Order Code RL33745
Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense —
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated May 23, 2008
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense — Background
and Issues for Congress
Summary
As part of its effort to develop a global ballistic missile defense (BMD) system,
the Department of Defense (DOD) is modifying 18 Navy cruisers and destroyers for
BMD operations, and has deployed a large BMD radar — the Sea-Based X-Band
Radar (SBX) — on a modified floating oil platform. The eventual role of sea-based
systems in the worldwide U.S. BMD architecture has not been determined. The
overall issue for Congress discussed in this report is: What should be the role of sea-
based systems in U.S. ballistic missile defense, and are DOD’s programs for sea-
based BMD capabilities appropriately structured and funded?
The Aegis BMD system in its current configuration is intended to track ballistic
missiles of all ranges, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and to
intercept shorter-ranged ballistic missiles. The current configuration is not intended
to intercept ICBMs. Current DOD plans call for modifying 3 Aegis cruisers and 15
Aegis destroyers with the Aegis BMD capability by the end of 2008. Future versions
of the Aegis BMD system are to include a faster interceptor designed to intercept
certain ICBMs. The Aegis BMD system has achieved 11 successful exo-atmospheric
intercepts in 13 attempts. The system was also temporarily modified and used on
February 20, 2008, to shoot down an inoperative U.S. surveillance satellite. Japan
is acquiring the Aegis BMD system, and some other allied navies have expressed an
interest in adding BMD capabilities to their ships.
For FY2009, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is requesting $1,157.8 million
in research and development funds for the Aegis BMD program. The program also
receives some additional Navy funds.
Potential specific issues for Congress regarding sea-based BMD systems include
technical risk in the Aegis BMD program, the number of Aegis BMD ships, the role
of Aegis BMD in European missile defense, the number of SM-3 interceptors
planned for procurement, the proposal to equip the SM-3 Block IIA missile with a
Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV), whether development a far-term sea-based terminal-
defense BMD capability should be accelerated, the potential role of the Kinetic
Energy Interceptor (KEI) in sea-based BMD operations, procurement of the planned
CG(X) cruiser, development and testing of the Aegis BMD system, and potential
allied sea-based BMD programs. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Rationale for Sea-Based BMD Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Aegis BMD Program In General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Aegis BMD Program Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Aegis Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Aegis Midcourse and Sea-Based Terminal Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Aegis BMD Midcourse Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Program Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Intended Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Modification Schedule and Initial Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Development, Testing, and Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Aegis BMD Sea-Based Terminal Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Aegis BMD Program Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Allied Programs and Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Other Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Potential Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Technical Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Number of Aegis BMD Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Role of Aegis BMD in European Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Number of SM-3 Missiles Planned for Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
FY2008 Defense Authorization Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Press Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) for SM-3 Block IIA Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
FY2008 Defense Authorization Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Press Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Far-Term Sea-Based Terminal Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Press Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
CG(X) Cruiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Development and Testing of Aegis BMD System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Cooperation With Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Legislative Activity for FY2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix A. Strengths and Limitations of Sea-Based BMD Systems . . . . . . . . 36
Potential Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Potential Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

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Appendix B. Arms Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix C. Aegis BMD Midcourse Flight Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
List of Tables
Table 1. Aegis BMD Program Funding, FY1995-FY2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 2. ALI and Aegis BMD Flight Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

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Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense —
Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
As part of its effort to develop a global ballistic missile defense (BMD) system,
the Department of Defense (DOD) is modifying 18 Navy cruisers and destroyers for
BMD operations, and has deployed a large BMD radar — the Sea-Based X-Band
Radar (SBX) — on a modified floating oil platform. The eventual role for sea-based
systems in the world-wide U.S. BMD architecture has not been determined.
The overall issue for Congress discussed in this report is: What should be the
role of sea-based systems in U.S. ballistic missile defense, and are DOD’s programs
for sea-based BMD capabilities appropriately structured and funded? Decisions that
Congress reaches on this issue could affect U.S. BMD capabilities and funding
requirements; the size, capabilities, and operational patterns of the Navy and the
other services; and the shipbuilding industrial base.
Background
Rationale for Sea-Based BMD Systems
DOD’s overall BMD plan includes ground-based, sea-based, airborne, and
space-based systems, each of which have potential strengths and limitations. DOD
believes that a combination of these systems will provide a more capable BMD
architecture. For a discussion of the potential strengths and limitations of sea-based
BMD systems, see Appendix A. For a discussion of arms control considerations
relating to sea-based BMD systems, see Appendix B.
Aegis BMD Program In General
The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) program is DOD’s primary
sea-based BMD program.
Aegis BMD Program Office. The Aegis BMD program office is an MDA
directorate that reports directly to the director of MDA. MDA provides direction,
funding, and guidance to the Aegis BMD program office and is the acquisition
executive for the program. To execute the program, the Aegis BMD program office
was established as a Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) field activity.
NAVSEA provides administrative support (e.g., contracting, comptroller, and
security) to the Aegis BMD program office.

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CRS-2
Aegis Ships. The Aegis BMD program builds on the capabilities of the
Navy’s Aegis ship combat system, which was originally developed for defending
ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and
subsurface threats.1 The Aegis system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and
has been updated several times since. The part of the Aegis combat system for
countering aircraft and ASCMs is the called the Aegis Weapon System. Key
components of the Aegis Weapon System relevant to this discussion include the
following:
! the SPY-1 radar — a powerful, phased-array, multifunction radar
that is designed to detect and track multiple targets in flight, and to
provide midcourse guidance to interceptor missiles;
! a suite of computers running the Aegis fire control and battle-
management computer program; and
! the Standard Missile (SM) — the Navy’s longer-ranged surface-to-
air missile (SAM), so called because it was first developed many
years ago as a common, or standard, replacement for a variety of
older Navy SAMs.2
The version of the Standard Missile currently used for air-defense operations is
called the SM-2 Block IV, meaning the fourth upgrade to the second major version
of the Standard Missile. The Navy is developing a new version of the Standard
Missile for future air-defense operations called the SM-6 Extended Range Active
Missile (SM-6 ERAM).
U.S. Navy ships equipped with the Aegis system include Ticonderoga (CG-47)
class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers. A total of 27 CG-47s
were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service
between 1983 and 1994. The first five, which were built to an earlier technical
standard, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were
removed from service in 2004-2005. The Navy currently plans to modernize the
remaining 22 ships and keep them in service to age 35.
A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and
FY2005; the first entered service in 1991 and the 62nd is scheduled to enter service
in 2011. The Navy currently plans to modernize these ships and keep them in service
to age 35 or 40.3
1 The Aegis system is named after the mythological shield carried by Zeus.
2 For more on the Aegis system and its principal components as originally deployed, see
CRS Report 84-180 F, The Aegis Anti-Air Warfare System: Its Principal Components, Its
Installation on the CG-47 and DDG-51 Class Ships, and its Effectiveness, by Ronald
O’Rourke. (October 24, 1984) This report is out of print and is available directly from the
author.
3 For more on the Navy’s plan for modernizing the Aegis cruisers and destroyers, see CRS
Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues
(continued...)

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CRS-3
Between 2011, when the 62nd DDG-51 is to enter service, and 2021, when the
first of the 22 remaining CG-47s reaches age 35, the Navy plans to maintain a force
of 84 Aegis ships — 22 cruisers and 62 destroyers.
Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied
countries that now operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped
ships include Japan (the first foreign buyer, with 6 destroyers in service), South
Korea (3 destroyers under construction or planned), Australia (3 destroyers planned),
Spain (4 frigates in service, 1 under construction, and possibly 1 more planned), and
Norway (2 frigates in service and 3 more under construction or planned).4 The
Norwegian frigates are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and
consequently carry a reduced-size version of the Aegis system that includes a smaller,
less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar.
Aegis Midcourse and Sea-Based Terminal Programs. The Aegis
BMD program includes the Aegis BMD midcourse program and the Aegis BMD sea-
based terminal program. Each of these is discussed below.
Aegis BMD Midcourse Program
Program Origin. The Aegis BMD midcourse program was created by the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in 2002. Earlier names for the program include the
Sea-Based Midcourse program, the Navy Theater Wide Defense program, and the
Sea-Based Upper Tier program. The program is the successor to earlier sea-based
BMD development efforts dating back to the early 1990s.5
Intended Capabilities. The Aegis BMD midcourse system in its current
configuration is designed to:
! detect and track ballistic missiles of any range, including ICBMs,
and
3 (...continued)
for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
4 Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007-2008.
5 The Aegis BMD program is the successor to the Aegis LEAP Intercept (ALI) Flight
Demonstration Project (FDP), which in turn was preceded by the Terrier Lightweight
Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Project, an effort that began in the early 1990s. Terrier
is an older Navy SAM replaced in fleet use by the Standard Missile. Although succeeded
by the Standard Missile in fleet use, the Navy continued to use the Terrier missile for
development and testing.
As mentioned in an earlier footnote (see section on arms control considerations), the ABM
Treaty, which was in force until 2002, prohibited sea-based defenses against strategic (i.e.,
long-range) ballistic missiles. Navy BMD development activities that took place prior to
2002 were permissible under the ABM treaty because they were not aimed at developing
technologies for countering long-range ballistic missiles.

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CRS-4
! intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and
MRBMs) above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospherically) during
their midcourse phase of flight.
When tracking ICBMs, Aegis BMD ships are to act as sensor platforms providing
fire-control-quality tracking data to the overall U.S. BMD architecture.
The Aegis BMD midcourse system in its current configuration is not designed
to:
! intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or
! intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere, during either their
initial boost phase of flight or their final (terminal) phase of flight.
In contrast to the current configuration of the Aegis BMD midcourse system, the
ground-based midcourse BMD program, with interceptors based in Alaska and
California, is designed to intercept ICBMs in the midcourse phase of flight.
Discussions comparing the current configuration of the Aegis BMD midcourse
system and the ground-based midcourse program have not always noted this basic
difference in the kinds of ballistic missiles they are intended to intercept.
Modification Schedule and Initial Deployments. Modifying an Aegis
ship for midcourse BMD operations involves making two principal changes:
! changing the Aegis computer program to permit the SPY-1 radar to
detect and track high-flying ballistic missiles; and
! arming the ship with a BMD version of the Standard Missile called
the SM-3 Block 1A.
A ship with the first modification is referred to as having a long-range search
and track (LRS&T) capability. A ship with both modifications is referred to as an
engage-capable ship. Modifying each ship reportedly takes about six weeks and costs
about $10.5 million.6
The SM-3 Block IA is equipped with a “hit-to-kill” warhead that is designed to
destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead by colliding with it outside the atmosphere,
during the enemy missile’s midcourse phase of flight. It is intended to intercept
SRBMs and MRBMs. An improved version, the Block IB, is to offer some
capability for intercepting intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). The Block
IA and IB do not fly fast enough to offer a substantial capability for intercepting
ICBMs.7
6 Jack Dorsey, “Navy On Front Line Of Missile Defense,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October
21, 2006.
7 Longer-range ballistic missiles generally fly faster than shorter-range ballistic missiles.
Consequently, intercepting a longer-range missile generally requires a faster-flying
(continued...)

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CRS-5
A faster-flying version of the SM-3, called the Block II/IIA, is now being
developed (see discussion below). The Block II/IIA version is intended to give Aegis
BMD ships an improved capability for intercepting IRBMs and some capability for
intercepting ICBMs.
Current DOD plans call for modifying 18 U.S. Aegis ships — 3 cruisers and 15
destroyers — with the Aegis BMD capability. The first LRS&T installations were
completed in 2004, and the first engage-capable installations were completed in
2005.8 All 18 ships are scheduled to be engage-capable by the end of calendar 2008.
LRS&T Aegis destroyers began operating in September 2004. Engage-capable
Aegis cruisers began operating in September 2005.9
Development, Testing, and Certification. B l o c k D e v e l o p m e n t
Strategy. Consistent with the approach used for other parts of DOD’s BMD
acquisition effort, the Aegis BMD midcourse system is being developed and
deployed in increasingly capable versions, or blocks. These blocks were previously
named after their approximate anticipated years of deployment (e.g., Blocks 2004,
2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012). Under this structure, the current version of the Aegis
system was known as the Block 2004 version.10
MDA has recently restructured the block development structure to move away
from date-associated block names, and the Aegis BMD system consequently is now
being developed in two blocks called Block 2.0 and Block 5.0. MDA states that
7 (...continued)
interceptor than is required for intercepting a shorter-range ballistic missile. The SM-3
Block IA and 1B fly fast enough to intercept TBMs, but not fast enough to provide an
effective capability for intercepting ICBMs.
8 The first engage-capable installations, on two cruisers, were emergency (i.e., preliminary)
installations. Non-emergency versions of the system were installed beginning in 2005.
9 The engage-capable cruisers conducted their first operations with the emergency (i.e.,
preliminary) version of the engagement capability.
10 The Block 2004 version included the SM-3 Block IA missile and a version of the Aegis
computer program called Aegis BMD 3.6, which allows the ship to perform BMD
operations and other warfare operations (such as air defense) at the same time. (The
previous 3.0 version of the computer program did not permit this.) The Block 2004 version
was intended to counter SRBMs and MRBMs. The Block 2006/2008 versions were to have
included various improvements, including the Block IB version of the SM-3 and the Aegis
BMD signal processor (Aegis BSP) — a radar signal and data processor that improves the
SPY-1’s ballistic missile target-discrimination performance. The improvements were
intended to, among other things, give the system a limited ability to intercept IRBMs. The
Block 2010/2012/2014 versions were to have included further improvements, including the
Block II version of the SM-3 around 2013, and the Block IIA version in 2015. The
improvements were intended to, among other things, give the system and improved ability
to intercept IRBMs and some ability to counter ICBMs. This version was also to have
incorporated changes intended to make the system suitable for broader international ship
participation.

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CRS-6
Block 2.0 includes, among other things, 71 SM-3 Block 1 and 1A interceptors, of
which 38 are to be in inventory by the end of calendar 2008, and that Block 5.0:
will increase the number of SM-3 ... interceptors and improve the performance
of the Aegis BMD Weapons System and the SM-3 interceptor.
The SM-3 Block IB interceptor, a critical Block 5.0 development effort,
will have major modifications to include a much improved seeker and a
Throttleable Divert and Attitude Control System (TDACS). When combined
with processing upgrades to the Aegis BMD Weapons System, the more capable
Block IB interceptor will more readily distinguish between threat reentry
vehicles and countermeasures. The Block IB expands the battle space and
enables more effective and reliable engagements of more diverse and
longer-range ballistic missiles. This year we look forward to completing design
and testing for the two-color seeker and TDACS and commencing the element
integration of the SM-3 Block IB missile in 2009.
Block 5.0 includes delivery of 23 SM-3 Block IA interceptors, [and] 53
SM-3 Block IB interceptors....11
“Test A Little, Learn A Lot” Development Approach. The Aegis BMD
program is employing a development approach that the program office characterizes
as “test a little, learn a lot.” MDA has stated that:
The test program for Aegis BMD has focused on the philosophy of “test a
little, learn a lot” since its inception in the early 1990’s with the TERRIER
Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Project. TERRIER LEAP
included four flight tests between 1992 and 1995, and was successful in
demonstrating that LEAP technology could be integrated into a sea-based tactical
missile for exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense.
The lessons learned from TERRIER LEAP evolved into the Aegis LEAP
Intercept (ALI) Flight Demonstration Project (FDP), the goal of which was to
utilize the Aegis Weapons System and Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) to hit a
ballistic missile in the exoatmosphere. The ALI test objectives were achieved
with two successful descent phase intercepts of a ballistic missile during Flight
Mission 2 (FM-2) and FM-3 in January 2002 and June 2002 respectively firing
an SM-3 from the [Aegis cruiser] USS LAKE ERIE.
The transition of ALI to an Aegis BMD capability commenced with FM-4
in November of 2002 with USS LAKE ERIE, executing the first successful
ascent phase intercept of a short range ballistic missile (SRBM) by the Aegis
BMD element.12
Flight Tests. From January 2002 through November 2007, the Aegis BMD
midcourse system has achieved 11 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 13
11 [Statement of] Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III, USAF, Director, Missile Defense
Agency, [on] Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 1, 2008, pp. 15-16.
12 “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” MDA fact sheet, January 30, 2004.

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CRS-7
attempts.13 For details on these flight tests, see Appendix C. Regarding future tests,
MDA states that:
We plan three Aegis BMD intercept tests in 2008 and 2009. In 2008 we
will demonstrate an intercept of a unitary, short-range ballistic missile target in
the terminal phase of flight using a SM-2 Block IV interceptor. Later this year
we will conduct the second Japanese intercept test against a medium-range target
warhead. And in 2009 we will conduct an intercept flight test against a
medium-range target to demonstrate an expanded battle space.14
Certification. On September 11, 2006, the Navy and MDA certified the
version of the Aegis BMD system using the Aegis BMD 3.6 computer program for
tactical deployment.15
February 2008 Shoot-Down of Malfunctioning Satellite. On February
20, 2008, an engage-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii used a
modified version of the Aegis BMD midcourse system to shoot down an inoperable
U.S. surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit. The modifications to the
ship’s Aegis BMD midcourse system reportedly involved primarily making changes
to software. DOD stated that the modifications were of a temporary, one-time nature.
Three SM-3 missiles reportedly were modified for the operation. The first modified
SM-3 fired by the cruiser successfully intercepted the satellite at an altitude of about
133 nautical miles (some sources provide differing altitudes). The other two
modified SM-3s (one carried by the cruiser, another carried by an engage-capable
Aegis destroyer) were not fired, and the Navy stated it would reverse the
modifications to these two missiles.16 The cost of the shoot-down operation has
13 Another CRS report, based on historical flight test data provided by MDA to CRS in June
2005, summarizes early sea-based BMD tests as follows:
The Navy developed its own indigenous LEAP program, which flight tested
from 1992-1995. Three non-intercept flight tests achieved all primary and
secondary objectives. Of the five planned intercept tests, only the second was
considered a successful intercept, however. Failures were due to various
hardware, software, and launch problems. Even so, the Navy determined that it
achieved about 82% of its primary objectives (18 of 22) and all of its secondary
objectives in these tests.
(CRS Report RL33240, Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile
Defense: A Status Overview, by Steven A. Hildreth.)
14 [Statement of] Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III, USAF, Director, Missile Defense
Agency, [on] Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April 1, 2008, p. 20.
15 See Missile Defense Agency, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Weapon System Gains
Fleet Certification,” September 1, 2006 (06-FYI-0082); and Lockheed Martin, “Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense Weapon System Gains Fleet Certification,” September 11, 2006.
16 For additional information, see Peter Spiegel, “Navy Missile Hits Falling Spy Satellite,”
Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2008; Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Navy Missile Hits
Satellite, Pentagon Says,” Washington Post, February 21, 2008; Thom Shanker, “Missile
Strikes A Spy Satellite Falling From Its Orbit,” New York Times, February 21, 2008; Bryan
(continued...)

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CRS-8
been reported to be $112 million when all costs are included, including $70 million
in costs to the Aegis BMD program and $42 million in additional costs outside the
Aegis BMD program.17
SM-3 Block II/IIA Missile (Cooperative Program With Japan). Under
a memorandum of agreement signed in 1999, the United States and Japan have
cooperated in researching technologies for the Block II/IIA version of the SM-3. The
cooperative research has focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the
sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the second-stage propulsion, and a lightweight
nose cone. Japan has funded a significant share of the effort.
In contrast to the Block IA/1B version of the SM-3, which has a 21-inch-
diameter booster stage but is 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of its
length, the Block II/IIA version would have a 21-inch diameter along its entire
length. The increase in diameter to a uniform 21 inches provides more room for
rocket fuel and is to give the missile a burnout velocity (a maximum velocity,
reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is 45% to 60% greater than
that of the Block IA/IB version.18 The Block IIA version would also include an
improved kinetic (hit-to-kill) warhead.19 MDA states that the Block II/IIA version
could “engage many [ballistic missile] targets that would outpace, fly over, or be
beyond the engagement range” of earlier versions of the SM-3, and that
16 (...continued)
Bender, “US Missile Hits Crippled Satellite,” Boston Globe, February 21, 2008; Zachary
M. Peterson, “Navy Hits Wayward Satellite On First Attempt,” NavyTimes.com, February
21, 2008; Dan Nakaso, “Satellite Smasher Back At Pearl,” Honolulu Advertiser, February
23, 2008; Zachary M. Peterson, “Lake Erie CO Describes Anti-Satellite Shot,”
NavyTimes.com, February 25, 2008; Anne Mulrine, “The Satellite Shootdown: Behind the
Scenes,” U.S. News & World Report, February 25, 2008; Nick Brown, “US Modified Aegis
and SM-3 to Carry Out Satellite Interception Shot,” Jane’s International Defence Review,
April 2008: 35.
17 Jason Sherman, “Total Cost for Shoot-Down of Failed NRO Satellite Climbs Higher,”
InsideDefense.com, May 12, 2008.
18 The 13.5-inch version has a reported burnout velocity of 3.0 to 3.5 kilometers per second
(kps). See, for example, J. D. Marshall, The Future Of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,
point paper dated October 15, 2004, available at [http://www.marshall.org/
pdf/materials/259.pdf]; “STANDARD Missile-3 Destroyers a Ballistic Missile Target in
Test of Sea-based Missile Defense System,” Raytheon news release circa January 26, 2002,
a v a i l a b l e a t [ h t t p : / / w w w . p r n e w s w i r e . c o m / c g i - b i n /
micro_stories.pl?ACCT=683194&TICK=RTN4&STORY=/www/story/01-26-2002/0001
655926&EDATE=Jan+26,+2002]; and Hans Mark, “A White Paper on the Defense Against
Ballistic Missiles,” The Bridge, summer 2001, pp. 17-26, available at
[ h t t p : / / w w w . n a e . e d u / n a e / b r i d g e c o m . n s f / w e b l i n k s / N A E W - 6 3 B M 8 6 /
$FILE/BrSum01.pdf?OpenElement]. See also the section on “Sea-Based Midcourse” in
CRS Report RL31111, Missile Defense: The Current Debate, coordinated by Steven A.
Hildreth.
19 Source for information on SM-3: Missile Defense Agency, “Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense SM-3 Block IIA (21-Inch) Missile Plan (U), August 2005,” a 9-page point paper
provided by MDA to CRS, August 24, 2005.

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CRS-9
the net result, when coupled with enhanced discrimination capability, is more
types and ranges of engageable [ballistic missile] targets; with greater probability
of kill, and a large increase in defended “footprint” or geography predicted....
The SM-3 Blk II/IIA missile with it[s] full 21-inch propulsion stack provides the
necessary fly out acceleration to engage IRBM and certain ICBM threats.20
The Block II and IIA versions of the missile are not expected to enter service
until the middle years of the next decade.
Aegis BMD Sea-Based Terminal Program
In addition to the midcourse program described above, which is intended to
intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, during the midcourse phase of
flight, the Aegis BMD program includes a second effort, called the sea-based
terminal capability, to develop a complementary sea-based capability for intercepting
TBMs in the final, or descent, phase of flight, after the missiles have reentered the
atmosphere, so as provide local-area defense of U.S. ships as well as friendly forces,
ports, airfields, and other critical assets ashore.
The sea-based terminal effort is the successor to an earlier effort to achieve such
a capability that was called the Navy Area Defense (NAD) program or Navy Area
TBMD (Theater BMD) program, and before that, the Sea-Based Terminal or Navy
Lower Tier program.21 The NAD system was canceled in December 2001.22
MDA divides the sea-based terminal effort into two blocks: the Block 2.0
version and a far-term sea-based terminal capability that MDA places beyond Block
5.0.
The Block 2.0 sea-based terminal capability includes a fuze-modified SM-2
Block IV interceptor with a blast-fragmentation warhead. The missile is intended to
be capable of intercepting a finite set of SRBMs inside the atmosphere. The Navy
(not MDA) is funding the modification of up to 100 SM-2 Block IV missiles into this
configuration. The Block 2.0 capability is scheduled to enter service in FY2009. A
20 “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense SM-3 Block IIA (21-Inch) Missile Plan (U), August
2005,” op. cit, pp. 3-4.
21 The NAD system was to have been deployed on Navy Aegis ships. The program involved
modifying the SM-2 Block IV air-defense missile. The missile, as modified, was called the
Block IVA version. The system was designed to intercept descending missiles
endo-atmospherically (i.e., within the atmosphere) and destroy them with the Block IVA
missile’s blast-fragmentation warhead.
22 In announcing its decision to cancel the program, DOD cited poor performance,
significant cost overruns, and substantial development delays, and cited the Nunn-McCurdy
provision (10 USC §2433), a defense acquisition law first enacted in 1981. This was the first
defense acquisition program that DOD officials could recall having been canceled under the
Nunn-McCurdy provision. (“Navy Area Missile Defense Program Cancelled,” Department
of Defense News Release No. 637-01, December 14, 2001; James Dao, “Navy Missile
Defense Plan Is Canceled By the Pentagon,” New York Times, December 16, 2001; Gopal
Ratnam, “Raytheon Chief Asks DOD To Revive Navy Program,” Defense News, January
14-20, 2002: 10.)

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CRS-10
Block 2.0 SM-2 IV missile successfully intercepted a target ballistic missile inside
the atmosphere, during the terminal phase of flight, in a test conducted on May 24,
2006.23
The far-term sea-based terminal capability is envisioned as including a new type
of missile, the design of which is not yet determined, that is to provide a more
capable sea-based terminal capability. Under current plans, the far-term sea-based
terminal capability might enter service around 2015.24 Potential candidates for the
far-term sea-based terminal interceptor include a modified version of the Army’s
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptor, called the PAC-3 Missile
Segment Enhancement (MSE), or a modified version of the SM-6 Extended Range
Active Missile (SM-6 ERAM) air defense missile being developed by the Navy.25
Aegis BMD Program Funding
Table 1 shows actual or programmed annual funding for the Aegis BMD
program from FY1995 through FY2013. The figures in Table 1 do not include Navy
funding for efforts such as modifying up to 100 SM-2 Block IV missiles for the near-
term (Block 2.0) sea-based terminal capability.
As shown in the Table 1, MDA is requesting $1,157.8 million in FY2009
research and development funds for the Aegis BMD program.
Allied Programs and Interest
Japan. Japan’s interest in BMD, and in cooperating with the United States on
the issue, was heightened in August 1998, when North Korea test-fired a Taepo
Dong-1 ballistic missile that flew over Japan before falling into the Pacific.26 In
23 See Missile Defense Agency, “First at-Sea Demonstration of Sea-Based Terminal
Capability Successfully Completed,” May 24, 2006 (06-FYI-0079); Gregg K. Kakesako,
“Missile Defense System Makes History,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, May 25, 2006; Audrey
McAvoy, “Ship Shoots Down Test Missile For The First Time,” NavyTimes.com, May 25,
2006; “Navy, MDA Announce First Terminal Sea-Based Intercept,” Aerospace Daily &
Defense Report, May 26, 2006; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Conducts First Sea-Based
Terminal Phase Missile Defense Test,” Inside the Navy, May 29, 2006; and Jeremy Singer,
“Sea-Based Terminal May Boost U.S. Missile Defense Capability,” Space News
(www.space.com), June 12, 2006.
24 Dan Taylor, “Navy Still Interested in Second MKV, MDA Will Talk to Congress,” Inside
the Navy, December 3, 2007.
25 See, for example, Bettina H. Chavanne, “Aegis Ships To Get Protection From Ballistic
Missile Threats,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, March 20, 2008: 2; Jason Ma and
Christopher J. Castelli, “Adaptation Of PAC-3 For Sea-Based Terminal Missile Defense
Examined,” Inside the Navy, July 19, 2004; Malina Brown, “Navy Rebuilding Case For
Terminal Missile Defense Requirement,” Inside the Navy, April 19, 2004.
26 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile
Defense: Issues and Prospects, by Richard P. Cronin. This archived report was last updated
on March 19, 2002. See also CRS Report RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for
(continued...)

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CRS-11
addition to cooperating with the United States on development of technologies for
the SM-3 Block II/IIA missile, Japan is modifying four of its Aegis destroyers with
the Aegis BMD midcourse system between FY2007 and early FY2011, at a pace of
about one ship per year. Under this plan, Japan would have an opportunity in
FY2011 and subsequent years to upgrade the ships’ BMD capability to a later Block
standard, and to install the Aegis BMD capability on its two remaining Aegis
destroyers.
Table 1. Aegis BMD Program Funding, FY1995-FY2013
(millions of dollars, rounded to the nearest tenth)
FY95
75.0
FY96
200.4
FY97
304.2
FY98
410.0
FY99
338.4
FY00
380.0
FY01
462.7
FY02
476.0
FY03
464.0
FY04
726.2
FY05
1,159.8
FY06
893.0
FY07
1,125.4
FY08
1,126.3
FY09
1,157.8
FY10
1,234.2
FY11
1,078.5
FY12 1,066.7
FY13 1,102.5
Sources: For FY1995 through FY2005: DOD Information Paper provided to CRS by Navy Office
of Legislative Affairs, November 14, 2006. For FY2006-FY2013: FY2008 and FY2009 MDA budget
justification books for Aegis BMD program.
A Japanese Aegis ship participated as a tracking platform in FTM-10, the June
22, 2006, flight test of the Aegis BMD system. This was the first time that an allied
military unit participated in a U.S. Aegis BMD intercept test.27 A Japanese ship
again tracked a target missile in FTM-11, in December 2006. On December 17,
26 (...continued)
Congress, by Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, and William H. Cooper.
27 Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Test Results in Successful ‘Hit To Kill’
Intercept,” June 22, 2006 (06-NEWS-0018).

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CRS-12
2008, in a test called Japan Flight Test Mission 1 (JFTM-1), a BMD-capable
Japanese Aegis destroyer used an SM-3 Block IA missile to successfully intercept a
ballistic missile target in a flight test off the coast of Hawaii. It was the first time that
a non-U.S. ship had intercepted a ballistic missile using the Aegis BMD system.28
Other Countries.29 Other countries that DOD views as potential naval BMD
operators include South Korea, Australia, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
and Italy. As mentioned earlier, South Korea, Australia, and Spain either operate, are
building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other countries operate destroyers
and frigates with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing
to BMD operations.30
Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX)
The Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) is DOD’s other principal sea-based BMD
element. It is a midcourse fire-control radar designed to support long-range BMD
systems. Its principal functions are to detect and establish precise tracking
information on ballistic missiles, discriminate missile warheads from decoys and
debris, provide data for updating ground-based interceptors in flight, and assess the
results of intercept attempts. SBX is intended to support more operationally realistic
testing of the ground-based midcourse system and enhance overall BMD system
operational capability.
SBX is a large, powerful, phased-array radar operating in the X band, a part of
the radio frequency spectrum that is suitable for tracking missile warheads with high
accuracy. The radar is mounted on a modified, self-propelled, semi-submersible oil
platform that can transit at a speed of 8 knots and is designed to be stable in high
winds and rough seas.31
28 John Liang, “Japanese Destroyer Shoots Down Ballistic Missile Test Target,” Inside
Missile Defense, December 19, 2007; “Japanese Aegis Destroyer Wins Test By Killing
Target Missile With SM-3 Interceptor,” Defense Daily, December 18, 2007; Reuters,
“Japanese Ship Downs Missile In Pacific Test,” New York Times, December 18, 2007: 8;
Audrey McAvoy, “Japan Intercepts Missile In Test Off Hawaii,” NavyTimes.com,
December 17, 2007.
29 Primary sources for this section: Missile Defense Agency, Frequently Asked Questions,
available at [http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/faq.html]; a briefing on the Aegis BMD
program by Rear Admiral Brad Hicks, Aegis BMD Program Director, to the RUSI 8th
Missile Defense Conference, February 27, 2007.
30 For an article discussing six European nations that reportedly have an option for giving
their ships an early-warning capability for maritime BMD (MBMD) operations, see
“European AAW Ships Get MBMD Option,” Jane’s International Defence Review,
February 2007: 8, 10, 12.
31 The platform is 238 feet wide and 398 feet long. It measures 282 from its submerged keel
to the top of the radar dome. The SBX has a total displacement of almost 50,000 tons —
about one-half the full load displacement of a Navy aircraft carrier. SBX is operated by a
crew of about 75.

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CRS-13
SBX was completed in 2005 for the Missile Defense Test Bed. The semi-
submersible platform was designed by a Norwegian firm and built in Russia. It was
purchased for the SBX program, and modified and integrated with the SBX radar in
Texas.32 SBX underwent sea trials and high-power radiation testing in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2005. It was then moved by a heavy transport vessel to Hawaii, arriving
there in January 2006. Technical issues in 2006 with the SBX’s semi-submersible
platform delayed the SBX’s transfer from Hawaii to its planned home port of Adak,
Alaska.33 The SBX reportedly departed Hawaii on January 3, 2007, and arrived in
Alaska’s Aleutian Islands on February 7, 2007.34
MDA announced on March 21, 2007, that on March 20, the SBX (and also the
SPY-1 radars on two Aegis ships) had successfully tracked a target ballistic missile
in a test of radars being incorporated into the overall U.S. BMD system.35
In April 2007, it was reported that the Navy and MDA had reached a
preliminary agreement for the Navy to assume control of the SBX program.36
Regarding other potential uses of the SBX, a March 2006 press report stated:
Boeing missile defense officials refuse to answer questions about whether
they are developing techniques to produce high-energy weapon effects from the
SBX sea-based radar. However, since large distributed-array devices [like the
SBX] can be focused to deliver large spikes of energy, powerful enough to
32 The platform was designed by Moss Maritime, a Norwegian firm, and built for Moss in
2001-2002 by Vyborg shipbuilding, which is located in Vyborg, Russia (a city north of St.
Petersburg, on the Gulf of Finland, that is near the Finnish border). Vyborg Shipbuilding’s
products include semi-submersible oil platforms. Moss sold the platform to Boeing. Boeing
and a subcontractor, Vertex RSI (a part of General Dynamics), modified the platform at the
Keppel AMFELS shipyard in Brownsville, TX. The platform was then moved to Kiewit
Offshore Services of Corpus Christi, TX, where the radar was added by a combined team
of Boeing, Raytheon, Vertex RSI, and Kiewit. (“MDA Completes Integration of X-Band
Radar On Sea-Going Platform,” Defense Daily, April 5, 2005; and “Sea-Based X-band
Radar,” GlobalSecurity.org.)
33 Jonathan Karp, “A Radar Unit’s Journey Reflects Hopes, Snafus In Missile Defense,”
Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2006: 1. See also Kirsten Scharnberg, “Radar Staying
Longer Than Planned,” Chicago Tribune, September 3, 2006. The article was also
published in the Honolulu Advertiser. See also SBX-1 Operational Suitability and Viability
Assessment, An Independent Assessment. Arlington (VA), SYColeman, 2006, pp. i-ii.
(Final Report, June 2, 2006, Submitted to: Director, Mission Readiness Task Force, Missile
Defense Agency, Submitted by: Independent Assessment Team, Prepared by: SYColeman,
A Wholly Owned Subsidiary of L-3 Communications). The report is available at
[http://www.pogo.org/m/dp/dp-SBXOVA-06022006.pdf]
34 “Way Up North,” Defense Daily, February 12, 2007.
35 Missile Defense Agency News Release, 07-NEWS-0028, 21 March 2007, “Missile
Defense Flight Test Successfully Completed.”
36 Emelie Rutherford, “Navy To Assume Responsibility For Sea-Based X-Band Radar
Program,” Inside the Navy, April 16, 2007.

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CRS-14
disable electronic equipment, the potential is known to exist and is being fielded
on a range of U.S., British and Australian aircraft.37
Potential Issues for Congress
Technical Risk
How much technical risk is there in the Aegis BMD program?
One potential oversight issue for Congress is how much technical risk there is
in the Aegis BMD program. A March 2008 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report assessing the technical risks of selected weapon programs stated of the
Aegis BMD program:
Program officials report all Block IA critical technologies are mature. Our
data indicate that one of the technologies is less mature. The Solid Divert and
Attitude Control System (SDACS) pulse one has been successfully flight tested
since our last report. However, the zero pulse mode of the missile’s third stage
rocket motor has not been demonstrated in an operational environment. Officials
also report the missile’s design is stable with 100 percent of its drawings released
to manufacturing and they do not anticipate any design changes. The Block IA
missile is in production but officials state that the contractor’s processes are not
mature enough to collect statistical data. Instead, other means are being used to
gauge production readiness.
Technology Maturity
We reported last year that two of the three technologies critical to the SM-3
Block IA missile, the Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS) and the
Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM), were not mature. Since our last report, one
of the SDACS’s pulse modes, pulse one, which allows the kinetic warhead to
divert in order to adjust its aim, has flown three times, in April, June, and
November 2007. Pulse one was used to shift the warhead’s aim just prior to
intercept and all tests resulted in successful intercepts. The other pulse mode of
the SDACS, pulse two, is identical in technology and functionality as pulse one
but has not been flight tested. Program officials state that both pulse modes have
been successfully tested in four consecutive ground tests but that it is difficult for
the SDACS to use both pulse modes in a flight test because the first pulse has
provided sufficient divert capability to make the intercept. Program officials state
that an artificiality would have to be built into the flight test in order to guarantee
the use of pulse two. Additionally, program officials consider pulse two to be a
margin to the system since it is designed to provide additional energy, if needed,
after employing pulse one, to make the necessary maneuvers to intercept the
target in the desired spot for maximum destruction. Similarly, the zero pulse
mode of the TSRM that increases the missile’s capability against shorter-range
threats has not been flight tested. Although the production design of the TRSM
attitude control system passed qualification testing in February 2007 and has
been integrated into the manufacturing line, the zero pulse mode is not scheduled
for flight testing due to range safety limitations.
37 “Radar Weapons,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, March 20, 2006.

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CRS-15
Design Stability
Program officials reported that the design for the SM-3 Block IA missiles
being produced during Block 2006 is stable, with 100 percent of its drawings
released to manufacturing. Program officials do not anticipate additional design
changes.
Production Maturity
We did not assess the production maturity of the SM-3 missiles being
procured for Block 2006. Program officials stated that the contractor’s processes
are not yet mature enough to statistically track production processes. The Aegis
BMD program continues to use other means to assess progress in production and
manufacturing, such as tracking rework hours, cost of defects per unit, and other
defect and test data.
Other Program Issues
The original Aegis BMD program goals for Block 2006 included delivery
of 19 SM-3 Block IA U.S. missiles. Last year, program officials reduced the goal
to 15. Since that time, delivery goals have been reduced to 12, because the
contractor did not have the production capacity to deliver both foreign military
sales missiles and U.S. missiles. Although Raytheon reported no cost or schedule
growth, because much of the SM-3 Block IA contract work was being reported
as a level of effort, it was difficult to assess true performance since it could not
be practically measured by discrete earned value techniques. According to
American National Standards Institute guidelines adopted by DOD, only work
that does not result in a product should be reported as level of effort under earned
value management. However, in August 2007, Raytheon reported 73 percent of
the contract work as level of effort, some of which was identified as possibly
unjustified and appearing excessive by a team composed of technical and
functional experts during a 2007 review. Since that time, program officials report
that they were able to implement earned value management reporting on future
delivery contracts and stated in January 2008 that Raytheon had reduced the
contract level of effort work to 18 percent.
Agency Comments
Technical comments provided by the program office were incorporated as
appropriate. In addition, program officials stated that they believe the TSRM is
a mature technology and add that is has been successfully flown in multiple
missions in increasingly realistic operational environments. Program officials
consider the zero pulse mode of the third stage rocket motor to be marginal to the
system and explain that the capability is difficult to demonstrate in an operational
environment due to range safety limitations. Additionally, program officials state
that all design verification tests for both the SDACS and the TSRM have been
completed, all requirements have been exceeded, and qualification tests for the
capabilities have been completed and verified by Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory and the Indian Head Division, Naval Warfare
Center.38
38 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected
(continued...)

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CRS-16
Number of Aegis BMD Ships
How many Aegis ships should be equipped for BMD operations?
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the number of Aegis
ships that should be equipped for BMD operations. The eventual U.S. BMD
architecture is to be defined by U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) — the
U.S. military command responsible for “synchronized DoD effects to combat
adversary weapons of mass destruction worldwide,” including integrated missile
defense39 — in consultation with MDA. Under the evolutionary acquisition approach
adopted for the overall U.S. BMD program, it likely will be a number of years before
USSTRATCOM and MDA define the eventual BMD architecture. Until then, the
absence of an objective architecture might complicate the task of assessing whether
the types and numbers of sea-based BMD systems being acquired are correct.
If the role of sea-based systems in the eventual U.S. BMD architecture turns out
to be greater than what DOD has assumed deciding to equip 18 Aegis ships with
BMD capabilities, then additional funding might be needed to expand the scope of
the program to include more than 18 ships. The issue could also affect the required
total number of Navy cruisers and destroyers. If the role of sea-based systems in the
eventual U.S. BMD architecture turns out to be greater than what the Navy has
assumed in calculating its 88-ship cruiser-destroyer requirement, then the
requirement might need to be increased to something more than 88 ships.
A November 5, 2007 press report stated:
the admiral who runs the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program for the Missile
Defense Agency is asking to expand the upgrade effort — even before the
large-scale Aegis upgrade planned to start in 2012.
“The question right now is: With 18 ships, is that an adequate number? I’m
not sure it is,” said Rear Adm. Alan Hicks, who noted that Navy plans call for
basing all but two of the BMD ships in the Pacific. “One of the concerns I have
today is that if we had to surge for both a North Korean and Iranian scenario, you
would end up taking ships [that would be used for] defense against North Korea.
You have to augment the two Atlantic fleet ships to do anything in either the
[Persian] Gulf or Mediterranean if there was an Iranian threat.”
Hicks approached Adm. Mike Mullen when Mullen was the chief of naval
operations about adding more BMD ships to handle simultaneous missile threats
from North Korea and Iran. Mullen agreed to a series of discussions as the Navy
builds its portion of the 2009 White House budget request.
38 (...continued)
Weapon Programs, GAO-08-467, March 2008, pp. 37-38.
39 For more on USSTRATCOM, see CRS Report RL33408, Nuclear Command and Control:
Current Programs and Issues, by Robert D. Critchlow. See also USSTRATCOM’s website
at [http://www.stratcom.mil/], from which the quoted passage is taken.

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CRS-17
Fifteen of the 18 ships in the current Aegis BMD plan are destroyers, and
so the obvious option is to add more cruisers. “Right now, we have three BMD
cruisers,” Hicks said. “Will [Navy officials] make a decision to upgrade any
more of the cruisers? That’s what they’ll be discussing.”
So far, Lockheed Martin reports it has completed 16 Aegis BMD ships,
with the final two scheduled to be ready by mid-2008. Hicks said the full
contingent must be ready for fielding by early 2009.
These ships are a stopgap, or “pre-modernization,” measure until Navy and
Pentagon officials decide how to incorporate ballistic missile defense into the
massive Aegis modernization program scheduled to start in 2012. At that time,
all 62 destroyers and 22 cruisers in the Aegis fleet will begin rotating into port
for 40-week computer modernization programs. How many of those modernized
ships will be equipped to fire missile interceptors is another topic for talks, Hicks
said.40
Similarly, in a speech in late-November 2007, Rear Admiral Alan Hicks
reportedly
described the 18 ships as “inadequate” to meet missile defense needs, and said
the Navy was trying to solve that problem.
“When the Aegis production line ends, I think there will be 84 ships —
we’re looking at 2012, 2013,” he told ITN [Inside the Navy]. “How many of
those ships needed to be BMD-capable is a decision for the chief of naval
operations and the secretary of defense, but the Navy knows 18 is inadequate.
Therefore, they’ve made a decision already that the ships that start DDG
[destroyers] modernization, 2012 and out, will have BMD added to that.”
The Navy is also reviewing its [Aegis] cruiser modernization program to
determine how many of them will get the system, he said.41
A January 21, 2008 press report stated:
The Navy is looking into the possibility of adding Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense systems to its entire fleet of cruisers and destroyers, the service’s top
surface warfare official said last week in a presentation to the Surface Navy
Association’s annual symposium in Arlington, VA.
Fifteen destroyers and three cruisers will be equipped with the BMD
capability “by the end of next year,” but the service wants to go well beyond
those 18 ships, said Rear Adm. Victor Guillory, director of the surface warfare
division (N86), in his Jan. 15 presentation to symposium attendees.
40 Ben Iannotta, “Admiral Wants Bigger Anti-Missile Upgrade,” NavyTimes.com, November
5, 2007. Bracketed material as in the original.
41 Dan Taylor, “Navy Still Interested in Second MKV, MDA Will Talk to Congress,” Inside
the Navy, December 3, 2007.

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CRS-18
“The DDG modernization program is funded to add BMD capability to the
remaining 47 destroyers, and we will be examining options [to add BMD to the]
remaining cruisers in POM-10 [program objective memorandum],” he said.42
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: In the absence
of a defined U.S. BMD architecture, what was the basis for deciding that 18 Aegis
ships should be equipped for BMD operations? What is the likelihood that 18 BMD-
equipped Aegis ships will turn out to be too many or not enough? What kinds of
BMD operations were factored into the Navy requirement for maintaining a force of
at least 88 cruisers and destroyers? If BMD operations by Navy ships turn out to be
more significant than what the Navy assumed in calculating the 88-ship figure, will
the figure need to be increased, and if so, by how much?
Role of Aegis BMD in European Missile Defense
What should be the role of Aegis BMD in European missile defense?
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential role of the
Aegis BMD system as a partial or complete alternative to the ground-based
midcourse defense (GMD) system that the Bush Administration has proposed to
establish in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russian President Vladimir Putin
opposes a ground-based GMD system in Europe and has suggested that the United
States explore certain alternative approaches, including the use of BMD-capable
Aegis ships. A June 21, 2007, press report stated:
The US has been less receptive to the idea of placing missile interceptors
in Turkey, Iraq, or on Aegis ships, as Mr Putin suggested. The Missile Defence
Agency says Turkey and Iraq are too close too Iran for interceptors to be able to
catch an incoming missile from Iran.
But the idea of using Aegis ships has seen more debate. Duncan Hunter, the
top Republican on the House armed services committee, recently said Mr Putin’s
proposal about sea-based missile defences was “promising”, although only as an
additional capability to ground-based missile interceptors in Poland.
“The Navy’s Aegis ship-based defensive systems could be based in existing
Black Sea ports, either in Ukraine, Russia or Turkey,” said Mr Hunter.
General Trey Obering, MDA director, has argued that the Aegis ships are
currently configured to intercept short- and medium-range threats, and could not
counter against long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles that could target the
US without costly modifications, which would take a considerable amount of
time. His critics say the Iranian threat is far enough in the future to provide the
US time.
Gen Obering also argues that the US would need to deploy tens of ships for
the system to be feasible. But several people familiar with a study prepared by
Raytheon, which is manufacturing missile interceptors for the Aegis ships, said
42 Dan Taylor, “Navy Considering Equipping Cruiser and Destroyer Fleet With Aegis
BMD,” Inside the Navy, January 21, 2008. Material in brackets as in original.

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CRS-19
it concluded that as few as five ships could provide a defence against an Iranian
threat. Raytheon declined to comment.43
A November 29, 2007 press report stated:
It would take a large number of U.S. Navy Aegis weapons system ships to
shield Europe against enemy missiles from the Middle East, if the United States
attempted to use the sea-based system to guard Europe instead of the
Ground-based Midcourse missile Defense (GMD) system proposed for the Czech
Republic and Poland.
That was the assessment yesterday of Rear Adm. Alan Hicks, program
director of the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, at a symposium of
the George C. Marshall Institute, a Washington think tank, held at the National
Press Club.
“Certainly by the near-term capability, between now and 2015, that’s a lot
of ships, and I wouldn’t recommend it,” he said.
Further, those ships wouldn’t be stationed in an ideal location, so that the
interceptors they would fire to take down enemy weapons would “run out of
juice” in pursuing those threats.
He added, though, that the Aegis sea-based system could be deployed as a
complement to the European GMD system when the ships aren’t needed for other
missions. The European GMD system has yet to win final approval from the
Czechs and Poles.
One key point is that it is not a stretch for the GMD system, with a radar in
the Czech Republic and 10 interceptors in silos in Poland, to provide 24-7
protection of Europe. But it would be difficult to have a sufficient number of
ships on station, on point, all the time, he said.44
For more on the debate concerning the European-based BMD system, see CRS
Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven A.
Hildreth and Carl Ek.
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: To what
extent could sea-based BMD systems perform functions that would be carried out by
the Administration’s proposed European BMD system? How many Aegis BMD
ships would be required? What would be the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of the Aegis BMD system as a partial or complete alternative to the
proposed European BMD system?
43 Demetri Sevastopulo, Guy Dinmore, and Neil Buckley, “Experts Sceptical [sic] On
Chances For Missile Deal,” Financial Times, June 21, 2007.
44 Dave Ahearn, “Large Number of Aegis Ships WOuld Be Needed To Shield Europe:
Admiral,” Defense Daily, November 29, 2007.

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CRS-20
Number of SM-3 Missiles Planned for Procurement
Is the number of SM-3 interceptors that DOD plans to procure sufficient?
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is whether DOD is planning to
procure a sufficient number of SM-3 interceptors. Current DOD plans call for
procuring a total of 147.
FY2008 Defense Authorization Act. The House Armed Services
Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-146 of May 11, 2007) on the FY2008 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 1585), stated that:
the recent Capabilities Mix Study completed by U.S. Strategic Command has
indicated that combatant commanders require twice as many SM-3 interceptors
than the 147 that are currently planned.45
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-77 of June 5,
2007) on the FY2008 defense authorization bill (S. 1547), stated:
Currently MDA plans to procure only some 147 SM-3 missiles of all Block I
varieties. The Commander, Joint Forces Component Command for Integrated
Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) testified in April 2007 that recent analyses indicate
a need to nearly double the number of planned SM-3 interceptors. The committee
urges MDA to plan and budget for increased numbers of SM-3 interceptors to
meet the needs of regional combatant commanders, as indicated by the
Commander, JFCC-IMD.46
Press Reports. A May 2007 press report stated that:
A preliminary DOD study points to the need for more Standard Missile-3
(SM-3) sea-based missile defense interceptors and Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) interceptors, according to Lt. Gen. Kevin Campbell,
commander of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC).
The study examined various major combat operations around the world,
estimating the percentages of enemy missiles that would be taken out by
conventional forces or felled by system failures. The current SM-3/THAAD
interceptor inventory then was compared to a list of critical assets identified by
DOD combatant commanders that need to be defended.
Near-term U.S. missile defense capabilities are “limited” primarily by
interceptor inventory, Campbell said at a May 16 breakfast in Washington
sponsored by National Defense University. In addition to SM-3s and THAAD
interceptors, DOD also needs more Patriot battalions and ground-based
interceptors, according to Campbell.47
45 H.Rept. 110-146, p. 235.
46 S.Rept. 110-77, p. 264.
47 Jefferson Morris, “Study Points To Need For More SM-3s, THAAD Interceptors,”
(continued...)

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CRS-21
In late November 2007, Rear Admiral Alan Hicks, Aegis BMD program
director, reportedly stated that
that even with 132 Standard Missiles (SMs) expected in the inventory by 2013,
there should be more to meet potential global requirements.
“We need more than that,” he said Nov. 28. “Inventory is inadequate to
meet our needs.” ...
But the admiral acknowledged that Aegis SM inventory also must be
weighed against Theater High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot Advanced
Capability missile inventories.48
Another press report based on the same speech by Hicks stated that
Hicks observed that the military will have 153 short- and mid-term missile
interceptors in the inventory by the end of 2009, but added that he believes the
Navy needs to expand the program beyond current plans. “Is it enough? No,”
Hicks said. “Inventory’s inadequate to meet our needs.”49
An April 2008 press report stated that:
Two senior Pentagon officials said they are working to bolster ballistic
missile defense fielding in the near term, an effort that could double the number
of planned Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) assets in the coming years.
Missile Defense Agency Director Air Force Lt. Gen. Trey Obering told
reporters yesterday he wants the number of Aegis and THAAD interceptors to
be increased during Pentagon discussions on Program Objective Memorandum
10 (POM ‘10).50
He said plans now spelled out in the five-year future years defense plan
running until fiscal year 2013 call for approximately 133 Standard Missile-3s
(SM-3s) that are part of the Aegis system, and 96 THAADs. He said he would
like to see those numbers “roughly” double starting with the FY ‘10 budget and
going until the “‘15, ‘16 timeframe.”
“If you take a look at what’s in our budget today and you look over the
FYDP, and double that, you come close,” to the number of Aegis and THAAD
interceptors he would like, Obering said.
47 (...continued)
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,” May 17, 2007: 3.
48 Michael Bruno, “Aegis BMD Program Chief Calls for More Missiles,” Aerospace Daily
& Defense Report, November 29, 2007: 1-2.
49 Megan Scully, “FY08 Funding Boost To Help Navy Deploy Missile Defenses,” National
Journal’s CongressDailyPM, November 28, 2007.
50 The Program Objective Memorandum is an internal DOD memorandum that provides
guidance for the preparation of the defense budget for a future fiscal year. POM 10 is the
POM for preparing the FY2010 defense budget.

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CRS-22
Specifically, he said he would like to roughly double the current production
rate.
“How much that equates to across the FYDP depends on how much money
the [Defense] Department allocates to them,” he said. “But if they allocate the
money that we would recommend to do this, it would roughly double the number
of missiles across the FYDP.”
Such an increase would not double the amount of needed money, he said,
because economies of scale and running of production lines would control costs.
Pentagon acquisition executive John Young submitted written testimony to
the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee yesterday talking about
this desire to field additional ballistic missile defense assets in the near-terms.
“System elements like Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense could provide our Combatant Commanders as well
as our friends and allies a significant defensive capability in just a few years,”
Young wrote. “I am working with General Obering to achieve this goal through
the [Defense] Department’s programming and budgeting process.”...
Obering told reporters that the warfighters — Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic
Command — actually make decisions on the matter, and that MDA generally
doesn’t make force-structure decisions.
“That’s up to the warfighters,” he said. “So they came in and they said this
is the force structure we believe we need, looking at the scenarios that they may
be faced with, that’s what they’re doing.”
As to where the extra money would come from for the additional ballistic
missile defense interceptors, Obering said that would be hashed out during the
POM ‘10 process.
“Whether we take it out of our portfolio, whether it is a combination of
service money or our money, that’s what we have to go through this budget
process and we’ll come up with our POM ‘10 number,” he said.51
Another press report carrying the same date made similar points and stated that
“The 2007 Joint Capabilities Mix Study II, recently approved by DOD’s Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, concluded that combatant commanders required
at least twice as many SM-3 and THAAD interceptors as currently planned.”52
Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) for SM-3 Block IIA Missile
Should the Block IIA version of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptor missile be
equipped with the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) now in development?
51 Emelie Rutherford, “Pentagon Officials Eye Increasing Near-Term Ballistic Missile
Defense Assets In POM ‘10,” Defense Daily, April 18, 2008.
52 Michael Bruno, “MDA Looks to Double Aegis, THAAD Interceptor Production,”
Aerospace Daily & Defence Report, April 18, 2008: 1-2.

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CRS-23
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is whether the SM-3 should be
equipped with the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) instead of the currently planned
unitary (i.e., single-target-capable) warhead, and if so, what effect this might have on
the cooperative program with Japan for developing the SM-3 Block IIA and the
schedule for deploying the interceptor.
The MKV is a new BMD interceptor warhead being developed by MDA that
would permit a single interceptor to attempt to destroy more than one BMD target.
MDA is considering whether to equip certain interceptors, including the SM-3 Block
IIA, with the MKV. The MKV is expected by DOD to achieve initial capability in
2017.53
FY2008 Defense Authorization Act. The House Armed Services
Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-146 of May 11, 2007) on the FY2008 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 1585), stated that:
the current family of exo-atmospheric kill vehicles are capable of dealing with
the near- to mid-term threats that the nation is likely to face from rogue nations
such as Iran and North Korea. Additionally, in budget justification materials, the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) notes that it plans to replace the unitary
warhead on the SM-3 Block IIA missile, which the United States is
co-developing with Japan, with the MKV. The committee is concerned that
MDA has taken this decision without fully consulting with the Japanese
Government and that this decision has the potential to delay the fielding the
SM-3 Block IIA missile, a system that the committee believes is vital to the
security of the United States and our allies around the world.
Section 224 of the conference report (H.Rept. 110-477 of December 6, 2007)
on H.R. 1585 states:
SEC. 224. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR REPLACING WARHEAD
ON SM — 3 BLOCK IIA MISSILE.
None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to an
authorization of appropriations in this Act may be obligated or expended to
replace the unitary warhead on the SM-3 Block IIA missile with the Multiple Kill
Vehicle until after the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that —
(1) the United States and Japan have reached an agreement to replace the
unitary warhead on the SM-3 Block IIA missile; and
(2) replacing the unitary warhead on the SM-3 Block IIA missile with the
Multiple Kill Vehicle will not delay the expected deployment date of 2014 —
2015 for that missile.
Regarding Section 224, the conference report states:
53 For more on the MKV, see Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:]
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, March 2008 (GAO-08-467SP), pp. 133-134.

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CRS-24
The conferees note that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has indicated
an interest in replacing the unitary kill vehicle development program, which is
specified in the agreement with Japan, with a new MKV development program.
This would have undermined the agreed program of cooperation between the
United States and Japan on joint development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor
missile. It is important to support the joint development program in accordance
with the agreed program of record, which currently specifies a unitary kill
vehicle.
This provision does not restrict the MDA from conducting research,
development, analysis, or testing of MKV technologies, including those which
could be used in the future with the SM-3 Block IIA missile. It also does not
restrict MDA from conducting analysis and discussions with Japanese officials
to consider the possibility of including MKV on the SM-3 Block IIA.54
FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act. The Senate Appropriations
Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-155 of September 14, 2007) on the FY2008
defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3222), stated that:
the Committee is concerned that MDA has not fully consulted the Japanese about
their intention to replace the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA program with
MKV. The Japanese have already committed to funding half of the
$2,500,000,000 SM-3 Block IIA development effort with the United States. The
Standard Missile is performing extremely well in the Aegis sea-based tests, and
upgrades to that system are less risky and will provide near-term capability
sooner than moving to an unproven, technically immature MKV for the Aegis
system.
The conference report (H.Rept. 110-434 of November 6, 2007) on H.R.
3222/P.L. 110-116 of November 13, 2007, reduced to zero the $62.9 million FY2008
research and development funding request, within the line item for multiple kill
vehicles, for the multiple engagement payload (MEP) for the SM-3. (Page 341). The
report stated:
The conferees are concerned that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) does not
have the resources to adequately fund both MEP and the Multiple Kill Vehicle
(MKV) for the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and the Kinetic Energy
Interceptor (KEI). Thus, the conferees agree to increase the MKV for the GBI
[Ground-Based Interceptor] and KEI by $25,000,000 in order to restore
reductions that the MDA has annually taken out of this program. The conferees
further agree with the Senate language that directs that no funding in the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense program element can be used for the MKV program.
Additionally, the conferees direct that the Multiple Kill Vehicle, PE 0603894 is
54 H.Rept. 110-477, p. 829. H.R. 1585 was vetoed by the President on December 28, 2008.
A new bill, H.R. 4986, was passed with changes that took into account the President’s
objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585. The President’s objection to certain parts of H.R.
1585 did not relate to Section 224 or the report language cited here. H.R. 4986 was signed
into law as P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008. Except for the changes made by Congress to
take into account the President’s objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585, H.Rept. 110-477
in effect serves as the conference report for H.R. 4986.

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CRS-25
designated as a congressional special interest item subject to prior approval
reprogramming procedures.55
Press Report. A December 3, 2007 press report stated:
The Missile Defense Agency likely will make another attempt next year to
secure money for Raytheon’s multiple kill vehicle (MKV) for the Navy’s
ballistic missile defense program, which had its funding axed by Congress in this
year’s budget, the Aegis BMD program director said during a talk at the National
Press Club Nov. 28.
“Within the MDA, we’re going to look for opportunities” to talk with
Congress about the issue again in the near future, Rear Adm. Alan Hicks told
attendees of the round table discussion, which was sponsored by the George C.
Marshall Institute to discuss the status of the Aegis program....
“I think we will talk within the administration once the [fiscal year 2009]
budget’s all solidified and get a position, and then we will go to Congress and
talk and see what they feel, how they feel,” he said in an interview with Inside
the Navy after his presentation.
The unitary version of the SM-3 missile was “priority one,” but “to get an
extra kill vehicle or two on top of the SM-3 and provide options against more
advanced threats in the future is something, obviously, I’d like to have as an
option,” Hicks told attendees. “So we’ll see how that plays out over the year.”56
Far-Term Sea-Based Terminal Program
Should development of the far-term sea-based terminal capability be accelerated?
Another potential oversight question for Congress is whether development of
the far-term sea-based terminal BMD capability should be accelerated. Supporters
of DOD’s sea-based terminal program could argue that the Block 2.0 sea-based
terminal capability will provide Navy ships with a sufficient degree of terminal
defense capability until the anticipated deployment of the far-term capability. They
could also argue that accelerating development of the far-term capability could
increase development risks or require reducing funding for other BMD programs or
other DOD priorities, increasing operational risks in other areas.
Supporters of accelerating development of the far-term capability could argue
that an improved terminal-defense capability could prove useful if not critical in the
near term as well as the far term for intercepting missiles — such as SRBMs or
ballistic missiles fired along depressed trajectories — that do not fly high enough to
exit the atmosphere and consequently cannot be intercepted by the SM-3. They could
also argue accelerating development of the far-term capability could improve the
55 H.Rept. 110-434, p. 346.
56 Dan Taylor, “Navy Still Interested in Second MKV, MDA Will Talk to Congress,” Inside
the Navy, December 3, 2007.

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CRS-26
Navy’s ability to counter Chinese TBMs equipped with maneuverable reentry
vehicles (MaRVs) capable of hitting moving ships at sea.57
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI)
If the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) is developed for land-based BMD operations,
should it also be based at sea? If so, what kind of sea-based platform should be
used?
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the Kinetic Energy Interceptor
(KEI) — a new BMD interceptor now in development that could be used as a
ground-based BMD interceptor and perhaps subsequently as a sea-based BMD
interceptor. Compared to the SM-3, the KEI would be much larger (reportedly 40
inches in diameter and almost 39 feet in length) and would have a much higher
burnout velocity. Because of its much higher burnout velocity, it might be possible
to use a KEI based on a forward-deployed ship to attempt to intercept ballistic
missiles during the boost and early ascent phases of their flights. Under current DOD
plans, the land-based version of the KEI could become available use by the middle
of the next decade.58
The issue is whether the KEI, if developed, should be based at sea, and if so,
what kind of sea-based platform should be used. Basing the KEI on a ship would
require the ship to have missile-launch tubes that are bigger than those currently
installed on Navy cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines. Potential sea-based
platforms for the KEI include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:
! ballistic missile submarines (which have launch tubes large enough
to accommodate the KEI);
! surface combatants equipped with newly developed missile-launch
tubes large enough for the KEI; and
! a non-combat DOD ship (perhaps based on a commercial hull) or
floating platform.
Supporters of deploying the KEI at sea could argue that it would be more
capable than the SM-3 Block II/IIA for intercepting ICBMs and that it could enable
57 As discussed in another CRS report, China may now be developing TBMs equipped with
maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs). Observers have expressed strong concern about
this potential development, because such missiles, in combination with a broad-area
maritime surveillance and targeting system, would permit China to attack moving U.S. Navy
ships at sea. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic
missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. Due to their ability to change course,
MaRVs would be more difficult to intercept than non-maneuvering ballistic missile reentry
vehicles. See CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S.
Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
58 For more on the KEI, see Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:]
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, March 2008 (GAO-08-467SP), pp. 115-116.

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CRS-27
navy ships to attempt to intercept certain missiles during the boost phase of flight.
Skeptics could argue that in light of other planned BMD capabilities, the need for
basing the KEI at sea is not clear.
Among supporters of basing the KEI at sea, supporters of basing it on ballistic
missile submarines could argue that submarines can operate close to enemy coasts,
in positions suitable for attempting to intercept missiles during their boost phase of
flight, while remaining undetected and less vulnerable to attack than surface
platforms. Skeptics of basing the KEI on ballistic missile submarines could argue
that communication links to submarines are not sufficiently fast to support boost-
phase intercept operations, and that launching the KEI could give away the
submarine’s location, making it potentially vulnerable to attack.
Supporters of basing the KEI on surface combatants equipped with missile-
launch tubes large enough for the KEI could argue that surface ships have faster
communication links than submarines and more capability to defend themselves than
non-combat ships or floating platforms. Skeptics could argue that surface
combatants might not be able to get close enough to enemy coasts to permit boost-
phase intercepts, and that the defensive capabilities of a surface combatant are
excessive to what would be needed for a KEI platform operating in the middle of the
ocean, far from potential threats, for the purpose of using the KEI for midcourse
intercepts.
Supporters of a non-combat ship or floating platform could argue that a non-
combat ship or floating platform would be suitable for basing the KEI in mid-ocean
locations, far from potential threats, for the purpose of using the KEI for midcourse
intercepts. Skeptics could argue that using such a platform could not be used close
to an enemy coast, for the purpose of attempting a boost-phase intercept, unless it
were protected by other forces.
One potential surface-combatant candidate for carrying the KEI is the Navy’s
planned CG(X) cruiser, whose primary missions are to be air defense and ballistic
missile defense. The Navy is studying design options for the CG(X) in a study called
the CG(X) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), which is scheduled to be completed by
the end of 2007.
FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act. The Senate Appropriations
Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-155 of September 14, 2007) on the FY2008
defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3222), stated:
According to the budget justification materials, KEI has three objectives:
“(1) to develop a midcourse interceptor capable of replacing the current fixed
Ground-based interceptor (GBI) when the deployed GBIs become obsolete; (2)
to develop this interceptor so that it could be strategically deployed as an
additional midcourse capability with mobile land- or sea-based launchers; and
(3) to assume the boost- and ascent-phase intercept mission within the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) if the Airborne Laser (ABL) fails to meet its
performance objectives.” The Committee believes that these objectives are
premature, that existing systems can achieve the same goals, and that the missile
is not suitable for Navy platforms....

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CRS-28
The Committee is concerned that MDA is developing KEI as a replacement
for the GBI’s prematurely since the GBI’s are still under development, the
fielded GBI’s undergo continuous upgrades and retrofits, and the GBI’s still have
to undergo significant testing. Furthermore, additional midcourse capability can
be achieved with upgrading current mobile systems, such as Theater High
Altitude Area Defense [THAAD]. In addition, a study is currently underway on
sea-basing the KEI, including an examination of Navy platforms suitable for
hosting the large KEI. The Committee has not been informed that any current or
future Navy ship will be outfitted with the KEI, and it appears that there are few,
if any, viable platforms. Therefore, the Committee recommends a reduction of
$30,000,000 for the KEI program.59
Press Report. According to a July 2007 press article, the CG(X) AOA will
recommend that the CG(X) not carry the KEI:
[Sources] say the analysis will recommend dropping the Kinetic Energy
Interceptor (KEI) from the CG(X) program....
The KEI is much larger than the SM-3 Standard missile developed by
Raytheon to arm Navy cruisers and destroyers for the BMD role. The 40-inch
diameter KEI is nearly 39 feet long, while the 21-inch diameter SM-3 stands just
over 21 feet tall. Both missiles use a kinetic energy warhead, intended to ram an
enemy missile.
Sources said a missile launch tube for a KEI would need to be so large it
would take the place of six SM-3 launch cells.
“That’s a poor exchange ratio,” said one naval analyst familiar with the
AoA.60
CG(X) Cruiser
Should procurement of the planned CG(X) cruiser be accelerated?
As a replacement for its 22 Aegis cruisers, the Navy plans to procure 19 new
CG(X) cruisers. The radar capabilities of the CG(X) are to be greater than that of the
Navy’s Aegis ships, and the CG(X) has been justified primarily in connection with
future air defense and BMD operations. Under Navy plans, the first CG(X) is to be
procured in FY2011, and the final ship in FY2023. If procured as planned, the first
CG(X) might enter service in 2017, and the final ship might enter service in 2029.61
A potential issue for Congress is whether the planned CG(X) procurement
profile would be sufficient to achieve the desired level of sea-based BMD capability
59 S.Rept. 110-155, p. 268.
60 Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. May Build 25,000-Ton Cruiser, Analysis of Alternatives Sees
Nuclear BMD Vessel,” Defense News, July 23, 2007.
61 For more on the CG(X) program, see CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser
Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

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CRS-29
in a timely manner. If not, then one option would be to accelerate procurement of
some of the later ships in the CG(X) program.62
Development and Testing of Aegis BMD System
Are there lessons from development and testing of the Aegis BMD system that can
be applied to programs for developing and testing land-based systems?
With 11 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 13 attempts, the Aegis BMD
program has achieved a higher rate of successful intercepts than has the ground-based
midcourse system. At least some part of the Aegis BMD program’s higher success
rate may be due to two factors:
! The configuration of the Aegis BMD system that has been tested to
date is intended to shoot down shorter-range ballistic missiles. In
general, shorter-range missiles fly at lower speeds than longer-ranged
missiles, and interceptors intended to shoot down shorter-ranged
ballistic missiles don’t need to be as fast as interceptors intended to
shoot down longer-ranged ballistic missiles. Consequently, the
closing speeds63 involved in intercepts of shorter-ranged ballistic
missiles are generally lower than those for intercepts of longer-ranged
ballistic missiles. Intercepts involving lower closing speeds can be
less difficult to attempt than intercepts involving higher closing
speeds. In BMD tests over more than 20 years, tests of shorter-range
kinetic-energy BMD systems has generally been more successful than
tests of longer-range BMD systems.64
! The Aegis BMD system is being developed as an extension of the
existing Aegis air defense system, and can thus benefit from the
proven radar, software, and interceptor technology of that system,
whereas the ground-based midcourse system is being developed
essentially as a relatively new weapon system.
The potential question is whether these two factors account completely for the
difference in success rates for testing of the Aegis BMD program and the ground-
based midcourse program. If they do not, then one potential issue for Congress is
whether there is something about the approach adopted for developing and testing the
Aegis BMD capability, compared to that of the ground-based midcourse program,
that accounts for part of the difference.
As mentioned earlier, the Aegis BMD program says it has focused since its
inception on the philosophy of “test a little, learn a lot.” It can also be noted that the
62 For a discussion of this option, see CRS Report RL34179, op cit.
63 Closing speed is the relative speed at which the missile warhead and the interceptor
kinetic kill vehicle approach one another.
64 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33240, Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile
Defense: A Status Overview, by Steven A. Hildreth.

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CRS-30
Navy has a long history of air-defense missile development programs, and has
established a record of technical discipline, rigorousness, and excellence in areas
such as nuclear propulsion and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Potential
questions for Congress include the following:
! How do the Aegis BMD and ground-based midcourse programs
compare in terms of their approaches for system development and
testing?
! Are there features of the Aegis BMD program’s approach that, if
applied to the ground-based midcourse program or other U.S. BMD
programs, could improve the development and test efforts for these
programs?
Cooperation With Allies
Should current U.S. efforts for helping to establish BMD capabilities in allied navies
be reduced, accelerated, or maintained at current levels?
An additional potential issue for Congress is whether U.S. efforts for helping
to establish BMD capabilities in allied navies should be reduced, accelerated, or
maintained at current levels. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the
following:
! What are the potential military and political advantages and
disadvantages of establishing BMD capabilities in allied navies?
! To what degree, if any, would these capabilities be integrated into
the overall U.S. BMD architecture? How, in terms of technology,
command and control, doctrine, and training, would such an
integration be accomplished? If these capabilities are not integrated
into the U.S. architecture, what kind of coordination mechanisms
might be needed to maximize the collective utility of U.S. and allied
sea-based BMD capabilities or to ensure that they do not work at
cross-purposes?
! How might the establishment of BMD capabilities in allied navies
affect U.S. requirements for sea-based BMD systems? To what
degree, if any, could allied BMD ships perform BMD operations
now envisaged for U.S. Aegis ships?
! What are the potential implications for regional security of missile
proliferation and proliferation of BMD systems?

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CRS-31
Legislative Activity for FY2009
FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001)
House. The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-652
of May 16, 2008) on H.R. 5658, recommended a total of $111 million in the
Defense-Wide procurement account for procurement of SM-3 interceptors. This total
includes the transfer into the Defense-Wide procurement account of $56 million that
was requested in the Defense-Wide research and development account, and an
additional $55 million that was not requested in the proposed FY2009 budget — $20
million for facility upgrades, and $35 million for procurement of long-leadtime items.
(Page 136, line 95) In discussing this recommendation, the report states:
The budget request contained no funds for advanced procurement of
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors.
Consistent with the findings of the Joint Capabilities Mix Study II, which
indicated that the combatant commanders require, at minimum, twice as many
SM-3 interceptors than the 133 now planned, the committee strongly supports
efforts to increase production of SM-3 interceptors to counter the threat from
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
In accordance with section 223 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), the committee recommends the
transfer of $56.0 million of the funds from PE 63892C for advanced procurement
of SM-3 interceptors to be executed by the Missile Defense Agency.
Furthermore, the committee recommends an additional increase of $55.0
million for SM-3 production. Of this amount, $20.0 million is for facility
upgrades that will increase the capacity to manufacture 4 or more SM–3 missiles
per month in fiscal year 2010, and $35.0 million is for long-lead procurement of
an additional 12 SM-3 missiles.
Therefore, the committee recommends a total increase of $111.0 million for
procurement of SM-3 interceptors. (Page 137)
Within the Defense-Wide research and development account, the report
recommends an additional $20 million for the Aegis BMD program for BMD signal
processors. The report at this point also notes the above-described transfer of $56
million in funding for procurement for SM-3s from this account to the Defense-Wide
procurement account. The net result of these two actions is a recommended $36-
million reduction to the request for FY2009 research and development funding for
the Aegis BMD program. (Page 241, line 81) In discussing this recommendation, the
report states:
The budget request contained [about] $1.2 billion [note: $1,157.8 million]
in PE 63892C, for the sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), which
is designed to defend against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles.

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CRS-32
The committee notes its continuing concern that the Missile Defense
Agency is not providing sufficient funds for Aegis BMD. Given the threat posed
by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, the committee is concerned that
the 133 Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors that are currently planned will
be insufficient. The committee’s views are consistent with the results of the
recently completed Joint Capabilities Mix Study II, which concluded that
combatant commanders require nearly twice as many SM-3 interceptors than the
133 now planned. Elsewhere in this Act, the committee has increased funding for
SM-3 production.
The committee also notes its strong support for the United States-Japan
Cooperative Development Program, which is co-developing the SM–3 Block IIA
missile designed to counter longer-range ballistic missile threats. The committee
expects the Missile Defense Agency to continue to support the development of
the current unitary kill vehicle for that interceptor.
The committee recommends an increase of $20.0 million in PE 63892C for
the purchase of additional ballistic missile signal processors. Furthermore, in
accordance with section 223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), the committee recommends the transfer
of $56.0 million for procurement of SM-3 interceptors to title 1 [procurement].
The committee, therefore, recommends a total of [about] $1.1 billion [note:
$1,121.8 million], a decrease of $36.0 million, in PE 63892C for Aegis BMD.
(Pages 255-256)
Senate. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 110-335
of May 12, 2008) on S. 3001, recommended a total of $77 million in the Defense-
Wide procurement account for procurement of long-leadtime items for SM-3
interceptors. This total includes the transfer into the Defense-Wide procurement
account of $57 million that was requested in the Defense-Wide research and
development account, and an additional $20 million that was not requested in the
proposed FY2009 budget. (Page 110, line 001a) In discussing this recommendation,
the report states:
The budget request included no procurement funds for long lead
procurement of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors for the Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) system. Contrary to the law, the budget request included
$57.0 million in research and development (R&D) funds in PE 63892C for long
lead procurement of SM-3 Block IA missiles. The committee recommends
transferring the requested $57.0 million in R&D funds to a new defense-wide
procurement funding line for procurement of long lead items for SM-3
interceptors, consistent with the law. The committee also recommends an
increase of $20.0 million in the new Procurement, Defense-wide line for long
lead procurement of an additional 15 SM-3 interceptor missiles.
Section 223(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 (Public Law 110-181) required the Department of Defense to request any
long lead procurement funding for SM–3 interceptors, and THAAD Fire Units
3 and 4, in the fiscal year 2009 budget request using procurement funds, rather
than R&D funds. In addition, section 223(c) of that act prohibits the use of fiscal
year 2009 R&D funds for procurement of long lead items for SM–3 interceptors
and THAAD Fire Units 3 and 4.

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CRS-33
The committee is deeply disappointed that the Department of Defense
chose not to comply with the requirements of section 223 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), and
directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) to jointly provide a report to the congressional defense
committees by no later than October 1, 2008, providing a detailed explanation
of the reasons the Department chose not to comply with the law, and an
explanation of the Department’s plans to comply with the law.
The committee notes that the Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) study,
conducted by the Joint Staff, concluded that U.S. combatant commanders need
about twice as many SM-3 and THAAD interceptors as currently planned to meet
just their minimum operational requirements for defending against the many
hundreds of existing short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The committee
is deeply disappointed that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has not planned
or budgeted to acquire more than a fraction of the SM-3 interceptors needed to
meet the warfighters’ minimum operational needs, and that it does not plan to
fund additional procurement beyond fiscal year 2010. The committee believes
that achieving at least the JCM levels of upper tier interceptors in a timely
manner should be the highest priority for MDA, and expects the Agency to
modify its plans and budgets to meet our combatant commanders’ current
operational needs. In section 223 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364), Congress
specified the Aegis BMD system and its SM–3 interceptor as a high priority
near-term program for the Department to focus on. As the JCM study makes
clear, the Department has failed to do so.
To address these concerns, the committee recommends an increase of $20.0
million in the new defense-wide procurement funding line for long lead
procurement of an additional 15 SM-3 missiles to start to address the need to
meet the requirements identified in the JCM analysis. As described elsewhere in
this report, the committee also recommends increases of $80.0 million for
increasing the production rate of the SM–3 missile, reducing schedule risk for the
SM–3 Block IB missile, and for improving the capability of the Aegis BMD
system to conduct engagements using offboard sensors, known as “engage on
remote,” and to engage missiles in the ascent phase of midcourse flight. (Pages
119-120)
Within the Defense-Wide research and development account, the report
recommends and additional $80 million for the Aegis BMD program for “Aegis
BMD/SM-3 enhancement.” The report at this point also notes the above-described
transfer of $57 million in funding for procurement for SM-3s from this account to the
Defense-Wide procurement account. The net result of these two actions is a
recommended $23-million increase to the request for FY2009 research and
development funding for the Aegis BMD program. (Page 233, line 81) In discussing
this recommendation, the report states:
The budget request included $1.2 billion in PE 63892C for the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program, including $57.0 million for long lead
procurement of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA interceptor missiles. The
committee notes that the Aegis BMD system with its SM–3 interceptor is the
only midcourse defense system currently being deployed to provide defense
against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats to our forward-deployed

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CRS-34
forces, allies, and other friendly nations. The Aegis BMD system has had an
impressive record of successful tests against short- and medium-range targets,
including a multi-mission test against a ballistic missile and an air-breathing
threat, and a multiple target intercept against two ballistic missile targets.
The SM-3 missile is being developed to have increasing capability with
each successive version, from Block IA, to Block IB, to the Block IIA version
being developed jointly with Japan. The Aegis BMD system and its SM-3
interceptor have the potential to provide a significant measure of defensive
capability in various regions of the world, and to increase its capability to
conduct intercepts based on radar tracks from offboard sensors, known as
“engage on remote,” and to engage missiles early in their midcourse flight,
including in the ascent phase.
The committee notes that the Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) study,
conducted by the Joint Staff, concluded that U.S. combatant commanders need
about twice as many SM-3 and THAAD interceptors as currently planned to meet
just their minimum operational requirements for defending against the many
hundreds of existing short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The committee
is deeply disappointed that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has not planned
or budgeted to acquire more than a fraction of the SM-3 interceptors needed to
meet the warfighters’ minimum operational needs. The committee believes that
achieving at least the JCM levels of upper tier interceptors in a timely manner
should be the highest priority for MDA, and expects the Agency to modify its
plans and budgets to meet our combatant commanders’ current operational needs.
In section 223 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364), Congress specified the Aegis BMD system and
its SM-3 interceptor as a high priority near-term program for the Department of
Defense to focus on. As the JCM study makes clear, the Department has failed
to do so.
Section 223(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 (Public Law 110-181) requires that any long lead or advance procurement
for SM-3 Block IA missiles in the fiscal year 2009 budget be requested in
procurement funds, rather than in research and development (R&D) funds.
Section 223(c) of that act prohibits the use of fiscal year 2009 R&D funds for
procurement of long lead items for SM-3 Block IA missiles. The Department
chose not to comply with the law, and requested R&D funds for procuring long
lead items for the SM-3 missiles. This is not acceptable. The committee notes
that the Department is obliged to comply with the law, and expects the
Department to do so.
To be consistent with the law, and to correct the Department’s failure to
comply with the law, the committee recommends that all long lead funds for
SM–3 missiles be authorized and appropriated in a new defense-wide
procurement line described elsewhere in this report. Accordingly, the committee
recommends a transfer of $57.0 million from PE 63892C to the new procurement
line for long lead procurement of SM-3 Block IA missiles. The committee also
recommends an increase of $20.0 million in that new procurement line for the
procurement of long lead items for an additional 15 SM-3 interceptors, to begin
the process of increasing the inventory of SM-3 missiles toward the JCM levels.
The committee notes that MDA does not plan any procurement of SM-3 Block
IB missiles after fiscal year 2010, which is inconsistent with the JCM study
conclusions concerning the need for about twice as many SM-3 and THAAD

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CRS-35
missiles as are currently planned. The committee expects MDA to modify its
plans and budgets for the fiscal year 2010 budget submission to address the
inventory levels indicated by the JCM study.
To address these numerous concerns, the committee recommends an
increase of $80.0 million in PE 63892C for the following projects: $20.0 million
for facilitizing an increase in SM-3 production capacity to four missiles per
month; $20.0 million to reduce schedule risk for the Block IB missile; and $40.0
million for accelerated development of enhanced Aegis BMD capability for
“engage on remote” and ascent-phase engagement. (Pages 259-260)
Regarding the MKV, the report states:
The committee also notes that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) plans
to fund two contractor teams with competing technology approaches, but does
not plan to have a competitive selection of the best technology in the future.
Although MDA is pursuing development of MKV technologies for long-range
midcourse defense interceptors and for the Standard Missile-3 Block II
interceptor, keeping two contractor teams for the indefinite future is both
expensive and possibly unnecessary. The committee urges MDA to consider a
competitive selection process to determine which of the two contractor teams has
the best technology, and to select that team as the only team to fund in the future.
The committee is also concerned that the consolidation of all kinetic kill
vehicle technology development in one office may have the unintended effect of
removing continued focus on developing or improving existing and planned
unitary kinetic kill vehicles, such as the unitary kill vehicle planned for the
Standard Missile-3 Block IIA missile being developed jointly by the United
States and Japan. (Page 262)
Regarding the February 2008 shoot-down of the malfunctioning satellite, the
report states:
The committee notes that the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
system was used in February for a one-time mission to intercept and destroy a
decaying U.S. satellite before it re-entered the earth’s atmosphere. This mission,
which cost more than $90.0 million, used considerable Aegis BMD assets and
funding. The committee is concerned that the Aegis BMD program will not be
fully reimbursed for its expenses in preparing for, testing for, and conducting the
mission, as well as for restoring the system’s components to their normal missile
defense configuration, and replacing the Standard Missile-3 interceptor used for
the mission. If the Aegis BMD program is not reimbursed for these expenses, it
would not be able to perform some $90.0 million worth of planned and budgeted
activities that have been approved by Congress. This would not be acceptable.
The committee directs the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the
Department of Defense to ensure that the Aegis BMD program is fully
reimbursed for all expenses related to the one-time satellite intercept mission, so
that all previously planned, funded, and approved Aegis BMD work will proceed
without delay. The committee directs MDA to report to the congressional
defense committees by no later than October 1, 2008 on the status of the full
reimbursement of the Aegis BMD program. (Page 267)

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CRS-36
Appendix A. Strengths and Limitations
of Sea-Based BMD Systems
Potential Strengths. Potential strengths of sea-based BMD systems
compared to other BMD systems include the following:
! Advantageous locations at sea. Sea-based systems can conduct
BMD operations from locations at sea that are potentially
advantageous for BMD operations but inaccessible to ground-based
BMD systems.
! Base access and freedom of action. Sea-based systems can be
operated in forward (i.e., overseas) locations in international waters
without need for negotiating base access from other governments,
and without restrictions from foreign governments on how they
might be used.
! Visibility. Sea-based systems can operate over the horizon from
observers ashore, making them potentially less visible and less
provocative.
! Mobility. Navy ships with BMD systems can readily move
themselves to respond to changing demands for BMD capabilities or
to evade detection and targeting by enemy forces, and can do so
without placing demands on U.S. airlift assets.
Regarding the first of these potential strengths, there are at least four ways that
a location at sea can be advantageous for U.S. BMD operations:
! The location might lie along a ballistic missile’s potential flight path,
which can facilitate tracking and intercepting the attacking missile.
! The location might permit a sea-based radar to view a ballistic
missile from a different angle than other U.S. BMD sensors, which
might permit the U.S. BMD system to track the attacking missile
more effectively.
! If a potential adversary’s ballistic missile launchers are relatively
close to its coast, then a U.S. Navy ship equipped with BMD
interceptors that is operating relatively close to that coast could
attempt to defend a large down-range territory against potential
attack by ballistic missiles fired from those launchers.65 One to four
Navy ships operating in the Sea of Japan, for example, could attempt
65 The ship’s potential ability to do this is broadly analogous to how a hand casts a shadow
in a candle-lit room. The closer that the hand (i.e., the Navy ship) is moved to the candle
(the ballistic missile launcher), the larger becomes the hand’s shadow on the far wall (the
down-range area that the ship can help defend against ballistic missile attack). In BMD
parlance, the area in shadow is referred to as the defended footprint.

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CRS-37
to defend most or all of Japan against theater-range ballistic missiles
(TBMs)66 fired from North Korea.
! If a Navy ship were equipped with very fast interceptors (i.e.,
interceptors faster than those the Navy is currently deploying), and
if that ship were deployed to an overseas location relatively close to
enemy ballistic missile launchers, the ship might be able to attempt
to intercept ballistic missiles fired from those launchers during the
missiles’ boost phase of flight — the initial phase, during which the
ballistic missiles’ rocket engines are burning. A ballistic missile in
the boost phase of flight is a relatively large, hot-burning target that
might be easier to intercept (in part because the missile is flying
relatively slowly and is readily seen by radar), and the debris from
a missile intercepted during its boost phase might be more likely to
not fall on or near the intended target of the attacking missile.
Potential Limitations. Potential limitations of sea-based BMD systems
compared to other BMD systems include the following:
! Conflicts with other ship missions. Using multimission Navy
cruisers and destroyers for BMD operations might reduce their
ability to perform other missions, such as air-defense operations
against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack
operations, and anti-submarine warfare operations, for four reasons:
— Conducting BMD operations might require a ship to
operate in a location that is unsuitable for performing one or
more other missions.
— Conducting BMD operations may reduce a ship’s ability
to conduct air-defense operations against aircraft and cruise
missiles due to limits on ship radar abilities.
— BMD interceptors occupy ship weapon-launch tubes that
might otherwise be used for air-defense, land-attack, or anti-
submarine weapons.
— Launching a BMD interceptor from a submarine might
give away the submarine’s location, which might make it more
difficult for the submarine to perform missions that require
stealthy operations (and potentially make the submarine more
vulnerable to attack).
! Costs relative to ground-based systems. A sea-based system
might be more expensive to procure than an equivalent ground-
based system due to the potential need to engineer the sea-based
66 TBMs include, in ascending order of range, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which
generally fly up to about 600 kilometers (about 324 nautical miles), medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs), which generally fly up to about 1,300 kilometers (about 702 nm), and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), which generally fly up to about 5,500
kilometers (about 2,970 nm). Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) are longer-ranged
missiles that can fly 10,000 kilometers (about 5,400 nm) or more. Although ICBMs can be
used to attack targets within their own military theater, they are not referred to as TBMs.

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CRS-38
system to resist the corrosive marine environment, resist
electromagnetic interference from other powerful shipboard systems
and meet shipboard safety requirements, or fit into a limited space
aboard ship. A BMD system on a ship or floating platform that is
dedicated to BMD operations might be more expensive to operate
and support than an equivalent ground-based system due to the
maintenance costs associated with operating the ship or platform in
the marine environment and the need for a crew of some size to
operate the ship or platform.
! Ship quantities for forward deployments. Maintaining a standing
presence of a Navy BMD ship in a location where other Navy
missions do not require such a deployment, and where there is no
nearby U.S. home port, can require a total commitment of several
Navy ships, due to the mathematics of maintaining Navy ship
forward deployments.67
! Vulnerability to attack. A sea-based BMD system operating in a
forward location might be more vulnerable to enemy attack than a
ground-based system, particularly a ground-based system located in
a less-forward location. Defending a sea-based system against
potential attack could require the presence of additional Navy ships
or other forces.
! Rough waters. Very rough waters might inhibit a crew’s ability to
operate a ship’s systems, including its BMD systems, potentially
creating occasional gaps in BMD coverage.
67 For more on the mathematics of Navy ship forward deployments, see CRS Report
RS21338, Navy Ship Deployments: New Approaches — Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

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CRS-39
Appendix B. Arms Control Considerations
No arms control treaty currently in force limits sea-based BMD systems. The
U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was in force from 1972 until
the United States withdrew from the treaty in 2002, prohibited sea-based defenses
against strategic (i.e., long-range) ballistic missiles. Article V of the treaty states in
part: “Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.”
Article II defines an ABM system as “a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles
or their elements in flight trajectory....” For more on the ABM Treaty, see CRS
Report RL33865, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and
Agreements, by Amy F. Woolf, Sharon Squassoni, and Steve Bowman. The United
States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, according to the treaty’s procedures
for doing so. For a discussion, see CRS Report RS21088, Withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty: Legal Considerations, by David M. Ackerman.

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CRS-40
Appendix C. Aegis BMD Midcourse Flight Tests
As mentioned earlier, from January 2002 through November 2007, the Aegis
BMD midcourse system has achieved 11 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 13
attempts.68 This appendix provides details on these flight tests.
Seven Tests Between January 2002 and November 2005. Table 2 below
summarizes seven ALI and Aegis BMD midcourse flight tests (called FTM-2 through
FTM-8, with the FTM standing for “flight test mission69) conducted between January
2002 and November 2005. As shown in the table, six of the seven tests resulted in
successful intercepts.
Eighth Test (June 2006). On June 22, 2006, an Aegis BMD midcourse flight
test called FTM-10 resulted in a seventh successful exo-atmospheric intercept in
eight attempts. This was the first test to use the Aegis 3.6 computer program.70
Ninth Test (December 2006). On December 7, 2006, an Aegis BMD
midcourse flight test called FTM-11 was not successful, and was the first
unsuccessful flight test since June 2003. MDA stated that the ninth test
was not completed due to an incorrect system setting aboard the Aegis-class
cruiser USS Lake Erie prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the
ship. The incorrect configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the
ship from launching the first of the two interceptor missiles. Since a primary test
objective was a near-simultaneous launch of two missiles against two different
targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally not launched.
The planned test was to involve the launch of a Standard Missile 3 against
a ballistic missile target and a Standard Missile 2 against a surrogate aircraft
target. The ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range
Facility, Kauai, Hawaii and the aircraft target was launched from a Navy aircraft.
The USS Lake Erie (CG 70), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and the Royal Netherlands
68 Another CRS report, based on historical flight test data provided by MDA to CRS in June
2005, summarizes early sea-based BMD tests as follows:
The Navy developed its own indigenous LEAP program, which flight tested
from 1992-1995. Three non-intercept flight tests achieved all primary and
secondary objectives. Of the five planned intercept tests, only the second was
considered a successful intercept, however. Failures were due to various
hardware, software, and launch problems. Even so, the Navy determined that it
achieved about 82% of its primary objectives (18 of 22) and all of its secondary
objectives in these tests.
(CRS Report RL33240, Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile
Defense: A Status Overview, by Steven A. Hildreth.)
69 In some presentations, the flight tests are referred to as FM-2, etc., without the “T.”
70 Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Test Results in Successful ‘Hit To Kill’
Intercept,”June 22, 2006 (06-NEWS-0018).

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CRS-41
Navy frigate TROMP were all successful in detecting and tracking their
respective targets. Both targets fell into the ocean as planned.
After a thorough review, the Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Navy
will determine a new test date.71
Table 2. ALI and Aegis BMD Flight Tests
Test name
FTM-2
FTM-3
FTM-4
FTM-5
FTM-6
FTM-7
FTM-8
Date
1/22/02
6/13/02
11/21/02
6/18/03
12/11/03
2/24/05
11/17/05
Target apogee
300km
300km
160km
160km
160km
160km
227km
Target range
500km
500km
600km
600km
600km
600km
925km
Aegis computer
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI
ALI 2.2.2
BMD 3.0
BMD 3.0
program
1.2
1.2
2.0
2.0
SM-3 version
Block 0
Block 0
Block 0
Block 0
Block 0
Block 1
Block 1
Engagement sequence
Uncued
Uncued
Uncued
Cueda
Cueda
Uncued
Uncued
Intercept down range
430km
430km
250km
250km
482km
250km
462km
Intercept cross range
240km
240km
200km
150km
248km
150km
150km
Crew disclosure
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Ship’s heading
Steady
Steady
Steady
Steady
Maneuvering
Maneuvering
Maneuvering
Target flight phase
Descent
Descent
Ascent
Ascent
Descent
Descent
Descent
Lethal aimpont
No
No
Aimpoint
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
shift
Kinetic warhead
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
intercept
Source: “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, Aegis BMD Update and Plans,” Briefing to the Future
Naval Plans & Requirements Conference, Scott Perry, Aegis BMD [Program], April 26, 2006, slide
11.
a. Aegis ship to Aegis ship and external sensor to Aegis ship.
A news article about the ninth test stated:
“You can say it’s seven of nine, rather than eight of nine,” Missile Defense
Agency spokesman Chris Taylor said of the second failure in tests of the system
by the agency and the Navy....
The drill was planned to demonstrate the Navy’s ability to knock down two
incoming missiles at once from the same ship.
“In a real world situation it is possible, maybe even probable, that in
addition to engaging a ballistic missile threat that was launched, you may be
engaging a surface action,” said Joe Rappisi before the test. He is director for the
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system at Lockheed Martin, the primary
contractor for the program.
71 Untitled Missile Defense Agency “For Your Information” statement dated December 7,
2006 (06-FYI-0090).

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The test would have marked the first time a ship has shot down one target
in space and another target in the air at the same time.
The test presented a greater challenge to the ship’s crew and the ballistic
missile defense system than previous tests, Rappisi said. The multiple target
scenario is also closer to what sailors might actually face in battle.
The U.S. Pacific Fleet has been gradually installing missile surveillance and
tracking technology on many of its destroyers and cruisers amid concerns about
North Korea’s long-range missile program.
It is also installing interceptor missiles on many of its ships, even as the
technology to track and shoot down incoming missiles is being developed and
perfected.
The Royal Netherlands Navy joined the tracking and monitoring off Kauai
to see how its equipment works. The Dutch presence marked the first time a
European ally has sent one of its vessels to participate in a U.S. ballistic missile
defense test.72
A subsequent news article stated that:
the test abort of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system Dec. 7 resulted from
human error, [MDA Director USAF Lt. Gen. Henry] Obering says.... Both the
ballistic missile and aircraft targets launched as planned, but the first interceptor
failed to fire because an operator had selected an incorrect setting for the test.
Officials then aborted before the second could boost.
Aegis missile defense system tests are at a standstill until officials are able to
identify an appropriate ballistic missile target. The one used Dec. 7 was the last
of its kind, Obering says, leaving them empty handed in the near future.73
Another article stated:
Philip Coyle, a former head of the Pentagon’s testing directorate, gives the
Navy credit for “discipline and successes so far” in its sea-based ballistic missile
defense testing program. Coyle is now a senior adviser at the Center for Defense
Information.
“The U.S. Navy has an enviable track record of successful flight intercept
tests, and is making the most of its current, limited Aegis missile defense
capabilities in these tests,” Coyle told [Inside the Navy] Dec. 7.
“Difficulties such as those that delayed the latest flight intercept attempt
illustrate the complexity of the system, and how everything must be carefully
72 David Briscoe, “Test Interceptor Missile Fails To Launch,” NavyTimes.com, December
8, 2006.
73 Amy Butler, “GMD Trial Delayed Until Spring; Aegis Failure Human Error,” Aerospace
Daily & Defense Report, December 19, 2006.

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CRS-43
orchestrated to achieve success,” Coyle added. “Nevertheless, this particular
setback won’t take the Navy long to correct.”74
Tenth Test (April 2007). On April 26, 2007, an Aegis BMD midcourse flight
test called FTM-11b (or FTM Event 4) resulted in the eighth successful exo-
atmospheric intercept in ten attempts. MDA states that the test
involved the simultaneous engagements of a ballistic missile “unitary” target
(meaning that the target warhead and booster remain attached) and a surrogate
hostile air target....
The test demonstrated the [Aegis ship’s] ability to engage a ballistic missile
threat and defend itself from attack at the same time. The test also demonstrated
the effectiveness of engineering, manufacturing, and mission assurance changes
in the solid divert and attitude control system (SDACS) in the kinetic kill
weapon. This was the first flight test of all the SM-3 Block IA’s upgrades,
previously demonstrated in ground tests.75
A press report on the test stated that the hostile air target was an anti-ship cruise
missile. The article stated that the scenario for the test
called for the [Aegis ship] to come under attack from a cruise missile fired by an
enemy plane.... A Navy plane fired the cruise missile target used in the test.76
Eleventh Test (June 2007). On June 22, 2007, an Aegis BMD midcourse flight
test called FTM-12 resulted in the ninth successful exo-atmospheric intercept in 11
attempts. MDA states that the test
was the third intercept involving a separating target and the first time an Aegis
BMD-equipped destroyer was used to launch the interceptor missile. The USS
Decatur (DDG 73), using the operationally-certified Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense Weapon System (BMD 3.6) and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block
IA missile successfully intercepted the target during its midcourse phase of
flight....
An Aegis cruiser, USS Port Royal (CG 73), a Spanish frigate, MÉNDEZ
NÚÑEZ (F-104), and MDA’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
mobile ground-based radar also participated in the flight test. USS Port Royal
used the flight test to support development of the new Aegis BMD SPY-1B radar
signal processor, collecting performance data on its increased target detection
and discrimination capabilities. MÉNDEZ NÚÑEZ, stationed off Kauai,
performed long-range surveillance and track operations as a training event to
assess the future capabilities of the F-100 Class. The THAAD radar tracked the
target and exchanged tracking data with the Aegis BMD cruiser.
74 Zachary M. Peterson, “Sea-Based Missile Defense Test Fails Due To ‘Incorrect
Configuration,’” Inside the Navy, December 11, 2006.
75 Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept,”
April 26, 2007 (07-NEWS-0032).
76 Audrey McAvoy, “Aegis Missile Test Successful,” NavyTimes.com, April 27, 2007.

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This event marked the third time that an allied military unit participated in
a U.S. Aegis BMD test, with warships from Japan and the Netherlands
participating in earlier tests.77
Twelfth Test (November 2007). On November 6, 2007, an Aegis BMD
midcourse flight test called FTM-13 that involved intercepting two SRBMs resulted
in the 10th and 11th successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 13 attempts. MDA states
that the test:
a multiple simultaneous engagement involving two ballistic missile targets....
For the first time, the operationally realistic test involved two unitary
“non-separating” targets, meaning that the target’s warheads did not separate
from their booster rockets....
At approximately 6:12 p.m. Hawaii Standard Time (11:12 p.m. EST), a
target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking
Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Moments later, a second, identical target was launched
from the PMRF. The USS Lake Erie’s Aegis BMD Weapon System detected and
tracked the targets and developed fire control solutions.
Approximately two minutes later, the USS Lake Erie’s crew fired two SM-3
missiles, and two minutes later they successfully intercepted the targets outside
the earth’s atmosphere more than 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean and 250
miles northwest of Kauai....
A Japanese destroyer also participated in the flight test. Stationed off Kauai
and equipped with the certified 3.6 Aegis BMD weapon system, the guided
missile destroyer JS Kongo performed long-range surveillance and tracking
exercises. The Kongo used the test as a training exercise in preparation for the
first ballistic missile intercept test by a Japanese ship planned for later this year.
This event marked the fourth time an allied military unit participated in a U.S.
Aegis BMDS test.78

77 Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept Achieved,”
June 22, 2007 (07-NEWS-0037).
78 Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense “Hit to Kill” Intercept Achieved,”
November 6, 2007 (07-NEWS-0051).

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