Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
~~October 20~~December 9, 2021 , 2021
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability ~~fo r~~for

conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend
Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as IranEurope from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran , and in in the Western , and in in the Western

Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks
from countries such as North Korea and Iran. MDA’s FY2022 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2022 there from countries such as North Korea and Iran. MDA’s FY2022 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2022 there
willwill be 48 total BMDS [BMD system] capable ships requiring maintenance support.” be 48 total BMDS [BMD system] capable ships requiring maintenance support.”
The Aegis BMD program is The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for
BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2021 budget requested a total of $1,647.9 million (i.e., about $1.6 billion) in BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2021 budget requested a total of $1,647.9 million (i.e., about $1.6 billion) in
procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in
Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon)
funding for the Aegis BMD program. funding for the Aegis BMD program.
Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:
 whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding  whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding
requests for the program; requests for the program;
 the impact of the COVID-19  the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the execution of Aegis BMD program efforts; pandemic on the execution of Aegis BMD program efforts;
 what role, if any, the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. homeland against attack from  what role, if any, the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. homeland against attack from
ICBMs; ICBMs;
 required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships;  required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships;
 the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, and whether  the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, and whether
there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships,
such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites; such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites;
 allied burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to  allied burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to
U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations; U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations;
 whether to procure and install an Aegis Ashore system on Guam;  whether to procure and install an Aegis Ashore system on Guam;
 whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site;  whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site;
 the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations  the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations
and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship -based BMD interceptor missiles; -based BMD interceptor missiles;
and and
 technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.  technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ~~bal istic~~ballistic
missile defense (BMD) program, a program carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) missile defense (BMD) program, a program carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
and the Navy that gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD and the Navy that gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD
operations. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of operations. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of
Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program. Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program.
Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD
capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base. capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base.
Background
Aegis Ships
Al All but three of the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are but three of the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are ~~cal ed~~called Aegis ships because they are Aegis ships because they are
equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers,
software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that
defended Zeus. (The exceptions are the Navy’s three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers, defended Zeus. (The exceptions are the Navy’s three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers,
which are discussed below.) The Aegis system was which are discussed below.) The Aegis system was ~~original y~~originally developed in the 1970s for developed in the 1970s for
defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and
subsurface threats. The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated subsurface threats. The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated
many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers. Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers
A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and
FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs
47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged 47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged
by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005, by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005,
leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73). leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73).
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers1
A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first
entered service in 1991 and the 62nd entered service in FY2012. The first 28 ships are known as entered service in 1991 and the 62nd entered service in FY2012. The first 28 ships are known as
Flight I/II DDG-51s. The next 34 ships, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design Flight I/II DDG-51s. The next 34 ships, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design
changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar. changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar.
No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured
the three above-mentioned Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does the three above-mentioned Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does
not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy
plans do not plans do not ~~cal~~ call for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.2 for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.2
Procurement of DDG-51s resumed in FY2010, following procurement of the three Zumwalt-class Procurement of DDG-51s resumed in FY2010, following procurement of the three Zumwalt-class
destroyers. A total of 25 DDG-51s have been procured from FY2010 through FY2021. DDG-51s destroyers. A total of 25 DDG-51s have been procured from FY2010 through FY2021. DDG-51s

1 For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS1 For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 For more on the DDG-1000 program, see CRS2 For more on the DDG-1000 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
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procured in FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a new version of the DDG-51 design procured in FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a new version of the DDG-51 design
~~cal ed~~called the Flight III version. The Flight III version is to be equipped with a new radar, the Flight III version. The Flight III version is to be equipped with a new radar, ~~cal ed~~called the the
SPY 6 radar (and prior to that, the Air and Missile Defense Radar, or AMDR), that is more SPY 6 radar (and prior to that, the Air and Missile Defense Radar, or AMDR), that is more
capable than the SPY-1 radar capable than the SPY-1 radar ~~instal ed on al~~ installed on all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers. previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers.
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies
Sales of the Aegis system to Sales of the Aegis system to ~~al ied~~allied countries began in the late 1980s. countries began in the late 1980s. ~~Al ied~~ Allied countries that now countries that now
operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Spain, and Norway.3 Japan’s Aegis-equipped ships are BMD-capable. The Aegis-Australia, Spain, and Norway.3 Japan’s Aegis-equipped ships are BMD-capable. The Aegis-
equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are currently not BMD-equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are currently not BMD-
capable. capable.
Aegis BMD System4
Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to
the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor
missiles. In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s missiles. In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s
procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are being built from the start with a BMD capability. procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are being built from the start with a BMD capability.
Versions and Capabilities of Aegis BMD System
Overview
The Aegis BMD system exists in multiple variants whose ascending numerical designations The Aegis BMD system exists in multiple variants whose ascending numerical designations
indicate ascending levels of capability. In MDA’s FY2022 budget submission, the designations of indicate ascending levels of capability. In MDA’s FY2022 budget submission, the designations of
Aegis BMD system variants have been changed and consolidated to 4.X, 5.X, and 6.X.5 These Aegis BMD system variants have been changed and consolidated to 4.X, 5.X, and 6.X.5 These
BMD system variants correlate with certain versions (i.e., baselines, or BLs) of the BMD system variants correlate with certain versions (i.e., baselines, or BLs) of the ~~overal~~ overall Aegis Aegis
system, which have their own numbering system. The more recent BMD variants, in addition to system, which have their own numbering system. The more recent BMD variants, in addition to
being able to address more being able to address more ~~chal enging~~challenging BMD scenarios, give BMD-equipped ships a capability to BMD scenarios, give BMD-equipped ships a capability to
simultaneously perform both BMD operations against simultaneously perform both BMD operations against ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles and anti-air warfare missiles and anti-air warfare
(AAW) operations (aka air-defense operations) against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles. (AAW) operations (aka air-defense operations) against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles.
Figure 1 provides a 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) summary of the capabilities provides a 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) summary of the capabilities
of the more recent BMD variants and their correlation to Aegis system baselines. Becausof the more recent BMD variants and their correlation to Aegis system baselines. Because Figure
1 was prepared in 2019, it uses the older designations for Aegis BMD system variants, rather than was prepared in 2019, it uses the older designations for Aegis BMD system variants, rather than
the new designations that have been introduced as part of the MDA’s FY2022 budget submission. the new designations that have been introduced as part of the MDA’s FY2022 budget submission.
The Aegis BMD system was The Aegis BMD system was ~~original y~~originally designed primarily to intercept theater-range designed primarily to intercept theater-range ~~bal istic~~ballistic
missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs,
and IRBMs, respectively). In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range and IRBMs, respectively). In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range ~~bal istic~~ballistic
missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system’s radar might be passed missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system’s radar might be passed
to other U.S. BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental to other U.S. BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental ~~bal istic missiles~~

~~3 T he~~ballistic missiles 3 The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version version
of the Aegisof the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerfulsystem that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar. version of the SPY-1 radar.
4 Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis 4 Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to BMD program given to
CRSCRS and CBOand CBO analysts on the MDA’s FY2020 and prior-year budget submissions. analysts on the MDA’s FY2020 and prior-year budget submissions.
5 5 ~~T he~~The 4.X variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 3.6.X, 4.0.X, 4.1, and 4.2. 4.X variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 3.6.X, 4.0.X, 4.1, and 4.2. ~~T he~~The 5.X 5.X
variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 5.0CU (with the CU standing for Capability variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 5.0CU (with the CU standing for Capability
Upgrade) and 5.1. Upgrade) and 5.1. ~~T he~~The 6.X variant is the new designation for the variant previously designated 6.0. 6.X variant is the new designation for the variant previously designated 6.0.
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(ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U.S. BMD (ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U.S. BMD
systems. systems.
Figure 1. GAO Summary of Capabilities of Aegis BMD System Variants

Source: GovernmentGovernment Accountability Office,Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Delivery Delays Provide ~~Opportunity~~ Opportunity for Increased
Testing to Better Understand Capability,, GAO-19-387, June 2019, Table 5 on p. 31. GAO-19-387, June 2019, Table 5 on p. 31.
April 2021 Press Report About Upcoming Test Against Mock Hypersonic Weapon
An AprilAn April 14, 2021, press report stated 14, 2021, press report stated
The Missile Defense Agency, together with the U.S. Navy, plan to test an SM The Missile Defense Agency, together with the U.S. Navy, plan to test an SM -6 missile -6 missile
against anagainst an “advanced“advanced ~~maneuvering~~ maneuvering threat,”threat,” a term thata term that ~~has been used~~ has been used in relationin relation to to
unpoweredunpowered ~~hypersonic~~ hypersonic boost-glideboost-glide vehicles,vehicles, later this year. The Pentagonlater this year. The Pentagon ~~says that~~
~~unspecified versions of the SM-6 have already demonstrated some degree of~~ says that unspecified versions of the SM-6 have already demonstrated some degree of capability capability
against these types of weapons, examples of which Russia and China have already begun against these types of weapons, examples of which Russia and China have already begun
putting to service. A new variant of the SM-6, the Block IB, is already under development putting to service. A new variant of the SM-6, the Block IB, is already under development
and will itself be able to reach hypersonic speeds. and will itself be able to reach hypersonic speeds.
Barbara Barbara McQuiston,McQuiston, ~~a senior U.S.~~ a senior U.S. official currentlyofficial currently ~~performing the duties of the~~ performing the duties of the Under Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, including mention of the scheduled Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, including mention of the scheduled
SM-6 test in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee SM-6 test in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee
on Defense yesterday…. on Defense yesterday….
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“MDA [the Missile Defense Agency], in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, demonstrated “MDA [the Missile Defense Agency], in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, demonstrated
early capability against maneuvering threats during flight-testing of the Standard Missile early capability against maneuvering threats during flight-testing of the Standard Missile
(SM)-6 Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense, and it will further demonstrate this capability (SM)-6 Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense, and it will further demonstrate this capability
against an advanced maneuvering threat-representative target later this year,” according to against an advanced maneuvering threat-representative target later this year,” according to
McQuiston’sMcQuiston’s ~~written~~ written testimony.testimony. ~~“We~~ “We will continue to advance our SBT capability to address the regional hypersonic threat and will test that capability ~~will continue to advance our SBT capability to~~
~~address the regional hypersonic threat and will test that capability~~ in the FY 2024 in the FY 2024
timeframe.”… timeframe.”…
This is not the first time the Pentagon has publicly discussed using a variant of the SM-6 This is not the first time the Pentagon has publicly discussed using a variant of the SM-6
for hypersonic defense. In March 2020, Mike Griffin,for hypersonic defense. In March 2020, Mike Griffin, then the Under Secretary of Defense then the Under Secretary of Defense
for Researchfor Research ~~and Engineering, first revealed that this missile was among those being~~
~~considered for this role and that there were plans to test one of them against an~~ and Engineering, first revealed that this missile was among those being considered for this role and that there were plans to test one of them against an actual actual
hypersonic boost-glide vehicle sometime in the 2023 Fiscal Year. It’s not clear whether the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle sometime in the 2023 Fiscal Year. It’s not clear whether the
test Griffin was referring to is the one now scheduled for thistest Griffin was referring to is the one now scheduled for this year or the one that MDA year or the one that MDA
now plans to carry out in the 2024 Fiscal Year.6 now plans to carry out in the 2024 Fiscal Year.6
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles
The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard7 Missile-3 (SM-3) and the The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard7 Missile-3 (SM-3) and the
SM-6. SM-6.
SM-3 Midcourse Interceptor
The SM-3 is designed to intercept The SM-3 is designed to intercept ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric
intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit- missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit-
to-to-~~kil~~ kill” warhead, ” warhead, ~~cal ed~~called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile’s warhead missile’s warhead
by collidingby colliding with it. The current versions of the SM-3 missile include the SM-3 Block IA, the with it. The current versions of the SM-3 missile include the SM-3 Block IA, the
SM-3 Block IB, and the SM-3 Block IIA.8 SM-3 Block IB, and the SM-3 Block IIA.8
Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target
seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting
its course. Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster its course. Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster
stage at the bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block stage at the bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block
IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform
21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout 21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout
velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater
than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as ~~wel~~ well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The
United States and Japan cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version, United States and Japan cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version,
with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.9 with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.9

~~6 Joseph T revithick, “~~ 6 Joseph Trevithick, “Navy SM-6 Missile Will Attempt Navy SM-6 Missile Will Attempt ~~T o~~To Swat Down Swat Down A Mock Hypersonic WeaponA Mock Hypersonic Weapon ,” ,” The Drive, April , April
14, 2021. 14, 2021.
7 7 ~~T he~~The Standard Missile Standard Missile is so named becauseis so named because it wasit was originally developed, decadesoriginally developed, decades ago, as a surface-to-air (i.e., air ago, as a surface-to-air (i.e., air
defense) missiledefense) missile to serve as the common (i.e., standard) successor to the Navy’s thento serve as the common (i.e., standard) successor to the Navy’s then -existing collection of -existing collection of ~~T alos,~~
~~T errier, and T artar~~Talos, Terrier, and Tartar air defense missiles air defense missiles (which were(which were sometimes referred to collectively as the 3-Tsometimes referred to collectively as the 3-T missiles). missiles).
8 MDA and Navy plans at one point called for the SM-3 Block IIA to be succeeded8 MDA and Navy plans at one point called for the SM-3 Block IIA to be succeeded by a still-more-capable interceptor by a still-more-capable interceptor
calledcalled the SM-3 Block IIB. the SM-3 Block IIB. ~~T he~~The effort to develop that missile, however, was effort to develop that missile, however, was ~~ended~~ ended years ago, and MDA at the time was years ago, and MDA at the time was
reportedly not pursuing any follow-on capabilities to the SM-3 Block IIA. (See,reportedly not pursuing any follow-on capabilities to the SM-3 Block IIA. (See, for example, Justin Doubleday, for example, Justin Doubleday,
“Missile Defense Agency Not Pursuing“Missile Defense Agency Not Pursuing Follow-On to SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor,” Follow-On to SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor,” Inside the Navy, October 24, , October 24,
2016.) 2016.)
9 9 ~~T he~~The cooperative research effort was carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed cooperative research effort was carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999. in 1999. ~~T he~~The
effort focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the second-stage effort focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the second-stage
propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone. propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone.
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A March 31, 2020, press report stated A March 31, 2020, press report stated
Raytheon and the Missile Defense Agency are exploring options to extend the range of the Raytheon and the Missile Defense Agency are exploring options to extend the range of the
Standard Missile-3Standard Missile-3 Block IB—pushingBlock IB—pushing ~~the ballistic missile interceptor to dramaticaly~~ the ballistic missile interceptor to dramatically
expand a defended area by allowing the weapon to communicate with off-board radars—a expand a defended area by allowing the weapon to communicate with off-board radars—a
movemove ~~that would require enhancing one of the Aegis ballistic missile defense~~ that would require enhancing one of the Aegis ballistic missile defense system’s system’s
newest features: Engage-on-Remote…. newest features: Engage-on-Remote….
MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill told Congress earlier this month that the new Engage- MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill told Congress earlier this month that the new Engage-
on-Remote capability provideson-Remote capability provides “a “a seven-fold increase inseven-fold increase in missile defense coveragemissile defense coverage when when
compared to an autonomous Aegis platform.”10 compared to an autonomous Aegis platform.”10
SM-6 Terminal Interceptor
The SM-2 Block IV was MDA’s and the Navy’s initial sea-based terminal-phase BMD The SM-2 Block IV was MDA’s and the Navy’s initial sea-based terminal-phase BMD
interceptor. It was designed to intercept interceptor. It was designed to intercept ~~bal istic~~ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo- missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo-
atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile’s flight. It was missile’s flight. It was
equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead. A limited number of these missiles were produced equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead. A limited number of these missiles were produced
years ago.11 The SM-2 Block IV has now been replaced by the SM-6. years ago.11 The SM-2 Block IV has now been replaced by the SM-6.
The SM-6 is MDA’s and the Navy’s more capable next-generation sea-based terminal-phase (i.e., The SM-6 is MDA’s and the Navy’s more capable next-generation sea-based terminal-phase (i.e.,
endo-atmospheric) BMD interceptor. It is based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the Navy’s endo-atmospheric) BMD interceptor. It is based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the Navy’s
successor to the SM-2 air defense missile). The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used successor to the SM-2 air defense missile). The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used
for either air defense (i.e., countering aircraft and ASCMs) or for either air defense (i.e., countering aircraft and ASCMs) or ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile defense. A July 23, missile defense. A July 23,
2018, press report states the following: 2018, press report states the following:
The The ~~Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramaticaly~~
Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramatically increase the speed and range of the Navy’s Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket increase the speed and range of the Navy’s Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket
motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and
defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system. defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system.
On Jan. 17 [2018], the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with On Jan. 17 [2018], the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with
a 21-inch diameter for the SM-6,a 21-inch diameter for the SM-6, which is currentlywhich is currently fielded with a 13.5-inch propulsion fielded with a 13.5-inch propulsion
package. The new rocketpackage. The new rocket ~~motor would~~ motor would sit atop the currentsit atop the current 21-inch booster, producing a 21-inch booster, producing a
new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB.12 new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB.12
Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
MDA’s FY2022 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2022 there MDA’s FY2022 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2022 there ~~wil~~ will be 48 total be 48 total
BMDS [BMD system] capable ships requiring maintenance support.”13 BMDS [BMD system] capable ships requiring maintenance support.”13
BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers Forward-Homeported in Spain
On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the
EPAA, four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers were to be forward-homeported (i.e., EPAA, four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers were to be forward-homeported (i.e.,

10 Jason Sherman, “10 Jason Sherman, “ After MDA Demonstrates 7x Increase in Defended Area, Raytheon Pitching EOR for Older SM-After MDA Demonstrates 7x Increase in Defended Area, Raytheon Pitching EOR for Older SM-
3s,” 3s,” Inside Defense, March 31, 2020. , March 31, 2020.
11 The~~11 T he~~ inventory of SM-2 Block IVs inventory of SM-2 Block IVs ~~was~~ was created by modifying SM-2screated by modifying SM-2s that were originally builtthat were originally built to intercept aircraft and to intercept aircraft and
ASCMs.ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVsA total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs ~~were~~ were modified, and at least 3 weremodified, and at least 3 were ~~used~~ used in BMD flight tests through February in BMD flight tests through February
2012. 2012.
12 Jason Sherman, “Navy Looking to Increase Range, Speed 12 Jason Sherman, “Navy Looking to Increase Range, Speed of SM-6 with Larger Rocket Motor,” of SM-6 with Larger Rocket Motor,” Inside the Navy, July , July
23, 2018. 23, 2018.
13 Missile 13 Missile Defense Agency, Defense Agency, Fiscal Year 2022 President’s Budget, Missile Defense Agency, May 2021, p. 12. (, May 2021, p. 12. (~~T his~~This is is
MDA’s budgetMDA’s budget justification book for the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide appropriation account.) justification book for the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide appropriation account.)
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based) at the naval base at Rota, Spain.14 The initial based) at the naval base at Rota, Spain.14 The initial set of four ships was transferred to Rota in set of four ships was transferred to Rota in
FY2014 and FY2015.15 They are reportedly scheduled to return to the United States and replaced FY2014 and FY2015.15 They are reportedly scheduled to return to the United States and replaced
at Rota by a new set of four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in 2020-2022.16 at Rota by a new set of four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in 2020-2022.16
Navy officials have said that the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in Navy officials have said that the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in
the Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be the Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be
provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U.S. east coast. The provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U.S. east coast. The
Rota homeporting arrangement thus effectively releases about six U.S. Navy BMD-capable Aegis Rota homeporting arrangement thus effectively releases about six U.S. Navy BMD-capable Aegis
ships for performing BMD patrols or other missions elsewhere. In February and March 2020, ships for performing BMD patrols or other missions elsewhere. In February and March 2020,
DOD officials testified that DOD is considering forward-homeporting an additional two BMD-DOD officials testified that DOD is considering forward-homeporting an additional two BMD-
capable Aegis destroyers at Rota, which would make for a total of six destroyers at the site.17 capable Aegis destroyers at Rota, which would make for a total of six destroyers at the site.17
Navy officials have testified that they support the idea.18 Navy officials have testified that they support the idea.18
Aegis Ashore Sites
Two Navy-Operated Sites in Romania and Poland
The land-based version of the Aegis BMD system is The land-based version of the Aegis BMD system is ~~cal ed~~called Aegis Ashore. There are two Aegis Aegis Ashore. There are two Aegis
Ashore sites in Europe—one in Romania, and one in Poland. The sites are intended to help Ashore sites in Europe—one in Romania, and one in Poland. The sites are intended to help
defend Europe against defend Europe against ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran. Each Aegis Ashore site missile threats from countries such as Iran. Each Aegis Ashore site
includes a structure housing an Aegis system that is similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship, includes a structure housing an Aegis system that is similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship,
and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the
VLS that is VLS that is ~~instal ed~~installed in Navy Aegis ships.19 in Navy Aegis ships.19
The plan to establish the two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland was announced in 2009, The plan to establish the two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland was announced in 2009,
as part of a plan for providing regional BMD defense in Europe as part of a plan for providing regional BMD defense in Europe ~~cal ed~~called the European Phased the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Aegis Ashore site in Romania achieved operational certification Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Aegis Ashore site in Romania achieved operational certification

14 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by 14 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by ~~NAT O~~NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ~~the P rime~~ the Prime
Minister of Spain, JoseMinister of Spain, Jose Luis RodriguezLuis Rodriguez Zapatero and USZapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF“SECDEF Announces Stationing of AegisAnnounces Stationing of Aegis ~~Ships~~ Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessedat Rota, Spain,” accessed ~~August~~ August 27, 2020, at https://web.archive.org/27, 2020, at https://web.archive.org/
web/20120117065346/http:/www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=63109. web/20120117065346/http:/www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, andmiles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65 milesabout 65 miles northwest of northwest of
the Strait of Gibraltar leadingthe Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have been homeported at Rota at various points into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have been homeported at Rota at various points
in the past, most recently (prior to the current arrangement) in 1979. (Source: Samin the past, most recently (prior to the current arrangement) in 1979. (Source: Sam Fellman, “Fellman, “ U.S. U.S. ~~T o~~To Base Anti- Base Anti-
MissileMissile ~~Ships~~ Ships in Spain,”in Spain,” Defense News,Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.) October 10, 2011: 76.)
15 15 ~~T he~~The four ships are the destroyers four ships are the destroyers Ross (DDG-71) and (DDG-71) and Donald Cook (DDG-75), which moved to Rota in FY2014, and (DDG-75), which moved to Rota in FY2014, and
the destroyers the destroyers Carney (DDG-64) and (DDG-64) and Porter (DDG-78), which moved to Rota in FY2015. (DDG-78), which moved to Rota in FY2015.
16 See, 16 See, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “USSfor example, Mallory Shelbourne, “USS Arleigh Burke Arrives in Spain,Arleigh Burke Arrives in Spain, ~~USS~~ USS Donald Cook Will Head to Donald Cook Will Head to
Mayport,” Mayport,” USNI News, April 12, 2021. , April 12, 2021.
17 See,17 See, for example, Paul McCleary, “EUCOM Callsfor example, Paul McCleary, “EUCOM Calls For For ~~T wo~~Two More Ships More Ships For SpanishFor Spanish Port,” Port,” Breaking Defense, ,
February 25, 2020; David B. Larter, “Push to Base SixFebruary 25, 2020; David B. Larter, “Push to Base Six US US Navy Destroyers in Spain CouldNavy Destroyers in Spain Could ~~Be Gaining~~ Be Gaining Steam,” Steam,”
Defense News,, March 3, 2020. March 3, 2020.
18 See, 18 See, for example, David B. Larter, “for example, David B. Larter, “~~T he~~The US Navy’s US Navy’s ~~T op~~Top Officer Declares Support for Basing Officer Declares Support for Basing 6 Destroyers in Spain,” 6 Destroyers in Spain,”
Defense News,, March 5, 2020; John Vandiver, “March 5, 2020; John Vandiver, “ Rota to Gain Rota to Gain ~~T wo US~~ Two US Destroyers by MiddleDestroyers by Middle of the Decade, EUCOM of the Decade, EUCOM
Chief Says,”Chief Says,” Stars and Stripes, April 15, 2021. es, April 15, 2021.
19 For additional discussion 19 For additional discussion of the Aegisof the Aegis Ashore sites, seeAshore sites, see ~~Edward~~ Edward Lundquist,Lundquist, “Aegis Ashore Adapts Sea-Based“Aegis Ashore Adapts Sea-Based Missile Missile
Defense System to Protect Europe,” Defense System to Protect Europe,” National Defense, September 2016. , September 2016.
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in May 2016.20 The site in Poland began construction in May 2016,21 and it was in May 2016.20 The site in Poland began construction in May 2016,21 and it was ~~initial y~~initially
scheduled to be completed in 2018. Its completion, however, has been delayed by four years, to scheduled to be completed in 2018. Its completion, however, has been delayed by four years, to
the end of 2022, due to construction contractor performance issues.22 An April 2021 GAO report on 2022, due to construction contractor performance issues.22 An April 2021 GAO report on
deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following: deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following:
According According ~~to MDA officials, the Aegis Ashore site in Poland continues to~~ to MDA officials, the Aegis Ashore site in Poland continues to experience experience
delays owing to poor performance by the main construction contractor. Based on MDA’s delays owing to poor performance by the main construction contractor. Based on MDA’s
latest estimate of completion no earlier than fiscal year 2022, the site will be between three latest estimate of completion no earlier than fiscal year 2022, the site will be between three
and four years late. According to MDA, in February 2020, the Army Corps of Engineers and four years late. According to MDA, in February 2020, the Army Corps of Engineers
(which manages construction at the site) notified the main contractor that earnings from (which manages construction at the site) notified the main contractor that earnings from al
all future invoices would be retained, and released only upon the completion of certain key future invoices would be retained, and released only upon the completion of certain key
activities. MDA stated that the contractor did not meet these benchmarks and as a result activities. MDA stated that the contractor did not meet these benchmarks and as a result
had not been paid since February 2020. had not been paid since February 2020.
MDA currently attributes $79 million in cost increases to these delays.23 MDA currently attributes $79 million in cost increases to these delays.23
Navy Interest in Divesting Aegis Ashore Sites It Operates
On January 11, 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Gilday, released a On January 11, 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Gilday, released a
guidance document for the Navy entitled guidance document for the Navy entitled CNO NavPlan (with NavPlan being short for navigation (with NavPlan being short for navigation
plan) that states plan) that states
To remain ahead of our competitors, we will divest ourselves of legacy capabilities that no To remain ahead of our competitors, we will divest ourselves of legacy capabilities that no
longerlonger ~~bring sufficient lethality to the fight. This includes divestment of~~ bring sufficient lethality to the fight. This includes divestment of experimental experimental
Littoral Combat Ship hulls, legacy Cruisers, and older Dock Landing Littoral Combat Ship hulls, legacy Cruisers, and older Dock Landing ~~Ship s~~Ships. It also includes . It also includes
divestingdivesting ~~non-core Navy missions like Aegis -ashore. Transferring shore-based~~ non-core Navy missions like Aegis-ashore. Transferring shore-based Ballistic Ballistic
Missile Defense sites to ground forces enables Sailors to focus on their core missions at Missile Defense sites to ground forces enables Sailors to focus on their core missions at
sea and frees up resources to increase our lethality.24 sea and frees up resources to increase our lethality.24
A January 12, 2021, press report states A January 12, 2021, press report states
The chief of naval operation’s new call to focus on sea control and power projection could The chief of naval operation’s new call to focus on sea control and power projection could
lead the service to shed other non-core missions the Navy conducts today, such as manning lead the service to shed other non-core missions the Navy conducts today, such as manning
Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. Aegis Ashore missile defense sites.
The biggest problem is, no one else has agreed to take over that mission yet…. The biggest problem is, no one else has agreed to take over that mission yet….
… no one else operates Aegis systems today, and no one has yet agreed to take over Aegis … no one else operates Aegis systems today, and no one has yet agreed to take over Aegis
Ashore,Ashore, ~~Rear~~ Rear Adm. Paul Schlise,Adm. Paul Schlise, ~~the director of surface warfare on the~~ the director of surface warfare on the CNO’s staff CNO’s staff
(OPNAV N96), said today during a panel presentation at the Surface Navy Association’s (OPNAV N96), said today during a panel presentation at the Surface Navy Association’s
annual symposium. annual symposium.
“It’s been an ongoing discussion in the building here. Right now we’ve got the ~~“It’s been an ongoing discussion in the building here. Right now we’ve got the~~ Aegis Aegis
Ashore sites in Europe, and there’s discussions about potentially more sites in other places. Ashore sites in Europe, and there’s discussions about potentially more sites in other places.

~~20 See,~~ The general discussion has been, this is not a core Navy mission. Sailors really belong at 20 See, for example, Amy Forsythe, “U.S. Navy Aegisfor example, Amy Forsythe, “U.S. Navy Aegis Ashore BaseAshore Base in Romania Hosts in Romania Hosts ~~NAT O~~NATO Country Ambassadors,” Country Ambassadors,”
Defense VisualDefense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS),Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), November 19, 2019; “November 19, 2019; “ Aegis Ashore,” MissileAegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Defense
Advocacy Alliance, accessedAdvocacy Alliance, accessed ~~August~~ August 27, 2020; US Naval Forces Europe-Africa, “27, 2020; US Naval Forces Europe-Africa, “ Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Aegis Ashore Missile Defense
System (AAMDS)-Romania Operationally Certified,” Defense-Aerospace.com, May 12, 2016. System (AAMDS)-Romania Operationally Certified,” Defense-Aerospace.com, May 12, 2016.
21 See, 21 See, for example, “for example, “ Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, accessedAegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, accessed ~~August~~ August 27, 2020. 27, 2020.
22 See,22 See, for example, Rich Abott, “Aegis Ashore Poland Set To Be Operational By End Of 2022,” Defense Daily, November 22, 2021. 23 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but Annual Goals Unmet, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. 24 U.S. ~~for example, Rich Abott, “Delayed Poland Aegis Ashore Site Needs T wo More Years,” Defense Daily, February~~
~~12, 2020; Jen Judson, “Poland’s Aegis Ashore Delayed to 2022 with New Way Forward Coming Soon,” Defense News,~~
~~February 18, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “MDA, Army Withholding Pay as Aegis Ashore Poland Construction Still~~
~~Drags,” USNI News, March 12, 2020; Seapower staff, “ Navy Commissions Naval Support Facility Redzikowo, a~~
~~Future Aegis Ashore Site,” Seapower, September 3, 2020.~~
~~23 Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed , but~~
~~Annual Goals Unm et, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24.~~
~~24 U.S.~~ Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, CNO NavPlan, January 2021, p. 10. See also Richard, January 2021, p. 10. See also Richard R. Burgess,R. Burgess, “ “CNO: CNO:
Divest AegisDivest Aegis Ashore Sites to GroundAshore Sites to Ground Forces,” Forces,” Seapower, January 11, 2021. , January 11, 2021.
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~~The general discussion has been, this is not a core Navy mission. Sailors really belong at~~
sea serving in ships. And we’ve got a good number of highly qualified folks serving in sea serving in ships. And we’ve got a good number of highly qualified folks serving in
those sites, they’re going a great job,” he said. those sites, they’re going a great job,” he said.
“But I think what the CNO teed up is, is this a core Navy mission? I don’t think it is. And “But I think what the CNO teed up is, is this a core Navy mission? I don’t think it is. And
so there’s been some discussion with the Army. The Army, of course, has some missile so there’s been some discussion with the Army. The Army, of course, has some missile
defense capability and of course great soldiers that serve in those roles. But they don’t have defense capability and of course great soldiers that serve in those roles. But they don’t have
any experience with that [Aegis Combat System], the systems that have been installed or any experience with that [Aegis Combat System], the systems that have been installed or
are in progress in Romania and Poland. So that’s been a running discussion.” are in progress in Romania and Poland. So that’s been a running discussion.”
Schlise said the discussion is taking place at the Office of the Secretary of Schlise said the discussion is taking place at the Office of the Secretary of ~~Defens e~~Defense level. level.
Without any final decisions, though, the Navy could not shed Aegis Ashore spending in its Without any final decisions, though, the Navy could not shed Aegis Ashore spending in its
most recent budgeting work, the Fiscal Year 2022 request that will come out after the Biden most recent budgeting work, the Fiscal Year 2022 request that will come out after the Biden
administration comes in and can review it. administration comes in and can review it.
“For the purposes of this past budget cycle, it was just kind of tabled. So we’ll have to see “For the purposes of this past budget cycle, it was just kind of tabled. So we’ll have to see
where that discussion goes. As always, here in the building, it’s about money. So if that where that discussion goes. As always, here in the building, it’s about money. So if that
transition weretransition were ~~to be considered and approved for moving forward, to transition it~~ to be considered and approved for moving forward, to transition it to to
another service, ‘who’s going to pay’another service, ‘who’s going to pay’ ~~will of course be~~ will of course be part of thepart of the discussion,”discussion,” Schlise Schlise
said.25 said.25
Japan Planned and Later Canceled Two Sites
Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems that reportedly were to be Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems that reportedly were to be
located at Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) facilities in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and located at Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) facilities in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and
Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, and would be operated mainly by the GSDF (i.e., Japan’s Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, and would be operated mainly by the GSDF (i.e., Japan’s
army).26 The two systems reportedly were to be equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar army).26 The two systems reportedly were to be equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar ~~cal ed~~
called the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that
is being is being ~~instal ed~~installed on U.S. Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly were to go into operation by on U.S. Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly were to go into operation by
2023.27 On June 15, 2020, however, Japan announced that it had suspended implementation of its 2023.27 On June 15, 2020, however, Japan announced that it had suspended implementation of its
Aegis Ashore initiativeAegis Ashore initiative due to cost growth and technical concerns.28 On June 25, 2020, Japan due to cost growth and technical concerns.28 On June 25, 2020, Japan
confirmed that it had canceled the plan for deploying the two Aegis Ashore sites.29 A December 6, confirmed that it had canceled the plan for deploying the two Aegis Ashore sites.29 A December 6,
2020, press report stated 2020, press report stated

25 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Wants to Shed Aegis25 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Wants to Shed Aegis Ashore Mission, But Army StillAshore Mission, But Army Still Hasn’t AgreedHasn’t Agreed ~~to T ake It~~ to Take It,” ,” USNI
News,, January 12, 2021. January 12, 2021.
26 Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Akita, Yamaguchi to Get Aegis“Akita, Yamaguchi to Get Aegis Ashore/GSDFAshore/GSDF Involvement Expected to Strengthen Missile Involvement Expected to Strengthen Missile
Defense,” Defense,” The Japan News, November 11, 2017. See also Kyodo, “Japan Mulling News, November 11, 2017. See also Kyodo, “Japan Mulling News ~~Missile~~ Missile Interceptor Interceptor
Deployment to Guard Against North Korea,” Deployment to Guard Against North Korea,” South China Morning Post, November 11, 2017. , November 11, 2017.
27 Anthony Capaccio, “Japan in 27 Anthony Capaccio, “Japan in ~~T alks~~Talks With U.S. on Buying Aegis With U.S. on Buying Aegis ~~Missile~~ Missile Defense,”Defense,” Bloomberg, November 7, 2017. , November 7, 2017.
28 See,28 See, for example, Rich Abott, “for example, Rich Abott, “ Japan SuspendsJapan Suspends ~~Aegis~~ Aegis Ashore Due Ashore Due ~~T o T echnical~~To Technical And Cost Concerns,” And Cost Concerns,” Defense Daily, ,
June 15, 2020; SamJune 15, 2020; Sam LaGrone, “LaGrone, “ Japan Backing AwayJapan Backing Away From AegisFrom Aegis Ashore,” Ashore,” USNI News,, June 15, 2020; Mari June 15, 2020; Mari
Yamaguchi, “Japan to Scrap Costly Land-BasedYamaguchi, “Japan to Scrap Costly Land-Based ~~US Missile~~ US Missile Defense System,” Defense System,” Associated Press,, June 15, 2020; Mike June 15, 2020; Mike
Yeo, “Japan SuspendsYeo, “Japan Suspends ~~Aegis~~ Aegis Ashore Deployment, Pointing to Cost and Ashore Deployment, Pointing to Cost and ~~T echnical~~Technical Issues,” Issues,” Defense News,, June 15, June 15,
2020; Brad Glosserman, “2020; Brad Glosserman, “ Canceling AegisCanceling Aegis Ashore RaisesAshore Raises Problems—and Hopes,” Problems—and Hopes,” Japan Times, June 17, 2020. , June 17, 2020.
Prior to the June 15, 2020, announcement, Japan had announced in early May that it would Prior to the June 15, 2020, announcement, Japan had announced in early May that it would evaluate alternatives to the evaluate alternatives to the
Akita Prefecture site due to strong local opposition to that site. (Masaya Kato, “Japan’Akita Prefecture site due to strong local opposition to that site. (Masaya Kato, “Japan’ s Missile Shields Missile Shield Deployment Deployment
ScupperedScuppered by Local Resistance,” by Local Resistance,” Nikkei Asian Review,, May 7, 2020.) May 7, 2020.)
29 Mari Yamaguchi 29 Mari Yamaguchi (Associated Press), “(Associated Press), “ Japan Confirms It’s Scrapping USJapan Confirms It’s Scrapping US ~~Missile~~ Missile Defense System,” Defense System,” Defense News, ,
June 25, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “June 25, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “ Japan Officially Ends AegisJapan Officially Ends Aegis Ashore Plans After National Security Council Ashore Plans After National Security Council
Deliberations,” Deliberations,” USNI News,, June 26, 2020. June 26, 2020.
SeeSee also Grant Newshamalso Grant Newsham “ “Abe’s AegisAbe’s Aegis Ashore Cancellation Doesn’t AddAshore Cancellation Doesn’t Add Up,” Up,” Asia Times, June, June 30, 2020; Lucy Craft, 30, 2020; Lucy Craft,
“Why Japan Scrapped a $4 Billion Missile“Why Japan Scrapped a $4 Billion Missile Defense Purchase from the U.S.,” Defense Purchase from the U.S.,” CBS News,, ~~July~~ July 2, 2020; 2, 2020; ~~T im~~Tim Kelly, Kelly,
“Explainer: Strike Capability, Other Military Options on “Explainer: Strike Capability, Other Military Options on ~~T able~~Table after Japan’s Aegis U- after Japan’s Aegis U-~~T urn~~Turn,” ,” Reuters, July, July 2, 2020; 2, 2020;
Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Jeffrey W. Hornung, “ Japan Is CancelingJapan Is Canceling ~~a U.S. Missile~~ a U.S. Missile Defense System,” Defense System,” Foreign Policy, July, July 2, 2020; Bruce Klingner, “Japan Undercuts Its Defense Against North Korean Missiles,” Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2020; Tim~~2, 2020; Bruce~~
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Japan Japan ~~will put new powerful Aegis radars on warships to upgrade its defences~~ will put new powerful Aegis radars on warships to upgrade its defences against against
possible ballistic missiles fired by North Korea after it cancelled plans to deploy them at possible ballistic missiles fired by North Korea after it cancelled plans to deploy them at
two ground-based stations, the Asahi newspaper reported. two ground-based stations, the Asahi newspaper reported.
Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s government is likely to approve the recommendation by Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s government is likely to approve the recommendation by
the country’s National Security Council before the end of the year, although any decision the country’s National Security Council before the end of the year, although any decision
onon ~~type of vessel or cost will be left until next year, the paper said, citing~~ type of vessel or cost will be left until next year, the paper said, citing unidentified unidentified
sources…. sources….
Deploying the new Aegis radars could cost twice as much and take up to three years longer Deploying the new Aegis radars could cost twice as much and take up to three years longer
to complete than the ground-based versions, which were expected cost of around $2 billion to complete than the ground-based versions, which were expected cost of around $2 billion
to build, a source with knowledge of the proposal told Reuters earlier…. to build, a source with knowledge of the proposal told Reuters earlier….
Fitted with Lockheed Martin Corp SPY-7 radars that will have at least three times the range Fitted with Lockheed Martin Corp SPY-7 radars that will have at least three times the range
of older Aegis systems deployed on Japanese navy destroyers, the upgrade will allow Japan of older Aegis systems deployed on Japanese navy destroyers, the upgrade will allow Japan
to use new interceptor missiles to target warheads in space fired by North Korea or other to use new interceptor missiles to target warheads in space fired by North Korea or other
potential foes, including China and Russia.30 potential foes, including China and Russia.30
An August 19, 2021, press report stated An August 19, 2021, press report stated
A sea-based Aegis missile defense system could be the next program to be abandoned by A sea-based Aegis missile defense system could be the next program to be abandoned by
Tokyo. Tokyo.
The Japanese Defense Ministry does not plan to seek funds for it in the upcoming fiscal The Japanese Defense Ministry does not plan to seek funds for it in the upcoming fiscal
2022 budget. Citing government sources, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper said such a budget 2022 budget. Citing government sources, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper said such a budget
request will “likely be impossible over the next few years.”31 request will “likely be impossible over the next few years.”31
Aegis BMD Development Philosophy and Flight Tests
The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as
following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of “build a little, following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of “build a little,
test a little, learn a lot,” meaning that development is done in manageable steps, then tested and test a little, learn a lot,” meaning that development is done in manageable steps, then tested and
validated before moving on to the next step.32 validated before moving on to the next step.32

~~Klingner, “ Japan Undercuts Its Defense Against North Korean Missiles,” Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2020; T im~~
Kelly and Yoshifumi Kelly and Yoshifumi ~~T akemoto, “~~ Takemoto, “Exclusive: As Japan Weighs Missile-Defence Options, Raytheon Lobbies for Exclusive: As Japan Weighs Missile-Defence Options, Raytheon Lobbies for
Lockheed’s $300 Million RadarLockheed’s $300 Million Radar Deal,” Reuters, July 30, 2020; Rieko Miki, “Deal,” Reuters, July 30, 2020; Rieko Miki, “ ~~T he~~The Price of Peace: Why Japan Scrapped Price of Peace: Why Japan Scrapped
a $4.2bn USa $4.2bn US ~~Missile~~ Missile System,” System,” Nikkei Asian Review,, ~~August~~ August 5, 2020; Loren 5, 2020; Loren ~~T hompson, “~~ Thompson, “Japan’s Rethink Of Aegis Japan’s Rethink Of Aegis
Ashore CouldAshore Could ~~T ie~~ Tie Up Navy, Increase Costs And Cause Up Navy, Increase Costs And Cause ~~Big~~ Big Delays,” Delays,” Forbes, August, August 11, 2020. 11, 2020.
On June 18, 2020, it was reported that the United States and Japan were On June 18, 2020, it was reported that the United States and Japan were in talks to addressin talks to address the technical issuesthe technical issues Japan Japan
cited and explore potential paths forward for bolstering Japan’s ballistic missilecited and explore potential paths forward for bolstering Japan’s ballistic missile defense capability.defense capability. ~~See~~ See Lara Seligman, Lara Seligman,
“U.S. and Japan in “U.S. and Japan in ~~T alks~~Talks about ‘Alternatives’ to Aegis Ashore Missile about ‘Alternatives’ to Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System,” Defense System,” Politico Pro, June 18, 2020; , June 18, 2020;
Idrees Ali, “Idrees Ali, “ U.S. in U.S. in ~~T alks~~Talks with Japan after Aegis Ashore Missile with Japan after Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Suspension:Defense System Suspension: Official,” Official,” Reuters, June , June
18, 2020; Jason Sherman, “18, 2020; Jason Sherman, “ MDA Hopes to ‘Resolve’ Japan’s AegisMDA Hopes to ‘Resolve’ Japan’s Aegis Ashore Concerns, Reinstate ProjectAshore Concerns, Reinstate Project ,” ,” Inside
Defense, June 18, 2020; “, June 18, 2020; “ ~~U.S. T alking~~U.S. Talking with Japan on Concerns over Halted Missile with Japan on Concerns over Halted Missile Defense Plan,” Defense Plan,” Kyodo News,, June June
19, 2020. See also Asahi Shimbun,19, 2020. See also Asahi Shimbun, “ “Japan Eyes Offshore Options to Replace AegisJapan Eyes Offshore Options to Replace Aegis Defense System,” Defense System,” Asahi Shimbun, ,
September 10, 2020. September 10, 2020.
30 Reuters staff, “30 Reuters staff, “ Japan to Put New AegisJapan to Put New Aegis ~~Radars~~ Radars on Warships after Cancelling Groundon Warships after Cancelling Ground Stations: Asahi,” Stations: Asahi,” Reuters, ,
December 6, 2020. See also AgenceDecember 6, 2020. See also Agence France-Presse, “France-Presse, “ Japan Weighs ShipsJapan Weighs Ships For AegisFor Aegis ~~Missile~~ Missile Defence System,” Defence System,”
Barron’s, December 9, 2020; Kyodo, “, December 9, 2020; Kyodo, “ Cabinet Set to Approve Destroyers as Alternative to Aegis Ashore,” Cabinet Set to Approve Destroyers as Alternative to Aegis Ashore,” Japan
~~Tim es~~Times, November 28, 2020. , November 28, 2020.
31 Chen Chuanren, “Japan’s Sea-Based 31 Chen Chuanren, “Japan’s Sea-Based ~~Aegis~~ Aegis System Faces Ax,” System Faces Ax,” Aviation Week Network,, ~~August~~ August 19, 2021. 19, 2021.
32 See,32 See, for example, “for example, “ Aegis BMD:Aegis BMD: “Build“Build a Little, a Little, ~~T est~~Test a Little, Learn a Lot a Little, Learn a Lot ,” USNI blog, March 15, 2010, accessed ,” USNI blog, March 15, 2010, accessed
September 11, 2013, at http://blog.usni.org/2010/03/15/aegis-bmd-build-a-little-test-a-little-learn-a-lot, and “September 11, 2013, at http://blog.usni.org/2010/03/15/aegis-bmd-build-a-little-test-a-little-learn-a-lot, and “ Aegis Aegis
Ballistic MissileBallistic Missile Defense, AegisDefense, Aegis Ballistic MissileBallistic Missile Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall Institute, RADM Alan Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall Institute, RADM Alan
B. Hicks, USN,B. Hicks, USN, ~~Aegis BMD~~ Aegis BMD Program Director, August 3, 2009, slide 16 of 20, entitled “Program Director, August 3, 2009, slide 16 of 20, entitled “ Some of our Philosophies In a Some of our Philosophies In a
Nutshell (1 of 2),” accessedNutshell (1 of 2),” accessed ~~August~~ August 27, 2020, at https://web.archive.org/web/20100706133017/https:/27, 2020, at https://web.archive.org/web/20100706133017/https:/
www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/743.pdf. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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An April An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020
stated the following about testing of the Aegis BMD system: stated the following about testing of the Aegis BMD system:
In fiscal year 2020, the Aegis BMD program did not conduct any of the six planned flight In fiscal year 2020, the Aegis BMD program did not conduct any of the six planned flight
tests, deleting one and delaying the remaining five. Most notably, a major operational flight tests, deleting one and delaying the remaining five. Most notably, a major operational flight
test—FTO-03—wastest—FTO-03—was deleted,deleted, ~~leaving~~ leaving the SM-3 Block IIA interceptorthe SM-3 Block IIA interceptor to enterto enter initial initial
production with a single operational flight test. Some flight tests were initially delayed due production with a single operational flight test. Some flight tests were initially delayed due
to range availability and higher priority flights tests (such as FEX-01) and delays were then to range availability and higher priority flights tests (such as FEX-01) and delays were then
exacerbatedexacerbated ~~by pandemic-driven travel restrictions. A congressionally mandated~~ by pandemic-driven travel restrictions. A congressionally mandated flight flight
test—FTM-44—pitting an SM-3test—FTM-44—pitting an SM-3 Block IIA interceptorBlock IIA interceptor ~~against~~ against a simple ICBM, was a simple ICBM, was
delayed, but executed in November 2020. delayed, but executed in November 2020.
The Aegis BMD program participated in three of five planned ground tests in fiscal year The Aegis BMD program participated in three of five planned ground tests in fiscal year
2020. The two ground tests were delayed due to the pandemic and the unavailability of the 2020. The two ground tests were delayed due to the pandemic and the unavailability of the
Poland Aegis Ashore site, respectively. Poland Aegis Ashore site, respectively.
All seven cybersecurity tests scheduled for fiscal year 2020 were consolidated into a single All seven cybersecurity tests scheduled for fiscal year 2020 were consolidated into a single
test, which was subsequently delayed.33 test, which was subsequently delayed.33
For a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since 2002, For a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since 2002, seesee Table A-1 i in Appendix.
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program
Japan
Eight BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers
Japan operates eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers—the eighth was commissioned into service Japan operates eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers—the eighth was commissioned into service
in March 2021.34 Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in some of the flight tests in March 2021.34 Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in some of the flight tests
of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (seof the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (see Table A-1 iin Appendix).
Cooperative Development of SM-3 Block IIA Missile
Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block IIA missile. Japan Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block IIA missile. Japan
developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of those developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of those
technologies, reducing the missile’s development costs for the United States. A July 6, 2018, technologies, reducing the missile’s development costs for the United States. A July 6, 2018,
press report states that “the U.S. and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation radar press report states that “the U.S. and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation radar
technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection range of technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection range of
the Aegis missile defense system.”35 the Aegis missile defense system.”35
Two Aegis Ashore Sites (Canceled)
As mentioned earlier, Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems, but As mentioned earlier, Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems, but
announced in June 2020 that it had canceled the plan. announced in June 2020 that it had canceled the plan.

~~www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/743.pdf.~~
33 Government Accountability Office, 33 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but
Annual Goals ~~Unm et~~Unmet, GAO, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. 21-314, April 2021, p. 24.
34 See, 34 See, for example, Xavier Vavasseur,for example, Xavier Vavasseur, “ “Japan Commissions NewJapan Commissions New Maya-Class AEGISMaya-Class AEGIS Destroyer JSDestroyer JS Haguro はぐろ Haguro はぐろ
DDG-180,” DDG-180,” Naval News,, March 19, 2021; Yomiuri Shimbun,March 19, 2021; Yomiuri Shimbun, “ “Japan Commissions 8th AegisJapan Commissions 8th Aegis Destroyer Haguro,” Destroyer Haguro,” Japan
News,, March 20, 2021. March 20, 2021.
35 Nikkei staff writers, “US 35 Nikkei staff writers, “US ~~T aps~~Taps Japan Radar Japan Radar ~~T ech~~ Tech to Double Missile to Double Missile Defense Range,”Defense Range,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 6, , July 6,
2018. 2018.
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South Korea
An October 12, 2018, press report states that “the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-An October 12, 2018, press report states that “the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-
based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, a top missile attacks from North Korea, a top
commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct. 12.”36 commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct. 12.”36
Other Countries
Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD
system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia. Spain, South Korea, and AustraliaSpain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia. Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are either operate, are
building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other countries operate destroyers and frigates building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other countries operate destroyers and frigates
with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations. with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations.
FY2022 MDA Procurement and R&D Funding
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for BMD-related effortsadditional funding for BMD-related efforts. Table 1 shows requested FY2022 MDA procurement shows requested FY2022 MDA procurement
and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts. (DOD’s FY2022 budget and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts. (DOD’s FY2022 budget
submission does not include line-item funding figures for the following four fiscal years.) submission does not include line-item funding figures for the following four fiscal years.)
Research and development funding in the table for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis Research and development funding in the table for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis
Ashore sites. MDA’s budget also includes additional funding not shown in the table for Ashore sites. MDA’s budget also includes additional funding not shown in the table for
operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD
program. program.
Table 1. FY2021-FY2025 MDA Procurement and
R&D Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts
(In (In ~~mil ions of dol ars~~millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding) , rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
FY22
FY23
FY24
FY25
FY26

(req.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
Procurement

Aegis Aegis BMD (line 31) BMD (line 31)
334.6 334.6
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
(SM-3 Block IB missile quantity)
(40)
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Aegis Aegis BMD Advance ProcurementBMD Advance Procurement (line 32) (line 32)
17.5 17.5
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
SM-3 Block SM-3 Block IIA (line 34) IIA (line 34)
295.3 295.3
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
(SM-3 Block IIA missile quantity)
(8)
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Aegis Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 38) Ashore Phase III (line 38)
25.9 25.9
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
Aegis Aegis BMD hardware and software (lineBMD hardware and software (line 40) 40)
81.8 81.8
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
SUBTOTAL Procurement
755.1
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Research and development

Aegis Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 86) BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 86)
732.5 732.5
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
Aegis Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line 118) BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line 118)
117.1 117.1
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 120) Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 120)
43.2 43.2
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
SUBTOTAL RDT&E
892.8
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
TOTAL
1,647.9
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2022 MDA budget submission. Table prepared by CRS based on FY2022 MDA budget submission.

36 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea to Buy Ship-Based36 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea to Buy Ship-Based Interceptors to Counter Ballistic Missile Interceptors to Counter Ballistic Missile ~~T hreats~~Threats,” ,” Defense News, ,
October 12, 2018. October 12, 2018.
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Note: “n/a” means not available—DOD’s “n/a” means not available—DOD’s FY2022 budget submissionFY2022 budget submission does not include line-itemdoes not include line-item funding figures funding figures
for FY2023-FY2026. for FY2023-FY2026.
Issues for Congress
Annual Funding Request
One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and
research and development funding requests for the program. In considering this issue, Congress research and development funding requests for the program. In considering this issue, Congress
may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for the may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for the
fiscal year in question is properly scoped and scheduled, and accurately priced. fiscal year in question is properly scoped and scheduled, and accurately priced.
COVID-19 Impact
Another issue for Congress concerns the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the execution of Another issue for Congress concerns the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the execution of
Aegis BMD program efforts. A DOD point paper on COVID-19 impacts to DOD acquisition Aegis BMD program efforts. A DOD point paper on COVID-19 impacts to DOD acquisition
programs from March 15, 2020, through June 20, 2020, stated that the impacts included, among programs from March 15, 2020, through June 20, 2020, stated that the impacts included, among
other things, “Aegis Program delays: SM-3 Block IIA production deliveries; Aegis Ashore Poland other things, “Aegis Program delays: SM-3 Block IIA production deliveries; Aegis Ashore Poland
construction (further delays); and Aegis Testing delays for Flight Test Missile (FTM)-44 (Aegis), construction (further delays); and Aegis Testing delays for Flight Test Missile (FTM)-44 (Aegis),
FTM-31, and FTM-33.”37 An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile FTM-31, and FTM-33.”37 An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile
defense systems in FY2020 stated the following: defense systems in FY2020 stated the following:
Among the Among the Aegis BMD programs, COVID-19Aegis BMD programs, COVID-19 ~~impacts~~ impacts have largely been limited to test have largely been limited to test
delays.delays. SM-3SM-3 Block IB andBlock IB and IIA program officialsIIA program officials ~~reported no direct~~ reported no direct impact toimpact to their their
production schedules, although in the case of the SM-3 Block IIA there have been impacts production schedules, although in the case of the SM-3 Block IIA there have been impacts
on certainon certain ~~suppliers. AWS program officials reported that some ship-board~~ suppliers. AWS program officials reported that some ship-board software software
upgrades would be delayed due to travel restrictions and isolation requirements. upgrades would be delayed due to travel restrictions and isolation requirements.
MDA officials stated that neither the U.S. nor Polish governments imposed any COVID- MDA officials stated that neither the U.S. nor Polish governments imposed any COVID-
19 restrictions that would have limited construction activities at the Aegis Ashore site in 19 restrictions that would have limited construction activities at the Aegis Ashore site in
Poland.38 Poland.38
Potential for Intercepting ICBMs
Another issue for Congress is what role, if any, the Aegis BMD program should play in defending Another issue for Congress is what role, if any, the Aegis BMD program should play in defending
the U.S. homeland against attack from ICBMs. With the advent of the SM-3 Block IIA the U.S. homeland against attack from ICBMs. With the advent of the SM-3 Block IIA
interceptor, DOD is evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain interceptor, DOD is evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain
ICBMs. Section 1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 ICBMs. Section 1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91
of December 12, 2017) directed DOD to “conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if of December 12, 2017) directed DOD to “conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if
~~technological y~~technologically feasible, the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental feasible, the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental ~~bal istic~~ballistic missile threat missile threat
using the standard missile 3 block IIA missile interceptor.” DOD’s January 2019 missile defense using the standard missile 3 block IIA missile interceptor.” DOD’s January 2019 missile defense
review report stated the following: review report stated the following:
The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intendedis intended as part of the regional missile defense as part of the regional missile defense
architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to existing GBIs architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to existing GBIs
[ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland. [ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland.

37 Department of Defense, “FY 2020 DoD COVID-19 Response and Stimulus37 Department of Defense, “FY 2020 DoD COVID-19 Response and Stimulus & COVID-19& COVID-19 Recovery Acquisition Recovery Acquisition
Contract Cost Overrun,” undated point paper, 4 pp., posted at Contract Cost Overrun,” undated point paper, 4 pp., posted at Inside Defense on August on August 6, 2020. For additional 6, 2020. For additional
discussiondiscussion of COVID-19 impacts to Navy programs, see CRSof COVID-19 impacts to Navy programs, see CRS Report RL32665, Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald, by Ronald O'Rourke. O'Rourke.
38 Government Accountability Office, 38 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but
Annual Goals ~~Unm et~~Unmet, GAO, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 23. 21-314, April 2021, p. 23.
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This This ~~interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease~~ interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the the
burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U.S. homeland against burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U.S. homeland against
evolving rogue states’ long-range missile capabilities. evolving rogue states’ long-range missile capabilities.
Congress Congress ~~has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM -3 Blk IIA against an~~
~~ICBM-class target. MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020. Due to the~~
~~mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis~~ has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an ICBM-class target. MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020. Due to the mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or or
conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland. Land-based sites conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland. Land-based sites
in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued.39 in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued.39
On November 16, 2020, MDA announced that the On November 16, 2020, MDA announced that the ~~congressional y~~congressionally directed ICBM-intercept flight directed ICBM-intercept flight
test, test, ~~cal ed~~called FTM-44, had been conducted on that date and had resulted in a successful intercept of FTM-44, had been conducted on that date and had resulted in a successful intercept of
the ICBM-representative target. MDA stated that “FTM-44, the ICBM-representative target. MDA stated that “FTM-44, ~~original y~~originally scheduled for May 2020, scheduled for May 2020,
was delayed due to restrictions in personnel and equipment movement intended to reduce the was delayed due to restrictions in personnel and equipment movement intended to reduce the
spread of COVID-19. FTM-44 satisfies a Congressional mandate to evaluate the feasibility of the spread of COVID-19. FTM-44 satisfies a Congressional mandate to evaluate the feasibility of the
SM-3 Block IIA missile’s capability to defeat an ICBM threat before the end of 2020.”40 A SM-3 Block IIA missile’s capability to defeat an ICBM threat before the end of 2020.”40 A
November 17, 2020, press report about the flight test stated that “the unarmed ICBM was a November 17, 2020, press report about the flight test stated that “the unarmed ICBM was a
replica of a target flown against the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system during a March replica of a target flown against the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system during a March
2019 flight test that featured a salvo launch of a pair of interceptors.”41 An April 2021 GAO 2019 flight test that featured a salvo launch of a pair of interceptors.”41 An April 2021 GAO
report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following: report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following:
MDA’s MDA’s ~~effort to include the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a new “layered”~~ effort to include the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a new “layered” homeland homeland
defense against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats targeting the U.S. could defense against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats targeting the U.S. could
introduce considerable cost, schedule, and performance uncertainty to a program that has introduce considerable cost, schedule, and performance uncertainty to a program that has
justjust ~~entered~~ entered initial production.initial production. ~~The GMD weapon system currently provides~~ The GMD weapon system currently provides defense defense
against ICBMs, but this new effort would add the SM-3 Block IIA and THAAD weapon against ICBMs, but this new effort would add the SM-3 Block IIA and THAAD weapon
system as layers underneath that provided by GMD. For further details on the GMD and system as layers underneath that provided by GMD. For further details on the GMD and
THAAD weapon systems see their THAAD weapon systems see their ~~res pective~~respective appendixes. appendixes.
ICBM intercepts are more challenging than the IRBM intercepts for which the SM ICBM intercepts are more challenging than the IRBM intercepts for which the SM -3 IIA -3 IIA
was originally designed. MDA’s most recent attempt to create a system for intercepting was originally designed. MDA’s most recent attempt to create a system for intercepting
ICBMs, known as the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV),ICBMs, known as the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), re-used some parts from the SM-3 re-used some parts from the SM-3
Block IIA. DOD cancelled the RKV before it could complete development after significant Block IIA. DOD cancelled the RKV before it could complete development after significant
costcost ~~and schedule overruns and questions about the ability of the design to~~ and schedule overruns and questions about the ability of the design to overcome overcome
specific performance risks. Parts re-used from the SM-3 Block IIA were implicated in some specific performance risks. Parts re-used from the SM-3 Block IIA were implicated in some
of the RKV’s performance shortfalls. Even so, planning for an anti-ICBM capability for of the RKV’s performance shortfalls. Even so, planning for an anti-ICBM capability for
the SM-3 Block IIA continued during and even after the RKV’s termination. the SM-3 Block IIA continued during and even after the RKV’s termination.
Achieving Achieving ~~such a capability will require surmounting several challen ges. According~~ such a capability will require surmounting several challenges. According to to
MDA, during the November 2020 flight test named FTM-44, the SM-3 Block IIA struck a MDA, during the November 2020 flight test named FTM-44, the SM-3 Block IIA struck a
simple ICBM target. This was not an operational test, however, and it was executed under simple ICBM target. This was not an operational test, however, and it was executed under
highly favorable conditions. More development work is needed for the SM-3 Block IIA to highly favorable conditions. More development work is needed for the SM-3 Block IIA to
support a layered homeland defense capability. MDA documents show that the agency now support a layered homeland defense capability. MDA documents show that the agency now
plans to develop and procure an upgraded version of the SM-3 Block IIA for the specific plans to develop and procure an upgraded version of the SM-3 Block IIA for the specific
purpose of fulfilling the homeland defense mission.42 purpose of fulfilling the homeland defense mission.42

39 Department of Defense, 39 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review 2019, released January 17, 2019, p. 55. David Axe, “19, released January 17, 2019, p. 55. David Axe, “~~T he~~The U.S. U.S.
Navy’s NewNavy’s New ~~Missile~~ Missile Defense Is a BadDefense Is a Bad Idea,” Idea,” National Interest, January 17, 2019. , January 17, 2019.
40 Missile40 Missile Defense Agency NewsDefense Agency News release 20NEWS-0003, “release 20NEWS-0003, “ U.S. SuccessfullyU.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Block IIA Intercept ~~T est~~Test
Against an Intercontinental Ballistic MissileAgainst an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ~~T arget~~ Target,” November 16, 2020. ,” November 16, 2020.
41 Jason Sherman, “ 41 Jason Sherman, “ SM-3 Block IIA Intercepts ICBM SM-3 Block IIA Intercepts ICBM ~~T arget~~Target, Validating Potential for Homeland Defense , Validating Potential for Homeland Defense
‘Underlayer,’” ‘Underlayer,’” Inside Defense, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
42 Government Accountability Office, 42 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but
Annual Goals ~~Unm et~~Unmet, GAO, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. See also Jen Judson,21-314, April 2021, p. 24. See also Jen Judson, “ “Watchdog Expresses Concern over Using Watchdog Expresses Concern over Using
USUS Navy Interceptor for Homeland Missile Defense,” Navy Interceptor for Homeland Missile Defense,” Defense News,, April 29, 2021. April 29, 2021.
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A May 13, 2021, press report stated A May 13, 2021, press report stated
The Missile Defense Agency proved that a Navy destroyer with a Standard Missile-3 Block The Missile Defense Agency proved that a Navy destroyer with a Standard Missile-3 Block
IIA can stop a simple intercontinental ballisticIIA can stop a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat, butmissile threat, but ~~more~~ more work remains to work remains to
prove whether this combination could contribute to homeland defense, the MDA director prove whether this combination could contribute to homeland defense, the MDA director
said Wednesday [May 12]. said Wednesday [May 12].
Vice Adm. Jon Hill described the Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM) 44, which took Vice Adm. Jon Hill described the Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM) 44, which took
place in the Pacific in November after pandemic-related delays earlier in the year: A simple place in the Pacific in November after pandemic-related delays earlier in the year: A simple
ICBM target was launched from the Army’s Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test ICBM target was launched from the Army’s Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test
Site on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Satellites detected the launch, and a Site on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Satellites detected the launch, and a
slew of satellites and sensors, including on the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii, slew of satellites and sensors, including on the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii,
tracked the target. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John Finn (DDG-113), positioned tracked the target. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John Finn (DDG-113), positioned
hundreds of miles east of Hawaii, launched an SM-3 Block IIA missile from its deck based hundreds of miles east of Hawaii, launched an SM-3 Block IIA missile from its deck based
on its best fire control solution at the time, and the missile itself maneuvered to on its best fire control solution at the time, and the missile itself maneuvered to ~~successfuly~~successfully
hit the target as it received more information in flight. hit the target as it received more information in flight.
The goal of the test, Hill said while speaking at the annual McAleese FY 2022 The goal of the test, Hill said while speaking at the annual McAleese FY 2022 Defense Defense
Programs Conference, was “to prove that we have the ability to leverage the robustness in Programs Conference, was “to prove that we have the ability to leverage the robustness in
thethe [Aegis][Aegis] ~~program, so that was really the first test just to see if it’s feasible. And~~ program, so that was really the first test just to see if it’s feasible. And we we
learned a lot.” learned a lot.”
Hill said the crew of John Finn, with limited data due to limited sensor coverage across the Hill said the crew of John Finn, with limited data due to limited sensor coverage across the
vast Pacific, maneuvered the ship to get the highest probabilityvast Pacific, maneuvered the ship to get the highest probability of kill. of kill.
“It maneuvered, shot the missile; lots of uncertainty because of lack of sensor coverage for “It maneuvered, shot the missile; lots of uncertainty because of lack of sensor coverage for
such a long-range flight where we were doing the exercise. So what we actually saw was a such a long-range flight where we were doing the exercise. So what we actually saw was a
really high divert [from the missile]. So kind of two walkaways from that first test, which really high divert [from the missile]. So kind of two walkaways from that first test, which
isis ~~why~~ why I thinkI think ~~it was really important, was that it was the longest propagated error or~~
~~uncertainty that we’ve ever seen in any test. And then we had the highest~~ it was really important, was that it was the longest propagated error or uncertainty that we’ve ever seen in any test. And then we had the highest divert—that divert—that
meant the [SM-3 IIA] missile was maneuvering to actually take it out,meant the [SM-3 IIA] missile was maneuvering to actually take it out, and it still took it and it still took it
out, which is really great,” Hill continued. out, which is really great,” Hill continued.
“In terms of feasibility, did we accomplish the mission? Absolutely. Every test objective “In terms of feasibility, did we accomplish the mission? Absolutely. Every test objective
achieved in November.” achieved in November.”
Hill was asked about an April Government Accountability Office report that cited concerns Hill was asked about an April Government Accountability Office report that cited concerns
about the Aegis Combat System/SM-3 IIA pairing for the homeland defense mission—as about the Aegis Combat System/SM-3 IIA pairing for the homeland defense mission—as
opposed to the regional defense mission it was built for, to protect a highopposed to the regional defense mission it was built for, to protect a high -value asset such -value asset such
as an aircraft carrier from an intermediate-range missile—and whether the simple ICBM as an aircraft carrier from an intermediate-range missile—and whether the simple ICBM
target used in the November test was representative of the real world. target used in the November test was representative of the real world.
“So what’s next? What’s next is to go against a more complex intercontinental ballistic “So what’s next? What’s next is to go against a more complex intercontinental ballistic
missile threat, and maybe even change the scenario. This scenario was a defense of missile threat, and maybe even change the scenario. This scenario was a defense of ~~Hawai~~
Hawaii scenario against a rogue nation—you guess which one out there in the Pacific—and in the scenario against a rogue nation—you guess which one out there in the Pacific—and in the
~~future we’re going to go to a more complex [threat], and that’s within the next~~ future we’re going to go to a more complex [threat], and that’s within the next couple couple
years,” he said. years,” he said.
“So we’re still analyzing data from November, and then we’re going to make upgrades and “So we’re still analyzing data from November, and then we’re going to make upgrades and
changes to the combat system, and we’ll make changes to the missile in terms of threat set changes to the combat system, and we’ll make changes to the missile in terms of threat set
to take on a higher end class threat.” to take on a higher end class threat.”
MDA and the military services would have to further integrate systems together to make MDA and the military services would have to further integrate systems together to make
this a credible layer in the homeland defense network, Hill said. During the November test, this a credible layer in the homeland defense network, Hill said. During the November test,
the MDA commanded and controlled the event from the Missile Defense Interoperability the MDA commanded and controlled the event from the Missile Defense Interoperability
and Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colo., using the and Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colo., using the ~~Co mmand~~Command and Control Battle and Control Battle
ManagementManagement ~~and Communication System (C2BMC) to receive satellite and sensor~~ and Communication System (C2BMC) to receive satellite and sensor data data
and feed it to John Finn,and feed it to John Finn, which fired itswhich fired its missile on remotemissile on remote ~~without~~ without having access to the having access to the
sensorsensor ~~data~~ data itself. While thatitself. While that worked in a controlledworked in a controlled ~~environ ment,~~ environment, for a permanent for a permanent
homeland defense mission the ship would need to be better integrated into U.S. Northern homeland defense mission the ship would need to be better integrated into U.S. Northern
Command’s network to fully share information and targeting data. Command’s network to fully share information and targeting data.
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Hill Hill said that Aegis has been integrated to operate with the Terminal High Altitude Area said that Aegis has been integrated to operate with the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense system, and THAAD has been integrated with the Patriot missile defense system, Defense system, and THAAD has been integrated with the Patriot missile defense system,
~~but~~ but MDA hasn’tMDA hasn’t ~~integrated~~ integrated all the regional defense systems with homeland defense systems. Beyond the actual integration and engineering work, Hill added that there was a ~~all the regional defense systems with homeland defense~~
~~systems.~~
~~Beyond the actual integration and engineering work, Hill added that there was a~~ policy policy
question to answer, too. question to answer, too.
“Do we want ships in that role of being off the West Coast … defending against ICBMs as “Do we want ships in that role of being off the West Coast … defending against ICBMs as
a layera layer ~~to the~~ to the Ground-BasedGround-Based Mid-CourseMid-Course Defense?Defense? ~~That’s an incredible~~ That’s an incredible conversation, conversation,
we’re having that now, and it’s hard to predict where it will go.” we’re having that now, and it’s hard to predict where it will go.”
Asked on Thursday during the Naval Postgraduate School’s acquisition research Asked on Thursday during the Naval Postgraduate School’s acquisition research
symposiumsymposium ~~if the Navy has the capacity and appetite to use destroyers for~~ if the Navy has the capacity and appetite to use destroyers for homeland homeland
defense, Hill said much of it comes down to what ships are available for the mission. defense, Hill said much of it comes down to what ships are available for the mission.
“I think if you asked Gen. [Glen] VanHerck from NORTHCOM about his confidence in “I think if you asked Gen. [Glen] VanHerck from NORTHCOM about his confidence in
defending the nation today, the answer would be confident. But as the threat evolves, right, defending the nation today, the answer would be confident. But as the threat evolves, right,
you start to see a little change in that view. And so it’s been viewed for a while that the you start to see a little change in that view. And so it’s been viewed for a while that the
Navy can play a role in that area, but it becomes an asset problem,” Hill said. “There are Navy can play a role in that area, but it becomes an asset problem,” Hill said. “There are
only so many ships we have up there. And they’re multi-mission ships, and they have a lot only so many ships we have up there. And they’re multi-mission ships, and they have a lot
of roles around the globe to execute.”43 of roles around the globe to execute.”43
A June 22, 2021, press report stated A June 22, 2021, press report stated
The Pentagon’s No. 2 official has ordered 11 missile interceptors transferred from research The Pentagon’s No. 2 official has ordered 11 missile interceptors transferred from research
and development for possible deployment on Navy ships in the Pacific or European regions and development for possible deployment on Navy ships in the Pacific or European regions
after a test in November indicated they could stop an intercontinental ballistic missile. after a test in November indicated they could stop an intercontinental ballistic missile.
In In ~~the test, the USS John Finn intercepted a mock ICBM intended to simulate one~~ the test, the USS John Finn intercepted a mock ICBM intended to simulate one that that
could be launched at Hawaii by North Korea. The destroyer, operating near Hawaii, fired could be launched at Hawaii by North Korea. The destroyer, operating near Hawaii, fired
off one of the Standard Missile-3 model Block IIA interceptorsoff one of the Standard Missile-3 model Block IIA interceptors built by Raytheon built by Raytheon
Technologies Corp. at the target launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Technologies Corp. at the target launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.
Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks informed Congress May 27 of her rationale for Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks informed Congress May 27 of her rationale for
transferring the interceptors, although she didn’t disclose it publicly. transferring the interceptors, although she didn’t disclose it publicly.
“The missiles have conducted successful intercept tests and their deployment is in the ~~“The missiles have conducted successful intercept tests and their deployment is in the~~
important interest of our national security,” Hicks spokesman Jamal Brown said in an email important interest of our national security,” Hicks spokesman Jamal Brown said in an email
this month. The transfer to the Navy marks the first major missile defense initiative of the this month. The transfer to the Navy marks the first major missile defense initiative of the
Biden administration. Biden administration.
Although the Navy’s Aegis combat system, which launched the missile, and the interceptor Although the Navy’s Aegis combat system, which launched the missile, and the interceptor
“were not designed to defeat an ICBM-class target, this test demonstrated some potential “were not designed to defeat an ICBM-class target, this test demonstrated some potential
limited capability,” Vice Admiral Jon Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, said in limited capability,” Vice Admiral Jon Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, said in
testimony to Congress last week.44 testimony to Congress last week.44
Required vs. Available Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
Another potential issue for Congress concerns required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships Another potential issue for Congress concerns required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships
versus availableversus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships. Some observers are concerned about the numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships. Some observers are concerned about the
potential operational implications of a potential operational implications of a ~~shortfal~~ shortfall in the availablein the available number of BMD-capable relative number of BMD-capable relative

43 Megan Eckstein, “43 Megan Eckstein, “ MDA: MDA: ~~T est~~Test of DDG, Standard of DDG, Standard Missile-3 IIA a GoodMissile-3 IIA a Good Start, But More Work NeededStart, But More Work Needed on Homeland on Homeland
Defense Mission,” Defense Mission,” USNI News,, May 13, 2021. See also Jason Sherman, “May 13, 2021. See also Jason Sherman, “ MDA Planning SecondMDA Planning Second SM-3 Block IIA SM-3 Block IIA
Flight Flight ~~T est~~Test Against ICBM Against ICBM ~~T arget~~Target; New; New Development and Upgraded Interceptor Needed,” Development and Upgraded Interceptor Needed,” Inside Defense, May 12, , May 12,
2021; Rich Abott, “2021; Rich Abott, “ MDA Planning SecondMDA Planning Second ~~T est~~ Test of SM-3 IIA Against ICBM of SM-3 IIA Against ICBM ~~T arget~~Target,” ,” Defense Daily, May 17, 2021. , May 17, 2021.
44 Anthony Capaccio, “44 Anthony Capaccio, “ U.S. Navy Ships CloseU.S. Navy Ships Close to Getting Interceptors to Getting Interceptors ~~T hat~~That Could Stop an ICBM,” Could Stop an ICBM,” Bloomberg, June 22, , June 22,
2021. 2021.
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to the required number. Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August to the required number. Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August
15, 2018, Navy information paper states the following: 15, 2018, Navy information paper states the following:
The [Navy’s] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA]45 sets the requirement [for BMD- The [Navy’s] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA]45 sets the requirement [for BMD-
capablecapable ships]ships] at at 54 BMD-capable54 BMD-capable ~~ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant~~
~~requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base~~ ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and and
limited expeditionary land base sites…. limited expeditionary land base sites….
The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as
follows.follows. ~~It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests~~ It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests for for
defense of land. defense of land.
- 30 to meet CVN - 30 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups
- 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand - 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand
- 9 in forward - 9 in forward ~~deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operatio nal timelines~~ deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operational timelines in in
USINDOPACOM USINDOPACOM
- 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM.46 - 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM.46
Burden of BMD Mission on U.S. Navy Aegis Ships
A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the
Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to
operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U.S. Navy missions, operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U.S. Navy missions,
and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy
Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites. A June 16, 2018, press report states the Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites. A June 16, 2018, press report states the
following: following:
The The U.S. Navy’sU.S. Navy’s top officertop officer ~~wants~~ wants to end standing ballisticto end standing ballistic missile defensemissile defense patrols and patrols and
transfer the mission to shore-based assets. transfer the mission to shore-based assets.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12 Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12
that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has
put aput a growing strain on thegrowing strain on the Navy’s hard-worn surfaceNavy’s hard-worn surface combatants, and thecombatants, and the duty shifted duty shifted
towards more shore-based infrastructure. towards more shore-based infrastructure.
“Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers “Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers
and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Richardson said and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Richardson said
during his address at the U.S. Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum. “And if you during his address at the U.S. Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum. “And if you
know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant. know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant.
“You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile.
So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little
box, defending land.” box, defending land.”
Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long
term the problem demands a different solution. term the problem demands a different solution.
“It’s a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile “It’s a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile
defense, we’re there,” he said. “But 10 years down the road, it’s time to build something defense, we’re there,” he said. “But 10 years down the road, it’s time to build something

~~45 T he FSA~~ 45 The FSA is the Navy’s analysis, performed every few years, that establishes the Navy’s ship force structure is the Navy’s analysis, performed every few years, that establishes the Navy’s ship force structure
requirements. For further discussion,requirements. For further discussion, see CRSsee CRS Report RL32665, Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. , by Ronald O'Rourke.
46 Navy information paper dated August 15, 2018, entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capable Ships 46 Navy information paper dated August 15, 2018, entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capable Ships
requirement,” provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CBOrequirement,” provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CBO and CRSand CRS on Auguston August 15, 2018. 15, 2018. ~~T he~~The information information
paper waspaper was ~~requested~~ requested by CBO. by CBO.
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on land to defend the land. Whether that’s AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of on land to defend the land. Whether that’s AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of
the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense.” the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense.”
The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the
surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a ~~s teaming~~steaming box box
doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that
could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia. could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia.
The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface fleet. Amid the fleet. Amid the
nuclearnuclear ~~threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of~~ threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of the the
readiness generated in the Japan-based U.S. 7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation readiness generated in the Japan-based U.S. 7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation
that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews, that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews,
an environment described in the Navy’s comprehensive review into the two collisions that an environment described in the Navy’s comprehensive review into the two collisions that
claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017. claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017.
Richardson Richardson ~~said~~ said that as potentialthat as potential enemies doubleenemies double ~~down~~ down on anti-accesson anti-access technologies technologies
designed to keep the U.S. Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its designed to keep the U.S. Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its
own assets. own assets.
“We’re going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle “We’re going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle
spaces we need to get into,” he said. “And so spaces we need to get into,” he said. “And so ~~res toring~~restoring dynamic maneuver has something dynamic maneuver has something
to do with missile defense.47 to do with missile defense.47
A June 23, 2018, press report states the following: A June 23, 2018, press report states the following:
The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it’s The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it’s
~~preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U.S. Navy~~ preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U.S. Navy Aegis Aegis
destroyer] fleet. Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the destroyer] fleet. Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the
U.S. Navy’s surface ships.U.S. Navy’s surface ships.
The Navy now stands at a crossroads. BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that The Navy now stands at a crossroads. BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that
hashas ~~pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past~~ pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past decade. The decade. The
game-changing SPY-6game-changing SPY-6 ~~air and missile defense radar destined~~ air and missile defense radar destined for DDG Flight III, for for DDG Flight III, for
example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters. But a smaller example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters. But a smaller
fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions
in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions. in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions.
“Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and “Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and
destroyers―sixdestroyers―six of themof them are onare on ~~ballistic~~ ballistic missile defense dutymissile defense duty at at sea,”sea,” Chief of Naval Chief of Naval
OperationsOperations ~~Adm. John Richardson said during an address at the recent U.S. Naval War~~
Adm. John Richardson said during an address at the recent U.S. Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at College’s Current Strategy Forum. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at
interceptingintercepting ~~that incoming missile. So we have six ships that could go anywhere in~~ that incoming missile. So we have six ships that could go anywhere in the the
world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land.” world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land.”
And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are
in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them. in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them.
The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible
andand ~~less~~ less predictable―“dynamic”predictable―“dynamic” is theis the ~~buzzword~~ buzzword of moment in Navyof moment in Navy circles. What circles. What
RichardsonRichardson ~~is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away~~ is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away from from
ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites, ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites,
and also surging the Navy’s at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat.... and also surging the Navy’s at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat....
In In ~~a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO’s comments, Navy spokesman~~
~~Cmdr. William Speaks said the Navy’s position is that BMD is an integral part of the~~
~~service’s mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should “consider a~~ a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO’s comments, Navy spokesman Cmdr. William Speaks said the Navy’s position is that BMD is an integral part of the service’s mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should “consider a more more
persistent, land-based solution as an option.” persistent, land-based solution as an option.”

47 David B. Larter, “47 David B. Larter, “~~T he~~The US Navy Is Fed US Navy Is Fed Up with Ballistic MissileUp with Ballistic Missile Defense Patrols,” Defense Patrols,” Defense News,, June 16, 2018. See June 16, 2018. See
also Paul McLeary, “also Paul McLeary, “ Will BudgetWill Budget Crunch Pentagon Laser & Space Investments?” Crunch Pentagon Laser & Space Investments?” Breaking Defense, November 13, , November 13,
2018. 2018.
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“This idea is not about the nation’s or the Navy’s commitment to BMD for the U.S. and “This idea is not about the nation’s or the Navy’s commitment to BMD for the U.S. and
our allies and partners―the Navy’s commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid,” our allies and partners―the Navy’s commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid,”
Speaks said. “In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60 Speaks said. “In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60
by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability. by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability.
“The idea is about how to best meet that commitment. In alignment with our ~~“The idea is about how to best meet that commitment. In alignment with our~~ national national
strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this
callscalls ~~us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission~~ us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission and and
optimize the power of the joint force.”... optimize the power of the joint force.”...
While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission
shipsships ~~is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a~~ is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a retired retired
destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group. destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group.
“The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface “The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface
combatants,” McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO’s comments. combatants,” McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO’s comments.
“Absent it, the number of CG’s and DDG’s would necessarily decline. This may in fact be “Absent it, the number of CG’s and DDG’s would necessarily decline. This may in fact be
desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate
underway. Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive underway. Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive
ones.ones.
“But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi-“But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi-
mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission
is an incredibly good thing. If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime subis an incredibly good thing. If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime sub -optimization -optimization
in order to have wartime capacity—should this not be considered a positive thing?” in order to have wartime capacity—should this not be considered a positive thing?”
McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis
havehave ~~been in response to the BMD threat. And indeed, the crown jewels of the~~ been in response to the BMD threat. And indeed, the crown jewels of the surface surface
fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD
simultaneously;simultaneously; ~~the Aegis~~ the Aegis common-sourcecommon-source ~~library; the forthcoming SPY-6;~~ library; the forthcoming SPY-6; cooperative cooperative
engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission.... engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission....
~~A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy’s shifting~~
~~language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the~~ A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy’s shifting language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the Navy Navy
latched onto the mission. But the official added that the situation more than a decade later latched onto the mission. But the official added that the situation more than a decade later
has dramatically shifted. has dramatically shifted.
“The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly “The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly
in thein the ~~western Pacific. We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as~~
western Pacific. We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as interconnected and interdependent as we do today,” the official said. “Nor have we ever interconnected and interdependent as we do today,” the official said. “Nor have we ever
seenseen ~~technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we~~ technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we see see
emerging around us. China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move emerging around us. China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move
to reshape the environment to their favor.” to reshape the environment to their favor.”
In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ desire to use the force more In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ desire to use the force more
dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said. “This includes taking a dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said. “This includes taking a
look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete, look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete,
deter and win against those who threaten us.”48 deter and win against those who threaten us.”48
A January 29, 2019, press report states the following: A January 29, 2019, press report states the following:
The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service’s top admiral The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service’s top admiral
said today, and the Pentagon’s new missile defense review might give the service the off-said today, and the Pentagon’s new missile defense review might give the service the off-
rampramp ~~it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile~~
~~launches.~~
it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile launches. This wasn’t the first time Adm. John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in This wasn’t the first time Adm. John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in
“small boxes” at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other “small boxes” at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other

48 David B. Larter, “As 48 David B. Larter, “As ~~T hreats~~Threats Mount, US Navy Grapples Mount, US Navy Grapples with Costly Ballistic Missilewith Costly Ballistic Missile Defense Mission,” Defense Mission,” Defense
News,, June 23, 2018. June 23, 2018.
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missions missions ~~challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and~~ challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and the the
North Atlantic…. North Atlantic….
“We’ve got exquisite capability, but we’ve had ships protecting some pretty static assets “We’ve got exquisite capability, but we’ve had ships protecting some pretty static assets
on land for a decade,” Richardson said at the Brookings Institute. “If that [stationary] asset on land for a decade,” Richardson said at the Brookings Institute. “If that [stationary] asset
is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let’s build something on land and protect is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let’s build something on land and protect
that and liberate these ships from this mission.” that and liberate these ships from this mission.”
Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor
and shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed with the Aegis radar and shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed with the Aegis radar
andand missile defensemissile defense ~~system, both of which would free up American hulls~~ system, both of which would free up American hulls from what from what
Richardson on Monday called “the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for Richardson on Monday called “the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for
ballistic missile defense.”49 ballistic missile defense.”49
Allied Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. Allied Contributions to Regional
BMD Capabilities
Another related potential issue for Congress concerns Another related potential issue for Congress concerns ~~al ied~~allied burden sharing—how burden sharing—how ~~al ied~~allied
contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to
overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U.S. overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U.S.
defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U.S. Navy Aegis ships, and defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U.S. Navy Aegis ships, and ~~cal s~~calls by some by some
U.S. observers for increased U.S. observers for increased ~~al ied~~allied defense efforts. The issue can arise in connection with both defense efforts. The issue can arise in connection with both
U.S. U.S. ~~al ies~~allies in Europe and U.S. in Europe and U.S. ~~al ies~~allies in Asia. Regarding U.S. in Asia. Regarding U.S. ~~al ies~~ allies in Asia, a December 12, 2018, in Asia, a December 12, 2018,
press report states the following: press report states the following:
In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during
a speecha speech ~~at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current~~
~~practice~~ at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current practice of dedicating severalof dedicating several US NavyUS Navy warships solelywarships solely ~~for~~ for Ballistic MissileBallistic Missile Defense (BMD). Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land~~Defense~~
~~(BMD).~~
~~Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are~~
~~limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land~~ -based -based
BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system. Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system.
In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has
gone quiet. gone quiet.
“My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate “My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate
actually stood,” one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times. actually stood,” one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times.
But others agree But others agree with him.with him. Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US
Missile DefenseMissile Defense Agency (MDA), acknowledgesAgency (MDA), acknowledges Richardson’s attempts to highlight how Richardson’s attempts to highlight how
~~these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome “strain on the (US Navy’s) crews~~ these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome “strain on the (US Navy’s) crews and and
equipment.” equipment.”
But there are complications. While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather But there are complications. While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather
than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could
defeatdefeat ~~land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy’s Aegis-~~
~~equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in~~
~~greater survivability overall.~~
~~As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps~~ land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy’s Aegis-equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in greater survivability overall. As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps other other
systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and

49 Paul McLeary, “49 Paul McLeary, “ ~~T he~~The Navy Has Had Enough of Missile Navy Has Had Enough of Missile Defense AndDefense And ~~Sees~~ Sees Its Chance,” Its Chance,” Breaking Defense, January , January
28, 2019. 28, 2019.
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South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents
abrupt change…. abrupt change….
Japan’s decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy Japan’s decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy
~~cessation~~ cessation of BMD patrols.of BMD patrols. “The“The land-basedland-based ~~option~~ option is more reliable, lessis more reliable, less ~~logisticaly~~ logistically
draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it
providesprovides a degreea degree of reassuranceof reassurance to the Japaneseto the Japanese ~~people~~ people and US government,and US government, and and
introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations,” said introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations,” said
[Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University [Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University
in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa. in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa.
“Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward-“Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward-
defense,defense, ~~before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions~~
before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions times,” Mulloy said. “Aegistimes,” Mulloy said. “Aegis ~~Ashore gives~~ Ashore gives more reactionmore reaction time – but over Japanese time – but over Japanese
airspace.”… airspace.”…
The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific
is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo. However, the Trump is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo. However, the Trump
administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support
US troops deployed overseas. US troops deployed overseas.
Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might
viewview ~~a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly~~ a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly aggressive aggressive
defense posture in the region. defense posture in the region.
But for them, it is a no-win situation. If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China But for them, it is a no-win situation. If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China
and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances
the US Navy’s maritime warfare capabilities.50 the US Navy’s maritime warfare capabilities.50
Potential Aegis Ashore Site on Guam
Another issue for Congress is whether to procure and Another issue for Congress is whether to procure and ~~instal~~ install an Aegis Ashore system on Guam. A an Aegis Ashore system on Guam. A
July 21, 2020, press report stated July 21, 2020, press report stated
The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command told reporters today he wants the Aegis Ashore The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command told reporters today he wants the Aegis Ashore
ballistic missile defense system to bolster the defense of Guam from Chinese missiles. ballistic missile defense system to bolster the defense of Guam from Chinese missiles.
The Aegis Ashore Baseline 10 system should be “the backbone of [a] homeland defense The Aegis Ashore Baseline 10 system should be “the backbone of [a] homeland defense
system”system” for Guam, Adm.for Guam, Adm. Phil Davidson saidPhil Davidson said ~~during a Defense Writers Group~~ during a Defense Writers Group virtual virtual
roundtable. roundtable.
“The reason I’m a key advocate for that is first: it is technology that is available to us now “The reason I’m a key advocate for that is first: it is technology that is available to us now
and could be delivered by 2026, when I believe the threat will require us to have a much and could be delivered by 2026, when I believe the threat will require us to have a much
more robust capability than the combination of [Terminalmore robust capability than the combination of [Terminal ~~High~~ High Altitude Area Defense], Altitude Area Defense],
which is deployed there now, and an Aegis ship in response can provide,” Davidson said. which is deployed there now, and an Aegis ship in response can provide,” Davidson said.
Davidson Davidson ~~said the current defense system for Guam is not adequate to thwart~~ said the current defense system for Guam is not adequate to thwart potential potential
Chinese missiles. Chinese missiles.
“When you look at the way the threat capability, threat capacity, is manifesting from China “When you look at the way the threat capability, threat capacity, is manifesting from China
in the future—whether it’s ballistic missiles from the land or whether it’s ballistic or cruise in the future—whether it’s ballistic missiles from the land or whether it’s ballistic or cruise
missiles from air and maritime platformsmissiles from air and maritime platforms —you are going to need a complete clock, a 360-—you are going to need a complete clock, a 360-
degree coverage in order to help defend Guam,” the admiral said.51 degree coverage in order to help defend Guam,” the admiral said.51

50 Peter J. Brown, “Japan, US Silent over Ending50 Peter J. Brown, “Japan, US Silent over Ending Ballistic MissileBallistic Missile Patrols,” Patrols,” Asia Times, December 12, 2018. , December 12, 2018.
51 Mallory Shelbourne,51 Mallory Shelbourne, “ “Protecting Guam from Chinese MissilesProtecting Guam from Chinese Missiles ~~is T op~~ is Top Priority for INDO-PACOM’s Davidson,” Priority for INDO-PACOM’s Davidson,”
USNI News,, July 21, 2020. See also Mandy Mayfield, “July 21, 2020. See also Mandy Mayfield, “ Web Exclusive: Commander Wants Aegis Ashore FundingWeb Exclusive: Commander Wants Aegis Ashore Funding to to
Defend Guam,”Defend Guam,” National Defense, July, July 21, 2020; Jason Sherman, “21, 2020; Jason Sherman, “ INDOPACOM: AegisINDOPACOM: Aegis Ashore with SPY-6 Needed Ashore with SPY-6 Needed
on Guamon Guam by 2026 to Counter Chinese Ballistic,by 2026 to Counter Chinese Ballistic, ~~Cruise~~ Cruise Missiles,”Missiles,” Inside Defense, July, July 21, 2020; and Aaron Mehta, 21, 2020; and Aaron Mehta,
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A September 18, 2020, press report states A September 18, 2020, press report states
Guam urgently Guam urgently ~~needs an Aegis Ashore missile defense system to protect vital~~ needs an Aegis Ashore missile defense system to protect vital military military
assets from an increasingly aggressive China, according to the head of U.S. Indoassets from an increasingly aggressive China, according to the head of U.S. Indo -Pacific -Pacific
Command. Command.
“There are billions of dollars in defense capability on Guam,” Adm. Phil Davidson said “There are billions of dollars in defense capability on Guam,” Adm. Phil Davidson said
ThursdayThursday [September[September 17] during17] during an onlinean online forum organizedforum organized ~~by the Missile~~ by the Missile Defense Defense
Advocacy Alliance. “There needs to be some investment in defending that.” Advocacy Alliance. “There needs to be some investment in defending that.”
The The ~~U.S. territory is home to air and naval bases and serves as a launching point~~ U.S. territory is home to air and naval bases and serves as a launching point for for
strategic bombers. The Navy is also building facilities to house a Marine Corps air-ground strategic bombers. The Navy is also building facilities to house a Marine Corps air-ground
task force to accommodate a planned drawdown of Marines on Okinawa…. task force to accommodate a planned drawdown of Marines on Okinawa….
China’s ability to launch missiles from submarines ranging farther from shore means Guam China’s ability to launch missiles from submarines ranging farther from shore means Guam
needs the 360-degree protection that Aegis can provide, he said. needs the 360-degree protection that Aegis can provide, he said.
Guam’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missile defense battery can Guam’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missile defense battery can
sense targets only within a 120-degree range, and it’s pointed at North Korea, Davidson sense targets only within a 120-degree range, and it’s pointed at North Korea, Davidson
said. said.
“It’s going to require a much deeper 360-degree persistent capability,” he said, adding that “It’s going to require a much deeper 360-degree persistent capability,” he said, adding that
it’s important to invest in Guam’s missile defense now. it’s important to invest in Guam’s missile defense now.
“It is not necessarily about designing or creating a defensive system that is impenetrable or “It is not necessarily about designing or creating a defensive system that is impenetrable or
invulnerable against the entire missile inventory of a potential adversary. Rather it is about invulnerable against the entire missile inventory of a potential adversary. Rather it is about
developing a combat credible deterrent.” developing a combat credible deterrent.”
INDOPACOM, in a report to Congress, put the cost of a system providing 360-degree air- INDOPACOM, in a report to Congress, put the cost of a system providing 360-degree air-
missile defense on Guam at just under $1.7 billion. missile defense on Guam at just under $1.7 billion.
Davidson has requested funding for the system starting in the next fiscal year as part of a Davidson has requested funding for the system starting in the next fiscal year as part of a
Pacific Deterrence Initiative that parallel’s a similar program in Europe designed to deter Pacific Deterrence Initiative that parallel’s a similar program in Europe designed to deter
Russia. Russia.
Building Aegis Ashore is a pathway to defending against hypersonic missiles, Davidson Building Aegis Ashore is a pathway to defending against hypersonic missiles, Davidson
said, adding that China’s rocket force fires and exercises more often than that of any other said, adding that China’s rocket force fires and exercises more often than that of any other
nation…. nation….
Rapidly growing capability in China and North Korea requires that Aegis be the starting Rapidly growing capability in China and North Korea requires that Aegis be the starting
point for the defense of Guam, Davidson said. point for the defense of Guam, Davidson said.
“We can’t … wait for some perfect solution to manifest itself in 2035 or 2040.“We can’t … wait for some perfect solution to manifest itself in 2035 or 2040. We are in We are in
the threat environment now,” he said.52 the threat environment now,” he said.52
A September 22, 2020, press report states A September 22, 2020, press report states
The Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system being eyed to bolster protection of Guam The Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system being eyed to bolster protection of Guam
could potentially be armed for strike missions to offset China’s current ballistic and cruise could potentially be armed for strike missions to offset China’s current ballistic and cruise
missilemissile ~~advantage against U.S. forces, according to the top U.S.~~ advantage against U.S. forces, according to the top U.S. military officialmilitary official in the in the
region. region.
Adm. Phil Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, broached the possibility Adm. Phil Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, broached the possibility
of using Aegis Ashore for offense during a Sept. 17 online discussion hosted by the Missile of using Aegis Ashore for offense during a Sept. 17 online discussion hosted by the Missile
Defense Advocacy Alliance, acknowledging a capability the Defense Department Defense Advocacy Alliance, acknowledging a capability the Defense Department

“INDOPACOM Head Wants Aegis“INDOPACOM Head Wants Aegis Ashore in GuamAshore in Guam by 2026,” by 2026,” Defense News,, July 22, 2020. See also Bradley July 22, 2020. See also Bradley
Bowman and Maj. ShaneBowman and Maj. Shane Praiswater, “Praiswater, “ Guam needs AegisGuam needs Aegis Ashore,” Ashore,” Defense News,, ~~August~~ August 25, 2020. 25, 2020.
52 Seth Robson, “Indo-Pacific Command Leader Underscores Need for Stronger Missile 52 Seth Robson, “Indo-Pacific Command Leader Underscores Need for Stronger Missile Defense on Guam,”Defense on Guam,” Stars and
Stripes, September 18, 2020. , September 18, 2020.
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disavowed for years while the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty remained disavowed for years while the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty remained
in force.53 in force.53
Other observers have argued that an Aegis Ashore site at Guam would not be the most cost- Other observers have argued that an Aegis Ashore site at Guam would not be the most cost-
effective option for bolstering Guam’s defenses against potential missile attacks. A July 30, 2020, effective option for bolstering Guam’s defenses against potential missile attacks. A July 30, 2020,
opinion article states opinion article states
The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said last week his top priority is establishing an The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said last week his top priority is establishing an
Aegis Ashore system on Guam by 2026.Aegis Ashore system on Guam by 2026. New air defenses will help protect U.S. citizens New air defenses will help protect U.S. citizens
and forces in Guam; but as Japan’s government found, Aegis Ashore may not be the best and forces in Guam; but as Japan’s government found, Aegis Ashore may not be the best
option to protectoption to protect military and civilianmilitary and civilian targets fromtargets from growing and improving Chinese and growing and improving Chinese and
North Korean missile threats…. North Korean missile threats….
Although the current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery on Guam can defend Although the current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery on Guam can defend
against some ballistic missiles, its single AN/TPY-2 radar is vulnerable and cannot provide against some ballistic missiles, its single AN/TPY-2 radar is vulnerable and cannot provide
360-degree coverage. Moreover, THAAD’s focus on high altitudes makes it a poor fit to 360-degree coverage. Moreover, THAAD’s focus on high altitudes makes it a poor fit to
defeat lower-flying aircraft or cruise missiles that would likely be used by China’s military defeat lower-flying aircraft or cruise missiles that would likely be used by China’s military
against Guam. The island needs a new air defense architecture. against Guam. The island needs a new air defense architecture.
Aegis Ashore is highly capable, but has its own limitations. Designed primarily to counter Aegis Ashore is highly capable, but has its own limitations. Designed primarily to counter
small numberssmall numbers of ballistic missiles, its fixed missile magazine andof ballistic missiles, its fixed missile magazine and radar would be radar would be
vulnerable to attack and would fall short against the bombardment possible from China. vulnerable to attack and would fall short against the bombardment possible from China.
Instead of installing one or more Aegis Ashore Instead of installing one or more Aegis Ashore ~~s ystems~~systems on Guam, a more effective air and on Guam, a more effective air and
missile defense architecture would combine the latest version of the Aegis Combat System missile defense architecture would combine the latest version of the Aegis Combat System
with a disaggregatedwith a disaggregated ~~system of~~ system of existing sensors,existing sensors, effectors,effectors, ~~and command~~ and command-and-control -and-control
nodes. A distributed architecture would also be scalable, allowing air and missile defenses nodes. A distributed architecture would also be scalable, allowing air and missile defenses
to also protect U.S. citizens and forces operating in the Northern Marianas. to also protect U.S. citizens and forces operating in the Northern Marianas.
Guam’s geography enables longer-range sensing than would be possible from a ship or a Guam’s geography enables longer-range sensing than would be possible from a ship or a
single Aegis Ashore radar. Fixed, relocatable and mobile radio frequency sensors should single Aegis Ashore radar. Fixed, relocatable and mobile radio frequency sensors should
be positioned around the island’s perimeter, such as compact versions of SPY-6 or Lower be positioned around the island’s perimeter, such as compact versions of SPY-6 or Lower
Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor radars and the passive Army LongTier Air and Missile Defense Sensor radars and the passive Army Long -Range Persistent -Range Persistent
SurveillanceSurveillance system.system. During periods ofDuring periods of ~~heightened tension, passive and active~~ heightened tension, passive and active radio radio
frequency and electro-optical/infrared sensors could also be deployed on unmanned aircraft frequency and electro-optical/infrared sensors could also be deployed on unmanned aircraft
andand ~~stratospheric balloons to monitor~~ stratospheric balloons to monitor over-the-horizonover-the-horizon threats.threats. ~~This~~ This mixed architecture mixed architecture
would provide better collective coverage and be more difficult to defeat compared to one would provide better collective coverage and be more difficult to defeat compared to one
or two fixed Aegis Ashore deckhouses. or two fixed Aegis Ashore deckhouses.
To shoot down To shoot down enemy missiles and aircraft, the architectureenemy missiles and aircraft, the architecture should field mobile, should field mobile,
containerizedcontainerized ~~launchers for long-range interceptors like the SM-6 and SM-3 rather than~~
launchers for long-range interceptors like the SM-6 and SM-3 rather than Aegis Ashore’s finite and targetable in-ground vertical launch magazines. They should be Aegis Ashore’s finite and targetable in-ground vertical launch magazines. They should be
complementedcomplemented by by medium- to short-rangemedium- to short-range ~~engagement systems to protect~~ engagement systems to protect high-value high-value
targetstargets such assuch as the Patriot, the Nationalthe Patriot, the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System or the Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System or the
Army’s planned Indirect Fire Protection Capability, as well as non-kinetic defenses such Army’s planned Indirect Fire Protection Capability, as well as non-kinetic defenses such
as high-powered microwave weapons and electronic warfare systems that could damage or as high-powered microwave weapons and electronic warfare systems that could damage or
confuse the guidance systems on incoming missiles. confuse the guidance systems on incoming missiles.
Today, Today, ~~destroyers patrol the waters around Guam to provide ballistic~~ destroyers patrol the waters around Guam to provide ballistic missile defense missile defense
capacity beyond that available with THAAD. A new distributed architecture would place capacity beyond that available with THAAD. A new distributed architecture would place
more capacity ashore to free surface combatants from missile defense duty. In a crisis or more capacity ashore to free surface combatants from missile defense duty. In a crisis or
conflict,conflict, ~~the architecture could add capacity with surface action groups and combat~~ the architecture could add capacity with surface action groups and combat air air
patrols capable of intercepting threats at longer ranges. patrols capable of intercepting threats at longer ranges.
Instead of Aegis Ashore’s large, single C2 node, a distributed architecture would virtualize Instead of Aegis Ashore’s large, single C2 node, a distributed architecture would virtualize
thethe ~~Aegis Combat System to~~ Aegis Combat System to allow multiple facilities or mobile vehiclesallow multiple facilities or mobile vehicles ~~to serve~~ to serve as as
miniature air operations centers. The mobility of sensors, effectors and C2 nodes in this miniature air operations centers. The mobility of sensors, effectors and C2 nodes in this

53 Jason Sherman, “53 Jason Sherman, “ INDOPACOM Chief: AegisINDOPACOM Chief: Aegis Ashore GuamAshore Guam ~~Could~~ Could One Day BeOne Day Be Armed for Strike to Counter China,” Armed for Strike to Counter China,”
Inside Defense, September 22, 2020. , September 22, 2020.
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architecture architecture ~~would enable the employment of camouflage, concealment and~~ would enable the employment of camouflage, concealment and deception, deception,
includingincluding ~~decoys, to complicate enemy targeting and increase the number of~~ decoys, to complicate enemy targeting and increase the number of weapons weapons
needed to ensure a successful attack. needed to ensure a successful attack.
INDOPACOM’s plan for implementing new Guam air defenses should also apply lessons INDOPACOM’s plan for implementing new Guam air defenses should also apply lessons
from Japan’s aborted Aegis Ashore program, whose accelerated timeline contributed to the from Japan’s aborted Aegis Ashore program, whose accelerated timeline contributed to the
selectionselection ~~of the least expensive and technically risky option —two fixed Aegis Ashore~~
~~systems—and the discounting of alternatives. Adm. Phil Davidson’s~~ of the least expensive and technically risky option—two fixed Aegis Ashore systems—and the discounting of alternatives. Adm. Phil Davidson’s 2026 goal of 2026 goal of
improving Guam’s defenses faces a similar risk. improving Guam’s defenses faces a similar risk.
Bound by an iron triangle, Guam’s air and missile defenses can be good, fast or cheap—Bound by an iron triangle, Guam’s air and missile defenses can be good, fast or cheap—
but not all three. If 2026but not all three. If 2026 is held as a rigid constraint, the only solution able to meet the is held as a rigid constraint, the only solution able to meet the
scheduleschedule ~~and requirements may be~~ and requirements may be the familiar, andthe familiar, and ineffective,ineffective, fixed Aegisfixed Aegis Ashore Ashore
architecture. architecture.
Compared to one or two Aegis Ashore sites, a distributed architecture may require slightly Compared to one or two Aegis Ashore sites, a distributed architecture may require slightly
more time to develop or funds to field. But a phased approach could introduce new systems more time to develop or funds to field. But a phased approach could introduce new systems
asas ~~funding becomes available and allow expanding the system’s capability to meet~~ funding becomes available and allow expanding the system’s capability to meet the the
evolving threat. For example, SPY-6evolving threat. For example, SPY-6 radars, C2 bunkers and composite THAAD-Patriot-radars, C2 bunkers and composite THAAD-Patriot-
NASAMS batteries could be fielded before 2026, quickly followed by the introduction of NASAMS batteries could be fielded before 2026, quickly followed by the introduction of
mobile assets. mobile assets.
Guam and Guam and ~~the Northern Marianas are essential to~~ the Northern Marianas are essential to U.S. strategy andU.S. strategy and operations inoperations in the the
Western Pacific. Their defenses have long beenWestern Pacific. Their defenses have long been ignored, andignored, and Adm. DavidsonAdm. Davidson should be should be
lauded for charting a path forward. A disaggregated architecture, however, will be more lauded for charting a path forward. A disaggregated architecture, however, will be more
likely to realize INDOPACOM’s vision of resilient and scalable air and missile defense.54 likely to realize INDOPACOM’s vision of resilient and scalable air and missile defense.54
A March 4, 2021, press report stated A March 4, 2021, press report stated
Building an Aegis Ashore facility on Guam would relieve three guided-missile destroyers Building an Aegis Ashore facility on Guam would relieve three guided-missile destroyers
fromfrom missile defensemissile defense work and make them available for Navy tasking, the head ofwork and make them available for Navy tasking, the head of U.S. U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command said Thursday [March 4]. Indo-Pacific Command said Thursday [March 4].
Speaking Speaking at a virtual eventat a virtual event ~~hosted by the American Enterprise Institute,~~ hosted by the American Enterprise Institute, Adm. Phil Adm. Phil
Davidson made the case for building a homeland missile defense system on Guam, which Davidson made the case for building a homeland missile defense system on Guam, which
he has said is his top priority, to protect the U.S. territory from Chinese he has said is his top priority, to protect the U.S. territory from Chinese ~~mis siles.~~
missiles. “The Guam defense system brings the same ability to protect Guam and the system itself “The Guam defense system brings the same ability to protect Guam and the system itself
as the three DDGs it would otherwise take to carry out the mission,” Davidson said. “We as the three DDGs it would otherwise take to carry out the mission,” Davidson said. “We
needneed ~~to free up those~~ to free up those guided-missileguided-missile ~~destroyers, who have multi-mission capability~~ destroyers, who have multi-mission capability to to
detect threats and finish threats under the sea, on the sea and above the sea, so that they can detect threats and finish threats under the sea, on the sea and above the sea, so that they can
move with a mobile and maneuverable naval forces that they were designed to protect and move with a mobile and maneuverable naval forces that they were designed to protect and
provide their ballistic missile defense.”… provide their ballistic missile defense.”…
“It’s return on investment,” Davidson said when arguing for the missile defense system. “It’s return on investment,” Davidson said when arguing for the missile defense system.
“For the cost it takes to build that facility and flesh it out, I free up at least three ships in “For the cost it takes to build that facility and flesh it out, I free up at least three ships in
conflict and probably more ships in crisis. You know, in the deterrence phase they keepconflict and probably more ships in crisis. You know, in the deterrence phase they keep up up
a rotation and do all that kind of stuff going forward,” he added, referring to the oft-cited a rotation and do all that kind of stuff going forward,” he added, referring to the oft-cited
notionnotion ~~that it takes three ships total to keep one deployed forward due to the cycle for~~
~~maintenance, training and operations.~~
~~The INDOPACOM chief emphasized that Guam’s current use of the Army’s Terminal~~
~~High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system paired with an Aegis destroyer~~ that it takes three ships total to keep one deployed forward due to the cycle for maintenance, training and operations. The INDOPACOM chief emphasized that Guam’s current use of the Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system paired with an Aegis destroyer is not is not
sufficient to address the threat posed by China. sufficient to address the threat posed by China.
“It doesn’t provide for a 360-degree defense necessarily,” he said. “It’s really designed to “It doesn’t provide for a 360-degree defense necessarily,” he said. “It’s really designed to
defend against a rogue shot from North Korea.” defend against a rogue shot from North Korea.”

~~54 T imothy~~ 54 Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark, “Guam’s Air Defense Should A. Walton and Bryan Clark, “Guam’s Air Defense Should Learn Lessons from Japan’s AegisLearn Lessons from Japan’s Aegis Ashore,” Ashore,”
Defense News,, ~~July~~ July 30, 2020. 30, 2020.
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Davidson pointed to China’s submarines and surface ships circumnavigating the Northern Davidson pointed to China’s submarines and surface ships circumnavigating the Northern
~~Mariana Islands and Guam, arguing these actions show that China’s ballistic missiles,~~
~~cruise missiles and potential anti-ship ballistic missiles pose “a 360-degree threat” to~~
~~Guam.~~
~~“We must evolve the critical defense of our people, our platforms and our posture~~
~~initiatives, and it begins in Guam. Now, a highly capable, fully adaptable and~~ Mariana Islands and Guam, arguing these actions show that China’s ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and potential anti-ship ballistic missiles pose “a 360-degree threat” to Guam. “We must evolve the critical defense of our people, our platforms and our posture initiatives, and it begins in Guam. Now, a highly capable, fully adaptable and proven proven
system like Aegis – established in a fixed location like Guam – will deliver persistent, 360-system like Aegis – established in a fixed location like Guam – will deliver persistent, 360-
degree integrated air and missile defense from the second island chain,” he said.55 degree integrated air and missile defense from the second island chain,” he said.55
A March 9, 2021, press report stated A March 9, 2021, press report stated
Warning that China’s missile arsenal threatens Guam and the United States will have to Warning that China’s missile arsenal threatens Guam and the United States will have to
“fight for it,” the head of Indo-Pacific Command pitched lawmakers on building an Aegis “fight for it,” the head of Indo-Pacific Command pitched lawmakers on building an Aegis
Ashore missile defense facility to guard the U.S. territory. Ashore missile defense facility to guard the U.S. territory.
Adm. Phil Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday [March 9] that Adm. Phil Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday [March 9] that
the island needs protection as the home of 170,000 U.S. citizens and service members, a the island needs protection as the home of 170,000 U.S. citizens and service members, a
deepwaterdeepwater ~~strategic port, fuel and munition stores and an airfield used to project~~ strategic port, fuel and munition stores and an airfield used to project U.S. U.S.
power. Guam would be key to responding to any conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. power. Guam would be key to responding to any conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.
“Guam is a target today. It needs to be defended, and it needs to be prepared for the threats “Guam is a target today. It needs to be defended, and it needs to be prepared for the threats
that will come in the future,” Davidson said. He added later: “China’s own Air Force has that will come in the future,” Davidson said. He added later: “China’s own Air Force has
put out a propaganda video showing their H-6 bomber force attacking Andersen Air Force put out a propaganda video showing their H-6 bomber force attacking Andersen Air Force
Base at Guam and distributed that quite publicly.” Base at Guam and distributed that quite publicly.”
While an Aegis Ashore system would counter ballistic missiles or cruise missiles launch While an Aegis Ashore system would counter ballistic missiles or cruise missiles launch
from the air, land andfrom the air, land and ~~sea, the island’s existing~~ sea, the island’s existing anti-ballisticanti-ballistic missile capability―the missile capability―the
Terminal HighTerminal High ~~Altitude Area Defense system―“is not capable of meeting the~~ Altitude Area Defense system―“is not capable of meeting the current current
trajectory of threats from China,” Davidson said. trajectory of threats from China,” Davidson said.
“It’s the key piece that we’re missing, that signals to the region that the U.S. is a reliable “It’s the key piece that we’re missing, that signals to the region that the U.S. is a reliable
and committed security partner, that we are there to defend not only U.S. territory but our and committed security partner, that we are there to defend not only U.S. territory but our
interests abroad,” Davidson said of Aegis Ashore. He added it would show China it “can’t interests abroad,” Davidson said of Aegis Ashore. He added it would show China it “can’t
knock Guam out with an easy shot and keep us out of the fight to present a fait accompli” knock Guam out with an easy shot and keep us out of the fight to present a fait accompli”
against Taiwan. against Taiwan.
Davidson has previously said the $1.6 billion system is his top priority among $27 billion Davidson has previously said the $1.6 billion system is his top priority among $27 billion
in spendingin spending he’she’s proposed to continueproposed to continue ~~a broader~~ a broader Pacific Deterrence InitiativePacific Deterrence Initiative through through
2027…. 2027….
The proposed Guam Defense System would consist of Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Combat The proposed Guam Defense System would consist of Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Combat
SystemSystem ~~Baseline 10; a solid-state radar such as the Raytheon SPY-6 or a variant of the~~
~~Lockheed SPY-7; the BAE Systems Mark 41 Vertical Launching System, and SM -3~~ Baseline 10; a solid-state radar such as the Raytheon SPY-6 or a variant of the Lockheed SPY-7; the BAE Systems Mark 41 Vertical Launching System, and SM-3 or or
SM-6 Missile, made by Raytheon. SM-6 Missile, made by Raytheon.
Davidson argued in written testimony that the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Davidson argued in written testimony that the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Battle Command SystemBattle Command System ~~and~~ and the Air Force’sthe Air Force’s ~~Advanced Battle Management~~ Advanced Battle Management System System
wouldn’t fit the bill because they “are not yet fully developed.” Any “recommendations for wouldn’t fit the bill because they “are not yet fully developed.” Any “recommendations for
additionaladditional studies,studies, including a requirementincluding a requirement for only for only ~~mob ile~~mobile systems, disregard the systems, disregard the
immediacyimmediacy ~~and complexity of the threat (2026) and the absolute need to integrate fires~~
~~across the region from a forward multi-domain command and control node west of~~ and complexity of the threat (2026) and the absolute need to integrate fires across the region from a forward multi-domain command and control node west of the the
International Date Line,” he said.56 International Date Line,” he said.56

55 Mallory Shelbourne,55 Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: Aegis“Davidson: Aegis Ashore on GuamAshore on Guam Would ‘Free Up’ 3 Navy Destroyers,” Would ‘Free Up’ 3 Navy Destroyers,” USNI News,, March March
4, 2021. 4, 2021.
56 Joe Gould,56 Joe Gould, “ “‘Guam Is a ‘Guam Is a ~~T arget T oday~~Target Today.’ Pacific Chief Pitches Aegis Ashore to Congress,” .’ Pacific Chief Pitches Aegis Ashore to Congress,” Defense News,, March 9, March 9,
2021. See also Jason Sherman, “2021. See also Jason Sherman, “ Pentagon Begins Work on AegisPentagon Begins Work on Aegis Ashore for Guam,”Ashore for Guam,” Inside Defense, March 9, 2021. , March 9, 2021.
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A June 24, 2021, press report stated A June 24, 2021, press report stated
The head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has suggested that portions of a future Aegis The head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has suggested that portions of a future Aegis
Ashore site on the strategic American island of Guam in the Pacific could go into bunkers Ashore site on the strategic American island of Guam in the Pacific could go into bunkers
underground or onto mobile platforms. Ostensibly, this is due to Guam’s terrain and limited underground or onto mobile platforms. Ostensibly, this is due to Guam’s terrain and limited
overall space, but it also speaks to the potential vulnerabilities of such a facility, overall space, but it also speaks to the potential vulnerabilities of such a facility, ~~especialy~~especially
in a major conflict with a near-peer adversary, such as China. in a major conflict with a near-peer adversary, such as China.
The Missile The Missile ~~Defense~~ Defense Agency’s (MDA)Agency’s (MDA) director,director, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Jon Hill, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Jon Hill,
provided these andprovided these and ~~other details about the current state of plans for an Aegis~~ other details about the current state of plans for an Aegis Ashore Ashore
capability on Guam at an event that Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) capability on Guam at an event that Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
think tank hosted earlier this week. U.S. military officials have publicly said in the past that think tank hosted earlier this week. U.S. military officials have publicly said in the past that
their goal is for this site, whatever its configuration might be in the end, to be operational their goal is for this site, whatever its configuration might be in the end, to be operational
by 2026. by 2026.
“I can see Aegis being underground or mobile,“ Hill said. “It’s not new science separating “I can see Aegis being underground or mobile,“ Hill said. “It’s not new science separating
radars from weapons.” radars from weapons.”
The The ~~existing “Aegis Ashore may not be sufficient,” he added, referring to the~~ existing “Aegis Ashore may not be sufficient,” he added, referring to the general general
structure of the existing and planned sites.57 structure of the existing and planned sites.57
An August 23, 2021, report by one observer recommended repurposing some Aegis cruisers that An August 23, 2021, report by one observer recommended repurposing some Aegis cruisers that
the Navy, as part of its FY2021 budget submission, has proposed for retirement as interim missile the Navy, as part of its FY2021 budget submission, has proposed for retirement as interim missile
defense platforms for Guam, Palau, and Saipan, pending the deployment of more permanent defense platforms for Guam, Palau, and Saipan, pending the deployment of more permanent
missile-defense systems for these locations. The report stated that missile-defense systems for these locations. The report stated that
there are options that could there are options that could be be deployed todeployed to Guam today,Guam today, which wouldwhich would measurably measurably
complicate Chinese operational thinking in attacking and suppressing Guam. First, there complicate Chinese operational thinking in attacking and suppressing Guam. First, there
are three aging BMD-capable Ticonderoga-class cruisers (the CG-73, the CG-72,are three aging BMD-capable Ticonderoga-class cruisers (the CG-73, the CG-72, and the and the
CG-61)CG-61) that the Navy has slated for that the Navy has slated for ~~decommis sioning~~decommissioning in 2022 due to high operational cost. in 2022 due to high operational cost.
Their older analog radar systems, while still capable, have a limited capacity for engaging Their older analog radar systems, while still capable, have a limited capacity for engaging
multiple targets and require auxiliary systems to cool associated electronics. Second, the multiple targets and require auxiliary systems to cool associated electronics. Second, the
cruise missile threat could be addressed by repurposing elements of the Army’s Counter cruise missile threat could be addressed by repurposing elements of the Army’s Counter
Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) systems. Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) systems.
Ticonderoga-class cruisers were designed to provide air defense to carrier strike groups, Ticonderoga-class cruisers were designed to provide air defense to carrier strike groups,
with laterwith later upgrades that enabledupgrades that enabled ~~ballistic~~ ballistic missile defense.missile defense. ~~As retired~~ As retired Admiral andAdmiral and ex-ex-
Commander of INDOPACOM Harry Harris recently argued, any future defense system for Commander of INDOPACOM Harry Harris recently argued, any future defense system for
Guam must be integrated across numerous systems—these cruisers do that already. Early Guam must be integrated across numerous systems—these cruisers do that already. Early
in their lifetime, these cruisers got the upgrades and space needed to support an Area Air in their lifetime, these cruisers got the upgrades and space needed to support an Area Air
Defense Commander with associated communications, sensors, and weapons. With this in Defense Commander with associated communications, sensors, and weapons. With this in
mind, these ships could serve as an operational test bed for integrating newer systems, such mind, these ships could serve as an operational test bed for integrating newer systems, such
as the Army’s highly capable TPY-2 radar, into the targeting of the 120 missiles carried in as the Army’s highly capable TPY-2 radar, into the targeting of the 120 missiles carried in
the cruiser’s vertical launch system.... the cruiser’s vertical launch system....
Typically, Typically, when the Navy deploys a BMDwhen the Navy deploys a BMD warship to defend Guam, it loiters inwarship to defend Guam, it loiters in waters waters
near the island or moored in port. Guam offers several protected anchorages that a moored near the island or moored in port. Guam offers several protected anchorages that a moored
BMD-capable cruiser could move between without having to conduct prolonged BMD-capable cruiser could move between without having to conduct prolonged
navigation. This potentially obviates the need for the Navy to man or maintain these ships navigation. This potentially obviates the need for the Navy to man or maintain these ships
for independent at-sea operations—potentially escorted or towed between mooring sites. for independent at-sea operations—potentially escorted or towed between mooring sites.
This would enable putting the ship’s propulsion system in a state of reduced operational This would enable putting the ship’s propulsion system in a state of reduced operational
readiness and reducing the crew, but to be clear, cost savings is a secondary consideration readiness and reducing the crew, but to be clear, cost savings is a secondary consideration
to sustaining weapons capacity for defense (and potentially strike).... to sustaining weapons capacity for defense (and potentially strike)....

~~57 Joseph T revithick, “ Guam’s New Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Could Go Underground~~ 57 Joseph Trevithick, “Guam’s New Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Could Go Underground And Mobile,” And Mobile,” The
Drive, June, June 24, 2021. See also Harry Harris, “24, 2021. See also Harry Harris, “ ~~Aegis Ashore T oo~~Aegis Ashore Too Limited For Guam: Limited For Guam: Former INDO-PACOM Head,” Former INDO-PACOM Head,”
Breaking Defense, July 9, 2021; Bradley Bowman and Mark Montgomery, “, July 9, 2021; Bradley Bowman and Mark Montgomery, “ Fully Fund the GuamFully Fund the Guam Defense System,” Defense System,”
War on the Rocks, July, July 29, 2021. 29, 2021.
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Finally, there is further utility of these ships given recent offers by the government of Palau Finally, there is further utility of these ships given recent offers by the government of Palau
to host U.S. forces, and increased U.S. attention on the Commonwealth of the Northern to host U.S. forces, and increased U.S. attention on the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, specifically Saipan and Tinian, for a diversion airfield supporting forward Mariana Islands, specifically Saipan and Tinian, for a diversion airfield supporting forward
operations. As in Guam, mooring these cruisers at Palau and Saipan can set the foundation operations. As in Guam, mooring these cruisers at Palau and Saipan can set the foundation
for a regional defense network that can mature over time, as more capable systems come for a regional defense network that can mature over time, as more capable systems come
online.... online....
While neither C-RAM nor repurposing of aged BMD-capable cruisers represents a long- While neither C-RAM nor repurposing of aged BMD-capable cruisers represents a long-
term solution to the defense of Guam, together with THAAD, they do significantly improve term solution to the defense of Guam, together with THAAD, they do significantly improve
it. In the near term, these cruisers could provide added firepower, sensor coverage, and a it. In the near term, these cruisers could provide added firepower, sensor coverage, and a
platform for integratedplatform for integrated ~~air and missile defense command and control until~~ air and missile defense command and control until follow-on follow-on
dedicateddedicated ~~systems~~ systems arrive. Doing this alsoarrive. Doing this also frees up three frontfrees up three front -line-line AEGIS-equipped AEGIS-equipped
destroyers for a range of other pressing missions.58 destroyers for a range of other pressing missions.58
Conversion of Hawaii Aegis Test Site
Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in ~~Hawai~~ Hawaii into an into an
operational land-based Aegis BMD site. DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report operational land-based Aegis BMD site. DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report
states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that
Another Another ~~repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently,~~ repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the the
Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of
Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities. DoD will study this possibility to further Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities. DoD will study this possibility to further
evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii. The United States evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii. The United States
willwill augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean
missile threat. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an missile threat. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an
Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize
the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary’s decision to do so, the the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary’s decision to do so, the
steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements. This plan steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements. This plan
willwill be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E,be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of and USDP within six months of the release of
the MDR.59 the MDR.59
A January 25, 2019, press report states the following: A January 25, 2019, press report states the following:
The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the
MissileMissile ~~Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii’s Aegis Ashore~~ Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii’s Aegis Ashore Missile Missile
Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency’s director. Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency’s director.
“Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews“Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews —that man that site—as —that man that site—as
well aswell as ~~funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production~~ funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production and and
sustainment,” Lt. Gen. Samsustainment,” Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding
would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the
recommendation.60 recommendation.60
Potential Contribution from Lasers
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in
coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might ~~eventual y~~eventually have have
on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles. Another CRS report discusses the on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles. Another CRS report discusses the

58 Brent D. Sadler,58 Brent D. Sadler, Repurposing Navy Cruisers Planned for Decommissioning: An Interim Capability for Countering
Chinese Missile Attacks on Guam , Heritage Foundation, August, Heritage Foundation, August 23, 2021, pp. 423, 2021, pp. 4 -5. -5.
59 Department of Defense, 59 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review 2019, released January 17, 2019, pp. 55-56. , released January 17, 2019, pp. 55-56.
60 Mallory Shelbourne,60 Mallory Shelbourne, “DOD to Determine Funding Breakdown“DOD to Determine Funding Breakdown for Aegisfor Aegis Ashore Repurposing,”Ashore Repurposing,” Inside the Navy, ,
January 25, 2019. January 25, 2019.
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potential value of ship-based lasers for performing various missions, including, potential value of ship-based lasers for performing various missions, including, ~~potential y~~potentially, ,
terminal-phase BMD operations.61 terminal-phase BMD operations.61
Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in
the Aegis BMD program. the Aegis BMD program.
July 2020 GAO Report
A July 2020 GAO report on the testing of U.S. BMD systems, including the Aegis BMD system, A July 2020 GAO report on the testing of U.S. BMD systems, including the Aegis BMD system,
stated the following: stated the following:
Aegis Aegis ~~BMD demonstrated various capabilities in fiscal year 2019 tests and~~ BMD demonstrated various capabilities in fiscal year 2019 tests and achieved achieved
independent accreditation for all its models used in operational ground tests. The Missile independent accreditation for all its models used in operational ground tests. The Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) conducted five Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) intercept Defense Agency (MDA) conducted five Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) intercept
flight tests in fiscal year 2019, successfully intercepting two ballistic missile targets and flight tests in fiscal year 2019, successfully intercepting two ballistic missile targets and
three cruise missiles. Additionally, MDA also conducted Aegis BMD nonthree cruise missiles. Additionally, MDA also conducted Aegis BMD non -intercept flight -intercept flight
teststests with live or simulated interceptors and targets, as well as five model-based ground with live or simulated interceptors and targets, as well as five model-based ground
tests that provided data on Aegis BMD interoperability and weapon system functionality tests that provided data on Aegis BMD interoperability and weapon system functionality
in various regional and Homeland Defense scenarios…. in various regional and Homeland Defense scenarios….
Aegis BMD testing also had some limitations. For instance, while most testing limitations Aegis BMD testing also had some limitations. For instance, while most testing limitations
are classified, DOT&E noted in its fiscal year 2019 assessment of Aegis BMD that MDA are classified, DOT&E noted in its fiscal year 2019 assessment of Aegis BMD that MDA
ground tests have routinely shown the need for improved inter-element coordination and ground tests have routinely shown the need for improved inter-element coordination and
interoperability to enhance engagement efficiency. Moreover, for the second year in a row, interoperability to enhance engagement efficiency. Moreover, for the second year in a row,
DOT&E noted that flight testing and models and simulations did not address all expected DOT&E noted that flight testing and models and simulations did not address all expected
threat types, ground ranges, and raid sizes for Aegis BMD. For instance, while Aegis BMD threat types, ground ranges, and raid sizes for Aegis BMD. For instance, while Aegis BMD
M&S tools were accredited for many scenarios, there were limitations for raid engagements M&S tools were accredited for many scenarios, there were limitations for raid engagements
due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of post-intercept due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of post-intercept
debris modeling. As we reported in June 2019, MDA planned to assess Aegis BMD 5.1 debris modeling. As we reported in June 2019, MDA planned to assess Aegis BMD 5.1
raid performance for the first time in December 2018, but the test was de-scoped to a single raid performance for the first time in December 2018, but the test was de-scoped to a single
interceptintercept ~~due, in part, to a test range safety asset malfunction. While MDA planned~~ due, in part, to a test range safety asset malfunction. While MDA planned to to
conduct a raid the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020, according to technical comments we conduct a raid the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020, according to technical comments we
received from MDA at the end of our audit, that plan has been canceled. In the received from MDA at the end of our audit, that plan has been canceled. In the ~~meant ime~~meantime, ,
the warfighter will have reduced information about how Aegis BMD 5.1 performs in these the warfighter will have reduced information about how Aegis BMD 5.1 performs in these
real-world-like scenarios. real-world-like scenarios.
MDA MDA ~~stayed on track to deliver the next generation of Aegis~~ stayed on track to deliver the next generation of Aegis BMD capabilities.BMD capabilities. For For
instance, MDA plans to deliver BMD 6.0 in the 2023 time frame to provide capabilities instance, MDA plans to deliver BMD 6.0 in the 2023 time frame to provide capabilities
against larger raids, better discrimination, and improved communication with its against larger raids, better discrimination, and improved communication with its
interceptors. Additionally, BMD 6.0 takes advantage of the Navy’s effort to replace the interceptors. Additionally, BMD 6.0 takes advantage of the Navy’s effort to replace the
AegisAegis AN/SPY-1 radarAN/SPY-1 radar ~~with a~~ with a more capable AN/SPY-6 (V)1more capable AN/SPY-6 (V)1 and to overhaul the entire and to overhaul the entire
Aegis combat system. As we reported in June 2019, MDA and the Navy re-planned AWS Aegis combat system. As we reported in June 2019, MDA and the Navy re-planned AWS
Baseline 10.0, after a funding reduction of $31.45 millionBaseline 10.0, after a funding reduction of $31.45 million against BMD 6.05. While the against BMD 6.05. While the
reductionreduction ~~resulted in delays to completion of some technical content, its delivery~~ resulted in delays to completion of some technical content, its delivery time time
frame did not change. In fiscal year 2019, the program remained on schedule, completing frame did not change. In fiscal year 2019, the program remained on schedule, completing
a planned review and participated in a Navy-funded developmental test of AN/SPY-6(V)1 a planned review and participated in a Navy-funded developmental test of AN/SPY-6(V)1
and FTX-34, demonstrating ballistic missile tracking capabilities. MDA efforts to deliver and FTX-34, demonstrating ballistic missile tracking capabilities. MDA efforts to deliver
integratedintegrated ~~AWS Baseline 5.4 were also on track in fiscal year 2019 after the~~ AWS Baseline 5.4 were also on track in fiscal year 2019 after the program program
readjusted its schedule in fiscal year 2018…. readjusted its schedule in fiscal year 2018….

~~61 See CRS~~ 61 See CRS Report R44175, Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald, by Ronald O'Rourke. O'Rourke.
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According to MDA, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB program considers the schedule for According to MDA, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB program considers the schedule for
awarding a multi-year procurement contract, and enduring subcontractor quality issues, to awarding a multi-year procurement contract, and enduring subcontractor quality issues, to
be the two main risks facing the program. MDA officials stated that they expected to award be the two main risks facing the program. MDA officials stated that they expected to award
the multi-year procurement contract in the first quarter, fiscal year 2020. MDA hadthe multi-year procurement contract in the first quarter, fiscal year 2020. MDA had also also
stated that a delay in the award could cause production delays both to the United States and stated that a delay in the award could cause production delays both to the United States and
to foreign military sales. MDA’s current plans call for the multi-year procurement award to foreign military sales. MDA’s current plans call for the multi-year procurement award
in the second quarter, fiscal year 2020. in the second quarter, fiscal year 2020.
In addition, as we reported in 2019, MDA officials have noted that the Aegis BMD SM-3 In addition, as we reported in 2019, MDA officials have noted that the Aegis BMD SM-3
Block IB’s prime contractor has had difficulty ensuring that all subcontracted components Block IB’s prime contractor has had difficulty ensuring that all subcontracted components
meetmeet ~~defined~~ defined specifications.specifications. Similar issuesSimilar issues ~~occurred in fiscal year 2019, each of~~ occurred in fiscal year 2019, each of which which
required resolution on a case-by-case basis. For example, MDA officials reported that an required resolution on a case-by-case basis. For example, MDA officials reported that an
important actuator was found to have contaminated lubricant, requiring the source of the important actuator was found to have contaminated lubricant, requiring the source of the
contaminationcontamination to be trackedto be tracked to a specific facility within the supplyto a specific facility within the supply chain and the chain and the
procurement of new hardware. In addition, a divert valve was experiencing an increased procurement of new hardware. In addition, a divert valve was experiencing an increased
reject rate, slowing down deliveries of the Third Stage Rocket Motor. The program and the reject rate, slowing down deliveries of the Third Stage Rocket Motor. The program and the
contractor developed and implemented three corrective actions to address this issue and contractor developed and implemented three corrective actions to address this issue and
accelerate deliveries. Even so, problems such as these canaccelerate deliveries. Even so, problems such as these can result inresult in months-long delays, months-long delays,
andand ~~MDA reported that the introduction of improved quality controls drove up costs~~ MDA reported that the introduction of improved quality controls drove up costs in in
fiscal year 2019…. fiscal year 2019….
Following the failure of FTM-29 in January 2018, MDA re-organized the SM-3 Block IIA Following the failure of FTM-29 in January 2018, MDA re-organized the SM-3 Block IIA
schedule to allow it to identify the cause of the failure, implement changes, and then test schedule to allow it to identify the cause of the failure, implement changes, and then test
these changes to validate their efficacy. As we reported in May 2019, as a result of the test these changes to validate their efficacy. As we reported in May 2019, as a result of the test
failure, MDA and the government of Japan convened a failure review board to investigate failure, MDA and the government of Japan convened a failure review board to investigate
the causes of the test failure. The board’s conclusions identified the source of the failure. the causes of the test failure. The board’s conclusions identified the source of the failure.
To test the fixes identified through the FTM-29 failure review board, MDA added a new To test the fixes identified through the FTM-29 failure review board, MDA added a new
flight testflight test to its schedule,to its schedule, FTM-45. DespiteFTM-45. Despite criticism from Departmentcriticism from Department of Defense of Defense
stakeholders that FTM-45 would not be taxing enough to make up for the failure of FTMstakeholders that FTM-45 would not be taxing enough to make up for the failure of FTM -
~~29, MDA successfully conducted the test, and thus validated the corrective actions,~~ -29, MDA successfully conducted the test, and thus validated the corrective actions, in in
October 2018. October 2018.
Two months later, in December 2018, MDA conducted FTI-03, the first successful SM-3 Two months later, in December 2018, MDA conducted FTI-03, the first successful SM-3
Block IIA interceptBlock IIA intercept ~~of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and the~~ of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and the first first
successful SM-3 Block IIA intercept to use remote sensor data to guide the engagement, successful SM-3 Block IIA intercept to use remote sensor data to guide the engagement,
known as Engage on Remote. However, as mentioned previously, the test’s initial plan was known as Engage on Remote. However, as mentioned previously, the test’s initial plan was
an intercept of two targets, but it was scaled down due to range safety issues. an intercept of two targets, but it was scaled down due to range safety issues.
MDA achieved its objective in FTI-03 by intercepting the target, but a more detailed review MDA achieved its objective in FTI-03 by intercepting the target, but a more detailed review
of the system’s performance revealed at least one issue. During the interceptor’s flight, the of the system’s performance revealed at least one issue. During the interceptor’s flight, the
attitude control system in the third stage rocket motor experienced a fault whereby a valve attitude control system in the third stage rocket motor experienced a fault whereby a valve
failed to respond to electronic instructions. A failure review board isolated the fault to a failed to respond to electronic instructions. A failure review board isolated the fault to a
specific component failing to provide adequate electric current. Seeking to avoid specific component failing to provide adequate electric current. Seeking to avoid
unnecessaryunnecessary work, the prime contractor temporarily suspended its operations in order to work, the prime contractor temporarily suspended its operations in order to
identify the root cause and then develop and implement corrective actions. This suspension identify the root cause and then develop and implement corrective actions. This suspension
has affected delivery scheduleshas affected delivery schedules for both third stage rocketfor both third stage rocket motors and completed motors and completed
interceptors. interceptors.
MDA MDA ~~originally planned for an initial production decision in December 2018, but two~~
~~issues delayed this decision. First, owing to the fact that the canceled Redesigned~~ originally planned for an initial production decision in December 2018, but two issues delayed this decision. First, owing to the fact that the canceled Redesigned Kill Kill
Vehicle re-used parts from the SM-3 Block IIA program, the Undersecretary of Defense Vehicle re-used parts from the SM-3 Block IIA program, the Undersecretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering requested a study to determine if the SMfor Research and Engineering requested a study to determine if the SM -3 Block IIA could -3 Block IIA could
be affected by the issues which resulted in the RKV’s cancellation. Second, DOD officials be affected by the issues which resulted in the RKV’s cancellation. Second, DOD officials
recommendedrecommended ~~against any initial production decision until the issue observed in~~ against any initial production decision until the issue observed in FTI-03 FTI-03
was resolved. was resolved.
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MDA MDA ~~documents indicated that its officials believed an initial production decision~~ documents indicated that its officials believed an initial production decision was was
possible before the end of fiscal year 2019. The SM-3 Block IIA received a positive initial possible before the end of fiscal year 2019. The SM-3 Block IIA received a positive initial
production decision in October 2019.62 production decision in October 2019.62
January 2021 DOT&E Report
A January 2021 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—A January 2021 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—
DOT&E’s annual report for FY2020—stated the following in its section on the Aegis BMD DOT&E’s annual report for FY2020—stated the following in its section on the Aegis BMD
program: program:
Assessment
• • Aegis BMD continues to demonstrate a capability to intercept non-separating, simple-Aegis BMD continues to demonstrate a capability to intercept non-separating, simple-
separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight with separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight with
SM-3 missiles. Aegis BMD has also demonstrated a capability to intercept select ballistic SM-3 missiles. Aegis BMD has also demonstrated a capability to intercept select ballistic
missilesmissiles ~~in the terminal phase of flight with SM-6 missiles. However, flight testing and~~
~~M&S [modeling and simulation] have not addressed all expected threat types,~~ in the terminal phase of flight with SM-6 missiles. However, flight testing and M&S [modeling and simulation] have not addressed all expected threat types, ground ground
ranges, and raid sizes. The MDA has used M&S to explore Aegis BMD raid engagement ranges, and raid sizes. The MDA has used M&S to explore Aegis BMD raid engagement
performance, but DOT&E has less confidence in these results because COMOPTEVFOR performance, but DOT&E has less confidence in these results because COMOPTEVFOR
[the Navy Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force] has been unable to accredit [the Navy Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force] has been unable to accredit
the models due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of the models due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of
post-intercept debris modeling. post-intercept debris modeling.
• During Pacific Dragon—2020• During Pacific Dragon—2020 [a Navy[a Navy fleet exercise in Augustfleet exercise in August 2020], the MDA 2020], the MDA
demonstrated Aegis BMDdemonstrated Aegis BMD ~~interoperability with Republic of Korea naval assets~~ interoperability with Republic of Korea naval assets while while
conducting simulated ballistic missile engagements. The AAMDTC [Aegis Ashore Missile conducting simulated ballistic missile engagements. The AAMDTC [Aegis Ashore Missile
Defense Test Complex] demonstrated Aegis interoperability with Australian naval assets Defense Test Complex] demonstrated Aegis interoperability with Australian naval assets
while tracking ballistic missile targets. while tracking ballistic missile targets.
• DOT&E will• DOT&E will provide an assessment of the FTM-44 [flight] test results and of the SBT provide an assessment of the FTM-44 [flight] test results and of the SBT
[sea-based terminal] Increment 2 capability (based on the results of FTM-31 E1 and FTM-[sea-based terminal] Increment 2 capability (based on the results of FTM-31 E1 and FTM-
33) [flight tests] in separate reports. 33) [flight tests] in separate reports.
• MDA ground tests have routinely shown that inter-element coordination and • MDA ground tests have routinely shown that inter-element coordination and
interoperabilityinteroperability ~~need improvement to improve engagement efficiency; however, flight~~
~~testing with multi-element engagement coordination has been limited. Aegis BMD~~ need improvement to improve engagement efficiency; however, flight testing with multi-element engagement coordination has been limited. Aegis BMD has has
exercised rudimentary engagement coordination with Terminal Highexercised rudimentary engagement coordination with Terminal High -Altitude Area -Altitude Area
Defense [THAAD] [BMD] firing units, but not with [the] Patriot [BMD system]. The MDA Defense [THAAD] [BMD] firing units, but not with [the] Patriot [BMD system]. The MDA
plansplans ~~to exercise engagement coordination between those three theater elements~~ to exercise engagement coordination between those three theater elements during during
Flight Test Operational (FTO)-05, but that flight test has been repeatedly delayed and is Flight Test Operational (FTO)-05, but that flight test has been repeatedly delayed and is
currently planned for FY28. currently planned for FY28.
• • DOT&E and USD(R&E)DOT&E and USD(R&E) [Under Secretary of Defense[Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering] for Research and Engineering]
have prompted the MDA to establish a ground testing approach to support assessments of have prompted the MDA to establish a ground testing approach to support assessments of
missile reliability. DOT&E cannot assess SM-3 missile reliability with confidence until the missile reliability. DOT&E cannot assess SM-3 missile reliability with confidence until the
MDA is able to provide additional ground test data that simulate the inMDA is able to provide additional ground test data that simulate the in -flight environment. -flight environment.
• The MDA delivered results from a subset of the high-fidelity M&S operational test runs • The MDA delivered results from a subset of the high-fidelity M&S operational test runs
for record for the SM-3 IIA missile. The MDA found a problem in one of the models used for record for the SM-3 IIA missile. The MDA found a problem in one of the models used
to conduct the M&S runs. The MDA has identified a fix action and the test runs will be re-to conduct the M&S runs. The MDA has identified a fix action and the test runs will be re-
run and delivered in FY21. The data from these re-executed runs will support the DOT&E run and delivered in FY21. The data from these re-executed runs will support the DOT&E
assessment of the operational effectiveness of the SM-3 Block IIA missile in FY21. assessment of the operational effectiveness of the SM-3 Block IIA missile in FY21.
• COVID-19• COVID-19 impacts have delayed delivery of high-fidelity M&S operational test runs for impacts have delayed delivery of high-fidelity M&S operational test runs for
record to support an assessment of SBT Increment 2 operational effectiveness. Verification record to support an assessment of SBT Increment 2 operational effectiveness. Verification

62 Government Accountability Office, 62 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Assessment of Testing Approach Needed as Delays and
Changes Persist,, GAO-20-432, July 2020, pp. 44, 45-46, 48-49, 51-52. GAO-20-432, July 2020, pp. 44, 45-46, 48-49, 51-52.
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and validation data from flight testing will not be available until FY21 to support model and validation data from flight testing will not be available until FY21 to support model
accreditation. M&S operational test runs for record will not be available until FY22. accreditation. M&S operational test runs for record will not be available until FY22.
• The developmental ~~• The developmental~~ AN/SPY-6(V)1 radarAN/SPY-6(V)1 radar ~~continues to track ballistic missiles~~ continues to track ballistic missiles during during
MDA flight tests. The radar detected and tracked the HGV [hypersonic glide vehicle] target MDA flight tests. The radar detected and tracked the HGV [hypersonic glide vehicle] target
in FEX-01. in FEX-01.
Recommendations
The MDA should: The MDA should:
1. Prioritize resources 1. Prioritize resources ~~for FTO-05 to ensure this critical flight test~~ for FTO-05 to ensure this critical flight test occurs as soonoccurs as soon as as
possible. possible.
2. Conduct Aegis BMD midcourse and terminal phase flight testing with live fire intercepts 2. Conduct Aegis BMD midcourse and terminal phase flight testing with live fire intercepts
of raids of two or more ballistic missile targets to aid in the validation of M&S tools. of raids of two or more ballistic missile targets to aid in the validation of M&S tools.
3. Improve Aegis 3. Improve Aegis ~~BMD~~ BMD high-fidelityhigh-fidelity M&S toolsM&S tools ~~to incorporate~~ to incorporate post-interceptpost-intercept debris debris
modeling to better assess engagement performance in raid scenarios. modeling to better assess engagement performance in raid scenarios.
4. Provide data from high-fidelity ground tests to DOT&E to inform SM-3 Block IB Threat 4. Provide data from high-fidelity ground tests to DOT&E to inform SM-3 Block IB Threat
Upgrade and Block IIA missile reliability estimates. Upgrade and Block IIA missile reliability estimates.
5. Work with DOT&E and USD(R&E) to establish a ground testing approach to support 5. Work with DOT&E and USD(R&E) to establish a ground testing approach to support
assessments of missile reliability.63 assessments of missile reliability.63
Regarding the SM-6 missile, the January 2021 DOT&E report also stated the following: Regarding the SM-6 missile, the January 2021 DOT&E report also stated the following:
Assessment
• As reported in the FY18 DOT&E SM-6 BLK I FOT&E [Follow-on Operational Test and • As reported in the FY18 DOT&E SM-6 BLK I FOT&E [Follow-on Operational Test and
Evaluation]Evaluation] ~~Report, the SM-6 remains effective and suitable with the exception of~~ Report, the SM-6 remains effective and suitable with the exception of the the
classified deficiency identified in the FY13 IOT&E [Initial Operational Test and classified deficiency identified in the FY13 IOT&E [Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation]Evaluation] ~~Report and two additional problems~~ Report and two additional problems discovered during FY17 SMdiscovered during FY17 SM -6 BLK -6 BLK
[block] I testing to verify corrected deficiencies. The SM-6 BLK IA FOT&E analysis is [block] I testing to verify corrected deficiencies. The SM-6 BLK IA FOT&E analysis is
consistent with prior reporting. consistent with prior reporting.
• While• While post-flightpost-flight ~~test data appears~~ test data appears promising,promising, DOT&EDOT&E will assesswill assess ~~the results of~~ the results of the the
developmental/engineering flight test to examine corrective actions to a classified developmental/engineering flight test to examine corrective actions to a classified
performance deficiency discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLKperformance deficiency discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLK verification of correction of verification of correction of
deficiency tests. This assessment will occur in FY21. deficiency tests. This assessment will occur in FY21.
Recommendations
The Navy should: The Navy should:
1. Fully 1. Fully ~~assess the corrective actions implemented to address the additional~~ assess the corrective actions implemented to address the additional problems problems
encounteredencountered ~~during~~ during FY17 SM-6 BLK I verificationFY17 SM-6 BLK I verification of corrected deficiencyof corrected deficiency tests by tests by
conducting a verification of deficiency operational flight test. conducting a verification of deficiency operational flight test.
2. Plan and conduct 2. Plan and conduct lethality assessmentslethality assessments for the SMfor the SM -6 FCD [Future Capabilities -6 FCD [Future Capabilities
Demonstration] capabilities.64 Demonstration] capabilities.64
Legislative Activity for FY2022
Summary of Action on FY2022 MDA Funding Request
Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the FY2022 request for MDA procurement and summarizes congressional action on the FY2022 request for MDA procurement and
research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program. research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program.

63 Department of Defense, Director, Operational 63 Department of Defense, Director, Operational ~~T est~~Test & Evaluation, & Evaluation, FY 2020 Annual Report, January 2021, p. 218. , January 2021, p. 218.
64 Department of Defense, Director, Operational 64 Department of Defense, Director, Operational ~~T est~~Test & Evaluation, & Evaluation, FY2020 Annual Report, January 2021, p. 168. , January 2021, p. 168.
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Table 2. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2022 MDA Funding Request
(In (In ~~mil ions of dol ars~~millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding) , rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
Authorization
Appropriation
HASC-
Request
HASC
SASC
~~Conf.~~SASC
HAC
SAC
Conf.
Procurement
Aegis Aegis BMD (line 31) BMD (line 31)
334.6 334.6
334.6 334.6
334.6 334.6

334.6 334.6 334.6
334.6 334.6

(SM-3 Block IB missile quantity)
(40)
(40)
(40)
(40)
(34)
(34)

Aegis Aegis BMD Advance ProcurementBMD Advance Procurement (line 32) (line 32)
17.5 17.5
17.5 17.5
17.5 17.5

17.5 17.5 17.5
17.5 17.5

SM-3 Block SM-3 Block IIA (line 34) IIA (line 34)
295.3 295.3
336.8 336.8
336.3 336.3

336.8 295.3 295.3
488.0 488.0

(SM-3 Block IIA missile quantity)
(8)
(10)
(10)
(10)
(6)
(16)

Aegis Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 38) Ashore Phase III (line 38)
25.9 25.9
25.9 25.9
25.9 25.9

25.9 25.9 25.9
25.9 25.9

Aegis Aegis BMD hardware and software (line 40) BMD hardware and software (line 40)
81.8 81.8
81.8 81.8
81.8 81.8

81.8 81.8 81.8
81.8 81.8

Subtotal Procurement
755.1
796.6
796.1
796.6
755.1
947.8

Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
Aegis Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 86) BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 86)
732.5 732.5
780.9 780.9
780.9 780.9

694.4 633.5 633.5
646.0 646.0

Aegis Aegis BMD test (PE 0604878C) (line 118) BMD test (PE 0604878C) (line 118)
117.1 117.1
117.1 117.1
117.1 117.1

111.3 111.3 111.3
110.7 110.7

Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 120) Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 120)
43.2 43.2
43.2 43.2
43.2 43.2

43.2 43.2 43.2
43.2 43.2

Subtotal RDT&E
892.8
941.2
941.2
848.9
788.0
799.9

TOTAL
1,647.9
1,737.8
1,737.3
1,645.5
1,543.1
1,747.7

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on DOD’sTable prepared by CRS based on DOD’s original FY2022 budget submission,original FY2022 budget submission, ~~committee~~ committee and and
conference reports,conference reports, and explanatory statements on FY2022 National Defenseand explanatory statements on FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2022 Authorization Act and FY2022
DOD AppropriationsDOD Appropriations Act. Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed is House Armed ~~Services~~ Services Committee; Committee; SASC is Senate Armed is Senate Armed ~~Services~~ Services Committee;Committee; HAC is is
House Appropriations Committee;House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; is Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC-SASC is HASC-SASC-negotiated proposal; Conf. is conference agreement. is conference agreement.
FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4350/S. 2792/S. 1605)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-118 of September 10, 2021) on The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-118 of September 10, 2021) on
H.R. 4350, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column H.R. 4350, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column ofof Table 2. The The
recommended increase of $41.5 recommended increase of $41.5 ~~mil ion~~million for line 34 is for “Procure 2 additional for line 34 is for “Procure 2 additional al all-up rounds.” -up rounds.”
(Pages 396-397) The recommended increase of $48.4 (Pages 396-397) The recommended increase of $48.4 ~~mil ion~~million for line 86 is for “Navy SPY Radar for line 86 is for “Navy SPY Radar
DigitalDigital Upgrade.” (Page 443) Upgrade.” (Page 443)
H.Rept. 117-118 states: H.Rept. 117-118 states:
Aegis radar
The The ~~committee recognizes that the rapid deployment of next-generation maritime radar~~
~~systems is required to address existing and emerging gaps in integrated air and~~ committee recognizes that the rapid deployment of next-generation maritime radar systems is required to address existing and emerging gaps in integrated air and missile missile
defenses, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the committee is concerned by defenses, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the committee is concerned by
thethe ~~apparent lack of alignment and congruent planning between three concurrent~~ apparent lack of alignment and congruent planning between three concurrent Aegis Aegis
Baseline radars funded at various stages of development or production across the Navy and Baseline radars funded at various stages of development or production across the Navy and
Congressional Research Service 31 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program Missile Defense Agency. Specifically, the Navy budget includes funding for the backfit of Missile Defense Agency. Specifically, the Navy budget includes funding for the backfit of
AN/SPY–6(V), which began low-rate production in 2016 and will enter full-rate AN/SPY–6(V), which began low-rate production in 2016 and will enter full-rate
production upon the award of a hardware production and sustainment contract anticipated production upon the award of a hardware production and sustainment contract anticipated
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by the end of fiscal year 2021. The Navy budget also includes funding for the development by the end of fiscal year 2021. The Navy budget also includes funding for the development
of a digital low noise amplifier modification to the existing AN/SPY–1 radar. At the same of a digital low noise amplifier modification to the existing AN/SPY–1 radar. At the same
time, the Missile Defense Agency budget includes funding for the development of a variant time, the Missile Defense Agency budget includes funding for the development of a variant
of the Long Range Discrimination Radar for use in Aegis Ashore applications. of the Long Range Discrimination Radar for use in Aegis Ashore applications.
The committee believes there are opportunities to better leverage common, mature radar The committee believes there are opportunities to better leverage common, mature radar
technologytechnology in modernizing all Aegisin modernizing all Aegis -based-based platforms,platforms, ~~including through U.S. Navy~~
~~weapon systems applications aboard existing surface ships, Homeland Defense Guam,~~
~~and/or defense of the continental United States from cruise missiles or air and~~ including through U.S. Navy weapon systems applications aboard existing surface ships, Homeland Defense Guam, and/or defense of the continental United States from cruise missiles or air and missile missile
defense threats. Leveraging such commonality across platforms would serve as a means to defense threats. Leveraging such commonality across platforms would serve as a means to
achieveachieve ~~critical distributed maritime operations objectives by expanding the number of~~
~~deployed netted sensors~~ critical distributed maritime operations objectives by expanding the number of deployed netted sensors while also proliferating the number of sensorswhile also proliferating the number of sensors capable of capable of
simultaneously defending against advanced air and missile defense threats. Moreover, the simultaneously defending against advanced air and missile defense threats. Moreover, the
committee believes that better aligning Aegis Baseline radar investments would also serve committee believes that better aligning Aegis Baseline radar investments would also serve
to reduce risk and lower acquisition, lifecycle, and sustainment costs. to reduce risk and lower acquisition, lifecycle, and sustainment costs.
Therefore, the committee directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Therefore, the committee directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
to conduct a review of the three Aegis Baseline radars included in the budget request for to conduct a review of the three Aegis Baseline radars included in the budget request for
fiscal year 2022 and to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later fiscal year 2022 and to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later
than December 1, 2021,than December 1, 2021, outlining the results of this review and making recommendations outlining the results of this review and making recommendations
for achievingfor achieving ~~greater~~ greater affordability,affordability, commonality,commonality, ~~and sustainability through~~ and sustainability through improved improved
alignment of radar modernization investments. (Page 16) alignment of radar modernization investments. (Page 16)
H.Rept. 117-118 also states: H.Rept. 117-118 also states:
Layered Defense for the Homeland Layered Defense for the Homeland
The committee notes advances in long-range missile capabilities by rogue states, The committee notes advances in long-range missile capabilities by rogue states,
particularly by making significant developments towards more sophisticated missile and particularly by making significant developments towards more sophisticated missile and
rocket technologies,rocket technologies, from use of solid fuels to developingfrom use of solid fuels to developing new submarinenew submarine -launched -launched
ballisticballistic ~~missiles. The committee continues to encourage the Department of Defense~~ missiles. The committee continues to encourage the Department of Defense to to
analyze and assess these variable threats posed by these missile and rocket capabilities, as analyze and assess these variable threats posed by these missile and rocket capabilities, as
well aswell as ~~provide an analysis of gaps in homeland missile defense, with focus on missile~~
~~defense gaps along the east coast of the United States. As such, the committee~~ provide an analysis of gaps in homeland missile defense, with focus on missile defense gaps along the east coast of the United States. As such, the committee looks looks
forward to receiving from the Department a report on layered homeland missile defense forward to receiving from the Department a report on layered homeland missile defense
systemsystem ~~as directed by~~ as directed by section 1648section 1648 of H.R. 6395, theof H.R. 6395, the William M. (Mac)William M. (Mac) Thornberry Thornberry
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, as passed by the House. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, as passed by the House.
Further, the committee notes the successful test of the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) and Further, the committee notes the successful test of the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) and
StandardStandard Missile-3Missile-3 (SM-3)(SM-3) ~~Block IIA against an intercontinental-range ballistic~~ Block IIA against an intercontinental-range ballistic missile missile
(ICBM) in November(ICBM) in November ~~2020, and funding requested by the Missile Defense Agency~~ 2020, and funding requested by the Missile Defense Agency to to
continue development of a layered defense architecture. Therefore, the committee directs continue development of a layered defense architecture. Therefore, the committee directs
the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with the Under Secretary of the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with the Under Secretary of
DefenseDefense for Policy, Chief of Naval Operations,for Policy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commander of U.S. Northern and Commander of U.S. Northern
Command, to submit a report to the House Committee on Command, to submit a report to the House Committee on ~~A rmed~~Armed Services by December Services by December
31, 2021, on development and deployment plans for using the AWS with SM31, 2021, on development and deployment plans for using the AWS with SM –3 Block IIA –3 Block IIA
interceptors as part of a layered missile defense system. The report shall include: interceptors as part of a layered missile defense system. The report shall include:
(1) requirements for deploying a layered defense using the AWS and SM–3 Block IIA for (1) requirements for deploying a layered defense using the AWS and SM–3 Block IIA for
defense of the continental United States (CONUS); defense of the continental United States (CONUS);
(2) analysis of future AWS and SM–3 Block IIA locations that would support improved (2) analysis of future AWS and SM–3 Block IIA locations that would support improved
defensive coverage of CONUS, and how the preferred location of Fort Drum, NY,defensive coverage of CONUS, and how the preferred location of Fort Drum, NY, for a for a
CONUS interceptor site using Ground-Based Interceptors could be leveraged for a future CONUS interceptor site using Ground-Based Interceptors could be leveraged for a future
layered defense system; layered defense system;
Congressional Research Service 32 link to page 35 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program (3) analysis of how deploying Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers ~~(3) analysis of how deploying Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers~~ for the for the
homeland missile defensehomeland missile defense mission would impact Navy readinessmission would impact Navy readiness and global force and global force
management; management;
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~~(4) should land-based AWS systems be deployed for layered homeland defense,~~ (4) should land-based AWS systems be deployed for layered homeland defense, the the
applicable manning strategy; and applicable manning strategy; and
(5) any applicable lessons learned from analysis conducted for the Guam Defense System (5) any applicable lessons learned from analysis conducted for the Guam Defense System
that could be applied to a layered homeland defense architecture, particularly for locations that could be applied to a layered homeland defense architecture, particularly for locations
previously evaluated and preferred for a CONUS interceptor site. (Page 281) previously evaluated and preferred for a CONUS interceptor site. (Page 281)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report S.Rept. 117-39 of September 22 [legislative The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report S.Rept. 117-39 of September 22 [legislative
day, September 21], 2021) on S. 2792, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC day, September 21], 2021) on S. 2792, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC
column column ofof Table 2. The recommended increase of $41.0 The recommended increase of $41.0 ~~mil ion~~million for line 34 is for “MDA UFR for line 34 is for “MDA UFR
[unfunded requirement]—Additional AURs [[unfunded requirement]—Additional AURs [al all-up rounds]”—that is, additional missiles. (Page -up rounds]”—that is, additional missiles. (Page
425) The recommended increase of $48.4 425) The recommended increase of $48.4 ~~mil ion~~million for line 86 is for “MDA UFR—Radar for line 86 is for “MDA UFR—Radar
upgrades.” (Page 467) upgrades.” (Page 467)
Section 132 of S. 2792 as reported by the committee states: of S. 2792 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 132. ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN RADAR INVESTMENT OPTIONS. SEC. 132. ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN RADAR INVESTMENT OPTIONS.
(a) ANALYSIS.— (a) ANALYSIS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director (1) IN GENERAL.—The Director ~~of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation shal~~
of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation shall conduct an analysis of covered radar systems operating with the Aegis combat system in conduct an analysis of covered radar systems operating with the Aegis combat system in
the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency in the future-years defense program. the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency in the future-years defense program.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The analysis conducted under paragraph (1) shall include the (2) ELEMENTS.—The analysis conducted under paragraph (1) shall include the
following: following:
(A) An independent cost estimate of each covered radar systems described in paragraph (A) An independent cost estimate of each covered radar systems described in paragraph
(1) and each variant thereof. (1) and each variant thereof.
(B) An assessment of the capability provided by each such system and variant to address (B) An assessment of the capability provided by each such system and variant to address
current and future air and missile defense threats. current and future air and missile defense threats.
(C) (C) In the case of covered radar systems operating with the Aegis combat system in the In the case of covered radar systems operating with the Aegis combat system in the
Navy, an assessment of the capability and technical suitability of each planned Navy, an assessment of the capability and technical suitability of each planned
configuration for such systems to support current and future distributed maritimeconfiguration for such systems to support current and future distributed maritime
operations in contested environments. operations in contested environments.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than (b) REPORT.—Not later than ~~March~~ March 1, 2022, the1, 2022, the Director of CostDirector of Cost ~~Assessment~~ Assessment and and
Program Evaluation shall submit to the congressional defense committees the following: Program Evaluation shall submit to the congressional defense committees the following:
(1) A report on the results of the analysis conducted under subsection (a)(1). (1) A report on the results of the analysis conducted under subsection (a)(1).
(2) Such recommendations (2) Such recommendations as the Director may have to achieveas the Director may have to achieve greater capability, greater capability,
affordability,affordability, ~~and sustainability across covered radar systems described in~~ and sustainability across covered radar systems described in subsection subsection
(a)(1), including variants thereof, during fiscal years 2022 through 2027, including whether (a)(1), including variants thereof, during fiscal years 2022 through 2027, including whether
toto ~~maintain parallel paths with different systems configurations or to choose to~~ maintain parallel paths with different systems configurations or to choose to pursue pursue
fewer configurations. fewer configurations.
(c) COVERED (c) COVERED RADAR SYSTEMS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered radar RADAR SYSTEMS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered radar
systems’’ includes the following: systems’’ includes the following:
(1) AN/SPY–1. (1) AN/SPY–1.
(2) AN/SPY–6. (2) AN/SPY–6.
(3) AN/SPY–7. (3) AN/SPY–7.
Regarding Section 132, S.Rept. 117-39 states: Regarding Section 132, S.Rept. 117-39 states:
~~Analysis of certain radar investment options (sec. 132)~~
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Analysis of certain radar investment options (sec. 132) The committee recommends a provision that would require the Director of the Office of The committee recommends a provision that would require the Director of the Office of
CostCost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to conduct an independent review of Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to conduct an independent review of
thethe ~~three radar systems supporting current Aegis combat systems of the Navy and~~ three radar systems supporting current Aegis combat systems of the Navy and the the
Missile Defense Agency in the fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2027Missile Defense Agency in the fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2027 timeframe. The timeframe. The
Director would be required to submit a report on the results of that analysis not later than Director would be required to submit a report on the results of that analysis not later than
March 1, 2022, to the congressional defense committees. March 1, 2022, to the congressional defense committees.
The The ~~committee recognizes that the rapid deployment of next-generation maritime~~ committee recognizes that the rapid deployment of next-generation maritime radar radar
systems will be required to address existing and emerging gaps in integrated air and missile systems will be required to address existing and emerging gaps in integrated air and missile
defense. To that end, the Navy intends to equip all new DDG–51 destroyers and the DDG–defense. To that end, the Navy intends to equip all new DDG–51 destroyers and the DDG–
X LargeX Large ~~Surface Combatant with the AN/SPY–6 Air and Missile Defense Radar.~~ Surface Combatant with the AN/SPY–6 Air and Missile Defense Radar. The The
AN/SPY–7 was chosen by the Missile Defense Agency to be the radar for Aegis Ashore AN/SPY–7 was chosen by the Missile Defense Agency to be the radar for Aegis Ashore
applications. applications.
The The ~~committee supports efforts to leverage commonality among weapons systems~~ committee supports efforts to leverage commonality among weapons systems and and
believes additional opportunities may be available to employ this approach in modernizing believes additional opportunities may be available to employ this approach in modernizing
AegisAegis ~~weapons systems aboard~~ weapons systems aboard existing surface shipsexisting surface ships as well as in Aegisas well as in Aegis Ashore Ashore
applications.applications. ~~Employing common radar systems could reduce risk and lower~~ Employing common radar systems could reduce risk and lower life cycle life cycle
costs for the Department of Defense. costs for the Department of Defense.
To clarify the To clarify the ~~options, the provision would require~~ options, the provision would require CAPE to analyzeCAPE to analyze the coststhe costs and capabilities of the current radars supporting Aegis combat systems. (Page 7) HASC-SASC-Negotiated Proposal The joint explanatory statement for the HASC-SASC-negotiated proposal for the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1605) that was released on December 7, 2021, recommends the funding levels shown in the HASC-SASC column of Table 2. The recommended increase of $41.5 million for line 34 is for “MDA UFR [unfunded requirement]—Additional AURs [all-up rounds].” (PDF page 479 of 670) The recommended net decrease of $38.094 million for line 86 includes a recommended reduction of $86.494 million for “Layered homeland defense lack of requirement” and a recommended increase of $48.4 million for “MDA UFR—Radar upgrades.” (PDF page 537 of 670). The recommended reduction of $5.8 million for line 118 is for “Unjustified growth—AEGIS LHD test funding early to need.” (PDF page 540 of 670) Section 145 of the HASC-SASC-negotiated proposal for S. 1605 states: SEC. 145. ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN RADAR INVESTMENT OPTIONS. (a) ANALYSIS REQUIRED.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation shall conduct an analysis of covered radar systems operating in the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency over the period covered by the most recent future-years defense program submitted to Congress under section 221 of title 10, United States Code. (2) ELEMENTS.—The analysis conducted under paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) An independent cost estimate of each covered radar system described in paragraph (1) and each variant thereof. (B) An assessment of the capability provided by each such system and variant to address current and future air and missile defense threats. Congressional Research Service 34 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program (C) In the case of covered radar systems operating in the Navy, an assessment of the capability and technical suitability of each planned configuration for such systems to support current and future distributed maritime operations in contested environments. (b) REPORT.—Not later than May 1, 2022, the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes the following: (1) The results of the analysis conducted under subsection (a)(1). (2) Such recommendations as the Director may have to achieve greater capability, affordability, and sustainability across covered radar systems described in subsection (a)(1), including variants thereof, during fiscal years 2022 through 2027, including whether— (A) to continue to develop and maintain each covered radar system separately; or (B) to pursue fewer configurations of such systems. (c) COVERED RADAR SYSTEMS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered radar systems’’ means radar systems with the following designations an any variants thereof: (1) AN/SPY–1. (2) AN/SPY–3. (3) AN/SPY–6. (4) AN/SPY–7. Section 1665 of the HASC-SASC-negotiated proposal for S. 1605 states (emphasis added): SEC. 1665. GUAM INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. (a) ARCHITECTURE AND ACQUISITION.—The Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, and in coordination with the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall identify the architecture and acquisition approach for implementing a 360-degree integrated air and missile defense capability to defend the people, infrastructure, and territory of Guam from the scope and scale of advanced cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats that are expected to be fielded during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act. (b) REQUIREMENTS.—The architecture identified under subsection (a) shall have the ability to— (1) integrate, while maintaining high kill chain performance against advanced threats, all applicable— (A) multi-domain sensors that contribute substantively to track quality and track custody; (B) interceptors; and (C) command and control systems; (2) address robust discrimination and electromagnetic compatibility with other sensors; (3) engage directly, or coordinate engagements with other integrated air and missile defense systems, to defeat the spectrum of cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats expected to be fielded during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act; (4) leverage existing programs of record to expedite the development and deployment of the architecture during the five-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, with an objective of achieving initial operating capability in 2025, including with respect to— (A) the Aegis ballistic missile defense system; (B) standard missile–3 and –6 variants; Congressional Research Service 35 link to page 35 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program (C) the terminal high altitude area defense system; (D) the Patriot air and missile defense system; (E) the integrated battle control system; and (F) the lower tier air and missile defense sensor and other lower tier capabilities, as applicable; (5) integrate future systems and interceptors, including directed energy-based kill systems, that will also have the capability to detect, track, and defeat hypersonic missiles in the glide and terminal phases, including integration of passive measures to protect assets in Guam; and (6) incentivize competition within the acquisition of the architecture and rapid procurement and deployment wherever possible. (c) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the architecture and acquisition approach identified under subsection (a), including— (1) an assessment of the development and implementation risks associated with each of the elements identified under subsection (b); and (2) a plan for expending funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2022 for such architecture. (d) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2022 for the Department of Defense for the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, not more than 80 percent may be obligated or expended until the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees the report under subsection (c). The joint explanatory statement for the HASC-SASC-negotiated proposal also states: Sense of Congress on Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1650A) that would express the sense of Congress on Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. The Senate amendment contained no similar provision. The agreement does not include this provision. We note that both Poland and Romania, which host Aegis Ashore sites, are vital allies of the United States. We understand that the contributions provided by these Aegis Ashore sites help ensure the defenses of Poland, Romania, the United States, and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We believe it is vital that the construction of the Aegis Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland, is completed and brought online at the earliest possible date. (PDF page 383 of 670) ~~and~~
~~capabilities of the current radars supporting Aegis combat systems. (Page 7)~~
FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4432/S. XXXX)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-88 of July 15, 2021) on H.R. The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-88 of July 15, 2021) on H.R.
4432, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column 4432, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column ofof Table 2.
Although the recommended funding levels for lines 31 and 34 are the same as the requested Although the recommended funding levels for lines 31 and 34 are the same as the requested
figures, the quantities of missiles to be procured under those two funding lines have been reduced figures, the quantities of missiles to be procured under those two funding lines have been reduced
by six missiles and two missiles, respectively, as shown in the table. (Page 228) by six missiles and two missiles, respectively, as shown in the table. (Page 228)
Congressional Research Service 36 link to page 35 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program The recommended reduction of $98.963 The recommended reduction of $98.963 ~~mil ion~~million for line 86 is for “Unjustified growth—AEGIS for line 86 is for “Unjustified growth—AEGIS
LHD lack of validated requirement and acquisition strategy.” (Page 314) The recommended LHD lack of validated requirement and acquisition strategy.” (Page 314) The recommended
reduction of $5.8 reduction of $5.8 ~~mil ion~~million for line 118 is for “Unjustified growth—AEGIS LHD test funding early for line 118 is for “Unjustified growth—AEGIS LHD test funding early
to need.” (Page 315) to need.” (Page 315)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the explanatory statement it released on October 18, The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the explanatory statement it released on October 18,
2021, for the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (S. XXXX), recommended the funding level 2021, for the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (S. XXXX), recommended the funding level
shown in the SAC column shown in the SAC column ofof Table 2.
The recommended increase of $192.7 The recommended increase of $192.7 ~~mil ion~~million for line 34 is for “Program increase: Eight SM–3 for line 34 is for “Program increase: Eight SM–3
IIA interceptors.” (PDF page 146 of 253) IIA interceptors.” (PDF page 146 of 253)
The recommended decrease of $86.494 The recommended decrease of $86.494 ~~mil ion~~million for line 86 is for “Layered homeland defense lack for line 86 is for “Layered homeland defense lack
of requirement.” (PDF page 206 of 253) of requirement.” (PDF page 206 of 253)
The recommended decrease of $6.335 The recommended decrease of $6.335 ~~mil ion~~million for line 118 is for “Layered homeland defense lack for line 118 is for “Layered homeland defense lack
of requirement” ($5.849 of requirement” ($5.849 ~~mil ion~~million) and “FTX–26 delay” ($0.486 ) and “FTX–26 delay” ($0.486 ~~mil ion~~million). (PDF page 207 of 253) ). (PDF page 207 of 253)
The explanatory statement for S. XXXX released by the committee on October 18, 2021, states: The explanatory statement for S. XXXX released by the committee on October 18, 2021, states:
AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense.—The Committee notes emerging mass ballistic missile —The Committee notes emerging mass ballistic missile
raid strategies and supports the development of vital propulsion technology and expansion raid strategies and supports the development of vital propulsion technology and expansion
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of the controllable missile propulsion industrial base to defend against swarm attacks. (PDF of the controllable missile propulsion industrial base to defend against swarm attacks. (PDF
page 10 of 253) page 10 of 253)

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Appendix. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests
Table A-1 presents a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. In addition presents a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. In addition
to the flight tests shown in the table, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser to the flight tests shown in the table, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser
operating northwest of operating northwest of ~~Hawai~~ Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3 used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3
missile to shoot down an inoperable U.S. missile to shoot down an inoperable U.S. ~~surveil ance satel ite~~ surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit. that was in a deteriorating orbit.
Table A-1. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests From January 2002 to the Present
Name of flight
Cumulative ~~Cumulative~~
Cumulative Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
Exo-atmospheric (using SM-3 missile)
1/25/02 1/25/02
US US
FM-2 FM-2
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
1 1
1 1
6/13/02 6/13/02
US US
FM-3 FM-3
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
2 2
2 2
11/21/02 11/21/02
US US
FM-4 FM-4
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
3 3
3 3
6/18/03 6/18/03
US US
FM-5 FM-5
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
No
3 3
4 4
12/11/03 12/11/03
US US
FM-6 FM-6
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
4 4
5 5
2/24/05 2/24/05
US US
FTM 04-1 (FM-7) Unitary short-range (TTV) FTM 04-1 (FM-7) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
5 5
6 6
11/17/05 11/17/05
US US
FTM 04-2 (FM-8) Separating short-range (MRT) FTM 04-2 (FM-8) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
6 6
7 7
6/22/06 6/22/06
US US
FTM 10 FTM 10
Separating short-range (TTV) Separating short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
7 7
8 8
12/7/06 12/7/06
US US
FTM 11 FTM 11
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
No
7 7
9 9
4/26/07 4/26/07
US US
FTM 11 FTM 11
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
8 8
10 10
Event 4 Event 4
6/22/07 6/22/07
US US
FTM 12 FTM 12
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
9 9
11 11
8/31/07 8/31/07
US US
FTM-11a FTM-11a
Classified Classified
Yes Yes
10 10
12 12
11/6/07 11/6/07
US US
FTM 13 FTM 13
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
11 11
13 13

Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
12 12
14 14
12/17/07 12/17/07
Japan Japan
JFTM-1 JFTM-1
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
13 13
15 15
11/1/08 11/1/08
US US
Pacific Blitz Pacific Blitz
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
14 14
16 16

Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
No
14 14
17 17
11/19/08 11/19/08
Japan Japan
JFTM-2 JFTM-2
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
No
14 14
18 18
7/30/09 7/30/09
US US
FTM-17 FTM-17
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
15 15
19 19
10/27/09 10/27/09
Japan Japan
JFTM-3 JFTM-3
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
16 16
20 20
10/28/10 10/28/10
Japan Japan
JFTM-4 JFTM-4
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
17 17
21 21
4/14/11 4/14/11
US US
FTM-15 FTM-15
Separating intermediate Separating intermediate range range
Yes Yes
18 18
22 22
(LV-2) (LV-2)
9/1/11 9/1/11
US US
FTM-16 E2 FTM-16 E2
Separating short-range (ARAV-B) Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
No
18 18
23 23
5/9/12 5/9/12
US US
FTM-16 E2a FTM-16 E2a
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
19 19
24 24
6/26/12 6/26/12
US US
FTM-18 FTM-18
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
20 20
25 25
10/25/12 10/25/12
US US
FTI-01 FTI-01
Separating short-range (ARAV-B) Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
No
20 20
26 26
2/12/13 2/12/13
US US
FTM-20 FTM-20
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
Yes Yes
21 21
27 27
(MRBM-T3) (MRBM-T3)
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Name of flight
Cumulative ~~Cumulative~~
Cumulative Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
5/15/13 5/15/13
US US
FTM-19 FTM-19
Separating short-range (ARAV- Separating short-range (ARAV-
Yes Yes
22 22
28 28
C) C)
9/10/13 9/10/13
US US
FTO-01 FTO-01
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
Yes Yes
23 23
29 29
(eMRBM-T1) (eMRBM-T1)
9/18/13 9/18/13
US US
FTM-21 FTM-21
Separating short-range (ARAV- Separating short-range (ARAV-
Yes Yes
24 24
30 30
C++) C++)
10/3/13 10/3/13
US US
FTM-22 FTM-22
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
Yes Yes
25 25
31 31
(ARAV-TTO-E) (ARAV-TTO-E)
11/6/14 11/6/14
US US
FTM-25 FTM-25
Separating short-range (ARAV-B) Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
Yes Yes
26 26
32 32
6/25/15 6/25/15
US US
FTO-02 E1 FTO-02 E1
Separating medium-range (IRBM Separating medium-range (IRBM
n n//aa
26 26
32 32
T1) T1)
10/4/15 10/4/15
US US
FTO-02 E2 FTO-02 E2
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
n n//ab
26 26
32 32
(eMRBM) (eMRBM)
10/20/15 10/20/15
US US
ASD-15 E2 ASD-15 E2
Separating short-range (Terrier Separating short-range (Terrier
Yes Yes
27 27
33 33
Orion) Orion)
11/1/15 11/1/15
US US
FTO-02 E2a FTO-02 E2a
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
No
27 27
34 34
(eMRBM) (eMRBM)
12/10/15 12/10/15
US (Aegis US (Aegis
FTO02 E1a FTO02 E1a
Separating medium-range (IRBM Separating medium-range (IRBM
Yes Yes
28 28
35 35
Ashore) Ashore)
T1) T1)
2/3/17 2/3/17
US-Japan US-Japan
SFTM-01 SFTM-01
Separating medium-range (MRT) Separating medium-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
29 29
36 36
6/21/17 6/21/17
US-Japan US-Japan
SFTM-02 SFTM-02
Medium-range Medium-range
No
29 29
37 37
10/15/17 10/15/17
US US
FS17 FS17
Medium-range target Medium-range target
Yes Yes
30 30
38 38
1/31/18 1/31/18
US (Aegis US (Aegis
FTM-29 FTM-29
Intermediate-range target Intermediate-range target
No
30 30
39 39
Ashore) Ashore)
9/11/18 9/11/18
Japan Japan
JFTM-05 JFTM-05
Simple Simple separating target separating target
Yes Yes
31 31
40 40
10/26/18 10/26/18
US US
FTM-45 FTM-45
Medium range Medium range
Yes Yes
32 32
41 41
12/10/18 12/10/18
US (Aegis US (Aegis
FTI-03 FTI-03
Intermediate-range target Intermediate-range target
Yes Yes
33 33
42 42
Ashore) Ashore)
11/16/20 11/16/20
US US
FTM-44 FTM-44
ICBM target ICBM target
Yes Yes
34 34
43 43
5/26/21 and 5/26/21 and
US- US-
ASD/FS21c ASD/FS21c
Non-separating MRBM target Non-separating MRBM target
YescYesc
35c 35c
44c 44c
30/2021 30/2021
Netherlands Netherlands
Endo-atmospheric (using SM-2 missile Block IV missile and [for MMW E1 and subsequent] SM-6 Dual 1 missile)
5/24/06 5/24/06
US US
Pacific Phoenix Pacific Phoenix
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
1 1
1 1
(Lance) (Lance)
6/5/08 6/5/08
US US
FTM-14 FTM-14
Unitary short-range target (FMA) Unitary short-range target (FMA)
Yes Yes
2 2
2 2
3/26/09 3/26/09
US US
~~Stel ar~~ Stellar Daggers Daggers
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
3 3
3 3
(Lance) (Lance)
7/28/15 7/28/15
US US
MMW E1 MMW E1
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
4 4
4 4
(Lance) (Lance)
7/29/15 7/29/15
US US
MMW E2 MMW E2
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
5 5
5 5
(Lance) (Lance)
12/14/16 12/14/16
US US
FTM-27 FTM-27
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
6 6
6 6
(Lance) (Lance)
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Name of flight
Cumulative ~~Cumulative~~
Cumulative Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
8/29/17 8/29/17
US US
FTM-27 E2 FTM-27 E2
Medium-range target (MRBM) Medium-range target (MRBM)
Yes Yes
7 7
7 7
5/29/21 5/29/21
US US
FTM-31 FTM-31
Medium-range target (MRBM) Medium-range target (MRBM)
No
7 7
8 8
7/24/21 7/24/21
US US
FTM-33 FTM-33
Two SRBM targets Two SRBM targets
Yes and Yes and
8 and 8 and
9 and 10 9 and 10
unconfirmedd unconfirmedd unconfirmedd
Sources: Table presented in MDA fact sheet, “AegisTable presented in MDA fact sheet, “Aegis ~~Bal istic Missile Defense~~ Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” February 2017, accessed Testing,” February 2017, accessed
on August 27, 2020, at https://web.archive.org/web/20170929180757/https:/www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/on August 27, 2020, at https://web.archive.org/web/20170929180757/https:/www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/
aegis_tests.pdf,aegis_tests.pdf, and (for flight tests subsequent to February 2017) MDA news releases. and (for flight tests subsequent to February 2017) MDA news releases.
Notes: TTV is target test vehicle; is target test vehicle; ARAV is Aegis Readiness Assessment is Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle.Vehicle. In addition to the flight tests In addition to the flight tests
shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S. shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S.
~~satel ite—an~~ satellite—an operation operation ~~cal ed~~called Burnt Frost. Burnt Frost.
a. MDA’sa. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of August 3, 2015, table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of August 3, 2015,
had not issued a news release had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 31 successful intercepts in 37 launches discussing this event. MDA’s count of 31 successful intercepts in 37 launches
through July 29, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was considered a “no test” through July 29, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was considered a “no test”
event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegisevent—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD systemBMD system or the SM-3 or the SM-3
interceptor.interceptor. News reportsNews reports state that the test was aborted due to a failurestate that the test was aborted due to a failure of the target missile.of the target missile. (Andrea (Andrea
Shalal, “U.S. Skips AegisShalal, “U.S. Skips Aegis Ashore MissileAshore Missile Test After Target Malfunction,” Test After Target Malfunction,” Reuters, June 26, 2015.) MDA’s, June 26, 2015.) MDA’s table table
similarlysimilarly shows the test of Decembershows the test of December 7, 2006, as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM7, 2006, as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM -3. MDA -3. MDA
issued a news releaseissued a news release on this test, which stated that an SM-3 was not launched “due to an incorrecton this test, which stated that an SM-3 was not launched “due to an incorrect system system
setting aboard the Aegis-classsetting aboard the Aegis-class ~~cruiser~~ cruiser USS USS Lake Erie prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles ~~from~~ from the the
ship. The incorrect configuration prevented the fire control systemship. The incorrect configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship fromaboard the ship from launching the first launching the first
of the two [SM-3] interceptor missiles.of the two [SM-3] interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneousSince a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch of two launch of two
missilesmissiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missileagainst two different targets, the second interceptor missile ~~was intentional y~~ was intentionally not launched.” MDA not launched.” MDA
counts the test of Decembercounts the test of December 7, 2006, as an unsuccessful intercept in its count of 31 successful intercepts in 7, 2006, as an unsuccessful intercept in its count of 31 successful intercepts in
37 launches through July 29, 2015. 37 launches through July 29, 2015.
b. MDA’s b. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of Novembertable shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of November 10, 10,
2015, had not issued a news release 2015, had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 32 successful intercepts in 39 discussing this event. MDA’s count of 32 successful intercepts in 39
launches through Novemberlaunches through November 1, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was 1, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was
considered a “no test” event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegisconsidered a “no test” event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD BMD
systemsystem or the SM-3 interceptor. or the SM-3 interceptor.
c. ASD/FS21 was an at-sea demonstration that occurred during a multilateral c. ASD/FS21 was an at-sea demonstration that occurred during a multilateral naval exercisenaval exercise ~~cal ed~~ called Formidable Formidable
Shield 2021. In the demonstration, a Dutch frigate used its radar to provide early Shield 2021. In the demonstration, a Dutch frigate used its radar to provide early warning track data to a warning track data to a
U.S. Navy destroyer that used the data to calculate a firing solution and launch its interceptor. SomeU.S. Navy destroyer that used the data to calculate a firing solution and launch its interceptor. Some press press
reports state that ASD/FS21 involved two successful reports state that ASD/FS21 involved two successful ~~bal istic missile~~ ballistic missile intercepts, rather than the one shown intercepts, rather than the one shown
in the table. in the table.
d. MDA stated that “based on initial observations, one target was successful y intercepted. d. MDA stated that “based on initial observations, one target was successful y intercepted. At this time,At this time, we we
cannot confirm the second target was destroyed.” (“MDA Test Intercepts Target,” MDA News Release cannot confirm the second target was destroyed.” (“MDA Test Intercepts Target,” MDA News Release 21-21-
NEWS-0012, July 24, 2021.) NEWS-0012, July 24, 2021.)

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

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