Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
February 6, 2024
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for

conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend
Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western

Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks
from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The number of BMD-capable Aegis ships has been growing over time. MDA’s
FY2024 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2024, there will be 53 total BMD capable [Aegis] ships requiring
maintenance support.” MDA testified on December 7, 2023, that the number of BMD-capable ships on that date was 49, and
that under MDA’s FY2024 budget submission, the number is to grow to 56 by FY2025 and 69 by FY2030.
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for
BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2024 budget requests a total of $1,747.2 million (i.e., about $1.7 billion) in
procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in
Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon)
funding for the Aegis BMD program.
Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:
• whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding
requests for the program;
• the adequacy of MDA’s cost estimating and its reporting of costs;
• what role the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. homeland against attack from
ICBMs;
• required versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships;
• the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, and whether there are
alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing
additional Aegis Ashore sites;
• allied burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to
U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations;
• whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site;
• the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations
and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles;
and
• deliveries, testing, and technical risk in the Aegis BMD program.

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Aegis Ships ............................................................................................................................... 1
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers ........................................................................ 1
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers .............................................................. 1
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies .............................................................................................. 2
Aegis BMD System................................................................................................................... 2
Versions and Capabilities of Aegis BMD System ............................................................... 2
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles ........................................................................................ 3
Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships ................................................................................... 5
BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers Forward-Homeported in Spain ............................................. 6
Aegis Ashore Sites .................................................................................................................... 7
Two Navy-Operated Sites in Romania and Poland ............................................................. 7
Navy Interest in Divesting Aegis Ashore Sites It Operates................................................. 8
Japan Planned and Later Canceled Two Sites ..................................................................... 9
Use of Aegis BMD Elements in Guam Missile Defense Architecture ...................................... 9
Aegis BMD Development Philosophy and Flight Tests .......................................................... 10
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program ........................................................ 11
Japan .................................................................................................................................. 11
South Korea ...................................................................................................................... 12
Other Countries ................................................................................................................. 12

FY2024-FY2028 MDA Procurement and R&D Funding ....................................................... 12
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 13
Annual Funding Request ......................................................................................................... 13
Estimating and Reporting Costs .............................................................................................. 13
Potential for Intercepting ICBMs ............................................................................................ 13
Required vs. Available Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships ............................................ 17
Burden of BMD Mission on U.S. Navy Aegis Ships .............................................................. 17
Allied Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. Allied Contributions to Regional BMD Capabilities........... 20
Conversion of Hawaii Aegis Test Site ..................................................................................... 21
Potential Contribution from Lasers ......................................................................................... 22
Program Deliveries, Testing, and Technical Risk .................................................................... 22

May 2023 GAO Report ..................................................................................................... 22
January 2024 DOT&E Report .......................................................................................... 25
Legislative Activity for FY2024 .................................................................................................... 25
Summary of Action on FY2024 MDA Funding Request ........................................................ 25
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226) ........................................ 26
House ................................................................................................................................ 26
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 26
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 27
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587) ......................................................... 27
House ................................................................................................................................ 27
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 27


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Figures
Figure 1. GAO Summary of Capabilities of Aegis BMD System Variants ..................................... 3

Tables
Table 1. FY2024-FY2028 MDA Procurement and R&D Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts .......... 12
Table 2. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 MDA Funding Request ......................... 26

Table A-1. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests From January 2002 to the Present ........................ 28

Appendixes
Appendix. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests ............................................................................... 28

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 31

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Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic
missile defense (BMD) program, a program carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
and the Navy that gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD
operations. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of
Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program.
Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD
capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base.
Background
Aegis Ships
All but three of the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are
equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers,
software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that
defended Zeus. (The exceptions are the Navy’s three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers,
which are discussed below.) The Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for
defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and
subsurface threats. The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated
many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers
A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and
FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs
47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged
by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005,
leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73). Retirements of these 22 ships began in
FY2022. The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission projects that 13 will remain in service at the end
of FY2023, and proposes that these 13 ships be retired in FY2024 (five ships), FY2025 (three
ships), FY2026 (three ships), and FY2027 (two ships).
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers
The Navy began procuring DDG-51s in FY1985, and a total of 92 have been procured through
FY2023. The first DDG-51 entered service in 1991, and a total of 74 have been delivered as of
August 2023. Under the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, retirements of older DG-51s are to
begin in FY2028.
The DDG-51 design has been updated multiple times over the years. The first 28 DDG-51s are
known as Flight I/II DDG-51s. The next 34, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some
significant design changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar. The version currently
being procured, called the Flight III DDG-51 design, incorporates another significant change—a
new radar, called the SPY 6 radar (and prior to that, the Air and Missile Defense Radar, or
AMDR), that is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on CG-47s and earlier DDG-51s.
No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured
the three above-mentioned Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does
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not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy
plans do not call for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.1
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies
Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now
operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Spain, and Norway.2 Japan’s Aegis-equipped ships are BMD-capable. The Aegis-
equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are currently not BMD-
capable.
Aegis BMD System3
Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to
the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor
missiles. Older Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s
procured in FY2010 and subsequent years have been built from the start with a BMD capability.
Versions and Capabilities of Aegis BMD System
Overview
The Aegis BMD system exists in multiple variants whose ascending numerical designations
indicate ascending levels of capability. As part of MDA’s FY2022 budget submission, the
designations of Aegis BMD system variants were changed and consolidated to 4.X, 5.X, and 6.X,
with the X indicating multiple subvariants. (The 4.X variant, for example, includes the 4.1 and
4.2 subvariants.4)
BMD system variants correlate with certain versions (i.e., baselines, or BLs) of the overall Aegis
system, which have their own numbering system. The more recent BMD variants, in addition to
being able to address more challenging BMD scenarios, give BMD-equipped ships a capability to
simultaneously perform both BMD operations against ballistic missiles and anti-air warfare
(AAW) operations (aka air-defense operations) against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles.
Figure 1 provides a 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) summary of the capabilities
of the more recent BMD variants and their correlation to Aegis system baselines as of 2019.
Because Figure 1 was prepared in 2019, it uses the older designations for Aegis BMD system
variants, rather than the new designations that were introduced as part of the MDA’s FY2022
budget submission.
The Aegis BMD system was originally designed primarily to intercept theater-range ballistic
missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs,
and IRBMs, respectively). In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range ballistic

1 For more on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000
Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version
of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar.
3 Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to
CRS and CBO analysts on the MDA’s FY2023 and prior-year budget submissions.
4 The 4.X variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 3.6.X, 4.0.X, 4.1, and 4.2. The 5.X
variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 5.0CU (with the CU standing for Capability
Upgrade) and 5.1. The 6.X variant is the new designation for the variant previously designated 6.0.
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missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system’s radar might be passed
to other U.S. BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U.S. BMD
systems.
Figure 1. GAO Summary of Capabilities of Aegis BMD System Variants

Source: Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Delivery Delays Provide Opportunity for Increased
Testing to Better Understand Capability
, GAO-19-387, June 2019, Table 5 on p. 31.
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles
The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard5 Missile-3 (SM-3) and the
SM-6.
SM-3 Midcourse Interceptor
The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric
intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit-
to-kill” warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead

5 The Standard Missile is so named because it was originally developed, decades ago, as a surface-to-air (i.e., air
defense) missile to serve as the common (i.e., standard) successor to the Navy’s then-existing collection of Talos,
Terrier, and Tartar air defense missiles, which were sometimes referred to collectively as the 3-T missiles.
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by colliding with it. The current versions of the SM-3 missile include the SM-3 Block IA, the
SM-3 Block IB, and the SM-3 Block IIA.6
Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target
seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting
its course. Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster
stage at the bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block
IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform
21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout
velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater
than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The
United States and Japan cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version,
with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.7
A March 31, 2020, press report stated
Raytheon and the Missile Defense Agency are exploring options to extend the range of the
Standard Missile-3 Block IB—pushing the ballistic missile interceptor to dramatically
expand a defended area by allowing the weapon to communicate with off-board radars—a
move that would require enhancing one of the Aegis ballistic missile defense system’s
newest features: Engage-on-Remote….
MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill told Congress earlier this month that the new Engage-
on-Remote capability provides “a seven-fold increase in missile defense coverage when
compared to an autonomous Aegis platform.”8
SM-6 Terminal Interceptor (Overview)
The SM-2 Block IV was MDA’s and the Navy’s initial sea-based terminal-phase (SBT) BMD
interceptor. It was designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo-
atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It was
equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead. A limited number of these missiles were produced
years ago.9 The SM-2 Block IV has now been replaced by the SM-6.
The SM-6 is MDA’s and the Navy’s more capable next-generation SBT BMD interceptor. It is
based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the Navy’s successor to the SM-2 air defense missile).
The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used for either air defense (i.e., countering
aircraft and ASCMs) or ballistic missile defense. A July 23, 2018, press report states the
following:
The Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramatically
increase the speed and range of the Navy’s Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket

6 MDA and Navy plans at one point called for the SM-3 Block IIA to be succeeded by a still-more-capable interceptor
called the SM-3 Block IIB. The effort to develop that missile, however, was ended years ago, and MDA at the time was
reportedly not pursuing any follow-on capabilities to the SM-3 Block IIA. (See, for example, Justin Doubleday,
“Missile Defense Agency Not Pursuing Follow-On to SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor,” Inside the Navy, October 24,
2016.)
7 The cooperative research effort was carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999. The
effort focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the second-stage
propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone.
8 Jason Sherman, “After MDA Demonstrates 7x Increase in Defended Area, Raytheon Pitching EOR for Older SM-3s,”
Inside Defense, March 31, 2020.
9 The inventory of SM-2 Block IVs was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and
ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and at least 3 were used in BMD flight tests through February
2012.
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motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and
defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system.
On Jan. 17 [2018], the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with
a 21-inch diameter for the SM-6, which is currently fielded with a 13.5-inch propulsion
package. The new rocket motor would sit atop the current 21-inch booster, producing a
new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB.10
SM-6 Terminal Interceptor (Hypersonic Threat Intercept Capability)
MDA and the Navy are developing a capability for the SM-6 to intercept hypersonic missiles.
MDA testified in December 2023 that
Today, the SM-6, which uses a blast fragmentation kill mechanism, is the only interceptor
available for a limited defense against hypersonic missile threats….
MDA is working closely with the Navy to develop, field, and upgrade SBT defenses to
counter more advanced maneuvering and hypersonic threats. SBT Inc 2 is deployed. MDA
is analyzing the evasion maneuvers that hypersonic weapons may perform and addressing
them in Aegis SBT Inc 3. SBT Inc 3 upgrade and delivery are in 2025 and include terminal
defense capability against hypersonic threats. MDA will conduct flight tests against
advanced threat-representative targets in FY 2024 and FY 2025….
Additionally, MDA is working closely with the Navy to develop, field, and upgrade SBT
defenses to counter more advanced maneuvering and hypersonic threats. We anticipate
delivering these SBT Inc 3 capabilities in 2025. We are also engaged in a competitive
development effort to significantly enhance hypersonic missile defense capabilities. MDA
is developing a layered defense capability against regional hypersonic threats and have
initiated a development program for Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) to defend the sea-base
and regional forces ashore, leveraging existing systems where possible, including proven
engage-on-remote and launch-on-remote capabilities. Layered defenses provide more
opportunities to engage and potentially neutralize hypersonic threats in-flight. We are
focusing on the proven Aegis Weapon System to provide the depth-of-fire needed for a
layered defense against hypersonic threats. Today, MDA is funding technology maturation
of two GPI concepts on the path to preliminary design.
The Aegis Sea-Based GPI, planned for delivery in 2034, includes the ability to plan, detect,
track, and defeat threats, and support integrated layered multiple engagement
opportunities. GPI is developing a missile and updates to the existing Aegis Weapon
System to counter hypersonic threats. The GPI interceptor will be hypersonic, multistage,
and compatible with the Navy’s MK-41 Vertical Launch System. MDA also is pursuing a
Cooperative Development of the GPI Interceptor with the Japan Ministry of Defense. This
project will focus on interceptor updates, and the United States will be responsible for the
overall missile system design and integration. Japan will fund and develop all Japan
workshare elements (to include rocket motor assemblies and control systems).11
Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
The number of BMD-capable Aegis ships has been growing over time. MDA’s FY2024 budget
submission states that “by the end of FY 2024, there will be 53 total BMD capable [Aegis] ships

10 Jason Sherman, “Navy Looking to Increase Range, Speed of SM-6 with Larger Rocket Motor,” Inside the Navy, July
23, 2018.
11 [Statement of] Rear Admiral Douglas L. Williams, USN, Director (Acting), Missile Defense Agency, Before the
House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, December 7, 2023, [hearing on] Demand for
Theater Missile Defense Assets, pp. 4, 6, 7-8.
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requiring maintenance support.”12 MDA testified on December 7, 2023, that the number of BMD-
capable ships on that date was 49, and that under MDA’s FY2024 budget submission, the number
is to grow to 56 by FY2025 and 69 by FY2030.13
BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers Forward-Homeported in Spain
On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that four BMD-
capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers were to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at the naval base
at Rota, Spain.14 The initial set of four ships was transferred to Rota in FY2014 and FY2015.15
They were replaced at Rota by a new set of four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in
2020-2022.16
Navy officials said the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in the
Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be
provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U.S. east coast, thus
effectively releasing about six U.S. Navy BMD-capable Aegis ships for performing BMD patrols
or other missions elsewhere.
In February and March 2020, DOD officials testified that DOD was considering forward-
homeporting an additional two BMD-capable Aegis destroyers at Rota, which would make for a
total of six destroyers at the site.17 Navy officials testified in 2020 that they supported the idea.18
On June 28, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that two additional Aegis destroyers
would be homeported at Rota.19 The Navy confirmed that the two additional Aegis destroyers are

12 Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, March 2023, p. 11. (This is
the FY2024 budget justification book for MDA’s portion of the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide
appropriation account.)
13 [Statement of] Rear Admiral Douglas L. Williams, USN, Director (Acting), Missile Defense Agency, Before the
House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, December 7, 2023, [hearing on] Demand for
Theater Missile Defense Assets, pp. 2, 6.
14 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
May 18, 2022, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/
web/20120117065346/http:/www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65 miles northwest of
the Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have been homeported at Rota at various points
in the past, most recently (prior to the current arrangement) in 1979. (Source: Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-
Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.)
15 The four ships were the destroyers Ross (DDG-71) and Donald Cook (DDG-75), which moved to Rota in FY2014,
and the destroyers Carney (DDG-64) and Porter (DDG-78), which moved to Rota in FY2015.
16 See, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “USS Arleigh Burke Arrives in Spain, USS Donald Cook Will Head to
Mayport,” USNI News, April 12, 2021.
17 See, for example, Paul McCleary, “EUCOM Calls For Two More Ships For Spanish Port,” Breaking Defense,
February 25, 2020; David B. Larter, “Push to Base Six US Navy Destroyers in Spain Could Be Gaining Steam,”
Defense News, March 3, 2020.
18 See, for example, David B. Larter, “The US Navy’s Top Officer Declares Support for Basing 6 Destroyers in Spain,”
Defense News, March 5, 2020. See also John Vandiver, “Rota to Gain Two US Destroyers by Middle of the Decade,
EUCOM Chief Says,” Stars and Stripes, April 15, 2021.
19 White House, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan En
Route Madrid, Spain,” June 28, 2022. See also Mallory Shelbourne, “Biden Administration Basing Two More
Destroyers in Rota, Spain,” USNI News, June 28 (updated June 29), 2022; Justin Katz, “‘A Powerful Signal:’ What It
Means to Send Two More DDGs to Spain,” Breaking Defense, July 1, 2022; Aaron Mehta, “US Increasing Troop
Presence in Europe, While New NATO Strategy Eyes China,” Breaking Defense, June 29, 2022; Geoff Ziezulewicz
(Associated Press), “Two More Navy Destroyers Will Be Homeported in Rota, Spain,” Navy Times, June 29, 2022.
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to be BMD-capable.20 An October 24, 2022, press report stated that “the U.S. and Spain will soon
launch negotiations on a new defense pact for an expanded naval presence in Spain,” including
the two additional BMD-capable Aegis destroyers. The report stated that “while an official
timeline for the ships’ arrival in Spain hasn’t been set, U.S. military commanders have put 2025
or 2026 as target years.”21 On May 8, 2023, Spain and the United States reportedly signed the
new agreement.22
Aegis Ashore Sites
Two Navy-Operated Sites in Romania and Poland
The land-based version of the Aegis BMD system is called Aegis Ashore. There are two Aegis
Ashore sites in Europe—one in Romania, and one in Poland. The sites are intended to help
defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran. Each Aegis Ashore site
includes a structure housing an Aegis system that is similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship,
and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the
VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships.23
The plan to establish the two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland was announced in 2009,
as part of a plan for providing regional BMD defense in Europe called the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Aegis Ashore site in Romania achieved operational certification
in May 2016.24 The site in Poland began construction in May 201625 and was initially scheduled
to be completed in 2018. Its completion, however, was delayed for years by construction
contractor performance issues.26 At a December 7, 2023, hearing on regional missile defense
assets before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Rear
Admiral Douglas L. Williams, the acting director of MDA, testified that
Aegis Ashore Poland, located in Redzikowo, was added to the Operational Capability
Baseline in September 2023 with upgrades over the original design and state-of-the-art
Integrated Electronic Security System. Aegis Ashore Poland was delivered to the U.S.
Navy on October 1, 2023 for operational use and maintenance. The Navy will formally
accept Aegis Ashore Poland into their inventory on December 15, 2023. This will complete
EPAA Phase 3, originally established in 2009. The Navy will install additional upgrades

20 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs email to CRS, July 1, 2022.
21 John Vandiver, “Talks on Addition of 2 Navy Destroyers at Base in Spain Expected to Start Soon,” Stars and
Stripes
, October 24, 2022.
22 Heather Mongilio, “U.S., Spain Agree to Host Two More Warships in Rota,” USNI News, May 9, 2023.
23 For additional discussion of the Aegis Ashore sites, see Edward Lundquist, “Aegis Ashore Adapts Sea-Based Missile
Defense System to Protect Europe,” National Defense, September 2016.
24 See, for example, Amy Forsythe, “U.S. Navy Aegis Ashore Base in Romania Hosts NATO Country Ambassadors,”
Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), November 19, 2019; “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense
Advocacy Alliance, accessed May 18, 2022, at https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/aegis-ashore/; US
Naval Forces Europe-Africa, “Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS)-Romania Operationally Certified,”
Defense-Aerospace.com, May 12, 2016.
25 See, for example, “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, accessed May 18, 2022, at
https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/aegis-ashore/.
26 Source: [Statement of] Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 18, 2022, p. 8. Earlier reporting said construction of the
Poland site would be complete by the end of 2022. See, for example, Rich Abott, “Aegis Ashore Poland Set To Be
Operational By End Of 2022,” Defense Daily, November 22, 2021; Jen Judson, “Construction of Aegis Ashore in
Poland Nearing Completion,” Defense News, March 9, 2022. See also Daniel Wasserbly, “US MDA Plans to Turn On
Polish Aegis Ashore Site in June, After Years of Delay,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 24, 2022.
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at Aegis Ashore Poland through May 2024, after which it will transfer to NATO in July
2024 for command and control of Aegis Ashore Poland in the defense of NATO European
states against ballistic missile threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic area.27
Navy Interest in Divesting Aegis Ashore Sites It Operates
On January 11, 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Gilday, released a
guidance document for the Navy entitled CNO NavPlan (with NavPlan being short for navigation
plan) that states
To remain ahead of our competitors, we will divest ourselves of legacy capabilities that no
longer bring sufficient lethality to the fight. This includes divestment of experimental
Littoral Combat Ship hulls, legacy Cruisers, and older Dock Landing Ships. It also includes
divesting non-core Navy missions like Aegis-ashore. Transferring shore-based Ballistic
Missile Defense sites to ground forces enables Sailors to focus on their core missions at
sea and frees up resources to increase our lethality.28
A January 12, 2021, press report states
The chief of naval operation’s new call to focus on sea control and power projection could
lead the service to shed other non-core missions the Navy conducts today, such as manning
Aegis Ashore missile defense sites.
The biggest problem is, no one else has agreed to take over that mission yet….
… no one else operates Aegis systems today, and no one has yet agreed to take over Aegis
Ashore, Rear Adm. Paul Schlise, the director of surface warfare on the CNO’s staff
(OPNAV N96), said today during a panel presentation at the Surface Navy Association’s
annual symposium.
“It’s been an ongoing discussion in the building here. Right now we’ve got the Aegis
Ashore sites in Europe, and there’s discussions about potentially more sites in other places.
The general discussion has been, this is not a core Navy mission. Sailors really belong at
sea serving in ships. And we’ve got a good number of highly qualified folks serving in
those sites, they’re going a great job,” he said.
“But I think what the CNO teed up is, is this a core Navy mission? I don’t think it is. And
so there’s been some discussion with the Army. The Army, of course, has some missile
defense capability and of course great soldiers that serve in those roles. But they don’t have
any experience with that [Aegis Combat System], the systems that have been installed or
are in progress in Romania and Poland. So that’s been a running discussion.”
Schlise said the discussion is taking place at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level.
Without any final decisions, though, the Navy could not shed Aegis Ashore spending in its
most recent budgeting work, the Fiscal Year 2022 request that will come out after the Biden
administration comes in and can review it.
“For the purposes of this past budget cycle, it was just kind of tabled. So we’ll have to see
where that discussion goes. As always, here in the building, it’s about money. So if that
transition were to be considered and approved for moving forward, to transition it to

27 [Statement of] Rear Admiral Douglas L. Williams, USN, Director (Acting), Missile Defense Agency, Before the
House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, December 7, 2023, [on] Demand for Theater
Missile Defense Assets, pp. 3-4. See also Jason Sherman, “After ‘Grossly Unacceptable Delay,’ Aegis Ashore Poland
Set for Navy Inventory, Maintenance,” Inside Defense, December 7, 2023; Joseph Trevithick, “Aegis Missile Defense
Site In Poland To Finally Go Operational (Updated),” The Drive, December 7, 2023.
28 U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, CNO NavPlan, January 2021, p. 10. See also Richard R. Burgess, “CNO:
Divest Aegis Ashore Sites to Ground Forces,” Seapower, January 11, 2021.
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another service, ‘who’s going to pay’ will of course be part of the discussion,” Schlise
said.29
Japan Planned and Later Canceled Two Sites
Prior to June 2020, Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems.30 The
two systems reportedly were to have been equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar called the
Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that is
being installed on U.S. Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly were to go into operation by
2023.31 On June 15, 2020, however, Japan announced that it had suspended implementation of its
Aegis Ashore initiative due to cost growth and technical concerns.32 On June 25, 2020, Japan
confirmed that it had canceled the plan for deploying the two Aegis Ashore sites. Rather than
building the two Aegis Ashore systems, Japan now plans to instead build two additional BMD-
capable Aegis ships.33 A June 23, 2023, press report stated that once the two additional BMD-
capable Aegis ships go into service, Japan’s other eight BMD-capable destroyers will revert to
anti-air-warfare (AAW) operations.34
Use of Aegis BMD Elements in Guam Missile Defense Architecture
After studying various possible BMD system architectures for Guam, DOD proposed a system
combining elements of the Aegis BMD system with elements of Army BMD systems. A March
30, 2022, press report states
The Missile Defense Agency’s initial plan for the architecture to protect Guam turns to
proven systems to help the agency meet a 2026 fielding deadline, according Vice Adm.
Jon Hill, the agency’s director.
The defense of Guam from potential ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missile attacks has
become a priority for the MDA, which is seeking $539 million in fiscal 2023 to continue
to design and develop multiple-land based radar systems, procure weapon system
components and initiate military construction planning and design activity.
“Current forces are capable of defending Guam against today’s North Korean ballistic
missile threats,” Dee Dee Martinez, the MDA’s comptroller said in a March 28 Pentagon

29 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Wants to Shed Aegis Ashore Mission, But Army Still Hasn’t Agreed to Take It,” USNI
News
, January 12, 2021.
30 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Akita, Yamaguchi to Get Aegis Ashore/GSDF Involvement Expected to Strengthen Missile
Defense,” The Japan News, November 11, 2017. See also Kyodo, “Japan Mulling News Missile Interceptor
Deployment to Guard Against North Korea,” South China Morning Post, November 11, 2017.
31 Anthony Capaccio, “Japan in Talks With U.S. on Buying Aegis Missile Defense,” Bloomberg, November 7, 2017.
32 See, for example, Rich Abott, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Due To Technical And Cost Concerns,” Defense Daily,
June 15, 2020; Sam LaGrone, “Japan Backing Away From Aegis Ashore,” USNI News, June 15, 2020; Mari
Yamaguchi, “Japan to Scrap Costly Land-Based US Missile Defense System,” Associated Press, June 15, 2020; Mike
Yeo, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Deployment, Pointing to Cost and Technical Issues,” Defense News, June 15,
2020; Brad Glosserman, “Canceling Aegis Ashore Raises Problems—and Hopes,” Japan Times, June 17, 2020.
Prior to the June 15, 2020, announcement, Japan had announced in early May that it would evaluate alternatives to the
Akita Prefecture site due to strong local opposition to that site. (Masaya Kato, “Japan’s Missile Shield Deployment
Scuppered by Local Resistance,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 7, 2020.)
33 See, for example, Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Japan Locks in Funding for 2 New Aegis Destroyers,” USNI News, December
20, 2023; Thomas Newdick, “Japan’s Missile Defense Ships Will Now Be Multi-Role, Cruiser-Like,” The Drive,
August 31, 2023; Yoshihiro Inaba, “Japan’s New ASEV Ships Will Boast An Impressive 128 VLS Cells,” Naval News,
June 3, 2023.
34 Ridzwan Rahmat, “Japan to Revert Aegis Destroyers for Air-Defence Roles Once BMD Ships Come Online,” Janes
Defence Weekly
, June 23, 2023.
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budget briefing. “However, the regional threat to Guam, including from China, continues
to rapidly evolve.”...
The architecture will not be a fixed missile defense site like Aegis Ashore in Romania and
Poland, Hill said. “Think of it as a distributed system.” He added that the agency is
interested in using mobile launchers.
The architecture will include Navy SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, the Patriot air-and-missile
defense system and the Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD).
A THAAD battery has been operating on Guam since 2013.
Those elements will be connected through the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System,
a command-and control-system that connects sensors and shooters on the battlefield. The
agency will also use the Aegis weapon system’s fire control capability, Hill said.
“Patriot [has] a fabulous capability for cruise missile defense, and that’s our first focus
area,” Hill said. “And we have the ability within Aegis to enable that, but, right now, we
are doing ballistic missiles, hypersonic, on the Aegis part of that overall integrated
architecture and then the cruise missile piece will be with the Army systems.”
While MDA is focused on using existing technology to make up the architecture, it will
consider new technology, including the Mid-Range Capability missile the Army will field
in FY23, as it becomes available, according to Hill....
“That topology of the island … it is a tough place,” Hill said. “An Aegis Ashore site is
limited in what it can do because of the the rise and the fall of the hills, you got radar, it’s
not a flat earth, and it’s certainly not flat on Guam, so we’ve done some really incredible
work and analysis over the last couple years ... by dispersing the systems and making sure
everything’s networked.”35
Aegis BMD Development Philosophy and Flight Tests
The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as
following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of “build a little,
test a little, learn a lot,” meaning that development is done in manageable steps, with each step
being tested and validated before moving on to the next step.36 For a summary of reported Aegis
BMD flight tests since 2002, see Table A-1 in the Appendix.

35 Jen Judson, “MDA’s Plan to Protect Guam Relies on Field-Proven Systems,” Defense News, March 30, 2022. See
also Robert Peters, The Plan to Defend Guam from Missile Threats Is Years from Completion: More Investment Is
Needed Now
, Heritage Foundation, January 9, 2024, 7 pp.; Jason Sherman, “OMB Reveals Land-Based VLS Also Part
of New Guam Missile Defense Architecture,” Inside Defense, July 13, 2022; Rich Abott, “MDA Decides On Guam
Defense Architecture,” Defense Daily, March 29, 2022; Jason Sherman, “DOD Picks SPY-7 for Land-Based Aegis,
Giving Lockheed First U.S. Customer for New Radar,” Inside Defense, May 6, 2022.
36 See, for example, “Aegis BMD: “Build a Little, Test a Little, Learn a Lot,” USNI blog, March 15, 2010, accessed
May 18, 2022, at http://blog.usni.org/2010/03/15/aegis-bmd-build-a-little-test-a-little-learn-a-lot, and “Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall Institute, RADM Alan B.
Hicks, USN, Aegis BMD Program Director, August 3, 2009, slide 16 of 20, entitled “Some of our Philosophies In a
Nutshell (1 of 2),” accessed May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/web/20100706133017/https:/www.marshall.org/
pdf/materials/743.pdf.
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Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program
Japan
Eight BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers
Japan operates eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers—the eighth was commissioned into service
in March 2021.37 As mentioned above, rather than building two Aegis Ashore systems, Japan now
plans to instead build two additional BMD-capable Aegis ships. As also mentioned above, a June
23, 2023, press report stated that once the two additional BMD-capable Aegis ships go into
service, Japan’s other eight BMD-capable destroyers will revert to anti-air-warfare (AAW)
operations.38 As also mentioned above, Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in
some of the flight tests of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (see Table A-1 in
Appendix).39
Cooperative Development of SM-3 Block IIA Missile
As mentioned earlier, Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block
IIA missile. Japan developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of
those technologies, reducing the missile’s development costs for the United States. A July 6,
2018, press report states that “the U.S. and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation
radar technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection
range of the Aegis missile defense system.”40

37 See, for example, Xavier Vavasseur, “Japan Commissions New Maya-Class AEGIS Destroyer JS Haguro はぐろ
DDG-180,” Naval News, March 19, 2021; Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan Commissions 8th Aegis Destroyer Haguro,” Japan
News
, March 20, 2021.
38 Ridzwan Rahmat, “Japan to Revert Aegis Destroyers for Air-Defence Roles Once BMD Ships Come Online,” Janes
Defence Weekly
, June 23, 2023.
39 Mari Yamaguchi (Associated Press), “Japan Confirms It’s Scrapping US Missile Defense System,” Defense News,
June 25, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Japan Officially Ends Aegis Ashore Plans After National Security Council
Deliberations,” USNI News, June 26, 2020.
See also Grant Newsham “Abe’s Aegis Ashore Cancellation Doesn’t Add Up,” Asia Times, June 30, 2020; Lucy Craft,
“Why Japan Scrapped a $4 Billion Missile Defense Purchase from the U.S.,” CBS News, July 2, 2020; Tim Kelly,
“Explainer: Strike Capability, Other Military Options on Table after Japan’s Aegis U-Turn,” Reuters, July 2, 2020;
Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan Is Canceling a U.S. Missile Defense System,” Foreign Policy, July 2, 2020; Bruce
Klingner, “Japan Undercuts Its Defense Against North Korean Missiles,” Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2020; Tim
Kelly and Yoshifumi Takemoto, “Exclusive: As Japan Weighs Missile-Defence Options, Raytheon Lobbies for
Lockheed’s $300 Million Radar Deal,” Reuters, July 30, 2020; Rieko Miki, “The Price of Peace: Why Japan Scrapped
a $4.2bn US Missile System,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 5, 2020; Loren Thompson, “Japan’s Rethink Of Aegis
Ashore Could Tie Up Navy, Increase Costs And Cause Big Delays,” Forbes, August 11, 2020.
On June 18, 2020, it was reported that the United States and Japan were in talks to address the technical issues Japan
cited and explore potential paths forward for bolstering Japan’s ballistic missile defense capability. See Lara Seligman,
“U.S. and Japan in Talks about ‘Alternatives’ to Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System,” Politico Pro, June 18, 2020;
Idrees Ali, “U.S. in Talks with Japan after Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Suspension: Official,” Reuters, June
18, 2020; Jason Sherman, “MDA Hopes to ‘Resolve’ Japan’s Aegis Ashore Concerns, Reinstate Project,” Inside
Defense
, June 18, 2020; “U.S. Talking with Japan on Concerns over Halted Missile Defense Plan,” Kyodo News, June
19, 2020. See also Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Eyes Offshore Options to Replace Aegis Defense System,” Asahi Shimbun,
September 10, 2020.
40 Nikkei staff writers, “US Taps Japan Radar Tech to Double Missile Defense Range,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 6,
2018.
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South Korea
An October 12, 2018, press report states that “the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-
based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, a top
commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct. 12.”41 An October 16, 2023, press report
states that South Korea’s newest Aegis destroyer will be BMD-capable.42
Other Countries
Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD
system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia. Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are
building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other countries operate destroyers and frigates
with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations.
FY2024-FY2028 MDA Procurement and R&D Funding
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for Aegis BMD-related efforts. Table 1 shows requested (FY2024) and
projected (FY2025-FY2028) MDA procurement and research and development funding for Aegis
BMD efforts under MDA’s FY2024 budget submission.
Table 1. FY2024-FY2028 MDA Procurement and
R&D Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
FY24
FY25
FY26
FY27
FY28

(req.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
Procurement





Aegis BMD (line 33)
374.8
372.6
528.5
537.1
550.0
(SM-3 Block IB missile quantity)
(27)
(24)
(43)
(43)
(43)
Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line 34)
0
0
0
0
0
SM-3 Block IIA (line 36)
432.8
507.7
464.1
457.9
467.1
(SM-3 Block IIA missile quantity)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)
Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 40)
2.4
1.0
0
0
0
Aegis BMD hardware and software (line 42)
27.8
44.9
28.4
35.5
31.8
SUBTOTAL Procurement
837.8
926.2
1,021.0
1,030.5
1,048.9
Research and development





Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 83)
693.7
639.7
707.0
699.6
733.9
Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line 114)
193.5
135.5
183.0
203.7
135.1
Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 116)
22.2
20.5
21.2
21.6
21.7
SUBTOTAL RDT&E
909.4
795.7
911.2
924.9
890.7
TOTAL
1,747.2
1,721.9
1,932.2
1,955.4
1,939.6
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2024 MDA budget submission.

41 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea to Buy Ship-Based Interceptors to Counter Ballistic Missile Threats,” Defense News,
October 12, 2018.
42 YoungHak Lee, “South Korea’s First KDX III Batch II Aegis Destroyer Started Sea Trials,” Naval News, October
16, 2023.
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Research and development funding in the table for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis
Ashore sites. MDA’s budget also includes additional funding not shown in the table for operations
and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD program.
Issues for Congress
Annual Funding Request
One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and
research and development funding requests for the program. In considering this issue, Congress
may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for the
fiscal year in question is properly scoped and scheduled, and accurately priced.
Estimating and Reporting Costs
Another issue for Congress concerns the adequacy of MDA’s cost estimating and its reporting of
costs. A February 2022 GAO report on MDA’s cost estimating and reporting of costs for missile
defense programs, including the Aegis BMD program, states
The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is continuing efforts
to deliver systems to the warfighter that will protect against enemy missiles. However,
shortfalls persist with MDA’s program and flight test cost estimates and reporting.
Program cost estimates. MDA continues to omit the military services’ operations and
sustainment costs from the program life-cycle cost estimates.... By omitting these costs,
MDA limits decision-makers’ insight into the full financial commitments needed for
affordability and funding determinations....
Flight test cost estimates. Accuracy issues linger with MDA’s flight test cost estimates that
could skew the agency’s annual $1.3 billion [flight test] funding request, such as not being
regularly updated with actual costs. However, MDA is taking steps to improve these cost
estimates by using a new cost model, among other things....
Program cost reporting. MDA continues to adjust program baselines without clear
traceability over time. MDA also forgoes recurrent comparisons to the original baseline.
Such adjustments and omissions impede decision-makers’ awareness of each program’s
cost performance and total system cost....
Flight test cost reporting. Congress required MDA to report on flight test costs, but we
found the information lacking due to the agency’s reporting methodology. MDA only
accounted for about $1.3 billion of at least $3.5 billion in funding the agency requested for
flight testing between March 2017 and September 2020. Moreover, the reporting
requirement ended in December 2021. Without further reporting on complete flight test
costs, Congress does not have information needed to facilitate holding the agency
accountable for its spending.43
Potential for Intercepting ICBMs
Another issue for Congress is what role the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the
U.S. homeland against attack from ICBMs. With the advent of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor,
DOD is evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain ICBMs. Section

43 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Addressing Cost Estimating and Reporting Shortfalls Could
Improve Insight into Full Costs of Programs and Flight Tests
, GAO-22-104344, February 2022, highlights page (PDF
page 2 of 58).
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1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12,
2017) directed DOD to “conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if technologically feasible,
the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat using the standard missile
3 block IIA missile interceptor.” DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report stated the
following:
The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense
architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to existing GBIs
[ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland.
This interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the
burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U.S. homeland against
evolving rogue states’ long-range missile capabilities.
Congress has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an
ICBM-class target. MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020. Due to the
mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or
conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland. Land-based sites
in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued.44
On November 16, 2020, MDA announced that the congressionally directed ICBM-intercept flight
test, called FTM-44, had been conducted on that date and had resulted in a successful intercept of
the ICBM-representative target. MDA stated that “FTM-44, originally scheduled for May 2020,
was delayed due to restrictions in personnel and equipment movement intended to reduce the
spread of COVID-19. FTM-44 satisfies a Congressional mandate to evaluate the feasibility of the
SM-3 Block IIA missile’s capability to defeat an ICBM threat before the end of 2020.”45 A
November 17, 2020, press report about the flight test stated that “the unarmed ICBM was a
replica of a target flown against the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system during a March
2019 flight test that featured a salvo launch of a pair of interceptors.”46 An April 2021 GAO
report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following:
MDA’s effort to include the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a new “layered” homeland
defense against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats targeting the U.S. could
introduce considerable cost, schedule, and performance uncertainty to a program that has
just entered initial production. The GMD weapon system currently provides defense
against ICBMs, but this new effort would add the SM-3 Block IIA and THAAD weapon
system as layers underneath that provided by GMD. For further details on the GMD and
THAAD weapon systems see their respective appendixes.
ICBM intercepts are more challenging than the IRBM intercepts for which the SM-3 IIA
was originally designed. MDA’s most recent attempt to create a system for intercepting
ICBMs, known as the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), re-used some parts from the SM-3
Block IIA. DOD cancelled the RKV before it could complete development after significant
cost and schedule overruns and questions about the ability of the design to overcome
specific performance risks. Parts re-used from the SM-3 Block IIA were implicated in some
of the RKV’s performance shortfalls. Even so, planning for an anti-ICBM capability for
the SM-3 Block IIA continued during and even after the RKV’s termination.
Achieving such a capability will require surmounting several challenges. According to
MDA, during the November 2020 flight test named FTM-44, the SM-3 Block IIA struck a
simple ICBM target. This was not an operational test, however, and it was executed under

44 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review 2019, released January 17, 2019, p. 55. David Axe, “The U.S.
Navy’s New Missile Defense Is a Bad Idea,” National Interest, January 17, 2019.
45 Missile Defense Agency News release 20NEWS-0003, “U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test
Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” November 16, 2020.
46 Jason Sherman, “SM-3 Block IIA Intercepts ICBM Target, Validating Potential for Homeland Defense
‘Underlayer,’” Inside Defense, November 17, 2020.
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highly favorable conditions. More development work is needed for the SM-3 Block IIA to
support a layered homeland defense capability. MDA documents show that the agency now
plans to develop and procure an upgraded version of the SM-3 Block IIA for the specific
purpose of fulfilling the homeland defense mission.47
A May 13, 2021, press report stated
The Missile Defense Agency proved that a Navy destroyer with a Standard Missile-3 Block
IIA can stop a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat, but more work remains to
prove whether this combination could contribute to homeland defense, the MDA director
said Wednesday [May 12].
Vice Adm. Jon Hill described the Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM) 44, which took
place in the Pacific in November after pandemic-related delays earlier in the year: A simple
ICBM target was launched from the Army’s Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test
Site on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Satellites detected the launch, and a
slew of satellites and sensors, including on the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii,
tracked the target. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John Finn (DDG-113), positioned
hundreds of miles east of Hawaii, launched an SM-3 Block IIA missile from its deck based
on its best fire control solution at the time, and the missile itself maneuvered to successfully
hit the target as it received more information in flight.
The goal of the test, Hill said while speaking at the annual McAleese FY 2022 Defense
Programs Conference, was “to prove that we have the ability to leverage the robustness in
the [Aegis] program, so that was really the first test just to see if it’s feasible. And we
learned a lot.”
Hill said the crew of John Finn, with limited data due to limited sensor coverage across the
vast Pacific, maneuvered the ship to get the highest probability of kill.
“It maneuvered, shot the missile; lots of uncertainty because of lack of sensor coverage for
such a long-range flight where we were doing the exercise. So what we actually saw was a
really high divert [from the missile]. So kind of two walkaways from that first test, which
is why I think it was really important, was that it was the longest propagated error or
uncertainty that we’ve ever seen in any test. And then we had the highest divert—that
meant the [SM-3 IIA] missile was maneuvering to actually take it out, and it still took it
out, which is really great,” Hill continued.
“In terms of feasibility, did we accomplish the mission? Absolutely. Every test objective
achieved in November.”
Hill was asked about an April Government Accountability Office report that cited concerns
about the Aegis Combat System/SM-3 IIA pairing for the homeland defense mission—as
opposed to the regional defense mission it was built for, to protect a high-value asset such
as an aircraft carrier from an intermediate-range missile—and whether the simple ICBM
target used in the November test was representative of the real world.
“So what’s next? What’s next is to go against a more complex intercontinental ballistic
missile threat, and maybe even change the scenario. This scenario was a defense of Hawaii
scenario against a rogue nation—you guess which one out there in the Pacific—and in the
future we’re going to go to a more complex [threat], and that’s within the next couple
years,” he said.
“So we’re still analyzing data from November, and then we’re going to make upgrades and
changes to the combat system, and we’ll make changes to the missile in terms of threat set
to take on a higher end class threat.”

47 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but
Annual Goals Unmet
, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. See also Jen Judson, “Watchdog Expresses Concern over Using
US Navy Interceptor for Homeland Missile Defense,” Defense News, April 29, 2021.
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MDA and the military services would have to further integrate systems together to make
this a credible layer in the homeland defense network, Hill said. During the November test,
the MDA commanded and controlled the event from the Missile Defense Interoperability
and Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colo., using the Command and Control Battle
Management and Communication System (C2BMC) to receive satellite and sensor data
and feed it to John Finn, which fired its missile on remote without having access to the
sensor data itself. While that worked in a controlled environment, for a permanent
homeland defense mission the ship would need to be better integrated into U.S. Northern
Command’s network to fully share information and targeting data.
Hill said that Aegis has been integrated to operate with the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense system, and THAAD has been integrated with the Patriot missile defense system,
but MDA hasn’t integrated all the regional defense systems with homeland defense
systems.
Beyond the actual integration and engineering work, Hill added that there was a policy
question to answer, too.
“Do we want ships in that role of being off the West Coast … defending against ICBMs as
a layer to the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense? That’s an incredible conversation,
we’re having that now, and it’s hard to predict where it will go.”
Asked on Thursday during the Naval Postgraduate School’s acquisition research
symposium if the Navy has the capacity and appetite to use destroyers for homeland
defense, Hill said much of it comes down to what ships are available for the mission.
“I think if you asked Gen. [Glen] VanHerck from NORTHCOM about his confidence in
defending the nation today, the answer would be confident. But as the threat evolves, right,
you start to see a little change in that view. And so it’s been viewed for a while that the
Navy can play a role in that area, but it becomes an asset problem,” Hill said. “There are
only so many ships we have up there. And they’re multi-mission ships, and they have a lot
of roles around the globe to execute.”48
A June 22, 2021, press report stated
The Pentagon’s No. 2 official has ordered 11 missile interceptors transferred from research
and development for possible deployment on Navy ships in the Pacific or European regions
after a test in November indicated they could stop an intercontinental ballistic missile.
In the test, the USS John Finn intercepted a mock ICBM intended to simulate one that
could be launched at Hawaii by North Korea. The destroyer, operating near Hawaii, fired
off one of the Standard Missile-3 model Block IIA interceptors built by Raytheon
Technologies Corp. at the target launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.
Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks informed Congress May 27 of her rationale for
transferring the interceptors, although she didn’t disclose it publicly.
“The missiles have conducted successful intercept tests and their deployment is in the
important interest of our national security,” Hicks spokesman Jamal Brown said in an email
this month. The transfer to the Navy marks the first major missile defense initiative of the
Biden administration.
Although the Navy’s Aegis combat system, which launched the missile, and the interceptor
“were not designed to defeat an ICBM-class target, this test demonstrated some potential

48 Megan Eckstein, “MDA: Test of DDG, Standard Missile-3 IIA a Good Start, But More Work Needed on Homeland
Defense Mission,” USNI News, May 13, 2021. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Planning Second SM-3 Block IIA
Flight Test Against ICBM Target; New Development and Upgraded Interceptor Needed,” Inside Defense, May 12,
2021; Rich Abott, “MDA Planning Second Test of SM-3 IIA Against ICBM Target,” Defense Daily, May 17, 2021.
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limited capability,” Vice Admiral Jon Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, said in
testimony to Congress last week.49
Required vs. Available Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
Another potential issue for Congress concerns required versus available numbers of BMD-
capable Aegis ships. Some observers have expressed concern about the potential operational
implications of a shortfall in the available number of BMD-capable relative to the required
number. Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August 15, 2018, Navy
information paper states the following:
The [Navy’s] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA]50 sets the requirement [for BMD-
capable ships] at 54 BMD-capable ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant
requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and
limited expeditionary land base sites….
The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as
follows. It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests for
defense of land.
- 30 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups
- 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand
- 9 in forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operational timelines in
USINDOPACOM
- 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM.51
Burden of BMD Mission on U.S. Navy Aegis Ships
A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the
Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to
operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U.S. Navy missions,
and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy
Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites. A June 16, 2018, press report states the
following:
The U.S. Navy’s top officer wants to end standing ballistic missile defense patrols and
transfer the mission to shore-based assets.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12
that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has
put a growing strain on the Navy’s hard-worn surface combatants, and the duty shifted
towards more shore-based infrastructure.
“Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers
and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Richardson said

49 Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Ships Close to Getting Interceptors That Could Stop an ICBM,” Bloomberg, June 22,
2021.
50 The FSA is the Navy’s analysis, performed every few years, that establishes the Navy’s ship force structure
requirements. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
51 Navy information paper dated August 15, 2018, entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capable Ships
requirement,” provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CBO and CRS on August 15, 2018. The information
paper was requested by CBO.
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during his address at the U.S. Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum. “And if you
know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant.
“You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile.
So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little
box, defending land.”
Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long
term the problem demands a different solution.
“It’s a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile
defense, we’re there,” he said. “But 10 years down the road, it’s time to build something
on land to defend the land. Whether that’s AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of
the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense.”
The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the
surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a steaming box
doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that
could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia.
The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface fleet. Amid the
nuclear threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of the
readiness generated in the Japan-based U.S. 7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation
that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews,
an environment described in the Navy’s comprehensive review into the two collisions that
claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017.
Richardson said that as potential enemies double down on anti-access technologies
designed to keep the U.S. Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its
own assets.
“We’re going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle
spaces we need to get into,” he said. “And so restoring dynamic maneuver has something
to do with missile defense.52
A June 23, 2018, press report states the following:
The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it’s
preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U.S. Navy Aegis
destroyer] fleet. Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the
U.S. Navy’s surface ships.
The Navy now stands at a crossroads. BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that
has pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past decade. The
game-changing SPY-6 air and missile defense radar destined for DDG Flight III, for
example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters. But a smaller
fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions
in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions.
“Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and
destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Chief of Naval
Operations Adm. John Richardson said during an address at the recent U.S. Naval War
College’s Current Strategy Forum. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at
intercepting that incoming missile. So we have six ships that could go anywhere in the
world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land.”

52 David B. Larter, “The US Navy Is Fed Up with Ballistic Missile Defense Patrols,” Defense News, June 16, 2018. See
also Paul McLeary, “Will Budget Crunch Pentagon Laser & Space Investments?” Breaking Defense, November 13,
2018.
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And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are
in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them.
The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible
and less predictable―“dynamic” is the buzzword of moment in Navy circles. What
Richardson is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away from
ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites,
and also surging the Navy’s at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat....
In a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO’s comments, Navy spokesman
Cmdr. William Speaks said the Navy’s position is that BMD is an integral part of the
service’s mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should “consider a more
persistent, land-based solution as an option.”
“This idea is not about the nation’s or the Navy’s commitment to BMD for the U.S. and
our allies and partners―the Navy’s commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid,”
Speaks said. “In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60
by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability.
“The idea is about how to best meet that commitment. In alignment with our national
strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this
calls us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission and
optimize the power of the joint force.”...
While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission
ships is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a retired
destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group.
“The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface
combatants,” McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO’s comments.
“Absent it, the number of CG’s and DDG’s would necessarily decline. This may in fact be
desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate
underway. Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive
ones.
“But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi-
mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission
is an incredibly good thing. If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime sub-optimization
in order to have wartime capacity—should this not be considered a positive thing?”
McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis
have been in response to the BMD threat. And indeed, the crown jewels of the surface
fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD
simultaneously; the Aegis common-source library; the forthcoming SPY-6; cooperative
engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission....
A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy’s shifting
language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the Navy
latched onto the mission. But the official added that the situation more than a decade later
has dramatically shifted.
“The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly
in the western Pacific. We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as
interconnected and interdependent as we do today,” the official said. “Nor have we ever
seen technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we see
emerging around us. China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move
to reshape the environment to their favor.”
In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ desire to use the force more
dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said. “This includes taking a
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look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete,
deter and win against those who threaten us.”53
A January 29, 2019, press report states the following:
The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service’s top admiral
said today, and the Pentagon’s new missile defense review might give the service the off-
ramp it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile
launches.
This wasn’t the first time Adm. John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in
“small boxes” at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other
missions challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and the
North Atlantic….
“We’ve got exquisite capability, but we’ve had ships protecting some pretty static assets
on land for a decade,” Richardson said at the Brookings Institute. “If that [stationary] asset
is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let’s build something on land and protect
that and liberate these ships from this mission.”
Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor
and shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed with the Aegis radar
and missile defense system, both of which would free up American hulls from what
Richardson on Monday called “the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for
ballistic missile defense.”54
Allied Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. Allied Contributions to Regional
BMD Capabilities
Another related potential issue for Congress concerns allied burden sharing—how allied
contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to
overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U.S.
defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U.S. Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some
U.S. observers for increased allied defense efforts. The issue can arise in connection with both
U.S. allies in Europe and U.S. allies in Asia. Regarding U.S. allies in Asia, a December 12, 2018,
press report states the following:
In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during
a speech at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current
practice of dedicating several US Navy warships solely for Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD).
Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are
limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land-based
BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system.
In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has
gone quiet.
“My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate
actually stood,” one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times.

53 David B. Larter, “As Threats Mount, US Navy Grapples with Costly Ballistic Missile Defense Mission,” Defense
News
, June 23, 2018.
54 Paul McLeary, “The Navy Has Had Enough of Missile Defense And Sees Its Chance,” Breaking Defense, January
28, 2019.
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But others agree with him. Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), acknowledges Richardson’s attempts to highlight how
these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome “strain on the (US Navy’s) crews and
equipment.”
But there are complications. While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather
than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could
defeat land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy’s Aegis-
equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in
greater survivability overall.
As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps other
systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and
South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents
abrupt change….
Japan’s decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy
cessation of BMD patrols. “The land-based option is more reliable, less logistically
draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it
provides a degree of reassurance to the Japanese people and US government, and
introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations,” said
[Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University
in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa.
“Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward-
defense, before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions
times,” Mulloy said. “Aegis Ashore gives more reaction time – but over Japanese
airspace.”…
The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific
is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo. However, the Trump
administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support
US troops deployed overseas.
Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might
view a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly aggressive
defense posture in the region.
But for them, it is a no-win situation. If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China
and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances
the US Navy’s maritime warfare capabilities.55
Conversion of Hawaii Aegis Test Site
Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an
operational land-based Aegis BMD site. DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report
states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that
Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the
Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of
Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities. DoD will study this possibility to further
evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii. The United States
will augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean
missile threat. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an
Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize
the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary’s decision to do so, the
steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements. This plan

55 Peter J. Brown, “Japan, US Silent over Ending Ballistic Missile Patrols,” Asia Times, December 12, 2018.
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will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of
the MDR.56
A January 25, 2019, press report states the following:
The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the
Missile Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii’s Aegis Ashore Missile
Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency’s director.
“Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews—that man that site—as
well as funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production and
sustainment,” Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding
would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the
recommendation.57
Potential Contribution from Lasers
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in
coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have
on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles. Another CRS report discusses the
potential value of ship-based lasers for performing various missions, including, potentially,
terminal-phase BMD operations.58
Program Deliveries, Testing, and Technical Risk
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns deliveries, testing, and technical risk in
the Aegis BMD program.
May 2023 GAO Report
A May 2023 GAO report on U.S. BMD systems, including the Aegis BMD system, stated the
following:
DELIVERIES
MDA did not meet its fiscal year 2022 goal for SM-3 Block IB interceptors as five planned
interceptors were delivered after the fiscal year ended. MDA, however, delivered nine
backlogged interceptors that were previously delayed due to a flight test failure. The Aegis
program temporarily halted deliveries to investigate the failure, but missile production did
not stop and deliveries subsequently resumed.
MDA also did not meet its goal for SM-3 Block IIA interceptors. Three interceptors
planned for fiscal year 2022 were not delivered. MDA was able to deliver six backlogged
interceptors that we previously reported were delayed due to missile assembly issues. The
Aegis program addressed the issues, which allowed them to resume deliveries.
As reported by the agency, in August 2022, the Director, MDA approved an acquisition
strategy to align SM-3 Block IB and Block IIA production under one contract. This
production alignment is expected to maximize efficiencies in program management and
obsolescence monitoring, among other synergies. According to MDA officials, they have
not identified any disadvantages with this strategy. This acquisition strategy is currently

56 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review 2019, released January 17, 2019, pp. 55-56.
57 Mallory Shelbourne, “DOD to Determine Funding Breakdown for Aegis Ashore Repurposing,” Inside the Navy,
January 25, 2019.
58 See CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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under review by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to
support a production decision for SM-3 Block IIA.
TESTING
Aegis BMD conducted four flight tests in fiscal year 2022, including a successful intercept
test event that demonstrated its interoperability with Japanese and Korean systems. The
last test—Flight Test Experiment Aegis Weapon System-01—gathered data while an SM-
3 Block IIA interceptor engaged a modified medium range ballistic missile target in a non-
intercept test.
Aegis BMD conducted two planned ground tests. Ground Test Integrated (GTI)-09 Sprint
1 provided data to support decisions related to system capabilities affecting United States
European Command and United States Central Command. GTI-ISR 21 assessed the
system’s interoperability with Israeli missile defense systems. Aegis BMD also
participated in GTI-08a—a delayed test originally planned for fiscal year 2020—which
provided data to support system capabilities decisions for Aegis and other missile defense
system elements.
A planned Aegis BMD operational cyber test was delayed to fiscal year 2024 due to
MDA’s changes to its test plan that affected planned ground and cyber tests.
OTHER PROGRAM INFORMATION
Aegis Ashore
We reported in June 2022 that delivery of the Aegis Ashore system to Poland was originally
planned for fiscal year 2018, but that construction challenges delayed delivery.1 Total
projected costs increased by 12 percent, including additional costs for retaining engineering
and security services during the delays. The site remains under construction, but MDA
officials stated there are no known technical risks. In addition, the Aegis Ashore program
recently met key milestones. Specifically, Aegis Light Off occurred in June 2022, which
signifies the initial powering up of the weapon system to observe if all integrated systems
are operational. The program completed physical installation of the system and
demonstrated it in October 2022. MDA expects to declare the site safe and technically
capable in early 2023 and Navy acceptance is anticipated for later in the year.
Safe Service Life Extension
The Aegis program has been able to extend the safe service life of SM-3 Block IA and
Block IB interceptors to ensure the interceptors can be used with no additional safety risk.
Under this effort, the safe service life of Block IA interceptors increased from 12 to 18
years and Block IB interceptors increased from 8 to 12 years. The safe service life of Block
IIA interceptors is currently 12 years and MDA is assessing the possibility to increase this
to 16, or possibly up to 20, years. MDA officials described the process to extend an
interceptor’s safe service life, which includes testing and analysis of aged missile
components to determine their suitability for extended service. The testing and analysis is
conducted by industry and government stakeholders and subject matter experts at various
locations and laboratories. MDA officials said safe service life extensions have helped
address the challenge of meeting the Navy’s interceptor inventory requirements, which
typically entail high volume procurements and consistent repair and recertification
throughput.
Software Development
MDA officials stated the Navy started implementing a multi-stage Development, Security,
and Operations strategy to deliver software upgrades to Aegis platforms. The Navy started
using a software factory—an automated process to develop software—in fiscal year 2021
and now plans to eliminate their legacy system for developing and delivering coded
software capability in fiscal year 2024.2 According to MDA officials, by fiscal year 2030
the Navy intends for this approach to be the sole means for developing and delivering coded
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software capability to all Aegis platforms. MDA officials explained this strategy provides
the opportunity to significantly increase the speed of software deliveries to the fleet, as well
as reduce costs and cybersecurity risk by integrating security functions in the development
process. They stated, however, there is risk since it is a significant transition from current
development strategies. They said the transition would require extensive retraining and
hiring of government personnel to fully execute the strategy, as well as additional costs to
develop the new required tools, such as software, models, and infrastructure.59
Regarding the development of a capability for the SM-6 to intercept hypersonic missiles, the
GAO report stated:
MDA has two main efforts under development to defend against hypersonic weapons:
• Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) is a program that includes a missile being designed to be fired
from Aegis-equipped ships to intercept a hypersonic weapon in the middle (or “glide”)
phase of its flight path.
• Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) is an effort to develop space-
based sensors to track and support the intercept of a hypersonic weapon….
GPI is expected to work with existing and future systems to provide hypersonic defense.
After a missile launch, SDA’s wide field of view satellites, capable of viewing large
portions of the globe, detect the threat launch and send sensor measurement data to BOA,
which generates track data with accuracy sufficient to cue HBTSS. HBTSS then acquires
the deployed Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) and collects precision angle measurements.
These measurements are processed by HBTSS, BOA, and Command, Control, Battle
Management, and Communications (C2BMC) to provide fire control quality tracks on the
HGV to Aegis for support of an engagement using GPI….
GPI STATUS AND CHALLENGES
Events and Milestones
By the early 2030s, the GPI program plans to deliver a prototype capability for testing,
demonstration data to inform further development, and 10 interceptors to be used for
testing. The program established a plan to acquire the capability and identified key events
and milestones for tracking development. The plan includes competitive development of
the GPI missile leveraging multiple contractors to begin the effort, but only one contractor
is anticipated to be selected to complete delivery of the prototype capability. In fiscal year
2022, MDA reported that three contractors were awarded Other Transaction Agreements
to initiate work on the GPI program.1 Later, in the fiscal year the program reported
selecting two contractors to continue the development of GPI into the next phase of the
acquisition process, technology development. In fiscal year 2023, the program expects to
focus efforts on technology maturity and applying top level requirements to component
level designs in preparation for the Preliminary Design Review….
The Preliminary Design Review is currently planned by the end of fiscal year 2027. The
GPI program also anticipates down-selecting from two to one contractor near this date to
continue until completing delivery of the prototype capability….
Challenges
Previously we found in June 2022 that MDA had not planned to conduct an Independent
Cost Estimate (ICE) or Independent Technical Risk Assessment (ITRA) for the GPI
program before the product development phase, which is after the technology development
phase. These assessments are required for certain elements by DOD Directive-Type
Memorandum 20-002 to mitigate risk. Since our reporting, MDA officials stated the Office
of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) completed a preliminary ICE for the

59 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Annual Goals Unmet for Deliveries and Testing, GAO-23-
106011, May 2023, pp. 22-23.
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GPI program in the August 2022 timeframe. As of February 2023, CAPE is working to
finalize the ICE pending the final President’s Budget program schedule. MDA officials
also stated the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
completed an ITRA for the GPI program in the August 2022 timeframe as well. According
to MDA, the ITRA found that the program should address technical risks earlier in the
development schedule by building and testing hardware. The ITRA also recommended
earlier testing. We plan to review the ICE and ITRA to assess whether MDA has acquired
knowledge to manage risk for the GPI program.60
January 2024 DOT&E Report
A January 2024 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—
DOT&E’s annual report for FY2023—states the following regarding the Aegis BMD system:
Aegis BMD has demonstrated the capability to intercept non-separating, simple-
separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight with
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) guided missiles, although flight testing and M&S have not
addressed all expected threat types, threat features, and raid sizes. Aegis BMD has also
demonstrated a capability to intercept select ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight
with SM-6 guided missiles. Flight testing in FY23 verified some of the corrective actions
to address failure review board findings from the two Sea-Based Terminal Increment 2
flight tests in FY21. All fielded Aegis BMD variants have demonstrated sufficient
reliability, with operational availabilities that exceed the specification. The SM-3 Block
IIA missile is reliable as it meets its threshold reliability metric, but not with statistical
confidence because of the relatively small number of live firings and ground test data
collection events to date. The MDA has implemented a process to monitor the health and
status of deployed SM-3 Block IIA missiles, which will provide additional reliability data
for future assessments.61
Legislative Activity for FY2024
Summary of Action on FY2024 MDA Funding Request
Table 2
summarizes congressional action on the FY2024 request for MDA procurement and
research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program.





60 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Annual Goals Unmet for Deliveries and Testing, GAO-23-
106011, May 2023, pp. 34-35.
61 Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY 2023 Annual Report, January 2024, pp. 340-341.
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Table 2. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 MDA Funding Request
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Final
HAC
SAC
Final
Procurement
Aegis BMD (line 33)
374.8
419.8
374.8
374.8
374.8
374.8

(SM-3 Block IB missile quantity)
(27)
(27)
(27)
(27)
(27)
(27)

Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line 34)
0
0
0
0
0
0

SM-3 Block IIA (line 36)
432.8
432.8
432.8
432.8
432.8
432.8

(SM-3 Block IIA missile quantity)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)

Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 40)
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4

Aegis BMD hardware and software (line 42)
27.8
27.8
27.8
27.8
27.8
27.8

Subtotal Procurement
837.8
882.8
837.8
837.8
837.8
837.8

Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 83)
693.7
709.7
693.7
689.7
698.9
693.7

Aegis BMD test (PE 0604878C) (line 114)
193.5
193.5
193.5
188.4
188.4
184.3

Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 116)
22.2
22.2
22.2
22.2
22.2
22.2

Subtotal RDT&E
909.4
925.4
909.4
900.3
909.5
900.2

TOTAL
1,747.2
1,808.2
1,747.2
1,738.1
1,747.3
1,738.0

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on DOD’s original FY2024 budget submission, committee and
conference reports, and explanatory statements on FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2024
DOD Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-125 of June 30, 2023) on H.R.
2670, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 2.
The recommended increase of $45.0 million for line 33 is for “MDA UPL [Unfunded Priorities
list]—SM–3 Blk 1B Life Extension.” (Page 467)
The recommended net increase of $16.0 million for line 83 includes a recommended increase of
$20.0 million for “PAC–3 [Patriot Advanced Capability 3] MSE [Missile Segment
Enhancement]/AEGIS Weapon System Integration” and a recommended reduction of $4.0
million for “Program decrease.” (Page 511)
Section 1667 of H.R. 2670 requires MDA to submit a report to the congressional defense
committees on potential enhancements to Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania.
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-58 of July 12, 2023) on S.
2226, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 2.
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H.Rept. 118-301 states:
Report on potential enhancements to Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1667) that would require the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency to provide a report on potential enhancements to the Aegis Ashore
missile defense sites in Poland and Romania.
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
The House recedes.
The conferees direct that, no later than April 30, 2024, the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on potential
enhancements to Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. This report shall include the
following elements:
(1) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of—
(a) enhancing associated sensor systems to detect a broader array of missile threats;
(b) fielding a mixed fleet of defensive interceptor systems; and
(c) physical hardening of the facilities;
(2) A funding profile, by year, detailing the complete costs associated with any options
assessed under paragraph (1); and
(3) Such other information as the Director considers appropriate.
This report shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (Pages 1318-
1319)
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 118-301) on H.R. 2670 recommended the funding levels shown in
the authorization final column of Table 2. The recommended reduction of $4.0 million for line 83
is for “Program decrease.” (Page 1486). The recommended reduction of $5.049 million for line
114 is for “Excess growth.” (Page 1488)
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-121 of June 27, 2023) on H.R.
4365, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 2.
The recommended net increase of $5.144 million for line 83 includes a recommended reduction
of $4.856 million for “Excess growth” and a recommended increase of $10.0 million for
“Program increase—lightweight, radiation-hardened, thermally insensitive sensors.” (Page 243)
The recommended reduction of $5.049 million for line 114 is for “Excess growth.” (Page 244)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-81 of July 27, 2023) on S. 2587,
recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 2.
The recommended reduction of $9.231 million for line 114 is for “Prior year test adjustments.”
(Page 252)

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Appendix. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests
Table A-1
presents a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. In addition
to the flight tests shown in the table, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser
operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3
missile to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit.
Table A-1. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests From January 2002 to the Present
Name of flight
Reported as
Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
successful?
Exo-atmospheric (using SM-3 missile)
1/25/02
US
FM-2
Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes
6/13/02
US
FM-3
Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes
11/21/02
US
FM-4
Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes
6/18/03
US
FM-5
Unitary short-range (TTV)
No
12/11/03
US
FM-6
Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes
2/24/05
US
FTM 04-1 (FM-7) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes
11/17/05
US
FTM 04-2 (FM-8) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes
6/22/06
US
FTM 10
Separating short-range (TTV)
Yes
12/7/06
US
FTM 11
Unitary short-range (TTV)
No
4/26/07
US
FTM 11
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes
Event 4
6/22/07
US
FTM 12
Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes
8/31/07
US
FTM-11a
Classified
Yes
11/6/07
US
FTM 13
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes


Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes
12/17/07
Japan
JFTM-1
Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes
11/1/08
US
Pacific Blitz
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes


Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
No
11/19/08
Japan
JFTM-2
Separating short-range (MRT)
No
7/30/09
US
FTM-17
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes
10/27/09
Japan
JFTM-3
Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes
10/28/10
Japan
JFTM-4
Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes
4/14/11
US
FTM-15
Separating intermediate range (LV-2)
Yes
9/1/11
US
FTM-16 E2
Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
No
5/9/12
US
FTM-16 E2a
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes
6/26/12
US
FTM-18
Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes
10/25/12
US
FTI-01
Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
No
2/12/13
US
FTM-20
Separating medium-range (MRBM-T3)
Yes
5/15/13
US
FTM-19
Separating short-range (ARAV-C)
Yes
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Name of flight
Reported as
Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
successful?
9/10/13
US
FTO-01
Separating medium-range (eMRBM-T1)
Yes
9/18/13
US
FTM-21
Separating short-range (ARAV-C++)
Yes
10/3/13
US
FTM-22
Separating medium-range (ARAV-TTO-E)
Yes
11/6/14
US
FTM-25
Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
Yes
6/25/15
US
FTO-02 E1
Separating medium-range (IRBM T1)
n/aa
10/4/15
US
FTO-02 E2
Separating medium-range (eMRBM)
n/ab
10/20/15
US
ASD-15 E2
Separating short-range (Terrier Orion)
Yes
11/1/15
US
FTO-02 E2a
Separating medium-range (eMRBM)
No
12/10/15
US (Aegis
FTO02 E1a
Separating medium-range (IRBM T1)
Yes
Ashore)
2/3/17
US-Japan
SFTM-01
Separating medium-range (MRT)
Yes
6/21/17
US-Japan
SFTM-02
Medium-range target
No
10/15/17
US
FS17
Medium-range target
Yes
1/31/18
US (Aegis
FTM-29
Intermediate-range target
No
Ashore)
9/11/18
Japan
JFTM-05
Simple separating target
Yes
10/26/18
US
FTM-45
Medium range target
Yes
12/10/18
US (Aegis
FTI-03
Intermediate-range target
Yes
Ashore)
11/16/20
US
FTM-44
ICBM target
Yes
5/26 and
US-
ASD/FS21c
Non-separating MRBM target
Yesc
30/2021
Netherlands
4/9/22f
US
FEM-01
Medium range target
Outcome not
reported
8/9/22
US
Part of Pacific
ARAV-B SRBM target
Yes
Dragon exercise
11/16/22e
US-Japan
JFTM-07
Medium-range T4-E target
Yes
11/18 or
US-Japan
JFTM-07
Short-range target
Yes
19/22e
ca. 10/25/23
US
Vigilant Wyvern/
Two short-range targets
Yes
FTM-48
Endo-atmospheric (using SM-2 missile Block IV missile and [for MMW E1 and subsequent] SM-6
Dual 1 missile)

5/24/06
US
Pacific Phoenix
Unitary short-range target (Lance)
Yes
6/5/08
US
FTM-14
Unitary short-range target (FMA)
Yes
3/26/09
US
Stellar Daggers
Unitary short-range target (Lance)
Yes
7/28/15
US
MMW E1
Unitary short-range target (Lance)
Yes
7/29/15
US
MMW E2
Unitary short-range target (Lance)
Yes
12/14/16
US
FTM-27
Unitary short-range target (Lance)
Yes
8/29/17
US
FTM-27 E2
Medium-range target (MRBM)
Yes
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Name of flight
Reported as
Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
successful?
5/29/21
US
FTM-31
Medium-range target (MRBM)
No
7/24/21
US
FTM-33
Two SRBM targets
Yes and
unconfirmedd
3/30/23
US
FTM-31 E1a
Medium-Range target (MRBM)
Yes (2-missile
salvo)
Sources: Table presented in MDA fact sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” February 2017, accessed
on May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/web/20170929180757/https:/www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/
aegis_tests.pdf, and (for flight tests subsequent to February 2017) MDA news releases, Jason Sherman, “U.S.
Intercepted Ballistic Missile Target over Pacific while China Exercised around Taiwan,” Inside Defense, August 12,
2022; and Wyatt Olson, “Missile-Defense Exercise Off Hawaiian Island Includes First Live-Fire Intercept,” Stars
and Stripes
, August 16, 2022.
Notes: TTV is target test vehicle; ARAV is Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle. In addition to the flight tests
shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S.
satellite—an operation called Burnt Frost.
a. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of August 3, 2015,
had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 31 successful intercepts in 37 launches
through July 29, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was considered a “no test”
event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD system or the SM-3
interceptor. Press reports state that the test was aborted due to a failure of the target missile. (Andrea
Shalal, “U.S. Skips Aegis Ashore Missile Test After Target Malfunction,” Reuters, June 26, 2015.) MDA’s table
similarly shows the test of December 7, 2006, as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA
issued a news release on this test, which stated that an SM-3 was not launched “due to an incorrect system
setting aboard the Aegis-class cruiser USS Lake Erie prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the
ship. The incorrect configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship from launching the first
of the two [SM-3] interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch of two
missiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally not launched.” MDA
counts the test of December 7, 2006, as an unsuccessful intercept in its count of 31 successful intercepts in
37 launches through July 29, 2015.
b. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of November 10,
2015, had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 32 successful intercepts in 39
launches through November 1, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was
considered a “no test” event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD
system or the SM-3 interceptor.
c. ASD/FS21 was an at-sea demonstration that occurred during a multilateral naval exercise called Formidable
Shield 2021. In the demonstration, a Dutch frigate used its radar to provide early warning track data to a
U.S. Navy destroyer that used the data to calculate a firing solution and launch its interceptor. Some press
reports state that ASD/FS21 involved two successful ballistic missile intercepts, rather than the one shown
in the table.
d. MDA stated that “based on initial observations, one target was successful y intercepted. At this time, we
cannot confirm the second target was destroyed.” (“MDA Test Intercepts Target,” MDA News Release 21-
NEWS-0012, July 24, 2021.)
e. A November 21, 2022, MDA new released stated: “The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the
United States Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announce the successful completion of a two-week missile
defense event incorporating two live fire exercises.” (Missile Defense Agency, “Japan Missile Defense Flight
Test Successful,” 22-NEWS-0009, November 21, 2022.) Presss reports stated that two intercept events
occurred on November 16 and November 18 or 19. (Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Two Japanese Destroyers Score
in Ballistic Missile Defense Test off Hawaii,” USNI News, November 21, 2022; Rich Abott, “Japanese
Destroyers First Successful y Test SM-3 In Ballistic Missile Defense Test,” Defense Daily, November 22,
2022.)
f.
For a press report about the SM-3 flight test of April 9, 2022, see Jason Sherman, “MDA Acknowledges
Clandestine SM-3 Block IIA Experiment of Classified Capability,” Inside Defense, January 26, 2023.

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Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs



Disclaimer
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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Congressional Research Service
RL33745 · VERSION 250 · UPDATED
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