Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
~~August 29~~October 20, 2022 , 2022
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for

conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend
Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western

Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks
from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The number of BMD-capable Aegis ships has been growing over time. MDA’s from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The number of BMD-capable Aegis ships has been growing over time. MDA’s
FY2023 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2023 there will be 50 total BMDS [BMD Systems] capable [Aegis] FY2023 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2023 there will be 50 total BMDS [BMD Systems] capable [Aegis]
ships requiring maintenance support.” ships requiring maintenance support.”
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for
BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2023 budget requests a total of $1,659.1 million (i.e., about $1.7 billion) in BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2023 budget requests a total of $1,659.1 million (i.e., about $1.7 billion) in
procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in
Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon)
funding for the Aegis BMD program. funding for the Aegis BMD program.
Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:
 whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding  whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding
requests for the program; requests for the program;
 the adequacy of MDA’s cost estimating and its reporting of costs;  the adequacy of MDA’s cost estimating and its reporting of costs;
 what role the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. homeland against attack from  what role the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. homeland against attack from
ICBMs; ICBMs;
 required versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships;  required versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships;
 the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, and whether there are  the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, and whether there are
alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing
additional Aegis Ashore sites; additional Aegis Ashore sites;
 allied burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to  allied burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to
U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations; U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations;
 the role of the Aegis BMD program in a new missile defense system architecture for Guam;  the role of the Aegis BMD program in a new missile defense system architecture for Guam;
 whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site;  whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site;
 the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations  the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations
and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles; and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles;
and and
 technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.  technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic
missile defense (BMD) program, a program carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) missile defense (BMD) program, a program carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
and the Navy that gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD and the Navy that gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD
operations. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of operations. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of
Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program. Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program.
Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD
capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base. capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base.
Background
Aegis Ships
All but three of the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are All but three of the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are
equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers,
software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that
defended Zeus. (The exceptions are the Navy’s three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers, defended Zeus. (The exceptions are the Navy’s three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers,
which are discussed below.) The Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for which are discussed below.) The Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for
defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and
subsurface threats. The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated subsurface threats. The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated
many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers. Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers
A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and
FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs
47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged 47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged
by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005, by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005,
leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73). The Navy’s FY2023 budget submission leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73). The Navy’s FY2023 budget submission
proposes retiring five of the 22 ships in FY2023, 12 more in FY2024-FY2027, and the remaining proposes retiring five of the 22 ships in FY2023, 12 more in FY2024-FY2027, and the remaining
five in years after FY2027. five in years after FY2027.
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers
The Navy began procuring DDG-51s in FY1985, and a total of 89 have been procured through The Navy began procuring DDG-51s in FY1985, and a total of 89 have been procured through
FY2022. The first DDG-51 entered service in 1991, and a total of 70 have been delivered as of FY2022. The first DDG-51 entered service in 1991, and a total of 70 have been delivered as of
February 2022. Under the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission, the first DDG-51 is to be retired in February 2022. Under the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission, the first DDG-51 is to be retired in
FY2027. FY2027.
The DDG-51 design has been updated multiple times over the years. The first 28 DDG-51s are The DDG-51 design has been updated multiple times over the years. The first 28 DDG-51s are
known as Flight I/II DDG-51s. The next 34, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some known as Flight I/II DDG-51s. The next 34, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some
significant design changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar. The version currently significant design changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar. The version currently
being procured, called the Flight III DDG-51 design, incorporates a new radar, called the SPY 6 being procured, called the Flight III DDG-51 design, incorporates a new radar, called the SPY 6
radar (and prior to that, the Air and Missile Defense Radar, or AMDR), that is more capable than radar (and prior to that, the Air and Missile Defense Radar, or AMDR), that is more capable than
the SPY-1 radar installed on CG-47s and earlier DDG-51s. the SPY-1 radar installed on CG-47s and earlier DDG-51s.
No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured
the three above-mentioned Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does the three above-mentioned Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does
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not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy
plans do not call for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.1 plans do not call for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.1
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies
Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now
operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Spain, and Norway.2 Japan’s Aegis-equipped ships are BMD-capable. The Aegis-Australia, Spain, and Norway.2 Japan’s Aegis-equipped ships are BMD-capable. The Aegis-
equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are currently not BMD-equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are currently not BMD-
capable. capable.
Aegis BMD System3
Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to
the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor
missiles. Older Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s missiles. Older Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s
procured in FY2010 and subsequent years have been built from the start with a BMD capability. procured in FY2010 and subsequent years have been built from the start with a BMD capability.
Versions and Capabilities of Aegis BMD System
Overview
The Aegis BMD system exists in multiple variants whose ascending numerical designations The Aegis BMD system exists in multiple variants whose ascending numerical designations
indicate ascending levels of capability. As part of MDA’s FY2022 budget submission, the indicate ascending levels of capability. As part of MDA’s FY2022 budget submission, the
designations of Aegis BMD system variants were changed and consolidated to 4.X, 5.X, and 6.X, designations of Aegis BMD system variants were changed and consolidated to 4.X, 5.X, and 6.X,
with the X indicating multiple subvariants. (The 4.X variant, for example, includes the 4.1 and with the X indicating multiple subvariants. (The 4.X variant, for example, includes the 4.1 and
4.2 subvariants.4) 4.2 subvariants.4)
BMD system variants correlate with certain versions (i.e., baselines, or BLs) of the overall Aegis BMD system variants correlate with certain versions (i.e., baselines, or BLs) of the overall Aegis
system, which have their own numbering system. The more recent BMD variants, in addition to system, which have their own numbering system. The more recent BMD variants, in addition to
being able to address more challenging BMD scenarios, give BMD-equipped ships a capability to being able to address more challenging BMD scenarios, give BMD-equipped ships a capability to
simultaneously perform both BMD operations against ballistic missiles and anti-air warfare simultaneously perform both BMD operations against ballistic missiles and anti-air warfare
(AAW) operations (aka air-defense operations) against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles. (AAW) operations (aka air-defense operations) against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles.
Figure 1 provides a 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) summary of the capabilities provides a 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) summary of the capabilities
of the more recent BMD variants and their correlation to Aegis system baselines as of 2019. of the more recent BMD variants and their correlation to Aegis system baselines as of 2019.
BecausBecause Figure 1 was prepared in 2019, it uses the older designations for Aegis BMD system was prepared in 2019, it uses the older designations for Aegis BMD system
variants, rather than the new designations that were introduced as part of the MDA’s FY2022 variants, rather than the new designations that were introduced as part of the MDA’s FY2022
budget submission. budget submission.
The Aegis BMD system was originally designed primarily to intercept theater-range ballistic The Aegis BMD system was originally designed primarily to intercept theater-range ballistic
missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs,
and IRBMs, respectively). In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range ballistic and IRBMs, respectively). In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range ballistic

1 For more on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs, see CRS Report RL32109, 1 For more on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000
Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version 2 The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version
of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar. of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar.
3 Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to 3 Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to
CRS and CBO analysts on the MDA’s FY2023 and prior-year budget submissions. CRS and CBO analysts on the MDA’s FY2023 and prior-year budget submissions.
4 The 4.X variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 3.6.X, 4.0.X, 4.1, and 4.2. The 5.X 4 The 4.X variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 3.6.X, 4.0.X, 4.1, and 4.2. The 5.X
variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 5.0CU (with the CU standing for Capability variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 5.0CU (with the CU standing for Capability
Upgrade) and 5.1. The 6.X variant is the new designation for the variant previously designated 6.0. Upgrade) and 5.1. The 6.X variant is the new designation for the variant previously designated 6.0.
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missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system’s radar might be passed missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system’s radar might be passed
to other U.S. BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles to other U.S. BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U.S. BMD (ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U.S. BMD
systems. systems.
Figure 1. GAO Summary of Capabilities of Aegis BMD System Variants

Source: Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Delivery Delays Provide Opportunity for Increased
Testing to Better Understand Capability, GAO-19-387, June 2019, Table 5 on p. 31. , GAO-19-387, June 2019, Table 5 on p. 31.
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles
The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard5 Missile-3 (SM-3) and the The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard5 Missile-3 (SM-3) and the
SM-6. SM-6.
SM-3 Midcourse Interceptor
The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric
intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit-intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit-

5 The Standard Missile is so named because it was originally developed, decades ago, as a surface-to-air (i.e., air 5 The Standard Missile is so named because it was originally developed, decades ago, as a surface-to-air (i.e., air
defense) missile to serve as the common (i.e., standard) successor to the Navy’s then-existing collection of Talos, defense) missile to serve as the common (i.e., standard) successor to the Navy’s then-existing collection of Talos,
Terrier, and Tartar air defense missiles, which were sometimes referred to collectively as the 3-T missiles. Terrier, and Tartar air defense missiles, which were sometimes referred to collectively as the 3-T missiles.
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to-kill” warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead to-kill” warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead
by colliding with it. The current versions of the SM-3 missile include the SM-3 Block IA, the by colliding with it. The current versions of the SM-3 missile include the SM-3 Block IA, the
SM-3 Block IB, and the SM-3 Block IIA.6 SM-3 Block IB, and the SM-3 Block IIA.6
Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target
seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting
its course. Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster its course. Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster
stage at the bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block stage at the bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block
IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform
21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout 21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout
velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater
than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The
United States and Japan cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version, United States and Japan cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version,
with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.7 with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.7
A March 31, 2020, press report stated A March 31, 2020, press report stated
Raytheon and the Missile Defense Agency are exploring options to extend the range of the Raytheon and the Missile Defense Agency are exploring options to extend the range of the
Standard Missile-3 Block IB—pushing the ballistic missile interceptor to dramatically Standard Missile-3 Block IB—pushing the ballistic missile interceptor to dramatically
expand a defended area by allowing the weapon to communicate with off-board radars—a expand a defended area by allowing the weapon to communicate with off-board radars—a
move that would require enhancing one of the Aegis ballistic missile defense system’s move that would require enhancing one of the Aegis ballistic missile defense system’s
newest features: Engage-on-Remote…. newest features: Engage-on-Remote….
MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill told Congress earlier this month that the new Engage- MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill told Congress earlier this month that the new Engage-
on-Remote capability provides “a seven-fold increase in missile defense coverage when on-Remote capability provides “a seven-fold increase in missile defense coverage when
compared to an autonomous Aegis platform.”8 compared to an autonomous Aegis platform.”8
SM-6 Terminal Interceptor (Overview)
The SM-2 Block IV was MDA’s and the Navy’s initial sea-based terminal-phase BMD The SM-2 Block IV was MDA’s and the Navy’s initial sea-based terminal-phase BMD
interceptor. It was designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo-interceptor. It was designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo-
atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It was atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It was
equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead. A limited number of these missiles were produced equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead. A limited number of these missiles were produced
years ago.9 The SM-2 Block IV has now been replaced by the SM-6. years ago.9 The SM-2 Block IV has now been replaced by the SM-6.
The SM-6 is MDA’s and the Navy’s more capable next-generation sea-based terminal-phase (i.e., The SM-6 is MDA’s and the Navy’s more capable next-generation sea-based terminal-phase (i.e.,
endo-atmospheric) BMD interceptor. It is based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the Navy’s endo-atmospheric) BMD interceptor. It is based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the Navy’s
successor to the SM-2 air defense missile). The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used successor to the SM-2 air defense missile). The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used
for either air defense (i.e., countering aircraft and ASCMs) or ballistic missile defense. A July 23, for either air defense (i.e., countering aircraft and ASCMs) or ballistic missile defense. A July 23,
2018, press report states the following: 2018, press report states the following:

6 MDA and Navy plans at one point called for the SM-3 Block IIA to be succeeded by a still-more-capable interceptor 6 MDA and Navy plans at one point called for the SM-3 Block IIA to be succeeded by a still-more-capable interceptor
called the SM-3 Block IIB. The effort to develop that missile, however, was ended years ago, and MDA at the time was called the SM-3 Block IIB. The effort to develop that missile, however, was ended years ago, and MDA at the time was
reportedly not pursuing any follow-on capabilities to the SM-3 Block IIA. (See, for example, Justin Doubleday, reportedly not pursuing any follow-on capabilities to the SM-3 Block IIA. (See, for example, Justin Doubleday,
“Missile Defense Agency Not Pursuing Follow-On to SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor,” “Missile Defense Agency Not Pursuing Follow-On to SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor,” Inside the Navy, October 24, , October 24,
2016.) 2016.)
7 The cooperative research effort was carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999. The 7 The cooperative research effort was carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999. The
effort focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the second-stage effort focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the second-stage
propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone. propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone.
8 Jason Sherman, “After MDA Demonstrates 7x Increase in Defended Area, Raytheon Pitching EOR for Older SM-3s,” 8 Jason Sherman, “After MDA Demonstrates 7x Increase in Defended Area, Raytheon Pitching EOR for Older SM-3s,”
Inside Defense, March 31, 2020. , March 31, 2020.
9 The inventory of SM-2 Block IVs was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and 9 The inventory of SM-2 Block IVs was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and
ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and at least 3 were used in BMD flight tests through February ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and at least 3 were used in BMD flight tests through February
2012. 2012.
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The Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramatically The Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramatically
increase the speed and range of the Navy’s Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket increase the speed and range of the Navy’s Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket
motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and
defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system. defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system.
On Jan. 17 [2018], the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with On Jan. 17 [2018], the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with
a 21-inch diameter for the SM-6, which is currently fielded with a 13.5-inch propulsion a 21-inch diameter for the SM-6, which is currently fielded with a 13.5-inch propulsion
package. The new rocket motor would sit atop the current 21-inch booster, producing a package. The new rocket motor would sit atop the current 21-inch booster, producing a
new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB.10 new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB.10
SM-6 Terminal Interceptor (Hypersonic Threat Intercept Capability)
MDA testified in May 2022: MDA testified in May 2022:
We are investing in defensive capabilities to counter regional hypersonic missile threats by We are investing in defensive capabilities to counter regional hypersonic missile threats by
upgrading sensors and C2BMC [Command and Control, Battle Management and upgrading sensors and C2BMC [Command and Control, Battle Management and
Communications] for early warning, identification, and tracking of regional and strategic Communications] for early warning, identification, and tracking of regional and strategic
hypersonic threats from space (e.g., HBTSS [Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space hypersonic threats from space (e.g., HBTSS [Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor]). We also are leveraging existing systems where possible (including proven Sensor]). We also are leveraging existing systems where possible (including proven
engage-on-remote and launch-on-remote capabilities) and pursuing a Glide Phase Intercept engage-on-remote and launch-on-remote capabilities) and pursuing a Glide Phase Intercept
(GPI) demonstration. We are working closely with the Navy to develop, field, and upgrade (GPI) demonstration. We are working closely with the Navy to develop, field, and upgrade
the SBT [sea-based terminal defense] capability to counter regional maneuvering and the SBT [sea-based terminal defense] capability to counter regional maneuvering and
hypersonic threats in the terminal phase of flight. The SBT program already provides an hypersonic threats in the terminal phase of flight. The SBT program already provides an
initial terminal defensive capability to counter hypersonic threats, and additional initial terminal defensive capability to counter hypersonic threats, and additional
improvements are scheduled for 2024. Today, the SM-6 missile is the only weapon in the improvements are scheduled for 2024. Today, the SM-6 missile is the only weapon in the
country’s arsenal capable of engaging highly-maneuverable hypersonic threats. In FY country’s arsenal capable of engaging highly-maneuverable hypersonic threats. In FY
2023, Aegis SBT will demonstrate a simulated engagement against a hypersonic target 2023, Aegis SBT will demonstrate a simulated engagement against a hypersonic target
(FTX-40) and in FY 2024 will demonstrate a salvo engagement firing two SM-6 Block IA (FTX-40) and in FY 2024 will demonstrate a salvo engagement firing two SM-6 Block IA
Upgraded guided missiles against a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle target (FTM-43). Upgraded guided missiles against a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle target (FTM-43).
Complementing this terminal capability, in FY 2023, MDA will continue to develop and Complementing this terminal capability, in FY 2023, MDA will continue to develop and
plan a GPI demonstration and leverage the Aegis Weapon System to provide the U.S. plan a GPI demonstration and leverage the Aegis Weapon System to provide the U.S.
Warfighter increasingly capable regional defensive capabilities.11 Warfighter increasingly capable regional defensive capabilities.11
An April 14, 2021, press report stated An April 14, 2021, press report stated
The Missile Defense Agency, together with the U.S. Navy, plan to test an SM-6 missile The Missile Defense Agency, together with the U.S. Navy, plan to test an SM-6 missile
against an “advanced maneuvering threat,” a term that has been used in relation to against an “advanced maneuvering threat,” a term that has been used in relation to
unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, later this year. The Pentagon says that unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, later this year. The Pentagon says that
unspecified versions of the SM-6 have already demonstrated some degree of capability unspecified versions of the SM-6 have already demonstrated some degree of capability
against these types of weapons, examples of which Russia and China have already begun against these types of weapons, examples of which Russia and China have already begun
putting to service. A new variant of the SM-6, the Block IB, is already under development putting to service. A new variant of the SM-6, the Block IB, is already under development
and will itself be able to reach hypersonic speeds. and will itself be able to reach hypersonic speeds.
Barbara McQuiston, a senior U.S. official currently performing the duties of the Under Barbara McQuiston, a senior U.S. official currently performing the duties of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, including mention of the scheduled Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, including mention of the scheduled
SM-6 test in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee SM-6 test in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee
on Defense yesterday…. on Defense yesterday….
“MDA [the Missile Defense Agency], in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, demonstrated “MDA [the Missile Defense Agency], in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, demonstrated
early capability against maneuvering threats during flight-testing of the Standard Missile early capability against maneuvering threats during flight-testing of the Standard Missile
(SM)-6 Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense, and it will further demonstrate this capability (SM)-6 Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense, and it will further demonstrate this capability
against an advanced maneuvering threat-representative target later this year,” according to against an advanced maneuvering threat-representative target later this year,” according to
McQuiston’s written testimony. “We will continue to advance our SBT capability to McQuiston’s written testimony. “We will continue to advance our SBT capability to

10 Jason Sherman, “Navy Looking to Increase Range, Speed of SM-6 with Larger Rocket Motor,” 10 Jason Sherman, “Navy Looking to Increase Range, Speed of SM-6 with Larger Rocket Motor,” Inside the Navy, July , July
23, 2018. 23, 2018.
11 [Statement of] Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the Senate Armed Services 11 [Statement of] Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 18, 2022, p. 10. Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 18, 2022, p. 10.
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address the regional hypersonic threat and will test that capability in the FY 2024 address the regional hypersonic threat and will test that capability in the FY 2024
timeframe.”… timeframe.”…
This is not the first time the Pentagon has publicly discussed using a variant of the SM-6 This is not the first time the Pentagon has publicly discussed using a variant of the SM-6
for hypersonic defense. In March 2020, Mike Griffin, then the Under Secretary of Defense for hypersonic defense. In March 2020, Mike Griffin, then the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering, first revealed that this missile was among those being for Research and Engineering, first revealed that this missile was among those being
considered for this role and that there were plans to test one of them against an actual considered for this role and that there were plans to test one of them against an actual
hypersonic boost-glide vehicle sometime in the 2023 Fiscal Year. It’s not clear whether the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle sometime in the 2023 Fiscal Year. It’s not clear whether the
test Griffin was referring to is the one now scheduled for this year or the one that MDA test Griffin was referring to is the one now scheduled for this year or the one that MDA
now plans to carry out in the 2024 Fiscal Year.12 now plans to carry out in the 2024 Fiscal Year.12
Development of New Hypersonic Threat Interceptor for Aegis System
A June 24, 2022, press report stated A June 24, 2022, press report stated
Raytheon Technologies and Northrop Grumman have each won contracts to continue Raytheon Technologies and Northrop Grumman have each won contracts to continue
developing hypersonic weapons interceptors in a Missile Defense Agency-led competition, developing hypersonic weapons interceptors in a Missile Defense Agency-led competition,
according to a June 24 Pentagon contract announcement.... according to a June 24 Pentagon contract announcement....
In November 2021, the MDA chose the two companies along with Lockheed Martin to In November 2021, the MDA chose the two companies along with Lockheed Martin to
design the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) for regional hypersonic missile defense. Through design the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) for regional hypersonic missile defense. Through
other transactional agreements, the companies entered an “accelerated concept design” other transactional agreements, the companies entered an “accelerated concept design”
phase. phase.
The interceptors are intended to counter a hypersonic weapon during its glide phase of The interceptors are intended to counter a hypersonic weapon during its glide phase of
flight, a challenge as the missiles can travel more than five times the speed of sound and flight, a challenge as the missiles can travel more than five times the speed of sound and
can maneuver, making it hard to predict a missile’s trajectory. can maneuver, making it hard to predict a missile’s trajectory.
The interceptors will be designed to fit into the U.S. Navy’s current Aegis Ballistic Missile The interceptors will be designed to fit into the U.S. Navy’s current Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense destroyers. It will be fired from its standard Vertical Launch System and integrated Defense destroyers. It will be fired from its standard Vertical Launch System and integrated
with the modified Baseline 9 Aegis Weapon System that detects, tracks, controls and with the modified Baseline 9 Aegis Weapon System that detects, tracks, controls and
engages hypersonic threats.13 engages hypersonic threats.13
Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
The number of BMD-capable Aegis ships has been growing over time. MDA’s FY2023 budget The number of BMD-capable Aegis ships has been growing over time. MDA’s FY2023 budget
submission states that “by the end of FY 2023 there will be 50 total BMDS [BMD Systems] submission states that “by the end of FY 2023 there will be 50 total BMDS [BMD Systems]
capable [Aegis] ships requiring maintenance support.”14 capable [Aegis] ships requiring maintenance support.”14
BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers Forward-Homeported in Spain
On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that four BMD-On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that four BMD-
capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers were to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at the naval base capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers were to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at the naval base

12 Joseph Trevithick, “Navy SM-6 Missile Will Attempt To Swat Down A Mock Hypersonic Weapon,” 12 Joseph Trevithick, “Navy SM-6 Missile Will Attempt To Swat Down A Mock Hypersonic Weapon,” The Drive, ,
April 14, 2021. April 14, 2021.
13 Jen Judson, “Raytheon, Northrop Advance in Competition to Develop Hypersonic Weapons Interceptor,” 13 Jen Judson, “Raytheon, Northrop Advance in Competition to Develop Hypersonic Weapons Interceptor,” Defense
News, June 24, 2022. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Selects Raytheon, Northrop to Advance in GPI Design Contest; , June 24, 2022. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Selects Raytheon, Northrop to Advance in GPI Design Contest;
Lockheed Sidelined,” Lockheed Sidelined,” Inside Defense, June 24, 2022. , June 24, 2022.
14 Missile Defense Agency, 14 Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, April 2022, p. 11. (This is the , April 2022, p. 11. (This is the
FY2023 budget justification book for MDA’s portion of the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide appropriation FY2023 budget justification book for MDA’s portion of the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide appropriation
account.) account.)
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at Rota, Spain.15 The initial set of four ships was transferred to Rota in FY2014 and FY2015.16 at Rota, Spain.15 The initial set of four ships was transferred to Rota in FY2014 and FY2015.16
They are being replaced at Rota by a new set of four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in They are being replaced at Rota by a new set of four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in
2020-2022.17 2020-2022.17
Navy officials said the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in the Navy officials said the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in the
Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be
provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U.S. east coast, thus provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U.S. east coast, thus
effectively releases about six U.S. Navy BMD-capable Aegis ships for performing BMD patrols effectively releases about six U.S. Navy BMD-capable Aegis ships for performing BMD patrols
or other missions elsewhere. or other missions elsewhere.
In February and March 2020, DOD officials testified that DOD was considering forward-In February and March 2020, DOD officials testified that DOD was considering forward-
homeporting an additional two BMD-capable Aegis destroyers at Rota, which would make for a homeporting an additional two BMD-capable Aegis destroyers at Rota, which would make for a
total of six destroyers at the site.18 Navy officials testified in 2020 that they supported the idea.19 total of six destroyers at the site.18 Navy officials testified in 2020 that they supported the idea.19
On June 28, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that two additional Aegis destroyers On June 28, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that two additional Aegis destroyers
would be homeported at Rota.20 The Navy confirmed that the two additional Aegis destroyers will would be homeported at Rota.20 The Navy confirmed that the two additional Aegis destroyers will
be BMD-capable.21 be BMD-capable.21
Aegis Ashore Sites
Two Navy-Operated Sites in Romania and Poland
The land-based version of the Aegis BMD system is called Aegis Ashore. There are two Aegis The land-based version of the Aegis BMD system is called Aegis Ashore. There are two Aegis
Ashore sites in Europe—one in Romania, and one in Poland. The sites are intended to help Ashore sites in Europe—one in Romania, and one in Poland. The sites are intended to help
defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran. Each Aegis Ashore site defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran. Each Aegis Ashore site
includes a structure housing an Aegis system that is similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship, includes a structure housing an Aegis system that is similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship,

15 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime 15 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
May 18, 2022, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also May 18, 2022, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/
web/20120117065346/http:/www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=63109. web/20120117065346/http:/www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65 miles northwest of Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65 miles northwest of
the Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have been homeported at Rota at various points the Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have been homeported at Rota at various points
in the past, most recently (prior to the current arrangement) in 1979. (Source: Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-in the past, most recently (prior to the current arrangement) in 1979. (Source: Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-
Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.) Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.)
16 The four ships were the destroyers 16 The four ships were the destroyers Ross (DDG-71) and (DDG-71) and Donald Cook (DDG-75), which moved to Rota in FY2014, (DDG-75), which moved to Rota in FY2014,
and the destroyers and the destroyers Carney (DDG-64) and (DDG-64) and Porter (DDG-78), which moved to Rota in FY2015. (DDG-78), which moved to Rota in FY2015.
17 See, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “USS Arleigh Burke Arrives in Spain, USS Donald Cook Will Head to 17 See, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “USS Arleigh Burke Arrives in Spain, USS Donald Cook Will Head to
Mayport,” Mayport,” USNI News, April 12, 2021. , April 12, 2021.
18 See, for example, Paul McCleary, “EUCOM Calls For Two More Ships For Spanish Port,” 18 See, for example, Paul McCleary, “EUCOM Calls For Two More Ships For Spanish Port,” Breaking Defense, ,
February 25, 2020; David B. Larter, “Push to Base Six US Navy Destroyers in Spain Could Be Gaining Steam,” February 25, 2020; David B. Larter, “Push to Base Six US Navy Destroyers in Spain Could Be Gaining Steam,”
Defense News, March 3, 2020. , March 3, 2020.
19 See, for example, David B. Larter, “The US Navy’s Top Officer Declares Support for Basing 6 Destroyers in Spain,” 19 See, for example, David B. Larter, “The US Navy’s Top Officer Declares Support for Basing 6 Destroyers in Spain,”
Defense News, March 5, 2020. See also John Vandiver, “Rota to Gain Two US Destroyers by Middle of the Decade, , March 5, 2020. See also John Vandiver, “Rota to Gain Two US Destroyers by Middle of the Decade,
EUCOM Chief Says,” EUCOM Chief Says,” Stars and Stripes, April 15, 2021. es, April 15, 2021.
20 White House, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan En 20 White House, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan En
Route Madrid, Spain,” June 28, 2022. See also Mallory Shelbourne, “Biden Administration Basing Two More Route Madrid, Spain,” June 28, 2022. See also Mallory Shelbourne, “Biden Administration Basing Two More
Destroyers in Rota, Spain,” Destroyers in Rota, Spain,” USNI News, June 28 (updated June 29), 2022; Justin Katz, “‘A Powerful Signal:’ What It , June 28 (updated June 29), 2022; Justin Katz, “‘A Powerful Signal:’ What It
Means to Send Two More DDGs to Spain,” Means to Send Two More DDGs to Spain,” Breaking Defense, July 1, 2022; Aaron Mehta, “US Increasing Troop , July 1, 2022; Aaron Mehta, “US Increasing Troop
Presence in Europe, While New NATO Strategy Eyes China,” Presence in Europe, While New NATO Strategy Eyes China,” Breaking Defense, June 29, 2022; Geoff Ziezulewicz , June 29, 2022; Geoff Ziezulewicz
(Associated Press), “Two More Navy Destroyers Will Be Homeported in Rota, Spain,” (Associated Press), “Two More Navy Destroyers Will Be Homeported in Rota, Spain,” Navy Times, June 29, 2022. , June 29, 2022.
21 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs email to CRS, July 1, 2022. 21 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs email to CRS, July 1, 2022.
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and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the
VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships.22 VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships.22
The plan to establish the two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland was announced in 2009, The plan to establish the two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland was announced in 2009,
as part of a plan for providing regional BMD defense in Europe called the European Phased as part of a plan for providing regional BMD defense in Europe called the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Aegis Ashore site in Romania achieved operational certification Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Aegis Ashore site in Romania achieved operational certification
in May 2016.23 The site in Poland began construction in May 201624 and was initially scheduled in May 2016.23 The site in Poland began construction in May 201624 and was initially scheduled
to be completed in 2018. Its completion, however, has been delayed to 2023 by construction to be completed in 2018. Its completion, however, has been delayed to 2023 by construction
contractor performance issues.25 An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. contractor performance issues.25 An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S.
missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following: missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following:
According to MDA officials, the Aegis Ashore site in Poland continues to experience According to MDA officials, the Aegis Ashore site in Poland continues to experience
delays owing to poor performance by the main construction contractor. Based on MDA’s delays owing to poor performance by the main construction contractor. Based on MDA’s
latest estimate of completion no earlier than fiscal year 2022, the site will be between three latest estimate of completion no earlier than fiscal year 2022, the site will be between three
and four years late. According to MDA, in February 2020, the Army Corps of Engineers and four years late. According to MDA, in February 2020, the Army Corps of Engineers
(which manages construction at the site) notified the main contractor that earnings from all (which manages construction at the site) notified the main contractor that earnings from all
future invoices would be retained, and released only upon the completion of certain key future invoices would be retained, and released only upon the completion of certain key
activities. MDA stated that the contractor did not meet these benchmarks and as a result activities. MDA stated that the contractor did not meet these benchmarks and as a result
had not been paid since February 2020. had not been paid since February 2020.
MDA currently attributes $79 million in cost increases to these delays.26 MDA currently attributes $79 million in cost increases to these delays.26
Navy Interest in Divesting Aegis Ashore Sites It Operates
On January 11, 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Gilday, released a On January 11, 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Gilday, released a
guidance document for the Navy entitled guidance document for the Navy entitled CNO NavPlan (with NavPlan being short for navigation (with NavPlan being short for navigation
plan) that states plan) that states
To remain ahead of our competitors, we will divest ourselves of legacy capabilities that no To remain ahead of our competitors, we will divest ourselves of legacy capabilities that no
longer bring sufficient lethality to the fight. This includes divestment of experimental longer bring sufficient lethality to the fight. This includes divestment of experimental
Littoral Combat Ship hulls, legacy Cruisers, and older Dock Landing Ships. It also includes Littoral Combat Ship hulls, legacy Cruisers, and older Dock Landing Ships. It also includes
divesting non-core Navy missions like Aegis-ashore. Transferring shore-based Ballistic divesting non-core Navy missions like Aegis-ashore. Transferring shore-based Ballistic
Missile Defense sites to ground forces enables Sailors to focus on their core missions at Missile Defense sites to ground forces enables Sailors to focus on their core missions at
sea and frees up resources to increase our lethality.27 sea and frees up resources to increase our lethality.27

22 For additional discussion of the Aegis Ashore sites, see Edward Lundquist, “Aegis Ashore Adapts Sea-Based Missile 22 For additional discussion of the Aegis Ashore sites, see Edward Lundquist, “Aegis Ashore Adapts Sea-Based Missile
Defense System to Protect Europe,” Defense System to Protect Europe,” National Defense, September 2016. , September 2016.
23 See, for example, Amy Forsythe, “U.S. Navy Aegis Ashore Base in Romania Hosts NATO Country Ambassadors,” 23 See, for example, Amy Forsythe, “U.S. Navy Aegis Ashore Base in Romania Hosts NATO Country Ambassadors,”
Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), November 19, 2019; “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), November 19, 2019; “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense
Advocacy Alliance, accessed May 18, 2022, at https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/aegis-ashore/; US Advocacy Alliance, accessed May 18, 2022, at https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/aegis-ashore/; US
Naval Forces Europe-Africa, “Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS)-Romania Operationally Certified,” Naval Forces Europe-Africa, “Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS)-Romania Operationally Certified,”
Defense-Aerospace.com, May 12, 2016. Defense-Aerospace.com, May 12, 2016.
24 See, for example, “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, accessed May 18, 2022, at 24 See, for example, “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, accessed May 18, 2022, at
https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/aegis-ashore/. https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/aegis-ashore/.
25 Source: [Statement of] Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the Senate Armed 25 Source: [Statement of] Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 18, 2022, p. 8. Earlier reporting said construction of the Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, May 18, 2022, p. 8. Earlier reporting said construction of the
Poland site would be complete by the end of 2022. See, for example, Rich Abott, “Aegis Ashore Poland Set To Be Poland site would be complete by the end of 2022. See, for example, Rich Abott, “Aegis Ashore Poland Set To Be
Operational By End Of 2022,” Operational By End Of 2022,” Defense Daily, November 22, 2021; Jen Judson, “Construction of Aegis Ashore in , November 22, 2021; Jen Judson, “Construction of Aegis Ashore in
Poland Nearing Completion,” Poland Nearing Completion,” Defense News, March 9, 2022. See also Daniel Wasserbly, “US MDA Plans to Turn On , March 9, 2022. See also Daniel Wasserbly, “US MDA Plans to Turn On
Polish Aegis Ashore Site in June, After Years of Delay,” Polish Aegis Ashore Site in June, After Years of Delay,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 24, 2022. , May 24, 2022.
26 Government Accountability Office, 26 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but
Annual Goals Unmet, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. , GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24.
27 U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, 27 U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, CNO NavPlan, January 2021, p. 10. See also Richard R. Burgess, “CNO: , January 2021, p. 10. See also Richard R. Burgess, “CNO:
Divest Aegis Ashore Sites to Ground Forces,” Divest Aegis Ashore Sites to Ground Forces,” Seapower, January 11, 2021. , January 11, 2021.
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A January 12, 2021, press report states A January 12, 2021, press report states
The chief of naval operation’s new call to focus on sea control and power projection could The chief of naval operation’s new call to focus on sea control and power projection could
lead the service to shed other non-core missions the Navy conducts today, such as manning lead the service to shed other non-core missions the Navy conducts today, such as manning
Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. Aegis Ashore missile defense sites.
The biggest problem is, no one else has agreed to take over that mission yet…. The biggest problem is, no one else has agreed to take over that mission yet….
… no one else operates Aegis systems today, and no one has yet agreed to take over Aegis … no one else operates Aegis systems today, and no one has yet agreed to take over Aegis
Ashore, Rear Adm. Paul Schlise, the director of surface warfare on the CNO’s staff Ashore, Rear Adm. Paul Schlise, the director of surface warfare on the CNO’s staff
(OPNAV N96), said today during a panel presentation at the Surface Navy Association’s (OPNAV N96), said today during a panel presentation at the Surface Navy Association’s
annual symposium. annual symposium.
“It’s been an ongoing discussion in the building here. Right now we’ve got the Aegis “It’s been an ongoing discussion in the building here. Right now we’ve got the Aegis
Ashore sites in Europe, and there’s discussions about potentially more sites in other places. Ashore sites in Europe, and there’s discussions about potentially more sites in other places.
The general discussion has been, this is not a core Navy mission. Sailors really belong at The general discussion has been, this is not a core Navy mission. Sailors really belong at
sea serving in ships. And we’ve got a good number of highly qualified folks serving in sea serving in ships. And we’ve got a good number of highly qualified folks serving in
those sites, they’re going a great job,” he said. those sites, they’re going a great job,” he said.
“But I think what the CNO teed up is, is this a core Navy mission? I don’t think it is. And “But I think what the CNO teed up is, is this a core Navy mission? I don’t think it is. And
so there’s been some discussion with the Army. The Army, of course, has some missile so there’s been some discussion with the Army. The Army, of course, has some missile
defense capability and of course great soldiers that serve in those roles. But they don’t have defense capability and of course great soldiers that serve in those roles. But they don’t have
any experience with that [Aegis Combat System], the systems that have been installed or any experience with that [Aegis Combat System], the systems that have been installed or
are in progress in Romania and Poland. So that’s been a running discussion.” are in progress in Romania and Poland. So that’s been a running discussion.”
Schlise said the discussion is taking place at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level. Schlise said the discussion is taking place at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level.
Without any final decisions, though, the Navy could not shed Aegis Ashore spending in its Without any final decisions, though, the Navy could not shed Aegis Ashore spending in its
most recent budgeting work, the Fiscal Year 2022 request that will come out after the Biden most recent budgeting work, the Fiscal Year 2022 request that will come out after the Biden
administration comes in and can review it. administration comes in and can review it.
“For the purposes of this past budget cycle, it was just kind of tabled. So we’ll have to see “For the purposes of this past budget cycle, it was just kind of tabled. So we’ll have to see
where that discussion goes. As always, here in the building, it’s about money. So if that where that discussion goes. As always, here in the building, it’s about money. So if that
transition were to be considered and approved for moving forward, to transition it to transition were to be considered and approved for moving forward, to transition it to
another service, ‘who’s going to pay’ will of course be part of the discussion,” Schlise another service, ‘who’s going to pay’ will of course be part of the discussion,” Schlise
said.28 said.28
Japan Planned and Later Canceled Two Sites
Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems that reportedly were to be Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems that reportedly were to be
located at Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) facilities in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and located at Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) facilities in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and
Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, and would be operated mainly by the GSDF (i.e., Japan’s Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, and would be operated mainly by the GSDF (i.e., Japan’s
army).29 The two systems reportedly were to be equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar called army).29 The two systems reportedly were to be equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar called
the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that
is being installed on U.S. Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly were to go into operation by is being installed on U.S. Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly were to go into operation by
2023.30 On June 15, 2020, however, Japan announced that it had suspended implementation of its 2023.30 On June 15, 2020, however, Japan announced that it had suspended implementation of its
Aegis Ashore initiative due to cost growth and technical concerns.31 On June 25, 2020, Japan Aegis Ashore initiative due to cost growth and technical concerns.31 On June 25, 2020, Japan

28 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Wants to Shed Aegis Ashore Mission, But Army Still Hasn’t Agreed to Take It,” 28 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Wants to Shed Aegis Ashore Mission, But Army Still Hasn’t Agreed to Take It,” USNI
News, January 12, 2021. , January 12, 2021.
29 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Akita, Yamaguchi to Get Aegis Ashore/GSDF Involvement Expected to Strengthen Missile 29 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Akita, Yamaguchi to Get Aegis Ashore/GSDF Involvement Expected to Strengthen Missile
Defense,” Defense,” The Japan News, November 11, 2017. See also Kyodo, “Japan Mulling News Missile Interceptor , November 11, 2017. See also Kyodo, “Japan Mulling News Missile Interceptor
Deployment to Guard Against North Korea,” Deployment to Guard Against North Korea,” South China Morning Post, November 11, 2017. , November 11, 2017.
30 Anthony Capaccio, “Japan in Talks With U.S. on Buying Aegis Missile Defense,” 30 Anthony Capaccio, “Japan in Talks With U.S. on Buying Aegis Missile Defense,” Bloomberg, November 7, 2017. , November 7, 2017.
31 See, for example, Rich Abott, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Due To Technical And Cost Concerns,” 31 See, for example, Rich Abott, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Due To Technical And Cost Concerns,” Defense Daily, ,
June 15, 2020; Sam LaGrone, “Japan Backing Away From Aegis Ashore,” June 15, 2020; Sam LaGrone, “Japan Backing Away From Aegis Ashore,” USNI News, June 15, 2020; Mari , June 15, 2020; Mari
Yamaguchi, “Japan to Scrap Costly Land-Based US Missile Defense System,” Yamaguchi, “Japan to Scrap Costly Land-Based US Missile Defense System,” Associated Press, June 15, 2020; Mike , June 15, 2020; Mike
Yeo, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Deployment, Pointing to Cost and Technical Issues,” Yeo, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Deployment, Pointing to Cost and Technical Issues,” Defense News, June 15, , June 15,
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confirmed that it had canceled the plan for deploying the two Aegis Ashore sites.32 A December 6, confirmed that it had canceled the plan for deploying the two Aegis Ashore sites.32 A December 6,
2020, press report stated 2020, press report stated
Japan will put new powerful Aegis radars on warships to upgrade its defences against Japan will put new powerful Aegis radars on warships to upgrade its defences against
possible ballistic missiles fired by North Korea after it cancelled plans to deploy them at possible ballistic missiles fired by North Korea after it cancelled plans to deploy them at
two ground-based stations, the Asahi newspaper reported. two ground-based stations, the Asahi newspaper reported.
Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s government is likely to approve the recommendation by Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s government is likely to approve the recommendation by
the country’s National Security Council before the end of the year, although any decision the country’s National Security Council before the end of the year, although any decision
on type of vessel or cost will be left until next year, the paper said, citing unidentified on type of vessel or cost will be left until next year, the paper said, citing unidentified
sources…. sources….
Deploying the new Aegis radars could cost twice as much and take up to three years longer Deploying the new Aegis radars could cost twice as much and take up to three years longer
to complete than the ground-based versions, which were expected cost of around $2 billion to complete than the ground-based versions, which were expected cost of around $2 billion
to build, a source with knowledge of the proposal told Reuters earlier…. to build, a source with knowledge of the proposal told Reuters earlier….
Fitted with Lockheed Martin Corp SPY-7 radars that will have at least three times the range Fitted with Lockheed Martin Corp SPY-7 radars that will have at least three times the range
of older Aegis systems deployed on Japanese navy destroyers, the upgrade will allow Japan of older Aegis systems deployed on Japanese navy destroyers, the upgrade will allow Japan
to use new interceptor missiles to target warheads in space fired by North Korea or other to use new interceptor missiles to target warheads in space fired by North Korea or other
potential foes, including China and Russia.33 potential foes, including China and Russia.33
An August 19, 2021, press report stated An August 19, 2021, press report stated
A sea-based Aegis missile defense system could be the next program to be abandoned by A sea-based Aegis missile defense system could be the next program to be abandoned by
Tokyo. Tokyo.

2020; Brad Glosserman, “Canceling Aegis Ashore Raises Problems—and Hopes,” 2020; Brad Glosserman, “Canceling Aegis Ashore Raises Problems—and Hopes,” Japan Times, June 17, 2020. , June 17, 2020.
Prior to the June 15, 2020, announcement, Japan had announced in early May that it would evaluate alternatives to the Prior to the June 15, 2020, announcement, Japan had announced in early May that it would evaluate alternatives to the
Akita Prefecture site due to strong local opposition to that site. (Masaya Kato, “Japan’s Missile Shield Deployment Akita Prefecture site due to strong local opposition to that site. (Masaya Kato, “Japan’s Missile Shield Deployment
Scuppered by Local Resistance,” Scuppered by Local Resistance,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 7, 2020.) , May 7, 2020.)
32 Mari Yamaguchi (Associated Press), “Japan Confirms It’s Scrapping US Missile Defense System,” 32 Mari Yamaguchi (Associated Press), “Japan Confirms It’s Scrapping US Missile Defense System,” Defense News, ,
June 25, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Japan Officially Ends Aegis Ashore Plans After National Security Council June 25, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Japan Officially Ends Aegis Ashore Plans After National Security Council
Deliberations,” Deliberations,” USNI News, June 26, 2020. , June 26, 2020.
See also Grant Newsham “Abe’s Aegis Ashore Cancellation Doesn’t Add Up,” See also Grant Newsham “Abe’s Aegis Ashore Cancellation Doesn’t Add Up,” Asia Times, June 30, 2020; Lucy Craft, , June 30, 2020; Lucy Craft,
“Why Japan Scrapped a $4 Billion Missile Defense Purchase from the U.S.,” “Why Japan Scrapped a $4 Billion Missile Defense Purchase from the U.S.,” CBS News, July 2, 2020; Tim Kelly, , July 2, 2020; Tim Kelly,
“Explainer: Strike Capability, Other Military Options on Table after Japan’s Aegis U-Turn,” “Explainer: Strike Capability, Other Military Options on Table after Japan’s Aegis U-Turn,” Reuters, July 2, 2020; , July 2, 2020;
Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan Is Canceling a U.S. Missile Defense System,” Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan Is Canceling a U.S. Missile Defense System,” Foreign Policy, July 2, 2020; Bruce , July 2, 2020; Bruce
Klingner, “Japan Undercuts Its Defense Against North Korean Missiles,” Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2020; Tim Klingner, “Japan Undercuts Its Defense Against North Korean Missiles,” Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2020; Tim
Kelly and Yoshifumi Takemoto, “Exclusive: As Japan Weighs Missile-Defence Options, Raytheon Lobbies for Kelly and Yoshifumi Takemoto, “Exclusive: As Japan Weighs Missile-Defence Options, Raytheon Lobbies for
Lockheed’s $300 Million Radar Deal,” Reuters, July 30, 2020; Rieko Miki, “The Price of Peace: Why Japan Scrapped Lockheed’s $300 Million Radar Deal,” Reuters, July 30, 2020; Rieko Miki, “The Price of Peace: Why Japan Scrapped
a $4.2bn US Missile System,” a $4.2bn US Missile System,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 5, 2020; Loren Thompson, “Japan’s Rethink Of Aegis , August 5, 2020; Loren Thompson, “Japan’s Rethink Of Aegis
Ashore Could Tie Up Navy, Increase Costs And Cause Big Delays,” Ashore Could Tie Up Navy, Increase Costs And Cause Big Delays,” Forbes, August 11, 2020. , August 11, 2020.
On June 18, 2020, it was reported that the United States and Japan were in talks to address the technical issues Japan On June 18, 2020, it was reported that the United States and Japan were in talks to address the technical issues Japan
cited and explore potential paths forward for bolstering Japan’s ballistic missile defense capability. See Lara Seligman, cited and explore potential paths forward for bolstering Japan’s ballistic missile defense capability. See Lara Seligman,
“U.S. and Japan in Talks about ‘Alternatives’ to Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System,” “U.S. and Japan in Talks about ‘Alternatives’ to Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System,” Politico Pro, June 18, 2020; , June 18, 2020;
Idrees Ali, “U.S. in Talks with Japan after Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Suspension: Official,” Idrees Ali, “U.S. in Talks with Japan after Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Suspension: Official,” Reuters, June , June
18, 2020; Jason Sherman, “MDA Hopes to ‘Resolve’ Japan’s Aegis Ashore Concerns, Reinstate Project,” 18, 2020; Jason Sherman, “MDA Hopes to ‘Resolve’ Japan’s Aegis Ashore Concerns, Reinstate Project,” Inside
Defense, June 18, 2020; “U.S. Talking with Japan on Concerns over Halted Missile Defense Plan,” , June 18, 2020; “U.S. Talking with Japan on Concerns over Halted Missile Defense Plan,” Kyodo News, June , June
19, 2020. See also Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Eyes Offshore Options to Replace Aegis Defense System,” 19, 2020. See also Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Eyes Offshore Options to Replace Aegis Defense System,” Asahi Shimbun, ,
September 10, 2020. September 10, 2020.
33 Reuters staff, “Japan to Put New Aegis Radars on Warships after Cancelling Ground Stations: Asahi,” 33 Reuters staff, “Japan to Put New Aegis Radars on Warships after Cancelling Ground Stations: Asahi,” Reuters, ,
December 6, 2020. See also Agence France-Presse, “Japan Weighs Ships For Aegis Missile Defence System,” December 6, 2020. See also Agence France-Presse, “Japan Weighs Ships For Aegis Missile Defence System,”
Barron’s, December 9, 2020; Kyodo, “Cabinet Set to Approve Destroyers as Alternative to Aegis Ashore,” , December 9, 2020; Kyodo, “Cabinet Set to Approve Destroyers as Alternative to Aegis Ashore,” Japan
Times, November 28, 2020. , November 28, 2020.
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The Japanese Defense Ministry does not plan to seek funds for it in the upcoming fiscal The Japanese Defense Ministry does not plan to seek funds for it in the upcoming fiscal
2022 budget. Citing government sources, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper said such a budget 2022 budget. Citing government sources, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper said such a budget
request will “likely be impossible over the next few years.”34 request will “likely be impossible over the next few years.”34
Aegis BMD Development Philosophy and Flight Tests
The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as
following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of “build a little, following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of “build a little,
test a little, learn a lot,” meaning that development is done in manageable steps, with each step test a little, learn a lot,” meaning that development is done in manageable steps, with each step
being tested and validated before moving on to the next step.35 being tested and validated before moving on to the next step.35
An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020
stated the following about testing of the Aegis BMD system: stated the following about testing of the Aegis BMD system:
In fiscal year 2020, the Aegis BMD program did not conduct any of the six planned flight In fiscal year 2020, the Aegis BMD program did not conduct any of the six planned flight
tests, deleting one and delaying the remaining five. Most notably, a major operational flight tests, deleting one and delaying the remaining five. Most notably, a major operational flight
test—FTO-03—was deleted, leaving the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor to enter initial test—FTO-03—was deleted, leaving the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor to enter initial
production with a single operational flight test. Some flight tests were initially delayed due production with a single operational flight test. Some flight tests were initially delayed due
to range availability and higher priority flights tests (such as FEX-01) and delays were then to range availability and higher priority flights tests (such as FEX-01) and delays were then
exacerbated by pandemic-driven travel restrictions. A congressionally mandated flight exacerbated by pandemic-driven travel restrictions. A congressionally mandated flight
test—FTM-44—pitting an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor against a simple ICBM, was test—FTM-44—pitting an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor against a simple ICBM, was
delayed, but executed in November 2020. delayed, but executed in November 2020.
The Aegis BMD program participated in three of five planned ground tests in fiscal year The Aegis BMD program participated in three of five planned ground tests in fiscal year
2020. The two ground tests were delayed due to the pandemic and the unavailability of the 2020. The two ground tests were delayed due to the pandemic and the unavailability of the
Poland Aegis Ashore site, respectively. Poland Aegis Ashore site, respectively.
All seven cybersecurity tests scheduled for fiscal year 2020 were consolidated into a single All seven cybersecurity tests scheduled for fiscal year 2020 were consolidated into a single
test, which was subsequently delayed.36 test, which was subsequently delayed.36
For a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since 2002, For a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since 2002, see Table A-1 iin Appendix.
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program
Japan
Eight BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers
Japan operates eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers—the eighth was commissioned into service Japan operates eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers—the eighth was commissioned into service
in March 2021.37 Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in some of the flight tests in March 2021.37 Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in some of the flight tests
of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (seof the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (see Table A-1 iin Appendix).

34 Chen Chuanren, “Japan’s Sea-Based Aegis System Faces Ax,” 34 Chen Chuanren, “Japan’s Sea-Based Aegis System Faces Ax,” Aviation Week Network, August 19, 2021. , August 19, 2021.
35 See, for example, “Aegis BMD: “Build a Little, Test a Little, Learn a Lot,” USNI blog, March 15, 2010, accessed 35 See, for example, “Aegis BMD: “Build a Little, Test a Little, Learn a Lot,” USNI blog, March 15, 2010, accessed
May 18, 2022, at http://blog.usni.org/2010/03/15/aegis-bmd-build-a-little-test-a-little-learn-a-lot, and “Aegis Ballistic May 18, 2022, at http://blog.usni.org/2010/03/15/aegis-bmd-build-a-little-test-a-little-learn-a-lot, and “Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall Institute, RADM Alan B. Missile Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall Institute, RADM Alan B.
Hicks, USN, Aegis BMD Program Director, August 3, 2009, slide 16 of 20, entitled “Some of our Philosophies In a Hicks, USN, Aegis BMD Program Director, August 3, 2009, slide 16 of 20, entitled “Some of our Philosophies In a
Nutshell (1 of 2),” accessed May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/web/20100706133017/https:/www.marshall.org/Nutshell (1 of 2),” accessed May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/web/20100706133017/https:/www.marshall.org/
pdf/materials/743.pdf. pdf/materials/743.pdf.
36 Government Accountability Office, 36 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but
Annual Goals Unmet, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. , GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24.
37 See, for example, Xavier Vavasseur, “Japan Commissions New Maya-Class AEGIS Destroyer JS Haguro はぐろ 37 See, for example, Xavier Vavasseur, “Japan Commissions New Maya-Class AEGIS Destroyer JS Haguro はぐろ
DDG-180,” DDG-180,” Naval News, March 19, 2021; Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan Commissions 8th Aegis Destroyer Haguro,” , March 19, 2021; Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan Commissions 8th Aegis Destroyer Haguro,” Japan
News, March 20, 2021. , March 20, 2021.
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Cooperative Development of SM-3 Block IIA Missile
As mentioned earlier, Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block As mentioned earlier, Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block
IIA missile. Japan developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of IIA missile. Japan developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of
those technologies, reducing the missile’s development costs for the United States. A July 6, those technologies, reducing the missile’s development costs for the United States. A July 6,
2018, press report states that “the U.S. and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation 2018, press report states that “the U.S. and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation
radar technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection radar technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection
range of the Aegis missile defense system.”38 range of the Aegis missile defense system.”38
Two Aegis Ashore Sites (Canceled)
As mentioned earlier, Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems, but As mentioned earlier, Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems, but
announced in June 2020 that it had canceled the plan. announced in June 2020 that it had canceled the plan.
South Korea
An October 12, 2018, press report states that “the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-An October 12, 2018, press report states that “the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-
based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, a top based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, a top
commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct. 12.”39 commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct. 12.”39
Other Countries
Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD
system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia. Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia. Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are
building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other countries operate destroyers and frigates building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other countries operate destroyers and frigates
with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations. with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations.
FY2023-FY2027 MDA Procurement and R&D Funding
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for Aegis BMD-related effortsadditional funding for Aegis BMD-related efforts. Table 1 shows requested (FY2023) and shows requested (FY2023) and
projected (FY2024-FY2027) MDA procurement and research and development funding for Aegis projected (FY2024-FY2027) MDA procurement and research and development funding for Aegis
BMD efforts under MDA’s FY2023 budget submission. Research and development funding in BMD efforts under MDA’s FY2023 budget submission. Research and development funding in
the table for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis Ashore sites. MDA’s budget also includes the table for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis Ashore sites. MDA’s budget also includes
additional funding not shown in the table for operations and maintenance (O&M) and military additional funding not shown in the table for operations and maintenance (O&M) and military
construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD program. construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD program.

38 Nikkei staff writers, “US Taps Japan Radar Tech to Double Missile Defense Range,” 38 Nikkei staff writers, “US Taps Japan Radar Tech to Double Missile Defense Range,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 6, , July 6,
2018. 2018.
39 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea to Buy Ship-Based Interceptors to Counter Ballistic Missile Threats,” 39 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea to Buy Ship-Based Interceptors to Counter Ballistic Missile Threats,” Defense News, ,
October 12, 2018. October 12, 2018.
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Table 1. FY2023-FY2027 MDA Procurement and
R&D Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding) (In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
FY23
FY24
FY25
FY26
FY27

(req.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
Procurement

Aegis BMD (line 32) Aegis BMD (line 32)
402.2 402.2
378.7 378.7
362.8 362.8
496.9 496.9
506.8 506.8
(SM-3 Block IB missile quantity)
(47)
(27)
(24)
(43)
(43)
Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line 33) Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line 33)
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
SM-3 Block IIA (line 35) SM-3 Block IIA (line 35)
338.0 338.0
458.2 458.2
479.2 479.2
460.5 460.5
457.9 457.9
(SM-3 Block IIA missile quantity)
(10)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)
Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 39) Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 39)
30.1 30.1
2.4 2.4
1.0 1.0
0 0
0 0
Aegis BMD hardware and software (line 41) Aegis BMD hardware and software (line 41)
78.2 78.2
115.8 115.8
116.0 116.0
61.7 61.7
32.7 32.7
SUBTOTAL Procurement
848.5
955.1
959.0
1,019.1
997.4
Research and development

Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 83) Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 83)
600.1 600.1
658.8 658.8
574.0 574.0
570.0 570.0
580.5 580.5
Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line 113) Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line 113)
182.8 182.8
173.5 173.5
159.1 159.1
203.9 203.9
187.5 187.5
Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 115) Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 115)
27.7 27.7
26.9 26.9
26.0 26.0
26.8 26.8
27.4 27.4
SUBTOTAL RDT&E
810.6
859.2
759.1
800.7
795.4
TOTAL
1,659.1
1,814.3
1,718.1
1,819.8
1,792.8
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2023 MDA budget submission. Table prepared by CRS based on FY2023 MDA budget submission.
Issues for Congress
Annual Funding Request
One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and
research and development funding requests for the program. In considering this issue, Congress research and development funding requests for the program. In considering this issue, Congress
may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for the may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for the
fiscal year in question is properly scoped and scheduled, and accurately priced. fiscal year in question is properly scoped and scheduled, and accurately priced.
Estimating and Reporting Costs
Another issue for Congress concerns the adequacy of MDA’s cost estimating and its reporting of Another issue for Congress concerns the adequacy of MDA’s cost estimating and its reporting of
costs. A February 2022 GAO report on MDA’s cost estimating and reporting of costs for missile costs. A February 2022 GAO report on MDA’s cost estimating and reporting of costs for missile
defense programs, including the Aegis BMD program, states defense programs, including the Aegis BMD program, states
The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is continuing efforts The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is continuing efforts
to deliver systems to the warfighter that will protect against enemy missiles. However, to deliver systems to the warfighter that will protect against enemy missiles. However,
shortfalls persist with MDA’s program and flight test cost estimates and reporting. shortfalls persist with MDA’s program and flight test cost estimates and reporting.
Program cost estimates. MDA continues to omit the military services’ operations and MDA continues to omit the military services’ operations and
sustainment costs from the program life-cycle cost estimates.... By omitting these costs, sustainment costs from the program life-cycle cost estimates.... By omitting these costs,
MDA limits decision-makers’ insight into the full financial commitments needed for MDA limits decision-makers’ insight into the full financial commitments needed for
affordability and funding determinations.... affordability and funding determinations....
Flight test cost estimates. Accuracy issues linger with MDA’s flight test cost estimates that Accuracy issues linger with MDA’s flight test cost estimates that
could skew the agency’s annual $1.3 billion [flight test] funding request, such as not being could skew the agency’s annual $1.3 billion [flight test] funding request, such as not being
regularly updated with actual costs. However, MDA is taking steps to improve these cost regularly updated with actual costs. However, MDA is taking steps to improve these cost
estimates by using a new cost model, among other things.... estimates by using a new cost model, among other things....
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Program cost reporting. MDA continues to adjust program baselines without clear MDA continues to adjust program baselines without clear
traceability over time. MDA also forgoes recurrent comparisons to the original baseline. traceability over time. MDA also forgoes recurrent comparisons to the original baseline.
Such adjustments and omissions impede decision-makers’ awareness of each program’s Such adjustments and omissions impede decision-makers’ awareness of each program’s
cost performance and total system cost.... cost performance and total system cost....
Flight test cost reporting. Congress required MDA to report on flight test costs, but we Congress required MDA to report on flight test costs, but we
found the information lacking due to the agency’s reporting methodology. MDA only found the information lacking due to the agency’s reporting methodology. MDA only
accounted for about $1.3 billion of at least $3.5 billion in funding the agency requested for accounted for about $1.3 billion of at least $3.5 billion in funding the agency requested for
flight testing between March 2017 and September 2020. Moreover, the reporting flight testing between March 2017 and September 2020. Moreover, the reporting
requirement ended in December 2021. Without further reporting on complete flight test requirement ended in December 2021. Without further reporting on complete flight test
costs, Congress does not have information needed to facilitate holding the agency costs, Congress does not have information needed to facilitate holding the agency
accountable for its spending.40 accountable for its spending.40
Potential for Intercepting ICBMs
Another issue for Congress is what role the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the Another issue for Congress is what role the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the
U.S. homeland against attack from ICBMs. With the advent of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, U.S. homeland against attack from ICBMs. With the advent of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor,
DOD is evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain ICBMs. Section DOD is evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain ICBMs. Section
1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12,
2017) directed DOD to “conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if technologically feasible, 2017) directed DOD to “conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if technologically feasible,
the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat using the standard missile the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat using the standard missile
3 block IIA missile interceptor.” DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report stated the 3 block IIA missile interceptor.” DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report stated the
following: following:
The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense
architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to existing GBIs architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to existing GBIs
[ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland. [ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland.
This interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the This interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the
burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U.S. homeland against burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U.S. homeland against
evolving rogue states’ long-range missile capabilities. evolving rogue states’ long-range missile capabilities.
Congress has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an Congress has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an
ICBM-class target. MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020. Due to the ICBM-class target. MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020. Due to the
mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or
conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland. Land-based sites conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland. Land-based sites
in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued.41 in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued.41
On November 16, 2020, MDA announced that the congressionally directed ICBM-intercept flight On November 16, 2020, MDA announced that the congressionally directed ICBM-intercept flight
test, called FTM-44, had been conducted on that date and had resulted in a successful intercept of test, called FTM-44, had been conducted on that date and had resulted in a successful intercept of
the ICBM-representative target. MDA stated that “FTM-44, originally scheduled for May 2020, the ICBM-representative target. MDA stated that “FTM-44, originally scheduled for May 2020,
was delayed due to restrictions in personnel and equipment movement intended to reduce the was delayed due to restrictions in personnel and equipment movement intended to reduce the
spread of COVID-19. FTM-44 satisfies a Congressional mandate to evaluate the feasibility of the spread of COVID-19. FTM-44 satisfies a Congressional mandate to evaluate the feasibility of the
SM-3 Block IIA missile’s capability to defeat an ICBM threat before the end of 2020.”42 A SM-3 Block IIA missile’s capability to defeat an ICBM threat before the end of 2020.”42 A
November 17, 2020, press report about the flight test stated that “the unarmed ICBM was a November 17, 2020, press report about the flight test stated that “the unarmed ICBM was a
replica of a target flown against the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system during a March replica of a target flown against the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system during a March

40 Government Accountability Office, 40 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Addressing Cost Estimating and Reporting Shortfalls Could
Improve Insight into Full Costs of Programs and Flight Tests, GAO-22-104344, February 2022, highlights page (PDF , GAO-22-104344, February 2022, highlights page (PDF
page 2 of 58). page 2 of 58).
41 Department of Defense, 41 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review 2019, released January 17, 2019, p. 55. David Axe, “The U.S. 19, released January 17, 2019, p. 55. David Axe, “The U.S.
Navy’s New Missile Defense Is a Bad Idea,” Navy’s New Missile Defense Is a Bad Idea,” National Interest, January 17, 2019. , January 17, 2019.
42 Missile Defense Agency News release 20NEWS-0003, “U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test 42 Missile Defense Agency News release 20NEWS-0003, “U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test
Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” November 16, 2020. Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” November 16, 2020.
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2019 flight test that featured a salvo launch of a pair of interceptors.”43 An April 2021 GAO 2019 flight test that featured a salvo launch of a pair of interceptors.”43 An April 2021 GAO
report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following: report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following:
MDA’s effort to include the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a new “layered” homeland MDA’s effort to include the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a new “layered” homeland
defense against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats targeting the U.S. could defense against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats targeting the U.S. could
introduce considerable cost, schedule, and performance uncertainty to a program that has introduce considerable cost, schedule, and performance uncertainty to a program that has
just entered initial production. The GMD weapon system currently provides defense just entered initial production. The GMD weapon system currently provides defense
against ICBMs, but this new effort would add the SM-3 Block IIA and THAAD weapon against ICBMs, but this new effort would add the SM-3 Block IIA and THAAD weapon
system as layers underneath that provided by GMD. For further details on the GMD and system as layers underneath that provided by GMD. For further details on the GMD and
THAAD weapon systems see their respective appendixes. THAAD weapon systems see their respective appendixes.
ICBM intercepts are more challenging than the IRBM intercepts for which the SM-3 IIA ICBM intercepts are more challenging than the IRBM intercepts for which the SM-3 IIA
was originally designed. MDA’s most recent attempt to create a system for intercepting was originally designed. MDA’s most recent attempt to create a system for intercepting
ICBMs, known as the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), re-used some parts from the SM-3 ICBMs, known as the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), re-used some parts from the SM-3
Block IIA. DOD cancelled the RKV before it could complete development after significant Block IIA. DOD cancelled the RKV before it could complete development after significant
cost and schedule overruns and questions about the ability of the design to overcome cost and schedule overruns and questions about the ability of the design to overcome
specific performance risks. Parts re-used from the SM-3 Block IIA were implicated in some specific performance risks. Parts re-used from the SM-3 Block IIA were implicated in some
of the RKV’s performance shortfalls. Even so, planning for an anti-ICBM capability for of the RKV’s performance shortfalls. Even so, planning for an anti-ICBM capability for
the SM-3 Block IIA continued during and even after the RKV’s termination. the SM-3 Block IIA continued during and even after the RKV’s termination.
Achieving such a capability will require surmounting several challenges. According to Achieving such a capability will require surmounting several challenges. According to
MDA, during the November 2020 flight test named FTM-44, the SM-3 Block IIA struck a MDA, during the November 2020 flight test named FTM-44, the SM-3 Block IIA struck a
simple ICBM target. This was not an operational test, however, and it was executed under simple ICBM target. This was not an operational test, however, and it was executed under
highly favorable conditions. More development work is needed for the SM-3 Block IIA to highly favorable conditions. More development work is needed for the SM-3 Block IIA to
support a layered homeland defense capability. MDA documents show that the agency now support a layered homeland defense capability. MDA documents show that the agency now
plans to develop and procure an upgraded version of the SM-3 Block IIA for the specific plans to develop and procure an upgraded version of the SM-3 Block IIA for the specific
purpose of fulfilling the homeland defense mission.44 purpose of fulfilling the homeland defense mission.44
A May 13, 2021, press report stated A May 13, 2021, press report stated
The Missile Defense Agency proved that a Navy destroyer with a Standard Missile-3 Block The Missile Defense Agency proved that a Navy destroyer with a Standard Missile-3 Block
IIA can stop a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat, but more work remains to IIA can stop a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat, but more work remains to
prove whether this combination could contribute to homeland defense, the MDA director prove whether this combination could contribute to homeland defense, the MDA director
said Wednesday [May 12]. said Wednesday [May 12].
Vice Adm. Jon Hill described the Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM) 44, which took Vice Adm. Jon Hill described the Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM) 44, which took
place in the Pacific in November after pandemic-related delays earlier in the year: A simple place in the Pacific in November after pandemic-related delays earlier in the year: A simple
ICBM target was launched from the Army’s Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test ICBM target was launched from the Army’s Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test
Site on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Satellites detected the launch, and a Site on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Satellites detected the launch, and a
slew of satellites and sensors, including on the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii, slew of satellites and sensors, including on the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii,
tracked the target. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John Finn (DDG-113), positioned tracked the target. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John Finn (DDG-113), positioned
hundreds of miles east of Hawaii, launched an SM-3 Block IIA missile from its deck based hundreds of miles east of Hawaii, launched an SM-3 Block IIA missile from its deck based
on its best fire control solution at the time, and the missile itself maneuvered to successfully on its best fire control solution at the time, and the missile itself maneuvered to successfully
hit the target as it received more information in flight. hit the target as it received more information in flight.
The goal of the test, Hill said while speaking at the annual McAleese FY 2022 Defense The goal of the test, Hill said while speaking at the annual McAleese FY 2022 Defense
Programs Conference, was “to prove that we have the ability to leverage the robustness in Programs Conference, was “to prove that we have the ability to leverage the robustness in
the [Aegis] program, so that was really the first test just to see if it’s feasible. And we the [Aegis] program, so that was really the first test just to see if it’s feasible. And we
learned a lot.” learned a lot.”
Hill said the crew of John Finn, with limited data due to limited sensor coverage across the Hill said the crew of John Finn, with limited data due to limited sensor coverage across the
vast Pacific, maneuvered the ship to get the highest probability of kill. vast Pacific, maneuvered the ship to get the highest probability of kill.

43 Jason Sherman, “SM-3 Block IIA Intercepts ICBM Target, Validating Potential for Homeland Defense 43 Jason Sherman, “SM-3 Block IIA Intercepts ICBM Target, Validating Potential for Homeland Defense
‘Underlayer,’” ‘Underlayer,’” Inside Defense, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
44 Government Accountability Office, 44 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but
Annual Goals Unmet, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. See also Jen Judson, “Watchdog Expresses Concern over Using , GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. See also Jen Judson, “Watchdog Expresses Concern over Using
US Navy Interceptor for Homeland Missile Defense,” US Navy Interceptor for Homeland Missile Defense,” Defense News, April 29, 2021. , April 29, 2021.
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“It maneuvered, shot the missile; lots of uncertainty because of lack of sensor coverage for “It maneuvered, shot the missile; lots of uncertainty because of lack of sensor coverage for
such a long-range flight where we were doing the exercise. So what we actually saw was a such a long-range flight where we were doing the exercise. So what we actually saw was a
really high divert [from the missile]. So kind of two walkaways from that first test, which really high divert [from the missile]. So kind of two walkaways from that first test, which
is why I think it was really important, was that it was the longest propagated error or is why I think it was really important, was that it was the longest propagated error or
uncertainty that we’ve ever seen in any test. And then we had the highest divert—that uncertainty that we’ve ever seen in any test. And then we had the highest divert—that
meant the [SM-3 IIA] missile was maneuvering to actually take it out, and it still took it meant the [SM-3 IIA] missile was maneuvering to actually take it out, and it still took it
out, which is really great,” Hill continued. out, which is really great,” Hill continued.
“In terms of feasibility, did we accomplish the mission? Absolutely. Every test objective “In terms of feasibility, did we accomplish the mission? Absolutely. Every test objective
achieved in November.” achieved in November.”
Hill was asked about an April Government Accountability Office report that cited concerns Hill was asked about an April Government Accountability Office report that cited concerns
about the Aegis Combat System/SM-3 IIA pairing for the homeland defense mission—as about the Aegis Combat System/SM-3 IIA pairing for the homeland defense mission—as
opposed to the regional defense mission it was built for, to protect a high-value asset such opposed to the regional defense mission it was built for, to protect a high-value asset such
as an aircraft carrier from an intermediate-range missile—and whether the simple ICBM as an aircraft carrier from an intermediate-range missile—and whether the simple ICBM
target used in the November test was representative of the real world. target used in the November test was representative of the real world.
“So what’s next? What’s next is to go against a more complex intercontinental ballistic “So what’s next? What’s next is to go against a more complex intercontinental ballistic
missile threat, and maybe even change the scenario. This scenario was a defense of Hawaii missile threat, and maybe even change the scenario. This scenario was a defense of Hawaii
scenario against a rogue nation—you guess which one out there in the Pacific—and in the scenario against a rogue nation—you guess which one out there in the Pacific—and in the
future we’re going to go to a more complex [threat], and that’s within the next couple future we’re going to go to a more complex [threat], and that’s within the next couple
years,” he said. years,” he said.
“So we’re still analyzing data from November, and then we’re going to make upgrades and “So we’re still analyzing data from November, and then we’re going to make upgrades and
changes to the combat system, and we’ll make changes to the missile in terms of threat set changes to the combat system, and we’ll make changes to the missile in terms of threat set
to take on a higher end class threat.” to take on a higher end class threat.”
MDA and the military services would have to further integrate systems together to make MDA and the military services would have to further integrate systems together to make
this a credible layer in the homeland defense network, Hill said. During the November test, this a credible layer in the homeland defense network, Hill said. During the November test,
the MDA commanded and controlled the event from the Missile Defense Interoperability the MDA commanded and controlled the event from the Missile Defense Interoperability
and Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colo., using the Command and Control Battle and Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colo., using the Command and Control Battle
Management and Communication System (C2BMC) to receive satellite and sensor data Management and Communication System (C2BMC) to receive satellite and sensor data
and feed it to John Finn, which fired its missile on remote without having access to the and feed it to John Finn, which fired its missile on remote without having access to the
sensor data itself. While that worked in a controlled environment, for a permanent sensor data itself. While that worked in a controlled environment, for a permanent
homeland defense mission the ship would need to be better integrated into U.S. Northern homeland defense mission the ship would need to be better integrated into U.S. Northern
Command’s network to fully share information and targeting data. Command’s network to fully share information and targeting data.
Hill said that Aegis has been integrated to operate with the Terminal High Altitude Area Hill said that Aegis has been integrated to operate with the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense system, and THAAD has been integrated with the Patriot missile defense system, Defense system, and THAAD has been integrated with the Patriot missile defense system,
but MDA hasn’t integrated all the regional defense systems with homeland defense but MDA hasn’t integrated all the regional defense systems with homeland defense
systems. systems.
Beyond the actual integration and engineering work, Hill added that there was a policy Beyond the actual integration and engineering work, Hill added that there was a policy
question to answer, too. question to answer, too.
“Do we want ships in that role of being off the West Coast … defending against ICBMs as “Do we want ships in that role of being off the West Coast … defending against ICBMs as
a layer to the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense? That’s an incredible conversation, a layer to the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense? That’s an incredible conversation,
we’re having that now, and it’s hard to predict where it will go.” we’re having that now, and it’s hard to predict where it will go.”
Asked on Thursday during the Naval Postgraduate School’s acquisition research Asked on Thursday during the Naval Postgraduate School’s acquisition research
symposium if the Navy has the capacity and appetite to use destroyers for homeland symposium if the Navy has the capacity and appetite to use destroyers for homeland
defense, Hill said much of it comes down to what ships are available for the mission. defense, Hill said much of it comes down to what ships are available for the mission.
“I think if you asked Gen. [Glen] VanHerck from NORTHCOM about his confidence in “I think if you asked Gen. [Glen] VanHerck from NORTHCOM about his confidence in
defending the nation today, the answer would be confident. But as the threat evolves, right, defending the nation today, the answer would be confident. But as the threat evolves, right,
you start to see a little change in that view. And so it’s been viewed for a while that the you start to see a little change in that view. And so it’s been viewed for a while that the
Navy can play a role in that area, but it becomes an asset problem,” Hill said. “There are Navy can play a role in that area, but it becomes an asset problem,” Hill said. “There are
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only so many ships we have up there. And they’re multi-mission ships, and they have a lot only so many ships we have up there. And they’re multi-mission ships, and they have a lot
of roles around the globe to execute.”45 of roles around the globe to execute.”45
A June 22, 2021, press report stated A June 22, 2021, press report stated
The Pentagon’s No. 2 official has ordered 11 missile interceptors transferred from research The Pentagon’s No. 2 official has ordered 11 missile interceptors transferred from research
and development for possible deployment on Navy ships in the Pacific or European regions and development for possible deployment on Navy ships in the Pacific or European regions
after a test in November indicated they could stop an intercontinental ballistic missile. after a test in November indicated they could stop an intercontinental ballistic missile.
In the test, the USS John Finn intercepted a mock ICBM intended to simulate one that In the test, the USS John Finn intercepted a mock ICBM intended to simulate one that
could be launched at Hawaii by North Korea. The destroyer, operating near Hawaii, fired could be launched at Hawaii by North Korea. The destroyer, operating near Hawaii, fired
off one of the Standard Missile-3 model Block IIA interceptors built by Raytheon off one of the Standard Missile-3 model Block IIA interceptors built by Raytheon
Technologies Corp. at the target launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Technologies Corp. at the target launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.
Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks informed Congress May 27 of her rationale for Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks informed Congress May 27 of her rationale for
transferring the interceptors, although she didn’t disclose it publicly. transferring the interceptors, although she didn’t disclose it publicly.
“The missiles have conducted successful intercept tests and their deployment is in the “The missiles have conducted successful intercept tests and their deployment is in the
important interest of our national security,” Hicks spokesman Jamal Brown said in an email important interest of our national security,” Hicks spokesman Jamal Brown said in an email
this month. The transfer to the Navy marks the first major missile defense initiative of the this month. The transfer to the Navy marks the first major missile defense initiative of the
Biden administration. Biden administration.
Although the Navy’s Aegis combat system, which launched the missile, and the interceptor Although the Navy’s Aegis combat system, which launched the missile, and the interceptor
“were not designed to defeat an ICBM-class target, this test demonstrated some potential “were not designed to defeat an ICBM-class target, this test demonstrated some potential
limited capability,” Vice Admiral Jon Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, said in limited capability,” Vice Admiral Jon Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, said in
testimony to Congress last week.46 testimony to Congress last week.46
Required vs. Available Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
Another potential issue for Congress concerns required versus available numbers of BMD-Another potential issue for Congress concerns required versus available numbers of BMD-
capable Aegis ships. Some observers have expressed concern about the potential operational capable Aegis ships. Some observers have expressed concern about the potential operational
implications of a shortfall in the available number of BMD-capable relative to the required implications of a shortfall in the available number of BMD-capable relative to the required
number. Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August 15, 2018, Navy number. Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August 15, 2018, Navy
information paper states the following: information paper states the following:
The [Navy’s] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA]47 sets the requirement [for BMD- The [Navy’s] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA]47 sets the requirement [for BMD-
capable ships] at 54 BMD-capable ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant capable ships] at 54 BMD-capable ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant
requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and
limited expeditionary land base sites…. limited expeditionary land base sites….
The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as
follows. It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests for follows. It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests for
defense of land. defense of land.
- 30 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups - 30 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups
- 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand - 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand

45 Megan Eckstein, “MDA: Test of DDG, Standard Missile-3 IIA a Good Start, But More Work Needed on Homeland 45 Megan Eckstein, “MDA: Test of DDG, Standard Missile-3 IIA a Good Start, But More Work Needed on Homeland
Defense Mission,” Defense Mission,” USNI News, May 13, 2021. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Planning Second SM-3 Block IIA , May 13, 2021. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Planning Second SM-3 Block IIA
Flight Test Against ICBM Target; New Development and Upgraded Interceptor Needed,” Flight Test Against ICBM Target; New Development and Upgraded Interceptor Needed,” Inside Defense, May 12, , May 12,
2021; Rich Abott, “MDA Planning Second Test of SM-3 IIA Against ICBM Target,” 2021; Rich Abott, “MDA Planning Second Test of SM-3 IIA Against ICBM Target,” Defense Daily, May 17, 2021. , May 17, 2021.
46 Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Ships Close to Getting Interceptors That Could Stop an ICBM,” 46 Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Ships Close to Getting Interceptors That Could Stop an ICBM,” Bloomberg, June 22, , June 22,
2021. 2021.
47 The FSA is the Navy’s analysis, performed every few years, that establishes the Navy’s ship force structure 47 The FSA is the Navy’s analysis, performed every few years, that establishes the Navy’s ship force structure
requirements. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, requirements. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
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- 9 in forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operational timelines in - 9 in forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operational timelines in
USINDOPACOM USINDOPACOM
- 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM.48 - 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM.48
Burden of BMD Mission on U.S. Navy Aegis Ships
A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the
Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to
operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U.S. Navy missions, operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U.S. Navy missions,
and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy
Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites. A June 16, 2018, press report states the Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites. A June 16, 2018, press report states the
following: following:
The U.S. Navy’s top officer wants to end standing ballistic missile defense patrols and The U.S. Navy’s top officer wants to end standing ballistic missile defense patrols and
transfer the mission to shore-based assets. transfer the mission to shore-based assets.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12 Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12
that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has
put a growing strain on the Navy’s hard-worn surface combatants, and the duty shifted put a growing strain on the Navy’s hard-worn surface combatants, and the duty shifted
towards more shore-based infrastructure. towards more shore-based infrastructure.
“Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers “Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers
and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Richardson said and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Richardson said
during his address at the U.S. Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum. “And if you during his address at the U.S. Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum. “And if you
know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant. know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant.
“You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile.
So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little
box, defending land.” box, defending land.”
Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long
term the problem demands a different solution. term the problem demands a different solution.
“It’s a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile “It’s a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile
defense, we’re there,” he said. “But 10 years down the road, it’s time to build something defense, we’re there,” he said. “But 10 years down the road, it’s time to build something
on land to defend the land. Whether that’s AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of on land to defend the land. Whether that’s AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of
the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense.” the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense.”
The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the
surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a steaming box surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a steaming box
doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that
could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia. could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia.
The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface fleet. Amid the The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface fleet. Amid the
nuclear threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of the nuclear threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of the
readiness generated in the Japan-based U.S. 7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation readiness generated in the Japan-based U.S. 7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation
that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews, that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews,
an environment described in the Navy’s comprehensive review into the two collisions that an environment described in the Navy’s comprehensive review into the two collisions that
claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017. claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017.
Richardson said that as potential enemies double down on anti-access technologies Richardson said that as potential enemies double down on anti-access technologies
designed to keep the U.S. Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its designed to keep the U.S. Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its
own assets. own assets.

48 Navy information paper dated August 15, 2018, entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capable Ships 48 Navy information paper dated August 15, 2018, entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capable Ships
requirement,” provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CBO and CRS on August 15, 2018. The information requirement,” provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CBO and CRS on August 15, 2018. The information
paper was requested by CBO. paper was requested by CBO.
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“We’re going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle “We’re going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle
spaces we need to get into,” he said. “And so restoring dynamic maneuver has something spaces we need to get into,” he said. “And so restoring dynamic maneuver has something
to do with missile defense.49 to do with missile defense.49
A June 23, 2018, press report states the following: A June 23, 2018, press report states the following:
The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it’s The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it’s
preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U.S. Navy Aegis preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U.S. Navy Aegis
destroyer] fleet. Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the destroyer] fleet. Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the
U.S. Navy’s surface ships. U.S. Navy’s surface ships.
The Navy now stands at a crossroads. BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that The Navy now stands at a crossroads. BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that
has pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past decade. The has pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past decade. The
game-changing SPY-6 air and missile defense radar destined for DDG Flight III, for game-changing SPY-6 air and missile defense radar destined for DDG Flight III, for
example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters. But a smaller example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters. But a smaller
fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions
in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions. in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions.
“Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and “Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and
destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Chief of Naval destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Chief of Naval
Operations Adm. John Richardson said during an address at the recent U.S. Naval War Operations Adm. John Richardson said during an address at the recent U.S. Naval War
College’s Current Strategy Forum. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at College’s Current Strategy Forum. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at
intercepting that incoming missile. So we have six ships that could go anywhere in the intercepting that incoming missile. So we have six ships that could go anywhere in the
world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land.” world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land.”
And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are
in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them. in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them.
The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible
and less predictable―“dynamic” is the buzzword of moment in Navy circles. What and less predictable―“dynamic” is the buzzword of moment in Navy circles. What
Richardson is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away from Richardson is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away from
ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites, ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites,
and also surging the Navy’s at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat.... and also surging the Navy’s at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat....
In a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO’s comments, Navy spokesman In a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO’s comments, Navy spokesman
Cmdr. William Speaks said the Navy’s position is that BMD is an integral part of the Cmdr. William Speaks said the Navy’s position is that BMD is an integral part of the
service’s mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should “consider a more service’s mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should “consider a more
persistent, land-based solution as an option.” persistent, land-based solution as an option.”
“This idea is not about the nation’s or the Navy’s commitment to BMD for the U.S. and “This idea is not about the nation’s or the Navy’s commitment to BMD for the U.S. and
our allies and partners―the Navy’s commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid,” our allies and partners―the Navy’s commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid,”
Speaks said. “In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60 Speaks said. “In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60
by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability. by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability.
“The idea is about how to best meet that commitment. In alignment with our national “The idea is about how to best meet that commitment. In alignment with our national
strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this
calls us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission and calls us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission and
optimize the power of the joint force.”... optimize the power of the joint force.”...
While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission
ships is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a retired ships is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a retired
destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group. destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group.
“The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface “The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface
combatants,” McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO’s comments. combatants,” McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO’s comments.
“Absent it, the number of CG’s and DDG’s would necessarily decline. This may in fact be “Absent it, the number of CG’s and DDG’s would necessarily decline. This may in fact be
desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate

49 David B. Larter, “The US Navy Is Fed Up with Ballistic Missile Defense Patrols,” 49 David B. Larter, “The US Navy Is Fed Up with Ballistic Missile Defense Patrols,” Defense News, June 16, 2018. See , June 16, 2018. See
also Paul McLeary, “Will Budget Crunch Pentagon Laser & Space Investments?” also Paul McLeary, “Will Budget Crunch Pentagon Laser & Space Investments?” Breaking Defense, November 13, , November 13,
2018. 2018.
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underway. Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive underway. Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive
ones. ones.
“But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi- “But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi-
mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission
is an incredibly good thing. If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime sub-optimization is an incredibly good thing. If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime sub-optimization
in order to have wartime capacity—should this not be considered a positive thing?” in order to have wartime capacity—should this not be considered a positive thing?”
McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis
have been in response to the BMD threat. And indeed, the crown jewels of the surface have been in response to the BMD threat. And indeed, the crown jewels of the surface
fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD
simultaneously; the Aegis common-source library; the forthcoming SPY-6; cooperative simultaneously; the Aegis common-source library; the forthcoming SPY-6; cooperative
engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission.... engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission....
A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy’s shifting A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy’s shifting
language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the Navy language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the Navy
latched onto the mission. But the official added that the situation more than a decade later latched onto the mission. But the official added that the situation more than a decade later
has dramatically shifted. has dramatically shifted.
“The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly “The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly
in the western Pacific. We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as in the western Pacific. We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as
interconnected and interdependent as we do today,” the official said. “Nor have we ever interconnected and interdependent as we do today,” the official said. “Nor have we ever
seen technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we see seen technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we see
emerging around us. China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move emerging around us. China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move
to reshape the environment to their favor.” to reshape the environment to their favor.”
In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ desire to use the force more In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ desire to use the force more
dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said. “This includes taking a dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said. “This includes taking a
look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete, look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete,
deter and win against those who threaten us.”50 deter and win against those who threaten us.”50
A January 29, 2019, press report states the following: A January 29, 2019, press report states the following:
The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service’s top admiral The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service’s top admiral
said today, and the Pentagon’s new missile defense review might give the service the off-said today, and the Pentagon’s new missile defense review might give the service the off-
ramp it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile ramp it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile
launches. launches.
This wasn’t the first time Adm. John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in This wasn’t the first time Adm. John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in
“small boxes” at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other “small boxes” at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other
missions challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and the missions challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and the
North Atlantic…. North Atlantic….
“We’ve got exquisite capability, but we’ve had ships protecting some pretty static assets “We’ve got exquisite capability, but we’ve had ships protecting some pretty static assets
on land for a decade,” Richardson said at the Brookings Institute. “If that [stationary] asset on land for a decade,” Richardson said at the Brookings Institute. “If that [stationary] asset
is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let’s build something on land and protect is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let’s build something on land and protect
that and liberate these ships from this mission.” that and liberate these ships from this mission.”
Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor
and shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed with the Aegis radar and shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed with the Aegis radar
and missile defense system, both of which would free up American hulls from what and missile defense system, both of which would free up American hulls from what
Richardson on Monday called “the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for Richardson on Monday called “the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for
ballistic missile defense.”51 ballistic missile defense.”51

50 David B. Larter, “As Threats Mount, US Navy Grapples with Costly Ballistic Missile Defense Mission,” 50 David B. Larter, “As Threats Mount, US Navy Grapples with Costly Ballistic Missile Defense Mission,” Defense
News, June 23, 2018. , June 23, 2018.
51 Paul McLeary, “The Navy Has Had Enough of Missile Defense And Sees Its Chance,” 51 Paul McLeary, “The Navy Has Had Enough of Missile Defense And Sees Its Chance,” Breaking Defense, January , January
28, 2019. 28, 2019.
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Allied Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. Allied Contributions to Regional
BMD Capabilities
Another related potential issue for Congress concerns allied burden sharing—how allied Another related potential issue for Congress concerns allied burden sharing—how allied
contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to
overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U.S. overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U.S.
defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U.S. Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U.S. Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some
U.S. observers for increased allied defense efforts. The issue can arise in connection with both U.S. observers for increased allied defense efforts. The issue can arise in connection with both
U.S. allies in Europe and U.S. allies in Asia. Regarding U.S. allies in Asia, a December 12, 2018, U.S. allies in Europe and U.S. allies in Asia. Regarding U.S. allies in Asia, a December 12, 2018,
press report states the following: press report states the following:
In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during
a speech at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current a speech at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current
practice of dedicating several US Navy warships solely for Ballistic Missile Defense practice of dedicating several US Navy warships solely for Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD). (BMD).
Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are
limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land-based limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land-based
BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system. Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system.
In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has
gone quiet. gone quiet.
“My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate “My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate
actually stood,” one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times. actually stood,” one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times.
But others agree with him. Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US But others agree with him. Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), acknowledges Richardson’s attempts to highlight how Missile Defense Agency (MDA), acknowledges Richardson’s attempts to highlight how
these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome “strain on the (US Navy’s) crews and these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome “strain on the (US Navy’s) crews and
equipment.” equipment.”
But there are complications. While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather But there are complications. While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather
than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could
defeat land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy’s Aegis-defeat land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy’s Aegis-
equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in
greater survivability overall. greater survivability overall.
As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps other As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps other
systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and
South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents
abrupt change…. abrupt change….
Japan’s decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy Japan’s decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy
cessation of BMD patrols. “The land-based option is more reliable, less logistically cessation of BMD patrols. “The land-based option is more reliable, less logistically
draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it
provides a degree of reassurance to the Japanese people and US government, and provides a degree of reassurance to the Japanese people and US government, and
introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations,” said introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations,” said
[Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University [Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University
in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa. in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa.
“Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward- “Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward-
defense, before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions defense, before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions
times,” Mulloy said. “Aegis Ashore gives more reaction time – but over Japanese times,” Mulloy said. “Aegis Ashore gives more reaction time – but over Japanese
airspace.”… airspace.”…
The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific
is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo. However, the Trump is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo. However, the Trump
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administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support
US troops deployed overseas. US troops deployed overseas.
Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might
view a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly aggressive view a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly aggressive
defense posture in the region. defense posture in the region.
But for them, it is a no-win situation. If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China But for them, it is a no-win situation. If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China
and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances
the US Navy’s maritime warfare capabilities.52 the US Navy’s maritime warfare capabilities.52
Role of Aegis BMD in New Guam Missile Defense Architecture
Another issue for Congress is the role of the Aegis BMD program in a new missile defense Another issue for Congress is the role of the Aegis BMD program in a new missile defense
system architecture for Guam. After studying various possible BMD system architectures for system architecture for Guam. After studying various possible BMD system architectures for
Guam, DOD is proposing a system that would combine elements of the Aegis BMD system with Guam, DOD is proposing a system that would combine elements of the Aegis BMD system with
elements of Army BMD systems. MDA’s proposed FY2023 budget requests funding to begin elements of Army BMD systems. MDA’s proposed FY2023 budget requests funding to begin
implementing its this BMD architecture for Guam. A March 30, 2022, press report states implementing its this BMD architecture for Guam. A March 30, 2022, press report states
The Missile Defense Agency’s initial plan for the architecture to protect Guam turns to The Missile Defense Agency’s initial plan for the architecture to protect Guam turns to
proven systems to help the agency meet a 2026 fielding deadline, according Vice Adm. proven systems to help the agency meet a 2026 fielding deadline, according Vice Adm.
Jon Hill, the agency’s director. Jon Hill, the agency’s director.
The defense of Guam from potential ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missile attacks has The defense of Guam from potential ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missile attacks has
become a priority for the MDA, which is seeking $539 million in fiscal 2023 to continue become a priority for the MDA, which is seeking $539 million in fiscal 2023 to continue
to design and develop multiple-land based radar systems, procure weapon system to design and develop multiple-land based radar systems, procure weapon system
components and initiate military construction planning and design activity. components and initiate military construction planning and design activity.
“Current forces are capable of defending Guam against today’s North Korean ballistic “Current forces are capable of defending Guam against today’s North Korean ballistic
missile threats,” Dee Dee Martinez, the MDA’s comptroller said in a March 28 Pentagon missile threats,” Dee Dee Martinez, the MDA’s comptroller said in a March 28 Pentagon
budget briefing. “However, the regional threat to Guam, including from China, continues budget briefing. “However, the regional threat to Guam, including from China, continues
to rapidly evolve.”... to rapidly evolve.”...
The architecture will not be a fixed missile defense site like Aegis Ashore in Romania and The architecture will not be a fixed missile defense site like Aegis Ashore in Romania and
Poland, Hill said. “Think of it as a distributed system.” He added that the agency is Poland, Hill said. “Think of it as a distributed system.” He added that the agency is
interested in using mobile launchers. interested in using mobile launchers.
The architecture will include Navy SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, the Patriot air-and-missile The architecture will include Navy SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, the Patriot air-and-missile
defense system and the Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD). defense system and the Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD).
A THAAD battery has been operating on Guam since 2013. A THAAD battery has been operating on Guam since 2013.
Those elements will be connected through the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System, Those elements will be connected through the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System,
a command-and control-system that connects sensors and shooters on the battlefield. The a command-and control-system that connects sensors and shooters on the battlefield. The
agency will also use the Aegis weapon system’s fire control capability, Hill said. agency will also use the Aegis weapon system’s fire control capability, Hill said.
“Patriot [has] a fabulous capability for cruise missile defense, and that’s our first focus “Patriot [has] a fabulous capability for cruise missile defense, and that’s our first focus
area,” Hill said. “And we have the ability within Aegis to enable that, but, right now, we area,” Hill said. “And we have the ability within Aegis to enable that, but, right now, we
are doing ballistic missiles, hypersonic, on the Aegis part of that overall integrated are doing ballistic missiles, hypersonic, on the Aegis part of that overall integrated
architecture and then the cruise missile piece will be with the Army systems.” architecture and then the cruise missile piece will be with the Army systems.”
While MDA is focused on using existing technology to make up the architecture, it will While MDA is focused on using existing technology to make up the architecture, it will
consider new technology, including the Mid-Range Capability missile the Army will field consider new technology, including the Mid-Range Capability missile the Army will field
in FY23, as it becomes available, according to Hill.... in FY23, as it becomes available, according to Hill....
“That topology of the island … it is a tough place,” Hill said. “An Aegis Ashore site is “That topology of the island … it is a tough place,” Hill said. “An Aegis Ashore site is
limited in what it can do because of the the rise and the fall of the hills, you got radar, it’s limited in what it can do because of the the rise and the fall of the hills, you got radar, it’s
not a flat earth, and it’s certainly not flat on Guam, so we’ve done some really incredible not a flat earth, and it’s certainly not flat on Guam, so we’ve done some really incredible

52 Peter J. Brown, “Japan, US Silent over Ending Ballistic Missile Patrols,” 52 Peter J. Brown, “Japan, US Silent over Ending Ballistic Missile Patrols,” Asia Times, December 12, 2018. , December 12, 2018.
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work and analysis over the last couple years ... by dispersing the systems and making sure work and analysis over the last couple years ... by dispersing the systems and making sure
everything’s networked.”53 everything’s networked.”53
Conversion of Hawaii Aegis Test Site
Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an
operational land-based Aegis BMD site. DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report operational land-based Aegis BMD site. DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report
states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that
Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the
Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of
Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities. DoD will study this possibility to further Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities. DoD will study this possibility to further
evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii. The United States evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii. The United States
will augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean will augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean
missile threat. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an missile threat. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an
Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize
the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary’s decision to do so, the the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary’s decision to do so, the
steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements. This plan steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements. This plan
will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of
the MDR.54 the MDR.54
A January 25, 2019, press report states the following: A January 25, 2019, press report states the following:
The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the
Missile Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii’s Aegis Ashore Missile Missile Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii’s Aegis Ashore Missile
Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency’s director. Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency’s director.
“Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews—that man that site—as “Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews—that man that site—as
well as funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production and well as funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production and
sustainment,” Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding sustainment,” Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding
would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the
recommendation.55 recommendation.55
Potential Contribution from Lasers
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in
coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have
on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles. Another CRS report discusses the on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles. Another CRS report discusses the
potential value of ship-based lasers for performing various missions, including, potentially, potential value of ship-based lasers for performing various missions, including, potentially,
terminal-phase BMD operations.56 terminal-phase BMD operations.56
Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in
the Aegis BMD program. the Aegis BMD program.

53 Jen Judson, “MDA’s Plan to Protect Guam Relies on Field-Proven Systems,” 53 Jen Judson, “MDA’s Plan to Protect Guam Relies on Field-Proven Systems,” Defense News, March 30, 2022. See , March 30, 2022. See
also Jason Sherman, “OMB Reveals Land-Based VLS Also Part of New Guam Missile Defense Architecture,” also Jason Sherman, “OMB Reveals Land-Based VLS Also Part of New Guam Missile Defense Architecture,” Inside
Defense, July 13, 2022; Rich Abott, “MDA Decides On Guam Defense Architecture,” , July 13, 2022; Rich Abott, “MDA Decides On Guam Defense Architecture,” Defense Daily, March 29, 2022; , March 29, 2022;
Jason Sherman, “DOD Picks SPY-7 for Land-Based Aegis, Giving Lockheed First U.S. Customer for New Radar,” Jason Sherman, “DOD Picks SPY-7 for Land-Based Aegis, Giving Lockheed First U.S. Customer for New Radar,”
Inside Defense, May 6, 2022. , May 6, 2022.
54 Department of Defense, 54 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review 2019, released January 17, 2019, pp. 55-56. , released January 17, 2019, pp. 55-56.
55 Mallory Shelbourne, “DOD to Determine Funding Breakdown for Aegis Ashore Repurposing,” 55 Mallory Shelbourne, “DOD to Determine Funding Breakdown for Aegis Ashore Repurposing,” Inside the Navy, ,
January 25, 2019. January 25, 2019.
56 See CRS Report R44175, 56 See CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
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June 2022 GAO Report
A June 2022 GAO report on U.S. BMD systems, including the Aegis BMD system, stated the A June 2022 GAO report on U.S. BMD systems, including the Aegis BMD system, stated the
following: following:
Deliveries
The Aegis Ashore site in Poland was originally planned to be delivered in fiscal year 2018, The Aegis Ashore site in Poland was originally planned to be delivered in fiscal year 2018,
but has experienced significant construction delays due to contractor under-performance, but has experienced significant construction delays due to contractor under-performance,
according to Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials. The program currently estimates according to Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials. The program currently estimates
that this site will be delivered no earlier than fiscal year 2022. that this site will be delivered no earlier than fiscal year 2022.
An AWS [Aegis Weapon System] software spiral—Aegis Baseline 9.C2.1—was delivered An AWS [Aegis Weapon System] software spiral—Aegis Baseline 9.C2.1—was delivered
as planned in fiscal year 2021. The program noted, however, that these capabilities will not as planned in fiscal year 2021. The program noted, however, that these capabilities will not
be available until Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) be available until Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)
spiral 8.2-5 and the Navy’s upgraded SM-6 Dual II missiles are fielded.... spiral 8.2-5 and the Navy’s upgraded SM-6 Dual II missiles are fielded....
SM-3 interceptors experienced production issues that led to delays in deliveries for fiscal SM-3 interceptors experienced production issues that led to delays in deliveries for fiscal
year 2021. SM-3 Block IIA production was halted to investigate multiple test and year 2021. SM-3 Block IIA production was halted to investigate multiple test and
component anomalies, some of which required re-work of delivered interceptors. An component anomalies, some of which required re-work of delivered interceptors. An
incremental production decision planned for fiscal year 2021 was delayed pending a incremental production decision planned for fiscal year 2021 was delayed pending a
revised cost estimate. revised cost estimate.
COVID-19
Aegis Ashore experienced increased travel and labor costs for all three sites due to travel Aegis Ashore experienced increased travel and labor costs for all three sites due to travel
restrictions, but the program does not anticipate these issues for fiscal year 2022. restrictions, but the program does not anticipate these issues for fiscal year 2022.
According to program officials, AWS software installations were disrupted by ship yard According to program officials, AWS software installations were disrupted by ship yard
availability and deployment dates and quarantine requirements for contractors performing availability and deployment dates and quarantine requirements for contractors performing
the installations led to a $554,000 cost increase. the installations led to a $554,000 cost increase.
SM-3 Block IIA interceptors experienced delays at test facilities due to pandemic SM-3 Block IIA interceptors experienced delays at test facilities due to pandemic
quarantine requirements. quarantine requirements.
Testing
Aegis BMD conducted eight flight tests in fiscal year 2021. One test—FTM-44— Aegis BMD conducted eight flight tests in fiscal year 2021. One test—FTM-44—
demonstrated the SM-3 Block IIA’s ability to intercept an intercontinental range target for demonstrated the SM-3 Block IIA’s ability to intercept an intercontinental range target for
a potential homeland defense scenario. Another test demonstrated the SM-3 Block IIA’s a potential homeland defense scenario. Another test demonstrated the SM-3 Block IIA’s
new guidance electronics unit, which has previously experienced performance issues. new guidance electronics unit, which has previously experienced performance issues.
Aegis BMD conducted two tests using SM-6 missiles, but both have ongoing failure review Aegis BMD conducted two tests using SM-6 missiles, but both have ongoing failure review
boards. FTM-31 E1—a salvo (two missiles) against a medium-range target—failed as boards. FTM-31 E1—a salvo (two missiles) against a medium-range target—failed as
neither missile intercepted the target. FTM-33—a salvo (4 missiles in total) against a raid neither missile intercepted the target. FTM-33—a salvo (4 missiles in total) against a raid
of two short-range targets—had one success and one failure. Aegis BMD also participated of two short-range targets—had one success and one failure. Aegis BMD also participated
in a series of international tests to demonstrate interoperability with North Atlantic Treaty in a series of international tests to demonstrate interoperability with North Atlantic Treaty
Organization partners; all of which were successful. Organization partners; all of which were successful.
Aegis BMD participated in three ground tests in fiscal year 2021. Two assessed AWS’s Aegis BMD participated in three ground tests in fiscal year 2021. Two assessed AWS’s
ability to track certain space objects and the other provided data on its search, track, and ability to track certain space objects and the other provided data on its search, track, and
remote engagement capabilities. Remaining tests were delayed due to COVID-19. remote engagement capabilities. Remaining tests were delayed due to COVID-19.
Aegis BMD did not plan to conduct operational cybersecurity tests in fiscal year 2021, Aegis BMD did not plan to conduct operational cybersecurity tests in fiscal year 2021,
though the program did conduct several developmental cybersecurity tests. though the program did conduct several developmental cybersecurity tests.
Other Program Information
Layered Homeland Defense
A flight test in fiscal year 2021—FTM-44—was part of an effort to evaluate if the SM-3 A flight test in fiscal year 2021—FTM-44—was part of an effort to evaluate if the SM-3
Block IIA interceptor, either in its current form or upgraded, could contribute to a layered Block IIA interceptor, either in its current form or upgraded, could contribute to a layered
homeland defense capability against intercontinental threat missiles.... This flight test was homeland defense capability against intercontinental threat missiles.... This flight test was
successful and MDA was able to use the results to support the planning and analysis for successful and MDA was able to use the results to support the planning and analysis for
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this capability. However, further planning for this capability is largely on hold pending this capability. However, further planning for this capability is largely on hold pending
DOD approval of a report on the possible concepts of operations for this capability, DOD approval of a report on the possible concepts of operations for this capability,
additional funding, and direction from Congress according to MDA officials.57 additional funding, and direction from Congress according to MDA officials.57
Regarding deliveries of interceptors, the report stated that of the 32 SM-3 Block IB missiles that Regarding deliveries of interceptors, the report stated that of the 32 SM-3 Block IB missiles that
were scheduled for delivery in FY2021, 23 were delivered, and that “Remaining deliveries were were scheduled for delivery in FY2021, 23 were delivered, and that “Remaining deliveries were
halted due to a recent flight test failure of the SM-6 missile, which shares major components with halted due to a recent flight test failure of the SM-6 missile, which shares major components with
the SM-3 Block IB.” The report stated that of the seven SM-3 Block IIA missiles that were the SM-3 Block IB.” The report stated that of the seven SM-3 Block IIA missiles that were
scheduled for delivery in FY2021, three were delivered, with “Production temporarily halted due scheduled for delivery in FY2021, three were delivered, with “Production temporarily halted due
to missile assembly issues.”58 to missile assembly issues.”58
January 2021 DOT&E Report59
A January 2022 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—A January 2022 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—
DOT&E’s annual report for FY2021—did not include a section specifically on the Aegis BMD DOT&E’s annual report for FY2021—did not include a section specifically on the Aegis BMD
program. program.
The January 2021 report from DOT&E—its annual report for FY2020—stated the following in The January 2021 report from DOT&E—its annual report for FY2020—stated the following in
its section on the Aegis BMD program: its section on the Aegis BMD program:
Assessment
• Aegis BMD continues to demonstrate a capability to intercept non-separating, simple- • Aegis BMD continues to demonstrate a capability to intercept non-separating, simple-
separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight with separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight with
SM-3 missiles. Aegis BMD has also demonstrated a capability to intercept select ballistic SM-3 missiles. Aegis BMD has also demonstrated a capability to intercept select ballistic
missiles in the terminal phase of flight with SM-6 missiles. However, flight testing and missiles in the terminal phase of flight with SM-6 missiles. However, flight testing and
M&S [modeling and simulation] have not addressed all expected threat types, ground M&S [modeling and simulation] have not addressed all expected threat types, ground
ranges, and raid sizes. The MDA has used M&S to explore Aegis BMD raid engagement ranges, and raid sizes. The MDA has used M&S to explore Aegis BMD raid engagement
performance, but DOT&E has less confidence in these results because COMOPTEVFOR performance, but DOT&E has less confidence in these results because COMOPTEVFOR
[the Navy Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force] has been unable to accredit [the Navy Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force] has been unable to accredit
the models due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of the models due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of
post-intercept debris modeling. post-intercept debris modeling.
• During Pacific Dragon—2020 [a Navy fleet exercise in August 2020], the MDA • During Pacific Dragon—2020 [a Navy fleet exercise in August 2020], the MDA
demonstrated Aegis BMD interoperability with Republic of Korea naval assets while demonstrated Aegis BMD interoperability with Republic of Korea naval assets while
conducting simulated ballistic missile engagements. The AAMDTC [Aegis Ashore Missile conducting simulated ballistic missile engagements. The AAMDTC [Aegis Ashore Missile
Defense Test Complex] demonstrated Aegis interoperability with Australian naval assets Defense Test Complex] demonstrated Aegis interoperability with Australian naval assets
while tracking ballistic missile targets. while tracking ballistic missile targets.
• DOT&E will provide an assessment of the FTM-44 [flight] test results and of the SBT • DOT&E will provide an assessment of the FTM-44 [flight] test results and of the SBT
[sea-based terminal] Increment 2 capability (based on the results of FTM-31 E1 and FTM-[sea-based terminal] Increment 2 capability (based on the results of FTM-31 E1 and FTM-
33) [flight tests] in separate reports. 33) [flight tests] in separate reports.
• MDA ground tests have routinely shown that inter-element coordination and • MDA ground tests have routinely shown that inter-element coordination and
interoperability need improvement to improve engagement efficiency; however, flight interoperability need improvement to improve engagement efficiency; however, flight
testing with multi-element engagement coordination has been limited. Aegis BMD has testing with multi-element engagement coordination has been limited. Aegis BMD has
exercised rudimentary engagement coordination with Terminal High-Altitude Area exercised rudimentary engagement coordination with Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense [THAAD] [BMD] firing units, but not with [the] Patriot [BMD system]. The MDA Defense [THAAD] [BMD] firing units, but not with [the] Patriot [BMD system]. The MDA
plans to exercise engagement coordination between those three theater elements during plans to exercise engagement coordination between those three theater elements during

57 Government Accountability Office, 57 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Better Oversight and Coordination Needed for Counter-
Hypersonic Development, GAO-22-105075, June 2022, pp. 39-40. , GAO-22-105075, June 2022, pp. 39-40.
58 Government Accountability Office, 58 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Better Oversight and Coordination Needed for Counter-
Hypersonic Development, GAO-22-105075, June 2022, p. 39. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Missed Mark for , GAO-22-105075, June 2022, p. 39. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Missed Mark for
Advanced Aegis Interceptor Deliveries, Including No. 1 Unfunded Priority,” Advanced Aegis Interceptor Deliveries, Including No. 1 Unfunded Priority,” Inside Defense, June 29, 2022. , June 29, 2022.
59 DOT&E’s annual report for FY2021, which is dated January 2022, includes a section that discusses missile defense 59 DOT&E’s annual report for FY2021, which is dated January 2022, includes a section that discusses missile defense
systems in general but does not include a section specifically discussing the Aegis BMD system. systems in general but does not include a section specifically discussing the Aegis BMD system.
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Flight Test Operational (FTO)-05, but that flight test has been repeatedly delayed and is Flight Test Operational (FTO)-05, but that flight test has been repeatedly delayed and is
currently planned for FY28. currently planned for FY28.
• DOT&E and USD(R&E) [Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering] • DOT&E and USD(R&E) [Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering]
have prompted the MDA to establish a ground testing approach to support assessments of have prompted the MDA to establish a ground testing approach to support assessments of
missile reliability. DOT&E cannot assess SM-3 missile reliability with confidence until the missile reliability. DOT&E cannot assess SM-3 missile reliability with confidence until the
MDA is able to provide additional ground test data that simulate the in-flight environment. MDA is able to provide additional ground test data that simulate the in-flight environment.
• The MDA delivered results from a subset of the high-fidelity M&S operational test runs • The MDA delivered results from a subset of the high-fidelity M&S operational test runs
for record for the SM-3 IIA missile. The MDA found a problem in one of the models used for record for the SM-3 IIA missile. The MDA found a problem in one of the models used
to conduct the M&S runs. The MDA has identified a fix action and the test runs will be re-to conduct the M&S runs. The MDA has identified a fix action and the test runs will be re-
run and delivered in FY21. The data from these re-executed runs will support the DOT&E run and delivered in FY21. The data from these re-executed runs will support the DOT&E
assessment of the operational effectiveness of the SM-3 Block IIA missile in FY21. assessment of the operational effectiveness of the SM-3 Block IIA missile in FY21.
• COVID-19 impacts have delayed delivery of high-fidelity M&S operational test runs for • COVID-19 impacts have delayed delivery of high-fidelity M&S operational test runs for
record to support an assessment of SBT Increment 2 operational effectiveness. Verification record to support an assessment of SBT Increment 2 operational effectiveness. Verification
and validation data from flight testing will not be available until FY21 to support model and validation data from flight testing will not be available until FY21 to support model
accreditation. M&S operational test runs for record will not be available until FY22. accreditation. M&S operational test runs for record will not be available until FY22.
• The developmental AN/SPY-6(V)1 radar continues to track ballistic missiles during • The developmental AN/SPY-6(V)1 radar continues to track ballistic missiles during
MDA flight tests. The radar detected and tracked the HGV [hypersonic glide vehicle] target MDA flight tests. The radar detected and tracked the HGV [hypersonic glide vehicle] target
in FEX-01. in FEX-01.
Recommendations
The MDA should: The MDA should:
1. Prioritize resources for FTO-05 to ensure this critical flight test occurs as soon as 1. Prioritize resources for FTO-05 to ensure this critical flight test occurs as soon as
possible. possible.
2. Conduct Aegis BMD midcourse and terminal phase flight testing with live fire intercepts 2. Conduct Aegis BMD midcourse and terminal phase flight testing with live fire intercepts
of raids of two or more ballistic missile targets to aid in the validation of M&S tools. of raids of two or more ballistic missile targets to aid in the validation of M&S tools.
3. Improve Aegis BMD high-fidelity M&S tools to incorporate post-intercept debris 3. Improve Aegis BMD high-fidelity M&S tools to incorporate post-intercept debris
modeling to better assess engagement performance in raid scenarios. modeling to better assess engagement performance in raid scenarios.
4. Provide data from high-fidelity ground tests to DOT&E to inform SM-3 Block IB Threat 4. Provide data from high-fidelity ground tests to DOT&E to inform SM-3 Block IB Threat
Upgrade and Block IIA missile reliability estimates. Upgrade and Block IIA missile reliability estimates.
5. Work with DOT&E and USD(R&E) to establish a ground testing approach to support 5. Work with DOT&E and USD(R&E) to establish a ground testing approach to support
assessments of missile reliability.60 assessments of missile reliability.60
Regarding the SM-6 missile, the January 2021 DOT&E report also stated the following: Regarding the SM-6 missile, the January 2021 DOT&E report also stated the following:
Assessment
• As reported in the FY18 DOT&E SM-6 BLK I FOT&E [Follow-on Operational Test and • As reported in the FY18 DOT&E SM-6 BLK I FOT&E [Follow-on Operational Test and
Evaluation] Report, the SM-6 remains effective and suitable with the exception of the Evaluation] Report, the SM-6 remains effective and suitable with the exception of the
classified deficiency identified in the FY13 IOT&E [Initial Operational Test and classified deficiency identified in the FY13 IOT&E [Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation] Report and two additional problems discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLK Evaluation] Report and two additional problems discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLK
[block] I testing to verify corrected deficiencies. The SM-6 BLK IA FOT&E analysis is [block] I testing to verify corrected deficiencies. The SM-6 BLK IA FOT&E analysis is
consistent with prior reporting. consistent with prior reporting.
• While post-flight test data appears promising, DOT&E will assess the results of the • While post-flight test data appears promising, DOT&E will assess the results of the
developmental/engineering flight test to examine corrective actions to a classified developmental/engineering flight test to examine corrective actions to a classified
performance deficiency discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLK verification of correction of performance deficiency discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLK verification of correction of
deficiency tests. This assessment will occur in FY21. deficiency tests. This assessment will occur in FY21.
Recommendations
The Navy should: The Navy should:

60 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, 60 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2020 Annual Report, January 2021, p. 218. , January 2021, p. 218.
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1. Fully assess the corrective actions implemented to address the additional problems 1. Fully assess the corrective actions implemented to address the additional problems
encountered during FY17 SM-6 BLK I verification of corrected deficiency tests by encountered during FY17 SM-6 BLK I verification of corrected deficiency tests by
conducting a verification of deficiency operational flight test. conducting a verification of deficiency operational flight test.
2. Plan and conduct lethality assessments for the SM-6 FCD [Future Capabilities 2. Plan and conduct lethality assessments for the SM-6 FCD [Future Capabilities
Demonstration] capabilities.61 Demonstration] capabilities.61
Legislative Activity for FY2023
Summary of Action on FY2023 MDA Funding Request
Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the FY2023 request for MDA procurement and summarizes congressional action on the FY2023 request for MDA procurement and
research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program. research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program.
Table 2. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2023 MDA Funding Request
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding) (In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Enacted
HAC
SAC
Enacted
Procurement
Aegis BMD (line 32) Aegis BMD (line 32)
402.2 402.2
425.7 425.7
402.2 402.2

402.2 402.2
402.2 402.2

(SM-3 Block IB missile quantity)
(47)
(47)
(47)

(47)

Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line 33) Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line 33)
0 0
0 0
0 0

0 0
0 0

SM-3 Block IIA (line 35) SM-3 Block IIA (line 35)
338.0 338.0
338.0 338.0
653.0 653.0

338.0 338.0
670.0 670.0

(SM-3 Block IIA missile quantity)
(10)
(10)
(18)

(24)

Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 39) Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 39)
30.1 30.1
30.1 30.1
30.1 30.1

30.1 30.1
30.1 30.1

Aegis BMD hardware and software (line 41) Aegis BMD hardware and software (line 41)
78.2 78.2
100.2 100.2
78.2 78.2

78.2 78.2
78.2 78.2

Subtotal Procurement
848.5
894.0 1,163.5

848.5 1,180.5

Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 83) Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 83)
600.1 600.1
600.1 600.1
600.1 600.1

606.1 606.1
575.5 575.5

Aegis BMD test (PE 0604878C) (line 113) Aegis BMD test (PE 0604878C) (line 113)
182.8 182.8
192.8 192.8
182.8 182.8

175.6 175.6
152.8 152.8

Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 115) Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 115)
27.7 27.7
27.7 27.7
27.7 27.7

27.7 27.7
27.7 27.7

Subtotal RDT&E
810.6
820.6
810.6

809.4
756.0

TOTAL
1,659.1 1,714.6 1,974.1
1,657.9 1,936.5

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on DOD’s original FY2023 budget submission, committee and Table prepared by CRS based on DOD’s original FY2023 budget submission, committee and
conference reports, and explanatory statements on FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2023 conference reports, and explanatory statements on FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2023
DOD Appropriations Act. DOD Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is is
House Appropriations Committee; House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee. is Senate Appropriations Committee.

61 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, 61 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2020 Annual Report, January 2021, p. 168. , January 2021, p. 168.
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FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 7900/S. 4543)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-397 of July 1, 2022) on H.R. The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-397 of July 1, 2022) on H.R.
7900, recommended the funding levels and missile quantities shown in the HASC column of 7900, recommended the funding levels and missile quantities shown in the HASC column of
Table 2. The recommended increase of $23.5 million for line 32 is for “Procure Replacement The recommended increase of $23.5 million for line 32 is for “Procure Replacement
IMU [Inertial Measurement Unit],” and the recommended increase of $22.0 million for line 41 is IMU [Inertial Measurement Unit],” and the recommended increase of $22.0 million for line 41 is
for “SPY–1 Low Noise Amplyfier [sic: amplifier].” (Page 454) The recommended increase of for “SPY–1 Low Noise Amplyfier [sic: amplifier].” (Page 454) The recommended increase of
$10 million for line 113 is for “Continued participation in ASD–23 [At-Sea Demonstration 23].” $10 million for line 113 is for “Continued participation in ASD–23 [At-Sea Demonstration 23].”
(Page 505) (Page 505)
Section 1648 of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states (emphasis added) of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states (emphasis added)
SEC. 1648. RISK REDUCTION IN PROCUREMENT OF GUAM MISSILE DEFENSE SEC. 1648. RISK REDUCTION IN PROCUREMENT OF GUAM MISSILE DEFENSE
SYSTEM. SYSTEM.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the defense of Guam and the Armed Forces that operate there is of key strategic (1) the defense of Guam and the Armed Forces that operate there is of key strategic
significance and is one of the top priorities for United States Indo-Pacific Command and significance and is one of the top priorities for United States Indo-Pacific Command and
the United States; the United States;
(2) the most severe adversary threat to Guam consists of long-range hypersonic and cruise (2) the most severe adversary threat to Guam consists of long-range hypersonic and cruise
missiles launched from a variety of air, land, and sea-based platforms; missiles launched from a variety of air, land, and sea-based platforms;
(3) the current plan of the Missile Defense Agency using a mixed architecture which, when (3) the current plan of the Missile Defense Agency using a mixed architecture which, when
applied to the launcher systems, relies on numerous road-mobile transport erector applied to the launcher systems, relies on numerous road-mobile transport erector
launchers for launching, and is an unproven and high-risk plan; and launchers for launching, and is an unproven and high-risk plan; and
(4) (4) the existing vertical launch system, which can accommodate the standard missile–
3 and the standard missile–6, is a more capable and tested system and provides
reasonable risk reduction to the short-term missile defense of Guam, and in the long
term provides much needed capacity increase.
(b) (b) AUTHORITY FOR PROCUREMENT.—Except as provided by subsection (c),
not later than December 31, 2023, the Secretary of Defense, acting through the
Director of the Missile Defense Agency, shall rapidly procure and field up to three
vertical launching systems that can accommodate planned interceptors operated by
the Navy as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) WAIVER.—The Secretary may waive the requirement under subsection (b) if— (c) WAIVER.—The Secretary may waive the requirement under subsection (b) if—
(1) the Secretary determines that the waiver is in the best interest of the ~~(1) the Secretary determines that the waiver is in the best interest of the~~ national security national security
of the United States; of the United States;
(2) the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a notification of such ~~(2) the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a notification of such~~
waiver, including a justification; and waiver, including a justification; and
(3) a period of 120 days has elapsed following the date of such notification. Regarding Section 1648, a July 12, 2022, Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 7900 states (emphasis as in original): Missile Defense Programs. The Administration opposes section 1648(b) and (c), which would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, to rapidly procure and field up to three vertical launching systems that can be operated by the Navy by December 31, 2023, as well as the subsequent waiver authority. The planned defense of Guam architecture has undergone a risk mitigation assessment with the intent to expedite capability delivery in a phased approach. Long lead items for a Congressional Research Service 28 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program vertical launch system will be procured in FY 2022 and the mobile launcher design modifications will be conducted in parallel.62~~(3) a period of 120 days has elapsed following the date of such notification.~~
Section 1705 of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states (emphasis added) of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states (emphasis added)
SEC. 1705. FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER SEC. 1705. FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER
ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY TO ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY TO
REPLENISH MISSILE AND MUNITION INVENTORIES. REPLENISH MISSILE AND MUNITION INVENTORIES.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the ongoing war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of understanding the defense (1) the ongoing war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of understanding the defense
industrial base gaps and limitations of replenishing inventories of critical, preferred, and industrial base gaps and limitations of replenishing inventories of critical, preferred, and
precision-guided weapon systems; and precision-guided weapon systems; and
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(2) the ability of the Department of Defense to replenish critical munitions in the event of (2) the ability of the Department of Defense to replenish critical munitions in the event of
a conflict with a strategic competitor lasting not less than six months is of critical a conflict with a strategic competitor lasting not less than six months is of critical
importance to the national security interests of the United States. importance to the national security interests of the United States.
(b) FFRDC STUDY.— (b) FFRDC STUDY.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter into an agreement with an appropriate federally Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter into an agreement with an appropriate federally
funded research and development center for the conduct of a detailed analysis of the funded research and development center for the conduct of a detailed analysis of the
capability of the Department of Defense replenish inventory of the weapons described in capability of the Department of Defense replenish inventory of the weapons described in
paragraph (3) to address long-range strike capabilities, including against naval surface and paragraph (3) to address long-range strike capabilities, including against naval surface and
subsurface, as well as land-based forces, air superiority, interdiction, air and missile subsurface, as well as land-based forces, air superiority, interdiction, air and missile
defense, and hard and deeply buried target mission areas. Such an agreement shall provide defense, and hard and deeply buried target mission areas. Such an agreement shall provide
that an analysis conducted pursuant to the agreement shall be completed within 180 days. that an analysis conducted pursuant to the agreement shall be completed within 180 days.
(2) MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION.—An analysis conducted pursuant to an (2) MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION.—An analysis conducted pursuant to an
agreement under paragraph (1) shall include a consideration of each of the following with agreement under paragraph (1) shall include a consideration of each of the following with
respect to the weapons described in paragraph (3): respect to the weapons described in paragraph (3):
(A) Any gaps in current or near-term production capability through 2025 or capacity due (A) Any gaps in current or near-term production capability through 2025 or capacity due
to the loss, impending loss, or obsolescence of manufacturers or suppliers of items, raw to the loss, impending loss, or obsolescence of manufacturers or suppliers of items, raw
materials, or software, along with recommendations to address the highest priority gaps. materials, or software, along with recommendations to address the highest priority gaps.
(B) The capability to significantly increase current levels of production beyond steady- (B) The capability to significantly increase current levels of production beyond steady-
state demand requirements, including an assessment of sub-tier supplier capacity, state demand requirements, including an assessment of sub-tier supplier capacity,
capability, and rates of production. capability, and rates of production.
(C) The predicted production capability and capacity during the time period beginning in (C) The predicted production capability and capacity during the time period beginning in
2025 and ending in 2035, including the capability and any recommendations to 2025 and ending in 2035, including the capability and any recommendations to
significantly increase production during that time period. significantly increase production during that time period.
(D) The reliance of the United States on materials and parts that are produced or sourced (D) The reliance of the United States on materials and parts that are produced or sourced
in foreign countries, particularly in the case of such reliance on a sole-source producer or in foreign countries, particularly in the case of such reliance on a sole-source producer or
supplier, an identification of countries of origin of such materials and parts, and associated supplier, an identification of countries of origin of such materials and parts, and associated
recommendations to address any priority vulnerabilities. recommendations to address any priority vulnerabilities.
(E) The capacity of the organic industrial base, including both Government-operated and (E) The capacity of the organic industrial base, including both Government-operated and
contractor-operated facilities, to support surge production, and an identification of the contractor-operated facilities, to support surge production, and an identification of the
weapons that each such facilities is equipped, or could be equipped, to produce. weapons that each such facilities is equipped, or could be equipped, to produce.
(3) WEAPONS DESCRIBED.—The weapons described in this paragraph are each of the (3) WEAPONS DESCRIBED.—The weapons described in this paragraph are each of the
following: following:
(A) Evolved sea sparrow missile. (A) Evolved sea sparrow missile.
62 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 7900—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Rep. Smith, D-WA), July 12, 2022, p. 5. Congressional Research Service 29 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program (B) MK 48 heavyweight torpedo. (B) MK 48 heavyweight torpedo.
(C) Standard missile variants (SM-6, SM-3 block IB and SM-3 block IIA).
(D) Patriot guided missiles. (D) Patriot guided missiles.
(E) Terminal high altitude area defense interceptors. (E) Terminal high altitude area defense interceptors.
(F) Guided and ballistic missiles fired from the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) or (F) Guided and ballistic missiles fired from the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) or
the high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS). the high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS).
(G) Javelin missile. (G) Javelin missile.
(H) Stinger missile. (H) Stinger missile.
(I) Air intercept missile (AIM)-9X-Sidewinder. (I) Air intercept missile (AIM)-9X-Sidewinder.
(J) AIM-120D - Advanced medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM). (J) AIM-120D - Advanced medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM).
(K) Air to ground (AGM)-114 - hellfire missile. (K) Air to ground (AGM)-114 - hellfire missile.
(L) Small diameter bomb II. (L) Small diameter bomb II.
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(M) Joint direct attack munition. (M) Joint direct attack munition.
(N) Advanced penetrating bombs. (N) Advanced penetrating bombs.
(O) Enhanced fragmentation bombs. (O) Enhanced fragmentation bombs.
(P) Low collateral damage bombs. (P) Low collateral damage bombs.
(Q) Tomahawk land attack missile. (Q) Tomahawk land attack missile.
(R) Maritime strike tomahawk. (R) Maritime strike tomahawk.
(S) Long range anti-ship missile. (S) Long range anti-ship missile.
(T) Naval strike missile. (T) Naval strike missile.
(U) Joint air-to-surface standoff missile-extended range. (U) Joint air-to-surface standoff missile-extended range.
(V) Harpoon anti-ship missile. (V) Harpoon anti-ship missile.
(W) Any other weapon that the Secretary of Defense or the federally funded research and (W) Any other weapon that the Secretary of Defense or the federally funded research and
development center determine should be included in the analysis. development center determine should be included in the analysis.
(4) REPORT.— (4) REPORT.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after entering into an agreement under (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after entering into an agreement under
subsection (a), the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report subsection (a), the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
containing the unaltered results of the analysis completed pursuant to the agreement. containing the unaltered results of the analysis completed pursuant to the agreement.
(B) FORM.—The report required under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in (B) FORM.—The report required under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Section 1708 of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states (emphasis added) of H.R. 7900 as reported by the committee states (emphasis added)
SEC. 1708. STUDY ON STOCKPILES AND PRODUCTION OF CRITICAL GUIDED SEC. 1708. STUDY ON STOCKPILES AND PRODUCTION OF CRITICAL GUIDED
MUNITIONS. MUNITIONS.
(a) STUDY.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the (a) STUDY.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall complete a study to determine how rapidly stockpiles of the Secretary of Defense shall complete a study to determine how rapidly stockpiles of the
United States of critical guided munitions would become depleted in the event of the United States of critical guided munitions would become depleted in the event of the
involvement of the United States in a large-scale conflict. involvement of the United States in a large-scale conflict.
(b) MATTERS.—The study under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the (b) MATTERS.—The study under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the
following: following:
(1) Modeling of the monthly munitions expenditure of the United States in the scenario of (1) Modeling of the monthly munitions expenditure of the United States in the scenario of
a large-scale conflict (lasting for a period of at least 180 days) in Europe during fiscal year a large-scale conflict (lasting for a period of at least 180 days) in Europe during fiscal year
Congressional Research Service 30 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 2025, at various levels of conflict intensity, including conflicts involving 25, 50, and 75 2025, at various levels of conflict intensity, including conflicts involving 25, 50, and 75
percent of the force structure of the land, naval, and air forces of the active Armed Forces. percent of the force structure of the land, naval, and air forces of the active Armed Forces.
(2) Modeling of the monthly munitions expenditure of the United States in the scenario of (2) Modeling of the monthly munitions expenditure of the United States in the scenario of
a large-scale conflict (lasting for a period of at least 180 days) in East Asia during fiscal a large-scale conflict (lasting for a period of at least 180 days) in East Asia during fiscal
year 2025, at various levels of conflict intensity, including conflicts involving 25, 50, and year 2025, at various levels of conflict intensity, including conflicts involving 25, 50, and
75 percent of the force structure of the land, naval, and air forces of the active Armed 75 percent of the force structure of the land, naval, and air forces of the active Armed
Forces. Forces.
(3) An analysis of how rapidly stockpiles of the United States of critical guided munitions (3) An analysis of how rapidly stockpiles of the United States of critical guided munitions
would become depleted in each of the scenarios referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) for, would become depleted in each of the scenarios referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) for,
at a minimum, the following munitions: at a minimum, the following munitions:
(A) Air Intercept Missile-260. (A) Air Intercept Missile-260.
(B) Joint Direct Attack Munition. (B) Joint Direct Attack Munition.
(C) Long Range Anti-Ship Missile. (C) Long Range Anti-Ship Missile.
(D) Naval Strike Missile. (D) Naval Strike Missile.
(E) Standard Missile-2. (E) Standard Missile-2.
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(F) Standard Missile-6.
(G) Harpoon Anti-ship Missile. (G) Harpoon Anti-ship Missile.
(H) MK-48 torpedo. (H) MK-48 torpedo.
(I) Each variant of the following: (I) Each variant of the following:
(i) Air Intercept Missile-9. (i) Air Intercept Missile-9.
(ii) Air Intercept Missile-120. (ii) Air Intercept Missile-120.
(iii) Army Tactical Missile System. (iii) Army Tactical Missile System.
(iv) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System. (iv) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System.
(v) Javelin. (v) Javelin.
(vi) Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. (vi) Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile.
(vii) Patriot Missile. (vii) Patriot Missile.
(viii) Precision Strike Missile. (viii) Precision Strike Missile.
(ix) Stinger. (ix) Stinger.
(x) Tomahawk Cruise Missile. (x) Tomahawk Cruise Missile.
(4) An analysis of the time and resources that would be necessary to restart production lines (4) An analysis of the time and resources that would be necessary to restart production lines
for the critical guided munitions specified in paragraph (3) that, as of the period during for the critical guided munitions specified in paragraph (3) that, as of the period during
which the study is conducted, are not in production by the United States. which the study is conducted, are not in production by the United States.
(5) An analysis of the time and resources that would be necessary to increase the monthly (5) An analysis of the time and resources that would be necessary to increase the monthly
production of critical guided munitions to meet the expenditure rates projected pursuant to production of critical guided munitions to meet the expenditure rates projected pursuant to
the modeling under paragraphs (1) and (2). the modeling under paragraphs (1) and (2).
(c) REPORT AND BRIEFING.— (c) REPORT AND BRIEFING.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the completion of the study (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the completion of the study
under sub section (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense under sub section (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report, and provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing, on committees a report, and provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing, on
the study. Such report shall contain the following: the study. Such report shall contain the following:
(A) A summary of the findings of the study. (A) A summary of the findings of the study.
(B) Recommendations to expedite the production of the munitions specified in subsection (B) Recommendations to expedite the production of the munitions specified in subsection
(b)(3). (b)(3).
Congressional Research Service 31 link to page 31 link to page 31 link to page 31 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program (2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but (2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex. may contain a classified annex.
(d) CRITICAL GUIDED MUNITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘critical guided (d) CRITICAL GUIDED MUNITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘critical guided
munition’’ means— munition’’ means—
(1) any munition specified in subsection (b)(3); and (1) any munition specified in subsection (b)(3); and
(2) any other munition designated as such by the Secretary of Defense. (2) any other munition designated as such by the Secretary of Defense.
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 117-130 of July 18, 2022) on S. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 117-130 of July 18, 2022) on S.
4543, recommended the funding levels and missile quantities shown in the SASC column of 4543, recommended the funding levels and missile quantities shown in the SASC column of
Table 2. The recommended increase of $315.0 million for line 35 is for “Capacity expansion—The recommended increase of $315.0 million for line 35 is for “Capacity expansion—
test equipment” ($63.0 million) and “Production increase” ($252.0 million). (Page 429) S.Rept. test equipment” ($63.0 million) and “Production increase” ($252.0 million). (Page 429) S.Rept.
117-130 states: 117-130 states:
Standard Missile–3 Block IIA
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The budget request included $338.0 million in line number 35 of Procurement, Defense- The budget request included $338.0 million in line number 35 of Procurement, Defense-
wide (PDW) to procure 10 Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) Block IIA missiles. wide (PDW) to procure 10 Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) Block IIA missiles.
The committee recommends an increase of $252.0 million in PDW line number 35 for The committee recommends an increase of $252.0 million in PDW line number 35 for
eight additional SM–3 Block IIA missiles and $63.0 million for SM–3 Block IIA test eight additional SM–3 Block IIA missiles and $63.0 million for SM–3 Block IIA test
equipment to increase production capacity to 36 missiles per year. (Page 19) equipment to increase production capacity to 36 missiles per year. (Page 19)
FY2023 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 8236/S. 4663)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-388 of June 24, 2022) on H.R. The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-388 of June 24, 2022) on H.R.
8236, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of8236, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 2. The recommended The recommended
increase of $6.0 million for line 83 is for “Program increase - lightweight telescope for advanced increase of $6.0 million for line 83 is for “Program increase - lightweight telescope for advanced
AEGIS Interceptor.” (Page 240) The recommended reduction of $7.157 million for line 113 is for AEGIS Interceptor.” (Page 240) The recommended reduction of $7.157 million for line 113 is for
“Excess growth.” (Page 241) “Excess growth.” (Page 241)
Senate
The explanatory statement for S. 4663 released by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July The explanatory statement for S. 4663 released by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July
28, 2022, recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of28, 2022, recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 2.
The recommended increase of $332.0 million for line 35 is for “Program increase: 14 additional The recommended increase of $332.0 million for line 35 is for “Program increase: 14 additional
SM–3 IIA interceptors.” (Page 155) SM–3 IIA interceptors.” (Page 155)
The recommended reduction of $24.529 million for line 83 is for “Cyber operations previously The recommended reduction of $24.529 million for line 83 is for “Cyber operations previously
funded” ($2.793 million), “Program operational growth” ($1.5 million), “Lack of schedule clarity funded” ($2.793 million), “Program operational growth” ($1.5 million), “Lack of schedule clarity
for AEGIS BMD 5.x ($16.041 million), and “BMD 6.x cost previously funded” ($4.195 million). for AEGIS BMD 5.x ($16.041 million), and “BMD 6.x cost previously funded” ($4.195 million).
(Page 220) (Page 220)
The recommended reduction of $30.0 million for line 113 is for “Prior year test adjustments.” The recommended reduction of $30.0 million for line 113 is for “Prior year test adjustments.”
(Page 221) (Page 221)

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Appendix. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests
Table A-1 presents a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. In addition presents a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. In addition
to the flight tests shown in the table, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser to the flight tests shown in the table, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser
operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3 operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3
missile to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit. missile to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit.
Table A-1. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests From January 2002 to the Present
Name of flight
Cumulative Cumulative
Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
Exo-atmospheric (using SM-3 missile)
1/25/02 1/25/02
US US
FM-2 FM-2
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
1 1
1 1
6/13/02 6/13/02
US US
FM-3 FM-3
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
2 2
2 2
11/21/02 11/21/02
US US
FM-4 FM-4
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
3 3
3 3
6/18/03 6/18/03
US US
FM-5 FM-5
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
No
3 3
4 4
12/11/03 12/11/03
US US
FM-6 FM-6
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
4 4
5 5
2/24/05 2/24/05
US US
FTM 04-1 (FM-7) Unitary short-range (TTV) FTM 04-1 (FM-7) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
5 5
6 6
11/17/05 11/17/05
US US
FTM 04-2 (FM-8) Separating short-range (MRT) FTM 04-2 (FM-8) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
6 6
7 7
6/22/06 6/22/06
US US
FTM 10 FTM 10
Separating short-range (TTV) Separating short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
7 7
8 8
12/7/06 12/7/06
US US
FTM 11 FTM 11
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
No
7 7
9 9
4/26/07 4/26/07
US US
FTM 11 FTM 11
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
8 8
10 10
Event 4 Event 4
6/22/07 6/22/07
US US
FTM 12 FTM 12
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
9 9
11 11
8/31/07 8/31/07
US US
FTM-11a FTM-11a
Classified Classified
Yes Yes
10 10
12 12
11/6/07 11/6/07
US US
FTM 13 FTM 13
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
11 11
13 13

Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
12 12
14 14
12/17/07 12/17/07
Japan Japan
JFTM-1 JFTM-1
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
13 13
15 15
11/1/08 11/1/08
US US
Pacific Blitz Pacific Blitz
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
14 14
16 16

Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
No
14 14
17 17
11/19/08 11/19/08
Japan Japan
JFTM-2 JFTM-2
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
No
14 14
18 18
7/30/09 7/30/09
US US
FTM-17 FTM-17
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
15 15
19 19
10/27/09 10/27/09
Japan Japan
JFTM-3 JFTM-3
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
16 16
20 20
10/28/10 10/28/10
Japan Japan
JFTM-4 JFTM-4
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
17 17
21 21
4/14/11 4/14/11
US US
FTM-15 FTM-15
Separating intermediate range Separating intermediate range
Yes Yes
18 18
22 22
(LV-2) (LV-2)
9/1/11 9/1/11
US US
FTM-16 E2 FTM-16 E2
Separating short-range (ARAV-B) Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
No
18 18
23 23
5/9/12 5/9/12
US US
FTM-16 E2a FTM-16 E2a
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
19 19
24 24
6/26/12 6/26/12
US US
FTM-18 FTM-18
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
20 20
25 25
10/25/12 10/25/12
US US
FTI-01 FTI-01
Separating short-range (ARAV-B) Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
No
20 20
26 26
2/12/13 2/12/13
US US
FTM-20 FTM-20
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
Yes Yes
21 21
27 27
(MRBM-T3) (MRBM-T3)
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Name of flight
Cumulative Cumulative
Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
5/15/13 5/15/13
US US
FTM-19 FTM-19
Separating short-range (ARAV- Separating short-range (ARAV-
Yes Yes
22 22
28 28
C) C)
9/10/13 9/10/13
US US
FTO-01 FTO-01
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
Yes Yes
23 23
29 29
(eMRBM-T1) (eMRBM-T1)
9/18/13 9/18/13
US US
FTM-21 FTM-21
Separating short-range (ARAV- Separating short-range (ARAV-
Yes Yes
24 24
30 30
C++) C++)
10/3/13 10/3/13
US US
FTM-22 FTM-22
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
Yes Yes
25 25
31 31
(ARAV-TTO-E) (ARAV-TTO-E)
11/6/14 11/6/14
US US
FTM-25 FTM-25
Separating short-range (ARAV-B) Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
Yes Yes
26 26
32 32
6/25/15 6/25/15
US US
FTO-02 E1 FTO-02 E1
Separating medium-range (IRBM Separating medium-range (IRBM
n n/aa
26 26
32 32
T1) T1)
10/4/15 10/4/15
US US
FTO-02 E2 FTO-02 E2
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
n n/ab
26 26
32 32
(eMRBM) (eMRBM)
10/20/15 10/20/15
US US
ASD-15 E2 ASD-15 E2
Separating short-range (Terrier Separating short-range (Terrier
Yes Yes
27 27
33 33
Orion) Orion)
11/1/15 11/1/15
US US
FTO-02 E2a FTO-02 E2a
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
No
27 27
34 34
(eMRBM) (eMRBM)
12/10/15 12/10/15
US (Aegis US (Aegis
FTO02 E1a FTO02 E1a
Separating medium-range (IRBM Separating medium-range (IRBM
Yes Yes
28 28
35 35
Ashore) Ashore)
T1) T1)
2/3/17 2/3/17
US-Japan US-Japan
SFTM-01 SFTM-01
Separating medium-range (MRT) Separating medium-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
29 29
36 36
6/21/17 6/21/17
US-Japan US-Japan
SFTM-02 SFTM-02
Medium-range Medium-range
No
29 29
37 37
10/15/17 10/15/17
US US
FS17 FS17
Medium-range target Medium-range target
Yes Yes
30 30
38 38
1/31/18 1/31/18
US (Aegis US (Aegis
FTM-29 FTM-29
Intermediate-range target Intermediate-range target
No
30 30
39 39
Ashore) Ashore)
9/11/18 9/11/18
Japan Japan
JFTM-05 JFTM-05
Simple separating target Simple separating target
Yes Yes
31 31
40 40
10/26/18 10/26/18
US US
FTM-45 FTM-45
Medium range Medium range
Yes Yes
32 32
41 41
12/10/18 12/10/18
US (Aegis US (Aegis
FTI-03 FTI-03
Intermediate-range target Intermediate-range target
Yes Yes
33 33
42 42
Ashore) Ashore)
11/16/20 11/16/20
US US
FTM-44 FTM-44
ICBM target ICBM target
Yes Yes
34 34
43 43
5/26 and 5/26 and
US- US-
ASD/FS21c ASD/FS21c
Non-separating MRBM target Non-separating MRBM target
Y Yesc
35c 35c
44c 44c
30/2021 30/2021
Netherlands Netherlands
8/9/22 8/9/22
US US
Part of Pacific Part of Pacific
ARAV-B SRBM target ARAV-B SRBM target
Yes Yes
36 36
45 45
Dragon exercise Dragon exercise
Endo-atmospheric (using SM-2 missile Block IV missile and [for MMW E1 and subsequent] SM-6 Dual 1 missile)
5/24/06 5/24/06
US US
Pacific Phoenix Pacific Phoenix
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
1 1
1 1
(Lance) (Lance)
6/5/08 6/5/08
US US
FTM-14 FTM-14
Unitary short-range target (FMA) Unitary short-range target (FMA)
Yes Yes
2 2
2 2
3/26/09 3/26/09
US US
Stellar Daggers Stellar Daggers
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
3 3
3 3
(Lance) (Lance)
7/28/15 7/28/15
US US
MMW E1 MMW E1
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
4 4
4 4
(Lance) (Lance)
7/29/15 7/29/15
US US
MMW E2 MMW E2
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
5 5
5 5
(Lance) (Lance)
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Name of flight
Cumulative Cumulative
Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
12/14/16 12/14/16
US US
FTM-27 FTM-27
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
6 6
6 6
(Lance) (Lance)
8/29/17 8/29/17
US US
FTM-27 E2 FTM-27 E2
Medium-range target (MRBM) Medium-range target (MRBM)
Yes Yes
7 7
7 7
5/29/21 5/29/21
US US
FTM-31 FTM-31
Medium-range target (MRBM) Medium-range target (MRBM)
No
7 7
8 8
7/24/21 7/24/21
US US
FTM-33 FTM-33
Two SRBM targets Two SRBM targets
Yes and Yes and
8 and 8 and
9 and 10 9 and 10
unconfirmedd unconfirmedd unconfirmedd
Sources: Table presented in MDA fact sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” February 2017, accessed Table presented in MDA fact sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” February 2017, accessed
on May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/web/20170929180757/https:/www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/on May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/web/20170929180757/https:/www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/
aegis_tests.pdf, and (for flight tests subsequent to February 2017) MDA news releases, Jason Sherman, “U.S. aegis_tests.pdf, and (for flight tests subsequent to February 2017) MDA news releases, Jason Sherman, “U.S.
Intercepted Ballistic Missile Target over Pacific while China Exercised around Taiwan,” Intercepted Ballistic Missile Target over Pacific while China Exercised around Taiwan,” Inside Defense, August 12, , August 12,
2022; and Wyatt Olson, “Missile-Defense Exercise Off Hawaiian Island Includes First Live-Fire Intercept,” 2022; and Wyatt Olson, “Missile-Defense Exercise Off Hawaiian Island Includes First Live-Fire Intercept,” Stars
and Stripes, August 16, 2022. , August 16, 2022.
Notes: TTV is target test vehicle; is target test vehicle; ARAV is Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle. In addition to the flight tests is Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle. In addition to the flight tests
shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S. shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S.
satellite—an operation called Burnt Frost. satellite—an operation called Burnt Frost.
a. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of August 3, 2015, a. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of August 3, 2015,
had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 31 successful intercepts in 37 launches had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 31 successful intercepts in 37 launches
through July 29, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was considered a “no test” through July 29, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was considered a “no test”
event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD system or the SM-3 event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD system or the SM-3
interceptor. News reports state that the test was aborted due to a failure of the target missile. (Andrea interceptor. News reports state that the test was aborted due to a failure of the target missile. (Andrea
Shalal, “U.S. Skips Aegis Ashore Missile Test After Target Malfunction,” Shalal, “U.S. Skips Aegis Ashore Missile Test After Target Malfunction,” Reuters, June 26, 2015.) MDA’s table , June 26, 2015.) MDA’s table
similarly shows the test of December 7, 2006, as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA similarly shows the test of December 7, 2006, as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA
issued a news release on this test, which stated that an SM-3 was not launched “due to an incorrect system issued a news release on this test, which stated that an SM-3 was not launched “due to an incorrect system
setting aboard the Aegis-class cruiser USS setting aboard the Aegis-class cruiser USS Lake Erie prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the
ship. The incorrect configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship from launching the first ship. The incorrect configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship from launching the first
of the two [SM-3] interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch of two of the two [SM-3] interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch of two
missiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally not launched.” MDA missiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally not launched.” MDA
counts the test of December 7, 2006, as an unsuccessful intercept in its count of 31 successful intercepts in counts the test of December 7, 2006, as an unsuccessful intercept in its count of 31 successful intercepts in
37 launches through July 29, 2015. 37 launches through July 29, 2015.
b. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of November 10, b. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of November 10,
2015, had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 32 successful intercepts in 39 2015, had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 32 successful intercepts in 39
launches through November 1, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was launches through November 1, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was
considered a “no test” event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD considered a “no test” event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD
system or the SM-3 interceptor. system or the SM-3 interceptor.
c. ASD/FS21 was an at-sea demonstration that occurred during a multilateral naval exercise called Formidable c. ASD/FS21 was an at-sea demonstration that occurred during a multilateral naval exercise called Formidable
Shield 2021. In the demonstration, a Dutch frigate used its radar to provide early warning track data to a Shield 2021. In the demonstration, a Dutch frigate used its radar to provide early warning track data to a
U.S. Navy destroyer that used the data to calculate a firing solution and launch its interceptor. Some press U.S. Navy destroyer that used the data to calculate a firing solution and launch its interceptor. Some press
reports state that ASD/FS21 involved two successful ballistic missile intercepts, rather than the one shown reports state that ASD/FS21 involved two successful ballistic missile intercepts, rather than the one shown
in the table. in the table.
d. MDA stated that “based on initial observations, one target was successful y intercepted. At this time, we d. MDA stated that “based on initial observations, one target was successful y intercepted. At this time, we
cannot confirm the second target was destroyed.” (“MDA Test Intercepts Target,” MDA News Release 21- cannot confirm the second target was destroyed.” (“MDA Test Intercepts Target,” MDA News Release 21-
NEWS-0012, July 24, 2021.) NEWS-0012, July 24, 2021.)

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs

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