Political Transition in Tunisia

Summary

Introduction

Source: CRS graphic. Basemap created by [author name scrubbed] from Esri (2013). "At a Glance" information from CIA World Factbook (2015), World Bank, and IMF (2015). Figures are 2014 estimates unless otherwise noted.

Many provisions in the 2014 constitution may require new laws, changes in existing laws, and/or the adoption of new policies and practices in order to be fully implemented. Tunisian leaders, civil society groups, media outlets, and members of the public continue to debate how best to implement the constitution, as well as a range of other policy dilemmas related to the country's transition from authoritarian rule. Selected issues and questions are described below.

• A new anti-terrorism law was enacted in July 2015, replacing a Ben Ali-era law widely portrayed as repressive. Human rights groups assert that the new law's definition of terrorism is too broad and that it does not sufficiently protect the rights of detainees.⁶ Rights advocates have also criticized a bill that would criminalize "denigration" of the security forces and the publication of broadly-defined "national security secrets."⁷ How might legal reforms and changes in practice provide the security forces with sufficient authority to address terrorist threats, while also protecting civil liberties enshrined in the 2014 constitution?
• Since 2011, successive governments have stated the importance of reforming the internal security services, formerly the backbone of the Ben Ali regime. Yet, structural changes to date have been ad-hoc and opaque, and there are some signs of a backlash among security force commanders and staff.⁸ To what extent should transparency and public oversight of the security forces be expanded, and how?
• How can Tunisia's government reform the economy while mitigating near-term negative consequences for local households and for political stability?
• The new constitution states that "Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship, the will of the people, and the supremacy of law," and—unusually for a majority-Muslim country—does not include any references to sharia (Islamic law). At the same time, the constitution asserts Tunisia's Muslim identity, at times in ways that suggest potential tensions with its more liberal provisions. What is the appropriate role of the state in regulating religious practice? What is the appropriate balance between protecting religious sensitivities and protecting free speech? What is the appropriate role of sharia in Tunisia?
• Since 2014, Tunisian courts have overturned key actions taken during the post-revolutionary period—for example, reversing criminal convictions of Ben Ali-era officials and placing into question the state's seizure of assets belonging to the Ben Ali family. President Caïd Essebsi and his cabinet have also backed a controversial "economic reconciliation" bill that would protect or absolve most Ben Ali-era officials and businessmen from corruption charges.⁹ Do these actions undermine gains made since the revolution and point to ongoing limitations on judicial independence, or do they reflect internal checks and balances and/or foster an atmosphere of reconciliation?
• A Truth and Dignity Commission and associated "Specialized Judicial Chambers" were created in 2013 and have begun hearing victims' testimony. How can the state best support accountability while also fostering reconciliation?
• A social movement calling itself "Where is the oil?" has highlighted public concerns over a lack of transparency in Tunisia's natural resource sector.¹⁰ How can officials improve transparency while also managing popular expectations regarding resource benefits?

While Tunisia shares many characteristics with neighboring countries, some of its attributes are unique: a small territory, a relatively homogenous population, a relatively liberalized economy, a large and educated middle class, and a history of encouraging women's socioeconomic freedoms. Tunisia's population is overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking and Sunni Muslim (although tribal and ethnic divisions persist in some areas), while its urban culture reflects European influences.

The legal and socioeconomic status of women is among Tunisia's particularities within the Arab world. Polygamy is banned, and women enjoy equal citizenship rights and the right to initiate divorce. (Inheritance laws and practices are nonetheless disadvantageous toward women.) Women serve in the military and in many professions, and constitute more than half of university students; the first woman governor was appointed in 2004. Many Tunisians attribute these advances to the country's relatively liberal Personal Status Code, promulgated in 1956 under then-President Habib Bourguiba, as well as Bourguiba-era educational reforms.

Prior to 2011, Tunisia was widely viewed as exhibiting a stable, albeit authoritarian, regime that focused on economic growth while staving off political liberalization. It had had only two leaders since independence from France in 1956: Bourguiba, a secular nationalist and independence activist, and Ben Ali, a former interior minister and prime minister who assumed the presidency in 1987. Ben Ali cultivated the internal security services and the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party as his power base, and harshly repressed political participation, freedom of expression, and religious activism. This repression, along with corruption and nepotism, undermined the regime's popular legitimacy, despite relatively effective state services and economic growth. Another factor driving popular dissatisfaction was the socioeconomic divide between the developed, tourist-friendly coast and the poorer interior. Anti-government unrest, particularly rooted in labor and economic grievances, has often originated in the interior—as did the 2011 protest movement.

Dozens of parties contested the 2014 elections, but the top two have come to represent the poles of Tunisian post-revolutionary politics. The ardently secularist Nidaa Tounes ("Tunisia's Call"), which was formed in 2012 in opposition to Islamist rule, includes a mix of former regime figures, trade-unionists, business leaders, and independents. Tunisia's main Islamist party, Al Nahda (alt: Ennahda, "Renaissance"), led an interim coalition government in 2012-2013 after winning by far the largest share of seats in the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections. Al Nahda stepped down in 2014 in favor of a technocratic interim government, pursuant to a negotiated agreement that deescalated a six-month political crisis caused, in part, by the assassination of two secularist politicians, reportedly by Islamist extremists.

The 2014 elections were largely peaceful, and all major political parties accepted the results. Nidaa Tounes won a plurality of seats in the new parliament, and its founder, Caïd Essebsi, who began his career under Tunisia's first post-independence leader, Habib Bourguiba, was elected president. Al Nahda won the second-largest block of seats. Al Nahda did not run or endorse a presidential candidate, but many of its supporters appear to have voted for Caïd Essebsi's top rival, former Interim President Moncef Marzouki. The campaign rhetoric was heated, with Caïd Essebsi suggesting that Al Nahda supporters were terrorists, while Marzouki accused Caïd Essebsi of seeking to resurrect the authoritarian Ben Ali regime.¹² Although Nidaa Tounes and Al Nahda both have national constituencies, the electoral results also pointed to an enduring regional divide: Nidaa Tounes won majorities in most of the urban districts along the northern coast, while Al Nahda and Marzouki came in first in much of the poorer and more rural south and interior.

Nidaa Tounes' electoral success may be attributable to several factors, including voters' apparent desire for a stronger response to security threats, dissatisfaction with the previous Nahda-led government and, perhaps, nostalgia for greater public order pre-2011. At the same time, Nidaa Tounes exhibits internal ideological divisions, and some question whether the party can outlast its charismatic founder, who is 88 years old. Critics argue that the party lacks internal democracy, and some have questioned Nidaa Tounes leaders' commitment to security sector reform, transitional justice, and government checks-and-balances.¹³

In early 2015, after protracted negotiations, Nidaa Tounes formed a four-party coalition government that includes Al Nahda. The decision was controversial within Nidaa Tounes, with some leaders arguing that working with Al Nahda would betray their supporters. Al Nahda leader Rached Ghannouchi, who had called for a "national unity" government, praised the decision, although there were some indications of disagreement within his party as well. Within the opposition, the secularist Popular Front party holds the largest block of seats. The two politicians assassinated in 2013 were from the Popular Front. The party is more strongly leftist than Nidaa Tounes and includes prominent activists from parties that were banned under Ben Ali.

Not all Tunisian Islamists back Al Nahda, and the party's willingness to compromise may have cost it some support among more radical factions of public opinion. Some religiously conservative Tunisian Salafists,¹⁴ who have become more visible since 2011, openly support the creation of an Islamic state, and some have challenged government authorities—as well as artists, labor union activists, journalists, academics, and women deemed insufficiently modest—through protests, threats, and/or violence. A handful of Salafist groups have registered as political parties, but many appear to prefer to operate outside the formal political system. In some areas, Salafist groups reportedly control mosques and have set up security and service-provision networks.¹⁵ A crackdown on unregistered mosques was initiated under the Nahda-led government and has since continued—and intensified following the recent terrorist attacks—sparking concerns among some civil liberties advocates.

Key Figures

Nidaa Tounes Leader Mohsen Marzouk. Marzouk, 50, became secretary-general of Nidaa Tounes in May 2015 after serving as a top advisor to President Caïd Essebsi and, previously, as his campaign manager. During his brief time as a presidential advisor, he co-signed a new U.S.-Tunisia "memorandum of understanding" on bilateral relations as the counterpart to Secretary of State John Kerry. Marzouk is a veteran activist in leftist, trade union, and human rights circles, and directed the Middle East program at Freedom House between 2002 and 2008.

Tunisia has suffered its two deadliest terrorist attacks to date in 2015—an attack on the Bardo museum in downtown Tunis in March and an attack on a hotel in the coastal city of Sousse in June. These killed 24 and 38 people, respectively. Both attacks targeted tourist destinations popular with foreigners, leading some to question whether the economic impact of terrorism could undermine political stability. Following the Sousse attack in June, the Tunisian government declared a state of emergency for a renewable period of 30 days, with President Caïd Essebsi warning that "if another attack were to occur, the state would collapse."¹⁶ The state of emergency limits some civil liberties, such as public assembly, and grants security forces additional authority. The government also announced it would build a sand barrier along its entire border with Libya, with guard posts, to prevent terrorist infiltration. In late July, Tunisia's parliament approved new counterterrorism legislation granting security forces broad surveillance powers, expanding pretrial detention, and allowing the death penalty for convicted terrorists.

Tunisian political leaders across the ideological spectrum, including Al Nahda, condemned the Bardo and Sousse attacks and joined large public rallies against terrorism. Some opposition parties and civil society groups criticized the government's response, however, expressing concerns that the state of emergency could lead to authoritarian abuses.¹⁷ As noted above ("Political Transition: Key Issues"), human rights groups have criticized the new law as well.

Violent extremist groups across North and West Africa are exploiting porous borders and the weaknesses of security forces. These groups—such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), its affiliates and break-away factions, and movements calling themselves Ansar al Sharia (Supporters of Islamic Law)—are also capitalizing on divisive identity issues as well as popular frustrations with poor governance. Tunisia has not been overwhelmed by insecurity, as in neighboring Libya, but it has not been immune to these trends. Apparent competition between groups aligned with Al Qaeda and those that support the Islamic State organization could conceivably spur new efforts to carry out large-scale attacks in North Africa with the goal of enticing recruits by demonstrating organizational viability.

Several Tunisia-based extremist groups have emerged since 2011, including Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia (AST) and a group known as the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade (alt: Katibat Uqba Ibn Nafi). The latter is reportedly affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Algerian-led regional network, but elements reportedly have ties to the Islamic State. U.S. and Tunisian officials blamed AST for an attack in 2012 against the U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis, along with several other attacks. Tunisia declared AST a terrorist group in 2013, and the U.S. State Department designated it a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2014. The group's leader, known as Abou Iyadh, relocated to Libya where he was reportedly killed in a U.S. airstrike in June 2015.²¹ The Tunisian military has led operations to counter terrorist cells near the northwestern border with Algeria, reportedly in close cooperation with Algerian authorities. Insecurity along the Libyan border and in the remote desert south, both transit areas for heavily armed smugglers, is also of concern.

Some observers attribute the increase in jihadist activity since 2011 to the release of over 1,000 "political prisoners" of various stripes in early 2011 (one was Abou Iyadh, who later founded AST); security force disorganization after the revolution; and events in Mali and Libya. Jihadist groups may also draw on support from Tunisian Salafist groups and communities.²² Officials regularly claim to have broken up domestic terrorist plots, including some targeting the 2014 elections.²³ In early 2015, the Interior Ministry announced two large-scale arrests of people suspected of planning assassinations and "spectacular attacks" against government targets, but it is unclear how advanced any preparations may have been.²⁴ A French-Tunisian militant was implicated in the 2013 political assassinations, and more recently has been linked to the Islamic State.²⁵ He was reportedly a former member of a Paris-based Islamist cell which has also been tied to the January 2015 attack on the Paris newspaper Charlie Hebdo.²⁶

Tunisia is also reportedly a top source of Islamist foreign fighters in Syria and Libya, and authorities have expressed concern about those who may return to perpetuate attacks at home. A U.N. working group reported in July 2015 that there were some 4,000 Tunisians in Syria, between 1,000 and 1,500 in Libya, and smaller numbers in Iraq, Mali, and Yemen.²⁷ Tunisian officials have also claimed to have prevented several thousand more Tunisians from traveling to Syria—although they have not publicly defined criteria for preventing individuals' travel, such as whether restrictions are implemented on the basis of specific threats.

Tunisia is an upper-middle-income country, and prior to 2011 it was considered one of the best-performing non-oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Textile exports, tourism, and phosphate mining are key sectors. Tunisia also exports agricultural products and petroleum, although it is a net energy-importer. Strong annual growth prior to 2011, however, masked inequalities that fed discontent. Wealth is concentrated along the Mediterranean coast, while the interior suffers from relative poverty and a lack of investment. Many Tunisians are highly educated, but the economy has generally created low-skilled and low-paid jobs, creating a large pool that is underemployed.

Socioeconomic grievances were a key factor in the 2011 uprising, but efforts to address them have been undermined by new economic strains—attributable, in part, to investor perceptions of political instability, negative regional security trends, and the downturn in the European Union (EU), Tunisia's largest trading partner. Protests and labor disputes have also hampered efforts to attract investment. Declines in tourism and foreign direct investment have been particularly damaging, and Tunisia's international credit ratings have been downgraded. The Bardo and Sousse attacks appear to have been partly aimed at scuttling Tunisia's economic growth by targeting the vital tourism sector. As much as 15% of Tunisia's GDP may be attributable to tourism, along with 7% of total employment.²⁸ According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, "Some 1.9m tourists arrived from the start of 2015 to June 20th, 22% fewer than in the same period of 2014 and 28% fewer than in the same period of 2010, the year before the revolution."²⁹

In order to stabilize Tunisia and support its transition to democracy, international financial institutions have provided additional aid. In 2013, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Tunisia agreed to a two-year, $1.75 billion loan program, of which about $1.15 billion had been disbursed as of December 2014; it was extended in May 2015.³⁰ Additional financial support has been provided by bilateral partners, including the United States, Europe, and Gulf countries.

The EU is Tunisia's largest trading partner, and it provides trade benefits and aid. France is a leading source of investment and tourism revenues, but bilateral relations suffered in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising due to close French ties with the Ben Ali regime, as well as a distrust of Islamist political movements among many French politicians. Since 2011, Tunisian officials have appealed for increased Western financial assistance—including from the United States—while also seeking to increase ties with other Arab and African states, particularly under the Nahda-led government in 2012-2013.³²

Tunisia has generally sought cordial relations with its larger, energy-rich neighbors, Algeria and Libya. President Caïd Essebsi's first official state visit was to Algeria, where he lauded the two countries' growing counterterrorism cooperation.³³ With regard to Libya, Caïd Essebsi has expressed support for regional political mediation and opposition to external military intervention.³⁴ Turmoil in Libya is an economic concern for Tunisian officials in addition to a security concern. Previously, work opportunities in Libya helped to absorb some of Tunisia's low-skilled labor surplus, while today, in addition to bemoaning the loss of such jobs, some Tunisians blame cross-border smuggling and the large number of Libyan refugees in their country for driving up prices. Former Interim President Moncef Marzouki attempted to revitalize the Arab Maghreb Union, which includes Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, but the organization remains inactive due to tensions between Morocco and Algeria, among other factors.

Tunisians broadly sympathize with the Palestinians, and Tunisia hosted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in exile from 1982 to 1993. Tunisia had an interests office in Israel from 1996 until the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, or uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in 2000. Criticism of Israel and Israeli policies is common across Tunisia's political spectrum, although Tunisia has also annually welcomed Israeli tourists during a pilgrimage to a historic synagogue on Djerba Island. In 2012, the Nahda-led government hosted visits by senior Hamas officials.

President Obama met with newly elected Tunisian President Béji Caïd Essebsi at the White House in May 2015 and subsequently designated Tunisia as a "major non-NATO ally."³⁵ Secretary of State John Kerry and then-presidential advisor Mohsen Marzouk also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that the State Department described as "outlining how our countries plan to work together to enhance both our security and our economic cooperation."³⁶ The text of the MOU has not been made public. President Obama declared in 2014 that Tunisia's transition "continued to inspire" people in the Arab world and beyond,³⁷ and his 2015 National Security Strategy commits to "work with Tunisia to further progress on building democratic institutions and strengthening its economy."

In February 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Tunis, where he pledged "our commitment to stand with Tunisia ... to help move down this road to democracy."³⁸ Kerry also announced a new U.S.-Tunisia Strategy Dialogue, the first session of which was held in Washington in April 2014. Then-Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa, who led Tunisia's delegation, also met with President Obama at the White House. A joint statement emphasized support for "Tunisia's historic democratic transition" and cooperation on economic development, educational and cultural affairs, and security and counterterrorism.³⁹

U.S. officials have supported Tunisian efforts to attract greater foreign investment through aid, trade delegations, and negotiations under the U.S.-Tunisia bilateral trade investment framework agreement (TIFA), which was signed in 2002. The two countries also have a bilateral investment treaty and an agreement to avoid double taxation. In 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed support for a free trade agreement, but there have been few concrete steps toward achieving one.⁴⁰ Tunisia is the United States' 92^nd-largest trading partner; in 2014, U.S. exports to Tunisia totaled $831 million and U.S. imports from Tunisia totaled $521 million.⁴¹ Given limited U.S. aid resources and structural obstacles to deepening bilateral economic ties—including a language barrier, Tunisia's small domestic market, and its trade orientation toward Europe—U.S. policymakers have encouraged other partners, such as the EU, to commit resources for Tunisia.

U.S. engagement with Tunisian security forces prior to 2011 was heavily focused on conventional military grants and sales. As terrorist threats have increased, and as the relationship between Tunisia's government and its security services continues to evolve, the United States has provided new types of security assistance to support counterterrorism and reforms. Tunisian officials have welcomed increased U.S. engagement, but the potential presence of U.S. military personnel, including for training activities, is politically sensitive.⁴² Tunisia cooperates with NATO's Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counterterrorism surveillance in the Mediterranean; participates in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue; and allows NATO ships to make port calls.

The attack on the U.S. embassy and American school in September 2012 appeared to lead to a temporary cooling of relations, and U.S. officials criticized the Nahda-led interim government's handling of the investigation and prosecution of suspects.⁴³ The State Department's decision to lift a travel warning in 2014, ahead of then-Prime Minister Jomaa's visit, appeared to signal increased confidence.

U.S.-Tunisian relations date back over 200 years. Tunisia was also the site of significant World War II battles, and a U.S. cemetery and memorial in Carthage (outside Tunis) holds nearly 3,000 U.S. military dead. During the Cold War, Tunisia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, despite an experiment with leftist economic policy in the 1960s. Still, U.S.-Tunisian ties were strained by the 1985 Israeli bombing of the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, which some Tunisians viewed as having been carried out with U.S. approval.⁴⁴

Tunisia was not a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance prior to 2011, but U.S. aid and defense cooperation have grown significantly since then. In total, the Administration, with congressional agreement, allocated about $580 million in aid between FY2011 and FY2014 (Table 1, below), equivalent to ten times the bilateral funding appropriated for Tunisia over the prior four fiscal years.⁴⁵ The Administration has signaled a desire to further increase aid in the wake of Tunisia's 2014 elections, and has requested $134 million in bilateral funding in FY2016—more than twice the FY2015 request. Some 60% would be for State Department-administered security assistance—a slightly higher proportion than the FY2015 request or FY2014 allocation, and proportionately much higher than FY2011-2013.

U.S. economic aid since 2011 has included at least $60 million for a U.S.-Tunisia "Enterprise Fund" intended to boost economic growth by investing in local firms,⁴⁶ as well as $79 million for the cost of two sovereign loan guarantees that allowed Tunisia to borrow (at a more favorable interest rate) $485 million in 2012 and $500 million in 2014 on the international debt market. In May 2015, the Administration stated that it was "prepared to consider" a third loan guarantee supporting up to $500 million in borrowing "to advance the Government of Tunisia's ongoing reform program."⁴⁷ Administration officials have encouraged increased U.S.-Tunisia trade and investment, while urging economic reforms.⁴⁸ The United States has also supported economic aid through multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Development Bank (AfDB), and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), all of which receive U.S. financing.

U.S. security assistance seeks to bolster Tunisia's counterterrorism capabilities and also to support institutional reforms, including within the opaque internal security services. At least $58 million in State Department-administered International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds have been allocated since 2011 for police and justice-sector reform programs. Tunisia is also one of six focus countries of the Administration's "Security Governance Initiative" (SGI), announced during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014.⁴⁹

$ millions, estimated allocations as of January 2015

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013

FY2014

FY2015 (req./est.)

FY2016 (req.)

Subtotal, Bilateral Aid

81.48

134.40 requested

of which, ESF

57.85

55.00

of which, FMF

17.12

62.50

of which, IMET

1.95

2.30

of which, INCLE

1.50

12.00

of which, NADR

3.06

2.60

Defense Department "Section 1206" global train & equip

13.03

Other (State & USAID regional, global, and centrally-managed economic and humanitarian assistance; multiple accounts)

44.12

TOTAL

138.62

251.92

125.06

63.48

134.40

Source: State Department, Bureau of Foreign Assistance, response to CRS query, February 2015; and State Department, FY2016 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 3.

a. Includes funding reprogrammed for Tunisia after being appropriated for other countries and/or purposes.

The Administration has announced plans to provide Tunisia with substantial new counterterrorism assistance in FY2015 and FY2016 through regional and global programs, including under the Defense Department's global train-and-equip authority, Section 2282 (previously, Section 1206).⁵⁰ The Defense Department has notified Congress of its intent to provide at least $68 million in equipment and training under Section 2282 in FY2015, of which $13.7 million would be funded through the new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF).⁵¹ Such aid is in addition to the bilateral funding requested specifically for Tunisia, referenced above.

In 2014, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to agree to sell Tunisia defense articles and services worth an estimated $700 million, including 12 Black Hawk helicopters, through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Tunisia has also purchased at least two U.S.-made C-130J military transport aircraft in recent years.⁵²

H.R. 2772, the FY2016 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill, would authorize additional Economic Support Fund (ESF) for the cost of additional loan guarantees for Tunisia. The report accompanying H.R. 2772 (H.Rept. 114-154) recommends the appropriation of $134 million in aid for Tunisia, which is the same as the Administration's request. The report accompanying the Senate version of the FY2016 foreign aid appropriations bill (S.Rept. 114-79, accompanying S. 1725), would provide substantially lower budget authority for several types of bilateral aid to Tunisia than the Administration has requested. The relevant accounts include ESF, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE). The report recommends, for ESF and INCLE, that the Administration add to the FY2016 appropriation by reprogramming existing funds for Tunisia, particularly monies that would have been spent in Yemen.

Congress authorized funding for loan guarantees and the creation of the Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund in the FY2012 Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Division I of P.L. 112-74).⁵³ Congress made new funds available for loan guarantees and the enterprise fund in the FY2015 and FY2014 foreign aid appropriations acts (§7034 [r], Division J of P.L. 113-235; and §7041[g], Division K of P.L. 113-76, respectively). The explanatory statement accompanying the FY2015 act, P.L. 113-235, specified $30 million in ESF budget authority for Tunisia, the same as the Administration's FY2015 request.⁵⁴

The FY2014 Department of State, Foreign Operations, And Related Programs Appropriations Act (Division K of P.L. 113-76) prohibited any foreign assistance from being used to support a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) "threshold" program in a country that is not a candidate for a full MCC compact. The Administration had planned a roughly $20 million MCC threshold grant for Tunisia that was to focus on addressing constraints to economic growth and job creation.⁵⁵ However, Tunisia's relatively high income level renders it ineligible for a compact.⁵⁶ The Joint Explanatory Statement on P.L. 113-76 referred explicitly to Tunisia, stating that, "Efforts by the Administration to provide MCC assistance to countries that do not meet MCC criteria undermine the integrity of the MCC model."

Tunisia has peacefully achieved many milestones since 2011, prompting observers to portray it as the lone success story of the "Arab Spring." Internal political tensions, socioeconomic pressures, terrorist threats, and regional dynamics are nonetheless likely to pose ongoing challenges. Despite a relative lack of conflict, Tunisia remains a potential locus of regional struggles among rival political ideologies, and among violent extremist groups vying for prominence and recruits. Key questions include whether Tunisia's new elected government is likely to remain cohesive, and whether it will effectively respond to terrorist threats, advance political and economic reforms, foster civil liberties, and satisfy popular demands for quality-of-life improvements. Tunisian leaders have welcomed U.S. assistance since 2011, but the local appetite for outside policy influence, now that the transitional period is formally over, remains to be seen.

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