Political Transition in Tunisia
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
February 10, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21666

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Political Transition in Tunisia

Summary
Tunisia has taken key steps toward democracy since the “Jasmine Revolution” in 2011, and has
so far avoided the violent chaos and/or authoritarian resurrection seen in other “Arab Spring”
countries. Tunisians adopted a new constitution in January 2014 and held national elections
between October and December 2014, marking the completion of a four-year transitional period.
A secularist party, Nidaa Tounes (“Tunisia’s Call”), won a plurality of seats in parliament, and its
leader Béji Caïd Essebsi was elected president. The results reflect a decline in influence for the
country’s main Islamist party, Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda, “Awakening” or “Renaissance”), which
stepped down from leading the government in early 2014. Al Nahda, which did not run a
presidential candidate, nevertheless demonstrated continuing electoral appeal, winning the
second-largest block of legislative seats and joining a Nidaa Tounes-led coalition government.
Although many Tunisians are proud of the country’s progress since 2011, public opinion polls
also show anxiety over the country’s future. Tangible improvements in the economy or
government service-delivery are few, while security threats have risen. Nidaa Tounes leaders have
pledged to improve counterterrorism efforts and boost economic growth, but have not provided
many concrete details on how they will pursue these ends. The party may struggle to achieve
internal consensus on specific policies, as it was forged from disparate groups united largely in
their opposition to Islamism. Tunisian politicians and civil society leaders may also debate how,
and when, to move from a pattern of ad-hoc negotiations to achieve “consensus” on key political
decisions, toward a greater reliance on formal political institutions.
There have been several small-scale terrorist attacks in Tunisia since 2011, and Tunisian nationals
are involved in violent extremist groups abroad. Notably, Tunisians reportedly constitute one of
the largest contingents of Islamist “foreign fighters” in Syria. A domestic group known as Ansar
al Sharia in Tunisia was formed in 2011 and appears to act variously as a charity, a recruitment
pipeline for Islamist militants, and an armed group. It was reportedly involved in an attack on the
U.S. embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012, prompting the Obama
Administration to designate it a foreign terrorist organization. Terrorist cells near the Algerian
border and in the remote south are the target of ongoing Tunisian military operations. Policy
debates over the root causes of violent extremism and how best to approach the problem have
entrenched mutual distrust between Islamist and secularist political factions.
U.S. policymakers have praised Tunisia’s transition, and President Obama has invited newly
elected President Béji Caïd Essebsi to visit Washington. Congress has shaped U.S. transitional
support to Tunisia and new defense cooperation. The Administration, in consultation with
Congress, has allocated over $610 million in aid since 2011—much of which was reprogrammed
from appropriations made for other intended purposes—and has proposed to double the annual
aid appropriation for Tunisia in FY2016. U.S. engagement and aid nonetheless remain modest
compared to states such as Egypt and Jordan, which are regarded as more intertwined with U.S.
national security interests. The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act
(P.L. 113-235) allows additional funding for loan guarantees and for the Tunisian-American
Enterprise Fund, which seeks to strengthen Tunisia’s private sector. The FY2014 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) also provided funding for these purposes, but prohibited a
planned Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) “threshold” grant because Tunisia’s income
level is too high to qualify for a full MCC compact.

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Political Transition in Tunisia

Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
Potential Issues for Congress ..................................................................................................... 2
Background................................................................................................................................ 4
Politics ............................................................................................................................................. 5
The 2014 Constitution ............................................................................................................... 7
Security Concerns ............................................................................................................................ 8
Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform ........................................................................... 11
The Economy ................................................................................................................................. 12
Foreign Relations ........................................................................................................................... 13
U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 13
U.S. Aid ................................................................................................................................... 15
Recent Legislation ................................................................................................................... 18
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 18

Figures
Figure 1. Tunisia: Selected Events since January 2011 ................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Tunisia at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 4
Figure 3. Party Distribution in Parliament ....................................................................................... 5

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Tunisia Since 2011 .............................................................. 17

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19

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Overview
Tunisia’s 2011 popular uprising, known as the “Jasmine Revolution,” ended the 23-year
authoritarian regime of then-President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and sparked a wave of unrest in
much of the Arab world. Since then, Tunisia has taken key steps toward democracy. Civil and
political liberties have expanded dramatically, and Tunisia has experienced far less violence than
some other transitional countries. An elected National Constituent Assembly adopted a new
constitution in early 2014, and presidential and parliamentary elections were held in late 2014,
formally ending a series of transitional governments (see timeline, Figure 1). During the
transitional period, leading political factions repeatedly overcame political crises by engaging in
informal negotiations. The durability of such arrangements remains to be seen.
The 2014 elections were largely peaceful, and all major political parties accepted the results.1
Nidaa Tounes (“Tunisia’s Call”), a secularist party founded in 2012, won the largest number of
seats in the new parliament, and its founder, Béji Caïd Essebsi, an elder statesman who served as
Interim Prime Minister in 2011, was elected president. The main Islamist party, Al Nahda (alt:
Ennahda, “Renaissance”), its top political opponent, won the second-largest block of seats. After
protracted negotiations, Nidaa Tounes formed a coalition that includes two other secularist parties
as well as Al Nahda. Al Nahda leaders, who had publicly called for a “national unity”
government, praised the coalition’s formation. It was controversial within Nidaa Tounes,
however, with some leaders arguing that the decision to include Al Nahda would betray voters.
Although many Tunisians are proud of their country’s progress toward democracy, opinion polls
in 2014 revealed acute anxiety over the future.2 Government service-delivery has suffered since
2011, threats to public safety have increased, and unemployment remains high. The new
government faces pressure to rapidly deliver economic gains, and has also identified
counterterrorism as a key focus. Terrorist threats have grown as Tunisia’s previously repressive
internal security apparatus has experienced bureaucratic disarray, and as neighboring Libya has
unraveled. Tunisians also reportedly make up one of the largest contingents of “foreign fighters”
in Syria, and have been implicated in terrorism in Mali and Algeria. Islamist-secularist tensions
have been fed by disagreement over how to handle security threats, by regional divisions, and by
mutual suspicion that each side seeks to manipulate the rules of politics to its advantage.
There appears to be broad agreement across Tunisia’s political spectrum that reforms are needed
to consolidate democratic gains and to unlock economic growth and job creation. Political parties
provided few concrete details on their policy preferences during the 2014 campaigns, however,
and the new coalition government may struggle to achieve internal agreement. Nidaa Tounes
itself exhibits little internal cohesion. The kinds of structural economic reforms that Tunisia’s
international partners have recommended would likely face significant opposition from key
interest groups that supported Nidaa Tounes (see “The Economy”). Critics have also questioned
Nidaa Tounes’s commitment to security sector reform, transitional justice, and government
checks-and-balances, with some portraying it as a “soft restoration” of the Ben Ali era.3

1 Preliminary statements by international election observation missions praised the elections while noting potential
areas for improvement. Tunisian civil society organizations also conducted national election-monitoring missions.
2 IRI’s Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 22-July 1, 2014, found that 67% of Tunisians felt that things in Tunisia
were going in the “wrong direction” and that 65% were “not satisfied at all” with democracy in Tunisia.
3 Monica Marks, “Tunisia Opts for an Inclusive New Government,” The Washington Post [blog], February 3, 2015.
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Tunisia has a small territory, a relatively well-educated and homogenous population, and a history
of state encouragement of women’s rights. These are arguably structural advantages that favor
peaceful politics. At the same time, Tunisia has not escaped being “an echo chamber of the
ideological conflicts that are shaking the region,” including contests between Islamists and
secularists, economic leftists and pro-business groups, and libertarians and authoritarians.4 Its
political accomplishments since 2011 are attributable, in part, to individual leaders’ willingness to
make concessions at key moments, often at the expense of support from their respective bases.
Backchannel negotiations have helped overcome several near-crises, but may be at odds with
efforts to institutionalize democratic procedures and foster accountability to voters.
Potential Issues for Congress
Stated U.S. policy priorities in Tunisia include encouraging democracy, advancing trade and
investment ties, and working with the Tunisian government to counter terrorism. Congress has
shaped U.S. policy toward Tunisia through its authorization and appropriation of foreign aid, its
review of arms sales and other security cooperation activities, and its oversight. U.S. engagement
and aid have also been affected by debates within Congress over the size of the federal budget,
the scale of U.S. foreign aid, and U.S. policy toward countries affected by the “Arab Spring.” The
Administration has requested $134 million in aid for Tunisia in FY2016, more than double the
FY2015 request, of which about 60% would be for security assistance. As Congress examines this
request and U.S. engagement with Tunisia, Members may consider questions such as:
• Is Tunisia likely to experience greater political stability following the 2014
elections, or will the new coalition government fracture? Will the completion of
the transition period translate into economic investment and growth? To what
extent will the government be able to respond to popular pressures to improve
service-delivery, address regional inequality, create jobs, and bolster security?
• How will the Nidaa Tounes-led government approach sensitive issues such as
regulatory reform, transitional justice, and security sector reform? How is
Tunisia’s new constitution being interpreted and implemented, including
provisions guaranteeing civil liberties and gender equality?
• To what degree are Tunisia-based Islamist extremist groups a threat to U.S.
national security? What factors explain domestic extremism and Tunisian
participation in transnational terrorism?
• To what extent is Tunisia a priority for U.S. foreign policy?
• What types of U.S. aid and engagement have been most effective at achieving
U.S. and Tunisian policy goals? What has been the impact of U.S. democracy-
promotion assistance on Tunisia’s transition?
• To what extent can or should U.S. aid seek to incentivize politically difficult
economic reforms? What steps, if any, can or should the United States take to
promote bilateral trade and investment?
• To what extent should the United States seek to pair counterterrorism assistance
with support for greater legislative and public oversight of the security sector?

4 International Crisis Group, Tunisia’s Elections: Old Wounds, New Fears, December 2014.
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Figure 1. Tunisia: Selected Events since January 2011



CRS-3

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Political Transition in Tunisia

Figure 2. Tunisia at a Glance

Background
While Tunisia shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, some of its attributes are
unique: a small territory, a relatively homogenous population, a relatively liberalized economy, a
large and educated middle class, and a history of encouraging women’s socioeconomic freedoms.
Tunisia’s population is overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking and Sunni Muslim (although tribal and
ethnic divisions persist in some areas), while its urban culture reflects European influences.
The legal and socioeconomic status of women is among Tunisia’s particularities within the Arab
world. Polygamy is banned, and women enjoy equal citizenship rights and the right to initiate
divorce. (Inheritance laws and practices are nonetheless disadvantageous toward women.)
Women serve in the military and in many professions, and constitute more than half of university
students; the first woman governor was appointed in 2004. Many Tunisians attribute these
advances to the country’s relatively liberal Personal Status Code, promulgated in 1956 under
then-President Habib Bourguiba, as well as Bourguiba-era educational reforms.
Prior to 2011, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable, albeit authoritarian, regime that
focused on economic growth while staving off political liberalization. It had had only two leaders
since independence from France in 1956: Bourguiba, a secular nationalist and independence
activist, and Ben Ali, a former interior minister and prime minister who assumed the presidency
in 1987. Ben Ali cultivated the internal security services and the Constitutional Democratic Rally
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(RCD) party as his power base, and harshly repressed political participation, freedom of
expression, and religious activism. This repression, along with corruption and nepotism,
undermined the regime’s popular legitimacy, despite relatively effective state services and
economic growth. Another factor driving popular dissatisfaction was the socioeconomic divide
between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the poorer interior. Anti-government unrest,
particularly rooted in labor and economic grievances, has often originated in the interior—as did
the 2011 protest movement.
The “Jasmine Revolution”
In December 2010, antigovernment protests broke out in Tunisia’s interior after a street vendor named Mohamed
Bouazizi set himself on fire in an apparent protest against state repression and a lack of economic opportunities.
Protests spread to neighboring towns and eventually to the capital, Tunis, and to wealthy coastal communities
associated with the ruling elite. Police opened fire on protesters and made sweeping arrests; an estimated 338 people
were killed.5 The army, however, reportedly refused an order to use force against demonstrations. On January 14,
2011, President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, in power since 1987, fled the country for Saudi Arabia, where he remains.
Politics
Dozens of parties contested the 2014 elections, but the top two have come to represent the two
poles of Tunisian post-revolutionary politics. One is the Islamist party Al Nahda, which won
Tunisia’s first free and fair elections in October 2011 after being banned under Ben Ali. The other
is the ardently secularist Nidaa Tounes, which represents a mix of former regime figures, business
interests, trade-unionists, and independents. Al Nahda’s electoral success in 2011 was grounded in
its superior grassroots mobilization and its image as a principled opponent of the former regime.
However, once in power, the party struggled to govern amid economic and security challenges.
Nidaa Tounes was founded in 2012 to rally secularist opposition to the Nahda-led government.
Nidaa Tounes won a the largest block of
Figure 3. Party Distribution in Parliament
parliamentary seats in the 2014 elections and
its founder, Caïd Essebsi, was elected
Popular
Other /
president. Al Nahda won the second-largest
Front
Indepe-
block of seats, reflecting a decrease in
7%
ndents
popularity since 2011 but still considerable
Afek
10%
electoral appeal. Al Nahda did not run a
Tounes
Nidaa
presidential candidate and declined to endorse
4%
Tounes
one. Many of its supporters, however, appear
40%
UPL
to have backed Caïd Essebsi’s top rival, then-
7%
Interim President Moncef Marzouki, who had
been part of the Nahda-led “Troika” coalition
Al
that governed in 2012-2013. In a multi-
Nahda
candidate contest in November 2014, Caïd
32%
Essebsi came in first with 39% of the vote,
followed by Marzouki, who won 33%,
Coalition includes: Nidaa Tounes, Al Nahda,
despite the fact that his Congress for the
UPL, and Afek Tounes.
Republic (CPR) party had won only four seats
in parliament (2%). Caïd Essebsi won a December run-off against Marzouki with 56% of votes.

5 Associated Press, “Report Raises Number of Killed During Tunisia’s Revolution to 338,” May 5, 2012.
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Campaign rhetoric was heated ahead of the run-off, with Caïd Essebsi suggesting that Al Nahda
supporters were terrorists, while Marzouki accused Caïd Essebsi of seeking to resurrect the Ben
Ali regime.6 Although both Nidaa Tounes and Al Nahda both have national constituencies, the
electoral results also pointed to an enduring regional divide among the electorate. Nidaa Tounes
won majorities in most of the urban districts along the northern coast, while Al Nahda and
Marzouki came in first in much of the south and interior.
In January 2015, Nidaa Tounes proposed a cabinet that included only one other major party, the
Free Patriotic Union (UPL after its French acronym). The UPL was founded by Slim Riahi, a
wealthy businessman and soccer club owner, and has little apparent ideological underpinning. Al
Nahda and other major parties signaled that they would vote against confirmation, forcing Nidaa
Tounes to propose a more broad-based coalition. The new coalition and cabinet, which parliament
confirmed in February 2015, includes the UPL; secularist party Afek Tounes (“Tunisia
Horizons”), which has emphasized market liberalism and youth leadership; and Al Nahda, which
was given the Ministry of Employment and three junior posts. The key ministries of interior,
defense, and justice are headed by independents considered close to Nidaa Tounes.
The Popular Front party opposes both Nidaa Tounes and Al Nahda, and appears positioned to lead
the parliamentary opposition to the coalition government. It is secularist but more strongly leftist
than Nidaa Tounes, and its leaders were activist opponents of the Ben Ali regime. Two Popular
Front politicians were assassinated in 2013, reportedly by Islamist militants (see “Security
Concerns”). Tunisia’s main trade union federation, known as the UGTT, has also asserted its
influence as a leftist and secularist counter-weight to Al Nahda, as a channel for popular
economic grievances, and as a convener of "national dialogue" on key policy issues.
Al Nahda is at the center of Tunisian debates over religion, state, and identity. It emerged as a
major political force in 2011 after its leaders had spent decades in exile, in prison, and
underground. In 2012-2013, Al Nahda headed a “Troika” coalition with two smaller, secular
parties. (See timeline, Figure 1.) During that time, secularists often argued that the movement
was seeking to prolong its hold on power, encourage religiously conservative social change, and
exercise partisan control over state institutions. Al Nahda leaders, for their part, pointed to their
repeated willingness to make concessions to secularists—for example not supporting a reference
to sharia in the new constitution, and agreeing to step down from the government in 2014—even
when such decisions angered the party’s base. Al Nahda leaders continue to criticize what they
view as secularists’ efforts to bar religion from public life, and appear to fear that secularists may
seek to manipulate the electoral or political process to exclude them from government.
Not all of Tunisia’s Islamists back Al Nahda, and the party’s willingness to compromise may have
cost it some support among more radical factions of public opinion. Some religiously
conservative Salafists7 openly support the creation of an Islamic state in Tunisia, and some have
challenged government authorities—as well as artists, labor union activists, journalists,
academics, and women deemed insufficiently modest—through protests, threats, and/or violence.

6 Le Monde, “Moncef Marzouki : « Béji Caïd Essebsi, c’est le retour de l’ancien régime »,” November 26, 2014;
Christine Petré, “Tunisia’s Presidential Climate Heats Up,” Middle East Monitor, December 19, 2014.
7 “Salafism” refers to a broad subset of Sunni Islamic reformist movements that seek to purify contemporary Islamic
religious practices and societies by encouraging the application of practices and views associated with the earliest days
of the Islamic faith. Salafist movements hold a range of positions on political, social, and theological questions. A
subset of Salafists advocate violence in pursuit of their aims, but many instead pursue non-violent preaching, charity,
and (for some) political activities. See CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
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A handful of Salafist groups have registered as political parties, but many appear to prefer to
operate outside the formal political system. In some areas, Salafist groups reportedly control
mosques and have set up security and service-provision networks.8 A crackdown on unregistered
mosques was initiated under the Nahda-led government and continued under the technocratic
Mehdi Jomaa government in 2014, sparking concerns among some civil liberties advocates.
Key Figures
President Béji Caïd Essebsi. Caïd Essebsi, 88, won Tunisia’s first free and fair direct presidential election in 2014.
Caïd Essebsi founded Nidaa Tounes in 2012, positioning the party as a big tent to ral y diverse opponents of political
Islam, and of the Nahda-led Troika government in particular. He campaigned in 2014 on improving the economy and
countering terrorism, but has provided few detailed policy proposals. Despite his opposition to Al Nahda, Caïd
Essebsi ultimately agreed to a coalition that includes the Islamist party. Caïd Essebsi is a lawyer and was a close aide to
Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, serving in a variety of posts including Interior Minister and Defense
Minister. He also held government positions under Ben Ali, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but was not at the
forefront of the regime. In 2011, he served as Interim Prime Minister, overseeing the initiation of political reforms and
the organization of the October 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections.
Prime Minister Habib Essid. Essid, 65, was appointed Prime Minister by President Caïd Essebsi and was confirmed
in a parliamentary vote in February 2015. In 2011, Essid served as Interior Minister in the post-revolution interim
government headed by then-Prime Minister Caïd Essebsi. Some civil society leaders faulted him at the time for
reportedly slowing ambitious reforms that were initiated immediately after the revolution. Previously, Essid served in
a variety of state positions under President Ben Ali, including in the Ministries of Agriculture, Fishery, Environment—
and, in the late 1990s, the Ministry of Interior, which was a pillar of the regime. Despite this history, Essid appears to
have the backing of Al Nahda leaders; he served as an advisor on security issues in the Nahda-led Troika government.
Assembly President Mohamed Ennaceur. Ennaceur, 80, of Nidaa Tounes, heads the Assembly of the
Representatives of the People (ARP), the 217-seat legislature created by the 2014 constitution. He was elected to his
current position by a majority vote among MPs, including crucial support from Al Nahda. Ennaceur is a former
government minister, diplomat, and civil society figure. Like President Caïd Essebsi, he began his career in government
under founding President Bourguiba and also served in posts under Ben Ali.
Foreign Minister Taïeb Baccouche. Baccouche, 70, Secretary-General and founding member of the Nidaa Tounes
party, is a union activist, human rights advocate, and linguistics professor. He was among the Nidaa Tounes MPs who
opposed including Al Nahda in the ruling coalition. Baccouche served as Minister of Education in the interim
government in 2011—a period of intense contestation over Tunisia’s ban on the ful face-veil (niqab) in educational
settings, which he maintained and defended.
Al Nahda Leader Rachid Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi, 73, is a political activist, author, and theorist of Islam and
democracy. He co-founded and leads Tunisia’s main Islamist political party, Al Nahda (“Renaissance”). He has not held
or sought any elected position, but has wielded substantial political influence through his ability to shape Al Nahda’s
policy positions, and through his engagement in negotiations with other political leaders to overcome various
government crises. Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia in 2011 under a general amnesty adopted soon after the
revolution. He had lived in exile, mostly in London, for two decades, and had been sentenced to jail in absentia under
Ben Ali. Ghannouchi has emphasized the importance of political “consensus” in advancing democracy while
maintaining stability in Tunisia, and has often appeared to overrule the party’s base in order to reach agreements with
other political interest groups. Secularist critics often accuse him of claiming to be moderate while intending to
gradually introduce restrictive laws and institutions.
The 2014 Constitution
Tunisia’s new constitution is the product of extensive debate among leading political factions. It
was adopted in an overwhelming vote in the National Constituent Assembly in January 2014. The
text reflects a complex process of adjudicating stark policy differences over the future shape of
state and society. The degree to which it lays the foundation for a stable democracy may depend

8 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Meeting Tunisia’s Ansar Al-Sharia,” Foreign Policy, March 8, 2013.
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on interpretation and implementation, the degree to which the judiciary and legislature leverage
their full authorities, and whether additional steps are taken to reform state institutions. Despite
attracting both Islamist and secularist backing, the constitution is unlikely, by itself, to
definitively settle debates regarding the role of religion in public life and the role of the state in
regulating religious practice.
The constitution was drafted by an elected body in which Al Nahda held by far the largest block
of seats. Its framing and many of its provisions, however, may be viewed as victories for
secularist parties, and/or for pragmatists within Al Nahda. There is no reference to sharia, or
Islamic law.9 Instead, Article 2 states that “Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship, the will of
the people, and the supremacy of law,” and Article 3 states that “the people are sovereign and the
source of authority, which is exercised through the people’s representatives and by referendum.”
These provisions appear to directly counter any argument that religious law trumps civil law.
“Freedom of conscience and belief” (Art. 6) is guaranteed, along with gender equality (Art. 21),
freedom of expression and information (Art. 31-32), freedom of assembly (Art. 37), individual
property rights (Art. 41), and some aspects of due process (e.g., Art. 27).
Despite its secular framing, the constitution asserts Tunisia’s Muslim identity, at times in ways
that suggest tensions with its more liberal provisions. For example, Article 1—carried over from
Tunisia’s first constitution—states that Tunisia’s “religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its
system the Republic.” Along with a provision stating that “the state is the guardian of religion”
(Art. 6), this has led some observers to fear that the state could proactively enforce practices
based in religious customs. A prohibition against declarations of apostasy or takfir (Art. 6)—
accusing a Muslim of leaving or denouncing Islam—has also been interpreted by some as a
constraint on free expression.10 Secularists had favored the ban, arguing that accusing someone of
apostasy is an incitement to violence. Article 73 states that only Muslims may run for president.
(Tunisia has tiny Jewish and Christian minorities.)
The constitution creates a mixed presidential system. The directly elected president/head of state
exercises powers over defense and foreign affairs but shares executive authorities with a prime
minister from the party with the largest number of seats in parliament. This model was preferred
by secularist parties, which saw it as creating balances of power, while Al Nahda officials had
expressed preference for a fully parliamentary system. Some observers have expressed concern
that the mixed system could prove unwieldy in practice or prone to political deadlock.11
Security Concerns
Violent extremist groups across North and West Africa are exploiting porous borders and the
weaknesses of security forces.12 These groups—such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), its affiliates and break-away factions, and movements calling themselves Ansar al
Sharia (Supporters of Islamic Law)—are also capitalizing on divisive identity issues as well as

9 Al Nahda leaders had in early 2012 committed not to reference sharia. During the amendment process, however, Al
Nahda MPs introduced amendments that would have referenced sharia. These were voted down after Al Nahda’s
leadership determined that the party would not support them.
10 See, e.g., Sarah Mersch, “Tunisia’s Compromise Constitution,” Sada, January 21, 2014.
11 Duncan Pickard, “Identity, Islam, and Women in the Tunisian Constitution,” Atlantic Council, January 24, 2014.
12 See CRS Report R43756, Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.
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popular frustrations with poor governance. Tunisia has not been overwhelmed by insecurity, as in
neighboring Libya, but it has not been immune to these trends. Competition between “core” Al
Qaeda and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) has sparked further divisions among
Islamist extremists in North Africa, and may influence these groups’ strategic choices.
Several Tunisia-based extremist groups have emerged since 2011, including Ansar al Sharia in
Tunisia (discussed below) and a cell known as the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which is reportedly
active in an area known as Mount Chaambi, near the Algerian border.13 Insecurity along the
Libyan border to the east and in the remote desert south is also of concern, as both areas appear to
be key transit zones for regional smuggling networks.14 Some observers attribute the increase in
jihadist activity since 2011 to the release of over 1,000 “political prisoners” of various stripes in
early 2011 (one of whom went on to found Ansar al Sharia); security force disorganization in the
aftermath of the revolution; and events in Mali and Libya.15 Jihadist groups may also draw on
support from Tunisian Salafist groups and communities.16
Tunisian nationals also reportedly make up a significant proportion of foreign fighters active in
violent extremist groups elsewhere in North and West Africa and in Syria.17 Tunisian authorities
stated in mid-2014 that at least 2,400 Tunisians had traveled to Syria as combatants since 2011,
which would make Tunisia one of the largest known sources of foreign fighters there.18
Authorities have also stated that they have prevented several thousand more Tunisians from
going—although they have not defined criteria for preventing individuals’ travel, such as whether
restrictions are implemented on the basis of specific threats. Tunisian authorities have expressed
acute concerns that fighters will return to conduct attacks at home.19
Local Tunisian groups have staged attacks against government, tourist, and Western targets within
the country. A Tunisian suicide bomber blew himself up outside a hotel in the beach resort of
Sousse in October 2013, and another bomber was apprehended by police the same day in the
coastal city of Monastir before he could detonate his vest. Two secularist opposition politicians
were killed by gunmen in February and July 2013 outside their homes. A mob attack on the U.S.
embassy in September 2012 caused extensive damage to the building’s outer enclosure and four
Tunisians were killed in subsequent clashes.20 Officials regularly claim to have broken up
domestic terrorist plots, including some targeting the recent 2014 elections.21 In early 2015, the
Interior Ministry announced two large-scale arrests of people suspected of planning
assassinations and “spectacular attacks” against government targets, but it is unclear how

13 The group is named for a prominent figure in the 7th-century Arab conquest of North Africa. Tunisian authorities
stated in 2012-2013 that Okba Ibn Nafaa was linked to AQIM, and that cells in Mount Chaambi included militants who
had fought in Mali. Since 2014, news reports have suggested ties between the group and ISIL. See Andrew Lebovich,
“Confronting Tunisia’s Jihadists,” ForeignPolicy.com, May 16, 2013.
14 See International Crisis Group, Tunisia’s Borders (II): Terrorism and Regional Polarisation, October 2014.
15 La Presse, “Enquête - Le jihadisme en Tunisie,” November 8, 2012.
16 International Crisis Group (ICG), Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge, February 13, 2013.
17 According to Algerian authorities, 11 Tunisian nationals—the largest group of any single nationality—participated in
a hostage-seizure attack by an AQIM offshoot on a gas facility in the southeastern Algerian town of In Amenas in
January 2013. The attack resulted in the deaths of 39 foreign hostages, including three U.S. citizens.
18 Tunis Afrique Presse [official], “Tunisia: 2,400 Tunisian Jihadists in Syria (Interior),” June 23, 2014.
19 See, e.g., The Guardian, “Tunisia Becomes Breeding Ground for Islamic State Fighters,” October 13, 2014.
20 State Department daily press briefing, September 14, 2012.
21 TAP, “Tunisian Interior Ministry Confirms Plans by Terrorist Group to Target Polls,” September 18, 2014.
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advanced any preparations may have been.22 A French-Tunisian militant was implicated in the
2013 oppositionist assassinations, and more recently has been linked to the Islamic State.23 He
was reportedly a former member of a Paris-based Islamist cell which has also been tied to the
January 2015 attack on Paris newspaper Charlie Hebdo.24
Tunisian authorities have accused the Tunisian Salafist group Ansar al Sharia of being involved in
several domestic attacks, although the group has not claimed responsibility.25 Ansar al Sharia
shares a name with other extremist organizations in North Africa, but the degree of coordination
among them is uncertain. The Tunisia-based group, which was established in 2011 and initially
focused on non-violent preaching and social works, has developed an increasingly acrimonious
relationship with the state since 2013. Clashes between group members and security forces,
followed by threats of violence from Ansar al Sharia’s leadership, led Tunisian officials in May
2013 to declare the group illegal. The U.S. State Department designated Ansar al Sharia a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2014, accusing it of involvement in the 2012 embassy
attack and stating that the group “represents the greatest threat to US interests in Tunisia.”26
Media reports since then have suggested that the group’s leader, Seifallah Ben Hassine (aka Abou
Iyadh)—who is wanted in Tunisia and designated for U.N. and U.S. sanctions—may be in Libya.
Terrorism in Tunisia: Background
While Tunisia has not experienced many large attacks, terrorism was considered a domestic threat prior to 2011, and
Tunisian nationals have long been active in transnational Islamist extremist networks. At one time, a dozen Tunisian
nationals were reportedly detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; most have been released to
third countries, including two transferred to Kazakhstan in December 2014. Two notable terrorist incidents on
Tunisian soil occurred during the Ben Ali era: the 2002 bombing of a synagogue on Djerba island (noted for its Jewish
population), which killed Tunisians and European tourists, and street battles in Tunis between alleged militants and
security forces in December 2006-January 2007. Al Qaeda’s then-deputy leader Ayman al Zawahiri (now head of Al
Qaeda) appeared to claim responsibility for the Djerba bombing in a taped message broadcast in October 2002,27 and
France, Spain, Italy, and Germany arrested several expatriate Tunisians for alleged involvement. The nature of the
2006-2007 violence, in which 14 militants were reported killed, was more opaque.
In 2002, the U.S. State Department placed the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which operated outside Tunisia, on
a list of special y designated global terrorists subject to U.S. sanctions.28 The TCG, reportedly founded in 2000, was
primarily active in Afghanistan, where it was linked to the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, an anti-Taliban
fighter, in September 2001. Its goals also reportedly included establishing an Islamic state in Tunisia. The TCG was
suspected of plotting attacks on the U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001, prompting a
multi-nation crackdown on the group. It has since been inactive. However, a TCG founder, Seifallah Ben Hassine
(Abou Iyadh), was released from jail in Tunisia in 2011 and went on to found Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia. Another
founder, Tarek Maaroufi, reportedly returned to Tunisia in 2011 after being released from prison in Belgium.

22 Kuwait News Agency, “Tunisia dismantles terrorist cell targeting security, military officials,” January 25, 2015;
Reuters, “Tunisia arrests 32 militant Islamists planning 'spectacular' attacks,” February 8, 2015.
23 The New York Times, “Tunisia: ISIS Fighters Claim 2 killings,” December 18, 2014.
24 The Washington Post, “Suspect in Paris attack had ‘long-term obsession’ carrying out terror attack,” January 8, 2015.
25 See, e.g., The Economist, “The Salafist Struggle,” January 1, 2014.
26 State Department, “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar al-Shari'a Organizations and Leaders,” January 10, 2014.
As a result of the designations, all property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which designated individuals and groups have
any interest is blocked, and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions with them or to their benefit.
27 Financial Times, “Al-Qaeda Deputy Leader Signals Involvement in Attacks,” October 10, 2002.
28 See State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,” April 30, 2003; and U.N. Security Council Sanctions
Committee on Al Qaeda, “Tunisian Combatant Group,” 2002 designation.
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Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform
Tunisians continue to debate how best to ensure accountability for past abuses while encouraging
national reconciliation. Criminal charges have been brought against former President Ben Ali in
absentia (he remains in Saudi Arabia), and against members of his family and former senior
officials, in connection with allegations of corruption and abusive security force actions.
However, the courts—some headed by judges appointed under Ben Ali—have acquitted or
otherwise dropped many of these prosecutions over the past year, sparking controversy.29 The
families of protesters who were killed in 2011 continue to call for justice and compensation. More
broadly, there is a question of what approach to adopt toward mid- and low-level state employees
and security force members who may have been complicit in past abuses, but did not command
them. After much debate, Al Nahda agreed during the 2013 “political dialogue” not to support
draft legislation that would have barred former regime officials from political participation,
effectively killing the bill and, arguably, enabling Nidaa Tounes’s subsequent electoral advances.
In December 2013, the Constituent Assembly adopted a law creating a Truth and Dignity
Commission and “Specialized Judicial Chambers” that may initiate prosecutions. Their work
remains nascent.30 The 2014 constitution also aims to increase judicial independence. Many
Tunisians remain skeptical of the justice system, which was inherited from the Ben Ali era and is
reportedly viewed as ineffective, subject to political influence, and, in some cases, corrupt.
Transitional governments between 2011 and 2014 made little concrete progress in ensuring
greater transparency and public oversight of the Interior Ministry and its components.31 The
ministry oversees internal security, the intelligence services, and the police, and under Ben Ali it
was associated with abuses such as extrajudicial arrests, domestic surveillance, intimidation of
political opponents, and torture. Whether the Nidaa Tounes-led government will pursue reforms is
uncertain, given the party’s emphasis on cracking down on security threats and the fact that
several of its officials served in Ben Ali’s government. The National Constituent Assembly
initiated, but did not complete, an effort to amend the controversial 2003 anti-terrorism law,
which critics view as overly broad and insufficiently concerned with due process. Tensions
between the security forces and various civilian leaders also emerged during the transitional
period as pressures increased on the security forces to engage in high-risk counterterrorism
operations, in the absence of structural reforms and in an atmosphere of political distrust.32
Tunisia’s military, estimated at about 35,000 personnel, has historically received fewer state
resources than the internal security services, and many observers view it as relatively apolitical. It
reportedly played a key role in influencing Ben Ali’s decision to step down during the 2011
protests, and reportedly refused an order to open fire on demonstrators. Since 2011, the military
has taken on a more prominent role in counterterrorism and border security. The army remains
popular, but its expanded mandate may risk overstretch.

29 Carlotta Gall, “Questions of Justice in Tunisia as Ousted Leaders Are Freed,” New York Times, July 16, 2014.
30 See International Center for Transitional Justice, “Tunisia’s Specialized Judicial Chambers—Q&A with Judge Walid
Melki,” September 4, 2014.
31 See, e.g., Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Security Sector Reform in Tunisia Three Years into the Democratic Transition,
Arab Reform Initiative, July 2014.
32 Tunisia Live, “Slow Progress in Police Reform Since Revolution,” March 19, 2013; Al Arabiya, “Protesters Force
Tunisian Leaders From Police Memorial Ceremony,” October 18, 2013; Al Jazeera via BBC Monitoring, “Tunisia
Security Personnel Lament ‘Campaign’ To Weaken Establishment,” October 19, 2013.
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The Economy
Tunisia is an upper-middle-income country, and prior to 2011 was considered one of the best-
performing non-oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Textile exports,
tourism, and phosphate mining are key sectors. Tunisia also exports agricultural products and
petroleum, although it is a net energy-importer. Strong annual growth prior to 2011, however,
masked inequalities that fed discontent. Wealth is concentrated in the capital and along the eastern
coast, while the interior has long suffered from relative poverty and a lack of investment. Many
Tunisians are highly educated, but the economy has generally created low-skilled and low-paid
jobs, thus creating a large pool that is educated but underemployed.
Socioeconomic grievances were a key factor in the 2011 uprising, but efforts to address them
have been undermined by new economic strains. These are attributable, in part, to investor
perceptions of political instability, negative regional security trends, and the economic downturn
in the European Union (EU), Tunisia’s largest trading partner. Declines in tourism and foreign
direct investment (FDI) have been particularly damaging, and Tunisia’s international credit
ratings have been repeatedly downgraded. Protests and labor disputes, in turn, have hampered
efforts to attract investment. Unemployment remains high at 15.3%, and is reportedly higher
among youth, particularly college graduates. The economy grew by 2.8% in 2014, a rebound
compared to its contraction in 2011 but still insufficient to generate substantial jobs.33 In 2013, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Tunisia agreed to a two-year, $1.75 billion loan program,
of which about $1.15 billion had been disbursed as of December 2014.34 Additional financial
stabilization support has been provided by bilateral partners, including Gulf countries and the
United States.
The IMF, World Bank, and U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation analysts broadly agree that
Tunisia requires deep reforms to promote growth and job creation. They have urged Tunisia, for
example, to loosen currency restrictions, liberalize its labor laws, restructure the banking sector,
and reform investment regulations to allow greater private sector competition and to attract more
foreign investment.35 The IMF has also urged fiscal stability measures such as reductions in state
pensions and subsidies. Some fiscal reforms were initiated during the transitional period, but a
series of interim leaders between 2011 and 2014 generally argued that only a future directly-
elected government would have the legitimacy to undertake deeper reform efforts.36
Nidaa Tounes leaders have promised rapid growth, but they may face political obstacles. For
example, further reductions in subsidies and pensions could impose hardships on some Tunisian
households, while any move to reduce labor protections could produce a backlash from the
powerful trade unions, which are secularist political allies. Meanwhile, banking sector and
investment code regulatory reforms could face opposition from business leaders who have vested
interests in the current system, many of whom have also supported the party.

33 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014.
34 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes Fifth Review Under Stand-By Arrangement for Tunisia; Approves
US$104.8 Million Disbursement,” December 12, 2014.
35 See, e.g., IMF, Tunisia: Fifth Review under the Stand-By Arrangement [...], December 29, 2014; World Bank, The
Unfinished Revolution: Bringing opportunity, good jobs and greater wealth to all Tunisians, May 2014; and MCC,
Identifying Tunisia's Binding Constraints to Broad-Based Growth, January 2013.
36 Reuters, “Tunisia Economy Needs 3 Years of ‘Painful’ Reform, PM Says,” October 13, 2014.
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Prior to 2011, Ben Ali family members and in-laws owned or controlled many of Tunisia’s
biggest companies, with shares sometimes allegedly obtained through political pressure or
corruption. Since 2011, government agencies have seized such assets, including shares of private
companies, and have auctioned some of them off. The process for recovering assets allegedly
stashed overseas, in countries such as France and Switzerland, has proven complex and
challenging, however.37
Foreign Relations
The EU is Tunisia’s largest trading partner, and it provides trade benefits and aid. France is a
leading source of investment and tourism revenues, but bilateral relations suffered in the
aftermath of the 2011 uprising due to close French ties with the Ben Ali regime, as well as a
distrust of Islamist political movements among many French politicians. Since 2011, Tunisian
officials have appealed for increased Western financial assistance—including from the United
States—while also seeking to increase ties with other Arab and African states.38
Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its larger, energy-rich neighbors, Algeria and
Libya. The first official state visit by newly elected President Béji Caïd Essebsi was to Algeria,
where he lauded efforts to increase bilateral counterterrorism cooperation.39 With regard to Libya,
Caïd Essebsi has expressed support for regional political mediation and opposition to external
military intervention.40 Turmoil in Libya is an economic concern in addition to a security concern
for Tunisian officials. Previously, work opportunities in Libya helped to absorb some of Tunisia’s
low-skilled labor surplus, while today, in addition to bemoaning the loss of such jobs, some
Tunisians blame cross-border smuggling and the large number of Libyan refugees in their country
for driving up prices. Former Interim President Moncef Marzouki attempted to revitalize the Arab
Maghreb Union, which includes Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, but the
organization remains inactive due to tensions between Morocco and Algeria, among other factors.
Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians, and Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia had an interests office in
Israel from 1996 until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, or uprising against the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Criticism of Israel and Israeli
policies is common across Tunisia’s political spectrum, although Tunisia has also annually
welcomed Israeli tourists during a pilgrimage to a historic synagogue on Djerba Island. In 2012,
the Nahda-led government hosted visits by senior Hamas officials.
U.S. Policy
U.S. officials have repeatedly referred to Tunisia’s democratic transition as a model for other
states in the Arab world and beyond. The Obama Administration has stated strong support for

37 See, e.g., La Tribune de Genève, “La restitution de fonds à la Tunisie annulée,” December 11, 2014.
38 Reuters, “Economics, Politics Underpin Qatar Aid to North Africa,” August 16, 2012; AFP, “La Tunisie de l'après
Ben Ali veut retrouver toute sa place en Afrique,” January 29, 2012.
39 AFP, “La Tunisie pas préparée à affronter seule le terrorisme, dit son président,” February 4, 2015.
40 Tout sur l’Algérie, “Caïd Essebsi s’exprime sur les relations avec l’Algérie, le Printemps arabe, la Libye et le Sahara
occidental,” February 4, 2015.
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Tunisia, and a desire to advance bilateral economic ties and deepen security cooperation.
President Obama’s new National Security Strategy, released in February 2015, states, “We will
work with Tunisia to further progress on building democratic institutions and strengthening its
economy.” President Obama has also invited President Caïd Essebsi to visit Washington.41
In February 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Tunis, where he pledged “our
commitment to stand with Tunisia ... to help move down this road to democracy.”42 Kerry also
announced a new U.S.-Tunisia Strategy Dialogue, the first session of which was held in
Washington in April 2014. Then-Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa, who led Tunisia’s delegation, met
with President Obama at the White House. A joint statement emphasized support for “Tunisia’s
historic democratic transition” and cooperation on economic development, educational and
cultural affairs, and security and counterterrorism.43
U.S. officials have supported Tunisian efforts to attract greater foreign investment through aid,
trade delegations, and negotiations under the U.S.-Tunisia bilateral trade investment framework
agreement (TIFA), which was signed in 2002. The two countries also have a bilateral investment
treaty and an agreement to avoid double taxation. In 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
expressed support for free trade agreement, but there have been few concrete steps toward one.44
Tunisia is the United States’ 88th-largest trading partner; in 2013, U.S. exports to Tunisia totaled
$870 million and imports $749 million.45 Given limited U.S. aid resources and structural
obstacles to deepening bilateral economic ties—including a language barrier, Tunisia’s small
domestic market, and its trade orientation toward Europe—U.S. policymakers may also seek to
encourage other partners, such as the EU, to commit resources for Tunisia.
U.S. engagement with Tunisian security forces prior to 2011 was heavily focused on conventional
military grants and sales. A Joint Military Commission meets annually and joint exercises are
held. As terrorist threats have increased, and as the relationship between Tunisia’s government
and its security services continues to evolve, the United States has provided new types of security
assistance (see “U.S. Aid” below). Tunisian officials have welcomed this increased engagement,
but the presence of U.S. military personnel, including those engaged in training activities, is
politically sensitive.46 Tunisia cooperates with NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, which
provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO’s
Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls.
The attack on the U.S. embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012 appeared to
lead to a temporary cooling of relations. The embassy was reportedly not well defended by
Tunisian security forces during the attack, and although both governments attributed the attack to
Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia, U.S. officials criticized Tunisia’s handling of the investigation and
prosecution of suspects.47 In November 2013, FBI Director James Comey named Tunisia as one

41 The White House, “Readout of the President's Call with President Caid Essebsi,” January 5, 2015.
42 State Department, “Secretary of State Kerry Holds News Conference in Tunis, Tunisia,” February 18, 2014.
43 The White House, “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Tunisian Republic,” April 4, 2014.
44 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, hearing, “FY13
Department of State and Foreign Operations Budget Request,” February 28, 2012. Progress toward an FTA would be
subject to an interagency process and congressional approval, among other factors.
45 U.S. International Trade Commission data, accessed at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ on February 6, 2015.
46 David S. Cloud, “U.S. Military Presence in Africa Growing in Small Ways,” LA Times, March 7, 2014.
47 Then-Interior Minister Ali Laraydh, an Al Nahda official (and subsequent prime minister), publicly apologized for
(continued...)
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of two places, along with Libya, where AQIM, its affiliates and allies “pose a high threat to U.S.
and Western interests... especially at embassies, hotels, and diplomatic facilities.”48 The State
Department’s decision in March 2014 to lift a travel warning for Tunisia, ahead of then-Prime
Minister Jomaa’s visit, appeared to signal increased U.S. confidence.
U.S.-Tunisian relations date back over 200 years. Tunisia was also the site of significant World
War II battles, and a U.S. cemetery and memorial in Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000
U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, despite an
experiment with leftist economic policy in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian ties were strained by the
1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some
Tunisians viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.49
U.S. Aid
U.S. bilateral aid to Tunisia prior to 2011 was relatively limited and highly focused on military
assistance, with relatively modest funding allocations by Middle East standards. Developments in
2011 led the Administration to work with Congress to identify and reprogram hundreds of
millions of dollars for new programs and initiatives, using funding appropriated in prior years and
for other purposes. As a result, despite relatively small bilateral aid appropriations, the United
States has allocated over $610 million in aid to Tunisia since 2011 (see Table 1below)—
equivalent to over forty times the bilateral aid appropriation in FY2009.
Since 2014, the State Department has referred to a “normalization” of Tunisia aid after initial,
“urgent” reprogrammed funding.50 Administration officials have also signaled that they intend to
increase aid given the successful 2014 elections. The Administration is requesting that Congress
appropriate $134 million for Tunisia for FY2016, more than double its FY2015 request. This
proposes an increase in the Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriation, from $30 million
requested in FY2015 to $55 million, and an increase in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) from
$25 million to $62.5 million. (Total FY2015 allocations will likely surpass the request, due to
additional Defense Department funding as well as reprogrammed funds; see Table 1.)
Prominent elements of U.S. economic assistance since 2011 include51:
• a $100 million cash transfer in 2012 to help Tunisia meet its international debt
obligations;

(...continued)
having initially “failed” to protect the embassy. On May 29, 2013, the U.S. embassy in Tunis released a public
statement criticizing the relatively lenient sentences given to several low-level suspects in the Tunis embassy attack.
The statement called for a “full investigation” and accused Tunisia’s government of failing to uphold its stated
commitment to oppose those who use violence.
48 Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on “Threats to the
Homeland,” November 14, 2013.
49 Jonathan C. Randal, “Raid Left Scars on U.S.-Tunisia Ties,” The Washington Post, March 5, 1987.
50 Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, “The Middle East and North Africa FY2014
Budget: Priorities and Challenges,” May 22, 2013.
51 State Department Bureau of Foreign Assistance, response to CRS query, February 2015. See also The White House,
“FACT SHEET: The President's Framework for Investing in Tunisia,” April 4, 2014; and “USAID Tunisia: Fact
Sheet,” released by the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia, November 20, 2014.
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• $85 million for the cost of two sovereign loan guarantees (in 2012 and 2014) that
enabled Tunisia to raise nearly $1 billion on the international bond markets;
• $80 million allocated to date for a Tunisian-American “Enterprise Fund,” which
is designed to make transformative investments in certain sectors of Tunisia’s
economy while also spurring economic reforms52;
• $49 million for programs administered by the State Department’s Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI), focusing on strengthening civil society, political
parties, the media, electoral processes, and local entrepreneurship; and
• $16 million allocated for a USAID “Information and Communications
Technology Competitiveness Project.”
U.S. bilateral educational and cultural exchanges have also expanded. The United States has also
provided economic aid through multilateral channels. International financial institutions such as
the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank (AfDB), and European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which receive U.S. financing, have provided
concessional loans, support for development projects, and advice on reforms. Group of Eight
(G8) member states, including the United States, have also coordinated some aid for Tunisia
through the Deauville Partnership, initiated in May 2011.53
As noted above (“U.S. Policy”), the United States has increased its security assistance to Tunisia
since 2011 to support counterterrorism and security sector reform. Notable bilateral security
assistance programs to date include:
• at least $51 million in State Department-administered International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement funds for police and justice-sector reforms (not
counting FY2015 appropriations); and
• $40 million in Defense Department “Section 1206” funding for counterterrorism-
related train-and-equip programs.
In August 2014, during the U.S.-African Leaders Summit in Washington D.C., the Administration
announced that Tunisia would be one of six African focus countries of a new “Security
Governance Initiative” (SGI). The program’s scope and implementation in Tunisia remain to be
seen.54 Tunisia is also one of 11 countries participating in the U.S. State Department-led Trans-
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, although the initiative has focused more on the poorer
Sahel states of West Africa. In July 2014, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to
agree to sell Tunisia defense articles and services worth an estimated $700 million, including 12
Black Hawk helicopters, through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Tunisia has also
purchased at least two U.S.-made C-130J military transport aircraft in recent years.55

52 A GAO report released in February 2015 stated that the Tunisia enterprise fund had made one investment to date, of
over $2.4 million, in a private equity fund that invests in Tunisian small and medium-sized enterprises. The report also
identified several “gaps in implementation” of the Tunisia fund and a fund established for Egypt, which, it said, could
“pose challenges for USAID's oversight.” Egypt and Tunisia Funds Are Established; Additional Steps Would
Strengthen Compliance with USAID Grant Agreements and Other Requirements, GAO-15-196, February 2, 2015.
53 See Deauville MENA Transition Fund portfolio in Tunisia, at http://www.menatransitionfund.org/content/portfolio.
As of January 2015, the United States has provided $30 million to the fund.
54 See The White House, “Fact Sheet: Security Governance Initiative,” August 6, 2014.
55 AP, “US Delivers Tunisia 2nd Military Transport Plane to Bolster Fight Against Terrorism,” January 8, 2015.
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Tunisia Since 2011
$ Millions
FY2015
FY2016

FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 (req./est.)
(req.)
TOTAL
96.75
138.62
251.92
125.06
63.48
(see note b)
134.40
Subtotal, Bilateral
81.48
211.34
107.70
57.78
65.98 (req.)b
134.40
Aida
ESF 57.85
154.80
74.47
25.00
30.00
55.00
FMF
17.12 29.50 20.55
20.00 25.00
62.50
IMET
1.95 1.84 2.16
2.30 2.00
2.30
INCLE 1.50
22.50
8.00
9.00
7.00
2.00
NADR
3.06 2.70 2.52
1.48 1.98
0.60
Subtotal, State &
USAID regional,
global, and centrally-
managed economic
36.65
26.53
14.64
5.00
-
-
assistance (multiple
accounts)
State Department
MEPI (ESF)
23.47 8.63 12.50
5.00 -
-
Subtotal, State &
Defense
Department global
and centrally
17.07
12.01
2.72
0.70
30.77
-
managed security
assistance (multiple
accounts)
Defense Department
13.03
6.87
-
-
20.77
-
“Section 1206”
INCLE (prior-year)
reprogrammed in
-
-
-
-
10.00
-
Nov. 2014
Subtotal,
humanitarian
3.43
2.05
-
-
-
-
assistance (multiple
accounts)
Source: State Department, Bureau of Foreign Assistance, estimated allocations as of January 2015.
Notes: Al ocations do not necessarily correspond to appropriations by year, and are subject to shift. Other than
“Section 1206,” does not include non-State Department/USAID foreign assistance resources. Multi-country
programs that may, in part, benefit Tunisian participants are also excluded. Totals may not sum due to rounding.

ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; IMET = International Military Education and
Training; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs; “-” = none or to be determined.
a. Includes funding reprogrammed for Tunisia after being appropriated for other countries and/or purposes.
b. FY2015 bilateral al ocations not yet available.
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Recent Legislation
Congress authorized loan guarantees and the creation of the Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund
in the FY2012 Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Division I of P.L.
112-74). Some Members of Congress, however, called in 2012 for cutting U.S. aid over Tunisia’s
handling of an alleged suspect in the terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya.56
Congress has made new funds available for loan guarantees and the enterprise fund in the
FY2014 and FY2015 foreign aid appropriations acts (Sec. 7034 [r], Division J of P.L. 113-235;
and Sec. 7041[g], Division K of P.L. 113-76). The explanatory statement accompanying PP.L.
113-235 specifically provides $30 million in ESF budget authority for Tunisia, the same as the
Administration’s FY2015 request.57
The FY2014 Department of State, Foreign Operations, And Related Programs Appropriations Act
(Division K of P.L. 113-76) prohibited any foreign assistance from being used to support a
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) “threshold” program in a country that is not a
candidate for a full MCC compact. The Administration had planned a roughly $20 million MCC
threshold grant for Tunisia that was to focus on addressing constraints to economic growth and
job creation.58 However, Tunisia’s relatively high income level currently makes it ineligible for a
compact, although its income had dipped to an eligible level in FY2011, the year from which the
MCC intended to draw funding. The Joint Explanatory Statement on P.L. 113-76 referred
explicitly to Tunisia, stating that, “Efforts by the Administration to provide MCC assistance to
countries that do not meet MCC criteria undermine the integrity of the MCC model.”
Outlook
Tunisia has peacefully achieved many milestones since 2011, prompting observers to portray it as
the lone success story of the “Arab Spring.” Internal political tensions, socioeconomic pressures,
terrorist threats, and regional dynamics are likely to pose ongoing challenges. Despite a relative
lack of conflict, Tunisia remains a potential locus of regional struggles among rival political
ideologies, and among violent extremist groups vying for prominence and recruits. Key questions
include whether Tunisia’s new elected government is likely to remain cohesive, and whether it
will advance political and economic reforms, foster civil liberties while engaging in
counterterrorism, and satisfy popular demands for quality-of-life improvements. Tunisian leaders
have welcomed U.S. assistance since 2011, but the local appetite for outside policy influence,
now that the transitional period is formally over, remains to be seen.


56 See, e.g., The Cable, “Graham Threatens Tunisia Over U.S. Access to Benghazi Suspect,” October 31, 2012; Rep.
Frank Wolf, “Cut Off Aid to Tunisia in Light of Obstructing Benghazi Investigation,” December 11, 2012; and The
Washington Times, “Benghazi Attack Suspect’s Release Spurs Calls to Punish Tunisia,” January 9, 2013. The suspect,
Ali Ani al Harzi, a Tunisian, was detained in Turkey and transferred to Tunisian custody in October 2012. U.S.
investigators were reportedly initially denied permission to question him in Tunisian custody, and he was released from
detention in January 2013 due to a purported lack of evidence. According to news reports, Al Harzi was later
implicated in the two political assassinations in 2013 and charged in Tunisia with belonging to a terrorist organization.
57 State Department, FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, March 2014.
58 State Department, “U.S. Government Assistance to Tunisia,” December 14, 2012. On MCC threshold grants, see
CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation, by Curt Tarnoff.
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Political Transition in Tunisia

Author Contact Information

Alexis Arieff
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in African Affairs
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314


Congressional Research Service
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