites are particularly concerned
with protecting Tunisia’s personal status code, which protects some socioeconomic rights for
women. Recent demonstrations by radical Islamist groups, including an assault by Salafists on
individuals attending the screening of a secularist film in Tunis in late June, have sparked
additional concerns.32 Al Nahda leaders, including founder and president Rachid Ghannouchi,
have generally portrayed themselves as moderates who seek to participate in a democratic
political system, support the separation of mosque and state, and would not scale back women’s
rights.33 The movement’s detractors, however, suspect it of a “double discourse,” i.e., portraying a
moderate face to the public and to international audiences in order to enter government and
gradually introduce more conservative, restrictive laws and institutions.34 On the other hand,
28
See, e.g., CTC Sentinel, “The Rise of Salafists in Tunisia After the Fall of Ben Ali,” August 1, 2011.
See, e.g., Institut de Sondage et de Traitement de l’Information Statistique (ISTIS), “Sondage d’Opinion sur la
Situation Politique et l’Impact de la Révolution sur les Média Presse,” April 2011; OSC doc. GMP20110706966178,
“Al Jazeera.net: Tunisians Undecided Ahead of October Vote,” July 6, 2011; AFP, “Tunisie/Elections : 67% des
Tunisiens Indécis, Ennahda (Islamistes) en Tête,” July 6, 2011; Sigma Conseil, Baromètre Politique, September 2011.
30
ISTIS, April 2011, op. cit.
31
State Department Office of Opinion Research, August 2011, op. cit.
32
Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Police Inaction Allowed Assault on Film Screening; Action Needed to Curb Attacks
on Artists Deemed ‘Un-Islamic,’” June 30, 2011; see also OSC doc. GMP20110701405002, “‘Supporters of Shari’ah’
Condemn ‘Attacks’ on ‘Sanctities of Muslims in Tunisia,’” Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, June 30, 2011.
33
For example, a Nahda spokesman told a journalist in April that “there is no developed country that does not have
women’s rights, these things go together.” Le Monde, “En Tunisie, Les Multiples Visages d’Un Islamisme Qui
Réapparaît au Grand Jour,” April 10, 2011. See also Marc Lynch, “Tunisia’s New al-Nahda,” ForeignPolicy.com, June
29, 2011; and Al Nahda, “Address by the General-Secretary of ‘Ennahda’ Party : Positions and Dimensions,” Sousse
Business Forum, June 11, 2011. For a sympathetic background on Ghannouchi’s political and philosophical evolution,
see Azzam S. Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
34
See, e.g., remarks by Nabila Hamza at a Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, “What Kind of Democracy
for the New Tunisia: Islamic or Secular,” May 9, 2011, in Washington, DC. Some Tunisians point to Ghannouchi’s
remarks in Egypt in August 2011, in which he stated that the “ultimate objective” of Muslims was the installation of a
caliphate, as proof of this phenomenon (see Le Temps, “Rached Ghannouchi en Egypte: ‘Le califat est notre objectif
ultime,’” August 3, 2011). An Al Nahda spokesman told CRS, via email, that the party had “distanced itself from this
(continued...)
29
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Political Transition in Tunisia
many Al Nahda supporters purport to feel threatened by “leftist” actors, whom they accuse of
dominating the interim government and of seeking to delay elections in order to restrict Islamists’
participation in politics.35 Ghannouchi has compared Al Nahda to Turkey’s ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP). However, he espoused more radical rhetoric during confrontations
with the government in the 1980s and early 1990s, and some Al Nahda supporters are also
thought to be more conservative in their views.
Al Nahda did not play a significant role in the December-January uprising, but the organization
raised its national profile in early 2011 by helping to form the Committee to Defend the
Revolution, a loose affiliation of political parties, activists, unionists, and leftist groups that
successfully called for the interim government to dismiss senior officials from the former regime.
At the same time, Al Nahda is contending with internal divisions and competing with emergent,
more radical Islamist groups for public support.36 The party’s leadership has split and been
reshuffled over various issues. Ghannouchi is not a candidate in the October elections; he has said
that he will step down before the end of the year, following which party members may elect a
new leader. When asked by a journalist whether national elections might reveal “a country closer
to Islamism than people think,” Prime Minister Essebsi replied, “We will not authorize those who
want to exploit freedom in order to crush it” but gave few further details.37
Background on Al Nahda
Al Nahda, now presided by Islamic scholar and activist Rachid Ghannouchi, was first formally organized by
Ghannouchi and Abdel Fattah Moro in 1981 (soon after multiparty politics were legalized under President Bourguiba)
as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). (Moro has since left the party.) Although the MTI was relatively moderate
compared to other Islamist groups, it was viewed as the most popular and therefore the most significant threat to the
government.38 The MTI organized demonstrations on university campuses, spurring arrests and clashes with the
security forces, and with leftist groups. The growing unrest, combined with that orchestrated by trade unions,
undermined support for Bourguiba’s presidency and laid the groundwork for Ben Ali’s rise in 1987.39
Initially upon coming to power, Ben Ali promised greater pluralism and a dialogue with opposition groups. Hoping to
gain legal recognition, the MTI changed its name to Hizb al Nahda to comply with the 1988 political party law, which
barred names based on religion. It was nonetheless denied legal status. Al Nahda candidates were allowed to run as
independents in the 1989 parliamentary elections, but when they garnered a high level of support—15% of the
national vote—Ben Ali initiated a crackdown on the group. Ghannouchi left the country during this time.
Violent confrontations between the government and Al Nahda activists escalated, culminating in an attack on a ruling
party office in 1991 that was blamed on Al Nahda. Al Nahda leaders condemned the attack and denied that those
responsible belonged to their movement, an explanation that remains disputed. Ben Ali accused Al Nahda of plotting
to overthrow the government and launched a campaign to eradicate the group and all signs of conservative Islam. The
government subsequently claimed it had unearthed an Islamist plot to assassinate Ben Ali, and in 1992 Tunisian
military courts convicted 265 Al Nahda members on charges of planning a coup. Al Nahda denied the accusations, and
some rights advocates criticized the case as biased and lacking due process.40 Ghannouchi was sentenced in absentia.
Similar tensions between Islamists and government forces drove neighboring Algeria into civil war in the early 1990s.
(...continued)
statement,” which he portrayed as Ghannouchi’s opinion as a legal scholar, not a political leader.
35
Al Nahda spokesman email to CRS, June 28, 2011; and Marina Ottaway, “The Revolution is Over,” op. cit.
36
See Rajaa Basly, “The Future of al-Nahda in Tunisia,” Carnegie Endowment, April 20, 2011.
37
Paris Marianne, “Tunisia’s Essebsi: Libyan Crisis a ‘Domestic Matter’ for Tunisians,” March 23, 2011; via OSC.
38
Henry Munson Jr., “Islamic Revivalism in Morocco and Tunisia,” The Muslim World, 76:3-4 (1986).
39
Munson 1986, op. cit.
40
Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, Routledge: New York, 2010.
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The Security Forces
A central challenge facing Tunisia’s interim government is how to assert control over the size and
mandate of the domestic security services, which formed a vast and secretive network under Ben
Ali, without sowing the seeds of future instability. It may also take time before members of the
public are willing to trust the police to ensure their security. The security services under Ben Ali
were accused of abuses including extrajudicial arrests, denial of due process, torture, and the
mistreatment of detainees. While the exact number of domestic security agents is unknown, it is
thought by some analysts to far exceed the number of military personnel and could be as high as
200,000.41 Several dozen senior security and Interior Ministry officials were fired in February,
and in March, the Interior Ministry announced it was dissolving entities “akin to ‘political
police.’”42 However, the number of affected personnel, and whether they will be permitted to
retain their employment with the government, has not been made public. For now, it does not
appear that a significant number of security officers have been dismissed, and it is unclear to what
extent the domestic security services have been restructured. According to some human rights
advocates, domestic intelligence services have not been dissolved, and may continue to conduct
surveillance activities—although whether they are following orders or merely habit is unclear. 43
The interim government has brought charges against Ben Ali (in absentia) for ordering the killing
of protesters in January, and against the former head of presidential security, Ali Seriati, who is in
custody. However, opinions are divided as to whether to pursue lower- and mid-ranking officials
and security officers for abuses committed under the former regime. The U.N. special rapporteur
on torture called on Tunisia in May to “promote accountability for past abuses,” including by
prosecuting perpetrators of torture and other abusive acts; the rapporteur also suggested that
torture may have continued, in a small number of cases, since Ben Ali’s departure.44 Fears among
police officers that they could be made to shoulder the blame for the regime’s decision to open
fire on demonstrators in January escalated into police demonstrations against the interim
government in early September.45
The Military
There is a notable distinction between the internal security forces, which were closely associated
with Ben Ali’s repressive security apparatus, and the military, which receives fewer state
resources and is viewed as relatively apolitical.46 The military comprises roughly 35,000
personnel; military service is compulsory for one year, but many Tunisians reportedly evade it.
41
Eric Goldstein/Human Rights Watch, “Dismantling the Machinery of Oppression,” The Wall Street Journal,
February 16, 2011.
42
TAP, “Interior Ministry Decides to Remove State Security Division,” March 7, 2011.
43
See Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), La Tunisie post Ben Ali face aux démons
du passé: Transition démocratique et persistance des violations graves des droits de l’homme,” July 2011.
44
AFP, “UN Torture Rapporteur Visits Tunisia,” and Reuters, “People Still Tortured in Tunisia—U.N. Rapporteur,”
May 21, 2011.
45
AFP, “Tunisia Bans Police from Union Activities,” September 6, 2011. Divisions between police commanders and
the rank-and-file were exposed in the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s exit, as thousands of police officers held their
own anti-government demonstration to distance themselves from the RCD and call for better working conditions.
46
In the late 1970s and mid-1980s, the military led the repression of anti-government protests. However, this role was
largely relegated to the civilian security services under Ben Ali. Unlike in neighboring Algeria, the military leadership
did not play a major role in the independence movement or in early state formation.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Government spending on the military constitutes only 1.4% of GDP—a low proportion compared
to other countries in the region, such as Algeria (3.3%), Egypt (3.4%), Libya (3.9%), and
Morocco (5%).47 The armed forces are positioned largely against external threats, and also
participate (to a limited extent) in multilateral peacekeeping missions.
The government’s initial, heavy-handed response to the December-January protests was led by
the police, who opened fire on demonstrators and reportedly conducted other abuses.48 The
deployment of the military to the streets on January 12 was a turning point, and many analysts
contend that military leaders subsequently played a key role in ending Ben Ali’s presidency.
Notably, General Rachid Ammar, then army chief of staff (since promoted to the equivalent of
joint chief of staff) is widely reported to have refused orders to open fire on demonstrators.49 On
January 23, Ammar publicly addressed protesters and promised to safeguard Tunisia’s
“revolution.” While Ammar’s comments were welcomed by many Tunisians, they sparked
concern among some observers over whether the armed forces could interfere in domestic
politics, particularly if the security situation should worsen.50 Following Ben Ali’s exit, members
of the military led efforts to stabilize the security situation, including by pursuing elements of the
domestic security apparatus and unidentified armed elements seen as loyal to the old regime.51 In
August, a mid-ranking officer publicly stated that on January 14, as Ben Ali was fleeing the
country, he had personally decided to arrest 28 members of the Ben Ali/Trabelsi family at the
airport and declined to follow orders from the head of presidential security to release them.52
Security Concerns
The rapid fall of the Ben Ali regime raised fears that the country could experience a security
vacuum. Although the security situation has largely stabilized since the chaotic first few weeks
after Ben Ali’s departure, incidents of looting, theft, and destruction of property continue to occur.
Incidents of religiously motivated violence have been reported, including the murder of a Polish
priest on February 18 and harassment directed at Tunisia’s tiny Jewish population. There have
also reportedly been several large prison escapes, for unclear reasons.53 Authorities are further
contending with the influx of refugees from Libya, which has created a humanitarian crisis along
the border, while inter-tribal violence has been reported in the southwest. Suspicions remain that
elements of the security services are seeking to provoke disorder, including by reportedly
infiltrating demonstrations; interim government officials blamed an armed attack on the Interior
47
CIA, The World Factbook; figures dated 2006.
Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Hold Police Accountable for Shootings,” January 29, 2011.
49
E.g., Abdelaziz Barrouhi, “Tunisie: L’Homme Qui A Dit Non,” Jeune Afrique, January 30-February 5, 2011.
50
Issandr El Amrani, “Tunisia Diary: Ammar’s Move?” TheArabist.net, January 24, 2011. In mid-2010, an analysis of
Tunisia’s political stability concluded that “a coup is a real possibility” should instability affect the transfer of power
after Ben Ali. Veritiss, Tunisia: Outlook 2011-2015 [UNCLASSIFIED], prepared For the Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office, August 2, 2010.
51
In the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure, international media reports referenced violence by civilianclothed “militias” seen as allied to the former president, whose identity and relationship to formal security structures
remains unclear. Angelique Chrisafis, “Confusion, Fear and Horror in Tunisia as Old Regime’s Militia Carries on the
Fight,” The Guardian (UK), January 17, 2011.
52
La Presse, “L’Arrestation des Membres de la Famille du Président Déchu et son Epouse S’Est Effectuée
Spontanément,” August 8, 2011.
53
Le Monde, “Incertitudes en Tunisie sur la Tenue des Elections, le 24 Juillet,” May 10, 2011.
48
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Ministry, on February 1, on a conspiracy by members of the former regime’s security forces.54
The interim government has indefinitely extended the “state of emergency” imposed by Ben Ali
in January (though its provisions barring the public assembly of more than three persons have not
been enforced), and the military is assisting in security operations in the interior.
Some analysts fear that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional affiliate of Al
Qaeda, could take advantage of the uprising and related insecurity, particularly when combined
with upheaval in neighboring Libya. AQIM released a statement in January hailing the departure
of Ben Ali and warning against supposed U.S. and French efforts to subvert the revolution.55 Al
Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman Al Zawahri, has released at least two statements seeking to
portray uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as motivated by Islamist sentiment and warning that the
United States would seek to manipulate the outcomes.56
In mid-May, Tunisian authorities announced they had arrested two suspected AQIM members in
the southeastern town of Nekrif, near the Libyan border. The two suspects were described as an
Algerian and a Libyan national, and were said to be in possession of an “explosive belt,” an
automatic weapon, a homemade bomb, and GPS equipment.57 According to Tunisian officials,
this was the first arrest of AQIM militants within Tunisia. Several days later, four Tunisian
soldiers were killed in a shoot-out in the northern town of Rouhia with a group described as
affiliated with Al Qaeda. Two militants were also reported killed. In July, Tunisian authorities
claimed to have halted AQIM militants from entering Tunisia from Algeria, and in August
security forces engaged in skirmishes with “terrorists” at the Algerian border.58 Armed groups
have also reportedly been stopped at the Libyan border.59
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background
While Tunisia has not been subject to many significant attacks, terrorism is a potential domestic
threat and Tunisians have participated in plots abroad. The two most significant recent incidents
of terrorism on Tunisian soil were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of
Djerba (noted for its tiny Jewish population) and a series of gun battles between alleged militants
and security forces in Tunis in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al
Zawahiri appeared to claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in
October 2002. In all, 14 German tourists, five Tunisians, and two French citizens were killed in
54
Tara Bahrampour, “In Tunisia, First Steps Toward Democracy,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2011; Jeune
Afrique, “Tunisie: l’Ex-RCD Soupçonné d’Avoir Commandité des Attaques de Postes de Police,” July 18, 2011.
55
OSC doc. GMP20110128836001, “AQLIM Warns Tunisians Against Western ‘Plots’ To ‘Abort’ Tunisian
Revolution,” Al-Mujahidin Electronic Network, January 28, 2011. For background on AQIM, see CRS Report R41070,
Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by
John Rollins.
56
Maamoun Youssef, “Al-Qaida’s No. 2 Incites Tunisians, Egyptians,” AP, February 28, 2011; OSC doc.
GMP20110913836004, “Al-Fajr Releases Al-Zawahiri Audio, Bin Ladin Video on 10th Anniversary of 9/11,” Ana Al
Muslim Network, September 13, 2011.
57
Radio Tunisienne, “Tunisian Interior Ministry Provides More Information on ‘Terrorists’ Arrest,” May 16, 2011, via
U.S. government Open Source Center (OSC).
58
BBC Monitoring, “Militants From Al-Qa'idah Try to Sneak into Tunisia, Official,” July 2, 2011; OSC doc.
GMP20110822280003, “Tunisian Sources Report Several Dead in Army Clashes with Terrorists Near Border,” Le
Temps d'Algerie, August 20, 2011.
59
Le Temps, “Menace Terroriste sur la Tunisie,” September 10, 2011.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
the attack.60 France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged
involvement in the attack. In January 2009, French authorities put two alleged culprits on trial.
The roots of the 2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, are more opaque.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated
outside Tunisia, on a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.61 The TCG
sought to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia and was considered to be a radical offshoot of Al
Nahda. The TCG was suspected of plotting, but not carrying out, attacks on U.S., Algerian, and
Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001. One founder, Tarek Maaroufi, was arrested in
Belgium the same month. The group appears to have since been inactive.
AQIM, an Algerian-led group formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC), actively recruits Tunisians and reportedly had ties with the TCG.62 In January 2007,
following the aforementioned gun battles, Tunisian security forces claimed that they had
discovered terrorists linked to the GSPC who had infiltrated from Algeria and possessed
homemade explosives, satellite maps of foreign embassies, and documents identifying foreign
envoys. Some 30 Tunisians were subsequently convicted of plotting to target U.S. and British
interests in Tunisia. AQIM later claimed responsibility for kidnapping two Austrian tourists in
Tunisia in February 2008.
Tunisian expatriates suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been arrested in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, Western Europe, Mauritania, and the United States. Some are reportedly detained at the U.S.
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and their possible return to Tunisia has proven to be
controversial.63 In April 2009, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of U.S. Central
Command, told a House Appropriations Committee subcommittee that the perpetrators of suicide
bombings in Iraq that month may have been part of a network based in Tunisia.64
Under Ben Ali, as many as 2,000 Tunisians were detained, charged, and/or convicted on
terrorism-related charges, including a sweeping anti-terrorism law passed in 2003.65 Critics
claimed that the law “makes the exercise of fundamental freedoms ... an expression of
terrorism.”66 These criticisms were echoed in the December 2010 report of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, who concluded that “the current definition of terrorism is vague and broad,
hence deviating from the principle of legality and allowing for wide usage of counter-terrorism
measures in practice.”67 Rights advocates also accused anti-terror trials of relying on excessive
pretrial detention, denial of due process, and weak evidence. The current interim government has
60
Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002.
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, released April 30, 2007.
62
Craig S. Smith, “Tunisia is Feared as New Islamist Base ... ,” International Herald Tribune, February 20, 2007.
Note, GSPC renamed itself Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in January 2007.
63
According to recent news reports, 12 out of the total number of those detained at Guantanamo at one time are
Tunisian, but only five currently remain in U.S. custody. Five were repatriated to third countries, partly due to concerns
over their possible torture if returned to Tunisia, while two others were returned to Tunisia and imprisoned. Bouazza
Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia to Send Mission to US for Release of its Remaining Gitmo Detainees,” September 14, 2011.
64
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Holds
Hearing on the US Central Command, April 24, 2009, transcript via CQ.
65
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010.
66
Jeremy Landor, “Washington’s Partner,” Middle East International, March 5, 2004, pp. 23-24.
67
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur, December 28, 2010, op. cit.
61
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Political Transition in Tunisia
promised to release all political prisoners, and there is ongoing debate about whether all
individuals convicted under the anti-terrorism law fall into this category.
Prosecuting Ben Ali and Associates
Tunisian authorities have brought dozens of criminal charges against Ben Ali and his wife, Leila
Trabelsi, both of whom remain outside the country. The decision to carry out multiple and rapid
trials of the former first couple in absentia, after Tunisian authorities unsuccessfully sought the
former president’s extradition from Saudi Arabia, has been controversial.68 The former president,
through his lawyers, denied the charges and criticized his first conviction (on charges of
embezzlement and misuse of state funds), in June, as a “parody of justice.”69 He was
subsequently convicted again, in July, on charges of illegal possession of drugs and weapons. He
reportedly faces nearly 200 additional charges in the civilian courts. A separate trial before a
military court, on charges related to killing and abusing protesters, is also anticipated. Dozens of
family members, along with former senior government and security officials, have also either
been tried or face charges. However, the ability of at least one suspect to flee the country in July
after an investigation had been opened and the courts’ decision in August to free a former Justice
Minister from custody (he was subsequently rearrested) led to widespread public criticism of the
interim authorities.70 The judicial system was inherited from the Ben Ali regime, and although it
has been ostensibly freed from executive branch interference, some observers view it as inept.71
Recovery of State Assets
Further investigations into the financial and real estate holdings of the Ben Ali and Trabelsi
families are ongoing. Family members reportedly owned or controlled many of the country’s
biggest companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure, and are
thought to have stashed away significant resources overseas.72 Tunisian authorities have seized
domestic assets belonging to the former president and his associates, and have identified at least
12 countries overseas where these individuals stored money, which could total billions of dollars.
Western governments have cooperated with Tunisian efforts to freeze these assets.73 However, the
process for recovering frozen assets on behalf of the state is complex and challenging.74 Interim
68
See AFP, “Ben Ali Critics Oppose His Trial in Absentia in Tunisia,” June 14, 2011; “Tunisians Dissatisfied with
Quick Ben Ali Verdict,” June 21, 2011; and Le Monde, “En Tunisie, la Difficile Justice Contre le Clan de l’Ancien
Président Ben Ali,” July 9, 2011. The interim government had also issued an international arrest warrant through
Interpol for Ben Ali, Leila Trabelsi, and several close relatives who have fled the country. Amnesty International called
the trial “unfair” and stated, “The current Tunisian government must follow due process and fair trial standards,
otherwise it risks replicating the unfair justice system that was a hallmark of Tunisia under Ben Ali.” “Accountability
in Tunisia and Egypt,” August 3, 2011.
69
Philippe Sauvagnargues, “Ben Ali Slams Fast-Track Corruption Conviction as ‘Insane,’” AFP, June 21, 2011.
70
Tarek Amara, “Tunisia Pledges Tougher Line on Ex-Leader’s Allies,” Reuters, August 18, 2011.
71
Hamadi Redissi, “The Revolution Is Not Over Yet [op-ed],” The New York Times, July 15, 2011.
72
Colin Freeman, “Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and His Family’s ‘Mafia Rule,’” The Telegraph (UK),
January 16, 2011.
73
The Wall Street Journal reported in February that U.S. investigators had opened a preliminary probe into assets
controlled by Ben Ali and family members. Joseph Palazzolo, “FBI Probe to Target Tunisia’s Ex-Leader,” The Wall
Street Journal, February 9, 2011.
74
Deborah Ball and Cassell Bryan-Low, “Arab Spring Regimes Face Long Slog to Recoup Assets,” The Wall Street
Journal, August 25, 2011.
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authorities have also moved to expropriate shares of companies controlled by certain Ben Ali
family members and associates accused of financial manipulation, but have allowed such
companies to continue operating (in most cases) under appointed managers.75
Key Actors
As political uncertainty continues to characterize the situation in Tunisia, it remains difficult to
distinguish which groups and individuals have the ability and popular credibility to decisively
influence events. Contenders for influence include Tunisia’s trade union federation; the security
forces; Islamist movements; the three older, secularist opposition political parties that were legal,
albeit highly restricted, under the former regime; and a vast array of newer political parties that
have proliferated since January, some reportedly headed by former RCD officials. The ideological
cohesion and mass appeal of these new parties are untested. While trade unionists and the Islamist
movement have, at different times, constituted the main vehicles for the mass expression of antigovernment dissent, the potential for either to present a cohesive political vision is unclear. Both
groups, along with leftist movements, which also draw significant support from some segments of
the population, have long been subject to government repression, harassment, and co-option.
Influential political groups include the main trade union, known as the UGTT; the main Islamist
party, Al Nahda; the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), a secular left-leaning party founded by
Ahmed Nejib el Chebbi; the Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties (FDTL), a centrist party
led by Mustafa Ben Jaafar that is now heading a coalition known as Ettakatol; Ettajdid, a leftist
party led by Ahmed Brahim; the Tunisian Communist Workers’ Party (PCOT), founded by
Hamma Hammami, which operated clandestinely under Ben Ali; the Congress for the People,
headed by human rights activist Moncef Marzouki; and potentially the Patriotic Free Union
(UPL), an emergent party headed by businessman Slim Riahi.76
Tunisia’s Trade Unions
Since Tunisia’s independence, the labor movement has served as a rare legal conduit for expressing dissent, and many
analysts view the main union federation, the Tunisian General Union of Labor (UGTT), as an important political force.
The UGTT, which claims over half a million members, played a key role in sustaining the December-January protests,
which its leadership framed as rooted in economic grievances.77 At the same time, the UGTT is highly fragmented,
with a relatively conservative, pro-government leadership frequently diverging from its more activist middle-tier and
grass-roots membership. In early February, some UGTT members protested against UGTT head Abdessalem Jrad,
whom they accused of being estranged from the union’s base. New unions and splinter movements have also been
formed, and labor unrest has continued, reportedly sparking a backlash among some segments of the middle class.
The UGTT was formed in the mid-1940s and was a force in Tunisia’s independence movement. During the Cold War,
75
Le Monde, “Orange Tunisie Passe Sous la Tutelle de l’Etat Tunisien,” March 30, 2011; David Gauthier-Villars,
“How ‘The Family’ Controlled Tunisia,” The Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2011.
76
The UPL, previously little-known, garnered widespread attention when it was listed in a September public opinion
survey as the party that garnered the seventh highest number of supporters. Sigma Conseil, Baromètre Politique, Tunis,
September 2011.
77
UGTT, Déclaration de la Commission Administrative Nationale, January 4, 2011; on membership, see the UGTT’s
website, at [www.ugtt.org.tn].
78
Global Security, “Union Génerale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT),” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/tunisia/ugtt.htm.
79
See Niger Disney, “The Working-Class Revolt in Tunisia,” Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
Reports, 67 (May 1978).
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it positioned itself as pro-Western (non-Communist) and formed links with the American labor movement.78 Tunisia’s
first president, Habib Bourguiba, strove to keep the unions under the government’s wing; during the 1960s, former
UGTT leader Ahmed Ben Salah led a decade-long period of socialist-oriented economic policy as minister for finance
and planning. By the late 1970s, however, amid growing economic unease, the union’s leadership turned to overt
confrontation with the government, particularly over grievances related to low wages and food price inflation.79 The
UGTT led a series of mass strikes and demonstrations—notably in 1978 and in the mid-1980s—which were met with
heavy state repression. During Ben Ali’s presidency, the government again attempted to co-opt the UGTT, including
by influencing its leadership selection process. The UGTT resurged as a key instigator of anti-government unrest in
recent years, organizing protests in the mining region of Gafsa in 2008 and 2010 that were arguably a precursor to
the December-January uprising.
Selected Profiles
•
Béji Caïd Essebsi, Prime Minister. Essebsi, 84, was named interim prime
minister on February 27 after then-Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi
resigned. Ghannouchi had served in the position since appointed by Ben Ali in
1999; he was pushed to resign by growing numbers of demonstrators who
objected to his continuation in office. Essebsi is a lawyer and was a close aide to
Tunisia’s founding president, Habib Bourguiba. In the 1960s and early 1970s, he
served in a variety of positions including interior minister and defense minister.
In 1978, he joined the Movement of Democratic Socialists (MDS), an opposition
party, before being reappointed to the cabinet as foreign minister in 1981. Essebsi
was served in parliament from 1989 to 1991.
•
Habib Essid, Minister of the Interior. Interim President Mebazaa appointed
Essid in March, replacing Farhat Rajhi, who was dismissed for unclear reasons.
Essid’s appointment was controversial, as Rejhi had been seen as a popular
reformist within the interim government, while Essid was viewed by some as
close to Ben Ali. Essid, 52, is an agricultural economist who has spent his entire
career in government administration, mostly in agricultural and development
policy but also as chief of staff at the Interior Ministry from 1997 to 2000.
•
Yadh Ben Achour, Head of the High Authority for the Realization of the
Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and the Democratic Transition.
Ben Achour is a Tunisian lawyer and well known legal scholar who was formerly
head of the law faculty at the University of Tunis. In January, he was appointed
to head a political reforms commission charged with changing Tunisia’s laws
ahead of national elections. In late March, Ben Achour roughly doubled the
commission’s membership, to about 130, in response to criticism that it was
insufficiently representative. Its authority continues to be challenged by some,
including Al Nahda, which briefly participated in the commission but has since
claimed that it pursued wide-ranging reforms without a sufficiently popular
mandate and that it represents an overly leftist, secularist, viewpoint.
•
Ahmed Nejib el Chebbi, Founder of the Progressive Democratic Party
(PDP). Chebbi formally stepped down from the leadership of the PDP, one of
three “dissident” opposition parties that were legally recognized during Ben Ali’s
presidency, in 2006, but continues to represent the party. He has portrayed
himself as the most prominent secular alternative to Islamist parties. Although
Chebbi and the PDP boycotted the 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections,
he is widely viewed as the most popular of the previously tolerated opposition
figures, and potentially more credible than members of the opposition who left
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Tunisia for exile abroad. A former student activist for leftist and pan-Arabist
causes, and a lawyer by training, Chebbi was imprisoned for several years in the
1960s. Chebbi directs a Tunis-based newspaper, El Mawkif, and provided legal
defense for several journalists targeted by the Ben Ali government.
•
General Rachid Ammar, Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Ammar is widely
reported to have refused to open fire on protesters during the December-January
uprising, and to have subsequently influenced Ben Ali’s decision to step down.
He consequently enjoys a high level of popularity. He has been chief of staff of
the 27,000-person army since 2002, when his predecessor was killed in a
helicopter crash. In April 2011, Ammar was promoted to chief of staff of the
military. On January 24, Ammar publicly addressed protesters, promising to
uphold Tunisia’s “revolution” and guarantee stability until elections are held. His
comments, which were welcomed by demonstrators, sparked concern among
some analysts over whether the armed forces, which were seen as relatively
apolitical under Ben Ali, could become an arbiter of domestic politics.
•
Rachid Ghannouchi, President and Co-Founder of Hizb al Nahda
(Renaissance). An Islamic scholar, teacher, and activist, Ghannouchi, 70, has led
Tunisia’s main Islamist movement for three decades. Ghannouchi’s early focus
was on religious and moral issues, but he grew more politically involved by the
late 1970s. He spent two decades in exile, largely in London, after his party, Al
Nahda, was banned in 1991, but returned to Tunisia in January following the
interim government’s announcement of a general amnesty. Ghannouchi has
portrayed himself as a moderate who would participate within a democratic
political system and not attempt to overturn women’s rights. He espoused more
radical rhetoric during confrontations with the government in the 1980s and early
1990s, however, and Tunisian secularists and some international observers view
him with suspicion. He has stated he will not run for president and that he will
soon step down from the leadership of the party.
•
Hamadi Jebali, Secretary-General of Al Nahda. Born 1949 in Sousse, Jebali is
a longtime activist in Al Nahda, having become a member of the group’s political
bureau in 1981 and served as its president from 1981 until 1984. He also served
as director of Al Nahda’s newspaper, Al Fajr. Previously, Jebali lived for 10 years
in France, where he completed an engineering degree and was one of the
founders of the French Muslim Association. In 1990, he was sentenced to over 16
years in prison due to his association with Al Nahda, and spent 10 years in
solitary confinement while in jail. After being freed in 2006, he rejoined Al
Nahda and subsequently became the party’s secretary-general.
•
Moncef Marzouki, Advocate and Leader of the Congress for the Republic
(CPR). Born in 1945, Marzouki is a medical doctor, author, and longtime human
rights activist who was in exile in France for a decade before returning to Tunisia
in January and announcing his intention to run for president. In 2001, Marzouki
founded the CPR party on a platform of establishing the rule of law and
promoting human rights. It was banned the following year.
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The Economy
Damage from the December-January unrest, political uncertainty, turmoil in neighboring Libya
(which caused the return of tens of thousands of migrant Tunisian workers and the related loss of
remittance revenues), and economic stagnation in Europe have caused Tunisia’s estimated
economic growth to plummet. Tunisia experienced a 3% economic contraction in the first quarter
of 2011, and its central bank predicts an economic recession in 2011, compared to 3.7% growth in
2010.80 Credit rating agencies have severely lowered Tunisia’s ratings due to political uncertainty.
The protests themselves reportedly caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, and
officials estimate that the political transition has cost at least $2 billion in lost revenues; tourism
receipts were reportedly down by 40% and foreign direct investment by 60% in the first six
months of 2011.81 Ongoing labor unrest, particularly in regions of the interior, including
phosphate mining areas, represents an additional potential economic obstacle, as do rising food
and fuel prices. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) nonetheless suggested in April that
improved economic growth was possible if reforms provide “greater access to opportunity and
more competition.”82
Officials have sought to restart tourism, garner donor support for economic stabilization, and
reassure investors by pledging greater economic transparency, with mixed effects. The interim
government is also reportedly considering plans for greater economic decentralization. In April,
Finance Minister Jalloul Ayed announced an “economic and social recovery plan” that aims to
create 40,000 new jobs (through a combination of public sector hiring and pro-business
measures), new infrastructure in the interior, access to microcredit for poor families, and a
monthly stipend for unemployed young people. The finance minister has also appealed for $4
billion in immediate foreign loans, while Prime Minister Essebi stated in May that Tunisia would
need at least $5 billion in aid per year over the next five years to finance infrastructure and job
creation.83 Officials have suggested they will not seek to restructure Tunisia’s outside debt. Some
commentators view donor perceptions of a weak interim government whose decision-making
authorities are fragmented as an impediment to greater outside financial support.84 Authorities
announced in June that they expect a strong domestic wheat crop in 2011, and that they plan to
open up some land, particularly in the interior, to foreign investment.
During Ben Ali’s presidency, many analysts contended that there was an implicit social contract
between the government and its citizens, which promoted economic stability and middle-class
standards of living at the expense of political freedom. Until the December-January protests, this
strategy appeared to have contained latent dissatisfaction from disrupting the political status quo.
Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and one of the best-performing non-oil exporting
Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Despite the impact of the global
80
Bouazza ben Bouazza, “Tunisie: L’Economie a dépassé le cap dangereux, selon le gouverneur de la Banque
centrale,” AP, July 9, 2011.
81
AFP, “Tunisie: Après le Retour au Calme, Place au Grand Chantier Economique,” March 9, 2011; Le Temps, “Appel
des 17 Pour Soutenir la Transition Démocratique en Tunisie,” May 19, 2011; Mark Tran, “Tunisia Offers Wake-Up
Call for Development,” The Guardian, June 9, 2011.
82
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2011.
83
AP, “Tunisie: Adoption d’un Plan de Relance Economique,” April 1, 2011; Reuters, “Tunisia Will Need $4 Bln in
Loans in 2011—FinMin,” April 1, 2011; Reuters, “Tunisia Economy Needs Foreign Help to Recover—Minister,” May
20, 2011; David Gauthier-Villars, “Tunisia to Seek Backing for Aid,” The Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2011.
84
OSC doc. GMP20110705966151, “Tunisia’s Economic Fallout,” July 5, 2011.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
economic crisis in 2009—which produced a decrease in exports, a contraction in the industrial
sector, and a lower expansion in services, largely due to a decrease in market demand in
Europe—the economy quickly rebounded with the government’s fiscal stimulus programs.
Textile exports and tourism have driven much of Tunisia’s economic growth in recent years. The
tourism sector is a major employer and provided some 11% of the country’s hard currency
receipts, and an estimated 400,000 jobs, prior to recent unrest. Tunisia has also attempted to
attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. Phosphate ore reserves are significant
and are the basis of a chemicals industry, but their value is reduced by their low grade. In 2009,
the World Bank cited Tunisia as a “top regional reformer,” citing progress in the areas of starting
a business, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, and border defense.85 In September
2010, the IMF predicted that Tunisia’s growth could continue to increase gradually, “provided
that policies and reforms planned by the authorities aimed at enhancing Tunisia’s
competitiveness, developing new markets, and supporting new sources of growth in sectors with
high added value bear fruit.”86 In 2009, public debt stood at roughly $22 billion, or about 47% of
gross domestic product (GDP), according to the World Bank.
At the same time, Tunisia’s strong economic record has long masked significant disparities.
Wealth has long been concentrated in the capital and along the tourist-friendly eastern coast,
while the interior has suffered from poverty and government neglect. Unemployment and
underemployment are major problems, notably for recent college graduates: the official
unemployment rate is high (over 13%) and the actual rate is believed to be even higher,
particularly among young people. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the
unemployment rate among university graduates was over 20% in 2010 and “increased by a factor
of ten over the last two decades” due to “the youth bulge, high throughput in universities,
mismatch in the demand and supply of skilled workers, and the relatively low quality of training
received by many graduates.” Moreover, unemployment is over 22%, on average, in interior
regions such as Kasserine and Gafsa, which were epicenters of the December-January unrest.87
Blatant official corruption under Ben Ali reinforced perceptions among many Tunisians that the
economic deck was stacked against them, even if they enjoyed high living standards relative to
others in the region.
In light of these issues, analysts have debated the role that economic factors played in the
Tunisian uprising. While most agree that a desire for greater democracy and individual freedoms
was a driving force in the popular protests that drove Ben Ali from office, socioeconomic
grievances doubtless spurred demands for change. In the aftermath of the uprising, numerous
segments of the society have expressed economic demands, notably union organizers and
residents in the interior. Indeed, demands for improvements in jobs and wages have soared even
as political unrest has contributed to severe economic contractions. Some observers fear that a
failure to address such grievances could lead an impatient public to lose faith in the transition
process, while others contend that many Tunisians are willing to endure prolonged economic
hardship in order to prioritize deep political reforms.
85
See World Bank, “Tunisia: A Top Regional Reformer According to Doing Business 2009,” September 2008.
Joël Toujas-Bernate and Rina Bhattacharya, International Monetary Fund, “Tunisia Weathers Crisis Well, But
Unemployment Persists,” September 10, 2010.
87
African Development Bank, The Revolution in Tunisia: Economic Challenges and Prospects, March 2011.
86
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U.S.-Tunisian Relations
Obama Administration officials have emphasized Tunisia’s role as an “important test case” of
democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa, a process for which the
Administration has expressed strong support.88 In a televised speech in May laying out a new
framework for U.S. policy toward the region, President Obama cited Tunisia as the place where
the “story of self-determination began” and called on the United States “to show that America
values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of the dictator.” The
President argued that “the stakes are high” in Tunisia and Egypt, but that “both nations can set a
strong example through free and fair elections, a vibrant civil society, accountable and effective
democratic institutions, and responsible regional leadership.”89 In congressional testimony in
May, Assistant Secretary of State Michael H. Posner stated, “The United States is committed to
helping secure a democratic transition that delivers results and sustainable economic development
for all the people of Tunisia.”90 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice stated in an
interview that “it matters enormously to American national security and our national interests”
that democratic transitions in Tunisia and Egypt “succeed.”91
A number of senior U.S. officials have visited Tunisia since mid-January, including Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Joseph Burns and Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton.92 In May, President Obama met with Prime Minister Essebsi on the sidelines of the
Group of Eight (G8) summit, where they discussed “the importance of moving forward with
democratic reforms.”93
The United States and Tunisia have enjoyed continuous relations since 1797. Tunisia was the site
of significant battles during World War II, and was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 in Operation
Torch. A U.S. cemetery and memorial near the ancient city of Carthage (outside Tunis) holds
nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a strongly pro-Western
foreign policy despite a brief experiment with leftist economic policies in the 1960s. U.S.Tunisian ties were nonetheless strained in the mid-1980s by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some viewed as having been
carried out with U.S. approval.94
U.S.-Tunisian relations during Ben Ali’s presidency largely emphasized security cooperation. The
United States considered Ben Ali to be an ally, a moderate Arab ruler, and a partner in
88
House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, “Developments in Egypt and Lebanon,” February 10, 2011, Statement of
James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, Department of State.
89
The White House, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and Africa,” May 19, 2011.
90
Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, statement before the
House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia for a hearing on “Political Transitions in the Middle East,”
May 5, 2011.
91
“U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Rice Interviewed on CNN,” May 19, 2011, transcript via CQ.
92
Clinton expressed strong support for the Tunisian revolution and pressed for economic and political reforms. Her
visit was protested by several hundred demonstrators in Tunis who said they opposed American “interference.” John
Thorne, “Hillary Clinton Visits Tunisia to Press for Reform,” The National, March 18, 2011.
93
“Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes and National Security Council Senior
Director for European Affairs Liz Sherwood-Randall Hold Media Availability,” May 27, 2011, via CQ.
94
Chicago Tribune Wires, “Bush Visits Tunisia to Patch Relations,” March 9, 1986; Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left
Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987.
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international counterterrorism efforts. Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor,
which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s
Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls at Tunis. Allegations have
been made that Tunisia cooperated in at least one case of U.S. “rendition” of a terrorist suspect, in
2004.95 However, Tunisia did not support the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 Iraq war and, when the
latter war began, Ben Ali expressed regret and fear that the conflict might destabilize the Middle
East.96 Tunisian officials’ criticism was not voiced directly at the United States, and their stance
did not significantly harm bilateral relations.
Despite generally positive bilateral ties with the Ben Ali regime, U.S. officials occasionally
voiced public criticism of Tunisia’s record on political rights and freedom of expression. The
State Department was critical of the 2004 and 2009 elections and said the United States would
continue to press for “political reform.”97 In a January 2010 speech on global Internet freedom,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton singled out Tunisia as one of five countries contributing to a
“spike in threats to the free flow of information.”98 In July, the State Department expressed
“deep” concern over “the decline in political freedoms, notably severe restrictions on freedom of
expression in Tunisia,” particularly with regard to the sentencing of an independent journalist to
four years in prison.99 In parallel with these criticisms, the United States continued to provide
military and economic assistance to the Tunisian government (see “U.S. Assistance,” below).
Numerous international and regional news reports and analyses have referenced internal
communications among U.S. diplomats that were reportedly highly critical of political repression
and corruption among Ben Ali’s inner circle and family. Some analysts have speculated that
reports of such communications may have played a role in sparking the protests that eventually
unseated Ben Ali.100
U.S.-Tunisian trade is relatively low in volume because Tunisia is a small country and conducts
most of its trade with Europe. In 2010, U.S. exports to Tunisia totaled $571 million and imports
totaled $405 million; in 2009, exports totaled $502 million and imports $326 million. While
Tunisian imports of U.S. goods did not fluctuate significantly during the global economic
recession, U.S. imports from Tunisia have yet to rebound to 2008 levels, when they totaled $644
million.101 Tunisia is eligible for special trade preferences, i.e., duty-free entry for listed products,
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Program. The United States and Tunisia have
a trade investment framework agreement (TIFA) and a bilateral investment treaty. TIFAs can be
the first step toward a free-trade agreement (FTA).
95
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, December 28, 2010, U.N. document
A/HRC/16/51/Add.2.
96
Tunis Infotunisie, “Ben Ali Expresses ‘Deep Regret’ at Start of War Against Iraq,” March 20, 2003, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document AFP20030320000266.
97
U.S. State Department Daily News Briefing, October 26, 2009; U.S. State Department, “Tunisia,” Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices, 2004, released February 28, 2005.
98
U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks on Internet Freedom,” January 21, 2010.
99
U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, July 9, 2010. For further background on Boukadous’ sentencing, see
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Tunisia Must Release Ailing Journalist on Hunger Strike,” October 21, 2010.
100
Christopher Alexander, “Tunisia’s Protest Wave: Where It Comes From and What It Means,” ForeignPolicy.com,
January 3, 2011.
101
U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/query.asp.
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U.S. Reactions to the January 2011 Uprising
U.S. criticism of the government’s response to the December-January demonstrations, although initially muted, grew
increasingly critical of Ben Ali as the protests escalated. On January 11, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an
interview with the Saudi-funded Arabic-language satellite television channel Al Arabiya that “we are worried, in general,
about the unrest and the instability, and what seems to be the underlying concerns of the people who are
protesting.”102 At the same time, Clinton stressed that “we are not taking sides,” and indicated that she had not been
in direct communication with senior authorities since the protests began. In a speech in Doha, Qatar, on January 13,
Secretary Clinton challenged Middle Eastern leaders to address the fundamental needs of their citizens and provide
channels for popular participation, or else risk instability and extremism. Events in Tunisia provided a vivid backdrop
to her remarks.
After Ben Ali’s departure on January 14, President Barack Obama stated, “I condemn and deplore the use of violence
against citizens peacefully voicing their opinion in Tunisia, and I applaud the courage and dignity of the Tunisian
people.” He also called on the Tunisian government to hold “free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the
true will and aspirations of the Tunisian people.”103 Secretary Clinton echoed the president’s call for elections and
encouraged the Tunisian government to “build a stronger foundation for Tunisia’s future with economic, social, and
political reforms,” adding that “the United States stands ready to help.”104 In his January 25 State of the Union
address, President Obama stated, “[W]e saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people
proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator…. The United States of America stands with the people of Tunisia
and supports the democratic aspirations of all people.”
Several Members of Congress have expressed concerns that the United States appeared to lack sufficient intelligence
on Middle East protest movements and their potential to upset governments in the region, concerns which executive
branch officials have disputed.105
U.S. Assistance
U.S. bilateral aid is modest by regional standards and was, until recently, highly focused on
military assistance and counterterrorism cooperation (Table 1, below).106 The Obama
Administration, which submitted its proposed FY2012 foreign assistance budget in early 2011,
did not initially request any democracy and governance funding for Tunisia in FY2011 or
FY2012, but the Administration subsequently identified a range of potential funding sources for
providing support for Tunisia’s transition. The State Department’s Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI) is currently leading related assistance efforts, with the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and others also administering new programs. MEPI has a
regional office in Tunis, responsible for programming to enhance political, economic, and
educational reforms in the region, but prior to 2011 implemented limited programs within
Tunisia. The Administration also supports draft legislation that would authorize the President to
establish a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund (see “Congress and Aid to Tunisia,” below).107 In
early September, the Administration named William B. Taylor to coordinate U.S. development
and other civilian aid to transitional countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
102
AFP, “US Concerned About Reports of ‘Excessive Force’ in Tunisia,” January 11, 2011; and U.S. State
Department, “Secretary of State Interviewed on Al Arabiya,” January 11, 2011, via Congressional Quarterly (CQ).
103
The White House, “Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
104
U.S. State Department, “Recent Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
105
Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on
Worldwide Threats, February 10, 2011, via CQ.
106
U.S. State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2011 and FY2012.
107
Testimony of William J. Burns before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on “U.S. Policy and
Uprisings in the Middle East,” March 17, 2011.
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Administration assistance initiatives include the following:
•
Approximately $23.3 million in “transition support” assistance administered by
MEPI. This aid is aimed at helping Tunisia establish independent media, civil
society, political parties, and a new electoral framework, and implement
economic reforms.108
•
USAID-administered funding in support of Tunisia’s political transition totals
approximately $10 million.109 This includes $5 million in FY2010 Complex
Crises Fund (CCF) funding, which is intended to support planned community
development projects and political reforms in the interior and southeast.110 It also
includes $2 million for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives and $3 million in
support of the electoral process.111
•
The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) plans to offer
financial support in the form of direct loans, guarantees, and political risk
insurance, and is already supporting two Tunisian private equity firms that are
focused on small and medium-size businesses. OPIC will also support visits by
American business investors.112
•
The Administration has also provided humanitarian aid in response to the
massive influx of refugees from neighboring Libya.
Security Assistance
In late May, General Carter Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), visited
Tunisia on his first trip to North Africa since taking command in March. A U.S.-Tunisian Joint
Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held regularly. The Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reports that Tunisia relies on U.S. Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) assistance to “maintain its aging 80s and early 90s era inventory of U.S.-origin equipment,
which comprises nearly 70% of Tunisia’s total inventory.”113 According to private sector analysis,
the United States is Tunisia’s primary supplier of military equipment, largely purchased through
108
State Department Congressional Notification Transmittal Sheets, March 11, 2011 and July 25, 2011. The MEPI
funding, which is drawn from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, has partly come from funding appropriated
in FY2010 for other purposes and reallocated for programs in Tunisia, subject to congressional notification ($18.3
million). MEPI also plans to support partnerships between Tunisian civil society groups and U.S. technology
companies to enhance information and communications capacity.
109
Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Michael H. Posner, May 5, 2011, op. cit. This figure appears to refer to
FY2010 and FY2011 Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) funding that has been allocated
toward Tunisia democracy and governance programming in 2011 (see Tunisia aid table, below). DCHA is generally not
appropriated bilaterally.
110
CN#56, “United States Agency for International Development Advice of Program Change,” June 3, 2011. The
notification referred to “an unanticipated opportunity to advance the Arab world’s first, and historic, democratic
transition.”
111
Figures communicated to CRS by the State Department’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance,
September 2011.
112
U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks with Tunisia Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi,”
March 17, 2011, via CQ. In congressional testimony, Assistant Secretary of State Michael H. Posner said OPIC would
provide “up to $2 billion in financial support for private-sector investments in the Middle East and North Africa.”
Statement before the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, “Political Transitions in the Middle
East,” May 5, 2011.
113
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Tunisia Summary,” updated January 13, 2011.
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Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements.114 FMF and Defense Department-administered
“Section 1206”115 security assistance funds have also provided Tunisia with equipment for border
and coastal security, which the United States views as a key area of counterterrorism prevention.
Since 2003, this equipment has included helicopters, machine guns, body armor and helmets,
parachutes, and night vision devices for sniper rifles. Other equipment has been provided through
the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, with plans to procure seven
Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with $4.1 million in FY2008 PKO funds forfeited
by Mauritania (which had been temporarily rendered ineligible for security assistance due to a
military coup).116 Tunisia has also been one of the top 20 recipients of International Military
Education and Training (IMET) since FY1994.117
In August 2011, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its plans to provide three new
Section 1206 packages for Tunisia, which are intended to “build the capacity of Tunisia’s national
military forces to conduct CT [counterterrorism] operations by providing equipment and
training.” The assistance, totaling $20.9 million, is intended to provide maritime equipment and
related operational training, land vehicles, and helicopter surveillance equipment.118
In July 2011 the State Department notified Congress of its intention to provide Tunisia with $1.43
million in FY2010 International Counter-Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds that
were originally notified for Jordan. The Department plans to use the funds “to strengthen the
criminal justice sector’s ability to combat corruption, implement judicial reforms and promote
prison reforms.”119 Prior to 2011, Tunisia had not benefitted from significant INCLE funding.
Tunisia is one of 10 countries participating in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership (TSCTP), an interagency regional program aimed at helping North and West African
countries better control their territory and strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities. The
Defense Department allocated over $13 million between FY2007 and FY2009 for TSCTP-related
military cooperation with Tunisia, including bilateral and multinational exercises, regional
conferences, and Joint-Combined Exchange Training programs, which are conducted by U.S.
special operations forces.120 Defense Department funds have also been allocated for programs
designed to counter violent extremist messages.
114
Forecast International, International Military Markets—Middle East & Africa, “Tunisia: Section 3—Market
Overview,” May 2009.
115
P.L. 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2006, Section 1206 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. For more information, see CRS Report RS22855,
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
116
This assistance is described as supporting the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
117
DSCA, op. cit.
118
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Congressional Notification, August 25, 2011.
119
State Department Congressional Notification Transmittal Sheet, July 25, 2011.
120
Funding figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.
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Table 1. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, Selected Accounts
(appropriations, thousands of current dollars)
FY2009
FMF
FY2010
FY2011 Est.
FY2012 Request
12,000
18,000
17,124
4,900
800
2,000
5,000
0
ESF (MEPI)
-
18,324
5,000
ESF (USAID nonbilateral)
-
830
1,700
1,945
1,950
1,675
INCLE
0
1,427
1,500
0
NADR
100
1,200
175
0
DCHA
-
8,000
2,000
Not available
IDA
-
-
100
Not available
Section 1206
8,800
0
20,900
Not available
Total, above
allocations
23,400
51,726
53,749
6,575
ESF (Bilateral)
IMET
0
Not available
Not available
Notes: FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ESF=Economic Support Funds; IMET=International Military Education
and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; DCHA= Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance;
IDA=International Disaster Assistance; Section 1206=Defense Department funds authorized for use in training
and equipping foreign military forces for certain purposes.
Items in italics refer to funding appropriated in FY2010 for other countries and purposes, then reallocated for
Tunisia in 2011. This chart does not reflect funding allocated under TSCTP.
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2009-FY2012;
communications from the State Department’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance; Defense
Department Congressional Notification; CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”
Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
Multilateral Assistance
Several multilateral institutions that receive significant U.S. financial support have pledged
economic aid for Tunisia during its transition process. The World Bank and African Development
Bank (AfDB) have each pledged $500 million in budget support to Tunisia, which is aimed at
providing emergency financial reserves while addressing regional disparities, reducing youth
unemployment, and improving civil liberties and economic governance.121 AfDB President
Donald Kaberuka indicated in early June that there is an additional $500 million in Tunisia aid “in
the pipeline,” which he hoped would be disbursed by year’s end, while the World Bank said in
May that it envisaged an additional $1 billion.122 The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), which also receives U.S. financial support, is considering extending aid to
North African countries, potentially including Tunisia. In May, G8 countries pledged $20 billion
121
African Development Bank, “AfDB Supports Accountability in Tunisia,” May 20, 2011.
African Development Bank, “AfDB and Tunisia Formally Sign USD 500M Budget Support Accord at Annual
Meetings,” June 10, 2011; World Bank, “World Bank Group Announces Up to $6 Billion for Egypt and Tunisia,” May
30, 2011.
122
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in aid for Tunisia and Egypt over three years, to be disbursed via multilateral banks such as the
European Investment Bank.123 French President Nicolas Sarkozy indicated that an additional $10
billion would be provided for the two countries by Gulf states, and another $10 billion by the
IMF.124 In September, the G8 pledged an additional $38 billion in new aid to transitional countries
in the region, although reports indicated that little of the previously promised funding had
materialized.125 Prime Minister Essebsi attended part of the G8 summit, where he appealed for
“economic support for our march towards democracy.”126
Congress and Aid to Tunisia
Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees foreign assistance funding and regularly
authorizes arms sale proposals. There is also a congressional Tunisia Caucus. Some Members of
Congress have advocated new assistance to support Tunisia’s transition to democracy and
economic stabilization. For example, S. 618 (Kerry) and H.R. 2237 (Schiff) would authorize the
President to establish a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund to promote private sector investment
and improve corporate governance, among other aims. S. 1388 (Kerry) would express support for
certain types of multilateral aid to North African countries undergoing political transitions that
meet certain criteria, among other provisions. Other Members contend that budgetary cuts take
precedence over new assistance programs, or that economic stability in Tunisia and elsewhere is
best addressed via private sector engagement and/or support from other donors. Some have
additionally pointed to uncertainties over the current and prospective nature of Tunisia’s
government. The discussion regarding potential new assistance has proceeded amid larger federal
budget debates and disagreements over funding priorities.
The Senate report accompanying S. 1253, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, states that “expanded military assistance and cooperation with the Tunisian Armed Forces
is an important component of a comprehensive U.S. policy to support the people and Government
of Tunisia in its transition to democracy” and “urges the Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, to enhance and expand U.S. security assistance to Tunisia in order to
strengthen the capacity of the Tunisian Armed Forces, in particular with regard to securing
Tunisia’s land and maritime borders.”127
Congress was supportive of U.S. military assistance to Tunisia during the latter years of Ben Ali’s
presidency. In an explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations
Act, 2009 (enacted on March 11, 2009), appropriators directed the State Department to allocate
$12 million in FMF assistance for Tunisia, far more than the State Department’s budget request
for $2.6 million. At the same time, appropriators wrote in the explanatory statement that
“restrictions on political freedom, the use of torture, imprisonment of dissidents, and persecution
of journalists and human rights defenders are of concern and progress on these issues is necessary
for the partnership between the United States and Tunisia to further strengthen.”128 In the
123
Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Springs, Deauville, May 26-27, 2011 (released on May 27, 2011).
Liz Alderman, “Group of 8 Pledges $20 Billion Aid to Egypt and Tunisia,” The New York Times, May 27, 2011.
125
Liz Alderman, “G-8 Nations Pledge New Aid to Arab Spring Economies,” The New York Times, September 11,
2011.
126
Sebastian Moffett and William Horobin, “Tunisia’s Leaders Call for Aid to Maintain Momentum of ‘Arab Spring,’”
May 27, 2011.
127
S.Rept. 112-26 (Title XII, Subtitle C, “United States-Tunisia Military-to-Military Cooperation,” June 22, 2011.
128
Congressional Record, February 23, 2009, p. H2417.
124
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conference report accompanying P.L. 111-117, the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(enacted on December 16, 2009), appropriators directed the State Department to allocate $18
million in FMF for Tunisia, $3 million more than the requested amount. The conference report
also allocated $2 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF)—the amount requested—for
“programs and activities in southern Tunisia and to promote respect for human rights.”129
Foreign Relations
Israel and the Palestinians
Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia’s foreign ministry
announced in September that it would support the Palestinians’ bid for a U.N. recognition of
statehood.130 Tunisia had an interests office in Israel until the outbreak of the second Palestinian
intifadah, or uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000.
Israelis of Tunisian descent are allowed to travel to Tunisia on Israeli passports, and the Israeli
and Tunisian foreign ministers sometimes meet. In September 2005, President Ben Ali sent a
personal letter to then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, praising his “courageous” withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip. Israel’s then-foreign minister, who was born in Tunisia, and thencommunications minister attended the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunisia in
2005. (Then-Prime Minister Sharon was invited along with leaders of all U.N. member states; his
invitation provoked demonstrations in Tunisia.)
Europe
Tunisia and the European Union (EU) have cemented a close relationship by means of an
Association Agreement, aid, and loans. At the same time, EU leaders periodically expressed
concerns over Tunisia’s record on human rights and political freedom under Ben Ali.131 More than
60% of Tunisia’s trade is conducted with Europe.132 The Association Agreement, which was
signed in 1995 and went into effect on January 1, 2008, eliminates customs tariffs and other trade
barriers on manufactured goods, and provides for the establishment of an EU-Tunisia free trade
area in goods, but not in agriculture or services. Negotiations on the provision of “advanced
status” for Tunisia vis-à-vis the EU, which would provide greater trade benefits, are expected to
be taken up again after elections.133 Tunisia receives aid from the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (MEDA) program and soft loans from the European Investment Bank, the financing
arm of the EU. The Europeans hope that their aid will help Tunisia to progress economically, and
thereby eliminate some causes of illegal immigration and Islamic fundamentalism.
129
Congressional Record, December 8, 2009, p. H14350.
UMCI News, “Tunisia Strongly Supports The Palestinian-UN Bid,” September 12, 2011.
131
See, e.g., AFP, “EU Calls for Release of Tunisian Protesters,” January 10, 2011.
132
World Trade Organization, Tunisia Profile, October 2010.
133
Haykel Tlili, “Chômage: L’Union Européenne Prépare une Task Force pour la Tunisie,” Le Temps, August 23,
2011. See European Commission, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, Tunisia, at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/
where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/tunisia/tunisia_en.htm.
130
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EU officials have focused high-level attention on Tunisia since Ben Ali’s departure. The EU has
imposed targeted sanctions against 48 individuals associated with the former regime (many of
them members of the extended Ben Ali and Trabelsi families)134 and has promised new economic,
trade, and governance assistance while seeking to ensure that Tunisia’s previous commitments,
such as the prevention of illegal emigration, will be maintained in the post-Ben Ali era.135
Relations with Italy were strained in February when thousands of Tunisian migrants began
arriving by boat to Italy’s southern Lampedusa island; Tunisia rejected direct Italian intervention
but indicated it would cooperate with Europe on stemming illicit population flows. In early April,
Tunisia and Italy agreed to increase police cooperation and ease compulsory repatriations. Italy
also pledged over 200 million euros in aid and credit lines to help block departures and create
jobs to dissuade potential migrants; Italy has also provided Tunisia with maritime patrol
equipment.136 The EU, meanwhile, in April approved agreements relaxing tariffs on imports from
certain North African countries, including Tunisia.
Relations between the interim government and France were strained over French support for Ben
Ali, which was extended even as his security forces cracked down on pro-democracy protesters.
French authorities have sought to reassure the interim government by refusing to offer Ben Ali
exile, replacing the French ambassador to Tunisia, announcing an asset freeze targeting members
of the Ben Ali family, dispatching senior officials on state visits, and pledging €425 million (over
$600 million) in bilateral aid, in addition to French support for multilateral assistance.137
Regional Relations
Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors, although Ben Ali’s
entente with neighboring Libya’s Muammar al Qadhafi was strained. Although it declined to
participate militarily in U.S. and NATO military operations in Libya, Tunisia’s interim
government has been supportive of the transition there. Tunisia reportedly froze assets belonging
to Qadhafi’s family, and the interim government recognized Libya’s Transitional National
Council (TNC) on August 21.138 Tunisian authorities appear to hope that an end to turmoil in
Libya will stabilize border areas (which were shelled by Qadhafi’s forces during the conflict, and
which are the site of massive refugee flows) and, eventually, produce an economic rebound that
would allow Libya to reabsorb some of Tunisia’s low-skilled labor surplus.139
Algeria and Morocco have been supportive of Tunisia’s post-Ben Ali government: Algeria has
offered financial assistance, while Morocco and Tunisia signed a bilateral military cooperation
agreement in May 2011. Tunisia is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union, established in 1989 by
134
See Council Regulation (EU) No. 101/2011 of 4 February 2011 Concerning Restrictive Measures Directed Against
Certain Persons, Entities and Bodies in View of the Situation in Tunisia.”
135
While some migrants are Tunisian, many are Sub-Saharan Africans who traverse Tunisia in search of passage to
Europe. Concerns over immigration have heightened with the flow of Libyans across the border and to southern Italy.
136
Reuters, “Italy, Tunisia Sign Deal to Ease Migrant Crisis,” April 5, 2011.
137
On French bilateral aid, see G8 Summit, “The Deauville Partnership: Helping the Arab Countries in Their
Transition to Free and Democratic Societies,” Deauville, May 27, 2011.
138
The previous week, Tunisia reportedly hosted Libyan rebel-government talks.U.S. State Department Daily Press
Briefing, August 15, 2011. The main political parties in Tunisia supported the government’s decision to recognize the
CNT. AFP, “Tunisie: Des Parties Politiques Saluent la ‘Nouvelle Libye,’” August 22, 2011.
139
Marie-Christine Corbier, “En Tunisie, le Patronat Voit la Libye Nouvelle comme une ‘Bouffée d’Oxygène,’” Les
Echos, August 30, 2011.
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Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, though the organization is inactive due to
tensions between Morocco and Algeria. Tunisia has free-trade agreements with Morocco, Egypt,
Jordan, Turkey, and Libya.140 In September, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
visited Tunisia as the first stop on a tour of countries affected by democratic uprisings. Tunis is
also the temporary headquarters location of the African Development Bank (AfDB), which
receives significant financial support from the United States. It was moved to Tunisia in 2005 due
to civil unrest in Côte d’Ivoire, its permanent location.
Outlook
Tunisians face a wide range of questions regarding their country’s future and that of the region.
Recent events, including widening political contestation and unrest across the Middle East and
North Africa also raise potential issues for Congress pertaining to the oversight of U.S.-Tunisian
bilateral relations, foreign assistance, and broader U.S. policy priorities in the Middle East.
Questions include
140
•
To what extent is Tunisia a “test-case” for democratic transitions in the Middle
East? To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. policy in the region?
•
What is the potential for free, fair, and well-managed elections? What is to be the
mandate, mode of operation, and duration of the National Constituent Assembly,
which is expected to be elected on October 24?
•
Is Tunisia likely to experience political stability in the medium term, or do
continued protests and insecurity remain significant threats? Do Ben Ali and/or
elements of the former regime continue to influence events in Tunisia? What is
the role of the military in steering political developments?
•
What will the future Tunisian government and political order look like? Is a
consensus among Islamist and secularist political factions possible? Will there be
a free and independent press and civil society in Tunisia?
•
Which individuals and groups currently enjoy significant popular credibility in
Tunisia, and what are their likely courses of action? What steps are various
groups doing to position themselves in the public eye ahead of elections? What
coalitions among political and interest groups are likely?
•
What is the potential medium-term impact of recent events on foreign investment
and economic growth in Tunisia and the region? Are the interim government’s
economic policies appropriate and effective? What steps are being taken to
address regional economic disparities within Tunisia?
•
What has been the impact of U.S. public statements and actions related to
Tunisia, and what are the prospects for future U.S. influence on the evolution of
events? How, if at all, should the U.S. government reshape its assistance
programs for Tunisia in response to recent and continuing events? What course of
U.S. action is most likely to fulfill foreign policy and national security goals?
EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
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Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Acknowledgments
This report includes analysis by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Congressional Research Service
29 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
With the election of the Constituent Assembly, government activities have turned to defining the
key issues inherent in drafting a new constitution and the processes through which they will be
addressed. Likely areas of focus for the drafting process include the future system of government
(parliamentary, presidential, or a combination), the shape of internal checks-and-balances within
that system, the role and structure of the judiciary, the level of protection for individual rights,
and the relationship between religion and state. Responding to pressing socioeconomic issues—
such as high unemployment and the collapse of the tourism industry, a key economic driver—and
6
EIU, Tunisia: Country Profile, 2008.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
addressing acute regional inequality may also be priorities for the new leaders. Heated debates
over the appropriate mechanisms to protect minority views while allowing efficient action by the
majority coalition will likely define much of the Constituent Assembly’s activity. Resurgent
public demonstrations and sporadic riots and labor unrest are also likely to pose challenges.
Some observers hope that the new government, put in place via an election instead of an ad-hoc
appointment process, will be able to act decisively under a popular mandate. At the same time,
discussions of constitutional issues were largely absent from the campaign period, and the policy
differences between parties and candidates were often opaque. While the main political factions
accepted the results of the election, the campaign also entrenched mutual suspicions among some
secularists and Islamists, and allegations of foul play—though difficult to verify—were made
from a variety of angles, particularly with regard to campaign finance. Tensions have also
burgeoned between representatives of the coastal elite and the disadvantaged interior, between the
activist youth who led the uprising and those selected for government positions, and among
political factions. “Economic stagnation, pent up social demands, and a combination of political
and cultural tensions” remain potent.7 Dissatisfaction and confusion over the transition process
could resurface as elites continue to confront challenges over who is empowered to act and how
to deliver tangible socioeconomic benefits to an impatient public. Vast and divided expectations
could also undermine Tunisia’s ability to make steady progress on institutional reforms.8
7
Christopher Alexander, “Suspicion and Strategy in Free Tunisia,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 20, 2011.
Marina Ottaway, “Tunisia: The Revolution is Over, Can Reform Continue?” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, July 13, 2011.
8
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The October 2011 Elections
The October 23, 2011, elections were widely viewed as fair, transparent, and well-conducted, despite preparations
having appeared disjointed at times and subject to delays. International observers stated that the voting process was
marked by peaceful and enthusiastic participation, generally transparent procedures, and confidence in the
independent electoral commission (known as the ISIE). At the same time, observers expressed some concerns
regarding insufficient information about the allocation of voters to polling stations; administrative difficulties
encountered by voters who had not formally registered, most of whom were eligible to vote at special polling
centers; limited voter education; and a lack of detailed procedures and training for key parts of the process, including
vote counting, tabulation, and election dispute resolution.9 Turnout was officially estimated at 54% of eligible voters; it
was much higher among those who had actively registered to vote in mid-2011.
A new electoral law promulgated in May 2011 set out a one-round voting system based on proportional
representation that was designed to make it difficult for any party to gain an absolute majority. The law included a
“parity” reservation for women on candidate lists.10 Tunisians in the diaspora were able to vote. The law barred from
candidacy certain senior officials of the former ruling party.11 Over 1,400 candidate lists competed for seats,
corresponding to over 11,600 candidates, including political party representatives, coalitions, and independents. The
May 2011 law will not necessarily serve as a basis for future elections, and the independent electoral commission is
expected to be dissolved pending new guidelines promulgated by the Constituent Assembly.
Despite the potentially high stakes of the election—determining who would shape the new political order through the
process of constitution-drafting—reports indicated that many Tunisians felt alienated by the complexity of the
transition process and a lack of understanding of the Constituent Assembly’s role.12 Only 52% of estimated eligible
voters registered to vote—although others were able to vote using their national identity cards—and two months
ahead of election day, roughly one in three Tunisians reported being undecided about whom to vote for.13 Efforts by
the electoral commission to ban certain types of media coverage and political advertizing during the campaign were
controversial, and may have contributed to confusion over policy differences among parties and candidates.14
The following sections discuss key issues in Tunisia’s transition.
A New Government
The 217-seat National Constituent Assembly is charged with drafting a new constitution and
preparing for future parliamentary and/or presidential elections, which will formally signal the
next step in the transition process. The Assembly has also selected a government and may
perform quasi-legislative functions. The main Islamist party, Harakat al Nahda (alt: Ennahda/AnNahda, “Renaissance”), controls 89 seats (41%): by far the largest block in the Assembly, but not
enough to rule without a coalition. It is followed by the center-left, secular Congress for the
Republic (CPR), with 29 seats; a populist, conservative, and fractious independent coalition, Al
9
See National Democratic Institute, “Tunisia Preliminary Election Statement,” October 24, 2011; International
Republican Institute, “Tunisian Elections Historic Step Forward,” October 24, 2011; and Carter Center, “Preliminary
Statement: Tunisian National Constituent Assembly Elections,” October 25, 2011.
10
Previously, Tunisia had a 25% female reservation requirement for party lists in parliamentary elections. Under the
“parity” requirement, each list had to alternate male and female candidates. However, since male candidates were
overwhelmingly placed at the top of lists, the requirement did not ensure an equal number of elected female candidates.
11
Art. 15 of Decree Law N. 35 on Election of the National Constituent Assembly, May 10, 2011. Senior officials were
defined as those who had occupied a “position of responsibility” in the government over the past ten years or who had
signed a petition supporting Ben Ali’s 2014 re-election bid.
12
U.S. Diplomatic Cable [UNCLASSIFIED], “Voter Registration Deadline Extended, Growing Frustration With Voter
Apathy,” August 1, 2011; Kaouther Larbi, “Tunisie: défiance ou myopie, la moitié des électeurs boudent l'inscription,”
AFP, August 14, 2011; Richard Valdmanis, “Confusion Reigns Ahead of Tunisia Vote,” Reuters, September 7, 2011.
13
Sigma Conseil, Baromètre Politique, Tunis, September 2011.
14
TunisieNews.com, “Les Partis Politiques Défient la Décision de l’ISIE et Poursuivent Leurs Compagnes
Publicitaires,” September 12, 2011.
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Aridha al Chaabia (Popular Petition), with 26 seats15; the center-left, secular Ettakatol (also
known as the Democratic Forum of Labor and Liberties or FDTL), with 20 seats; and the leftist,
stringently secularist Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), with 16 seats. Twenty-two other
parties and independent groupings won at least one seat each. Forty-nine women were elected to
the Assembly, of whom 42 are Al Nahda delegates.
Following the election, Al Nahda formed a governing coalition with the CPR and Ettakatol,
popularly referred to as the “Troika.” The agreement paved the way for Assembly delegates to
elect Ettakatol’s leader, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, as president of the Assembly on November 22, and
CPR leader Moncef Marzouki as President (a largely ceremonial position) on December 12.
Marzouki, in turn, appointed Al Nahda’s secretary-general, Hamadi Jebali, as Prime Minister—
the head of government and most powerful of the three roles. The delay in Marzouki’s election
responded to demands among Assembly delegates that they first be able to debate a set of internal
procedures that define some of the roles, decision-making processes, and mandates of the
Assembly and its leadership. The procedures were adopted in a vote on December 10.
The “Troika” coalition may be subject to internal frictions, given the parties’ divergent histories,
potential policy differences, and outside pressures. Within the fragmented opposition, the PDP is
likely to lead a coalition of secularist parties opposed primarily to Al Nahda. The PDP led partial
opposition boycotts of the December 10 and December 12 votes in order to protest purported
efforts by Al Nahda to enhance the authorities of the Prime Minister at the expense of the
Presidency, and a lack of term limits for the current government. While most of the main political
parties—including Al Nahda and Ettakatol but not the CPR—had agreed in September to
complete the draft constitution within one year,16 Assembly delegates overruled PDP-led attempts
to enact a firm deadline. Assembly members have also contended with street demonstrations by
secularists and others opposed to Al Nahda’s growing influence, Islamists supportive of Al
Nahda, and a wide range of other interest groups.
Islam, Politics, and the State
The relationship between religion and the state is likely to be a key area of debate by members of
the Constituent Assembly. The main political parties have agreed not to significantly alter Article
1 of Tunisia’s current constitution: “Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state. Its religion
is Islam, its language is Arabic and its type of government is the Republic.” However, areas of
disagreement may include the mandate or continued existence of the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, which regulates religious activities; the continuation (or alteration) of limits on the ability
of religiously conservative Salafist groups to register as political parties; the legal status of
religious minorities (98% of Tunisians are Sunni Muslims, but there are tiny Jewish and Christian
communities); and how to balance freedom of expression and religious sensitivities.
15
The electoral success of the Al Aridha coalition, a previously little-known entity, was unforeseen by most observers
and Tunisian elites. The coalition’s campaign appears to have focused on a populist platform and a grassroots approach
that appealed to population segments in Tunisia’s interior that may have been ignored by the mainstream parties. Rivals
accused Hamdi of violating Tunisia’s campaign finance rules and of being close to former president Zine el Abidine
Ben Ali, who was deposed in January. Hamdi denies the allegations, and an attempt by the electoral commission to
overturn seven seats won by Al Aridha on campaign finance grounds was overruled by the courts.
16
Tunisia Watch, “Une ‘Déclaration du Processus Transitoire’ Signée par 12 Partis,” September 15, 2011.
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The October elections confirmed the political rise of Tunisia’s main Islamist party, Al Nahda. Al
Nahda leaders have portrayed themselves as moderates who seek to participate in a democratic
system, support the separation of mosque and state, and would not scale back women’s freedom.17
Ghannouchi has compared Al Nahda to Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Al
Nahda leaders, for example, have expressed support for preserving Tunisia’s personal status code,
which is a key focus of concern among secularists. The movement’s detractors, however, often
accuse Al Nahda of a “double discourse,” i.e., of portraying a moderate face in order to enter
government and gradually introduce more conservative, restrictive laws and institutions.
Conversely, Al Nahda members purport to feel threatened by “leftist” actors, whom they accuse
of seeking illegitimately to restrict Islamists’ political influence. Increasing polarization between
Islamists and secularists could portend gridlock within the Constituent Assembly.
Al Nahda’s electoral gains appear to have stemmed from a range of factors. Clearly, the
movement remained popular despite two decades of confinement to exile and underground
activities. In addition, the repression meted out to Al Nahda activists under Ben Ali appears to
have endeared the movement to many Tunisians and enhanced its popular legitimacy. Al Nahda
did not play a significant role in the “Jasmine Revolution” uprising, but the organization raised its
profile in 2011 through a series of politically savvy choices. For example, in early 2011, it joined
the Committee to Defend the Revolution, a loose coalition of political party activists, unionists,
and leftist groups that successfully called for the interim government to broaden consultation on
political reforms and dismiss senior officials from the former regime. Al Nahda also is widely
reported to have engaged in superior grassroots mobilization during the electoral campaign, and
may have benefitted from campaign missteps by the most vocally secularist parties, such as the
PDP and the Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM). These attempted to drive a wedge between
Islamists and secularists, a strategy that may have backfired among Tunisians eager to reconcile
democratic participation with what they view as their Arab/Muslim identity.18 Conversely, voters
appeared to reward secularist parties that signaled a willingness to work with Al Nahda, such as
the CPR and Ettakatol. Indeed, a significant percentage of Tunisians, who may or may not have
voted for Al Nahda, broadly desire Islam to play a more prominent role in public life.19 At the
same time, very few indicate that they prefer an Islamic system of government.20
Some Tunisians have expressed concerns that political power could become overly concentrated
in Al Nahda’s hands. At the same time, Al Nahda’s actions are likely to be limited by a number of
factors, including the party’s own broad constituency (who cast votes for the party for a wide
variety of reasons), the strategic constraints of vital state interests (such as security prerogatives
and economic ties), and the pressures exerted by other domestic actors, including via street
protests. Al Nahda may contend with internal divisions as it takes on a political leadership role,
and could also find itself competing with emergent, more radical Islamist groups for public
17
For example, a Nahda spokesman told a journalist in April that “there is no developed country that does not have
women’s rights, these things go together.” Le Monde, “En Tunisie, Les Multiples Visages d’Un Islamisme Qui
Réapparaît au Grand Jour,” April 10, 2011. See also Marc Lynch, “Tunisia’s New al-Nahda,” ForeignPolicy.com, June
29, 2011; and Al Nahda, “Address by the General-Secretary of ‘Ennahda’ Party : Positions and Dimensions,” Sousse
Business Forum, June 11, 2011. For a sympathetic account of Ghannouchi’s political and philosophical evolution, see
Azzam S. Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
18
CRS interviews with political observers in Tunis, October 2011.
19
Institut de Sondage et de Traitement de l'Information Statistique (ISTIS), "Sondage d'Opinion sur la Situation
Politique et l'Impact de la Révolution sur les Média Presse," April 2011.
20
State Department Office of Opinion Research, “Tunisians Up for Elections, But Down on Parties,” August 31, 2011;
Michael Robbins and Mark Tessler, “Tunisians Voted for Jobs, Not Islam,” ForeignPolicy.com, December 7, 2011.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
support. Al Nahda founder and president Rachid Ghannouchi, who was not a candidate in the
October elections, has said that he will soon step down, allowing party members to select a new
leader; this could place the future direction of the party in question.
Many analysts argue that Tunisia’s secular traditions, educated middle class, and history of
promoting women’s socioeconomic equality are bulwarks against extremism. Still, radical
Islamist groups, although marginal, have become more visible in the post-Ben Ali era, as previous
state restrictions have been rolled back. Recent demonstrations and violent attacks by Salafists,
including an assault on individuals attending the screening of a secularist film in Tunis in late
June 2011, an attack on a television station in October that had broadcast an animated film briefly
depicting God, and agitation on university campuses over bans on the niqab (full face veil), have
sparked concerns. Some observers fear that these incidents have chilled free expression.21
Background on Al Nahda
Al Nahda, presided over by Islamic scholar and activist Rachid Ghannouchi, was first formally organized by
Ghannouchi and Abdel Fattah Moro in 1981—soon after multiparty politics were legalized under President
Bourguiba—as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI). Although the MTI was relatively moderate compared to other
Islamist groups, it was viewed as the most popular and therefore the most significant threat to the government.22 The
MTI organized demonstrations on university campuses, spurring arrests and clashes with the security forces and with
leftist groups. The growing unrest, combined with that orchestrated by trade unions, undermined support for
Bourguiba’s presidency and laid the groundwork for Ben Ali’s rise in 1987.23
Upon coming to power, Ben Ali promised greater pluralism and a dialogue with opposition groups. Hoping to gain
legal recognition, the MTI changed its name to Al Nahda to comply with the 1988 political party law, which barred
names based on religion. It was nonetheless denied legal status. Al Nahda candidates were permitted to run as
independents in the 1989 parliamentary elections, but when they garnered a high level of support—reportedly 15% of
the national vote—Ben Ali initiated a crackdown on the group. Ghannouchi left the country during this time.
Confrontations between the government and Al Nahda activists escalated, culminating in an attack on a ruling party
office in 1991 that was blamed on Al Nahda. Al Nahda leaders condemned the attack and denied that those
responsible belonged to their movement, an explanation that remains disputed. Ben Ali accused Al Nahda of plotting
to overthrow the government and launched a campaign to eradicate the group and all signs of conservative Islam. The
government subsequently claimed it had unearthed an Islamist plot to assassinate Ben Ali, and in 1992 Tunisian
military courts convicted 265 Al Nahda members on charges of planning a coup. Al Nahda denied the accusations, and
some rights advocates criticized the case as biased and lacking due process.24 Ghannouchi was sentenced in absentia.
Similar tensions between Islamists and government forces drove neighboring Algeria into civil war in the early 1990s.
The Security Forces
A central challenge facing Tunisia’s interim government is how to assert control over the size and
mandate of the domestic security services, which formed a vast and secretive network under Ben
Ali, without sowing the seeds of future instability. It may also take time before members of the
public are willing to trust the police to ensure their security. The security services under Ben Ali
were accused of abuses such as extrajudicial arrests, extensive internet surveillance, and torture.
The number of security agents remains unknown, although it is thought by some analysts to far
21
Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia: Police Inaction Allowed Assault on Film Screening; Action Needed to Curb Attacks
on Artists Deemed ‘Un-Islamic,’” June 30, 2011; see also OSC doc. GMP20110701405002, “‘Supporters of Shari’ah’
Condemn ‘Attacks’ on ‘Sanctities of Muslims in Tunisia,’” Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, June 30, 2011.
22
Henry Munson Jr., “Islamic Revivalism in Morocco and Tunisia,” The Muslim World, 76:3-4 (1986).
23
Munson 1986, op. cit.
24
Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, Routledge: New York, 2010.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
exceed the number of military personnel and could be as high as 200,000.25 Several dozen senior
security and Interior Ministry officials were fired in February, and in March 2011, the Interior
Ministry announced it was dissolving entities “akin to ‘political police.’”26 However, the number
of affected personnel and whether they would retain their employment with the government was
not made public. It is unclear to what extent the security services have been restructured.27
The interim government brought charges against a few senior security officials from the Ben Ali
regime. However, opinions are divided as to whether to pursue lower- and mid-ranking officials
and security officers. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture called on Tunisia in May 2011 to
“promote accountability for past abuses,” including by prosecuting perpetrators of torture and
other abusive acts; the rapporteur also suggested that torture may have continued, in a small
number of cases, since Ben Ali’s departure.28 Fears among police officers that they could be made
to shoulder the blame for the regime’s decision to open fire on demonstrators in January 2011
have led to several police demonstrations in recent months.29
The Military
There is a notable distinction between the security services, which were closely associated with
Ben Ali’s repressive internal security apparatus, and the military, which has received fewer state
resources and is viewed as relatively apolitical.30 The military comprises roughly 35,000
personnel; military service is compulsory for one year, but many Tunisians reportedly evade it.
Government spending on the military constitutes only 1.4% of GDP—a low proportion compared
to other countries in the region.31 The armed forces are positioned largely against external threats,
and also participate (to a limited extent) in multilateral peacekeeping missions.
The government’s initial, heavy-handed response to the 2011 protests was led by the police and
security services. The deployment of the military to the streets was a turning point, and military
leaders appear to have subsequently played a key role in ending Ben Ali’s presidency. Notably,
General Rachid Ammar, then army chief of staff (since promoted to the equivalent of joint chief
of staff) is widely reported to have refused orders to open fire on demonstrators.32 On January 23,
Ammar publicly addressed protesters and promised to safeguard Tunisia’s “revolution.” While
25
Eric Goldstein/Human Rights Watch, “Dismantling the Machinery of Oppression,” The Wall Street Journal,
February 16, 2011. Others note that inflated figures on the number of security agents may have been purposefully
tolerated (even circulated) by the former regime in order to exaggerate its ability to control the population.
26
TAP, “Interior Ministry Decides to Remove State Security Division,” March 7, 2011.
27
According to some human rights advocates, domestic intelligence services have not been dissolved, and may
continue to conduct surveillance activities—although whether they are following orders or merely habit is unclear. See
Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), La Tunisie Post Ben Ali Face aux Démons du
Passé: Transition démocratique et persistance des violations graves des droits de l’homme, July 2011.
28
AFP, “UN Torture Rapporteur Visits Tunisia,” and Reuters, “People Still Tortured in Tunisia—U.N. Rapporteur,”
May 21, 2011. Local rights groups have also since highlighted cases of ongoing mistreatment of police detainees.
29
See, e.g., AFP, “Tunisia Bans Police from Union Activities,” September 6, 2011. Divisions between police
commanders and the rank-and-file were exposed in the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali’s exit, as thousands of police
officers held their own demonstration to distance themselves from the RCD and call for better working conditions.
30
In the late 1970s and mid-1980s, the military led the repression of anti-government protests. However, this role was
largely relegated to the civilian security services under Ben Ali. Unlike in neighboring Algeria, the military leadership
did not play a major role in the independence movement or in early state formation.
31
Figures compared from the CIA World Factbook.
32
E.g., Abdelaziz Barrouhi, “Tunisie: L’Homme Qui A Dit Non,” Jeune Afrique, January 30-February 5, 2011.
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Ammar’s comments were welcomed by many Tunisians, they sparked concern among some
observers over whether the armed forces could interfere in domestic politics, particularly if the
security situation should worsen.33 Following Ben Ali’s exit, members of the military led efforts
to stabilize the security situation, including by pursuing elements of the domestic security
apparatus and unidentified armed elements seen as loyal to the old regime.
Security Concerns
Although the security situation has largely stabilized since the chaotic first few weeks after Ben
Ali’s departure, incidents of looting, theft, and destruction of property continue to occur. Incidents
of religiously motivated violence were reported in early 2011, including the murder of a Polish
priest on February 18 and harassment directed at Tunisia’s tiny Jewish population. There have
also reportedly been several large prison escapes, for unclear reasons.34 Authorities have had to
further contend with the influx of refugees from Libya, while inter-tribal violence has been
reported in the southwest. Suspicions remain that elements of the security services could be
seeking to provoke disorder, including by reportedly infiltrating demonstrations35; interim
government officials blamed an armed attack on the Interior Ministry, in February 2011, on a
conspiracy by members of the former regime’s security forces. The “state of emergency” imposed
by Ben Ali in early 2011 has been repeatedly extended (though many of its more draconian
provisions have not been enforced), and the military is assisting in internal security operations.
Some analysts fear that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional affiliate of Al
Qaeda with roots in Algeria’s 1990s civil conflict, could take advantage of political instability and
insecurity along Tunisia’s southern borders, particularly when combined with upheaval in
neighboring Libya.36 AQIM released a statement in January 2011 hailing the departure of Ben Ali
and warning against supposed U.S. and French efforts to subvert the revolution.37 Al Qaeda’s
second-in-command, Ayman Al Zawahri, has released at least two statements seeking to portray
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as motivated by Islamist sentiment and warning that the United
States would seek to manipulate the outcomes.38
In mid-May 2011, Tunisian authorities announced they had arrested two suspected armed AQIM
members near the Libyan border, described as an Algerian and a Libyan national.39 According to
33
Issandr El Amrani, “Tunisia Diary: Ammar’s Move?” TheArabist.net, January 24, 2011. In mid-2010, an analysis of
Tunisia’s political stability concluded that “a coup is a real possibility” should instability affect the transfer of power
after Ben Ali. Veritiss, Tunisia: Outlook 2011-2015 [UNCLASSIFIED], prepared For the Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Open Source Program Office, August 2, 2010.
34
Le Monde, “Incertitudes en Tunisie sur la Tenue des Elections, le 24 Juillet,” May 10, 2011.
35
Tara Bahrampour, “In Tunisia, First Steps Toward Democracy,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2011; Jeune
Afrique, “Tunisie: l’Ex-RCD Soupçonné d’Avoir Commandité des Attaques de Postes de Police,” July 18, 2011.
36
See CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for
U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
37
OSC doc. GMP20110128836001, “AQLIM Warns Tunisians Against Western ‘Plots’ To ‘Abort’ Tunisian
Revolution,” Al-Mujahidin Electronic Network, January 28, 2011. For background on AQIM, see CRS Report R41070,
Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by
John Rollins.
38
Maamoun Youssef, “Al-Qaida’s No. 2 Incites Tunisians, Egyptians,” AP, February 28, 2011; OSC doc.
GMP20110913836004, “Al-Fajr Releases Al-Zawahiri Audio, Bin Ladin Video on 10th Anniversary of 9/11,” Ana Al
Muslim Network, September 13, 2011.
39
Radio Tunisienne, “Tunisian Interior Ministry Provides More Information on ‘Terrorists’ Arrest,” May 16, 2011, via
(continued...)
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Tunisian officials, this was the first arrest of AQIM militants within Tunisia. Days later, four
Tunisian soldiers were killed in the northern town of Rouhia by a group described as affiliated
with Al Qaeda. Two militants were also reported killed. In July, Tunisian authorities claimed to
have halted AQIM militants from entering Tunisia from Algeria, and in August security forces
engaged in skirmishes with “terrorists” at the Algerian border.40 In September 2011, the Defense
Ministry stated that an army air patrol exchanged fire with an unidentified, heavily armed convoy
of nine vehicles traversing a remote southwest border region. Reportedly, the Tunisian armed
forces, in a coordinated assault by ground troops and combat helicopters, destroyed seven of the
vehicles and stopped the remaining two, killing six individuals and taking others into custody.41
The State Department cited the incident in a travel alert to U.S. citizens in early October. Armed
groups have also reportedly been stopped at the Libyan border.42
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background
While Tunisia has not been subject to many large attacks, terrorism is a potential domestic threat
and Tunisians have participated in plots abroad. Two notable incidents of terrorism on Tunisian
soil were the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba (noted for its tiny
Jewish population) and a series of street battles between alleged militants and security forces in
Tunis in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri appeared to
claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002. In all,
14 German tourists, five Tunisians, and two French citizens were killed in the attack.43 France,
Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement. The roots of the
2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, are more opaque.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated
outside Tunisia, on a list of specially designated global terrorists and froze its assets.44 The TCG
sought to establish an Islamic state in Tunisia and was considered to be a radical offshoot of Al
Nahda. The TCG was suspected of plotting, but not carrying out, attacks on U.S., Algerian, and
Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001. One founder, Tarek Maaroufi, was arrested in
Belgium the same month. The group appears to have since been inactive.
AQIM actively recruits Tunisians and reportedly had ties with the TCG.45 In January 2007,
following the aforementioned street battles, Tunisian security forces claimed that they had
discovered terrorists linked to the GSPC who had infiltrated from Algeria and possessed
homemade explosives, satellite maps of foreign embassies, and documents identifying foreign
envoys. Some 30 Tunisians were subsequently convicted of plotting to target U.S. and British
(...continued)
U.S. government Open Source Center (OSC).
40
BBC Monitoring, “Militants From Al-Qa'idah Try to Sneak into Tunisia, Official,” July 2, 2011; OSC doc.
GMP20110822280003, “Tunisian Sources Report Several Dead in Army Clashes with Terrorists Near Border,” Le
Temps d'Algerie, August 20, 2011.
41
AFP, “L’Armée Tunisienne Attaque un Convoi Armé dans le Sud, près de l’Algérie,” September 21, 2011; BBC
Monitoring, “Algerian Forces Clash with ‘Terrorists’ Infiltrated from Tunisia,” El Khabar, September 22, 2011; AFP,
“Six Killed in Tunisian Clashes Near Algeria: Diplomat,” September 23, 2011.
42
Le Temps, “Menace Terroriste sur la Tunisie,” September 10, 2011.
43
Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002.
44
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, released April 30, 2007.
45
Craig S. Smith, “Tunisia is Feared as New Islamist Base,” International Herald Tribune, February 20, 2007.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
interests in Tunisia. AQIM later claimed responsibility for kidnapping two Austrian tourists in
Tunisia in February 2008.
Tunisian expatriates suspected of ties to Al Qaeda have been arrested in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, Western Europe, Mauritania, and the United States. Several are reportedly detained at the
U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and their possible return to Tunisia has proven to be
controversial.46 In April 2009, General David Petraeus, then-Commander of U.S. Central
Command, told a House Appropriations Committee subcommittee that the perpetrators of suicide
bombings in Iraq that month may have been part of a network based in Tunisia.47
Under Ben Ali, as many as 2,000 Tunisians were detained, charged, and/or convicted on
terrorism-related charges, including under a sweeping anti-terrorism law passed in 2003.48 Critics
claimed that the law “makes the exercise of fundamental freedoms ... an expression of
terrorism.”49 These criticisms were echoed in the December 2010 report of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, who concluded that “the current definition of terrorism is vague and broad,
hence deviating from the principle of legality and allowing for wide usage of counter-terrorism
measures in practice.”50 Rights advocates also accused anti-terror trials of relying on excessive
pretrial detention, denial of due process, and weak evidence.
Anti-Corruption Efforts
Tunisian authorities have brought dozens of criminal charges against Ben Ali and his wife, Leila
Trabelsi, both of whom remain outside the country; many of these cases pertain to alleged
corruption. Family members reportedly owned or controlled many of the country's biggest
companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure, and are thought
to have stashed away significant resources overseas. However, the decision to carry out multiple
and rapid trials of the former first couple in absentia, after Tunisian authorities unsuccessfully
sought Ben Ali’s extradition from Saudi Arabia, has been controversial.51 Dozens of family
members, along with former senior government and security officials, have also either been tried
or face charges. An ad-hoc national commission appointed during the interim government carried
out an eight-month investigation into corruption under the former regime, and submitted its final
report to the government in early November 2011. The report, accompanied by thousands of
documentary files, may lead to new prosecutions. While some Tunisian commentators have
46
According to recent news reports, 12 Tunisians were at one time detained in Guatanamo, but only five remain in U.S.
custody. Five were repatriated to third countries, partly due to concerns over their possible torture if returned to
Tunisia, while two others were returned to Tunisia and imprisoned. Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia to Send Mission to
US for Release of its Remaining Gitmo Detainees,” September 14, 2011.
47
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Holds
Hearing on the US Central Command, April 24, 2009, transcript via CQ.
48
U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, released August 5, 2010.
49
Jeremy Landor, “Washington’s Partner,” Middle East International, March 5, 2004, pp. 23-24.
50
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur, December 28, 2010, op. cit.
51
The interim government had also issued an international arrest warrant through Interpol for Ben Ali, Leila Trabelsi,
and several close relatives who have fled the country. Amnesty International called the first trial of Ben Ali “unfair”
and warned that the Tunisian government “risks replicating the unfair justice system that was a hallmark of Tunisia
under Ben Ali.” “Accountability in Tunisia and Egypt,” August 3, 2011.
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welcomed a judicial approach, some are skeptical regarding the capacity and political leanings of
the justice system, which was inherited from the Ben Ali regime.52
Recovery of State Assets
Tunisian authorities have seized domestic assets belonging to the former president and his
associates, and have identified at least 12 countries overseas where these individuals stored
money, which could total billions of dollars. The financial and real estate holdings of the Ben Ali
and Trabelsi families have been of particular interest, and public inquiries into these areas could
continue. Western governments have cooperated with Tunisian efforts to freeze assets; however,
the process for recovering such assets on behalf of the Tunisian state is complex and
challenging.53 Interim authorities have also moved to expropriate shares of domestic companies
controlled by certain Ben Ali family members and associates accused of financial manipulation,
but have allowed most such companies to continue operating under appointed managers.54
Key Actors
Contenders for political influence in Tunisia include the political parties; trade unions; the
security forces; Islamist actors who remain outside the political system; and, potentially, former
RCD officials. The political party spectrum is fluid, but several broad groupings are emergent:
Islamist parties, of which the largest is Al Nahda; center-left/secular parties willing to work with
Al Nahda, such as the CPR and Ettakatol; stringently secularist parties, such as the PDP, the
Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM) coalition (led by the Ettajdid party), and Afek Tounes; and
parties whose founders were senior members of the former ruling RCD party, such as Al
Moubadara (The Initiative). The Al Aridha coalition does not easily fit into these categories, as its
candidates reportedly used both religious and populist messages in their campaigns; the
coalition’s membership also does not appear to be acting as a block. In addition to registered
parties, religiously conservative Salafist groups—which were not permitted to participate in the
elections—have expanded their activities and visibility. The internal and ideological cohesion of
many parties remains untested.
Selected Profiles
•
Hamadi Jebali, Prime Minister and Secretary-General of Al Nahda. Born
1949 in Sousse, Jebali is an engineer by training and a longtime activist in Al
Nahda (previously the Islamic Tendancy Movement), having become a member
of the group’s political bureau in 1981 and served as its president from 1981 until
1984. He also directed Al Nahda’s newspaper, Al Fajr. In the early 1990s, Jebali
52
Hamadi Redissi, “The Revolution Is Not Over Yet [op-ed],” The New York Times, July 15, 2011; Tarek Amara,
“Tunisia Pledges Tougher Line on Ex-Leader’s Allies,” Reuters, August 18, 2011.
53
Deborah Ball and Cassell Bryan-Low, “Arab Spring Regimes Face Long Slog to Recoup Assets,” The Wall Street
Journal, August 25, 2011. The Wall Street Journal reported in February that U.S. investigators had opened a
preliminary probe into assets controlled by Ben Ali and family members. Joseph Palazzolo, “FBI Probe to Target
Tunisia’s Ex-Leader,” The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2011.
54
Le Monde, “Orange Tunisie Passe Sous la Tutelle de l’Etat Tunisien,” March 30, 2011; David Gauthier-Villars,
“How ‘The Family’ Controlled Tunisia,” The Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2011.
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was sentenced to over 16 years in prison due to his association with Al Nahda,
and spent 10 years in solitary confinement. After being freed in 2006, he rejoined
Al Nahda and became the party’s secretary-general. Previously, Jebali lived for
10 years in France, where he completed an engineering degree and was a founder
of the French Muslim Association. Jebali has emphasized strong support for
individual freedoms, women’s rights, and foreign investment. He has rejected the
label “Islamist”—maintaining that Al Nahda is a “civil political party”—and is
viewed by some observers as the “moderate” or “reformist” face of the party.55
•
Moncef Marzouki, President and Leader of the Congress for the Republic
(CPR). Born in 1945, Marzouki is a medical doctor, author, and longtime human
rights activist. After receiving medical training in France, he taught medicine at
the University of Sousse from 1981 to 2000, while pursuing human rights
advocacy through the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH). In 2001,
Marzouki founded the leftist, secularist CPR party on a platform of establishing
the rule of law and promoting human rights. It was soon banned, leading
Marzouki to a decade of exile and diaspora activism in France. While outside the
country and during the electoral campaign, Marzouki signaled he was willing to
forge common cause with Al Nahda, at times criticizing stringent secularists for
being out of touch with ordinary Tunisians.56
•
Mustapha Ben Jaafar, President of the Constituent Assembly and Leader of
Ettakatol. Ben Jaafar, a medical doctor born in Tunis in 1940, founded the
center-left, secularist Ettakatol party in 1994. It became one of three “dissident”
opposition parties legally recognized under Ben Ali, which operated under
significant restrictions. After receiving his medical degree in France, Ben Jaafar
became engaged in political and human rights advocacy, including within the
LTDH, while also serving on the medical faculty at the University of Tunis. Ben
Jaafar has publicly expressed concern that the interim government of 2011 did
not represent a significant enough break with the past, and that Ben Ali loyalists
may continue to hold sway within various official structures.57
•
Ahmed Nejib el Chebbi, Founder of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)
and Member of the Constituent Assembly. Chebbi formally stepped down
from the leadership of the PDP, also a legal but repressed opposition party under
Ben Ali, in favor of longtime party activist Maya Jribi in 2006, but he continues
to be the party’s most prominent figure. Chebbi has portrayed himself as the most
vocally secularist alternative to Islamist parties, and he and Jribi are likely to lead
a secularist/left-leaning opposition block in the Constituent Assembly. A former
student activist for leftist and pan-Arabist causes and a lawyer by training,
Chebbi was imprisoned in the 1960s. The party directs a Tunis-based newspaper,
El Mawkif, and Chebbi provided legal defense for several journalists targeted by
the Ben Ali government.
55
“Profile: Tunisian Ennahdha Prime Minister Candidate Hammadi Jebali,” via OSC, October 28, 2011; Al Arabiya,
“Tunisia’s Hamadi Jebali: The Face of Moderate Islam?” November 18, 2011.
56
LePoint.fr, “L’Opposant Historique Moncef Marzouki Va Devenir Président,” November 21, 2011.
57
AFP, “‘Pour l’opinion, il n’y a pas eu de vrai rupture avec le passé’ (Ben Jaafar),” September 22, 2011; CRS
interview with Ben Jaafar, Tunis, October 2011.
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•
General Rachid Ammar, Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Ammar is widely
reported to have refused orders to fire on protesters in January 2011, and to have
subsequently influenced Ben Ali’s decision to step down. In the immediate
aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure, Ammar enjoyed massive popularity, and the
army continues to benefit from high public regard. On January 24, 2011, Ammar
publicly addressed protesters, promising to uphold Tunisia’s “revolution” and
guarantee stability ahead of elections. His comments were welcomed by
demonstrators, but sparked concern among some analysts over whether the
armed forces would seek a political role. Ammar was made chief of staff of the
27,000-person army in 2002, when his predecessor was killed in a helicopter
crash. In April 2011, he was promoted to chief of staff of the armed forces.
•
Rachid Ghannouchi, President and Co-Founder of Al Nahda. An Islamic
scholar, teacher, and activist, Ghannouchi, 70, has led Tunisia’s main Islamist
movement for three decades. Ghannouchi’s early focus was on religious and
moral issues, but he grew more politically active by the late 1970s. He spent two
decades in exile, largely in London, after Al Nahda was banned in 1991, but
returned to Tunisia in January 2011 following the interim government’s
announcement of a general amnesty. Ghannouchi has emphasized that Al
Nahda’s goal is to participate within a democratic political system and that the
party will not attempt to turn back women’s rights or other liberal aspects of
Tunisian society. However, Tunisian secularists view him with suspicion.
Ghannouchi has stated he will not run for president and that he will soon step
down from the leadership of the party.
Background on Tunisia’s Trade Unions
Since Tunisia’s independence, the labor movement has served as a rare legal conduit for expressing dissent, and the
main union federation, the Tunisian General Union of Labor (UGTT), wields political clout. The UGTT, which claims
over half a million members, played a key role in sustaining the “Jasmine Revolution” protests, which it framed as
rooted in economic grievances.58 Since Ben Ali’s departure, however, the UGTT has suffered from internal
fragmentation—notably between a more radical grassroots and a leadership that is seen by some as having been
subject to cooption by the Ben Ali regime. New unions and splinter movements have recently been formed, which
may compete with the UGTT for influence. Ongoing labor unrest has also sparked a backlash among some segments
of the middle class. UGTT activists formed candidate lists in the October 2011 election under the banner of the
Tunisian Labor Party (PTT), but did not win any seats.
The UGTT was organized in the mid-1940s and was a force in Tunisia’s independence movement. During the Cold
War, it positioned itself as pro-West (non-Communist) and formed links with the American labor movement.59
Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, strove to keep the unions under the government’s wing; during the 1960s,
former UGTT leader Ahmed Ben Salah led a decade-long period of socialist-oriented economic policy as minister for
finance and planning. By the late 1970s and into the mid-1980s, however, amid growing economic unease, the union’s
leadership turned to overt confrontation with the government, particularly over wages and food price inflation.60 The
UGTT led a series of strikes and demonstrations that were met with heavy state repression. During Ben Ali’s
presidency, the government again attempted to influence the UGTT, including by interfering in its leadership selection.
The UGTT nevertheless was a key instigator of anti-government unrest in recent years, including protests in the
mining region of Gafsa in 2008 and 2010 that were arguably a precursor to the “Jasmine Revolution” uprising.
58
UGTT, Déclaration de la Commission Administrative Nationale, January 4, 2011; see also http://www.ugtt.org.tn.
Global Security, “Union Génerale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT),” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/tunisia/ugtt.htm.
60
See Niger Disney, “The Working-Class Revolt in Tunisia,” Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
Reports, 67 (May 1978).
59
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The Economy
Damage from the December 2010-January 2011 unrest, political uncertainty, turmoil in
neighboring Libya (which caused the return of tens of thousands of migrant Tunisian workers and
the related loss of remittance revenues), and economic crisis in Europe have contributed to severe
economic difficulties. Tunisia experienced economic contraction in the first quarter of 2011, and
its central bank has predicted 0% growth in 2011, compared to 3.7% growth in 2010. Tourism
receipts were reportedly down by 40% and foreign direct investment by 60% in the first six
months of 2011.61 Ongoing labor unrest, particularly in the interior, including phosphate mining
areas, represents an additional challenge, as do rising food and fuel prices and recent flooding.
According to interim government estimates, up to 20% of the working-age population can’t find
work, and up to a quarter of them are university graduates.62 The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has suggested that future economic growth is probable if reforms provide “greater access
to opportunity and more competition.” However, in October 2011 the IMF projected that the
worsening global economic outlook would negatively affect Tunisia’s growth prospects in the
near future and warned of the potential for widening fiscal deficits due to social spending.63 A
significant challenge for post-Ben Ali authorities has been managing public expectations.
Officials have sought to encourage the return of tourists, garner donor support for economic
stabilization, and reassure investors, with mixed effects. Under the interim government, thenFinance Minister Jaloul Ayed led efforts to respond to socioeconomic pressures, including
through an increase in public sector hiring, new infrastructure construction in the interior,
expanded access to microcredit for poor families, the encouragement of public-private
partnerships, and social assistance programs for unemployed youth and others. Ayed appealed for
$4 billion in immediate foreign loans, while then-Prime Minister Caïd Essebsi stated in May 2011
that Tunisia would need at least $5 billion in aid per year for five years to finance infrastructure
and job creation.64 Interim authorities also indicated that some assets seized from the Ben Ali
family would be used as seed money for public-private development projects.
The interim government’s economic proposals were formalized in the September 2011 release of
a five-year “development strategy,” dubbed the “Jasmine Plan,” which was positively received by
Western donors. It emphasized pursuing greater exports and foreign investment; fostering a larger
role for the private sector in job creation; increasing public investment in infrastructure and
education, with a focus on addressing regional inequalities; reviving privatization programs; and
reducing public debt. The degree to which the Jasmine Plan will serve as a blueprint for economic
policy under the Constituent Assembly is unclear. Al Nahda leaders have stated their support for
private sector and foreign investment while calling for a more equal distribution of wealth.65
61
AFP, “Tunisie: Après le Retour au Calme, Place au Grand Chantier Economique,” March 9, 2011; Le Temps, “Appel
des 17 Pour Soutenir la Transition Démocratique en Tunisie,” May 19, 2011; Mark Tran, “Tunisia Offers Wake-Up
Call for Development,” The Guardian, June 9, 2011.
62
Peter Wonacott, “Tunisia’s Leadership Faces Restive Unemployed,” The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2011.
63
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, April 2011; IMF Survey, “Mideast Outlook Varies
Markedly Across Regions,” October 26, 2011.
64
AP, “Tunisie: Adoption d’un Plan de Relance Economique,” April 1, 2011; Reuters, “Tunisia Will Need $4 Bln in
Loans in 2011—FinMin,” April 1, 2011; Reuters, “Tunisia Economy Needs Foreign Help to Recover—Minister,” May
20, 2011; David Gauthier-Villars, “Tunisia to Seek Backing for Aid,” The Wall Street Journal, May 21, 2011.
65
CRS interviews with Al Nahda officials, Tunis, October 2011; TAP, “Hamadi Jebali: ‘Les Hommes d’Affaires
Partenaires dans la Prise de Décision,’” November 2, 2011.
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During Ben Ali’s presidency, many analysts contended that there was an implicit social contract
between the government and its citizens, which promoted economic stability and middle-class
standards of living at the expense of political freedom. Prior to the “Jasmine Revolution,” this
strategy appeared to have contained latent dissatisfaction from disrupting the political status quo.
Tunisia is considered a middle-income country, and one of the best-performing non-oil exporting
Arab countries. Home and car ownership are widespread. Despite the impact of the global
economic crisis in 2009—which produced a decrease in exports, a contraction in the industrial
sector, and a lower expansion in services, largely due to a decrease in market demand in
Europe—the economy quickly rebounded in 2010 with fiscal stimulus programs.
Textile exports and tourism have driven much of Tunisia’s economic growth in recent years. The
tourism sector is a major employer and previously provided some 11% of the country’s hard
currency receipts, up to 7% of GDP, and an estimated 400,000 jobs. Tunisia has also attempted to
attract foreign investment in its nascent oil and gas sector. Phosphate ore reserves are significant
and are the basis of a chemicals industry, but their value is reduced by their low grade. In 2009,
the World Bank cited Tunisia as a “top regional reformer,” citing progress in the areas of starting
a business, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, and border defense.66 In September
2010, the IMF predicted that Tunisia’s growth could continue to increase gradually, “provided
that policies and reforms planned by the authorities aimed at enhancing Tunisia’s
competitiveness, developing new markets, and supporting new sources of growth in sectors with
high added value bear fruit.”67 In 2009, public debt stood at roughly $22 billion, or about 47% of
gross domestic product (GDP), according to the World Bank.
Tunisia’s strong economic record has long masked significant disparities. Wealth has long been
concentrated in the capital and along the eastern coast, while the interior has suffered from
poverty and government neglect. Unemployment and underemployment are major problems,
notably for recent college graduates. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the
unemployment rate among university graduates was over 20% in 2010 and “increased by a factor
of ten over the last two decades” due to “the youth bulge, high throughput in universities,
mismatch in the demand and supply of skilled workers, and the relatively low quality of training
received by many graduates.” Moreover, unemployment is over 22%, on average, in interior
regions such as Kasserine and Gafsa, which were epicenters of the early 2011 unrest.68 Blatant
official corruption under Ben Ali reinforced many Tunisians’ perceptions that the economic deck
was stacked against them, even if they enjoyed relatively high living standards within the region.
In light of these issues, analysts have debated the role that economic factors played in the
Tunisian uprising. While most agree that a desire for greater individual freedoms and “social
justice” was a driving force in the protests, socioeconomic grievances doubtless spurred demands
for change. Since then, numerous segments of the society have expressed demands for jobs,
higher wages, and wealth distribution. Indeed, such calls have soared even as political unrest has
contributed to severe economic contractions. Some observers fear that a failure to address such
grievances could lead an impatient public to lose faith in the transition process.
66
See World Bank, “Tunisia: A Top Regional Reformer According to Doing Business 2009,” September 2008.
Joël Toujas-Bernate and Rina Bhattacharya, International Monetary Fund, “Tunisia Weathers Crisis Well, But
Unemployment Persists,” September 10, 2010.
68
African Development Bank, The Revolution in Tunisia: Economic Challenges and Prospects, March 2011.
67
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Foreign Relations
Al Nahda officials and other political leaders have emphasized continuity in Tunisia’s foreign
relations, for instance regarding international agreements and commitments made under Ben Ali.
Al Nahda leaders have stated that they wish to protect and expand foreign direct investment and
international trade, including with traditional partners in the West. The party has also indicated a
desire to cultivate closer economic ties with other Arab and Muslim states.69 Rachid
Ghannouchi’s first foreign trip after the October elections was to Qatar, highlighting the
potentially increased influence of Arab Gulf states in post-Ben Ali Tunisia. Relations with Turkey
could also be bolstered. In September, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited
Tunisia as the first stop on a regional tour of countries affected by democratic uprisings; his
public remarks emphasized the compatibility of Islam and democracy.
Israel and the Palestinians
Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians; Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia had an interests office in
Israel until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah, or uprising against the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Under Ben Ali, Israeli and Tunisian foreign
ministers sometimes met. In September 2005, President Ben Ali sent a personal letter to then
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, praising his “courageous” withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
Israel’s then-foreign minister, who was born in Tunisia, and then-communications minister
attended the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunisia in 2005. (Then-Prime Minister
Sharon was invited along with leaders of all U.N. member states; his invitation provoked
demonstrations in Tunisia.)
Al Nahda leader Ghannouchi refers to Israel as an “occupying state,” and has indicated that the
creation of a Palestinian state is a prerequisite for discussing Tunisian-Israeli ties70; in November
2011, Al Nahda’s secretary-general, Hamadi Jebali, hosted a public meeting with a Hamas
official. At the same time, Al Nahda’s position on Israel and the Palestinians does not appear to be
very different from other political parties in Tunisia. Tunisia’s interim foreign ministry—led by
secularists—announced in September 2011 that it would support the Palestinians’ bid for a U.N.
recognition of statehood. Indeed, some domestic critics have accused Al Nahda of being too
conciliatory toward Israel.71
Europe
Tunisia and the European Union (EU) have cemented a close relationship by means of an
Association Agreement, aid, and loans.72 More than 60% of Tunisia’s trade is conducted with
69
CRS interviews with Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali, Tunis, October 2011.
CRS interviews with Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali, Tunis, October 2011; and Ghannouchi statements at the
Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), November 30, 2011.
71
E.g., Al-Haqaiq editorial on Ghannouchi and Israel, December 9, 2011.
72
At the same time, EU leaders periodically expressed concerns over Tunisia’s record on human rights and political
freedom under Ben Ali.
70
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Europe.73 The Association Agreement, which was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1998,
eliminates customs tariffs and other trade barriers on manufactured goods, and provides for the
establishment of an EU-Tunisia free trade area in goods, but not in agriculture or services.
Negotiations on the provision of “advanced status” for Tunisia vis-à-vis the EU, which would
provide greater trade benefits, were restarted under the interim government.74 Tunisia receives aid
from the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (MEDA) and soft loans from the European
Investment Bank, the financing arm of the EU. Europeans hope that aid will help Tunisia’s
economic growth and thereby reduce illegal immigration and Islamic fundamentalism.
EU officials have focused high-level attention on Tunisia’s political transition. The EU has
imposed targeted sanctions against individuals associated with the former regime and has
promised new economic, trade, and governance assistance, while seeking to ensure that Tunisia’s
previous commitments, such as the prevention of illegal emigration, will be maintained.75
Relations with Italy were strained in February 2011 when thousands of Tunisian migrants began
arriving by boat to Italy’s southern Lampedusa island; Tunisia rejected direct Italian intervention
but indicated it would cooperate with Italy and the EU on stemming illicit population flows. Italy
pledged over 200 million euros in aid and credit lines to help block departures and create jobs to
dissuade potential migrants, and also provided Tunisia with maritime patrol equipment.76
Relations with France were strained over French support for Ben Ali, which was extended even as
his security forces cracked down on pro-democracy protesters. French authorities have sought to
ingratiate themselves with post-Ben Ali authorities by replacing the French ambassador to
Tunisia, imposing an asset freeze on members of the Ben Ali family and associates, dispatching
senior officials on state visits, and pledging new bilateral aid, in addition to supporting
multilateral assistance.77 French officials congratulated Al Nahda on its election victory, but only
after two weeks had passed; suspicion of Islamists reportedly persists in French political circles.
Regional Relations
Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its immediate neighbors, although Ben Ali’s
entente with neighboring Libya’s Muammar al Qadhafi was strained. Although it declined to
participate militarily in U.S. and NATO military operations in Libya, Tunisia’s interim
government has been strongly supportive of the transition there. Tunisia’s interim government
reportedly froze assets belonging to Qadhafi’s family, and recognized Libya’s Transitional
National Council (TNC) on August 21.78 Tunisian authorities hope that an end to turmoil in Libya
will stabilize border areas and, eventually, produce an economic rebound that would allow Libya
to reabsorb some of Tunisia’s low-skilled labor surplus. In December 2011, Al Nahda leader
Ghannouchi participated in a TNC-led Libyan reconciliation and reconstruction forum.
73
World Trade Organization, Tunisia Profile, October 2010.
Haykel Tlili, “Chômage: L’Union Européenne Prépare une Task Force pour la Tunisie,” Le Temps, August 23, 2011.
See European Commission, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation, Tunisia, at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/
neighbourhood/country-cooperation/tunisia/tunisia_en.htm.
75
While some migrants are Tunisian, many are Sub-Saharan Africans who traverse Tunisia in search of passage to
Europe. Concerns over immigration have heightened with the flow of Libyans across the border and to southern Italy.
76
Reuters, “Italy, Tunisia Sign Deal to Ease Migrant Crisis,” April 5, 2011.
77
See G8 Summit, “The Deauville Partnership: Helping the Arab Countries in Their Transition to Free and Democratic
Societies,” Deauville, May 27, 2011.
78
The main political parties in Tunisia supported the interim government’s decision to recognize the CNT.
74
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Political Transition in Tunisia
Algeria and Morocco have been publicly supportive of Tunisia’s transition: Algeria has offered
financial assistance, while Morocco and Tunisia signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement
in May 2011. Tunisia is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union, established in 1989 by Tunisia,
Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, though the organization is inactive due to tensions
between Morocco and Algeria. Tunis is also the temporary headquarters location of the African
Development Bank (AfDB), which receives significant financial support from the United States.
It moved to Tunisia in 2005 due to unrest in Côte d’Ivoire, its permanent location.
U.S.-Tunisian Relations
Obama Administration officials have expressed strong support for Tunisia’s political transition
and have emphasized Tunisia’s role as an “important test case” for the region.79 In a speech in
May 2011 on U.S. policy toward Middle East, President Obama called on the United States “to
show that America values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of
the dictator,” and argued that Tunisia and Egypt “can set a strong example through free and fair
elections, a vibrant civil society, accountable and effective democratic institutions, and
responsible regional leadership.”80 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice has stated
that “it matters enormously to American national security and our national interests” that
democratic transitions in Tunisia and Egypt “succeed.”81 A number of senior U.S. officials have
visited Tunisia since Ben Ali’s departure, including Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
William Joseph Burns and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.82 Then-interim Prime Minister Caïd
Essebsi visited Washington DC in October 2011, where he met with President Obama at the
White House. In May 2011, President Obama and Caïd Essebsi had met on the sidelines of the
Group of Eight (G8) summit, where they discussed Tunisia’s democratic reforms.83
Regarding the October elections, U.S. officials repeatedly stated that they would work with the
new government, whatever its ideological leanings. With regard to Islamist parties such as Al
Nahda, Secretary Clinton stated that “what parties call themselves is less important to us than
what they actually do.”84 On October 23, President Obama congratulated the Tunisian people and
encouraged them to meet the challenges of “forming an interim government, drafting a new
Constitution, and charting a democratic course that meets the aspirations of all Tunisians.”85
The United States and Tunisia have enjoyed continuous relations since 1797. Tunisia was the site
of significant battles during World War II, and was liberated by Allied forces in 1943 in Operation
Torch. A U.S. cemetery and memorial near the ancient city of Carthage (outside Tunis) holds
79
House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, “Developments in Egypt and Lebanon,” February 10, 2011, Statement of
James B. Steinberg, Deputy Secretary, Department of State.
80
The White House, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and Africa,” May 19, 2011.
81
“U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Rice Interviewed on CNN,” May 19, 2011, transcript via CQ.
82
Clinton expressed strong support for the Tunisian revolution and pressed for economic and political reforms. Her
visit was protested by several hundred demonstrators in Tunis who said they opposed American “interference.” John
Thorne, “Hillary Clinton Visits Tunisia to Press for Reform,” The National, March 18, 2011.
83
“Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes and National Security Council Senior
Director for European Affairs Liz Sherwood-Randall Hold Media Availability,” May 27, 2011, via CQ.
84
Bradley Klapper, “Championing Democracy, Clinton Says US Can Work with Islamist Parties Gaining from Arab
Spring,” November 8, 2011.
85
Barack Obama, “Statement on Elections in Tunisia,” October 23, 2011.
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Political Transition in Tunisia
nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign
policy despite a brief experiment with leftist economic programs in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian
ties were strained by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
headquarters in Tunis, which some viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.86
Tunisia cooperates in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism
surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows
NATO ships to make port calls at Tunis. U.S.-Tunisian relations during Ben Ali’s presidency
largely emphasized security cooperation. The United States considered Ben Ali to be an ally, a
moderate Arab ruler, and a partner in international counterterrorism efforts. Allegations have been
made that Tunisia cooperated in at least one case of U.S. “rendition” of a terrorist suspect, in
2004.87 However, Tunisia did not support the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 Iraq war.88
Despite generally positive bilateral ties with the Ben Ali regime, U.S. officials occasionally
voiced public criticism of Tunisia’s record on political rights, the conduct of elections, and
freedom of expression.89 Numerous international and regional news reports and analyses have
referenced internal communications among U.S. diplomats that were reportedly highly critical of
political repression and corruption among Ben Ali’s inner circle and family. Some analysts have
speculated that reports of such communications may have played a role in sparking the protests
that eventually unseated Ben Ali.90 In parallel with these criticisms, the United States continued to
provide military and economic assistance to the Tunisian government.
U.S.-Tunisian trade is relatively low in volume because Tunisia is a small country and conducts
most of its trade with Europe. In 2010, U.S. exports to Tunisia totaled $571 million and imports
totaled $405 million; in 2009, exports totaled $502 million and imports $326 million. While
Tunisian imports of U.S. goods did not fluctuate significantly due to the global economic
recession, U.S. imports from Tunisia have yet to rebound to 2008 levels, when they totaled $644
million.91 Tunisia is eligible for special trade preferences, i.e., duty-free entry for listed products,
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Program. A bilateral trade investment
framework agreement (TIFA) was signed in 2002, and a bilateral investment treaty entered into
force in 1993. TIFAs can be the first step toward a free-trade agreement (FTA). U.S. foreign
direct investment (FDI) in Tunisia totaled $220 million in 2009 (latest available).
86
Chicago Tribune Wires, “Bush Visits Tunisia to Patch Relations,” March 9, 1986; Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left
Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987.
87
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, December 28, 2010, U.N. document
A/HRC/16/51/Add.2.
88
Tunis Infotunisie, “Ben Ali Expresses ‘Deep Regret’ at Start of War Against Iraq,” March 20, 2003, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document AFP20030320000266.
89
See, e.g., U.S. State Department annual reports on human rights; State Department Daily News Briefing, October 26,
2009; U.S. State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks on Internet Freedom,” January 21, 2010;
U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, July 9, 2010.
90
Christopher Alexander, “Tunisia’s Protest Wave: Where It Comes From and What It Means,” ForeignPolicy.com,
January 3, 2011.
91
U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/query.asp.
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U.S. Reactions to the January 2011 Uprising
U.S. criticism of the government’s response to the January 2011 demonstrations was initially muted, but grew critical
as protests mounted. On January 11, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that “we are worried, in general, about
the unrest and the instability, and what seems to be the underlying concerns of the people who are protesting”; at the
same time, she stressed that “we are not taking sides,” and indicated that she had not been in direct communication
with Tunisian authorities since the protests began.92 In a speech in Doha, Qatar, on January 13, Secretary Clinton
challenged Middle Eastern leaders to address the needs of their citizens and provide channels for popular
participation, or else risk instability and extremism. Events in Tunisia provided a vivid backdrop to her remarks.
After Ben Ali’s departure on January 14, President Barack Obama stated, “I applaud the courage and dignity of the
Tunisian people,” and called on the Tunisian government to hold “free and fair elections in the near future that reflect
the true will and aspirations of the Tunisian people.”93 Secretary Clinton echoed the call for elections and encouraged
“economic, social, and political reforms,” adding that “the United States stands ready to help.”94 In his January 2011
State of the Union address, President Obama stated, “[W]e saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will
of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator…. The United States of America stands with the
people of Tunisia and supports the democratic aspirations of all people.”
Several Members of Congress expressed concerns that the United States appeared to lack sufficient intelligence on
Middle East protest movements and their potential to upset governments in the region, concerns which executive
branch officials have disputed.95
U.S. Assistance
Prior to 2011, U.S. bilateral assistance was highly focused on military aid and counterterrorism
cooperation. Since January 2011, the Obama Administration has identified a range of funding
sources for providing support to Tunisia’s unanticipated transition, notably including funds
appropriated for other purposes that have been reallocated for Tunisia. Transitional assistance
efforts have been led by the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), along
with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other agencies. MEPI has a
regional office in Tunis, responsible for programming to enhance political, economic, and
educational reforms in the region, but prior to 2011 implemented limited bilateral programs. In
early September, the Administration named William B. Taylor to coordinate U.S. development
and other civilian aid to transitional countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
The Administration in 2011 designated a total of roughly $42 million in bilateral, non-military
“transition support” for Tunisia (see Table 1).96 This includes:
•
Approximately $23.3 million in “transition support” assistance administered by
MEPI. This aid is aimed at helping Tunisia establish independent media, civil
society, political parties, and a new electoral framework, and implement
economic reforms.97
92
AFP, “US Concerned About Reports of ‘Excessive Force’ in Tunisia,” January 11, 2011; and U.S. State Department,
“Secretary of State Interviewed on Al Arabiya,” January 11, 2011, via Congressional Quarterly (CQ).
93
The White House, “Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
94
U.S. State Department, “Recent Events in Tunisia,” January 14, 2011.
95
Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on
Worldwide Threats, February 10, 2011, via CQ.
96
Figures based on CRS analysis of State Department and USAID congressional notifications, data provided to CRS by
the State Department, and public statements by the Administration.
97
State Department Congressional Notification Transmittal Sheets, March 11, 2011 and July 25, 2011. The MEPI
funding, which is drawn from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, has largely come from funding appropriated
(continued...)
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•
Approximately $10 million in USAID-administered funding, including $5
million in FY2010 Complex Crises Fund (CCF) funding, which is intended to
support planned community development projects and political reforms in the
interior and southeast, $2 million for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives,
and $3 million in support of the electoral process.98
•
Just under $3 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) funds, provisionally allocated for police and justice sector reform
initiatives.99
In addition, the Administration has indicated that it intends to initiate a Peace Corps program in
Tunisia; consider the provision of a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) “Threshold”
grant; re-launch trade and investment talks under the 2002 U.S.-Tunisia Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement; provide increased funding for academic and cultural exchanges; initiate
negotiations on a possible “Open Skies” agreement on direct air links; and consider a range of
additional technical assistance.100 The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
plans to offer regional financial support in the form of direct loans, guarantees, and political risk
insurance, and is already supporting two Tunisian private equity firms that are focused on small
and medium-size businesses. OPIC will also support visits by American business investors.101 The
Administration also supports the establishment of a Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund and the
provision of U.S. loan guarantees, both of which require congressional authorization (“Congress
and Aid to Tunisia,” below).102
(...continued)
in FY2010 for other purposes and reallocated for programs in Tunisia, subject to congressional notification. MEPI also
plans to support partnerships between Tunisian civil society groups and U.S. technology companies to enhance
information and communications capacity.
98
USAID Congressional Notification, June 3, 2011; figures communicated to CRS by the State Department’s Office of
the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, September 2011.
99
State Department Congressional Notification, July 25, 2011; State Department, FY2012 Congressional Budget
Justification for Foreign Operations.
100
State Department, “Statement on U.S.-Tunisia Political and Economic Partnership,” September 22, 2011; White
House, “Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Framework for Investing in Tunisia,” October 7, 2011.
101
State Department, “Secretary of State Clinton Delivers Remarks with Tunisia Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi,”
March 17, 2011. Assistant Secretary of State Michael H. Posner has stated that OPIC would provide “up to $2 billion in
financial support for private-sector investments in the Middle East and North Africa.” Statement before the House
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, “Political Transitions in the Middle East,” May 5, 2011.
102
Testimony of William J. Burns before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on “U.S. Policy and
Uprisings in the Middle East,” March 17, 2011.
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Table 1. Foreign Assistance to Tunisia, Selected Accounts
(appropriations, thousands of current dollars)
FY2009
FMF
FY2010
FY2011 Est.
FY2012 Request
12,000
18,000
17,124
4,900
800
2,000
5,000
0
ESF (MEPI)
-
18,324
5,000
ESF (USAID nonbilateral)
-
830
1,700
1,945
1,950
1,675
INCLE
0
1,427
1,500
0
NADR
100
1,200
175
0
DCHA
-
8,000
2,000
Not available
IDA
-
-
100
Not available
Section 1206
8,800
0
20,900
Not available
Total, above
allocations
23,400
51,726
53,749
6,575
ESF (Bilateral)
IMET
0
Not available
Not available
Notes: FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ESF=Economic Support Funds; IMET=International Military Education
and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; DCHA= Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance;
IDA=International Disaster Assistance; Section 1206=Defense Department funds authorized for use in training
and equipping foreign military forces for certain purposes.
Items in italics refer to funding appropriated in FY2010 for other countries and/or purposes, then reallocated
for Tunisia in 2011. This chart does not reflect aid allocated under regional counterterrorism initiatives.
Sources: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2009-FY2012;
communications from the State Department’s Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance; Defense
Department Congressional Notification; CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206”
Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
Military Assistance
A U.S.-Tunisian Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are held regularly.
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reports that Tunisia relies on U.S. Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) assistance to “maintain its aging 80s and early 90s era inventory of
U.S.-origin equipment, which comprises nearly 70% of Tunisia’s total inventory.”103 According to
private sector analysis, the United States is Tunisia’s primary supplier of military equipment,
largely purchased through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements.104 FMF and Defense
Department-administered “Section 1206”105 security assistance funds have also provided Tunisia
with equipment for border and coastal security, which the United States views as a key area of
103
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Tunisia Summary,” updated January 13, 2011.
Forecast International, International Military Markets—Middle East & Africa, “Tunisia: Section 3—Market
Overview,” May 2009.
105
P.L. 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2006, Section 1206 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. For more information, see CRS Report RS22855,
Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
104
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counterterrorism prevention. Since 2003, this equipment has included helicopters, machine guns,
body armor and helmets, parachutes, and night vision devices for sniper rifles. Other equipment
has been provided through the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, with
plans to procure seven Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with $4.1 million in
FY2008 funds forfeited by Mauritania.106 Tunisia has also been one of the top 20 recipients of
International Military Education and Training (IMET) since FY1994.107 In May 2011, General
Carter Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), visited Tunisia on his first trip to
North Africa since assuming the position in March.
In August 2011, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its plans to provide three new
Section 1206 packages for Tunisia totaling $20.9 million, which the Department said would
“build the capacity of Tunisia’s national military forces to conduct CT [counterterrorism]
operations by providing equipment and training.” The assistance is intended to provide maritime
equipment, related operational training, land vehicles, and helicopter surveillance equipment.108
Tunisia is one of 10 countries participating in the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership (TSCTP), an interagency regional program aimed at helping North and West African
countries better control their territory, strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities, and
cooperate regionally on security issues. The Defense Department allocated over $13 million
between FY2007 and FY2009 for TSCTP-related military cooperation with Tunisia, including
bilateral and multinational exercises, regional conferences, and Joint-Combined Exchange
Training programs conducted by U.S. special operations forces.109 Defense Department funds
have also been allocated for programs designed to counter violent extremist messages.
Multilateral Assistance
Several multilateral institutions that receive significant U.S. financial support have pledged
economic aid for Tunisia during its transition process. The World Bank and African Development
Bank (AfDB) have each pledged $500 million in budget support to Tunisia, which is aimed at
providing emergency financial reserves while addressing regional disparities, reducing youth
unemployment, and improving civil liberties and economic governance.110 AfDB President
Donald Kaberuka indicated in early June that there is an additional $500 million in Tunisia aid “in
the pipeline,” which he hoped would be disbursed by year’s end, while the World Bank said in
May that it envisaged an additional $1 billion.111 The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), which also receives U.S. financial support, is considering extending aid to
North African countries, potentially including Tunisia. In May 2011, G8 countries pledged $20
billion in aid for Tunisia and Egypt over three years, to be disbursed via multilateral financial
institutions.112 French President Nicolas Sarkozy indicated that an additional $10 billion would be
provided by Gulf states, and another $10 billion by the IMF.113 In September, the G8 pledged an
106
This assistance is described as supporting the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
DSCA, op. cit.
108
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Congressional Notification, August 25, 2011.
109
Funding figures provided to CRS by the State Department, 2010.
110
African Development Bank (AfDB), “AfDB Supports Accountability in Tunisia,” May 20, 2011.
111
AfDB, “AfDB and Tunisia Formally Sign USD 500M Budget Support Accord at Annual Meetings,” June 10, 2011;
World Bank, “World Bank Group Announces Up to $6 Billion for Egypt and Tunisia,” May 30, 2011.
112
Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Springs, Deauville, May 26-27, 2011 (released on May 27, 2011).
113
Liz Alderman, “Group of 8 Pledges $20 Billion Aid to Egypt and Tunisia,” The New York Times, May 27, 2011.
107
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additional $38 billion in new aid to transitional countries in the region, although reports indicated
that little of the previously promised funding had materialized.114
Congress and Aid to Tunisia
Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees foreign assistance funding, and regularly
authorizes arms sale proposals. There is a congressional Tunisia Caucus. Some Members of
Congress have advocated new assistance to support Tunisia’s transition to democracy and
economic stabilization. Others contend that budgetary cuts take precedence over new assistance
programs, or that economic stability in Tunisia and elsewhere is best addressed via private sector
engagement and/or support from other donors. Some have additionally pointed to uncertainties
over the current and prospective nature of Tunisia’s government. The discussion regarding
potential new assistance has proceeded amid larger federal budget debates and disagreements
over funding priorities, including foreign aid. The FY2012 Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (Division I, H.R. 2055) authorizes up to
$30 million in FY2011 Economic Support Fund (ESF) for the cost of loan guarantees for Tunisia,
and authorizes and appropriates up to $20 million in ESF for a U.S.-Tunisia Enterprise Fund
aimed at promoting private sector investment and economic reforms.
Congress has been supportive of U.S. military assistance to Tunisia, including during the latter
years of Ben Ali’s presidency. In an explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 111-8, the
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (enacted on March 11, 2009), appropriators directed the State
Department to allocate $12 million in FMF assistance for Tunisia, far more than the State
Department’s budget request for $2.6 million. At the same time, appropriators wrote in the
explanatory statement that “restrictions on political freedom, the use of torture, imprisonment of
dissidents, and persecution of journalists and human rights defenders are of concern and progress
on these issues is necessary for the partnership between the United States and Tunisia to further
strengthen.”115 In the conference report accompanying P.L. 111-117, the FY2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (enacted on December 16, 2009), appropriators directed the State Department
to allocate $18 million in FMF for Tunisia, $3 million more than the requested amount. The
conference report also allocated $2 million in ESF—the amount requested—for “programs and
activities in southern Tunisia and to promote respect for human rights.”116
Outlook
Tunisians face a wide range of questions regarding their country’s future and that of the region.
Recent events, including widening political contestation and unrest across the Middle East and
North Africa, also raise potential issues for Congress pertaining to the oversight of U.S.-Tunisian
bilateral relations, foreign assistance, and broader U.S. policy priorities in the Middle East.
Questions include the following.
114
Alderman, “G-8 Nations Pledge New Aid to Arab Spring Economies,” The New York Times, September 11, 2011.
Congressional Record, February 23, 2009, p. H2417.
116
Congressional Record, December 8, 2009, p. H14350.
115
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Political Transition in Tunisia
•
To what extent is Tunisia a “test-case” for democratic transitions in the Middle
East? To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. policy in the region?
•
What are the key issues in constitution drafting, and how will Tunisians seek to
overcome strongly felt differences in policy preferences? Will the new
constitution provide protections and equality for religious, ethnic, and political
minorities? What will the new constitution say—if anything—regarding the
relation between Islam and the state, women’s rights, government
decentralization, and the ability of Salafist groups to participate in politics?
•
What will the future Tunisian government and political order look like? Is a
consensus among Islamist and secularist political factions possible? Will there be
a free and independent press and civil society in Tunisia?
•
Do continued protests and insecurity constitute significant threats? Do elements
of the former regime continue to influence events in Tunisia? How will
transitional authorities approach the question of reforming the security and
domestic intelligence services?
•
Which individuals and groups currently enjoy significant popular credibility in
Tunisia, and what are their likely courses of action? What coalitions among
political and interest groups are likely?
•
What is the potential medium-term impact of recent events on foreign investment
and economic growth in Tunisia and the region? What steps are being taken to
promote economic growth and job creation, and to address socioeconomic
grievances and regional economic disparities?
•
What has been the impact of U.S. statements and actions, and what are the
prospects for future U.S. influence on the evolution of events in Tunisia? How
should the U.S. government shape its future foreign aid programs? What course
of U.S. action is most likely to fulfill foreign policy and national security goals?
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Acknowledgments
This report includes analysis by Carol Migdalovitz, now-retired CRS Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
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