Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
March 19April 5, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33745
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program
Summary
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for
conducting BMD operations. Under MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy
Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 24 at the end of FY2011 to 36 at the end of FY2018.
Under the Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD
operations, BMD-capable Aegis ships have begun operating in European waters to defend Europe
from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran. On October 5, 2011, the
United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the EPAA, four BMD-capable
Aegis ships are to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at Rota, Spain, in FY2014 and FY2015.
BMD-capable Aegis ships also operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide
regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and
Iran.
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2013 budget requests a total of
$2,303.0 million in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts,
including funding for Aegis Ashore sites that are to be part of the EPAA.
Issues for Congress for FY2013 include the reduction under the proposed FY2013 budget in the
ramp-up rate for numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships over the next few years; the U.S.
economic impact of shifting four Aegis ships to Rota, Spain; U.S. vs. European naval
contributions to European BMD; the lack of a target for simulating the endo-atmospheric (i.e.,
final) phase of flight of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile; the capability of the SM-3
Block IIB Aegis BMD interceptor; and technical risk in the Aegis program.
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program
Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Aegis Ships................................................................................................................................ 1
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers ........................................................................ 1
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers .............................................................. 2
Projected Aegis Ship Force Levels...................................................................................... 2
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies............................................................................................... 3
Aegis BMD System................................................................................................................... 3
Versions of Aegis BMD System.......................................................................................... 3
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles......................................................................................... 3
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD.......................................... 6
Planned Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Interceptors................................. 6
Home Ports of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships ............................................................................... 8
Pacific vs. Atlantic Fleet Homeporting ............................................................................... 8
October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain ................................................ 8
Aegis BMD Flight Tests .......................................................................................................... 11
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program ....................................................... 12
Japan.................................................................................................................................. 12
Other Countries ................................................................................................................. 13
FY2013 Funding Request........................................................................................................ 14
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 15
Reduction in Ramp-Up Rate for BMD-Capable Aegis Ships ................................................. 15
Demands for Aegis Ships in General....................................................................................... 18
U.S. Economic Impact of Shifting Four Aegis Ships to Rota, Spain ...................................... 21
U.S. vs. European Naval Contributions to European BMD .................................................... 23
Target for Simulating Endo-Atmospheric Flight of DF-21 ASBM ......................................... 23
Capability of SM-3 Block IIB Interceptor............................................................................... 24
Technical Risk in Aegis BMD Program .................................................................................. 26
March 2011 GAO ReportSM-3 Block IB Missile .................................................................................................. 27
April 2011 Press Report ... 26
SM-3 Block IIA Missile .................................................................................................... 28
SM-3 Block IIB Missile .................................................................................................... 29
Aegis Ashore ..................................................................................................................... 30
Legislative Activity for FY2013 .................................................................................................... 3231
Summary of Action on FY2013 MDA Funding Request ........................................................ 3231
Tables
Table 1. Versions of Aegis BMD System......................................................................................... 5
Table 2. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Missiles ............................................. 7
Table 3. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts, FY2012-FY2017............................................... 14
Table 4. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships Under FY2012 and FY2013 Budgets .............. 15
Table 5. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2013 Request for MDA Procurement
and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program ......................................................................... 32
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program
Table A-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests Since January 2002............................................................... 34
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Appendixes
Appendix. Aegis BMD Flight Tests............................................................................................... 33
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 46
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program
Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic
missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and
the Navy, and gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD
operations. Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD
capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base.
Background
Aegis Ships
The Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the
Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays,
weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus. The
Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship
cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface threats. The system was first deployed
by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers
A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered
service between 1983 and 1994. The first five (CGs 47 through 51), which were built to an earlier
technical standard in certain respects, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize
and were removed from service in 2004-2005.
As a cost-saving measure, the Navy’s FY2013 budget proposes retiring 7 of the remaining 22
Aegis cruisers in FY2013 and FY2014, more than a decade before the end of their 35-year
expected service lives.1 One of these seven ships has been given a capability for BMD
operations;2 some or all of the other six were scheduled to be modified for BMD operations at
some point.
1
The seven ships are Cowpens (CG-63), Anzio (CG-68), Vicksburg (CG-69), and Port Royal (CG-73), which are
proposed for retirement in FY2013, and Gettysburg (CG-64), Chosin (CG-65), and Hue City (CG-66), which are
proposed for retirement in FY2014. These ships entered service between 1991 (Cowpens) and 1994 (Port Royal); their
35-year service lives would extend to between 2026 and 2029. Port Royal was the last of the 27 ships in the class (i.e.,
it is the youngest ship in the class). Of the 22 Aegis cruisers currently in service, the oldest is Bunker Hill (CG-52),
which entered service in 1986.
2
The ship that has already been given a capability for BMD operations is Port Royal (CG-73).
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers3
62 Flight I/II and Flight IIA DDG-51s Procured in FY1985-FY2005
A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first
entered service in 1991 and the 62nd is scheduled to enter service in FY2012. The first 28 ships,
known as Flight I/II DDG-51s, are scheduled to remain in service until age 35. The next 34 ships,
known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design changes and are scheduled to remain in
service until age 40.
No DDG-51s Procured in FY2006-FY2009
No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured
three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does not use the Aegis
system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy plans do not call
for modifying DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.
10 Flight IIA DDG-51s Procured or Programmed for FY2010-FY2016
Procurement of DDG-51s resumed in FY2010. One Flight IIA DDG-51 was procured in FY2010,
two more were procured in FY2011, and a fourth was procured in FY2012. Navy plans call for
procuring six more Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY2013-FY2016. The ship procured in FY2010 is
scheduled to enter service in FY2016.
Flight III DDG-51s Programmed Starting in FY2016
Navy plans call for shifting to procurement of a new version of the DDG-51, called the Flight III
version, starting in FY2016.4 The Flight III version is to be equipped with a new radar, called the
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), that is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on
all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers.
Projected Aegis Ship Force Levels
The Navy’s FY2012FY2013 30-year (FY2012-FY2041FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan projects that the total number
of Aegis cruisers and destroyers will grow from 84 at the end of FY2011 to a peak of 94 in
FY2020 and FY2021, and then decline thereafter as CG-47s and older DDG-51s retire and are
replaced by new DDG-51s on a less than one-for-one basis, reaching a minimum of 65 ships in
FY2034 before growing back to 75 ships in FY2041. The Navy’s cruiser-destroyer force during
this period is also todecline from 80 ships in FY2013 to 77 ships in FY2014FY2015, grow to a peak of 87 ships in FY2027, decline to 75 ships in FY2034, and grow back to
85 or 86 ships in FY2039-FY2042. These figures are for Aegis cruisers and destroyers only; they
do not include the three DDG-1000s procured in FY2006-FY2009.5
3
For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4
Of the two DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2016, one is to be the final Flight IIA ship, and the other is to
be the first Flight III ship.
5
The three DDG-1000s are scheduled to enter service in FY2014, FY2016, and FY2018, and remain in service beyond
the end of the 30-year period. For a table showing the total number of cruisers and destroyers each year from FY2013
through FY2042 (including the three DDG-1000s), see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000
Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. A similar table can be found in CRS
(continued...)
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Aegis Ships in Allied Navies
Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now
operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Spain, and Norway.56
Aegis BMD System6System7
Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to
the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor
missiles. In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s
procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are to be built from the start with a BMD capability.
Versions of Aegis BMD System
Currently fielded versions of the Aegis BMD system are called the 3.6.1 version and the newer
and more capable 4.0.1 version. MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable
versions in coming years; these planned versions are called 5.0, 5.1, and 5.2. Improved versions
feature improved processors and software, and are to be capable of using improved versions of
the SM-3 interceptor missile (see Table 1).
MDA states that an in-service Aegis ship with a 3.6.1 BMD capability can be upgraded to a 4.0.1
BMD capability for about $45 million to $55 million.
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles
The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the
Standard Missile-2 Block IV (SM-2 Block IV). The SM-2 Block IV is to be succeeded in coming
years by a BMD version of the new SM-6 interceptor.
SM-3 Midcourse Interceptor
The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric
intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hitto-kill” warhead, called a kinetic warhead, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead
by colliding with it.
MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable versions of the SM-3 in coming years.
The current version, called the SM-3 Block IA, is now being supplemented by the more capable
SM-3 Block IB. These are to be followed by the SM-3 Block IIA and the SM-3 Block IIB.
5
(...continued)
Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
6
The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version
of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar.
67
Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to
CRS and CBO analysts in March 2010, March 2011, and March 2012.
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MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable versions of the SM-3 in coming years.
The current version, called the SM-3 Block IA, is now being supplemented by the more capable
SM-3 Block IB. These are to be followed by the SM-3 Block IIA and the SM-3 Block IIB.
Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target
seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting
its course.
In contrast to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster stage at the
bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block IIA version
is to have a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform 21
inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout
velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater
than that of the Block IA and IB versions,78 as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The
United States and Japan have cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA
version, with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.89
Compared to the Block IIA, the Block IIB version is to include a lighter kill vehicle, flexible
propulsion, and upgraded fire control software.910
MDA states that that SM-3 Block IBs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $12
million to $15 million, and that SM-3 Block IIAs have an estimated unit procurement cost of
about $20 million to $24 million.
SM-2 and SM-6 Terminal Interceptors
The SM-2 Block IV is designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endoatmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is
equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead.
The existing inventory of SM-2 Block IVs—72 as of February 2012—was created by modifying
SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs
were modified, and three have been used in BMD flight tests, leaving the current remaining
inventory of 72.
7
8
Some press reports and journal articles, most now a decade or more old, report unconfirmed figures on the burnout
velocities of various SM-3 missile configurations (some of which were proposed but ultimately not pursued). See, for
example, J. D. Marshall, The Future Of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, point paper dated October 15, 2004, accessed
online at http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/259.pdf; “STANDARD Missile-3 Destroys a Ballistic Missile Target
in Test of Sea-based Missile Defense System,” Raytheon news release circa January 26, 2002; Gopal Ratnam, “U.S.
Navy To Play Larger Role In Missile Defense, Defense News, January 21-27, 2002: 10; Hans Mark, “A White Paper on
the Defense Against Ballistic Missiles,” The Bridge, Summer 2001, pp. 17-26, accessed online at http://www.nae.edu/
nae/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/NAEW-63BM86/$FILE/BrSum01.pdf?OpenElement; Michael C. Sirak, “White House
Decision May Move Sea-Based NMD Into Spotlight,” Inside Missile Defense, September 6, 2000: 1; Henry F. Cooper
and J.D. Williams, “The Earliest Deployment Option—Sea-Based Defenses,” Inside Missile Defense, September 6,
2000 (guest perspective; including graphic on page 21); Robert Holzer, “DoD Weighs Navy Interceptor Options,
Defense News, July 24, 2000: 1, 60 (graphic on page 1); and Robert Holzer, “U.S. Navy Gathers Strength, Allies in
NMD Showdown,” Defense News, March 15, 1999: 1, 42 (graphic on page 1).
89
The cooperative research effort has been carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999.
The effort has focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the
second-stage propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone. The Block IIA development effort includes the development of a
missile, called the Block II, as a stepping stone to the Block IIA. As a result, the Block IIA development effort has
sometimes been called the Block II/IIA development effort. The Block II missile is not planned as a fielded capability.
910
Source: H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010 (the House Armed Services Committee report on H.R. 5136, the FY2011
defense authorization bill), p. 196.
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The existing inventory of SM-2 Block IVs—72 as of February 2012—was created by modifying
SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs
were modified, and three have been used in BMD flight tests, leaving the current remaining
inventory of 72.
MDA and Navy plans call for developing and procuring a more capable terminal-phase BMD
interceptor based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the successor to the SM-2 air defense missile).
The initial version of the SM-6 BMD interceptor, called Increment 1, is to enter service around
2015; a subsequent version, called Increment 2, is to enter service around 2018.
Table 1 summarizes the various versions of the Aegis BMD system and correlates them with the
phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA; see below) for European BMD
operations.
Table 1. Versions of Aegis BMD System
EPAA Phase
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
Phase IV
Version of Aegis BMD system
3.6.1
4.0.1
5.0/5.0.1
5.1/5.1.1
5.1/5/1.1
Certified for initial use
2006
2012
2014
2018
2020
OTE assessment
2008
2014
2016
2020
2022
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Mid-course interceptor(s) used
SM-3 Block IA
SM-3 Block IB
SM-3 Block IIA
SM-3 Block IIB
X
Terminal-phase interceptor used
SM-2 Block IV
X
X
SM-6 Increment 1
X
SM-6 Increment 2
X
X
Types of ballistic missiles that can be engaged
SRBM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
MRBM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
IRBM
Limited
Yes
Yes
Enhanced
Enhanced
ICBM
Noa
Noa
Noa
Limited
Limited
Launch or engage on remote capability
Launch on remote
Initial
Enhanced
Yes
Yes
Yes
Engage on remote
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Source: MDA briefings to CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), March 2010, March 2011, March
2012.
Notes: OTE is operational test and evaluation. SRBM is short-range ballistic missile; MRBM is medium-range
ballistic missile; IRBM is intermediate-range ballistic missile; ICBM is intercontinental ballistic missile. Launch
on remote is the ability to launch the interceptor using data from off-board sensors. Engage on remote is
the ability to engage targets using data from off-board sensors.
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a.
Cannot intercept ICBMs, but the system has a long-range search and track (LRS&T) capability—an ability to
detect and track ballistic missiles at long ranges.
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European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD
On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new approach for regional BMD
operations called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The first application of the approach is in
Europe, and is called the European PAA (EPAA). EPAA calls for using BMD-capable Aegis
ships, a land-based radar in Europe, and eventually two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and
Poland to defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran. MDA states
that:
The Department [of Defense] met its commitment for EPAA Phase 1 by deploying Aegis
BMD ships and a land-based radar in Europe by the end of 2011. Deliveries in the next three
EPAA phases include:
•
Aegis Ashore in Romania with SM-3 IB interceptors in the 2015 timeframe (Phase 2),
•
Aegis Ashore in Poland with SM-3 IIA interceptors in the 2018 timeframe (Phase 3),
and
•
SM-3 IIB interceptors and early intercept capability in the 2020 timeframe (Phase 4)
The United States will also pursue phased adaptive approaches in the Asia Pacific and the
Middle East by building on current efforts.1011
Each Aegis Ashore site in the EPAA is to include a structure housing an Aegis system similar to
the deckhouse on an Aegis ship and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a re-locatable Vertical
Launch System (VLS) based on the VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships.
Although BMD-capable Aegis ships have deployed to European waters in the past, the first
BMD-capable Aegis ship officially deployed to European waters as part of the EPAA departed its
home port of Norfolk, VA, on March 7, 2011, for a deployment to the Mediterranean that lasted
several months.1112
Planned Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and
SM-3 Interceptors
As shown in Table 2, under the proposed FY2013 budget, the number of BMD-capable Navy
Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 24 at the end of FY2011 to 36 at the end of FY2018.
1011
Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 President’s Budget Submission, Missile
Defense Agency, Justification Book Volume 2a, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, February
2012, pp. xix-xx.
1112
Karen Parrish, “Milestone nears for European Missile Defense Plan,” American Forces Press Service, March 2, 2011
(accessed online at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62997); Untitled “Eye On The Fleet” news item,
Navy News Service, March 7, 2011 (accessed online at http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=98184); “Warship
With Radar Going To Mediterranean,” Washington Post, March 2, 2011; Brock Vergakis, “US Warship Deploys to
Mediterranean to Protect Europe Form Ballistic Missiles, Canadian Press, March 7, 2011.
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Table 2. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Missiles
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
BMD-capable Aegis ships
BMD conversions of existing Aegis cruisers and destroyers (cumulative totals)
3.6.1 versiona
22
24
23
19
17
16
13
11
TBD
TBD
4.0.1 version
2
4
6
9
9
9
9
9
TBD
TBD
5.0 version
0
1
3
4
6
7
10
11
TBD
TBD
5.1 version
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
TBD
TBD
Subtotal
24
29
32
32
32
32
32
32
TBD
TBD
New Aegis destroyers procured in FY2010 and beyond, with BMD installed during ship’s construction (cumulative totals)
5.0 version
TOTAL
0
0
0
0
0
1b
3b
4b
6b
7b
24
29
32
32
32
33
35
36
TBD +
6
TBD +
7
SM-3 missile procurement (annual quantities)
Block IA
26
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Block IB
0c
46
29
69
82
77
72
72
72
72
0
12
36
48
TBD
Block IIA
0
0
0
0
22d
Block IIB
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TBD
TBD
Total
26
46
29
69
104
77
84
108
120 +
TBD
72 +
TBD
SM-3 missile deliveries/inventorye
Block I/IA
107/87
113/92
113/91
136/114
136/105
136/88
136/70
136/45
136/27
136/16
Block IB
1/0
16/12
25/18
61/49
100/83
169/152
251/234
328/311
400/381
472/453
Block IIA
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
7/7
19/13
3121
70/60
Block IIB
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
108/87
129/104
138/109
197/163
236/188
305/240
394/311
483/369
567429
678/529
Total
Source: DOD budget submissions for FY2013 and prior years, and (for certain SM-3 annual procurement
quantities) telephone consultation with MDA, March 19, 2012.
Notes: TBD is to be determined.
a.
Declining totals for 3.6.1 ships after FY2012 reflect the upgrading of some of these ships to more advanced
versions of the Aegis BMD system.
b.
Figures taken from the Navy’s FY2013 budget submission. MDA shows two ships as being in service by
FY2016 (as opposed to the one ship shown in the Navy’s budget submission as being in service by then).
c.
25 Block IB missiles (including 1 Pathfinder missile) funded prior to the 46 shown for FY2012.
d.
22 Block IIA missiles to be funded with research and development in FY2015.
e.
Deliveries figures are cumulative and include missiles procured prior to FY2011 through both RDT&E and
procurement funds. Inventory figures reflect missiles used or projected to be used in Aegis BMD flight tests.
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Home Ports of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
Pacific vs. Atlantic Fleet Homeporting
As of February 2012, 16 of the Navy’s 24 BMD-capable Aegis ships were homeported in the
Pacific, including 5 at Yokosuka, Japan, 6 at Pearl Harbor, HI, and 5 at San Diego, CA. The other
eight BMD-capable Aegis ships were homeported in the Atlantic, with seven at Norfolk, VA, and
one at Mayport, FL.
Reflecting the implementation of the EPAA, the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships
homeported in the Atlantic is scheduled to grow over time. By the end of FY2012, the Navy is to
still have 16 BMD-capable Aegis ships homeported in the Pacific, but the number of Aegis-BMD
ships homeported in the Atlantic is to grow to 13, including 11 at Norfolk and 2 at Mayport.
October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain
On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the
EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis ships are to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at the naval
base at Rota, Spain.1213 The four ships are the destroyers Ross (DDG-71) and Donald Cook (DDG75), which are to move to Rota in FY2014, and the destroyers Carney (DDG-64) and Porter
(DDG-78), which are to move to Rota in FY2015. As of early 2012, Carney was homeported at
Mayport, FL, and the other three ships were homeported at Norfolk.1314 The move is to involve an
estimated 1,239 military billets (including 1,204 crew members for the four ships and 35 shorebased support personnel),1415 and about 2,100 family members.1516
The Navy estimates the up-front costs of transferring the four ships at $92 million in FY2013, and
the recurring costs of basing the four ships in Spain rather than in the Untied States at roughly
$100 million per year.16
1217
13
“Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed October 6, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/
search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
1314
See “Navy Names Forward Deployed Ships to Rota, Spain,” Navy News Service, February 16, 2012, accessed online
at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=65393; Kate Wiltrout, “Three Norfolk-Based Navy Ships To
Move To Spain,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 17, 2012; “Bound for Spain, Inside the Navy, February 20, 2012.
1415
Source: Navy information paper dated March 8, 2012, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on
March 9, 2012.
1516
Source: Navy briefing slides dated February 27, 2012, provided by the Navy to CRS on March 9, 2012.
1617
Source: Navy briefing slides dated February 27, 2012, provided by the Navy to CRS on March 9, 2012. The briefing
slides state that the estimated up-front cost of $92 million includes $13.5 million for constructing a new weapon
magazine, $0.8 million for constructing a pier laydown area, $3.4 million for constructing a warehouse, $5.0 million for
repairing an existing facility that is to be used as an adminsitrative/operations space, and $69.3 million for conducting
maintenance work on the four ships in the United States prior to moving them to Rota. The briefing states that the
estimated recurring cost of $100 million per year includes costs for base operating support, annual PCS (personnel
change of station) costs, a pay and allowances delta, annual mobile training team costs, ship maintenance work, the
operation of a Ship Support Activity, and higher fuel costs associated with a higher operating tempo that is maintained
by ships that are homeported in foreign countries.
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Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65
miles northwest of the Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have
been homeported at Rota at various points in the past, most recently in 1979.1718
As part of the October 5, 2011, joint announcement, the Prime Minister of Spain, Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero, stated in part:
This meeting marks a step forward on the path that we set for ourselves less than a year ago
at the Lisbon Summit, aiming to make NATO an Alliance that is “more effective, engaged
and efficient than ever before”, in the words of [NATO] Secretary-General Rasmussen.
At that historic Summit, decisions of enormous importance for the future of the Alliance
were taken, such as the New Strategic Concept to face the new challenges of the 21st century,
and the establishment of a new command structure that is leaner and more flexible, and
improved.
Besides these two important innovations, and as a consequence of them, the allies decided to
develop an Anti-Missile Defence System.…
As you will recall, as a consequence of this new structure launched in Lisbon, Spain obtained
an installation of great importance within NATO’s Command and Control Structure: the
Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain.
This Centre, together with the Centre in Uedem, Germany, will form part of the air command
and control system which is to include the anti-missile defence that the Alliance is going to
implement.
Together with this land-based component of the new air defence system, I can inform you
that Spain is also going to support, starting in 2013, an important part of the system’s naval
element.
In recent months, the different options have been studied, and finally, it was decided that
Spain should be the site for this component of the system, due to its geostrategic location and
its position as gateway to the Mediterranean.
Specifically, the United States is going to deploy, as its contribution to NATO’s Anti-Missile
Defence System, a total of four vessels equipped with the AEGIS system, to be based in
Rota.
This means that Rota is going to become a support centre for vessel deployment, enabling
them to join multinational forces or carry out NATO missions in international waters,
particularly in the Mediterranean….
Moreover, this initiative will have a positive impact, in socio-economic terms, on our
country, and most especially on the Bay of Cadiz.
Permanently basing four vessels in Rota will require investing in the Base’s infrastructure,
and contracts with service providers, thus generating approximately a thousand new jobs,
both directly and indirectly.
1718
Source: Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.
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For the shipyards, and for Spain’s defence industry, the foreseeable impact will also be
highly positive, as the USA is considering conducting the vessels’ maintenance and upkeep
at the nearby San Fernando shipyards, in the province of Cadiz. In addition, there will be
significant transfer of state-of-the-art technology, from which Spain can benefit.1819
As part of the same joint announcement, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated in part:
With four Aegis ships at Rota, the alliance is significantly boosting combined naval
capabilities in the Mediterranean, and enhancing our ability to ensure the security of this vital
region. This relocation of assets takes place as part of the United States’ ongoing effort to
better position forces and defensive capabilities in coordination with our European allies and
partners.
This announcement should send a very strong signal that the United States is continuing to
invest in this alliance, and that we are committed to our defense relationship with Europe
even as we face growing budget constraints at home.…
Alongside important agreements that were recently concluded with Romania, Poland, and
Turkey, Spain’s decision represents a critical step in implementing the European Phased
Adaptive Approach, as our leaders agreed to in Lisbon.…
Beyond missile defense, the Aegis destroyers will perform a variety of other important
missions, including participating in the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, as well as joining
in naval exercises, port visits, and maritime security cooperation activities….
The agreement also enables the United States to provide rapid and responsive support to the
U.S. Africa and U.S. Central Commands, as needed.1920
An October 5, 2011, press report stated:
A senior U.S. defense official said making the [ships’] base at Rota, on Spain’s southwestern
Atlantic coast near Cadiz, would reduce the numbers of [BMD-capable Aegis] ships needed
for the [EPAA] system.
“You [would] probably need 10 of these ships if they were based in the eastern U.S. to be
able to ... transit across the ocean back and forth to [keep the same number on] patrol in the
Med,” he said.
The U.S. official said the United States was committed to having at least one ship on station
at all times in the eastern Mediterranean, where their anti-missile missiles would be most
effective. Having them based in Rota would enable more than one to be in the eastern
Mediterranean as needed.
1819
“Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm.
1920
“Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed October 6, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/
search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
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The ships also would be part of the pool of vessels available to participate in standing NATO
maritime groups, which are used to counter piracy and for other missions, he said.2021
An October 10, 2011, press report stated:
“Our plan is to have the first couple [of ships] there in 2014 and the next two in about 2015,”
said Cmdr. Marc Boyd, spokesman for [U.S. Navy] 6th Fleet. Boyd added: “It’s really early
in the process and we haven’t selected any of the ships yet.” Boyd said the shift will bring an
estimated 1,300 sailors and Navy civilians and 2,100 dependents to Naval Station Rota,
which would double the base’s ranks. Naval Station Rota spokesman Lt. j.g. Jason Fischer
said the base now has 1,067 sailors….
The three piers at the base primarily support Navy ships passing through on port calls.
Boyd said 6th Fleet is considering plans to add base infrastructure and maintenance facilities
to support the ships, as well as additional housing for crews, “but the base is pretty suited as
it is now.”2122
Aegis BMD Flight Tests
DOD states that since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 18 successful exoatmospheric intercepts in 23 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including three successful
intercepts in four attempts by Japanese Aegis ships), and 3 successful endo-atmospheric
intercepts in 3 attempts using the SM-2 Block IV missile, making for a combined total of 21
successful intercepts in 26 attempts. In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis
cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system to shoot
down an inoperable U.S. surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit.2223 Including this
intercept in the count increases the totals to 19 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 24
2021
David Brunnstrom and David Alexander, “Spain To Host U.S. Missile Defense Ships,” Reuters, October 5, 2011.
Ellipsis as in original.
2122
Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.
2223
The modifications to the ship’s Aegis BMD midcourse system reportedly involved primarily making changes to
software. DOD stated that the modifications were of a temporary, one-time nature. Three SM-3 missiles reportedly
were modified for the operation. The first modified SM-3 fired by the cruiser successfully intercepted the satellite at an
altitude of about 133 nautical miles (some sources provide differing altitudes). The other two modified SM-3s (one
carried by the cruiser, another carried by an engage-capable Aegis destroyer) were not fired, and the Navy stated it
would reverse the modifications to these two missiles. (For additional information, see the MDA discussion available
online at http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_one_time_mission.html, and also Peter Spiegel, “Navy Missile Hits Falling
Spy Satellite,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2008; Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Navy Missile Hits Satellite,
Pentagon Says,” Washington Post, February 21, 2008; Thom Shanker, “Missile Strikes A Spy Satellite Falling From Its
Orbit,” New York Times, February 21, 2008; Bryan Bender, “US Missile Hits Crippled Satellite,” Boston Globe,
February 21, 2008; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Hits Wayward Satellite On First Attempt,” NavyTimes.com, February
21, 2008; Dan Nakaso, “Satellite Smasher Back At Pearl,” Honolulu Advertiser, February 23, 2008; Zachary M.
Peterson, “Lake Erie CO Describes Anti-Satellite Shot,” NavyTimes.com, February 25, 2008; Anne Mulrine, “The
Satellite Shootdown: Behind the Scenes,” U.S. News & World Report, February 25, 2008; Nick Brown, “US Modified
Aegis and SM-3 to Carry Out Satellite Interception Shot,” Jane’s International Defence Review, April 2008: 35.)
MDA states that the incremental cost of the shoot-down operation was $112.4 million when all costs are included.
MDA states that this cost is to be paid by MDA and the Pacific Command (PACOM), and that if MDA is directed to
absorb the entire cost, “some realignment or reprogramming from other MDA [program] Elements may be necessary to
lessen significant adverse impact on [the] AEGIS [BMD program’s] cost and schedule.” (MDA information paper
dated March 7, 2008, provided to CRS on June 6, 2008. See also Jason Sherman, “Total Cost for Shoot-Down of Failed
NRO Satellite Climbs Higher,” InsideDefense.com, May 12, 2008.)
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attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 22 successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 27
attempts using both SM-3 and SM-2 Block IV missiles.
A December 2011 report on various DOD acquisition programs from DOD’s Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E’s annual report for FY2011—stated, in the
section on the Aegis BMD program, that
In FY[20]11, Aegis BMD demonstrated, for the first time, the capability to engage an
intermediate-range separating ballistic missile in the midcourse phase with an SM-3 Block
IA interceptor. In that engagement, the firing ship used track data forwarded by C2BMC
from an AN/TPY-2 (FBM) radar to develop a firing solution. The engagement, which
exercised Aegis BMD 3.6.1 launch-on-remote functionality, demonstrated an important type
of engagement capability needed to support Phase 1 of the PAA for defense of Europe. Cued
engagements against longer-range targets would be expected in the European theater.
Anomalous behavior was observed during the flyout of the SM-3 Block IA interceptor in
FTM-15, but the anomaly did not preclude an intercept. If the anomaly occurred under
different engagement conditions, it could have had an impact on the success of the
engagement. However, it should be noted that the anomaly was not observed in any of the 21
previous SM-3 flyouts. The cause of the anomaly is under investigation by the program.
Aegis BMD continues to improve its interoperability with other BMDS elements and
sensors, as demonstrated in recent ground testing. Improvements in interoperability are still
needed, however, to ensure that Aegis BMD can send and receive cues and track data of
sufficient quality to support PAA Phase 1, which will be deployed at the end of CY11.
FTM-16 Event 2 failed to demonstrate the capability to intercept a ballistic missile with the
new SM-3 Block IB interceptor fired from an Aegis BMD 4.0.1 ship. Although the
interceptor failed to intercept the target, many of the new capabilities of the Aegis BMD
4.0.1 system were exercised during the mission, and functioned as designed. FTM-16 Event
2 was the first developmental firing mission with the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 system. A Failure
Review Board is determining the root cause.2324
For further discussion of Aegis BMD flight tests—including a May 2010 magazine article and
supplementary white paper in which two professors with scientific backgrounds criticize DOD
claims of successes in Aegis (and other DOD) BMD flight tests—see the Appendix.
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program
Japan
Japan’s interest in BMD, and in cooperating with the United States on the issue, was heightened
in August 1998 when North Korea test-fired a Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile that flew over Japan
before falling into the Pacific.2425 In addition to cooperating with the United States on development
of technologies for the SM-3 Block IIA missile, Japan is modifying all six of its Aegis destroyers
2324
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2011 Annual Report, December 2011, p. 257.
For a discussion, see CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and
Prospects, by Richard P. Cronin. This archived report was last updated on March 19, 2002. See also CRS Report
RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
2425
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with an approximate equivalent of the 3.6.1 version Aegis BMD system. (Japan’s previous plans
called for modifying four of the six ships.) As of December 2010, four of Japan’s Aegis ships had
received the modification.2526 Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have conducted four flight tests
of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor, achieving three successful exo-atmospheric
intercepts.
Other Countries
Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD
system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Spain, Germany, Denmark, South Korea, and Australia. As mentioned earlier, Spain, South
Korea, and Australia either operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other
countries operate destroyers and frigates with different combat systems that may have potential
for contributing to BMD operations.
An October 3, 2011, press report stated that
The Netherlands, which has had a longtime interest in a missile shield, is pressing ahead to
build up its own capabilities. The Dutch defense ministry plans to expand the capabilities of
the Thales Smart-L radar on Dutch frigates to take on BMD roles. The program’s value is
estimated at €100-250 million, including logistics support and spares.
Other European navies using the sensor may follow the Dutch lead.
Dutch Defense Minister Hans Hillen notes that the Smart-L effort would help address the
BMD sensor shortage within the NATO alliance. Citing NATO’s decision last year to take a
more expansive approach to BMD, Hillen says Smart-L could give the ALTBMD [Active
Layered Theater BMD] command-and control backbone the required long-range targetdetection analysis to help identify where a threat originates.
The Netherlands has already carried out a sensor trial for the expanded role in cooperation
with the U.S. Navy. The move does not include the purchase of Raytheon Standard Missile
SM-3 interceptors.
Both hardware and software modifications to the combat management system are needed.
All four [of the Dutch navy’s] De Zeven Provincien-class frigates would be modified to
ensure that two can be deployed, even as one is in maintenance and the fourth is being
readied for operations.
Thales is due to complete a series of studies to prepare for the acquisition of the upgrade in
the third quarter of 2012. The goal is to have the first frigates ready for operations by 2017.
All four should be upgraded by the end of that year.
Although the Netherlands is leading the program, other Smart-L users, including the German
navy and Denmark, have been monitoring the effort. France also has shown interest in the
system, Hillen said in a letter to legislators.
France also wants to upgrade its Aster 30 interceptor to give it a basic BMD capability,
although a formal contract has not been awarded….
2526
John Liang, “Japan To Increase Aegis BMD Ship Fleet From Four To Six,” Inside the Navy, December 27, 2010.
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Raytheon, meanwhile, is still fighting to win a foothold for its Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) in
Europe. The company continues its push to persuade continental navies to embrace the SM-3
Block 1B for missile defense roles, and says it has largely validated the dual-mode data link
that would be key to the concept.
The data link would feature both S- and X-band capability—the former to support the Aegis
radar system used by the U.S. and others, and the latter for the Smart-L/APAR (active
phased array radar) combination used, for instance, by the Dutch navy.2627
FY2013 Funding Request
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. As shown in Table 3, MDA’s proposed FY2013
budget requests a total of $2,303.0 million in procurement and research and development funding
for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for Aegis Ashore sites that are to be part of the EPAA,
which is referred to in the table as funding for the land-based SM-3.
Table 3. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts, FY2012-FY2017
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding; FY2012 is actual;
FY2013 is requested; FY2014-FY2017 are programmed)
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
565.4
389.6
757.0
834.3
775.7
1,003.0
Procurement
Aegis BMD (Line 31)
Research, development, test & evaluation (RDT&E)
Next-generation Aegis missile (SM-3 IIB)
(PE 0603902C, line 65)
13.4
224.1
295.2
455.4
508.4
430.2
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C, line 86)
988.9
992.4
960.9
950.1
1,030.2
958.7
Land-based SM-3 (LBSM3)
(PE0604881C, line 107)
306.2
276.3
127.2
113.7
47.7
56.2
Aegis SM-3 IIA Co-development
(PE0604881C, line 108)
473.8
420.6
273.9
200.7
185.0
46.1
SUBTOTAL RDT&E
1,782.3
1,913.4
1,657.2
1,719.9
1,771.3
1,491.2
TOTAL
2,347.7
2,303.0
2,414.2
2,554.2
2,547.0
2,494.2
Source: FY2013 budget-justification books for MDA for Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, DefenseWide (Volume 2a) and for Procurement, Defense-Wide (Volume 2b).
2627
Robert Wall, Amy Svitak, and Amy Butler, “Supporting Role,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 3,
2011: 28-29. A shorter version of the story was published as Robert Wall, “Dutch Press Forward On Ship-Based
Missile Defense Effort,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 27, 2011: 4.
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Issues for Congress
Reduction in Ramp-Up Rate for BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns a reduction under the proposed FY2013
budget in the ramp-up rate for numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships over the next few years.
Table 4 shows projected numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships under the FY2013 compared to
projected numbers under the FY2012 budget.
Table 4. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships Under FY2012 and FY2013 Budgets
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
28
32
36
37
38
38
37
37
37
3
4
6
6
6
FY2012 budget
Conversions
23
New-built
DDG-51s
0
0
0
0
1a
Total
23
28
32
36
38
41
42
43
43
43
24
29
32
32
32
32
32
32
TBD
TBD
3b
4b
6b
7b
FY2013 budget
Conversions
New-built
DDG-51s
0
0
0
0
0
1b
Total
24
29
32
32
32
33
35
36
TBD
+6
TBD
+6
-4
-6
-8
-7
-7
not
clear
not
clear
FY2013 plan compared to FY2012 plan
+1
+1
NC
Source: FY2012 and FY2013 budget submissions.
Notes: TBD is to be determined; NC is no change.
a.
Navy budget-justification documents for FY2012 showed the DDG-51 procured in FY2010 entering service
in FY2016, not FY2015 as shown in this table.
b.
Figures taken from Navy’s FY2013 budget submission. MDA shows two ships as being in service by FY2016
(as opposed to the one ship shown in the Navy’s budget submission as being in service by then).
As can be seen Table 4, under the FY2013 budget, there are to be 36 BMD-capable Aegis ships
by FY2018, or 7 less than projected under the FY2012 budget for FY2018.
The proposal under the FY2013 budget to retire seven Aegis cruisers early, in FY2013 and
FY2014 (see “Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers” in “Background”), may explain part of
the difference between the ramp-up rates under the two budget plans: as mentioned earlier, one of
these seven ships has been given a capability for BMD operations, and some or all of the other six
were scheduled to be modified for BMD operations at some point.
Some observers have been concerned that demands for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing
faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. The reduction in the ramp-up rate for
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numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships under the proposed FY2013 budget compared to the
FY2012 budget might, other things held equal, reinforce such concerns. On the other hand, as
mentioned earlier (see “October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain” in
“Background”), a DOD official has been quoted in the press as saying that the EPAA mission to
be performed by the four BMD-capable Aegis ships to be homeported at Rota, Spain, would
instead require 10 U.S.-homeported BMD-capable Aegis ships to perform. On that basis, it would
appear that homeporting four BMD-capable Aegis ships at Rota, Spain, would, other things held
equal, reduce demands for BMD-capable Aegis ships by a net six ships. On that basis, in terms of
the balance between demands for BMD-capable Aegis ships and available numbers of BMDcapable Aegis ships, the decline in the ramp-up rate in the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships
under the proposed FY2013 budget compared to the FY2012 budget might be viewed as offset to
a substantial degree, at least in certain years, by the plan to forward-homeport four BMD-capable
Aegis ships at Rota.
Concerning demands for BMD-capable Aegis ships in general, a September 16, 2011, press report
stated:
“The BMD ships between now and 2017 are basically deployed for seven months, home for
seven months, deployed for seven months, home for seven months for the next six years,”
[Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead] said. “With the retention environment
we’re in now, we’re not seeing the effects of that on our people yet, but when the economy
turns, that’s a pretty brutal pace.”2728
An April 2011 Navy report to Congress on naval force structure and BMD stated the following:
The Navy currently has sufficient capacity to meet the most critical demands for multimission surface combatants. However, the Navy does not have the capacity to meet all GCC
[Global Combatant Commander] demands for BMD-capable surface combatants without
breaking currently established Chief of Naval Operations Personnel Tempo program limits
for deployment lengths, dwell and homeport tempo. Navy’s funded BMD upgrade plan is
structured to balance the need to meet current multi-mission and Aegis BMD operational
requirements against the need to increase Aegis BMD capacity and upgrade existing BMDcapable Aegis ships to pace the future threat.
The Navy, in conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), has established a plan to
increase the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships from 23 in FY2011 to 41 in FY2016 to
begin to address this shortfall. This plan increases capacity through a combination of
installing Aegis BMD 3.6.1 / 4.0.1 / 5.0 suites in existing Aegis ships (Aegis Modernization
Program) and new construction commencing with DDG-113. This combined upgrade/new
construction approach is designed to mitigate both the near term operational demand for
multi-mission (including BMD) large surface combatants and the increasing Aegis BMD
capability and capacity demand in the future.
The analytical work associated with the Navy’s ongoing Force Structure Analysis has
progressed to the point that a FY2024 requirement for 94 multi-mission large surface
combatants has been established. The global proliferation of land-attack ballistic missiles and
the anticipated proliferation of anti-ship ballistic missiles underpins a related requirement for
all multi-mission large surface combatants with Aegis weapon systems to be BMD-capable
beyond ~2025….
2728
Dan Taylor, “CNO: Biggest Concern Is That Shrinking Budgets Will Stretch Force Thin,” Inside the Navy,
September 19, 2011.
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The Navy and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have concluded that the Geographic
Combatant Commanders’ (GCCs) demand for surface combatants with Aegis BMD
capability will outpace capacity through approximately 2018. This conclusion was reached
based on an assessment that considered the current and projected ballistic missile threat;
current and projected requests from the GCCs including the Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) for defense of Europe directed by the President; other force generation factors such as
maintenance availabilities necessary to ensure the ships reach their expected service lives,
training requirements and deployment lengths; and the deployment of Aegis Ashore to offset
some of the growing demand for BMD capability….
BMD-capable large surface combatant requirements are independently determined by each
GCC based on theater operational planning and mission analyses that consider unique
regional factors such as the ballistic missile threat, threat dispersal, geography, size of the
defended area, and the specific number and disposition of defended assets. Each GCC
submits their fiscal year Aegis BMD requirement to the Joint Staff for validation. Once
validated, U.S. Fleet Forces Command provides a consolidated sourcing solution for large
surface combatants, to include those that are BMD-capable. The annual requirements and
sourcing solutions are reviewed by a Global Force Management Board which ensures
competing GCC requirements are properly prioritized based on overarching global defense
priorities and that the Navy’s limited BMD capacity is applied to the most critical needs.
The Global Force Management Board submits its requirements/sourcing recommendation to
SECDEF for approval, in the form of a Global Force Management Allocation Plan which
allocates Aegis BMD surface combatants to the GCC’s for specified timeframes. Emergent
GCC requirements for Aegis BMD combatants in response to unforeseen crises are subject
to a similar approval process, without the Global Force Management Board review. In this
case, SECDEF decisions represent adjustments to the annual Global Force Management
Allocation Plan.
The total number of ships required to support the Phased Adaptive Approach to ballistic
missile defense of Europe will be based on the operational planning and mission analysis
factors noted above, combined with force generation factors such as maintenance, training
and forward stationing or rotational model considerations. US European Command’s
operational plan for the ballistic missile defense of Europe has not been approved as of the
date of this report….
US European Command’s operational plan for the ballistic missile defense of Europe has not
yet been approved, but could incorporate up to two Aegis Ashore batteries. Using a standard
rotational BMD force structure model of five ships to sustain 1.0 presence, each Aegis
Ashore battery could make up to five ships available to service Aegis BMD combatant
requirements that would otherwise go unresourced….
All Aegis BMD surface combatants undergo the training, deployment and maintenance
phases that comprise the Fleet Response Plan. These phases are balanced to ensure each crew
is proficient across the full spectrum of missions the ship is capable of performing; to meet
the operational requirements of the GCCs; and to ensure these capital assets reach their
expected service life. In the near term, this balance will entail deployments for BMD-capable
surface combatants of about seven months.28
2829
29
U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Strategy and Policy (N51), Report to Congress On
Naval Force Structure and Missile Defense, April 2011, 12 pp.
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Demands for Aegis Ships in General
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns demands from U.S. regional military
commanders for Aegis ships in general. Some observers are concerned that demands for Aegis
ships for conducting BMD operations could strain the Navy’s ability to provide regional military
commanders with Aegis ships for performing non-BMD missions in various locations around the
world.
The Navy’s Aegis ships are multi-mission platforms that are used for performing a range of nonBMD missions, including forward-deployed presence for regional deterrence, reassurance, and
stabilization; partnership-building activities; humanitarian assistance and disaster response
(HADR) operations; maritime security operations (including anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations; counter-terrorism
operations; and (if need be) conventional warfighting operations. In conventional warfighting
operations, Aegis ships could be called upon to perform a variety of non-BMD functions,
including anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, strike warfare and naval surface fire support, and
antisubmarine warfare. Locations that are good for performing BMD operations might not be
good for performing non-BMD operations, and vice versa.
The Navy’s force-level goal for cruisers and destroyers is to achieve and maintain a force of 94
about
90 ships. The Navy’s FY2012FY2013 30-year (FY2012-FY2041FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan does not contain enough
enough destroyers to maintain a force of 94about 90 cruisers and destroyers consistently over the
long run. The
Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a cruiser-destroyercruiserdestroyer force that
drops remains below 9490 ships in FY2025,every year in the 30-year plan except FY2027, and
that reaches a minimum of 6878 ships (i.e., 2612 ships, or about 28%,
13%, below the required figure of 94 ships) in FY2034, and remains 16 or more ships below the 94ship figure through the end of the 30-year period
about 90 ships) in FY2014-FY2015 and again in FY2034. The projected cruiser-destroyer
shortfall is the
largest projected shortfall of any ship category in the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding
plan. Another
CRS report discusses the projected cruiser-destroyer shortfall in greater detail.2930
Rear Admiral Archer Macy, the director of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Organization, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 20, 2010, that DOD
does not plan to give BMD-capable Aegis ships a strict role of performing BMD operations only.
He also stated, however, that it was possible, depending on ballistic missile threats, that BMDcapable Aegis ships might sometimes be constrained to certain operating areas.3031
As mentioned earlier (see “October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain” in
“Background”), Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated the following as part of the October 5,
2011, joint announcement about homeporting four BMD-capable Aegis ships at Rota, Spain, as
part of the EPAA:
Beyond missile defense, the Aegis destroyers will perform a variety of other important
missions, including participating in the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, as well as joining
in naval exercises, port visits, and maritime security cooperation activities….
2930
CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
3031
Dan Taylor, “Macy: Navy Increases Total Aegis BMD Assets Over FYDP To 38 Ships,” Inside the Navy, April 26,
2010.
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The agreement also enables the United States to provide rapid and responsive support to the
U.S. Africa and U.S. Central Commands, as needed.3132
An April 2011 Navy report to Congress on naval force structure and BMD stated the following:
The Navy’s operating concept for maritime BMD features a graduated readiness posture that
allows BMD-capable Aegis ships to be on a BMD mission tether and employed concurrently
in other missions such as strike warfare, air defense, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare,
information warfare, high value asset protection, or maritime interdiction to contribute to
overall GCC [Global Combatant Commander] naval requirements. While Aegis ships
performing a BMD mission do not lose the capability to conduct these other missions,
specific mission effectiveness may be affected by optimizing the ships’ position for BMD
and/or application of the ship’s radar resources to the BMD mission.
The Navy currently has sufficient capacity to meet the most critical demands for multimission surface combatants….
The analytical work associated with the Navy’s ongoing Force Structure Analysis has
progressed to the point that a FY2024 requirement for 94 multi-mission large surface
combatants has been established. This requirement assumed that the Phased Adaptive
Approach for the ballistic missile defense of Europe would incorporate two Aegis Ashore
batteries….
Each GCC’s multi-mission surface combatant requirement, including the BMD mission, is
constantly evolving to reflect changes in the global security environment, our National
Military Strategy, and other Department of Defense guidance related to operations and
contingency plans. Within this context, BMD-capable surface combatant requirements are
independently determined by each GCC based on mission analyses that consider unique
regional factors such as the ballistic missile threat, threat dispersal, geography, size of the
defended area, and the specific number and disposition of defended assets. Other mission
requirements are similarly derived and the GCC’s total surface combatant requirement is
ultimately determined considering specific operational objectives and the extent to which
supporting schemes of maneuver accommodate multi-mission employment of Aegis BMD
surface combatants.3233
A January 4, 2010, news report stated:
No sooner did the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) system become operational in 2008
than U.S. combatant commanders started asking for BMD-equipped ships to begin patrolling
their areas.
Central Command needed a “shooter” in the northern Arabian Gulf. European Command
wanted one in the eastern Mediter-ranean. Pacific Command already had Aegis ships with
limited BMD capabilities on guard around Japan for a potential launch from North Korea.
3132
“Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed October 6, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/
search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
3233
U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Strategy and Policy (N51), Report to Congress On
Naval Force Structure and Missile Defense, April 2011, 12 pp.
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The demand for BMD ships is only expected to increase, driven in part by rising concerns
about Iran’s intentions and the U.S. decision in September to cancel an anti-missile system in
Poland and the Czech Republic and rely instead on Aegis.
But the Navy has a relatively small number of such ships, and those destroyers and cruisers
are designed to carry out a wide range of war-fighting tasks.
As a result, while Navy commanders are pleased with the expanding capabilities of their
Aegis ships, they’re also somewhat guarded about trumpeting the advances.
“We can’t constrain assets to one mission,” a senior officer said last month. “They need to do
a variety of other missions.” Worries that valuable Aegis ships might be locked into the
BMD mission were discussed in December at a two-day seminar at the National Defense
University (NDU) in Washington. Reporters were allowed to quote comments made at the
seminar under the condition that no speaker be identified.
“Sea-based ballistic missile defense is a necessary component of any theater defense,” said
the senior officer. “We need to find ways to get folks to use the ships in ways consistent with
their being a ship—to realize they are not a point-defense asset.” One analyst added, “The
demand signal is ahead of the pot of ships.” U.S. Navy spokesman Lt. Tommy Buck said the
service is working to manage the demand.
“Combatant commanders need to understand BMD-capable ships are multimission-capable.
BMD is one available asset,” Buck said Dec. 18.
The Navy is also working on how to respond, said Vice Adm. Samuel Locklear, director of
the Navy Staff.
“We have a small Navy today—the smallest since 1916—yet we have a growing global
demand for maritime forces, maritime security operations. And now we have a growing
demand for maritime ballistic missile defense. Our ships and our crews and our systems are
up to the challenge, but it’s a capacity issue for us,” Locklear said to a reporter during the
NDU seminar.
“As the capacity grows faster than we can grow the number of ships we have—which is
always difficult, particularly in the demanding fiscal environment we’re in—we have to look
at ways to deploy these ships so that we can get the job done and still have a reasonable
expectation that we can take care of the ship and the crew,” Locklear said. “So we’re looking
at a lot of different options as to how we’ll do that as this demand grows. But we are limited
in capacity.” Locklear said that despite meeting demands from joint commanders, the Navy
has “to some degree preserved the command and control. Navy component commanders still
command and control these ships.” But, he added, “What we’ve had to do is to spread these
multimission platforms more thinly across a growing number of demands globally.”
27 BMD Ships By 2013
Twenty-one cruisers and destroyers will have been upgraded with the Aegis BMD capability
by early 2010, and six more destroyers are to receive the upgrade in 2012 and 2013. But at
least one senior officer at the seminar noted “there will be no more new ships for missile
defense.” The demand has already affected deployments. Early in 2009, for example, The
Sullivans, a Florida-based destroyer on deployment with a carrier group, moved to Japan for
a few weeks to pick up the exercise schedule of a Japan-based BMD destroyer that was
called on by Central Command to guard the northern Ara-bian Gulf.
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This fall, a San Diego-based ship, the destroyer Higgins, deployed to the eastern
Mediterranean to provide BMD defense for European Command and take part in exercises.
Both moves are unusual, as it’s rare for an Atlantic Fleet ship to visit Japan or for a Pacific
ship to patrol the Mediterranean. Such cross-deployments require more coordination by fleet
planners.
“Effective global force management requires global visibility on requirements,” Buck said.
“U.S. Fleet Forces Command [headquartered in Norfolk, Va.] and Pacific Fleet
[headquartered in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii] collaborate, coordinate and communicate to have
more complete knowledge of location and status of fleet capabilities and work to best
employ those capabilities to meet global combatant commander requirements to include
BMD.” The senior officer said one way to manage demand is to encourage combatant
commanders to give “sufficient warning to have ships on station. We need to remind
[combatant commanders] that these are multimission ships.” The BMD cruisers and
destroyers are also equipped to handle anti-submarine, land-attack, air-defense and other
tasks.3334
U.S. Economic Impact of Shifting Four Aegis Ships to Rota, Spain
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the U.S. economic impact of the plan to
shift the homeport of four BMD-capable Aegis ships to Rota, Spain (see “October 5, 2011,
Announcement of Homeporting in Spain” in “Background”). As mentioned earlier, the Prime
Minister of Spain, as part of the October 5, 2011, joint announcement of this plan, stated that
this initiative will have a positive impact, in socio-economic terms, on our country, and most
especially on the Bay of Cadiz [area near Rota].
Permanently basing four vessels in Rota will require investing in the Base’s infrastructure,
and contracts with service providers, thus generating approximately a thousand new jobs,
both directly and indirectly.
For the shipyards, and for Spain’s defence industry, the foreseeable impact will also be
highly positive, as the USA is considering conducting the vessels’ maintenance and upkeep
at the nearby San Fernando shipyards, in the province of Cadiz. In addition, there will be
significant transfer of state-of-the-art technology, from which Spain can benefit.3435
Assessing the U.S. economic impact of the plan to shift the homeport of four BMD-capable Aegis
ships to Rota, Spain, could include accounting for, among other things, the economic impact of
•
U.S. personnel and their families spending their paychecks in Spain rather than in
the current home port areas;
•
the Navy performing overhaul, maintenance, and repair work on the ships in
Spain rather than in the United States; and
3334
Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Juggles Ships To Fill BMD Demands,” Defense News, January 4, 2010. Material
in brackets as in original.
3435
“Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm.
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•
the Navy purchasing supplies for these ships in Spain rather than from sources in
the current home port areas.
Regarding the first item above, CRS asked the Navy for the total dollar value of personnel pay
and allowances per year associated with the four destroyers designated to be homeported at Rota.
The Navy replied that:
The annual military personnel cost for the four DDGs designated to deploy as Forward
Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) in Rota is provided below. All personnel are ships force
[i.e., ship crew members].
$ millions
FY 2013
FY 2014
FY 2015
FY 2016
FY2017
MPN/RPN $0
$0
$67.1
$131.6
$134.0
$137.735736
Regarding second item above, the Navy states that
The annual ship maintenance cost [in millions] for the four DDGs designated to deploy as
Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) in Rota is provided in Table 1.
FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17
FY15
FY16
FY17
FDNF-based1, 2
$40.79
$44.99
$47.50
$43.06
CONUS-based
$49.04
$51.10
$40.85
$38.77
Cost Differential
-$8.25
-$6.11
$6.65
$4.29
Table 1. Total Annual Maintenance Cost for Four DDGs Deploying as FDNF-based Forces
vs. their Total Annual Maintenance Cost as CONUS-based Forces.
Notes:
1. Prior to FDNF deployment, all vessels receive a large maintenance availability to correct
known deficiencies and groom Ballistic Missile Defense systems. Consequently, some of the
depot maintenance work originally scheduled for accomplishment in FY14 and FY15 has
been moved to FY12 and/or FY13, and the cost differential is lower than normal. Cost
differentials in FY16 and FY17 are more representative of expected future year differential
maintenance costs.
2. Incremental maintenance costs are based on two ships deploying in FY14, followed by
two additional ships in FY15, and account for a change in maintenance availability
periodicity from 32 months CONUS-based to 17 months FDNF-based. Costs include
continuous maintenance, emergent and other restricted technical availabilities, voyage
repairs, fly-away teams and regional maintenance center support.36
3537
Regarding the third item above, the Navy states that:
36
Source: Navy information paper dated February 29, 2012, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on
March 19, 2012. MPN and RPN are the Military Personnel, Navy, and Reserve Personnel, Navy, appropriations
accounts.
3637
Source: Navy information paper dated March 19, 2012, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on
March 19, 2012. The information paper expressed the cost figures in thousands (e.g., $40,790 for FDNF-based in
FY2014); they are converted here into millions (e.g., $40.79 million). CONUS is continental United States.
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Regarding the third item above, the Navy states that:
A Forward Deployed Naval Force of four DDGs is expected to spend a total of
approximately $7.2M per year on direct Navy purchases in Rota, Spain, that otherwise would
have been spent in CONUS. These purchases consist of:
•
Utilities $6M per year
•
Consumables $1.2M per year (only open purchases made by ships’ company)3738
U.S. vs. European Naval Contributions to European BMD
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns European naval contributions to
European BMD capabilities and operations compared to U.S. naval contributions to European
BMD capabilities and operations. Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following:
•
How does the total value of European naval contributions to European BMD
capabilities and operations compare to the total value of the U.S. contributions to
European BMD capabilities and operations?
•
Given anticipated reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending resulting
from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011), as
well as the potential for giving BMD capabilities to European navy ships (see
“Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program” in “Background”),
should the United States seek increased investment by European countries in
their naval BMD capabilities so as to reduce the need for assigning BMD-capable
U.S. Navy Aegis ships to the EPAA?
Target for Simulating Endo-Atmospheric Flight of DF-21 ASBM
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the lack of a target for simulating the
endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile. DOD’s
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), in a December 2001 report (DOT&E’s
annual report for FY2011), stated:
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Target
A threat representative Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) target for operational open-air
testing has become an immediate test resource need. China is fielding the DF-21D ASBM,
which threatens U.S. and allied surface warships in the Western Pacific. While the Missile
Defense Agency has exo-atmospheric targets in development, no program currently exists
for an endo-atmospheric target. The endo-atmospheric ASBM target is the Navy’s
responsibility, but it is not currently budgeted. The Missile Defense Agency estimates the
non-recurring expense to develop the exo-atmospheric target was $30 million with each
target costing an additional $30 million; the endo-atmospheric target will be more expensive
to produce according to missile defense analysts. Numerous Navy acquisition programs will
37
Source: Navy information paper dated March 8, 2012, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on
March 9, 2012.
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require an ASBM surrogate in the coming years, although a limited number of targets (3-5)
may be sufficient to validate analytical models.38
require an ASBM surrogate in the coming years, although a limited number of targets (3-5)
may be sufficient to validate analytical models.39
38
Source: Navy information paper dated March 8, 2012, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on
March 9, 2012.
39
Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2011 Annual Report, December 2011, p. 294.
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A February 28, 2012, press report stated:
“Numerous programs will require” a test missile to stand in for the Chinese DF-21D,
“including self-defense systems used on our carriers and larger amphibious ships to counter
anti-ship ballistic missiles,” [Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test
and evaluation] said in an e-mailed statement....
“No Navy target program exists that adequately represents an anti-ship ballistic missile’s
trajectory,” Gilmore said in the e-mail. The Navy “has not budgeted for any study,
development, acquisition or production” of a DF-21D target, he said.
Lieutenant Alana Garas, a Navy spokeswoman, said in an e-mail that the service
“acknowledges this is a valid concern and is assessing options to address it. We are unable to
provide additional details.”...
Gilmore, the testing chief, said his office first warned the Navy and Pentagon officials in
2008 about the lack of an adequate target. The warnings continued through this year, when
the testing office for the first time singled out the DF-21D in its annual public report....
The Navy “can test some, but not necessarily all, potential means of negating anti-ship
ballistic missiles,” without a test target, Gilmore said.3940
Capability of SM-3 Block IIB Interceptor
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective capability of the SM-3
Block IIB interceptor for conducting certain kinds of intercepts called “early intercepts” as part of
the EPAA. A June 13, 2011, press report stated:
When asked what the Pentagon’s plan is for countermeasures if early intercept does not
materialize with the [SM-3 Block] IIB in 2020, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials
simply state: “We fully expect to have a viable early-intercept capability with the SM-3
Block IIB in the 2020 time period.”...
At issue today is whether the architecture as envisioned is achievable; and the piece most
critics question is the plan to achieve early intercept and protect the Eastern U.S. from an
Iranian ICBM attack.
USAF Gen. (ret.) Lester Lyles, who led the MDA when it was called the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization, is co-chairing a Defense Science Board task force review of the earlyintercept strategy with Adm. (ret.) William Fallon, who headed U.S. Pacific Command. The
report is being written and will likely be briefed to Pentagon leaders in the fall.
38
Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2011 Annual Report, December 2011, p. 294.
Tony Capaccio, “Navy Lacks Targets To Test U.S. Defenses Against China Missile,” Bloomberg Government
(bgov.com), February 28, 2012.
39
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Lyles declines to discuss his findings until they are briefed to the Pentagon. Industry and
government sources familiar with the study have different views on what the findings will
be. Some say the task force questions the ability to achieve early intercept with the time and
money available. Others say the report will outline what can be achieved with the current
strategy.
40
Tony Capaccio, “Navy Lacks Targets To Test U.S. Defenses Against China Missile,” Bloomberg Government
(bgov.com), February 28, 2012.
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Whatever the outcome, the results are likely to influence the SM-3 IIB program, whether it
moves forward and, if it does, what the missile will look like. The IIB is the notional longrange missile killer that will be fielded in Phase IV by 2020 for early intercept to fulfill the
promise of protecting the Eastern U.S. and most of Europe from an Iranian ICBM attack....
GMD advocates point to the option of placing interceptors at Fort Drum, N.Y., to provide a
deeper magazine and coverage for the Eastern U.S.....
The question of whether a IIB missile can achieve early intercept, and how to do it, is likely
be to sorted out this summer. The Defense Science Board will report its findings, and the
MDA is likely to request funding for the IIB strategy in the fiscal 2013 budget proposal that
is due to Congress next February.4041
A June 17, 2011, press report states:
A Defense Science Board (DSB) report on early missile intercept is already prompting
discussion on Capitol Hill over how U.S. strategic forces are funded.
The Obama administration is pursuing the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
defense, which by 2020 would develop the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor to protect the U.S.
and Europe against long-range missiles from North Korea and Iran. In April, Boeing,
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon each won concept definition and program planning awards
worth at least $41 million.
But the DSB study, led by retired Air Force Gen. Lester Lyles and retired Navy Adm.
William Fallon, casts doubt on a central capability of that interceptor—primarily the ability
to hit an incoming missile before it deploys countermeasures, according to Senate
Republican aides. The study’s unclassified version also finds that the goal of early
interception may lead to a less-capable system overall and rather than investing in the
interceptor, improvements to radars, satellites and communications are also important, an
aide says.
With that information, already a critical question is emerging on Capitol Hill: During a
deficit crisis, should the government be spending $1.7 billion over the next five years to
develop the SM-3 Block IIB if its ultimate goal is in doubt?
At least the rationale for pursuing the interceptor—replacing a missile defense site based in
Poland and the Czech Republic—is in line for scrutiny.
“If the administration continues to sell early interceptors as a way of going after
countermeasures, that’s not going to work,” one aide says.
So in that case, does it make sense to continue working on the IIB missile for other reasons?
And if not, what are the alternatives?
40
Amy Butler, “End Game,” Aviation Week & Space Technology,” June 13, 2011: 40.
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One camp could emerge in support of upgrades to the current Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system or the creation of a site in the eastern United States. Another group may
want to improve on the capabilities of the Raytheon-led SM-3 Block IIA.4142
41
Amy Butler, “End Game,” Aviation Week & Space Technology,” June 13, 2011: 40.
Jen DiMascio, “DSB Report Raises Questions About SM-3 Block IIB Costs,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
June 17, 2011: 4.
42
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A July 6, 2011, letter to the editor from the two co-chairmen of the DSB task force in question
and the chairman of the full DSB stated:
The Defense Science Board (DSB) is now completing a review on Science and Technology
Issues of Early Intercept (EI) Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility as a concept to enhance
missile defense....
In previous work, the DSB found the EI concept helpful in national missile defense against
long-range ballistic missiles. In the current review, EI, as defined by the study’s terms of
reference, was judged less helpful in regional missile defense against shorter range regional
ballistic missiles....
The DSB concluded that the Missile Defense Agency is on the right track in developing
European Phased Adapted Approach (EPAA) options, including continued evolution of the
SM-3 family of missiles, which will expand the battle space and provide more engagement
opportunities in the regional defense provided by the EPAA. The DSB also examined the
potential in the EPAA context for EI in regional defense against short-range missiles before
threat payloads could be deployed, and concluded that this was not a viable option because
of technical constraints - primarily related to the very short payload deployment times and
the present absence of adequate sensors/Ballistic Missile C3 to overcome this.
The fact that this form of EI is not viable in shorter-range regional applications does not
imply that either SM-3 family interceptors or the EPAA concept are flawed. In general, EI,
including intercepts of longer- range missiles before the threat missile reaches apogee, can
provide for multiple engagement opportunities and more effective defenses.
MDA is on the right track in pursuing this capability for national missile defense, and
examining the potential application in regional defense as a function of the range of threat
missiles.
The DSB did not conclude that EI is flawed. Nor did they conclude that the EPAA approach
or the SM-3 family were flawed. The DSB did conclude that EI would have a very limited
role in regional defense against shorter range missile threats.4243
Technical Risk in Aegis BMD Program
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is how much technical risk there is in the Aegis
BMD program.
41
Jen DiMascio, “DSB Report Raises Questions About SM-3 Block IIB Costs,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
June 17, 2011: 4.
42 A March 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing major
DOD weapon acquisition programs44 provided assessments of the technical risk in four Aegis
BMD development efforts; these assessments are presented below.
SM-3 Block IB Missile
The March 2012 GAO report stated the following regarding the SM-3 Block IB missile:
43
Letter to the editor from Admiral William J. Fallon, U.S. Navy, retired, task force co-chairman; General Lester
Lyles, U.S. Air Force, retired, task force co-chairman and DSB vice chairman; and Paul G. Kaminski, DSB chairman,
published under the title “‘Early Intercept’ Not Flawed,” Washington Times, July 6, 2011: B2.
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March 2011 GAO Report
A March 2011 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on DOD BMD programs stated
the following regarding the Aegis BMD program:
Aegis BMD did not conduct any developmental intercept flight tests in fiscal year 2010,
although it did participate in several other BMDS flight and ground tests to assess BMD
functionality and interoperability with the BMDS. During fiscal year 2010, MDA expected
to conduct FTM-15 to demonstrate Aegis 3.6’s ability to launch the SM-3 IA interceptor
using data from a remote sensor against an intermediate-range ballistic missile target.
However, the flight test has been delayed due to target availability. This had a ripple effect
on other scheduled events, resulting in a delay in demonstrating key capabilities of Aegis
3.6.1 with SM-3 IA and Aegis 4.0.1 with SM-3 IB. The FTM-15 is key to demonstrating
capability of the IA interceptor to engage threat missiles in the range expected for European
PAA Phase I, planned for deployment by December 2011. In other testing, a Japanese Aegis
BMD destroyer conducted a successful intercept of a separating target using an SM-3 IA
interceptor.
Aegis 4.0.1 with SM-3 IB has executed more slowly than expected in fiscal year 2010. At
the last execution review of the fiscal year, progress toward verifying the SM-3 IB
engagement capability required action, and 6 of the 14 development phase exit criteria
tracking program execution were assessed as not on track, including those related to
requirements, affordability, design, manufacturing, and weapon system safety. The slower
pace primarily reflects delays in SM-3 IB interceptor development.
Aegis 4.0.1, with the SM-3 IB interceptor, is expected to have increased discrimination,
engagement coordination, threat missile range capability and raid capacity. Technology
development of the interceptor’s Throttleable Divert Attitude Control System (TDACS) is
following a high-risk path due to continuing resolution of issues discovered during subassembly hazard testing. The TDACS issues relate to the operational suitability and expected
lifetime of the interceptor. The first intercept flight test, FTM-16, was moved into the third
quarter fiscal year 2011 to allow time to investigate and resolve the issues. FTM-16 is critical
to demonstrating the interceptor performance, as well as being required to certify the Aegis
combat system. According to the Director, MDA, the flight test was rescheduled to allow
time to complete qualification tests. Design verification and qualification tests validate
component performance, reliability and producibility. MDA has since determined the root
cause of the TDACS problem and identified two design improvements. However, due to
continuing delays redesigned TDACS components will not be included in the interceptor
manufactured for FTM- 16; instead, it will be manufactured using a new process control to
partially mitigate the issue. Further, MDA has since decided to conduct the flight test in the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011 without completing the qualification tests as originally
planned. The TDACS qualifications and verifications leading up to the FTM-16 intercept test
will be limited to the environmental conditions expected during the FTM-16 event.
Following FTM-16, the design changes to the TDACS will require the full set of design and
qualification testing.
We reported in February 2010 that planned interceptor production would precede knowledge
of interceptor performance, and recommended that MDA delay a decision to produce
interceptors to follow successful completion of developmental testing, a flight test, and
manufacturing readiness review. We reported again in December that the SM-3 IB test
schedule was not synchronized with planned production and financial commitments. This
schedule had become even more compressed as a result of TDACS redesign, and planned
requalification. As a result, MDA recently deferred planned interceptor production decisions
to follow redesign efforts, the manufacturing readiness review, and an additional flight test;
steps that could better inform those production decisions.
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While MDA characterized the first 30 interceptors as being test rounds, half remain
unassigned to a specific test. Furthermore, of those interceptors assigned to a test, some may
be produced earlier than necessary since they deliver 1 to 2 years prior to the scheduled test.
Program officials note the unassigned “test” rounds will provide information on reliability,
maintainability, and supportability, and verify cost estimates and production processes….
Aegis BMD 5.0 will not provide new mission capability; instead it will leverage the Navy’s
Aegis modernization effort, which transitions the cruisers’ and destroyers’ computers and
displays from military standard to commercial-off-the-shelf components. The modernization
effort will increase the number of cruisers and destroyers that have the potential to be BMD
capable from 27 to 84, and the installation of Aegis 5.0 in conjunction with the
modernization will add the BMD capability. Once Aegis 5.0 is available, Aegis ships with
version 3.6.1 may be upgraded directly to 5.0, instead of undergoing an interim installation
of 4.0.1 (estimated at $52 million per ship). Although it does not add new mission capability,
the migration into an open architecture environment requires significant modification and
testing of 8 of 10 major components of the Aegis weapons system. Execution reviews
already show signs of schedule compression and interdependencies of multiple efforts
increase schedule risk. As the European PAA’s new Aegis Ashore program is highly
dependent on the scheduled delivery of Aegis 5.0, delays could have significant
consequences for providing European BMD capability as planned….43
Regarding the Aegis Ashore program, the GAO report stated:
According to the Director of MDA, the idea of Aegis Ashore preceded the new European
PAA policy. Earlier in 2008 and 2009 MDA had been studying alternatives to the Arrow 3
program—a joint US-Israeli program designed for Israeli self-defense against short-range
ballistic missiles. MDA’s analysis had considered several land-based SM-3 options, and had
concluded that an Aegis with SM-3 was the preferred option. It is unclear how assumptions
and analysis related to Arrow-3 supported—and what if any additional technical analysis was
conducted to support—the selection of Aegis Ashore for the European PAA.
While MDA does not yet follow DOD’s standard acquisition processes, a robust
consideration of alternatives is a key first step in that process and is intended to assess the
operational effectiveness, costs, and risks of alternative weapon system solutions for
addressing a validated warfighting need. We reported in September 2009 that DOD often did
not effectively consider a broad range of alternatives for addressing a warfighting need or
assess technical and other risks associated with each alternative. Without a sufficient
comparison of alternatives and focus on technical and other risks, reviews of alternatives
may identify solutions that are not feasible and decision makers may approve programs
based on limited knowledge. While many factors can affect cost and schedule outcomes, we
found that programs that had a limited assessment of alternatives tended to have poorer
outcomes than those that had more robust assessments. The Office of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation is studying alternatives to Aegis Ashore.
A knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process in which certain knowledge
is acquired by key decision points before proceeding. In other words, demonstrating
technology maturity is a prerequisite for moving forward into system development, during
which the focus should be on design and integration. The President’s announcement of the
European PAA on September 17, 2009 officially began Aegis Ashore, and MDA placed
Aegis Ashore directly into the third acquisition development phase—product development.
43
Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:]Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability,
GAO-11-372, March 2011, pp. 58-60.
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MDA officials note that this decision was due to the understanding that Aegis Ashore would
be a modification of proven Aegis BMD capabilities. Yet Aegis Ashore has not yet
completed some of the activities MDA outlines for its first two development phases (materiel
solutions analysis and technology development), and is executing others concurrently with
activities in the third development phase (product development). For example, although
MDA’s acquisition oversight process identifies the following top-level tenets for phase
review entry/entrance criteria prior to entering the Product Development phase, Aegis
Ashore had not: obtained an independent cost estimate, prepared a life cycle cost estimate,
demonstrated critical technologies in the operational environment (land), or ensured
interoperability and integration with the larger BMDS. MDA’s knowledge points—typically
identified during the first MDA acquisition phase—identify information required to make
key decisions (e.g. program funding decisions, technology selections, capability declarations,
program continuation, or the selection of an alternative course of action) and manage
program risk. MDA’s knowledge points for Aegis Ashore were completely redefined less
than 3 months after being established.
DOD’s commitment to field Aegis Ashore by 2015 has resulted in significant schedule
compression for the program, even as MDA discovered issues that broadened the scope of
development and design, placing the program at increased risk of cost growth and schedule
delay. According to the Director, MDA, Aegis Ashore development is not a high risk
because it is based on the existing Aegis BMD system. However, while Aegis BMD has
demonstrated performance at sea, these demonstrations used the currently fielded 3.6.1
version of Aegis BMD with the SM-3 IA interceptor, not the newer variant of the Aegis
operating system and new interceptor that Aegis Ashore will use. Aegis Ashore is dependent
on next-generation versions of Aegis systems—Aegis 4.0.1 and Aegis 5.0—as well as the
new SM-3 IB interceptor, all of which are currently under development (see appendix III).
Moreover, a series of changes are required to further modify these new variants of Aegis
BMD for use on land with Aegis Ashore. These modifications include changes to the VLS;
suppression or disabling of certain features used at sea; design, integration, and fabrication of
a new deckhouse enclosure for the radar, and potential changes to the SM-3 IB interceptor.
Changes to those existing Aegis BMD components that will be reused for Aegis Ashore may
reduce their maturity in the context of the new Aegis Ashore program, and new features will
require testing and assessment to demonstrate their performance. MDA plans to conduct both
ground and flight tests prior to deployment, however these tests will not occur prior to
making production decisions.
Aegis Ashore expects to leverage the existing shipboard Aegis Combat System—comprised
of 32 sensors, communications, weapons, and countermeasures. However only 11 of these
will be reused for Aegis Ashore; the remaining 21 will need to be suppressed or otherwise
disabled, including the software that accounts for a ship’s pitch and yaw. While officials note
that current land-based testing processes for portions of the Aegis Combat System involve
similar suppression, the Aegis Ashore land-based configuration is unique and must still be
demonstrated through operational testing.
The program office assessed both the SPY-1 radar and the VLS as flight proven through
successful mission conditions, reflecting the assessment of the radar and VLS currently at
sea. However, these systems will operate on land, and it is unclear whether the radar’s
spectrum supportability is fully understood or accounted for. Also, the VLS will be modified
to address the differing protection, safety, and environmental requirements of its new landbased environment. Finally, MDA may modify the SM-3 Block IB for Aegis Ashore; the
extent of these changes remains unknown.
Both the radar and the VLS will be configured in removable enclosures that have not yet
been designed or tested. Also, Aegis Ashore’s new deckhouse—instead of being integrated
on a ship deck with the VLS and the ship’s hull, mechanical, and electrical systems—will be
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configured apart from the VLS and these will require standalone power generation. The
deckhouse design also requires that it be removable in order to facilitate shipment. However
not all requirements are fully known, and although neither the deckhouse requirements or
design are stable, the contract for Aegis Ashore deckhouse fabrication and integration was
awarded prior to preliminary or critical design reviews for the overall Aegis Ashore system.
The potential for rework because design starts before requirements are complete was noted
as a continuing risk in the last program review of the fiscal year, and we have previously
reported that starting fabrication prior to achieving design stability can lead to costly
modifications later in the process due to rework.
The number of planned developmental flight test events has been reduced since the Aegis
Ashore program began and they are not timed to inform production decisions. In MDA’s
February 2010 test plan Aegis Ashore was scheduled to participate in 7 developmental flight
test events, 5 of which were intercept events. The current plan is for 4 test events, 2 of which
are intercepts. The first intercept is now scheduled more than a year later than previously
planned….
MDA officials indicate that the current plan is sufficient to collect data on critical variables
and to evaluate weapon system performance in the Aegis Ashore configuration. We have
previously reported that repetition of intercept-related objectives is important to build
confidence in intercept capability. MDA plans to make production commitments for the first
operational Aegis Ashore and its interceptors by early fiscal year 2012. The first intercept
flight test with a target is planned for the second half of fiscal year 2014, at which point the
design will have been finalized, the Aegis Ashore deckhouse and components built, and
Aegis Ashore construction and interceptor production will be well under way.44
April 2011 Press Report
An April 6, 2011, press report stated:
The Navy’s overreliance on the Raytheon [RTN]-built SM-3 system as the backbone for its
ballistic missile defense strategy in Europe could delay White House plans to have a viable
BMD presence in the region by 2015, a former high-ranking military official said yesterday.
Technical difficulties found in elements of the Block IA version of the SM-3 would likely
find their way into the new Block IB variant of the weapon, former Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) director Lt. Gen. Trey Obering said in an Aerospace Industry Association-sponsored
event on Capitol Hill yesterday. Obering, currently an executive with Booz Allen Hamilton
[BAH], served as director of MDA from 2004-2009.
Raytheon’s block development approach on the SM-3, he added, would also make it likely
that such problems would “tend to cycle through” all current and future variants of the
weapon, he said….
Navy and industry program officials completed the system requirements review for Aegis
Ashore late last year, with system design review for the program slated for February.
Program officials plan to conduct the critical design review for the weapons system in the
44
Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:]Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability,
GAO-11-372, March 2011, pp. 61-65. See also Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense: European Phased
Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges, GAO-11-179R,
December 21, 2010, 39 pp.
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following fiscal quarter, Lisa Callahan, vice president of maritime BMD programs for
Lockheed Martin [LMT], said in a Jan. 5 teleconference.
“All of that will culminate in a test system for Aegis Ashore that will be in Hawaii in 2013
and the first Aegis Ashore capability in Romania in 2015,” according to Callahan….
But those deployment plans could be thrown off course, should the new SM-3 variants be
plagued with the same problems experienced on the Block IA weapon, Obering warned,
noting that initial flight tests for the Block IB system were originally slated to begin in 2009.
Those tests are now set for summer of this year.
The former Air Force three-star general went even further, saying technical delays “are
likely” on the Block IB and the next-generation Block IIA and IIB, which could push any
SM-3 deployments supporting BMD operations in Eastern Europe to the right.
“I expect we are going to see delays in there,” he said, adding the Navy and the Pentagon
would be well served “to have alternative options” to the SM-3 system. The former MDA
chief did not go into specifics on what alternatives could be explored.
However, Raytheon has undergone an “unmatched test process” on the Block IA system and
has worked through the development issues and delivered the system to the Navy on time, in
support of the first phase of the EPAA strategy Frank Wyatt, vice president of Raytheon Air
and Missile Defense Systems, said in an interview with Defense Daily that same day.
On the postponement of Block IB flight testing, the delay was prompted mainly by
development challenges with the integration of a new warhead propulsion and maneuvering
system—known as the Throttling Divert and Attitude Control System (TDACS)—which
allows the weapon to engage “more complex threats,” Wyatt said.
Along with the TDACS, the major changes between Block IA and IB were focused on
improvements to the sensor and processing capabilities on the missile, the Raytheon
executive added.
However, after a recent successful system integration test of the Block IB version of the SM3, Wyatt was confident any TDACS problems have been corrected and the company will
meet the 2015 deployment timeline for the IB missile, as outlined by the EPAA.
Aside from concerns over the SM-3’s viability, Obering also said he was “disturbed” over
the manner in which Raytheon downplayed the potential development difficulties for the
Block IB version, noting the program possessed “a higher technical risk than it was painted
out to be.”
While acknowledging that he did not see any “fatal” problems with the Block IA or IB, and
that any technical risk in the weapon’s development would be no different than those
experienced on other new start programs. However, Raytheon’s decision to pitch the Block
IB system as mere follow-on to the IA missile implied that the Block IB’s development
would not suffer many of those new start challenges seen on other programs.
In response, Wyatt said the company was not dismissing any potential challenges that could
arise with the SM-3 Block IB development, but added that using a follow-on, spiral strategy
was the lowest risk approach to the weapon’s development while meeting the Pentagon’s
time lines.
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‘We would not be meeting the [EPAA] timelines with an approach that begins with a brandnew interceptor,” he said. “Clearly, if you can spiral develop from an existing program that is
clearly a lower-risk position.”45
Legislative Activity for FY2013
Summary of Action on FY2013 MDA Funding Request
Table 5 summarizes congressional action on the FY2013 request for MDA procurement and
research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program.
Table 5. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2013 Request for MDA
Procurement and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
Authorization
Request
HASC
SASC
Appropriation
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
Procurement
Aegis BMD (Line 31)
389.6
Research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)
Next-generation Aegis
224.1
missile (SM-3 IIB) (PE
0603902C, line 65)
Aegis BMD (PE
0603892C, line 86)
992.4
Land-based SM-3
(LBSM3) (PE0604881C,
line 107)
276.3
Aegis SM-3 IIA Codevelopment
(PE0604881C, line 108)
420.6
Subtotal RDT&E
1,913.4
TOTAL
2,303.0
Source: For request: FY2013 budget-justification books for MDA for Research, Development, Test &
Evaluation, Defense-Wide (Volume 2a) and for Procurement, Defense-Wide (Volume 2b).
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference.
45
Carlo Munoz, “Obering: Navy Dependence On SM-3 Missile System Could Delay European BMD Plans,” Defense
Daily, April 6, 2011: 3-4. Material in brackets as in original. See also Otto Kreisher, “Missile Defense Advocates Look
For clearer Direction,” National Journal Daily AM, April 6, 2011.
44
Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-12400SP, March 2012, 188 pp.
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The SM-3 IB will be at continued risk of cost growth, schedule delays, and performance
shortfalls unless it demonstrates that the missile’s critical technologies and design perform as
expected before committing to further production. In 2011, the SM-3 IB failed during its first
developmental flight test. At the time of the failure, MDA had contracted for 25 SM-3 IB
interceptors, 18 of which were dedicated to flight testing. As a result of the flight test failure,
MDA halted acceptance of SM-3 IB deliveries, convened a failure review board, and delayed
key program decisions. In addition, two critical technologies—the throttleable divert attitude
control system and third-stage rocket motor—still may not be mature. The attitude control
system has not completed developmental testing or been successfully flight tested and the
third-stage rocket motor may need to be redesigned....
According to the program, all five of its critical technologies—the third-stage rocket motor,
throttleable divert attitude control system, reflective optics, two-color warhead seeker, and
kinetic warhead advanced signal processor—are mature. However, the attitude control
system has not completed qualification testing or been demonstrated in a realistic flight
environment. In addition, the third-stage rocket motor, which was previously considered the
most mature technology, may need to be redesigned to address issues discovered in flight
testing. In its first developmental flight test in September 2011, the SM-3 IB experienced a
failure involving one of its critical technologies and did not intercept the target. A failure
review board is investigating the cause. The program plans to redo the failed test and conduct
two additional intercept flight tests in 2012. Program officials expect that all SM-3 IB
technologies will be flight-qualified and demonstrated through testing by the program’s
planned fiscal year 2013 production decision.
Design Maturity
The SM-3 IB’s design has been relatively stable since its critical design review in May 2009,
although design changes may be necessary to address issues discovered in testing. In
addition, the program has not demonstrated that the missile’s design can perform as intended
through developmental testing. As a result, it remains at risk for further design changes, cost
growth, and schedule delays.
Production Maturity
MDA has delayed the official start of operational missile production from February 2010 to
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. According to officials, MDA will not make this
production decision until it completes initial developmental testing with productionrepresentative missiles and shipboard systems.
The program has already contracted for 25 missiles, 18 of which will be used for
developmental testing. The seven additional missiles could require costly rework and
retrofits if the program decides to use them as operational assets as planned. According to
MDA, additional missiles will also be used to prove manufacturing processes and for other
purposes. MDA is also planning to purchase 46 additional missiles in fiscal year 2012. Any
additional missiles ordered in fiscal year 2012 before the completion of flight tests needed to
validate the missile’s performance would be at higher risk of cost growth and schedule
delays.
The flight-test failure investigation and possible redesigns are delaying both developmental
and operational missile production. The program’s acceptance of developmental missile
deliveries and the production of certain missile components are on hold pending the results
of the investigations. Program officials estimate that the failure investigations, design
modifications, and additional testing will increase costs and they have not yet determined
how many missiles may need to be refurbished.
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Other Program Issues
MDA originally planned to stop production of the SM-3 IA in 2010 and begin production of
the SM-3 IB. However, SM-3 IB developmental issues have required MDA to twice delay
the purchase of SM-3 IB missiles, purchase additional SM-3 IA missiles to avoid production
gaps and keep SM-3 suppliers active, and reduce the planned initial purchase quantity of
SM-3 IBs. The program’s acceptance of SM-3 IA deliveries and the production of a missile
component have been halted since April 2011, when an SM-3 IA missile experienced an
anomaly during a flight test. The anomaly may have occurred in a component that is
common to the SM-3 IA and SM-3 IB.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.45
SM-3 Block IIA Missile
The March 2012 GAO report stated the following regarding the SM-3 Block IIA missile:
Technology Maturity
The SM-3 Block IIA program faces significant technology development challenges. The
majority of the SM-3 Block IIA components are new technology compared to the SM-3
Block IB. The program must develop a new propulsion system with a much greater thrust, a
new divert and attitude control system, a more capable seeker, and use new solid fuel, all of
which pose significant technological challenges. The development of similar components has
been a challenge for previous SM-3 interceptors.
The SM-3 Block IIA program has identified eight critical technologies—six of which are
immature and require additional development and testing before they can be demonstrated in
a system prototype. The program held subsystem preliminary design reviews during fiscal
year 2011, which demonstrated that some critical technologies required redesign or other
adjustments. The program has plans in place to rebalance SM-3 Block IIA requirements or
replace certain technology components. For example, the program has moved away from a
component that has caused problems for the SM-3 Block IB. The program completed new
reviews for the four technologies that failed to complete the initial reviews by early fiscal
year 2012. In addition, two critical technologies—the second- and third-stage rocket
motors—have experienced problems during testing. The program was investigating the
causes of those problems and the potential effects at the end of fiscal year 2011. According
to the program, all critical technologies will be nearing maturity by its planned September
2013 critical design review.
Other Program Issues
The SM-3 Block IIA program has extended its development schedule by more than a year,
which likely will increase program costs, but lower the risk of further cost growth and
schedule delays in the future. The program adjusted its system-level preliminary and critical
design reviews after several key components failed their preliminary design reviews. The
45
Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-12400SP, March 2012, pp. 53-54.
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adjustment may reduce acquisition risk and the potential for future cost growth by providing
the program more time to reconcile gaps between requirements and resources; demonstrate
technical knowledge; and ensure that requirements are defined, feasible, and achievable
before committing to product development. The new schedule also lowers risk in other ways,
such as building in more recovery time between program reviews and flight tests. Under the
revised schedule, flight tests will be delayed from 2015 to late 2016. The SM-3 Block IIA is
still planned to be deployed with Aegis Weapons System 5.1 as part of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach Phase III in the 2018 time frame.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, Aegis BMD program management officials
noted the SM-3 Block IIA program held 60 component-level preliminary design reviews in
fiscal year 2011, of which 4 did not receive a pass during the first evaluation. This result
drove a schedule adjustment of 1 year. The officials further noted the program used this
additional time to implement a more robust engineering process. Actions the program took
resulted in the completion of the four component-level reviews and support the completion
of the system-level preliminary design review in March 2012. The rebalancing of the
component-level requirements that occurred has not affected system-level requirements.
Finally, the officials note that the program is on schedule to achieve its European Phased
Adaptive Approach objectives. MDA also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.46
SM-3 Block IIB Missile
The March 2012 GAO report stated the following regarding the SM-3 Block IIB missile:
Current Status
The SM-3 Block IIB program entered technology development in July 2011 and awarded
three contracts to conduct trade studies, define missile configurations, and produce
development plans. One contractor will be selected for system development in 2013. The
SM-3 Block IIB program is developing advance seeker and other technologies that cut across
the SM-3’s variants through a technology risk-reduction program.
According to a tentative schedule, the SM-3 Block IIB program plans to enter system
development prior to holding a preliminary design review, raising the possibility of cost and
schedule growth. The program is conducting a series of reviews to receive engineering
insight into each contractor’s design. While these reviews will provide important knowledge,
we have reported that before starting system development, programs should hold key
engineering reviews, culminating in the preliminary design review, to ensure that the
proposed design can meet defined, feasible requirements within cost, schedule, and other
system constraints. Beyond the crosscutting technologies the program is developing, it is
taking steps to develop technology maturation plans that will include demonstrating
technologies in a relevant environment using a representative model or prototype before the
SM-3 Block IIB enters system development. The three contractors’ plans are expected to
outline the level of investment required to demonstrate this degree of technology maturity by
2014. Program officials have not yet defined the specific critical technologies for the SM-3
Block IIB, which could hamper these efforts. Unlike most major defense acquisition
programs, MDA programs are not required to demonstrate technologies in a relevant
46
Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-12400SP, March 2012, p. 56.
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environment prior to system development, so decision makers will have to hold the program
accountable for ensuring the technologies mature as intended....
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA noted the
SM-3 Block IIB’s primary mission is early intercept of long-range ballistic missiles. One
system development contract will be competitively awarded in fiscal year 2014. MDA has
identified key missile technologies and made investments to reduce development risks. Prior
to system development, there will be a government-only system requirements review. MDA
also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.47
Aegis Ashore
The March 2012 GAO report stated the following regarding the Aegis Ashore sites:
Aegis Ashore is following a concurrent acquisition approach by entering system
development prior to holding a preliminary design review and purchasing operational
components prior to completing testing—both of which increase the risk of cost growth and
schedule delays. The program office has now assessed its five critical technologies as mature
or nearing maturity. However, several of these technologies may be less mature than
reported. The system’s design was stable by February 2012, but the risk of design changes
will remain until it demonstrates the design can perform as expected by flight testing, which
will not occur until 2014. Program management stated that the development is low risk
because the technologies are already used by Aegis BMD ships and the program’s ground
and flight test schedule will confirm the capability by the time it is deployed....
Technology Maturity
According to the Aegis Ashore program office, all five of its critical technologies are mature
or nearing maturity. The program has assessed the SPY-1 radar, command and control
system, SM-3 Block IB interceptor, and vertical launching system as mature and the
multimission signal processor as nearing maturity. However, the maturity of some of these
technologies may be overstated. The SPY-1 radar requires modifications for its use on land
and other changes may be necessary due to host nation radar frequency issues. Program
management officials stated at least some of these changes are software modifications, but
the frequency issues may require other changes. The launch system must also be modified
for use both on land and at a greater distance from the deckhouse. In addition, the maturity of
SM-3 Block IB may be overstated because some of its component technologies have not
been flight tested or have experienced failures in testing. The multimission signal processor
also faces development challenges, and the Defense Contract Management Agency has
identified its schedule as high risk. We have previously reported that a significant percentage
of its software still needs to be integrated.
Design Maturity
The deckhouse design was 100 percent complete in February 2012, prior to the planned
award of the deckhouse fabrication contract in the third quarter of fiscal year 2012. However,
the program does not plan to demonstrate the design can perform as expected by flight
testing until 2014, although there will be ground testing to demonstrate Aegis Ashore
component integration prior to the flight test. As a result, the risk of design changes will
remain until developmental testing is complete.
47
Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-12400SP, March 2012, p. 140.
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Other Program Issues
The Aegis Ashore program is following an acquisition approach that increases the risk of
cost growth and schedule delays. The program began system development 14 months before
completing its preliminary design review. We have previously reported that this review
should be held prior to starting development to ensure that requirements are defined, feasible,
and achievable within cost, schedule, and other system constraints. The program also
contains concurrency between development and production, which increases the risk of late
and costly design changes and retrofits. For example, the program is simultaneously
acquiring the developmental test deckhouse and the operational deckhouse and is
constructing the operational deckhouse first. In addition, the first developmental flight test of
Aegis Ashore is scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2014, at which point two
deckhouses will have been constructed and other components will already be in production.
Program management officials stated its concurrent schedule is low risk given its use of
technology already used by Aegis BMD and modifications can be made to the deckhouse
before it is installed in Romania. In addition, it stated that the current strategy has cost
benefits and construction and testing efficiency advantages.
The program has experienced cost growth because of additional requirement costs. In 2011,
the unit cost of Aegis Ashore grew, which the program attributed to costs for the
reconstitutable deckhouse design that were not included in its baseline and the addition of
hardware for a third site in Poland.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.48
Legislative Activity for FY2013
Summary of Action on FY2013 MDA Funding Request
Table 5 summarizes congressional action on the FY2013 request for MDA procurement and
research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program.
48
Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-12400SP, March 2012, pp. 51-52.
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Table 5. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2013 Request for MDA
Procurement and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
Authorization
Request
HASC
SASC
Procurement
Aegis BMD (Line 31)
389.6
Research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)
Next-generation Aegis
224.1
missile (SM-3 IIB) (PE
0603902C, line 65)
Aegis BMD (PE
0603892C, line 86)
992.4
Land-based SM-3
(LBSM3) (PE0604881C,
line 107)
276.3
Aegis SM-3 IIA Codevelopment
(PE0604881C, line 108)
420.6
Subtotal RDT&E
1,913.4
TOTAL
2,303.0
Appropriation
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
Source: For request: FY2013 budget-justification books for MDA for Research, Development, Test &
Evaluation, Defense-Wide (Volume 2a) and for Procurement, Defense-Wide (Volume 2b).
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference.
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Appendix. Aegis BMD Flight Tests
Summary of Test Flights
Table A-1 presents a DOD summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. As shown in
the table, DOD states that since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 18 successful
exo-atmospheric intercepts in 23 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 3 successful
intercepts in 4 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships), and 3 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in
3 attempts using the SM-2 Block IV missile, making for a combined total of 21 successful
intercepts in 26 attempts.
In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii
used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance
satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit—an operation called Burnt Frost. Including this intercept
in the count increases the totals to 19 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 24 attempts using
the SM-3 missile, and 22 successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 27 attempts using
both SM-3 and SM-2 Block IV missiles.
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Table A-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests Since January 2002
Name of
Date
Country
flight test
Exo-atmospheric (using SM-3 missile)
1/25/02
US
FM-2
6/13/02
US
FM-3
11/21/02
US
FM-4
US
FM-5
6/18/03
12/11/03
US
FM-6
2/24/05
US
FTM 04-1 (FM-7)
11/17/05
US
FTM 04-2 (FM-8)
6/22/06
US
FTM 10
US
FTM 11
12/7/06
4/26/07
US
FTM 11 Event 4
6/22/07
US
FTM 12
8/31/07
US
FTM-11a
11/6/07
US
FTM 13
12/17/07
11/1/08
Japan
US
JFTM-1
Pacific Blitz
Target
Successful?
Cumulative
successes
Cumulative
attempts
Unitary TTV short-range target
Unitary TTV short-range target
Unitary TTV short-range target
Unitary TTV short-range target
Unitary TTV short-range target
Unitary TTV short-range target
Separating medium-range target
Separating medium-range target
Unitary TTV short-range target
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target
Separating medium-range target
Classified
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target
Separating medium-range target
Short-range missile target
Short-range missile target
Separating medium-range target
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target
Separating medium-range target
Separating medium-range target
LV-2 intermediate range target
Short-range missile target
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1
2
3
3
4
5
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
14
14
15
16
17
18
18
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Yes
Yes
Yes
1
2
3
21
1
2
3
26
Japan
JFTM-2
11/19/08
US
FTM-17
7/30/09
Japan
JFTM-3
10/27/09
Japan
JFTM-4
10/28/10
US
FTM-15
4/14/11
US
FTM-16
9/1/11
Endo-atmospheric (using SM-2 missile)
5/24/06
US
Pacific Pheonix
Unitary short-range target
6/5/08
US
FTM-14
Unitary short-range target
3/26/09
US
Stellar Daggers
Short-range ballistic missile target
Combined total for exo- and endo-atmospheric above tests
Source: Table adapted from table presented in MDA fact sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” dated
November 2010, accessed on November 19, 2010, at http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis_tests.pdf.
Notes: TTV is target test vehicle; ARAV is Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle. In addition to the flight tests
shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S.
satellite—an operation called Burnt Frost. Including this intercept in the count increases the totals to 19
successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 24 attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 22 successful exo- and endoatmospheric intercepts in 27 attempts using both SM-3 and SM-2 Block IV missiles.
May 2010 Criticism of Claimed Successes in Flight Tests
In a May 2010 magazine article and supplementary white paper, two professors with scientific
backgrounds—George Lewis and Theodore Postol—criticized DOD claims of successes in Aegis
(and other DOD) BMD flight tests, arguing that
the Defense Department’s own test data show that, in combat, the vast majority of
“successful” SM-3 experiments would have failed to destroy attacking warheads. The data
also show potential adversaries how to defeat both the SM-3 and the GMD [ground-based
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missile defense] systems, which share the same serious flaws that can be readily exploited by
adversaries.4649
The criticisms made by Lewis and Postol were reported in a May 18, 2010, New York Times
article.4750 In response to the criticisms and the New York Times article, MDA issued a press release
and other information defending the flight tests and arguing that the criticisms are based on
inaccurate or incomplete information.4851
Details on Selected Exo-Atmospheric (SM-3) Flight Tests
June 22, 2006, Test. This was the first test to use the 3.6 version of the Aegis BMD system.4952
December 7, 2006, Test. This was the first unsuccessful flight test since June 2003. MDA stated
that the ninth test
was not completed due to an incorrect system setting aboard the Aegis-class cruiser USS
Lake Erie prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the ship. The incorrect
configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship from launching the first of
the two interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch
of two missiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally
not launched.
The planned test was to involve the launch of a Standard Missile 3 against a ballistic missile
target and a Standard Missile 2 against a surrogate aircraft target. The ballistic missile target
was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii and the aircraft target
was launched from a Navy aircraft. The USS Lake Erie (CG 70), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and
the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate TROMP were all successful in detecting and tracking
their respective targets. Both targets fell into the ocean as planned.
After a thorough review, the Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Navy will determine a
new test date.5053
A news article about the ninth test stated:
4649
George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” Arms Control
Today, May 2010: 24-32. The quoted passage appears on p. 26. The associated white paper is George N. Lewis and
Theodore A. Postol, A Technically Detailed Description of Flaws in the SM-3 and GMD Missile Defense Systems
Revealed by the Defense Department’s Ballistic Missile Test Data, May 3, 2010, 13 pp.
4750
William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Review Cites Flaws In U.S. Antimissile Program,” New York Times, May
18, 2010: 1.
4851
Missile Defense Agency news release entitled “Missile Defense Agency Responds to New York Times Article,” 10News-0005, May 18, 2010; Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense Agency Response to Request for Information,
Standard Missile – 3 Interceptor Testing, May 18, 2010, 2 pp.; Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense Agency
Response to Request for Information, Response to New York Times May 18, 2010, Article Regarding SM-3 Testing,
May 18, 2010, 3 pp.; Richard Lehner, “Missile Defense Agerncy Responds to New York Times Article,” DOD Live
(http://www.dodlive.mil), May 18, 2010; Transcript of Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable With Richard
Lehner, Spokesman, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Subject: Standard Missile 3 Test Program, May 18, 2010.
4952
Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Test Results in Successful ‘Hit To Kill’ Intercept,” June 22, 2006 (06NEWS-0018).
5053
Untitled Missile Defense Agency “For Your Information” statement dated December 7, 2006 (06-FYI-0090).
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“You can say it’s seven of nine, rather than eight of nine,” Missile Defense Agency
spokesman Chris Taylor said of the second failure in tests of the system by the agency and
the Navy....
The drill was planned to demonstrate the Navy’s ability to knock down two incoming
missiles at once from the same ship.
“In a real world situation it is possible, maybe even probable, that in addition to engaging a
ballistic missile threat that was launched, you may be engaging a surface action,” said Joe
Rappisi before the test. He is director for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system at
Lockheed Martin, the primary contractor for the program.
The test would have marked the first time a ship has shot down one target in space and
another target in the air at the same time.
The test presented a greater challenge to the ship’s crew and the ballistic missile defense
system than previous tests, Rappisi said. The multiple target scenario is also closer to what
sailors might actually face in battle.
The U.S. Pacific Fleet has been gradually installing missile surveillance and tracking
technology on many of its destroyers and cruisers amid concerns about North Korea’s longrange missile program.
It is also installing interceptor missiles on many of its ships, even as the technology to track
and shoot down incoming missiles is being developed and perfected.
The Royal Netherlands Navy joined the tracking and monitoring off Kauai to see how its
equipment works. The Dutch presence marked the first time a European ally has sent one of
its vessels to participate in a U.S. ballistic missile defense test.5154
A subsequent news article stated:
the test abort of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system Dec. 7 resulted from human
error, [MDA Director USAF Lt. Gen. Henry] Obering says.... Both the ballistic missile and
aircraft targets launched as planned, but the first interceptor failed to fire because an operator
had selected an incorrect setting for the test. Officials then aborted before the second could
boost.
Aegis missile defense system tests are at a standstill until officials are able to identify an
appropriate ballistic missile target. The one used Dec. 7 was the last of its kind, Obering
says, leaving them empty handed in the near future.5255
Another article stated:
Philip Coyle, a former head of the Pentagon’s testing directorate, gives the Navy credit for
“discipline and successes so far” in its sea-based ballistic missile defense testing program.
Coyle is now a senior adviser at the Center for Defense Information.
5154
David Briscoe, “Test Interceptor Missile Fails To Launch,” NavyTimes.com, December 8, 2006.
Amy Butler, “GMD Trial Delayed Until Spring; Aegis Failure Human Error,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
December 19, 2006.
5255
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“The U.S. Navy has an enviable track record of successful flight intercept tests, and is
making the most of its current, limited Aegis missile defense capabilities in these tests,”
Coyle told [Inside the Navy] Dec. 7.
“Difficulties such as those that delayed the latest flight intercept attempt illustrate the
complexity of the system, and how everything must be carefully orchestrated to achieve
success,” Coyle added. “Nevertheless, this particular setback won’t take the Navy long to
correct.”5356
April 26, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test:
involved the simultaneous engagements of a ballistic missile “unitary” target (meaning that
the target warhead and booster remain attached) and a surrogate hostile air target....
The test demonstrated the [Aegis ship’s] ability to engage a ballistic missile threat and
defend itself from attack at the same time. The test also demonstrated the effectiveness of
engineering, manufacturing, and mission assurance changes in the solid divert and attitude
control system (SDACS) in the kinetic kill weapon. This was the first flight test of all the
SM-3 Block IA’s upgrades, previously demonstrated in ground tests.5457
A press report on the test stated that the hostile air target was an anti-ship cruise missile. The
article stated that the scenario for the test
called for the [Aegis ship] to come under attack from a cruise missile fired by an enemy
plane.... A Navy plane fired the cruise missile target used in the test.5558
June 22, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test
was the third intercept involving a separating target and the first time an Aegis BMDequipped destroyer was used to launch the interceptor missile. The USS Decatur (DDG 73),
using the operationally-certified Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Weapon System (BMD 3.6)
and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA missile successfully intercepted the target
during its midcourse phase of flight....
An Aegis cruiser, USS Port Royal (CG 73), a Spanish frigate, MÉNDEZ NÚÑEZ (F-104),
and MDA’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) mobile ground-based radar
also participated in the flight test. USS Port Royal used the flight test to support development
of the new Aegis BMD SPY-1B radar signal processor, collecting performance data on its
increased target detection and discrimination capabilities. MÉNDEZ NÚÑEZ, stationed off
Kauai, performed long-range surveillance and track operations as a training event to assess
the future capabilities of the F-100 Class. The THAAD radar tracked the target and
exchanged tracking data with the Aegis BMD cruiser.
This event marked the third time that an allied military unit participated in a U.S. Aegis
BMD test, with warships from Japan and the Netherlands participating in earlier tests.56
5359
56
Zachary M. Peterson, “Sea-Based Missile Defense Test Fails Due To ‘Incorrect Configuration,’” Inside the Navy,
December 11, 2006.
5457
Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept,” April 26, 2007 (07-NEWS0032).
5558
Audrey McAvoy, “Aegis Missile Test Successful,” NavyTimes.com, April 27, 2007.
5659
Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept Achieved,” June 22, 2007 (07-NEWS(continued...)
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August 31, 2007, Test. MDA has publicly noted the occurrence of this test and the fact that it
resulted in a successful intercept,5760 but states that the details about the test are classified.5861 MDA
does not appear to have issued a news release about this flight test following the completion of
the test, as it has for other Aegis BMD flight tests.5962
November 6, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test involved:
a multiple simultaneous engagement involving two ballistic missile targets.... For the first
time, the operationally realistic test involved two unitary “non-separating” targets, meaning
that the target’s warheads did not separate from their booster rockets....
At approximately 6:12 p.m. Hawaii Standard Time (11:12 p.m. EST), a target was launched
from the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Moments
later, a second, identical target was launched from the PMRF. The USS Lake Erie’s Aegis
BMD Weapon System detected and tracked the targets and developed fire control solutions.
Approximately two minutes later, the USS Lake Erie’s crew fired two SM-3 missiles, and
two minutes later they successfully intercepted the targets outside the earth’s atmosphere
more than 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean and 250 miles northwest of Kauai....
A Japanese destroyer also participated in the flight test. Stationed off Kauai and equipped
with the certified 3.6 Aegis BMD weapon system, the guided missile destroyer JS Kongo
performed long-range surveillance and tracking exercises. The Kongo used the test as a
training exercise in preparation for the first ballistic missile intercept test by a Japanese ship
planned for later this year. This event marked the fourth time an allied military unit
participated in a U.S. Aegis BMDS test.6063
December 17, 2007, Test. In this flight test, a BMD-capable Japanese Aegis destroyer used an
SM-3 Block IA missile to successfully intercept a ballistic missile target in a flight test off the
coast of Hawaii. It was the first time that a non-U.S. ship had intercepted a ballistic missile using
the Aegis BMD system.6164
(...continued)
0037).
5760
See for example, slide 8 in the 20-slide briefing entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense Program Overview For The
Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series,” dated June 20, 2008, presented by Lieutenant General Trey Obering, USAF,
Director, Missile Defense Agency. Source for briefing: InsideDefense.com (subscription required). Each slide in the
briefing includes a note indicating that it was approved by MDA for public release on June 13, 2008. Slide 8 lists Aegis
BMD midcourse flight tests conducted since September 2005, including a test on August 31, 2007. The slide indicates
with a check mark that the flight test was successful. A success in this test is also needed to for the total number of
successful intercepts to match the reported figure.
5861
An e-mail from MDA to CRS dated June 30, 2008, states that the flight test “was a hit to kill intercept test but details
about the test are classified.”
5962
MDA’s website, when accessed on June 30, 2008, did not show a news release issued on of soon after August 31,
2007, that discusses this test.
6063
Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense “Hit to Kill” Intercept Achieved,” November 6, 2007 (07NEWS-0051).
6164
John Liang, “Japanese Destroyer Shoots Down Ballistic Missile Test Target,” Inside Missile Defense, December 19,
2007; “Japanese Aegis Destroyer Wins Test By Killing Target Missile With SM-3 Interceptor,” Defense Daily,
December 18, 2007; Reuters, “Japanese Ship Downs Missile In Pacific Test,” New York Times, December 18, 2007: 8;
Audrey McAvoy, “Japan Intercepts Missile In Test Off Hawaii,” NavyTimes.com, December 17, 2007.
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November 1, 2008, Test. This flight test was reportedly the first U.S. Navy Aegis BMD flight test
conducted by the Navy, without oversight by MDA. The test involved two Aegis ships, each
attempting to intercept a ballistic missile. The SM-3 fired by the first Aegis ship successfully
intercepted its target, but the SM-3 fired by the second Aegis ship did not intercept its target. A
press release from the U.S. Third Fleet (the Navy’s fleet for the Eastern Pacific) states that:
Vice Adm. Samuel J. Locklear, Commander, U.S. Third Fleet announced today the
successful Navy intercept of a ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean during Fleet
Exercise Pacific Blitz. This was the first Fleet operational firing to employ the Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) against a ballistic missile target. Command and control of this mission
resided with Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, based in San Diego, Calif.
Pearl Harbor-based Aegis destroyers, USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) and USS Hopper (DDG
70), which have been upgraded to engage ballistic missiles, fired SM-3 missiles at separate
targets. During this event, a short-range ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific
Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Upon detecting and tracking
the target, USS Paul Hamilton, launched a SM-3 missile, resulting in a direct-hit intercept.
Following USS Paul Hamilton’s engagement, PMRF launched another target. USS Hopper
successfully detected, tracked and engaged the target. The SM-3 followed a nominal
trajectory, however intercept was not achieved. Extensive analysis of the flight mission will
be used to improve the deployed Aegis BMD system.6265
November 19, 2008, Test. This was the second Japanese flight test, and involved a single ballistic
missile target. The test did not result in a successful intercept. MDA states that:
Rear Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Director General of Operations and Plans, for the Japanese
Maritime Staff Office (MSO), Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and Lt. General
Henry “Trey” Obering, United States Missile Defense Agency director, announced the
completion today of a cooperative sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense intercept flight
test off the coast of Kauai in Hawaii. The event, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 2
(JFTM-2), marked the second attempt by an Allied naval ship to intercept a ballistic missile
target with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense. Target performance, interceptor missile launch and flyout, and operation of
the Aegis Weapon System by the crew were successful, but an intercept was not achieved.
The JFTM-2 was a test of the newest engagement capability of the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS CHOKAI (DDG176). At approximately 4:21 pm (HST), 11:21 am (Tokyo time) a ballistic missile target was
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. JS
CHOKAI crew members detected and tracked the target using an advanced on-board radar.
The Aegis Weapon System then developed a fire control solution, and at approximately 4:24
pm (HST), 11:24 am (Tokyo time) on Nov 20, a single Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block IA
was launched. Approximately two minutes later, the SM-3 failed to intercept the target.
There is no immediate explanation for the failed intercept attempt. More information will be
available after a thorough investigation. The JS CHOKAI crew performance was excellent in
executing the mission. JFTM-2 was the second time that a Japanese ship was designated to
6265
Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, Public Affairs Office, press release 23-08, dated November 1, 2008, entitled “Navy
Intercepts Ballistic Missile Target in Fleet Exercise Pacific Blitz.” See also Dave Ahearn, “One of Two Missiles Hit In
Aegis Test; Navy For First Time Runs Test Instead of MDA,” Defense Daily, November 4, 2008: 1-2.
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launch the interceptor missile, a major milestone in the growing cooperation between Japan
and the U.S.6366
A November 21, 2008, press report states that:
An Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) test by the Japanese destroyer Chokai (DDG-176)
ended in failure when the Standard Missile-3 Block 1A interceptor lost track of the target
missile in the final seconds before a planned hit-to-kill.
The Chokai and its crew performed well throughout the test, and the SM-3 also performed
flawlessly through its first three stages, according to Rear Adm. Brad Hicks, the U.S. Navy
Aegis ballistic missile defense program director. He spoke with several reporters in a
teleconference around midnight ET Wednesday-Thursday, after the test in the area of the
Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii.
This was the second Aegis BMD test failure in less than a month.
These latest two failures come as some Democrats in Congress are poised to cut spending on
missile defense programs when they convene next year to consider the Missile Defense
Agency budget for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2010....
Still, in the coming money debates next year, missile defense advocates will be able to point
out that even including the Hopper and Chokai failures, the record for the Aegis tests is an
overwhelming 16 successful hits demolishing target missiles out of 20 attempts.
Those successes included the first Japanese attempt. The Japanese destroyer Kongo (DDG173) successfully used its SM-3 interceptor to kill a target missile. The difference in tests is
that the Kongo crew was advised beforehand when the target missile would be launched,
while the Chokai crew wasn’t....
[Hicks] said a board will be convened to examine why the latest test failed. Hicks declined to
speculate on why the SM-3 interceptor missed the target. “I’m confident we’ll find out the
root cause” of the Chokai interceptor failure to score a hit, he said.
However, he was asked by Space & Missile Defense Report whether the prior SM-3
successes make it unlikely the Chokai failure stems from some basic design flaw in all SM3s, and whether it is more likely that the Chokai SM-3 failed because of some flaw or glitch
in just that one interceptor.
Hicks said that is likely.
“Obviously, we believe this is hopefully related to this one interceptor,” and doesn’t reflect
any basic design flaw in the SM-3 interceptors, he said.
The Chokai test failure cost Japan a $55 million loss, he said, adding, “It wasn’t cheap.”...
In the Chokai test, the target missile was launched from Barking Sands, and about three
minutes later the Chokai crew had spotted the target, the Aegis system had developed a
tracking and hit solution, and the SM-3 interceptor was launched.
6366
Missile Defense Agency press release 08-News-0087, dated November 19, 2008, entitled “Japan/U.S. Missile
Defense Flight Test Completed.”
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The first, second and third stages of the interceptor performed nominally, without problems,
but then came the fourth stage. The nosecone components opened to expose the kill vehicle
area, and somehow the program to track the target missile failed.
“It lost track,” Hicks said, only seconds before the hit would have been achieved.
If the kill had occurred, it would have been about 100 nautical miles (roughly 115 statute
miles) above Earth, and some 250 miles away from Barking Sands, Hicks said.
It took the interceptor about two minutes flight time to reach the near miss with the target
missile.
Meanwhile, the Hamilton was nearby watching the test. The Hamilton Aegis system
successfully spotted and tracked the target, and developed a simulated solution and simulated
interceptor launch that, if it had been real, would have resulted in a successful hit on the
target, Hicks said. The Hamilton didn’t cue the Chokai, however. “It was strictly Chokai’s
engagement,” Hicks said.6467
July 30, 2009, Test. MDA states that:
In conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Pacific Fleet ships and crews
successfully conducted the latest Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) at-sea firing event
on July 30. During this event, entitled Stellar Avenger, the Aegis BMD-equipped ship, USS
Hopper (DDG 70), detected, tracked, fired and guided a Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block
(Blk) IA to intercept a sub-scale short range ballistic missile. The target was launched from
the Kauai Test Facility, co-located on the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking
Sands, Kauai. It was the 19th successful intercept in 23 at-sea firings, for the Aegis BMD
Program, including the February 2008 destruction of the malfunctioning satellite above the
earth’s atmosphere. Stellar Avenger was part of the continual evaluation of the certified and
fielded Aegis BMD system at-sea today.
At approximately 5:40 pm (HST), 11:40 pm (EDT), a target was launched from PMRF.
Three U.S. Navy Aegis BMD-equipped ships, the cruiser, USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and
destroyers USS Hopper (DDG 70) and USS O'Kane (DDG 77) detected and tracked the
target with their SPY radars. Each developed fire control solutions. At 5:42 pm (HST), 11:42
pm (EDT) the crew of USS Hopper fired one SM-3 Blk IA missile. The USS Hopper’s Aegis
BMD Weapon System successfully guided the SM-3 to a direct body to body hit,
approximately two minutes after leaving the ship. The intercept occurred about 100 miles
above the Pacific Ocean. USS O'Kane conducted a simulated engagement of the target. USS
Lake Erie, with its recently installed upgraded Aegis BMD 4.0.1 Weapons System, detected
and tracked the same target.6568
A July 31, 2009, press report states:
The test was the first Aegis BMD exercise to feature two versions of the software in a single
event, according to Lisa Callahan, Lockheed’s vice president for ballistic missile defense
programs.
6467
Dave Ahearn, “Japanese Aegis Missile Defense Test Fails, But Aegis Record Is 16 Hits In 20 Tries,” Defense Daily,
November 21, 2008: 5-6.
6568
Missile Defense Agency press release 09-News-0015, dated July 31, 2009, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Test Successful.”
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A goal of the exercises was to test the Aegis system’s ability to discern all the different parts
and pieces of a ballistic missile, Nick Bucci, Lockheed’s director for Aegis BMD
development programs, told reporters July 29 during a pre-exercise conference call.
Three more flight tests this fall will further test the system’s discrimination capabilities,
Bucci added, with each test becoming more complex. The last test will “be against a pretty
darn complex target,” he said.
The July 30 tests also validated fixes put in place after a BMD test last November involving
a missile launched from the Aegis BMD Japanese destroyer Chokai failed to intercept its
target, according to MDA spokesman Chris Taylor. The improvements—which were
successful in the most recent test—involved fixes to the Solid Divert Attitude Control
System.
The Chokai is the second of four Japanese Aegis ships being upgraded with BMD capability.
A third ship, the Myoko, is scheduled to carry out a BMD test this fall.6669
An August 3, 2009, press report states:
This test was added to the schedule to evaluate changes made after last year’s failed attempt
to intercept a target with an SM-3 Block IA launched by a Japanese Aegis-equipped ship ....
After the Nov. 19 test, MDA officials said, “Target performance, interceptor missile launch
and flyout, and operation of the Aegis Weapon System by the crew were successful, but an
intercept was not achieved.”
A root cause has not been identified, and an MDA spokesman did not say whether fixes have
been made to hardware or operational procedures resulting from the failure review. It is also
unclear why a subscale target was used in the July 30 trial.6770
An August 4, 2009, press report states:
[Rear Admiral Alan “Brad” Hicks, Aegis/SM-3 program manager for MDA], said that a
November [2008] failure of an SM-3 Block IA... during a flight-test was attributable to poor
adherence to processes on Raytheon’s assembly line in Tucson, Ariz.
This was isolated to that missile, and it was the result of perturbations to the build process
encountered when shifting from development to production operations.
During the November test, a Japanese Aegis-equipped ship fired the interceptor and it flew
“perfectly,” Hicks said. In the endgame, a failure of the divert and attitude control system on
the unitary kill vehicle led to a miss.
The July 30 demonstration using a U.S. ship “restored confidence” for the Japanese that the
miss last fall was an isolated incident, he says.6871
October 27, 2009, Test. This was the third Japanese flight test, and it involved a single ballistic
missile target. MDA states that:
6669
Christopher P. Cavas, “Aegis BMD Test Successful,” DefenseNews.com, July 31, 2009.
Amy Butler, “SM-3 Scores Hit After Fixes Implemented,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 3, 2009: 5.
6871
Amy Butler, “SM-3 Upgrade Program Cost Increases,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 4, 2009: 1-2. See
also Dan Taylor, “Navy Conducts Aegis BMD Test, New Baseline System Participates,” Inside the Navy, August 3,
2009; Daniel Wasserbly, “US Aegis BMD System Achieves Trial Success,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 5, 2009: 8.
6770
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The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the United States Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) announced the successful completion of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) intercept flight test, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, off the coast of Kauai in
Hawaii. The event, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 3 (JFTM-3), marked the third time
that a JMSDF ship has successfully engaged a ballistic missile target, including two
successful intercepts, with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by
Aegis BMD.
The JFTM-3 test event verified the newest engagement capability of the Japan Aegis BMD
configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS MYOKO (DDG-175). At
approximately 6:00pm (HST), 1:00 pm Tokyo time on Oct 28, a separating, medium-range
ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands,
Kauai, Hawaii. JS MYOKO crew members detected and tracked the target. The Aegis
Weapon System then developed a fire control solution and, at approximately 6:04pm (HST),
1:04 pm Tokyo time a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA interceptor missile was
launched. Approximately 3 minutes later, the SM-3 successfully intercepted the target
approximately 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. JFTM-3 is a significant milestone in the
growing cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the area of missile defense.
Also participating in the test, were the Pearl Harbor-based USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and USS
Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) which detected and tracked the target and conducted a simulated
engagement.6972
October 28, 2010, Test. This was the fourth Japanese flight test, and it involved a single ballistic
missile target. MDA states that:
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the United States Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) announced the successful completion of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) intercept flight test, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, off the coast of Kauai in
Hawaii.
The event marked the fourth time that a JMSDF ship has engaged a ballistic missile target,
including three successful intercepts, with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability
provided by Aegis BMD.
The JFTM-4 test event verified the newest engagement capability of the Japan Aegis BMD
configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS KIRISHIMA. At
approximately 5:06 p.m. (HST), 12:06 p.m. Tokyo time on Oct. 29, 2010, a separating 1,000
km class ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at
Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii.
JS KIRISHIMA crew members detected and tracked the target. The Aegis Weapon System
then developed a fire control solution and launched a Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block IA
missile. Approximately three minutes later, the SM-3 successfully intercepted the target
approximately 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. JFTM-4 is a significant milestone in the
growing cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the area of missile defense.
6972
Missile Defense Agency press release 09-News-0021, dated October 28, 2009, entitled “Japan/U.S. Missile Defense
Flight Test Successful.” See also Christopher P. Cavas, “Japanese Destroyer Conducts Successful BMD Test,”
NavyTimes.com, October 28, 2009; and Amy Butler and Michael Bruno, “SM-3 Scores Hit In Japanese Test,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,” October 29, 2009: 3.
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Also participating in the test was USS LAKE ERIE and USS RUSSELL, Aegis ships which
cooperated to detect, track and conduct a simulated intercept engagement against the same
target.7073
April 15, 2011, Test. MDA states that this flight test “was the most challenging test to date, as it
was the first Aegis BMD version 3.6.1 intercept against an intermediate-range target (range 1,864
to 3,418 [statute] miles) and the first Aegis BMD 3.6.1 engagement relying on remote tracking
data.” MDA states that:
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Navy sailors aboard the Aegis destroyer USS
O’KANE (DDG 77), and Soldiers from the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command
operating from the 613th Air and Space Operations Center at Hickam Air Force Base,
Hawaii, successfully conducted a flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
element of the nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense System, resulting in the intercept of a
separating ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean. This successful test demonstrated
the capability of the first phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
announced by the President in September, 2009.
At 2:52 a.m. EDT (6:52 p.m. April 15 Marshall Island Time), an intermediate-range ballistic
missile target was launched from the Reagan Test Site, located on Kwajalein Atoll in the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, approximately 2,300 miles southwest of Hawaii. The target
flew in a northeasterly direction towards a broad ocean area in the Pacific Ocean. Following
target launch, a forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-band transportable radar, located on Wake
Island, detected and tracked the threat missile. The radar sent trajectory information to the
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system, which
processed and transmitted remote target data to the USS O’KANE. The destroyer, located to
the west of Hawaii, used the data to develop a fire control solution and launch the SM-3
Block IA missile approximately 11 minutes after the target was launched.
As the IRBM target continued along its trajectory, the firing ship’s AN/SPY-1 radar detected
and acquired the ballistic missile target. The firing ship’s Aegis BMD weapon system
uplinked target track information to the SM-3 Block IA missile. The SM-3 maneuvered to a
point in space as designated by the fire control solution and released its kinetic warhead. The
kinetic warhead acquired the target, diverted into its path, and, using only force of a direct
impact, destroyed the threat in a “hit-to-kill” intercept.
During the test the C2BMC system, operated by Soldiers from the 94th Army Air and Missile
Defense Command, received data from all assets and provided situational awareness of the
engagement to U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic
Command.
The two demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance Satellites (STSS), launched by
MDA in 2009, successfully acquired the target missile, providing stereo “birth to death”
tracking of the target.
Today’s event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-15 (FTM-15), was the most
challenging test to date, as it was the first Aegis BMD version 3.6.1 intercept against an
intermediate-range target (range 1,864 to 3,418 [statute] miles) and the first Aegis BMD
3.6.1 engagement relying on remote tracking data. The ability to use remote radar data to
7073
Missile Defense Agency press release 10-News-0016, dated October 29, 2010, entitled “Joint Japan-U.S. Missile
Defense Flight Test Successful.” See also Marina Malenic, “Japanese Aegis Destroyer Successfully Completes MissileIntercept Test,” Defense Daily, November 1, 2010: 6.
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engage a threat ballistic missile greatly increases the battle space and defended area of the
SM-3 missile.
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will
spend the next several months conducting an extensive assessment and evaluation of system
performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.7174
September 1, 2011, Test. This flight test, which did not result in an intercept, was the first flight
test of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor. MDA states that it
was unable to achieve the planned intercept of a ballistic missile target during a test over the
Pacific Ocean exercising the sea-based element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS).
At approximately 3:53 a.m. Hawaii Standard Time (9:53 a.m. EDT) a short-range ballistic
missile target was launched from the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai,
Hawaii. Approximately 90 seconds later, a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block 1B interceptor
missile was launched from the cruiser USS LAKE ERIE (CG-70) but an intercept of the
target was not achieved.
This was the first flight test of the advanced SM-3 Block 1B interceptor missile. Program
officials will conduct an extensive investigation to determine the cause of the failure to
intercept.7275
Endo-Atmospheric (SM-2 Block IV) Flight Tests
The Aegis BMD system using the SM-2 Block IV interceptor has achieved three successful endoatmospheric intercepts in three at-sea attempts, the first occurring on May 24, 2006,7376 the second
on June 5, 2008,7477 and the third between March 24 and March 26, 2009.75
7178
74
Missile Defense Agency press release 11-News-0007, dated April 15, 2011, entitled “Sea-based Missile Defense
Flight Test Results in Successful Intercept.”
7275
Missile Defense Agency press release 11-News-0016, dated September 1, 2011, entitled “Sea-Based Missile Defense
Test Conducted.” See also Amy Butler, “Upgraded Ballistic Missile Killer Fizzles In First Flight Test,” Aerospace
Daily & Defense Report, September 2, 2011: 3; and Mike McCarthy, “Sea-Based Missile Defense Test Fails,” Defense
Daily, September 2, 2011: 2-3.
7376
See Missile Defense Agency, “First at-Sea Demonstration of Sea-Based Terminal Capability Successfully
Completed,” May 24, 2006 (06-FYI-0079); Gregg K. Kakesako, “Missile Defense System Makes History,” Honolulu
Star-Bulletin, May 25, 2006; Audrey McAvoy, “Ship Shoots Down Test Missile For The First Time,” NavyTimes.com,
May 25, 2006; “Navy, MDA Announce First Terminal Sea-Based Intercept,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May
26, 2006; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Conducts First Sea-Based Terminal Phase Missile Defense Test,” Inside the
Navy, May 29, 2006; and Jeremy Singer, “Sea-Based Terminal May Boost U.S. Missile Defense Capability,” Space
News (www.space.com), June 12, 2006.
7477
See Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense Intercept,” June 5, 2008 (08-NEWS-0068);
Dave Ahearn, “Aegis, SM-2 Interceptors Kill Target Missile In Terminal-Phase Success,” Defense Daily, June 6, 2008.
7578
“Navy Completes Air and Ballistic Missile Exercise,” Navy News Service, March 26, 2009.
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Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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