Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
June 10, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33745
CRS Report for Congress
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repared for Members and Committees of Congress

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Summary
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for
conducting BMD operations. Under current MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable
Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY2010 to 38 at the end of FY2015.
MDA and Navy plans also call for an increasing portion of the Navy’s BMD-capable Aegis ships
to be equipped with newer and more capable versions of the Aegis BMD system.
BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional
defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran.
The Administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for BMD operations, announced in
September 2009, calls for operating BMD-capable Aegis ships in European waters to defend
Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran.
Some observers are concerned—particularly following the Administration’s announcement of its
intention to use Aegis-BMD ships to defend Europe against potential ballistic missile attacks—
that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing
faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. They are also concerned that demands from
U.S. regional military commanders for Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations could strain
the Navy’s ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for performing non-
BMD missions. There is also some concern regarding the adequacy of planned numbers of SM-3
missiles—the interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations.
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for the program. MDA’s proposed FY2011 budget requests a total of $2,161.6
million for the Aegis BMD program.
FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the FY2011 MDA and
Navy funding requests for the Aegis BMD program, and whether to provide MDA or the Navy
with additional direction concerning the program. FY2011 options for Congress regarding the
Aegis BMD program include, among other things, the following: accelerating the modification of
Aegis ships to BMD-capable configurations, increasing procurement of new Aegis destroyers,
increasing procurement of SM-3 missiles, and providing funding for integrating the SM-2 Block
IV BMD interceptor missile into the 4.0.1 version of the Aegis BMD system.

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................ 1
Navy Aegis Ships.................................................................................................................. 1
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers...................................................................... 2
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers ............................................................ 2
Projected Aegis Ship Force Levels .................................................................................. 3
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies ........................................................................................... 3
Aegis BMD System .............................................................................................................. 3
Versions of Aegis BMD System ...................................................................................... 3
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles ..................................................................................... 4
Aegis Ashore Sites ................................................................................................................ 5
Planned Quantities of Ships, Ashore Sites, and Interceptor Missiles....................................... 6
Home Ports of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships ............................................................................ 7
Aegis BMD Flight Tests........................................................................................................ 7
Administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for BMD ............................................... 8
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program ....................................................... 9
Japan .............................................................................................................................. 9
Other Countries............................................................................................................... 9
MDA Funding For Aegis BMD Program in FY2011-FY2015 .............................................. 10
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 12
Demands for BMD-Capable Aegis Ships............................................................................. 12
Demands for Aegis Ships in General ................................................................................... 14
Numbers of SM-3 Interceptors ............................................................................................ 17
SM-2 Block IV Capability for 4.0.1 and Higher Versions .................................................... 18
Additional Issues Concerning European Aegis BMD Operations ......................................... 18
Technical Risk in Aegis BMD Program ............................................................................... 23
Options For Congress................................................................................................................ 25
Legislative Activity for FY2011 ................................................................................................ 25
FY2011 Funding Request .................................................................................................... 25
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)..................................................... 25
House ........................................................................................................................... 25
Senate ........................................................................................................................... 33

Tables
Table 1. Versions of Aegis BMD System ..................................................................................... 5
Table 2. Aegis BMD Ships, Aegis Ashore Sites, and SM-3 Deliveries, FY2009-FY2018............ 6
Table 3. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Program, FY2011-FY2015.......................................... 10
Table B-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests Since January 2002 ........................................................... 49

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Appendixes
Appendix A. Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for BMD Operations........................................ 36
Appendix B. Aegis BMD Flight Tests........................................................................................ 49

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 59

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Introduction
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for
conducting BMD operations. Under current MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable
Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY2010 to 38 at the end of FY2015.
MDA and Navy plans also call for an increasing portion of the Navy’s BMD-capable Aegis ships
to be equipped with newer and more capable versions of the Aegis BMD system.
BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional
defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran.1
The Administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for BMD operations, announced in
September 2009, calls for operating BMD-capable Aegis ships in European waters to defend
Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran.
Some observers are concerned—particularly following the Administration’s announcement of its
intention to use Aegis-BMD ships to defend Europe against potential ballistic missile attacks—
that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing
faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. They are also concerned that demands from
U.S. regional military commanders for Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations could strain
the Navy’s ability to provide regional military commanders with Aegis ships for performing non-
BMD missions. There is also some concern regarding the adequacy of planned numbers of SM-3
missiles—the interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships for conducting BMD operations.
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for the program. MDA’s proposed FY2011 budget requests a total of $2,161.6
million for the Aegis BMD program.
FY2011 issues for Congress include whether to approve, reject, or modify the FY2011 MDA and
Navy funding requests for the Aegis BMD program, and whether to provide MDA or the Navy
with additional direction concerning the program. FY2011 options for Congress regarding the
Aegis BMD program include, among other things, the following: accelerating the modification of
Aegis ships to BMD-capable configurations, increasing procurement of new Aegis destroyers,
increasing procurement of SM-3 missiles, and providing funding for integrating the SM-2 Block
IV BMD interceptor missile into the 4.0.1 version of the Aegis BMD system. Congress’ decisions
on these issues could affect U.S. BMD capabilities and MDA and Navy funding requirements.
Background
Navy Aegis Ships
The Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the
Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays,

1 For a news article about BMD-capable Aegis ships providing ballistic missile defense in the Persian Gulf, see David
E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Speeding Up Missile Defenses In Persian Gulf,” New York Times, January 31, 2010:
1.
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weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus. The
Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship
cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface threats. The system was first deployed
by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers
A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered
service between 1983 and 1994. The first five, which were built to an earlier technical standard,
were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in
2004-2005. The remaining 22 are scheduled to remain in service until age 35.
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers
62 Flight I/II and Flight IIA DDG-51s Procured in FY1985-FY2005
A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first
entered service in 1991 and the 62nd is scheduled to enter service in late 2011. The first 28 ships,
known as Flight I/II DDG-51s, are scheduled to remain in service until age 35. The next 34 ships,
known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design changes and are to remain in service
until age 40.
No DDG-51s Procured in FY2006-FY2009
No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured
three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does not use the Aegis
system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy plans do not call
for modifying DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.
Nine More Flight IIA DDG-51s Programmed for Procurement in FY2010-FY2015
Procurement of DDG-51s resumed in FY2010. Navy plans call for procuring nine Flight IIA
DDG-51s in FY2010-FY2015 in annual quantities of 1-2-1-2-1-2. The first of the nine ships is
scheduled to enter service in late 2015; the ninth may enter service around 2020.
24 Flight III DDG-51s Envisioned for Procurement in FY2016-FY2031
Navy plans call for shifting in FY2016 to procurement of a new version of the DDG-51, called
the Flight III version. The Flight III version is to be equipped with a new radar, called the Air and
Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), that is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on all
previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers. The Navy’s 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan
calls for procuring 24 Flight III DDG-51s between FY2016 and FY2031.2 This plan, if

2 Supplementary data on 30-year shipbuilding plan provided to CRS and CBO by the Navy on February 18, 2010. For
more on the Navy’s plans for procuring DDG-51s, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer
Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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implemented, would bring the Navy’s total DDG-51 production run to 95 ships over 47 years
(FY1985-FY2031).
Projected Aegis Ship Force Levels
The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that the total number of Aegis cruisers and
destroyers will grow from 84 at the end of FY2011 to a peak of 93 in FY2020 and FY2021, and
then decline thereafter as CG-47s and older DDG-51s retire and are replaced by new DDG-51s on
a less than one-for-one basis.3
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies
Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now
operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Spain, and Norway.4
Aegis BMD System5
Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to
the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor
missiles. In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s
procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are to be built from the start with a BMD capability.
Versions of Aegis BMD System
The current version of the Aegis BMD system is called the 3.6.1 version. MDA and Navy plans
call for fielding increasingly capable versions in coming years; the current 3.6.1 version is to be
followed by a version called 4.0.1, and after that by versions called 5.0, 5.1, and 5.2. Later
versions feature improved processors and software, and are to be capable of using improved
versions of the SM-3 interceptor missile (see below).
MDA states that an in-service Aegis ship with no BMD capability can be given a 3.6.1 BMD
capability for about $10 million to $15 million, or a 4.0.1 BMD capability for about $53 million
to $55 million. MDA states that an in-service ship with a 3.6.1 BMD capability can be upgraded
to a 4.0.1 BMD capability for about $45 million, and that an in-service ship with a 5.0 capability
can be upgraded to a 5.1 capability for about $23 million.

3 The Navy’s cruiser-destroyer force during this period is also to include the three DDG-1000s procured in FY2006-
FY2009.
4 The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version
of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar.
5 Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from an MDA briefing on the Aegis BMD program given
to CRS and CBO analysts on March 18, 2010.
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Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles
The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the
Standard Missile-2 Block IV (SM-2 Block IV). The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic
missiles above the atmosphere, in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is
equipped with a “hit-to-kill” warhead, called a kinetic warhead, that is designed to destroy a
ballistic missile’s warhead by colliding with it. The SM-2 Block IV is designed to intercept
ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere, during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s
flight. It is equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead.
MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable versions of the SM-3 in coming years.
The version currently in use, the SM-3 Block IA, is to be followed by the SM-3 Block IB, then
the SM-3 Block IIA and (for land-based use) the SM-3 Block IIB. Compared to the Block IA
version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target seeker, an advanced signal
processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting its course. In contrast to
the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster stage at the bottom but are
13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block IIA version would have a
21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform 21 inches provides
more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout velocity (a
maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is 45% to 60% greater
than that of the Block IA and IB versions,6 as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The
United States and Japan have cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA
version, with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.7 The Block IIB version would
include a lighter kill vehicle, flexible propulsion, and upgraded fire control software.8
MDA states that SM-3 Block IAs have a unit procurement cost of about $9 million to $10
million, that SM-3 Block IBs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $12 million to
$15 million, and that SM-3 Block IIAs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $15
million.
The existing inventory of 75 SM-2 Block IVs (as of January 2010) was created by modifying
SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and ASCMs. MDA and Navy plans do not
call for acquiring any additional SM-2 Block IVs; they instead call for eventually replacing the
current stock of SM-2 Block IVs with a new and more capable terminal-phase BMD interceptor.

6 The 13.5-inch version has a reported burnout velocity of 3.0 to 3.5 kilometers per second (kps). See, for example, J.
D. Marshall, The Future Of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, point paper dated October 15, 2004, available at
http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/259.pdf; “STANDARD Missile-3 Destroyers a Ballistic Missile Target in Test
of Sea-based Missile Defense System,” Raytheon news release circa January 26, 2002, available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=683194&TICK=RTN4&STORY=/www/story/01-26-
2002/0001655926&EDATE=Jan+26,+2002; and Hans Mark, “A White Paper on the Defense Against Ballistic
Missiles,” The Bridge, summer 2001, pp. 17-26, available at http://www.nae.edu/nae/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/NAEW-
63BM86/$FILE/BrSum01.pdf?OpenElement. See also the section on “Sea-Based Midcourse” in CRS Report RL31111,
Missile Defense: The Current Debate, by Steven A. Hildreth et al.
7 The cooperative research effort has been carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999.
The effort has focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the
second-stage propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone. The Block IIA development effort includes the development of a
missile, called the Block II, as a stepping stone to the Block IIA. As a result, the Block IIA development effort has
sometimes been called the Block II/IIA development effort. The Block II missile is not planned as a fielded capability.
8 Source: H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010 (the House Armed Services Committee report on H.R. 5136, the FY2011
defense authorization bill), p. 196.
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Table 1 summarizes the various versions of the Aegis BMD system and correlates them with
phases of the Administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for BMD operations.
Table 1. Versions of Aegis BMD System

PAA Phase I
PAA Phase II
PAA Phase III
Version of Aegis BMD system
3.6.1
4.0.1
5.0
5.1
5.2
Certified for initial use
2006
2012
2014
2016
2018
OTE assessment
2008
2014
2016
2018
2020
Mid-course interceptor(s) used
SM-3 Blk IA
X
X
X
X
X
SM-3 Blk IB

X
X
X
X
SM-3 Blk IIA



X
X
Terminal-phase interceptor used
SM-2 Blk IV
X




Eventual new missile




X
LRS&T capability
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Types of ballistic missiles that can be engaged
SRBM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
MRBM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
IRBM
Limited
Limited
Limited Enhanced Enhanced
ICBM
No
No
No
Limited
Limited
Launch on remote capability
Initial
Enhanced
Yes
Yes
Yes
Engage on remote capability
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Source: MDA briefing to CRS and CBO, March 18, 2010.
Notes: OTE is operational test and evaluation. LRS&T is long-range search and track—the ability to detect
and track ballistic missiles. SRBM is short-range ballistic missile; MRBM is medium-range ballistic missile; IRBM
is intermediate-range ballistic missile; ICBM is intercontinental ballistic missile. Launch on remote is the ability
to launch the interceptor using data from off-board sensors. Engage on remote is the ability to engage targets
using data from off-board sensors.
Aegis Ashore Sites
The Administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach for BMD operations calls for fielding two land-
based Aegis BMD systems in Europe. Each of these Aegis Ashore sites, as they are called, would
include, among other things, a land-based Aegis SPY-1 radar and 24 SM-3 missiles. The Aegis
Ashore sties would launch SM-3 missiles from a re-locatable Vertical Launch System (VLS)
based on the VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships for launching missiles. Observers expect
that the establishment of the two Aegis Ashore sites will permit a reduction in the number of
BMD-capable Aegis ships needed for European BMD operations.
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Planned Quantities of Ships, Ashore Sites, and Interceptor Missiles
MDA and the Navy plan to eventually equip at least 10 of the Navy’s 22 Aegis cruisers, and every
Aegis destroyer (of which 63 have been funded through FY2010), for BMD operations. As of
early 2010, MDA and the Navy were discussing whether to equip more than 10 of the CG-47s for
BMD operations, and had not yet settled on a schedule for providing BMD capability to the 34
Flight IIA DDG-51s procured between FY1994 and FY2005.
As shown in Table 2, under current MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy
Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY2010 to 38 at the end of FY2015. As
also shown in the plan, MDA and Navy plans call for an increasing portion of the Navy’s BMD-
capable Aegis ships to be equipped with newer and more capable versions of the Aegis BMD
system.
Table 2. Aegis BMD Ships, Aegis Ashore Sites, and SM-3 Deliveries, FY2009-FY2018


FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18
Aegis cruisers modified to have:



3.6.1
version
2 4 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 0



4.0.1
version
0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0



5.0/5.1/5.2
version 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 9 9



Total
2 4 5 5 5 8 9 10 10 9
Flight I/II Aegis destroyers procured in FY1985-FY1994 and later modified to have:



3.6.1
version
16 16 18 20 20 16 13 10 9 6



4.0.1
version
0 0 0 2 4 7 7 7 6 6



5.0/5.1/5.2
version 0 0 0 1 3 5 8 11 13 16



Total
16 16 18 23 27 28 28 28 28 28
Flight IIA Aegis destroyers procured in FY1994-FY2005 and later modified to have:
versions TBD
0
0
0
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
Flight IIA destroyers procured FY2010-FY2015 and built from the start with:



4.0.1
version
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 6
TOTAL AEGIS BMD SHIPS



3.6.1
version
18 20 21 23 23 19 16 11 10 6
4.0.1 version
0
0
2
4
6
9
8
10
10
12
5.0/5.1/5.2 version
0
0
0
1
3
8
14
20
22
25



ALL
VERSIONS 18 20 23 28 32 36 38 41 42 43
Aegis Ashore Sites
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
Cumulative SM-3 missile deliveries
SM-3 Block IAs
n/a
80
106
112
112
112
112
112
112
112
SM-3 Block IBs
n/a
1
4
16
42
108
180
252
324
324





TOTAL
IAs/IBs n/a 81 110 128 154 220 292 364 436 436
SM-3 Block IIAs
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
3
n/a
n/a
n/a
Source: MDA briefing to CRS and CBO, March 18, 2010.
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Notes: TBD means to be determined; n/a means data not available from briefing. Modification schedule for
Flight IIA destroyers procured FY1994-FY2005 to be determined; modifications of any of these ships by FY2018
would add to the totals shown in the table. Figures for FY2009 and FY2010 do not include one cruiser, Lake
Erie (CG-70), that is equipped with an Engineering Development Model (EDM) version of the 4.0.1 system. CG-
70 is scheduled to convert to an operational BMD system in FY2011 and is counted as such in FY2011 and
subsequent years. Each Aegis Ashore Site is equipped with 24 SM-3 missiles.
Home Ports of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
As of January 2010, 16 of the Navy’s 21 BMD-capable Aegis ships were homeported in the
Pacific, including five at Yokosuka, Japan, six at Pearl Harbor, HI, and five at San Diego, CA.
The remaining five BMD-capable Aegis ships were homeported in the Atlantic, with four at
Norfolk, VA, and one at Mayport, FL. The figures of 21 BMD-capable ships, including six at
Pearl harbor, include the Lake Erie (CG-70), which is equipped with an Engineering
Development Model (EDM) version of the 4.0.1 system. This ship is not included in the totals
shown for FY2009 and FY2010 in Table 2. Implementing the Administration’s plan to use
BMD-capable Aegis ships to defend Europe against potential ballistic missile attacks would likely
lead to an increase over time in the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships homeported in the
Atlantic.
Aegis BMD Flight Tests
Since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 16 successful exo-atmospheric
intercepts in 20 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including two successful intercepts in three
attempts by Japanese Aegis ships), and three successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in three
attempts using the SM-2 Block IV missile, making for a combined total of 19 successful
intercepts in 23 attempts. In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser
operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system to shoot down
an inoperable U.S. surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit. Including this intercept
in the count increases the total to 20 successful intercepts in 24 attempts.9

9 The modifications to the ship’s Aegis BMD midcourse system reportedly involved primarily making changes to
software. DOD stated that the modifications were of a temporary, one-time nature. Three SM-3 missiles reportedly
were modified for the operation. The first modified SM-3 fired by the cruiser successfully intercepted the satellite at an
altitude of about 133 nautical miles (some sources provide differing altitudes). The other two modified SM-3s (one
carried by the cruiser, another carried by an engage-capable Aegis destroyer) were not fired, and the Navy stated it
would reverse the modifications to these two missiles. (For additional information, see Peter Spiegel, “Navy Missile
Hits Falling Spy Satellite,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2008; Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Navy Missile Hits
Satellite, Pentagon Says,” Washington Post, February 21, 2008; Thom Shanker, “Missile Strikes A Spy Satellite Falling
From Its Orbit,” New York Times, February 21, 2008; Bryan Bender, “US Missile Hits Crippled Satellite,” Boston
Globe
, February 21, 2008; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Hits Wayward Satellite On First Attempt,” NavyTimes.com,
February 21, 2008; Dan Nakaso, “Satellite Smasher Back At Pearl,” Honolulu Advertiser, February 23, 2008; Zachary
M. Peterson, “Lake Erie CO Describes Anti-Satellite Shot,” NavyTimes.com, February 25, 2008; Anne Mulrine, “The
Satellite Shootdown: Behind the Scenes,” U.S. News & World Report, February 25, 2008; Nick Brown, “US Modified
Aegis and SM-3 to Carry Out Satellite Interception Shot,” Jane’s International Defence Review, April 2008: 35.)
MDA states that the incremental cost of the shoot-down operation was $112.4 million when all costs are included.
MDA states that this cost is to be paid by MDA and the Pacific Command (PACOM), and that if MDA is directed to
absorb the entire cost, “some realignment or reprogramming from other MDA [program] Elements may be necessary to
lessen significant adverse impact on [the] AEGIS [BMD program’s] cost and schedule.” (MDA information paper
dated March 7, 2008, provided to CRS on June 6, 2008. See also Jason Sherman, “Total Cost for Shoot-Down of Failed
NRO Satellite Climbs Higher,” InsideDefense.com, May 12, 2008.)
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DOD’s director for operational test and evaluation testified in April 2010 that:
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, or Aegis BMD, has demonstrated that it can detect, track,
and engage simple non-separating and separating short range ballistic missiles (those with
ranges below about 1000 kilometers). Using Aegis BMD 3.6 hardware and software and
SM-3 Block IA hit-to-kill interceptors, Aegis BMD has demonstrated it is operationally
effective for performing midcourse intercept of short-range ballistic missiles. Additionally,
follow-on operational testing of Aegis BMD 3.6.1 hardware and software demonstrated
Aegis BMD’s capability to engage simple short range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase
with modified SM-2 Block IV warhead interceptors.
During 2009, Aegis BMD completed two U.S. flight tests, Stellar Daggers and FTM-17. The
two tests addressed midcourse-phase and terminal-phase engagement capabilities for Aegis
BMD 3.6.1. Stellar Daggers performed a simultaneous engagement of a short range ballistic
missile in the terminal phase of flight with a modified SM-2 Block IV interceptor, and a
cruise missile target with a SM-2 Block IIIA interceptor. FTM-17 completed the planned
follow-on operational test and evaluation flight testing phase for Aegis BMD 3.6.1. It also
provided a venue for regression testing of midcourse-phase engagement capability following
the upgrade from Aegis BMD 3.6 to Aegis BMD 3.6.1. The latter introduced the capability
for terminal intercepts and merged anti-submarine warfare functionality into the system
software.10
For further discussion of Aegis BMD flight tests, see Appendix B.
Administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for BMD
On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new approach for BMD
operations, called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), that calls for using BMD-capable Aegis
ships and eventually Aegis Ashore sites to defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from
countries such as Iran. The PAA is to be implemented in four phases between 2011 and 2020. A
DOD official summarized the four phases as follows in April 2010 testimony:
In Phase 1, out through the 2011 timeframe, existing missile defenses to defend against
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles will be deployed. Phase 1 will be accomplished
by deploying a forward-based sensor and utilizing BMD-capable Aegis ships carrying SM-3
Block IA interceptors.
In Phase 2, in the 2015 timeframe, improved interceptors and sensors to defend against
SRBMs and MRBMs will be deployed. The architecture will be expanded with a land-based
SM-3 site in Southern Europe and the deployment of SM-3 Block IB interceptors.
In Phase 3, in the 2018 timeframe, to improve coverage against medium- and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles, a second land-based SM-3 site will be deployed in Northern Europe.
This will include use of the more capable SM-3 Block IIA interceptors on land and at sea to
cover all NATO Europe countries.
In Phase 4, a decade from now, to address the threat of potential ICBM attack from the
Middle East, the next generation SM-3 interceptor, the Block IIB, will be available for land-

10 Statement by J. Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Before the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee, April 15, 2010, pp. 3-4.
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based sites. This interceptor, with its higher velocity, is intended to provide the ability to
engage longer-range ballistic missiles and to intercept threats in their ascent phase.11
The Administration has stated that the PAA can be used for structuring BMD operations in other
regions, such as the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf. For more on the PAA, see Appendix A.
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program
Japan
Japan’s interest in BMD, and in cooperating with the United States on the issue, was heightened
in August 1998 when North Korea test-fired a Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile that flew over Japan
before falling into the Pacific.12 In addition to cooperating with the United States on development
of technologies for the SM-3 Block IIA missile, Japan is modifying four of its six Aegis
destroyers with an approximate equivalent of the 3.6.1 version Aegis BMD system. As of March
2010, three of Japan’s Aegis ships had received the modification. As mentioned earlier (see
“Aegis BMD Flight Tests”), Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have conducted three flight tests
of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor, achieving two successful exo-atmospheric
intercepts. A Japanese Aegis ship has also tracked a ballistic missile target in a U.S. Aegis BMD
flight test.
Other Countries
Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators include the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Denmark, South Korea, and Australia. As mentioned earlier,
Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis
ships. The other countries operate destroyers and frigates with different combat systems that may
have potential for contributing to BMD operations. As of March 2010, none of these countries
had committed to fielding a sea-based BMD capability.

11 Statement of Dr. Brad Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy,
Before the House Armed Services Committee, April 15, 2010, p. 9. An MDA official testifying at the same hearing
summarized the four phases as follows:
The Phase 1 capability (planned to begin deployment in 2011) will provide initial protection for
southern Europe from existing short- and medium-range threats using sea-based interceptors and
forward-based sensors. Phase 2 (~2015) deploys the SM-3 IB interceptor at sea and at an Aegis
Ashore site. In collaboration with OSD Policy, USSTRATCOM, the Department of State, and
United States European Command (USEUCOM), we are preparing to begin negotiations with
Romania to locate an Aegis Ashore site on its territory in 2015. Phase 3 (~2018) employs SM-3 IIA
on land and at sea to protect NATO from SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM threats. Poland has agreed to
host this Aegis Ashore site. The Phase 4 architecture (~2020 timeframe) features the higher
velocity land-based SM-3 IIB, a persistent sensor network, and enhanced command and control
system to intercept large raids of medium- to long-range missiles early in flight.
(Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense
Agency, Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Regarding the Fiscal Year 2011 Missile Defense Programs, Thursday, April 15, 2010, pp. 5-6.)
12 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and
Prospects
, by Richard P. Cronin. This archived report was last updated on March 19, 2002. See also CRS Report
RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
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MDA Funding For Aegis BMD Program in FY2011-FY2015
Table 3 shows requested and programmed MDA funding for the Aegis BMD program for
FY2011-FY2015. The table does not include Navy funding for the Aegis BMD program, which
includes, among other things, funding for modifying in-service Aegis ships to have a BMD
capability. As can be seen in the table, MDA’s proposed FY2011 budget requests a total of
$2,161.6 million for the Aegis BMD program, including $281.4 million for the Aegis Ashore
development project.
Table 3. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Program, FY2011-FY2015
(Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)

FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
PE0603892C / Project MD09
1,412.6
972.0
1,063.4
1,030.0
886.0
PE0603892C
/
Project
MD40
54.7 49.9 49.3 46.7 37.3
PE0604881C
/
Project
MD09
318.8 405.5 416.3 337.3 227.5
PE0208866C
/
Project
MD09
94.1 701.9 712.7 681.7 669.7
SM-3 quantities funded in the
8 66 72 72 72
above line
Subtotal
above
1,880.2 2,129.3 2,241.7 2,095.7 1,820.5
PE0604880C / Project MD68
281.4
345.9
187.1
93.5
139.6
TOTAL
2,161.6 2,475.2 2,428.8 2,189.2 1,960.1
Source: Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 President’s Budget, Missile Defense Agency, Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide – 0400, Justification Book, February 2010, Volume 2b and Volume 2c,
and Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimates Overview, p. 25.
Notes: Table includes only MDA funding for Aegis BMD program; it does not include Navy funding for Aegis
BMD program. PE is program element (i.e., a research and development account line item).
PE0603892C / Project MD09 is the Aegis BMD project within the BMD Aegis program element.
PE0603892C / Project MD40 is program-wide support within the BMD Aegis program element.
PE0604881C / Project MD09 is U.S. funding for the SM-2 Block IIA co-development project with Japan.
PE0208866C / Project MD09 is procurement of SM-3 missiles.
PE0604880C / Project MD68 is the Aegis Ashore development project within the land-based SM-3 program
element.
An MDA official summarized MDA’s FY2011 funding request for the Aegis BMD program in
April 2010 testimony as follows:
We will continue the design, qualification, and testing of the SM-3 IB interceptor;
manufacture 30 SM-3 IB test and production verification interceptors (we plan to procure a
total of 436 Aegis SM-3 IA and IB interceptors by 2015), and upgrade 3 additional Aegis
BMD engagement ships (two Aegis BMD 3.6.1 destroyers and one 4.0.1 destroyer) for a
total of 23 BMD capable ships by the end of FY2011 and 38 BMD capable ships by 2015.
We will continue development and testing of the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 and 5.0 fire control
system to launch SM-3 IB and IA interceptors against threat missiles when they are beyond
the range of the ship’s own radar. We also will continue the co-development of the SM-3 IIA
interceptor with the Government of Japan to increase significantly the area defended by the
Aegis BMD system with its 21-inch diameter rocket motors, two-color seeker, and increased
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kinetic warhead divert capability. We also will continue to design the first Aegis Ashore
battery that will be installed for testing at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in 2012.13
Regarding the first two line items in Table 3, MDA states the following:
BMD Aegis (PE 0603892C): For the FYDP, we are requesting $5.602B, including $1.467B
in FY 2011. The request includes $165M to complete manufacturing of 30 SM-3 Block IB
interceptors that are incrementally funded from the RDT&E appropriation. All additional
SM-3 Block IB interceptors are fully funded from the Procurement appropriation after the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has approved initial
production. The remainder of the request is primarily devoted to continuing the hardware and
software developments as outlined below:
• $143M for the continuing development and testing of the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 Combat
System. The System expands the Aegis BMD Weapons System (AWS) effectiveness by
allowing the use of both the SM-3 Block IA and the SM-3 Block IB interceptor. It
improves engagement performance against an expanded threat set and surveillance and
track performance against some IRBMs as well as the capability of using remote BMDS
sensor information to launch an interceptor (termed “Launch-on-Remote”).
• $99M to continue the upgrade of three additional Aegis BMD engagement ships (two
Aegis BMD 3.6.1 destroyers and one 4.0.1 destroyer).
• $255M for continuing development and testing of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor. The
SM-3 IB is the next upgrade entering the fleet. The seeker, signal processor, and
propulsion system of the Block IB missile kinetic warheads are improved versions of the
proven Block IA missile and will result in increased missile effectiveness against
growing technical sophistication of ballistic missiles. This missile upgrade, in
combination with the BMD signal processor, provides Aegis BMD and the BMDS with
an improved capability to identify closely spaced objects and probability of kill against
advanced threats; it also expands the number of possible simultaneous engagements.
• $110M for system-level testing, including two important flight tests: (1) exercise the
PAA’s Phase 1 capability with an Aegis BMD AWS 3.6.1 and SM-3 IA interceptor
engagement of an MRBM target; and (2) test an Aegis BMD AWS 4.0.1 and SM-3
Block 1B missile engagement and intercept of an MRBM target.
• $228M for continuing development and testing of the Aegis BMD 5.0 capability. Aegis
BMD 5.0 will integrate Aegis BMD 4.0.1 with the Open Architecture system developed
by the Navy. This will allow the transition of Aegis BMD from older military standard
computers to a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) computing system and will ensure the
Aegis BMD system remains compatible with Navy assets as ship modernization plans
are executed. A significant advantage of Aegis BMD 5.0 is that it will enable any Aegis
ship to serve as a candidate for the BMD mission.
• $119M for development of Aegis BMD 5.1. Aegis BMD 5.1 integrates the SM-3 Block
IIA missile with the 5.0 Open Architecture AWS and is capable of using remote BMDS
sensor information to engage an incoming target (Engage-on-Remote).14

13 Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the
House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Regarding the Fiscal Year 2011 Missile Defense
Programs, Thursday, April 15, 2010, pp. 6-7.)
14 Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimates Overview, pp. 11-12.
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In addition to the funding shown in Table 3, MDA’s proposed FY2011 budget requests $40.8
million in FY2011 funding for research and development on high-performance interceptor
components that DOD budget materials describe as technologies for the SM-3. MDA states: “We
are requesting $41M in FY 2011 to develop components that increase the speed of our SM-3
family of interceptors with advanced divert capability, faster boosters, and lighter kill vehicles.
We are studying the use of a derivative SM-3 IB kill vehicle and derivatives of the first and
second stages of the SM-3 IIA interceptor as part of the development of the SM-3 IIB long-range
missile interceptor.”15
Issues for Congress
Demands for BMD-Capable Aegis Ships16
Some observers are concerned—particularly following the Administration’s announcement of its
intention to use Aegis-BMD ships to defend Europe against potential ballistic missile attacks—
that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing
faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. Much of the concern focuses on the situation
over the next few years, prior to the scheduled establishment of the two Aegis Ashore sites in
Europe, which observers anticipate will permit a reduction in the number of BMD-capable Aegis
ships needed for European BMD operations.
The number of BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers that will be needed for European BMD
operations over the next few years will depend on
• the number of BMD-capable ships that are to be kept on station in European
waters at any given moment,
• the way in which being on station is defined, and
• the Navy’s approach for providing ships for those stations.
General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified in 2009 that for
“early-stage” European BMD operations, DOD is considering maintaining two BMD-capable
ships at each of three European BMD stations, for a total of six ships on station.17 Those figures
could change; if they do, the discussion below could be adjusted accordingly.

15 Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the
House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Regarding the Fiscal Year 2011 Missile Defense
Programs, Thursday, April 15, 2010, p. 15. A similar statement appears in Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY)
2011 Budget Estimates Overview, p. 15.
16 The discussion in this section is adapted from Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs,
Congressional Research Service, before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces hearing on Navy Force Structure and Capabilities, January 20, 2010, pp. 15-16. For an additional
and broadly similar discussion of the potential number of BMD-capable Aegis ships that will be needed for the next
few years, see Statement of Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, [on] The Long-Term Outlook
for the U.S. Navy’s Fleet, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. House of Representatives, January 20, 2010, pp. 14-17.
17 Emelie Rutherford, “Congress To Probe Possible Need For More Ships For Obama Missile-Defense Plan,” Defense
Daily
, January 12, 2010: 1-2; Pat Host, “Lawmaker: Pacific Left Vulnerable Under New Missile Defense Plan,” Inside
the Navy
, October 19, 2009; Dan Taylor, “O’Reilly: Pentagon To Send BMD Ships To Eastern Mediterranean,” Inside
(continued...)
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If the Navy relied entirely on East Coast-homeported destroyers operating on seven-month
deployments for supporting European BMD operations, then maintaining six ships continuously
on station in European waters could require approximately 26 ships.18 This figure might be taken
as a high-end or worst-case analysis. The figure could be reduced by
increasing trans-Atlantic transit speeds, which would marginally reduce
stationkeeping multipliers by reducing transit times (but would also increase fuel
consumption during transits);
using Sea Swap—that is, extended-length (e.g., 18- or 24-month) deployments
with crew rotation—which could substantially reduce stationkeeping multipliers
by reducing the number of trans-Atlantic transits;
using multiple crewing—that is, operating the ships with an average of more
than one crew for each ship—which could substantially reduce stationkeeping
multipliers by increasing the percentage of time that each ship is in deployed
status;
homeporting the ships in Europe, which could substantially reduce
stationkeeping multipliers by eliminating most trans-Atlantic transits (some
trans-Atlantic transits might still be needed for maintenance or training reasons);
taking advantage of transit presence—that is, meeting some of the requirement
with BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers that are passing through the
Mediterranean on their way to or from the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region; and
using an operational “tether”—that is, defining “being on station” to mean
being in the needed location and ready to conduct BMD operations within a
certain number of hours or days of receiving an order. General Cartwright
testified last year that DOD is considering using a tether of “a couple of days” for
European BMD operations, as it does for BMD operations in the Sea of Japan.19
These measures are not mutually exclusive, and pursuing a combination could substantially
reduce the number of cruisers and destroyers required to keep six on station. European
homeporting, for example, might be combined with multiple crewing and taking advantage of
transit presence. Such a strategy, combined with an operational tether, might represent something
close to a low-end or best-case analysis.20

(...continued)
the Navy, October 5, 2009; Dan Taylor, “Cartwright: Navy May Station Six Aegis BMD Ships Near Europe.” Inside
the Navy
, September 28, 2009; Emelie Rutherford, “Navy Ship Role In New Missile-Defense Architecture
Questioned,” Defense Daily, September 25, 2009: 2-3.
18 This number is based on a stationkeeping multiplier of 4.4 for Norfolk-based DDG-51s deploying to the European
Command’s area of responsibility on seven-month deployments. The stationkeeping multiplier is the number of ships
of a given type and a certain homeporting location that are needed to maintain one ship of such ship continuously on
station in a certain overseas operating area. (Source for stationkeeping multiplier: Navy information paper on
stationkeeping multipliers dated December 30, 2009, provided by the Navy to CRS on January 8, 2010.)
19 Pat Host, “Lawmaker: Pacific Left Vulnerable Under New Missile Defense Plan,” Inside the Navy, October 19,
2009; Dan Taylor, “O’Reilly: Pentagon To Send BMD Ships To Eastern Mediterranean,” Inside the Navy, October 5,
2009.
20 The aircraft carrier that is homeported in Japan is counted as being present as a forward-deployed ship in the Pacific
even when it is at pier or in dry dock in Japan. As a result, the Navy treats the homeporting of a carrier in Japan as
reducing to 1.0 the stationkeeping multiplier for keeping a carrier forward-deployed in the Pacific. This counting rule
(continued...)
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An April 19, 2010, news report stated:
Navy planners are investigating the possibility that ballistic-missile defense ships could be
forward-deployed to ports in Europe to make it easier for them to defend the continent, a top
U.S. commander said.
Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, commander of Naval Forces Europe, said that the top authorities
involved have made no decision about whether BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers could
be based somewhere in Europe, in the same way warships stay in Japan, but the move is
being considered….
Fitzgerald said one thing is clear: American ships will probably need to patrol only the
eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Early diagrams from the Missile Defense Agency
showed American ships in the North and Black Seas, above the continent, but in practice,
those parts of Europe will probably not be in danger because Iranian missiles can’t reach that
far—yet.
“We’re going to have to pace the threat. Whatever the range of the threat is, that’s where
we’ll put the ships,” Fitzgerald said.21
Rear Admiral Archer Macy, the director of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Organization, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 20, 2010, that the
number of Aegis-BMD ships planned to be in service by FY2015 was increased from 27 to 38
because of the decision to use BMD-capable Aegis ships for European BMD operations. An April
26, 2010, press report on the hearing stated:
“The original increase up to 27 was as a result partly of the studies we had done saying that
we need more,” Macy said. “And then the PAA came into being, the general was asked what
more will it take, and that resulted in a further increase in the number of ships.”…
Macy added that he thinks 38 ships is “a good number.”
“It is a step in the right direction,” he said. “Whether it is the total number will be part of the
analysis ... that will be conducted over the next year….”22
Demands for Aegis Ships in General
Some observers are concerned that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for Aegis
ships for conducting BMD operations could strain the Navy’s ability to provide regional military

(...continued)
might not be suitable for BMD-capable ships homeported in Europe, since their mission would involve not simply
being present, but being ready to conduct BMD operations. Consequently, homeporting the ships in Europe might not
reduce to six the total number of ships required to keep six on station. But it could reduce the stationkeeping multiplier
by significantly reducing time spent transiting between the home port and the operating station, and perhaps also by
permitting the ships to adopt an operational cycle that is more like the operational cycle of the Japan-homeported
carrier.
21 Philip Ewing, “Officials Consider European Home Ports,” NavyTimes.com, April 19, 2010. See also Cid Standifer,
“Mabus Suggests That European Homerporting Would Help BMD Mission,” Inside the Navy, April 26, 2010.
22 Dan Taylor, “Macy: Navy Increases Total Aegis BMD Assets Over FYDP To 38 Ships,” Inside the Navy, April 26,
2010.
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commanders with Aegis ships for performing non-BMD missions in various locations around the
world.
The Navy’s Aegis ships are multi-mission platforms that are used for performing a range of non-
BMD missions, including forward deployed presence for regional deterrence, reassurance and
stabilization; partnership-building activities; humanitarian assistance and disaster response
(HADR) operations; maritime security operations (including anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations; counter-terrorism
operations; and (if need be) conventional warfighting operations. In conventional warfighting
operations, Aegis ships could be called upon to perform a variety of non-BMD functions,
including anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, strike warfare and naval surface fire support, and
antisubmarine warfare. Locations that are good for performing BMD operations might not be
good for performing non-BMD operations, and vice versa.
The Navy’s current cruiser-destroyer force-structure goal is to achieve and maintain a force of 88
cruisers and destroyers. The 88-ship goal is part of the Navy’s overall 313-ship force structure
plan, which was first presented to Congress in February 2006. A potential issue for Congress is
whether the 88-ship goal is still appropriate, particularly in light of the Administration’s
September 2009 announcement of its plan to use BMD-capable Aegis ships to defend Europe
against potential ballistic missile attacks. The Navy in recent years has deployed only limited
numbers of cruisers and destroyers to waters around Europe,23 and has not announced a reduction
in the combined number of cruisers and destroyers required for performing operations in other
regions.
In December 2009, it was reported that the Navy was considering increasing the cruiser-destroyer
force-level objective to 96 ships as part of its FY2011 budget submission.24 The FY2011 budget
submission, however, left the 313-ship plan, including the 88-ship cruiser-destroyer objective,
unchanged, at least for the time being. The Navy’s report on its 30-year (FY2011-FY2040)
shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA) that could lead to a
change in the 313-ship plan, possibly including a change in the cruiser-destroyer force-level
objective. The report does not state when the FSA will be completed, or when a change to the
313-ship plan might be announced.25
The Navy’s report on its 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that the cruiser-destroyer force will
increase from 84 ships in FY2011 to 88 ships in FY2015, continue increasing to a peak of 96
ships in FY2020 and FY2021, decline to 67 ships in FY2034, and then increase to 76 ships by
FY2039 and FY2040. (For FY2015 and later years, these figures include three non-Aegis DDG-
1000 class destroyers.)

23 The Navy stated in 2009 that an average of about 1.7 cruisers and destroyers have been maintained on station in the
Mediterranean on a daily basis during the preceding five years. This figure excludes cruisers and destroyers transiting
the Mediterranean on their way to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region or the Atlantic Ocean. It also excludes any
cruisers and destroyers the Navy might have deployed to northern European waters for purposes such as making port
calls or conducting exercises. (Source: Navy information paper dated October 8, 2009, and provided to CRS on
October 9, 2009, by the Navy Office of Legislative Affairs.)
24 Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Raises 313-Ship Goal To 324, Boosts Focus on Missile Defense,” Inside the Navy,
December 7, 2009.
25 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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A January 4, 2010, news report stated:
No sooner did the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) system become operational in 2008
than U.S. combatant commanders started asking for BMD-equipped ships to begin patrolling
their areas.
Central Command needed a “shooter” in the northern Arabian Gulf. European Command
wanted one in the eastern Mediter-ranean. Pacific Command already had Aegis ships with
limited BMD capabilities on guard around Japan for a potential launch from North Korea.
The demand for BMD ships is only expected to increase, driven in part by rising concerns
about Iran’s intentions and the U.S. decision in September to cancel an anti-missile system in
Poland and the Czech Republic and rely instead on Aegis.
But the Navy has a relatively small number of such ships, and those destroyers and cruisers
are designed to carry out a wide range of war-fighting tasks.
As a result, while Navy commanders are pleased with the expanding capabilities of their
Aegis ships, they’re also somewhat guarded about trumpeting the advances.
“We can’t constrain assets to one mission,” a senior officer said last month. “They need to do
a variety of other missions.” Worries that valuable Aegis ships might be locked into the
BMD mission were discussed in December at a two-day seminar at the National Defense
University (NDU) in Washington. Reporters were allowed to quote comments made at the
seminar under the condition that no speaker be identified.
“Sea-based ballistic missile defense is a necessary component of any theater defense,” said
the senior officer. “We need to find ways to get folks to use the ships in ways consistent with
their being a ship—to realize they are not a point-defense asset.” One analyst added, “The
demand signal is ahead of the pot of ships.” U.S. Navy spokesman Lt. Tommy Buck said the
service is working to manage the demand.
“Combatant commanders need to understand BMD-capable ships are multimission-capable.
BMD is one available asset,” Buck said Dec. 18.
The Navy is also working on how to respond, said Vice Adm. Samuel Locklear, director of
the Navy Staff.
“We have a small Navy today—the smallest since 1916—yet we have a growing global
demand for maritime forces, maritime security operations. And now we have a growing
demand for maritime ballistic missile defense. Our ships and our crews and our systems are
up to the challenge, but it’s a capacity issue for us,” Locklear said to a reporter during the
NDU seminar.
“As the capacity grows faster than we can grow the number of ships we have—which is
always difficult, particularly in the demanding fiscal environment we’re in—we have to look
at ways to deploy these ships so that we can get the job done and still have a reasonable
expectation that we can take care of the ship and the crew,” Locklear said. “So we’re looking
at a lot of different options as to how we’ll do that as this demand grows. But we are limited
in capacity.” Locklear said that despite meeting demands from joint commanders, the Navy
has “to some degree preserved the command and control. Navy component commanders still
command and control these ships.” But, he added, “What we’ve had to do is to spread these
multimission platforms more thinly across a growing number of demands globally.”
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27 BMD Ships By 2013
Twenty-one cruisers and destroyers will have been upgraded with the Aegis BMD capability
by early 2010, and six more destroyers are to receive the upgrade in 2012 and 2013. But at
least one senior officer at the seminar noted “there will be no more new ships for missile
defense.” The demand has already affected deployments. Early in 2009, for example, The
Sullivans, a Florida-based destroyer on deployment with a carrier group, moved to Japan for
a few weeks to pick up the exercise schedule of a Japan-based BMD destroyer that was
called on by Central Command to guard the northern Ara-bian Gulf.
This fall, a San Diego-based ship, the destroyer Higgins, deployed to the eastern
Mediterranean to provide BMD defense for European Command and take part in exercises.
Both moves are unusual, as it’s rare for an Atlantic Fleet ship to visit Japan or for a Pacific
ship to patrol the Mediterranean. Such cross-deployments require more coordination by fleet
planners.
“Effective global force management requires global visibility on requirements,” Buck said.
“U.S. Fleet Forces Command [headquartered in Norfolk, Va.] and Pacific Fleet
[headquartered in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii] collaborate, coordinate and communicate to have
more complete knowledge of location and status of fleet capabilities and work to best
employ those capabilities to meet global combatant commander requirements to include
BMD.” The senior officer said one way to manage demand is to encourage combatant
commanders to give “sufficient warning to have ships on station. We need to remind
[combatant commanders] that these are multimission ships.” The BMD cruisers and
destroyers are also equipped to handle anti-submarine, land-attack, air-defense and other
tasks.26
Rear Admiral Archer Macy, the director of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Organization, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 20, 2010, that DOD
does not plan to give BMD-capable Aegis ships a strict role of performing BMD operations only.
He also stated, however, that it was possible, depending on ballistic missile threats, that BMD-
capable Aegis ships might sometimes be constrained to certain operating areas.27
Numbers of SM-3 Interceptors
Some observers have expressed concern in recent years regarding the adequacy of planned
numbers of SM-3 missiles. These concerns may have been reinforced by the Administration’s
September 2009 announcement of its plan to use BMD-capable Aegis ships to defend Europe
against potential ballistic missile attacks. MDA in recent years has been increasing planned
numbers of SM-3s, and states that its FY2011 plan—which would procure a cumulative total of
436 SM-3 Block IA and IB missiles by FY2015 and deliver a cumulative total of 436 by FY2017
(see Table 2)—represents an increase of 107 missiles over the number in its FY2010 plan.28

26 Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Juggles Ships To Fill BMD Demands,” Defense News, January 4, 2010. Material
in brackets as in original.
27 Dan Taylor, “Macy: Navy Increases Total Aegis BMD Assets Over FYDP To 38 Ships,” Inside the Navy, April 26,
2010.
28 Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimates Overview, p. 11.
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SM-2 Block IV Capability for 4.0.1 and Higher Versions
Another potential issue for Congress concerns MDA’s plan to not include a capability for using
the SM-2 Block IV missile in the 4.0.1, 5.0, and 5.1 versions of the Aegis BMD system (see
Table 1). Being able to use the SM-2 Block IV gives a BMD-capable Aegis ship a second layer
of defense against ballistic missiles, permitting the ship to attempt to intercept missiles that are
not intercepted by SM-3s. MDA states that the absence of an ability to use the SM-2 Bock IV
missile from the 4.0.1 version of the Aegis BMD system is an affordability measure. A potential
question for Congress is how much additional funding would be needed to add a capability for
using the SM-2 Block IV missile to the 4.0.1, 5.0, and 5.1 versions of the Aegis system, and how
adding such a capability would affect the ability of ships equipped with the 4.0.1, 5.0, and 5.1
versions to intercept ballistic missiles under various scenarios. Another potential question is
whether the current fixed inventory of 75 SM-2 Block IVs (as of January 2010) would be
adequate to provide missiles to ships equipped with the 4.0.1, 5.0, and 5.1 versions.
Additional Issues Concerning European Aegis BMD Operations
The Administration’s plan to use BMD-capable Aegis ships to defend Europe against potential
ballistic missile attacks raises a number of additional potential oversight issues for Congress,
including the following:
• What will be the command and control procedures governing use of sea-based
SM-3s for purposes of intercepting ballistic missiles fired toward Europe from
Iran (or some other country in the Middle East or Southwest Asia)? Would
authority to fire the missile rest with the ship’s commanding officer, or would
approval from a higher authority be required?
• What modifications are needed to make the SM-3 suitable for use as a land-based
missile, and what are the technical risks associated with these modifications?
• What additional system-integration challenges would the Administration’s plan
pose for the Aegis BMD system? How significant are the technical risks
associated with these challenges?
• What implications, if any, does Japanese involvement in the development of the
SM-3 Block IIA missile have for implementing the Administration’s plan?
• If allied European navies in the future acquire BMD capabilities using the
Aegis/SM-3 combination or other systems, does the Administration envisage
having those navies participate in European BMD operations, so as to reduce the
burden on U.S. BMD systems?
An April 19, 2010, press report stated that
questions still under consideration include basics such as which areas American ships will
defend and when; how many ships will be available; and how the alphabet-soup of U.S. and
international commanders will work together in a crisis.
[Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, commander of Naval Forces Europe] gave a simple example of
the bureaucratic and diplomatic intricacies involved with Navy ballistic-missile defense of
Europe: Although U.S. European Command controls the territory in which BMD ships will
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be on guard, the potential launch sites in the Middle East, from which an attack might come,
belong to U.S. Central Command.
Officials need to determine how to integrate their sensors, how they’ll handle warnings, and
who will be in the loop—American, NATO, European Union or individual countries’
militaries—if a threat occurs….
The U.S. and its allies have begun testing systems and practicing for threats, Fitzgerald said,
and American BMD ships are confirmed ready to join Israel’s command-and-control grid in
case of an attack.29
A November 6, 2009, press report stated:
Citing the resource-constrained U.S. Army budget, the general overseeing the Army’s Space
and Missile Defense Command says he would prefer the U.S. Navy to assume oversight and
execution of the mission to land-base SM-3 Block IB ballistic missile killers in Europe for
protection against an Iranian attack.
“Today, we have a number of priorities that we have trouble meeting outside of missile
defense,” Campbell said during a Nov. 3 interview with Aviation Week.
These include providing weapons and manpower for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
“In my view this is an opportunity to have another service, in this case the Navy, to be the
lead service…From a resource perspective, it would be one less competing priority that we
have to put in the mix.”
The Pentagon plans to field land-based SM-3 Block IB interceptors, originally designed for
launch from Aegis ships, in Europe by 2015. Eventually, the SM-3 Block IIA, built on a 21-
inch booster (the IA and IB use 13.5-inch boosters), will likely be based on European soil. It
is unclear what type of fire control and sensor architecture will be used. Candidates include
those used for the Navy’s Aegis ship system or the Army’s Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (Thaad) system now being fielded.
It would seem a natural mission for the Army to fund and field the land-based SM-3 mission
as the lead service. Campbell notes that the Army has 10 years of experience in operating
missile defense architectures abroad through the Patriot, PAC-3 and now Thaad. “We’ve
only started to scratch on the surface on how would it work in the theater with the new
Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense, Thaad, and then how would it work with an Aegis ship
introduced into the same region … and Patriot could be part of that architecture,” Campbell
said.
However, he says the service is facing too many financial troubles to take on the mission.
Inputs from both the Army and Navy have been sent to the Pentagon for consideration. A
final decision is expected on the matter soon.30
An October 25, 2009, press report stated:

29 Philip Ewing, “Officials Consider European Home Ports,” NavyTimes.com, April 19, 2010.
30 Amy Butler, “Army Three-Star Pushes For Navy To Be Ashore SM-3 Lead,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
November 6, 2009: 1-2. Ellipses as in original.
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked Japan last week to export a new type of ship-
based missile interceptor [the SM-3 Block IIA] under joint development by Tokyo and
Washington to third countries, presumably European, sources close to Japan-U.S. relations
said.
Gates’ request could lead to a further relaxation of Japan’s decades-long arms embargo and
spark a chorus of opposition from pacifist elements in the ruling Democratic Party of Japan
and one of its coalition partners, the Social Democratic Party.
Gates made the request concerning Standard Missile-3 Block 2A missiles during talks with
Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa on Wednesday, the sources said....
Japan has a policy of not exporting weapons or arms technology, except to the United States,
with which it has a bilateral security pact.
Gates’ request followed President Barack Obama’s announcement in September that the
United States is abandoning plans for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe and
adopting a new approach to antimissile defense.
During his talks with Kitazawa, Gates called for a relaxation of Japan’s arms embargo and
prodded Tokyo to pave the way for exports of the new interceptors to third countries,
particularly European, the sources said.
Kitazawa refrained from answering directly, telling Gates the government would study the
request as it is an internal matter for Japan, the sources said.
The United States plans to begin deploying SM-3 Block 2A missiles in 2018. The Foreign
and Defense ministries believe it will be difficult to reject Gates’ request, the sources said.
In December 2004, Japan and the United States signed an agreement for bilateral cooperation
on a ballistic missile defense system. At the time, Japan exempted U.S.-bound exports of
missile interceptors to be developed by the two countries from its arms embargo rules.
Following an agreement on joint development of a new missile interceptor, Japan and the
U.S. exchanged diplomatic documents on banning its transfer to third parties or its use for
purposes other than originally intended without Japan’s advance agreement.
The sources said Japan would probably be forced to exempt the export of the interceptors to
third countries or give its nod in advance as stated in the documents.
The United States is hoping to get an answer to Gates’ request by the end of 2010, and
envisages Japan exporting the new interceptors to European countries, including Germany,
the sources said....
In fiscal 2006, Japan and the United States began to jointly develop the SM-3 Block 2A, an
advanced and more accurate version [of the SM-3 interceptor]....
Japan is developing the core part of the interceptor, which protects an infrared ray sensor
from heat generated by air friction, while the United States is in charge of developing the
warhead, called the Kinetic projectile, which would hit and destroy a ballistic missile.
Japan’s arms embargo dates back to 1967, when then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared a
ban on weapons exports to communist states, countries to which the United Nations bans
such exports and parties to international conflicts.
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The policy was tightened in 1976 when then Prime Minister Takeo Miki imposed an almost
blanket ban on the export of weapons. But in 1983, Japan exempted exports of weapons
technology to the United States from the embargo.31
An October 8, 2009, press report stated:
As Navy planners figure out how the fleet will take on its new job of providing ballistic-
missile defense protection for Europe, they don’t have to look far for an example of what it
could look like.
The Norfolk, Va.-based destroyer Stout returned in early September from European
Command’s first dedicated BMD deployment, in what could be an early model for the
missions of tomorrow.
“I would think they would look kind of similar to what we did,” Cmdr. Mark Oberley, the
Stout’s commanding officer, told Navy Times.
Stout deployed to the 6th Fleet area of operations, made regular stops in the Mediterranean
and Black seas, trained with partner navies and overall showed the U.S. flag. But everywhere
it went, BMD was part of its daily life.
“The BMD just kind of goes in parallel with our normal routine wherever we go in the
world; that didn’t really change the exercises we did and the way we prepared,” Oberley
said.
The U.S. is committing at least two BMD ships—and as many as six, a top defense official
said Sept. 24—for a standing patrol off Europe by 2011. The ships will be there to safeguard
against ballistic-missile attacks launched from Iran.
It isn’t clear yet just what that duty will look like: Still to be determined is where ships will
patrol, how they’ll be outfitted and what it all means for their crews and schedules.
In Stout’s case, the crew was tied to patrol areas for which the ship had to provide BMD
protection, within which it had some latitude about where it could stray.
“[Aegis] can reach far, but you also have a tether to be in a certain area in a certain time, just
like a lot of the other missions that we do, and basically, as long as we’re in that tether, then
you’re good,” he said.
And although the Navy’s BMD tests in the Pacific typically involve two or three ships,
Oberley said Stout or any other BMD ship probably could see and hit a ballistic missile
flying from the Middle East toward Europe.
“It depends on where it’s launched from and where it’s going to, so all those things are
variable. If the situation required us to link with another ship or another system, we could do
that,” he said.
Missile numbers
Aegis warships are suitable for ballistic-missile defense because they can carry so many SM-
3 interceptors. Cruisers have 122 vertical launch system missile tubes and destroyers have 90

31 Kyodo News, “U.S. Urges Japan To Export SM-3s,” Japan Times, October 25, 2009.
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or 96, depending on their flight. But there aren’t even that many missiles in the whole U.S.
arsenal—yet. The Pentagon has “more than 40” SM-3s today, according to Missile Defense
Agency spokesman Chris Taylor. It requested funds for 147 missiles in fiscal 2009 and
planned to request funding for 218 missiles in fiscal 2010.32
A September 30, 2009, press report stated:
The Navy’s new mission of protecting Europe from ballistic-missile attacks has widespread
implications for the surface fleet, potentially affecting everything from deployment schedules
to crewing arrangements to command-and-control procedures for cruisers and destroyers.
Ballistic-missile defense warships have become the keystone in a new national strategy to
shield European allies from potential attacks by Iran. Rather than field sensors and missiles
on the ground in Poland and the Czech Republic, the U.S. will first maintain a presence of at
least two or three Aegis BMD ships in the waters around Europe, starting in 2011.
That announcement—which defined a new mission for the surface force: continent
defense—immediately raised many questions that Navy planners must answer over the next
two years:
Which ships will take the patrol mission? What will the deployments look like—will ships
participate in exercises, make port visits or be confined to a narrow patrol box? How long
will ships be assigned picket duty? Will BMD patrol ships sail with the crews they would
have taken on normal deployments, or will they have fewer sailors to account for the
narrower mission?
Navy officials had few answers in the week after Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced
the new BMD mission. Spokesmen at the Pentagon and for 3rd Fleet, which is responsible for
Navy Air and Missile Defense Command, said officials were working out the details.
Some hints could come from the deployment this summer of the BMD destroyer Stout,
which spent six months in the Mediterranean and Black seas, training with Turkish,
Romanian, Georgian and other sailors. When the mission was finished, Stout returned to
Norfolk, Va., in early September.
But that traditional model might not be best for the new BMD patrols, said retired Rear Adm.
Ben Wachendorf. He said top commanders might consider reviving crew-swaps—flying
replacement sailors to a forward port to relieve a ship’s company when its time at sea is over,
keeping the ship at sea for extended periods of time.
Wachendorf, who worked on the Navy’s original crew-swap experiments in the early 2000s,
said it would be expensive, but crew swaps would enable commanders to keep BMD ships in
place in European ports and save long transits home. Most of the Navy’s BMD fleet is based
in the Pacific, meaning ships would need a month at sea just to get to Europe and then
another month for the trip home.
One reason the fleet might reconsider crew swaps is that BMD-patrol ships could sail with
fewer people. If a cruiser or destroyer is loaded only with Standard Missile-3 interceptors
and will be tasked only with picket duty, it may not need some elements of a normal crew,
making it easier to fly fewer people to a forward port.

32 Philip Ewing, “Stout Deployment May Be BMD Mission Blueprint,” NavyTimes.com, October 8, 2009.
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Then again, that concept could backfire.
“You might be able to cut back on some things. Do you need a towed array? Are you ever
going to stream it out? Do you need a [helicopter] detachment?” Wachendorf asked. “I could
say no, but Big Navy worries, ‘If we have a helo-capable ship that never operates helos,
they’re not going to be ready to do that.’ Same thing with [anti-submarine warfare].”
Who pushes the button?
There were broader questions beyond crewing and deployments: For the first time, the
commanding officer of a surface warship will have strategic responsibilities—the ship could
be the only thing standing between a nuclear attacker and its victim. What discretion will
commanders have in responding to attacks?
“You’ve put these commanders on a par with [ballistic-missile submarine] commanders,”
said Steven Cimbala, an expert on ballistic-missile issues.
“But unlike an SSBN commander, who is unlikely to be under immediate tactical threat, an
Aegis cruiser or a [destroyer] could very easily be attacked by surface or subsurface craft, or
aircraft, as part of a first strike,” Cimbala said.
According to new intelligence described by Gates, the stakes for an engagement are very
high: Rather than one or two rogue launches, Gates described the threat from Iran as
involving volleys of many missiles fired simultaneously.
That also means a BMD captain could be responsible for a big, complex, dangerous battle in
the space over Europe, needing to fire dozens of missiles to try to destroy dozens of
attackers.33
Technical Risk in Aegis BMD Program
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is how much technical risk there is in the Aegis
BMD program. A March 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing the
technical risks of selected weapon programs stated the following regarding the Aegis BMD
program:
Technology Maturity
The Aegis BMD program is putting the SM-3 Block IB at risk for cost growth and schedule
delays by planning to begin manufacturing in 2010 before its critical technologies have been
demonstrated in a realistic environment. This risk has been deemed acceptable by the MDA.
While Aegis program officials consider two technologies to be fully mature and three to be
nearing maturity, we assessed four of those five technologies as immature. Prototypes of
these four critical technologies—the throttleable divert and attitude control system, all
reflective optics, two-color seeker, and kinetic warhead advanced signal processor—have not
completed developmental testing in a relevant environment. Aegis program officials told us
that the integrated ground test would not be completed until late 2010. In addition, the first
target intercept flight test will not occur until the second quarter of fiscal year 2011.

33 Philip Ewing, “BMD Fleet Plans Europe Defense Mission,” NavyTimes.com, September 30, 2009. Material in
brackets as in original.
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Design Maturity
Program officials reported that 100 percent of SM-3 Block IB drawings were released to
manufacturing. However, since most of the critical technologies have not completed
developmental testing, additional design changes and costly rework could be necessary if
problems are discovered.
Production Maturity
The Aegis program intends to proceed with production of 18 operationally configured Block
IB rounds for testing or fielding in the second quarter of 2010 before flight testing a fully
integrated prototype in an operational environment. This increases the risk of design changes
and costly rework while production is underway. The first target intercept flight test will help
demonstrate that the system will work as intended and in a reliable manner, but it has been
delayed until the second quarter of fiscal year 2011. Program officials consider moving
forward with SM-3 Block IB production before a fully integrated prototype is tested to be an
acceptable risk because of the SM-3 Block IB’s success in developmental testing and the
program office’s confidence in the throttleable divert and attitude control system design. In
addition, in order to avoid a break in the combined SM-3 IA/IB missile production, long lead
items must be ordered about 30 months before delivery. We could not assess the maturity of
the SM-3 Block IB’s production processes because the program has not started to collect
production data. The program has identified 26 critical manufacturing processes—an
important first step for assessing maturity—and intends to conduct a detailed analysis of
process control data before the manufacturing readiness review in December 2010.
Other Program Issues
The Aegis program is developing an SM-3 Block IIA missile under a cooperative agreement
with the government of Japan. The Block IIA missile is intended to be faster and have an
advanced discrimination seeker. The Aegis program completed the system design review for
the Block IIA in fiscal year 2009 after a delay of over 5 months. The first operational test of
the Block IIA is planned for the third quarter of fiscal year 2014.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, Aegis BMD program officials disagreed with
GAO’s assertion that the SM-3 Block IB missile is at risk of cost growth and schedule delays
by beginning production in 2010. Program officials stated that the SM-3 Block IB full rate
production decision is scheduled for 2012—after several flight tests. The procurement that is
mentioned in this report is for test rounds to conduct developmental and operational flight
testing. These rounds may also be deployed if a security situation demands, and any
remaining rounds will support fleet proficiency firings.
GAO Response
The program office acknowledges that the initial 18 SM-3 Block IBs could be deployed if
needed, indicating that they may be used as operational fleet assets. Furthermore, according
to MDA’s September 2009 SM-3 Block IB utilization plan, 2 missiles are to be used for
flight tests, 10 are to be used for fleet deployment and 6 are to be used for either fleet
proficiency or deployment. The program office acknowledged that the technologies will not
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be fully mature until after the decision to produce these 18 SM-3s, which puts the program at
risk for costly design changes and retrofits if testing reveals issues.34
Options For Congress
FY2011 options for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include, among other things, the
following:
• accelerating the modification of Aegis ships to BMD-capable configurations,
• increasing procurement of new Aegis destroyers,
• increasing procurement of SM-3 missiles, and
• providing funding for integrating the SM-2 Block IV missile into the 4.0.1
version of the Aegis BMD system.
Legislative Activity for FY2011
FY2011 Funding Request
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for the program. MDA’s proposed FY2011 budget requests a total of $2,161.6
million for the Aegis BMD program (see Table 3).
FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the
FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommends increasing MDA’s FY2011 funding
request for procurement of SM-3 missiles (PE0208866C/Project MD09 in Table 3) by $50
million (page 114, line 035). The report recommends approving MDA’s other FY2011 funding
requests for the Aegis BMD program (the other four line items in Table 3) (see page 188, line 084
of the committee’s report, which covers two of these four other line items, and page 189, lines
107 and 108, which cover the other two line items).
Regarding the committee’s recommended $50-million increase for SM-3 procurement, the
committee’s report states:
Fielding of Aegis ballistic missile defense interceptors

34 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-10-
388SP, March 2010, p. 38.
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The budget request contained $94.1 million for fielding of Aegis ballistic missile defense
(BMD) interceptors, a reduction of $131.5 million from the fiscal year 2010 appropriated
level.
The request would support the purchase of eight Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) Block 1B
interceptors in fiscal year 2011, the first year that Block 1B interceptors would be purchased
using procurement funding.
In fiscal year 2012, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) anticipates increasing the purchase
of SM–3 Block 1B interceptors to 66, at a projected cost of $701.9 million. Yet the
production schedule contained in the Department’s detailed budget justification book shows
an 18-month gap between the last deliveries of Block 1A interceptors in December 2011 and
the first deliveries of the Block 1B purchases in July 2013.
In March 2010, the Government Accountability Office reported that the “Aegis BMD
program is putting the SM–3 Block IB at risk for cost growth and schedule delays by
planning to begin manufacturing in 2010 before its critical technologies have been
demonstrated in a realistic environment.” The first flight test to demonstrate the Block 1B
interceptor’s technology readiness has been delayed until the winter of 2011.
The committee is concerned that the lack of stability in the purchase of SM–3 interceptors
and the steep expansion of production of Block 1B interceptors in fiscal year 2012 could
damage the industrial base and delay increases in the inventory of a system that will play a
central role in the Phased, Adaptive Approach to missile defenses in Europe announced by
the President in September 2009. The committee notes that the development of regional
missile defense plans beyond Europe, pursuant to the Administration’s Ballistic Missile
Defense Review released on February 1, 2010, may also expand the near-term requirement
for Aegis BMD interceptors.
The committee recommends $144.1 million, an increase of $50.0 million, to provide for
greater stability in SM–3 production and to reduce the size of the production increase in
fiscal year 2012. The committee expects that MDA will only allocate additional funding for
SM–3 Block 1B production in fiscal year 2011 if the first flight test is successful. (Page 119)
The report also states:
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and defense against sea-based missile attacks
The committee commends the Department of Defense funding increase for the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program to advance the capabilities of sea-based missile
defense. The committee believes the investment in sea-based missile defenses will serve to
strengthen the security of the United States. Nevertheless, the committee believes there are
additional steps the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) should take to expand sea-based missile
defense capabilities.
First, the committee believes MDA should increase its collaboration with the Navy to ensure
sea-based ballistic missile defenses are fully integrated into the broader missile defense
Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications system. Additionally,
both the Navy and MDA should work to see Aegis BMD ships receive the widest array of
off-board sensor data necessary to support theater, regional and national missile defense
operations.
Second, the committee understands that the Department’s objectives for pursuing early-
intercept capabilities are to handle large raid sizes, provide more shoot-look-shoot
opportunities, constrain countermeasure deployments, and hedge against advanced threats.
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The committee believes that capability enhancements planned for the Standard Missile-3
(SM–3) interceptor may provide such early intercept capability. Specifically, the next-
generation SM–3 Block IIA interceptor with a planned increase in velocity and SM–3 Block
IIB interceptor with a planned lighter kill vehicle, flexible propulsion, and upgraded fire
control software, should enable greater early-intercept capability when fielded in either a
ship-based configuration or relocatable land-based configuration. The committee therefore
encourages MDA to continue the requisite technology development and maturation of these
promising capabilities.
Finally, the committee remains concerned about the nation’s vulnerability to cruise missiles
and shorter-range ballistic missiles that could be launched from off the coast. This
vulnerability is particularly acute for the east coast of the United States. Accordingly, the
committee directs the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, with contribution from the
Director of MDA and the Director of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Office, to
provide the congressional defense committees with an assessment by March 15, 2011, of the
vulnerability of the United States homeland to cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic
missiles that could be launched from off the coast, and a plan for how such vulnerabilities
are being addressed. (Page 196)
The report also states:
Regional missile defense plans
The new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe announced by the
President on September 17, 2009, is likely to create increased force structure and inventory
demands. Furthermore, as noted in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) released
on February 1, 2010, the Phased Adaptive Approach is to be tailored to other geographic
regions such as East Asia and the Middle East, which is also likely to create significant force
structure and inventory demands. As acknowledged in the BMDR, “regional demand for
U.S. BMD assets is likely to exceed supply for some years to come.”
Until these regional missile defense architectures are completed, the committee is concerned
that the Department’s missile defense force structure and inventory requirements, and the
resulting resource implications will be difficult to quantify. In addition, certain missile
defense capabilities, such as Aegis ballistic missile defense ships, will remain high demand,
low density assets that must be carefully managed across the combatant commands so that no
one theater accepts greater risk at the expense of another.
The committee is aware that the Department is developing regional missile defense
architectures based on the PAA and also developing a comprehensive force management
process. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by
December 1, 2010, describing: (1) the regional missile defense architectures, including the
force structure and inventory requirements derived from the architectures, and (2) the
comprehensive force management process, and the capability, deployment, and resource
outcomes that have been determined by this process. (Pages 207-208)
The report also states:
Training for Global Ballistic Missile Defense
Each military service is responsible for missile defense training on the individual missile
defense assets which the service owns and operates. For example, the Navy is responsible for
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense training and the Army for Theater High Altitude Area
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Defense training. However, missile defense operations are global and inherently joint. The
effectiveness of the global ballistic missile defense system is dependent upon the
synchronization of these individual assets across each military service, and the committee
believes that missile defense training must be similarly synchronized.
The committee is concerned that current individual service training programs for missile
defense do not fully reflect the global and joint nature of ballistic missile defense system
operations. The committee further observes that no single entity has clear responsibility for
joint missile defense training. The committee believes that gaps in joint missile defense
training, from the lowest sensor or shooter operator level to the highest levels of decision-
making on combatant command (COCOM) staffs, must be identified and rectified.
The committee therefore directs the Comptroller General of the United States to provide a
report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2011, that contains the
following:
(1) A description of existing missile defense training and education, including training of
COCOM staffs and service component staffs;
(2) An assessment of the synchronization and standardization across existing training
programs, including best practices; and
(3) Recommendations for training improvements, including recommended roles and
responsibilities, organizational models, resources, and facilities required for joint missile
defense training. (Pages 263-264)
Section 123 of H.R. 5136 as reported by the committee would require a report on required
numbers of cruisers and destroyers in light of demands for such ships for conducting BMD
operations.
Section 221 would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for site activation,
construction, preparation of equipment for, or deployment of a medium-range or long-range
missile defense system in Europe until certain conditions are met.
Section 223 would require a report on the Phased Adaptive Approach for BMD in Europe and
limits the obligation and expenditure of certain funds until the report is submitted.
Section 224 would establish U.S. policy regarding BMD systems in Europe, including policy
relating to the capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA and IIB missiles in Europe.
Section 227 would require semi-annual reports on the SM-3 missile, particularly the Block IIA
and IIB versions.
The text of Section 123 is as follows:
SEC. 123. REPORT ON NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Report- Not later than March 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the
Chief of Naval Operations, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on
the requirements of the major combatant surface vessels with respect to missile defense.
(b) Matters Included- The report shall include the following:
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(1) An analysis of whether the requirement for sea-based missile defense can be
accommodated by upgrading Aegis ships that exist as of the date of the report or by
procuring additional combatant surface vessels.
(2) Whether such sea-based missile defense will require increasing the overall number of
combatant surface vessels beyond the requirement of 88 cruisers and destroyers in the 313-
ship fleet plan of the Navy.
(3) The number of Aegis ships needed by each combatant commander to fulfill ballistic
missile defense requirements, including (in consultation with the Chairman of the Joints
Chiefs of Staff) the number of such ships needed to support the phased, adaptive approach to
ballistic missile defense in Europe.
(4) A discussion of the potential effect of ballistic missile defense operations on the ability of
the Navy to meet surface fleet demands in each geographic area and for each mission set.
(5) An evaluation of how the Aegis ballistic missile defense program can succeed as part of a
balanced fleet of adequate size and strength to meet the security needs of the United States.
(6) A description of both the shortfalls and the benefits of expected technological
advancements in the sea-based missile defense program.
(7) A description of the anticipated plan for deployment of Aegis ballistic missile ships
within the context of the fleet response plan.
The text of Section 221 is as follows:
SEC. 221. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR MISSILE DEFENSES IN
EUROPE.
(a) Limitation on Construction and Deployment of Systems- No funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense for
fiscal year 2011 or any fiscal year thereafter may be obligated or expended for site
activation, construction, preparation of equipment for, or deployment of a medium-range or
long-range missile defense system in Europe until—
(1) any nation agreeing to host such system has signed and ratified a missile defense basing
agreement and a status of forces agreement; and
(2) a period of 45 days has elapsed following the date on which the Secretary of Defense
submits to the congressional defense committees the report on the independent assessment of
alternative missile defense systems in Europe required by section 235(c)(2) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84; 123 Stat. 2235).
(b) Limitation on Procurement or Deployment of Interceptors- No funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for the Department of Defense for
fiscal year 2011 or any fiscal year thereafter may be obligated or expended for the
procurement (other than initial long-lead procurement) or deployment of operational missiles
of a medium-range or long-range missile defense system in Europe until the Secretary of
Defense, after receiving the views of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation,
submits to the congressional defense committees a report certifying that the proposed
interceptor to be deployed as part of such missile defense system has demonstrated, through
successful, operationally realistic flight testing, a high probability of working in an
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operationally effective manner and that such missile defense system has the ability to
accomplish the mission.
(c) Conforming Repeal- Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 (P.L. 111-81; 123 Stat. 2234) is repealed.
The text of Section 223 is as follows:
SEC. 223. PHASED, ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE.
(a) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the new phased, adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe, announced by the
President on September 17, 2009, should be supported by sound analysis, program plans,
schedules, and technologies that are credible;
(2) the cost, performance, and risk of such approach to missile defense should be well
understood; and
(3) Congress should have access to information regarding the analyses, plans, schedules,
technologies, cost, performance, and risk of such approach to missile defense in order to
conduct effective oversight.
(b) Report Required-
(1) REPORT- The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the phased, adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe.
(2) MATTERS INCLUDED- The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A discussion of the analyses conducted by the Secretary of Defense preceding the
announcement of the phased, adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe on September
17, 2009, including—
(i) a description of any alternatives considered;
(ii) the criteria used to analyze each such alternative; and
(iii) the result of each analysis, including a description of the criteria used to judge each
alternative.
(B) A discussion of any independent assessments or reviews of alternative approaches to
missile defense in Europe considered by the Secretary in support of the announcement of the
phased, adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe on September 17, 2009.
(C) A description of the architecture for each of the four phases of the phased, adaptive
approach to missile defense in Europe, including—
(i) the composition, basing locations, and quantities of ballistic missile defense assets,
including ships, batteries, interceptors, radars and other sensors, and command and control
nodes;
(ii) program schedules and site-specific schedules with task activities, test plans, and
knowledge and decision points;
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(iii) technology maturity levels of missile defense assets and plans for retiring technical
risks;
(iv) planned performance of missile defense assets and defended area coverage, including
sensitivity analysis to various basing scenarios and varying threat capabilities (including
simple and complex threats, liquid and solid-fueled ballistic missiles, and varying raid sizes);
(v) operational concepts and how such operational concepts effect force structure and
inventory requirements;
(vi) total cost estimates and funding profiles, by year, for acquisition, fielding, and
operations and support; and
(vii) acquisition strategies.
(3) GAO- The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report assessing the report under paragraph (1) pursuant to section
232(g) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 107-107; 10
U.S.C. 2431 note).
(c) Limitation on Funds- Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by section 301(5) for
operation and maintenance, Defense-wide, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, not
more than 95 percent of such amounts may be obligated or expended until the date on which
the report required under subsection (b)(1) is submitted to the congressional defense
committees.
The text of Section 224 is as follows:
SEC. 224. HOMELAND DEFENSE HEDGING POLICY.
(a) Findings- Congress finds the following:
(1) As noted by the Director of National Intelligence, testifying before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on February 2, 2010, `the Iranian regime continues to flout UN
Security Council restrictions on its nuclear program ... we judge Iran would likely choose
missile delivery as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon. Iran already has the
largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and it continues to expand the scale,
reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces—many of which are inherently
capable of carrying a nuclear payload.’.
(2) The Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran, dated April 2010, states that, `with
sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could probably develop and test an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States by 2015. Iran could also have
an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable of threatening Europe.’.
(3) Under phase 3 of the phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe (scheduled
for 2018), the United States plans to deploy the standard missile-3 block IIA interceptor at
sea- and land-based sites in addition to existing missile defense systems to provide coverage
for all NATO allies in Europe against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
(4) Under phase 4 of the phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe (scheduled
for 2020), the United States plans to deploy the standard missile-3 block IIB interceptor to
provide additional coverage of the United States against a potential intercontinental ballistic
missile launched from the Middle East in the 2020 time frame.
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(5) According to the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the United States will
continue the development and assessment of a two-stage ground-based interceptor as part of
a hedging strategy and, as further noted by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during
testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on
October 1, 2009, `we keep the development of the two-stage [ground-based interceptor] on
the books as a hedge in case things come earlier, in case there’s any kind of technological
challenge with the later models of the [standard missile-3].’.
(b) Policy- It shall be the policy of the United States to—
(1) field missile defense systems in Europe that—
(A) provide protection against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats
consistent with NATO policy and the phased, adapted approach for missile defense
announced on September 17, 2009; and
(B) have been confirmed to perform the assigned mission after successful, operationally
realistic testing;
(2) field missile defenses to protect the territory of the United States pursuant to the National
Missile Defense Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-38; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) and to test those systems in
an operationally realistic manner;
(3) ensure that the standard missile-3 block IIA interceptor planned for phase 3 of the
phased, adaptive approach for missile defense is capable of addressing intermediate-range
ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East and the standard missile-3 block IIB
interceptor planned for phase 4 of such approach is capable of addressing intercontinental
ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East; and
(4) continue the development and testing of the two-stage ground-based interceptor to
maintain it—
(A) as a means of protection in the event that—
(i) the intermediate-range ballistic missile threat to NATO allies in Europe materializes
before the availability of the standard missile-3 block IIA interceptor;
(ii) the intercontinental ballistic missile threat to the United States that cannot be countered
with the existing ground-based missile defense system materializes before the availability of
the standard missile-3 block IIB interceptor; or
(iii) technical challenges or schedule delays affect the standard missile-3 block IIA
interceptor or the standard missile-3 block IIB interceptor; and
(B) as a complement to the missile defense capabilities deployed in Alaska and California for
the defense of the United States.
The text of Section 227 is as follows:
SEC. 227. REPORTS ON STANDARD MISSILE SYSTEM.
(a) Reports- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and each 180-
day period thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
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committees a report on the standard missile system, particularly with respect to standard
missile-3 block IIA and standard missile-3 block IIB.
(b) Matters Included- The reports under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A detailed discussion of the modernization, capabilities, and limitations of the standard
missile.
(2) A review of the standard missile’s comparison capability against all expected threats.
(3) A report on the progress of complimentary systems, including, at a minimum, radar
systems, delivery systems, and recapitalization of supporting software and hardware.
(4) Any industrial capacities that must be maintained to ensure adequate manufacturing of
standard missile technology and production ratio.
Senate
The FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454), as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010), recommends approving MDA’s FY2011 funding
request for procurement of SM-3 missiles (PE0208866C/Project MD09 in Table 3) (see page 699
of the printed bill, line 35), as well as MDA’s other FY2011 funding requests for the Aegis BMD
program (the other four line items in Table 3) (see page 753, line 84 of the printed bill, which
covers two of these four other line items, and page 754, lines 107 and 108, which cover the other
two line items).
Section 231 of the bill as reported would make certain findings and express the sense of Congress
on certain matters relating to BMD. Section 231(b) states:
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress—
(1) that the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe is an appropriate
response to the existing ballistic missile threat from Iran to European territory of North
Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, and to potential future ballistic missile capabilities of
Iran, and, as indicated by the April 19, 2010, certification by the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, meets congressional guidance provided in
section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84;
123 Stat. 2234);…
(2) that the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe is not intended to, and
will not, provide a missile defense capability relative to the ballistic missile deterrent forces
of the Russian Federation, or diminish strategic stability with the Russian Federation;
(3) to support the efforts of the United States Government and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization to pursue cooperation with the Russian Federation on ballistic missile defense
relative to Iranian missile threats;
(4) that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system deployed in Alaska and
California currently provides adequate defensive capability for the United States against
potential and forseeable future long-range ballistic missiles from Iran, and this capability will
be enhanced as the system is improved, including by the planned deployment of an
AN/TPY-2 radar in southern Europe in 2011;
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(5) that the United States should, as stated in its unilateral statement accompanying the New
START Treaty, `continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to
defend itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening
stability in key regions’;
(6) that, as part of this effort, the Department of Defense should pursue the development,
testing, and deployment of operationally effective versions of all variants of the Standard
Missile-3 for all four phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe;
(7) that the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor missile planned for deployment in Phase 4 of the
Phased Adaptive Approach should be capable of addressing the potential future threat of
intermediate-range and long-range ballistic missiles from Iran, including intercontinental
ballistic missiles that could be capable of reaching the United States;
(8) that there are no constraints contained in the New START Treaty on the development or
deployment by the United States of effective missile defenses, including all phases of the
Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe and further enhancements to the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, as well as future missile defenses; and
(9) that the Department of Defense should continue the development, testing, and assessment
of the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor in such a manner as to provide a hedge against
potential technical challenges with the development of the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor
missile as a means of augmenting the defense of Europe and of the homeland against a
limited ballistic missile attack from nations such as North Korea or Iran.
The committee’s report states:
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
The budget request included $1.5 billion in PE 63892C for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) research and development, and $94.0 million in Procurement, Defense-Wide, for the
procurement of eight Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) Block IB interceptors for the Aegis BMD
system. In addition, the budget request includes funding in two new Aegis BMD-related
funding lines to support the new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in
Europe: $281.4 million in PE 64880C for development of land-based SM–3 capabilities and
$318.8 million in PE 64881C for co-development, with Japan, of the SM–3 Block IIA
interceptor.
The Aegis BMD system is the centerpiece of the PAA to missile defense in Europe, which
will involve the deployment, at sea and on land, of four increasingly capable variants of the
SM–3 interceptor (Blocks IA, IB, IIA, and IIB) over the four phases of the PAA from 2011
to 2020. Given its inherent mobility and flexibility, as well as its evolving capability to
defend against all ranges of ballistic missiles from nations like Iran and North Korea, Aegis
BMD will also be the core of other regional missile defense architectures, for example in the
Middle East and East Asia.
The committee strongly supports the development, testing, production, and deployment of
operationally effective Aegis BMD and SM–3 capabilities in sufficient numbers to support
the needs of regional combatant commanders and to implement the PAA in Europe.
However, the committee has several concerns relating to the Aegis BMD program.
First, the committee notes that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is focused on production
of the SM–3 Block IB, and is not planning production of more SM–3 IA interceptors.
Consequently, the supplier base for unique SM–3 IA components will soon no longer be
qualified to supply those components if needed in the future. If there is a problem or delay
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with the development of the SM–3 IB, a delay in the planned first flight test of the SM–3 IB,
or the test is not successful, it would create a situation where no operational SM–3
interceptors (Block IA) can be produced, at a time when increasing the interceptor inventory
is essential. The committee directs the Department of Defense (DOD) to consider what
actions could be taken to mitigate this risk and expects DOD to take appropriate actions to
keep SM–3 IA suppliers qualified and able to produce additional SM–3 IA if necessary,
including the possibility of a reprogramming action with fiscal year 2010 funds. The
committee is aware that MDA has studied a variety of such options and that there are near-
term mitigation options available, including procurement of Block IA kill vehicle kits or
additional Block IA interceptors, if action is taken before the suppliers go out of
qualification.
Second, the committee notes that the planned production schedule for the SM–3 IB has a
steep increase between fiscal year 2011 with 8 interceptors and fiscal year 2012 with 66
interceptors, an eightfold increase. Although the committee supports the objective of fielding
adequate numbers of SM–3 Block IB interceptors after testing has demonstrated their
capability, this will be a challenging ramp-up in the production rate. The committee is
concerned that this planned production increase may cause unanticipated production
problems, including production delays, similar to the experience with far lower production
rates for the Block IA interceptor. The committee urges MDA to consider risk mitigation
options for this steep production increase, including the possibility of budgeting some
research and development funds to cope with production challenges.
Third, the committee is concerned that the development effort for the SM–3 Block IIB
missile is not currently being managed by the Aegis BMD program office, but rather within
the MDA technology development program office. The significant milestones and
capabilities achieved to date with the Aegis BMD program have resulted in large part from
the close collaboration between the Aegis BMD program office and the Navy, which has
more than 30 years of experience in the development, testing, fielding, and operation of the
Standard Missile series and the Aegis Weapon System. The committee believes it is essential
for this collaborative relationship to continue with respect to the SM–3 Block IIB program,
and directs MDA to ensure that the Aegis BMD program office has the central role in the
management of the Block IIB program.
Finally, the current plan for deployment of the SM–3 Block IIB interceptor would be limited
to deployment on land because of shipboard safety concerns related to the anticipated use of
hypergolic fuels in the Block IIB interceptor. The committee directs MDA and the Navy to
conduct an analysis of options for alternative technologies or practices that would permit the
deployment of the SM–3 Block IIB on Aegis BMD ships, as well as on land, and to report to
the congressional defense committees on the results of this analysis not later than April 30,
2011. (Pages 92-93)
The committee’s report also states:
Consistent with the BMDR [DOD’s Ballistic Missile Defense Review], and in order to
implement the PAA and to fulfill the missile defense needs of regional combatant
commanders, the budget request included funds to increase the planned inventory of SM–3
and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors, as Congress had
previously directed. The current plan is for 436 SM–3 Block IA and IB interceptors by 2015
and for 9 THAAD batteries with 431 interceptors by 2015, an increase of nearly 250
interceptors above plans announced for fiscal year 2010. This represents a significant
enhancement in the capacity to defend our forward deployed forces, allies, and partners
against the existing threat of short- and medium-range missiles Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) for BMD Operations and against the evolving regional missile threat. According to
Secretary Gates, this effort is a “top priority.” (Pages 94-95)
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Appendix A. Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for
BMD Operations

This appendix presents additional background information on the Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) for BMD operations announced by the Administration on September 17, 2009.
A September 17, 2009, White House fact sheet on the PAA stated:
President Obama has approved the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Gates and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for a phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. This
approach is based on an assessment of the Iranian missile threat, and a commitment to
deploy technology that is proven, cost-effective, and adaptable to an evolving security
environment.
Starting around 2011, this missile defense architecture will feature deployments of
increasingly-capable sea- and land-based missile interceptors, primarily upgraded versions of
the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), and a range of sensors in Europe to defend against the
growing ballistic missile threat from Iran. This phased approach develops the capability to
augment our current protection of the U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic missile
threats, and to offer more effective defenses against more near-term ballistic missile threats.
The plan provides for the defense of U.S. deployed forces, their families, and our Allies in
Europe sooner and more comprehensively than the previous program, and involves more
flexible and survivable systems.
The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the President that he
revise the previous Administration’s 2007 plan for missile defense in Europe as part of an
ongoing comprehensive review of our missile defenses mandated by Congress. Two major
developments led to this unanimous recommended change:
• New Threat Assessment: The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from
Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than
previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower to develop than previously estimated. In the
near-term, the greatest missile threats from Iran will be to U.S. Allies and partners, as
well as to U.S. deployed personnel—military and civilian –and their accompanying
families in the Middle East and in Europe.
• Advances in Capabilities and Technologies: Over the past several years, U.S. missile
defense capabilities and technologies have advanced significantly. We expect this trend
to continue. Improved interceptor capabilities, such as advanced versions of the SM-3,
offer a more flexible, capable, and cost-effective architecture. Improved sensor
technologies offer a variety of options to detect and track enemy missiles.
These changes in the threat as well as our capabilities and technologies underscore the need
for an adaptable architecture. This architecture is responsive to the current threat, but could
also incorporate relevant technologies quickly and cost-effectively to respond to evolving
threats. Accordingly, the Department of Defense has developed a four-phased, adaptive
approach for missile defense in Europe. While further advances of technology or future
changes in the threat could modify the details or timing of later phases, current plans call for
the following:
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• Phase One (in the 2011 timeframe)—Deploy current and proven missile defense
systems available in the next two years, including the sea-based Aegis Weapon System,
the SM-3 interceptor (Block IA), and sensors such as the forward-based Army
Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/TPY-2), to address regional
ballistic missile threats to Europe and our deployed personnel and their families;
• Phase Two (in the 2015 timeframe)—After appropriate testing, deploy a more capable
version of the SM-3 interceptor (Block IB) in both sea- and land-based configurations,
and more advanced sensors, to expand the defended area against short- and medium-
range missile threats;
• Phase Three (in the 2018 timeframe)—After development and testing are complete,
deploy the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA variant currently under development, to
counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats; and
• Phase Four (in the 2020 timeframe)—After development and testing are complete,
deploy the SM-3 Block IIB to help better cope with medium- and intermediate-range
missiles and the potential future ICBM threat to the United States.
Throughout all four phases, the United States also will be testing and updating a range of
approaches for improving our sensors for missile defense. The new distributed interceptor
and sensor architecture also does not require a single, large, fixed European radar that was to
be located in the Czech Republic; this approach also uses different interceptor technology
than the previous program, removing the need for a single field of 10 ground-based
interceptors in Poland. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense recommended that the United
States no longer plan to move forward with that architecture.
The Czech Republic and Poland, as close, strategic and steadfast Allies of the United States,
will be central to our continued consultations with NATO Allies on our defense against the
growing ballistic missile threat.
The phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe:
Sustains U.S. homeland defense against long-range ballistic missile threats. The
deployment of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor in Phase Four of the
approach would augment existing ground-based interceptors located in Alaska and
California, which provide for the defense of the homeland against a potential ICBM
threat.
Speeds protection of U.S. deployed forces, civilian personnel, and their accompanying
families against the near-term missile threat from Iran. We would deploy current and
proven technology by roughly 2011—about six or seven years earlier than the previous
plan—to help defend the regions in Europe most vulnerable to the Iranian short- and
medium-range ballistic missile threat.
Ensures and enhances the protection of the territory and populations of all NATO
Allies, in concert with their missile defense capabilities, against the current and growing
ballistic missile threat. Starting in 2011, the phased, adaptive approach would
systematically increase the defended area as the threat is expected to grow. In the 2018
timeframe, all of Europe could be protected by our collective missile defense
architecture.
Deploys proven capabilities and technologies to meet current threats. SM-3 (Block 1A)
interceptors are deployed on Aegis ships today, and more advanced versions are in
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various stages of development. Over the past four years, we have conducted a number of
tests of the SM-3 IA, and it was the interceptor used in the successful engagement of a
decaying satellite in February 2008. Testing in 2008 showed that sensors we plan to
field bring significant capabilities to the architecture, and additional, planned research
and development over the next few years offers the potential for more diverse and more
capable sensors.
Provides flexibility to upgrade and adjust the architecture, and to do so in a cost-
effective manner, as the threat evolves. Because of the lower per-interceptor costs and
mobility of key elements of the architecture, we will be better postured to adapt this set
of defenses to any changes in threat.
We will work with our Allies to integrate this architecture with NATO members’ missile
defense capabilities, as well as with the emerging NATO command and control network that
is under development. One benefit of the phased, adaptive approach is that there is a high
degree of flexibility—in addition to sea-based assets, there are many potential locations for
the architecture’s land-based elements, some of which will be re-locatable. We plan to
deploy elements in northern and southern Europe and will be consulting closely at NATO
with Allies on the specific deployment options.
We also welcome Russian cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader
defense of our common strategic interests. We have repeatedly made clear to Russia that
missile defense in Europe poses no threat to its strategic deterrent. Rather, the purpose is to
strengthen defenses against the growing Iranian missile threat. There is no substitute for Iran
complying with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. But ballistic
missile defenses will address the threat from Iran’s ballistic missile programs, and diminish
the coercive influence that Iran hopes to gain by continuing to develop these destabilizing
capabilities.
Through the ongoing Department of Defense ballistic missile defense review, the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to provide recommendations to the
President that address other aspects of our ballistic missile defense capabilities and posture
around the world.35
At a September 17, 2009, DOD news briefing on the PAA, General James Cartwright, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated the following:
• The SM-3 “has had eight successful flight tests since 2007. These tests have
amply demonstrated the SM-3’s capability and have given us greater confidence
in the system and its future.”
• Regarding the second phase of the proposal, “Consultations have begun with
allies, starting with Poland and the Czech Republic, about hosting a land-based
version of the SM-3 and other components of the system. Basing some
interceptors on land will provide additional coverage and save costs compared to
a purely sea-based approach.”
• The SM-3 Block 1A “has proven itself in the testing and which we are now
fielding in larger numbers. It is a more capable area-defense weapon. It is more

35 White House news release, September 17, 2009, entitled “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy A ‘Phased,
Adaptive Approach’ for Missile Defense in Europe,” available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe/.
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aligned with trying to take care of a general area like the area from Philadelphia
down to Washington, D.C., for an analogy.”
• The SM-3 Block 1B “along with better sensors—and the beginning deployment
of these airborne sensors, should they manifest themselves in the way we think
they will—will allow us to move from a relatively small area—and I talked about
Philadelphia to Washington, D.C.—this would be at least three times larger,
based on the ability of the missile and the sensor packages to address the threats
that are out there.”
• The SM-3 Block IIA “will allow us, in probably no more than three locations, to
be able to cover the entire land mass of Europe, okay, against intermediate- and
short-range ballistic missiles. ”
• The SM-3 Block IIB “is an even more energetic capability that will have a
substantial capability to intercept intercontinental ballistic missile type
capabilities emanating from Iran.”
• “What you can do with an SM-3 in affordability and in deployment and dispersal
is substantially greater for larger numbers of missiles than we what we have with
a ground-based interceptor. A single Aegis can carry a hundred-plus or minus a
few, depending on their mission configuration, of the SM-3. So this is a
substantial addressal of the proliferation of the threat that we're seeing emerge. If
it doesn't emerge, we don't have to build them all, but if it does, we're ready to
basically go after it. And so we've put in place an architecture here that allows us
to be adaptable. It is a global architecture.”
• Regarding the number of Aegis ships that would be maintained on station near
Europe for BMD purposes, “on a day-in, day-out basis, we're looking probably
for what we would call a 2.0 presence, maybe a 3.0 presence [i.e., two or three
ships on station 12 months out of the year], so [two or] three ships at any given
time in and around the Mediterranean and the North Sea, et cetera, to protect
areas of interest, and then we would surge additional ships. And part of what’s in
the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global
deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any
one theater at a time.”
• Regarding where in Europe land-based SM-3s might be based, “Initially—and
it’s the [SM-3 Block] IB that we would start with, the land-based system, so
about the 2015 time frame. And it’s actually relatively agnostic to the where. And
so the Czech Republic, Poland, are both candidates. It’s certainly something that
they have to have a say in, though, as to whether we go there. There are other
candidates in that region, and then obviously deeper into Europe, that would be
good sites for the SM-3.”36
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who was at the DOD news briefing along with Cartwright,
also addressed the issue of where land-based SM-3s might be based, stating:

36 Transcript of the September 17, 2009, DOD news briefing with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright, available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4479.
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We still want to partner with Poland. We still want Poland to go forward with the ratification
of the agreements that we have with them, including the SOFA. We would prefer to put the
SM-3s in Poland, in place of the GBI—the ground-based interceptors. That will still involve
a presence of the U.S. They may be there earlier than they would have been with the ground-
based interceptors, because, as I said, they would not become operational until probably
2017, 2018. We're talking about 2015 now. So I think that there are—all of the same
opportunities for partnership between the United States and Poland that existed under the
previous program continue to exist under this program.37
At an October 1, 2009, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, General James E.
Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Michèle A. Flournoy, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated:
Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, and members of the Committee. We
appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Administration’s new approach to missile defense
in Europe, and to set the record straight that the Obama Administration is committed to
deploying timely, cost-effective, and responsive missile defenses to protect the United States,
our deployed forces, as well as our friends and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges.
We are confident that our new approach represents a dramatic improvement over the
program of record. Under the old plan, we were not going to be able to deploy a European
missile defense system capable of protecting against Iranian missiles until at least 2017.
Under our new plan, we’ll be able to protect vulnerable parts of Europe and the tens of
thousands of US troops stationed there by the end of 2011. We’ll also be creating a far more
flexible missile defense system, one that can be adapted to provide better protection against
emerging threats. And finally, we’ll be able to enhance protections for the U.S. homeland
against possible future threats from long-range ICBMs.
Before going into details, I would like to place this decision about European missile defense
in context. As you know, we are in the midst of several major defense reviews, one of which
is a congressionally-mandated review of our approach to ballistic missile defense. DOD is
leading that review, with active participation from the intelligence community and a number
of other agencies. That review is comprehensive and ongoing; it examines our strategic and
operational approach to missile defense not just in Europe but around the world.
The review is moving forward based on four key principles:
1) We must ensure that US missile defenses are responsive to the threats we face today and
are likely to face in the future, that the technologies we use are proven and effective, and that
our defenses are cost effective;
2) We must maintain and improve defenses for the US and our allies against potential missile
attacks from countries such as Iran and North Korea;
3) We must renew our emphasis on protecting US deployed forces and their dependents in
theater, as well as US Allies and partners against regional threats; and
4) We must continue to make missile defense an important feature of our international
cooperation efforts.

37 Transcript of the September 17, 2009, DOD news briefing with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright, available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4479.
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The results of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review are not due back to Congress until
January, but as we began our in-depth analysis, it became clear very early that circumstances
had changed fundamentally with regard to missile defense in Europe, so that we would need
to make some significant adjustments to the previous administration’s plans.
Let me start by discussing what has changed since early 2007, when the previous
administration decided to seek deployment of ground-based interceptors in Poland, a
European Mid-Course radar (EMR) in the Czech Republic, and an AN/TPY-2 radar
elsewhere in the region. The decision to move forward with that particular configuration was
made nearly three years ago, based on the threat information and the technologies available
at that time.
Circumstances have changed significantly since early 2007, however.
First, we now have a rather different intelligence picture than we had three years ago,
particularly with regard to Iranian capabilities. And second, we have made major strides in
missile defense technologies and capabilities in just the last few years. We are now in a
position to put an effective missile defense system in place far more rapidly than we were a
few years ago, one that will be far more flexible, adaptable, and capable.
The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran’s short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat
of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower to
develop than previously estimated. Iran already possesses hundreds of ballistic missile
capable of reaching neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey and the Caucasus, and is actively
developing and testing missiles that can reach further into Europe. Our intelligence
assessments indicate that the continued production and deployment of these more capable
medium-range missiles has become one of Iran’s highest missile priorities.
In the near-to mid-term, what this means is that the primary threat posed by Iranian missiles
will be to US allies, our 80,000 deployed forces in the Middle East and Europe, and our
civilian personnel and the many accompanying families. And needless to say, this concern is
all the more urgent in light of Iran’s continued uranium enrichment program. Iran continues
to defy international obligations, and there continues to be reason to fear that Iran is seeking
a nuclear weapons option.
We hope that won’t come to pass. But obviously it increases the urgency of developing a
truly effective missile defense system in Europe for the protection of NATO territory and
population and the US homeland. Missile defense is not a substitute for the critically
important diplomatic efforts the U.S. and the international community are already engaged in
with Iran, but strong missile defense can complement diplomatic efforts by providing an
effective deterrent.
As the Secretary of Defense has noted, we understand that intelligence projections can be
wrong, which makes it all the more important for us to have a flexible and adaptable missile
defense system that can evolve with the threat. Iran may change its priorities and capabilities
and ways we can’t entirely predict. So we remain very concerned about Iran’s potential to
develop ICBMs in the future, and part of our approach is to maintain and improve robust
homeland defense capabilities to ensure that we can effectively counter any future ICBM
threats, whether they come from Iran or North Korea or any other adversary.
But I’ll come back to that in a moment. I’ve described the changed intelligence assessments
that lead us to consider short and medium-range missiles the greatest near-term threat. As I
mentioned, however, the threat assessment is not the only thing that has changed since the
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program of record was planned nearly three years ago. The second thing that has changed is
the technologies and capabilities available to us.
Technological developments over the past several years have led to new capabilities,
demonstrated in multiple tests. Improved interceptor capabilities now offer us more flexible
and capable missile defense architecture, and we have also significantly improved our sensor
technologies. That means we now have a variety of better options to detect and track enemy
missiles and guide the interceptor in-flight to enable a successful engagement. As a result,
we now have new and proven missile defense options that were not available even a few
years ago.
The previous plan, approved in early 2007, relied on two large, fixed missile-defense sites,
with 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and the EMR in the Czech Republic. It was
designed to identify and destroy up to about five to ten long-range missiles, and as noted, the
radar and interceptors called for under the old plan would not have been in place until at least
2017.
Our new approach, which the President adopted on the unanimous recommendation of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will rely on a distributed network of
sensors and SM-3 interceptors. The SM-3 IA has had eight successful tests since 2007, and it
is more than capable of dealing with current threats from even multiple short and medium-
range missiles. It and future variants also have many advantages over a Ground Based
Interceptor (GBI). The SM-3 is much smaller, weighing only about 1 ton compared to the
GBI’s 20 tons. Because it is smaller and fits inside a vertical launch canister, it can be fired
both from Aegis capable ships and, starting with the SM-3IB, from land.
The capability of having a missile defense system that can integrate sensors and interceptor
sites located both at sea and on land offers us geographic flexibility that was unavailable
under the previous plan. Furthermore, the resulting distributed network is more survivable in
the case of an attack than the single large radar and single missile field of the previous plan.
The SM-3 IA and IB, at around $10 million per interceptor, are also much cheaper than a
GBI, which costs around $70 million per interceptor. This means that we can deploy scores
of SM-3 interceptors, again enhancing our defensive capabilities. Since Iran already
possesses hundreds of short and medium range ballistic missiles, this improved defensive
capability is critical.
Our new plan for European missile defense involves a phased, adaptive approach. As our
capabilities and technologies continue to improve, the architecture will evolve and become
ever more capable. Specifically, we are phasing in SM-3 upgrades over time. Each SM-3
upgrade will provide more capability for countering Iranian threats, meaning each upgrade
will be able to defend an increasingly larger area.
Phase 1 of our approach to missile defense in Europe is already underway; the SM-3 Block
IA is already deployed in the fleet. In this first phase of our plan, we can provide SM-3
Block IA capable warships when necessary for the protection of parts of southern Europe. To
enhance protection in Phase 1, we will also rely on a forward based sensor, probably a TPY-
2 radar. We expect that full Phase I missile defense capability will be possible in 2011.
By including a forward based sensor in Phase 1, we are retaining one of the most significant
contributions to the defense of the United States from the previously proposed architecture.
The forward based sensor will not only help protect the region, but will also contribute to the
defense of the United States homeland by providing early and precise track data to our
Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California.
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In Phase 2, to be completed by 2015, we intend to use a more advanced version of the SM-3
interceptor, the SM-3 Block IB, which is already under development. We will deploy this at
sea and on land. By adding the land-based sites, we will significantly increase coverage of
NATO against ballistic missiles from Iran without having to increase the number of Aegis
BMD ships—a much more cost effective approach.
In Phase 3, we will introduce a new, more capable version of the SM-3, the Block IIA. The
SM-3 Block IIA will provide full coverage of NATO against short, medium, and
intermediate range ballistic missiles. We expect to deploy the SM-3 Block IIA by 2018.
In the final phase, Phase 4, we expect to field an even more-improved SM-3 missile that has
anti-ICBM capabilities. This ascent-phase intercept capability will further augment the
defense of the US homeland from potential Iranian ICBM threats. This phase is planned for
2020.
It is important to note that the SM-3-based defense against any Iranian ICBMs will be in
addition to the GBI-based defense we already have deployed in the United States, at Fort
Greely and Vandenberg AFB. As noted previously, these U.S.-based defenses will be made
more effective by the forward-basing of a TPY-2 radar—which we plan by 2011.
We currently have the ability to defend the United States (including the East Coast) against
any Iranian ICBM, and with the TPY-2 deployment planned in Phase I and continued
improvement of the GBIs, this defense will grow even stronger in the next several years.
While we expect the SM-3-based approach to ICBM defense to be effective on its own, we
also will continue to improve our existing GBI-based system here in the United States and
conduct tests of the 2-stage GBI in the near-term. The SM-3s ascent-phased intercept
capability in Phase 4 would mean that, unlike the previous administration’s GBI-based
system, Iranian missiles would have to defeat not one, but two very different kinds of missile
defenses. This is something I want to underline, since it has at times been misunderstood: we
are already capable of countering all current Iranian missile threats to the US homeland, and
this will not change. Our defenses of the US homeland will only grow stronger as we
proceed with our new approach.
But back to Europe: Over time, we plan on one land-based site in southern Europe and one
somewhere in northern Europe. Given the flexibility of the architecture, there are a number
of options for land-based sites that would provide the same capability, including in Poland.
The mix of sea-and land-based systems makes our new approach far more capable and
adaptable than the program of record, because we can move sensors and interceptors from
region to region as needed. This approach also allows us to scale up our defenses, if
necessary, by deploying additional SM-3 interceptors much faster and at lower costs than by
adding the program of record’s much heavier Ground Based Interceptors and their associated
silos.
In times of crisis, the system can “flex” by surging Aegis capable ships to the area for more
protection and to serve as a visible deterrent. This approach also allows us to deal with a
wider range of potential missile tactics, such as salvo launches. The previous GBI
architecture could intercept about five to ten missiles at most; the new plan’s distributed
network will be able to cope far more effectively should an adversary fire many missiles
simultaneously.
Similarly, replacing the fixed radar site with a mix of sensors that are airborne, seaborne and
ground-based will allow us to gather much more accurate data, and will offer better early
warning and tracking options combined with a stronger networking capacity. Finally,
because it relies on a distributed network of sensors and interceptors, the new approach is
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more survivable—less vulnerable to destruction or disruption—than the previous plan, which
relied on a single large radar and a single interceptor field.
It should be crystal clear that those who say we are “scrapping” missile defense in Europe
are, as Secretary Gates has said, “either misinformed or misrepresenting the reality of what
we are doing.” In fact, we are replacing the previous plan with a phased approach that
delivers more effective and more robust capability sooner.
To sum up: the new Phased Adaptive Approach offers many advantages over the previous
plan for European missile defense. We will now be able to defend the most vulnerable parts
of Europe 6-7 years earlier than the previous plan. Our new approach will be also able to
cover all NATO territory and populations, rather than leaving some allies exposed to short-
and medium-range threats. And we will move toward a new additive approach to defending
the United States against any future Iranian ICBM—while continuing to enhance our
existing GBI-based defenses. Overall, our new approach allows us to better respond to
existing threats now—and to better prepare for future threats as they emerge.
Those who assert that the new plan doesn’t uphold U.S. security commitments to friends and
allies, particularly Poland and the Czech Republic, are far off the mark. This is a better
defense for Europe as well as for the United States. All of our missile defense efforts will be
complementary of and interoperable with those being developed by NATO, and the new
architecture we are creating provides many opportunities for alliance-building and burden-
sharing between the United States and our NATO partners. NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen has hailed our decision as “a positive step”; Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk
said it offers a real “chance to strengthen Europe’s security.”
We remain firmly committed to strong bilateral relationships with both Poland and the Czech
Republic and have already begun discussions with both nations about their potential roles in
the new missile defense architecture. In the coming weeks, we will have numerous strategic
discussions with the Poles on missile defense and our security arrangements. It is prudent
that we continue to seek Polish ratification of the missile defense basing agreement and
supplemental Status of Forces Agreement.
We are also in discussions with the Czech Republic to ensure that they continue to play a
leadership role on missile defense within the Alliance. We have several joint projects already
underway with our Czech partners, and are discussing several more.
Two weeks ago, in addition to visiting Warsaw and Prague to discuss the Phased, Adaptive
Approach, I briefed the North Atlantic Council on our new approach and emphasized that we
will pursue missile defense in a NATO context. The response was very positive, as
evidenced by the NATO Secretary General’s comments last week that “It is my clear
impression that the American plan on missile defense will involve NATO…to a higher
degree in the future…This is a positive step in the direction of an inclusive and transparent
process, which I also think is in the interest of…the NATO alliance.”
This phased adaptive approach better meets our security needs, and our security
commitments to our European allies and partners. Russia’s positive response to date is a
useful collateral benefit, though we are not sure whether and how it will affect their
perspective on missile defenses. We welcome Russian interest in our new approach as well
as potential cooperation in sharing data from their radars. But this is not about Russia, and
regardless of Russian reactions, we will continue to do whatever it takes to ensure our
security and that of our European partners and allies.
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In closing, it is important to note that the strategic thinking behind our new approach to
European missile defense will also be valuable as we continue to address missile defense
issues in other regions.
Because the type of system we are planning in Europe can be easily adapted to different
geographic constraints, it can be applied in various regions around the globe, if necessary. In
fact, a scaled-down version of this approach is already being used for the defense of Japan
against North Korean missile threats, and for the defense of Israel against an Iranian missile
attack. Because the assets of this system are either mobile or transportable, the new approach
provides future flexibility to reposition interceptors and sensors if the geopolitical
environment changes. And because the systems will be upgraded over time, the new
approach provides a natural evolution to match the threat.
As the President said, “our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide a
stronger, smarter, and swifter defense of American forces, and America’s allies. It is more
comprehensive than our previous program. It deploys capabilities that are proven (SM-3 IA)
and cost-effective. And it sustains and builds upon our commitment to protect the U.S.
homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats. And it ensures and enhances the
protection of all of our NATO allies.”
Thank you for your time. We will continue to work with you as we move forward on the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and I look forward to your questions. 38
At the same hearing, Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, the Director of MDA, stated:
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, distinguished Members of the Committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the technical and programmatic
details of the President’s decision to use a Phased Adaptive Approach to enhance missile
defense protection for the United States and Europe for our friends, Allies, our forward
deployed forces, civilian personnel, and their families there. This new proposal would
provide a more powerful missile defense capability for NATO, enhance U.S. homeland
defense, would be applicable in other theaters around the world to counter a growing ballistic
missile threat, and would be more adaptable to respond to threat uncertainties and
developments. With the Phased Adaptive Approach, we are not scrapping or diminishing
missile defense—rather we are strengthening it and delivering more capability sooner.
In 2006 the Defense Department proposed a long-range missile defense of Europe that
consisted of four components: a command and control system; 10 Ground Based Interceptors
(or GBIs) in Poland; an X- band discrimination radar in the Czech Republic; and an X-band
precision tracking radar forward based in Southern Europe. Assuming a shot doctrine of two
interceptors against each threat missile, the 2006 proposed missile defense architecture
provided an upper-tier missile defense to intercept five Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
(IRBMs) aimed at Europe, or it could intercept five Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs) aimed at the Continental United States from the Middle East. The most important
component of the 2006 proposed architecture to the defense of the U.S. homeland was the
forward based X-band radar in Southern Europe, which provided early and precise tracking
of threat missiles from the Middle East, increasing the accuracy of the fire control
instructions to our GBIs based at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California. We remain concerned about a future Iranian ICBM threat; therefore, we are

38 Opening Statement of VCJCS [General James E. Cartwright, USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] and
USDP [Honorable Michèle A. Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense] [at] HASC
hearing on European Missile Defense, October 1, 2009, 8 pp.
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retaining the forward-based X-band radar of the 2006 proposed European missile defense
architecture in our new Phased Adaptive Approach proposal. We will also continue to
improve our domestic GBI-based system and conduct research and development for the two-
stage GBI in the near term.
Under the Phased, Adaptive Approach, we propose defending Europe in phases starting with
the area most vulnerable to today’s Iranian missile threat: southern Europe. Phase 1 would
consist of Aegis ships with Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block IA missiles deployed in the
Mediterranean Sea and a forward-based sensor in southern Europe. This will provide
protection across much of the southern tier of Europe against Iranian medium-range ballistic
missiles.
We propose by 2015 the deployment of the SM-3 Block IB missile, which will have a
greater capacity to use a network of sensors and greater ability to discriminate threat objects.
Once this technology is proven in our test program these interceptors would be deployed at
land- and sea-based locations and extend protection against medium-range ballistic missiles
launched from the Middle East.
By 2018, the deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA missile, an interceptor with greater range
currently being developed, could defend all of Europe from land- and sea-based locations.
By 2020, our goal is to leverage the lightweight kill vehicle technology developed in the now
terminated Multiple Kill Vehicle program to develop a higher velocity SM-3 Block IIB
missile that would destroy ballistic missiles early in flight, during the ascent phase, from
many hundreds of kilometers from the threat launch location. This missile would still fit on
today’s Aegis launch system. With that capability, two land-based SM-3 Block IIB sites
could protect all of Europe. The timelines I have presented allow for missile defense
technologies to be tested and proven prior to deployment decisions.
A significant limitation of the previous European architecture was that the GBIs were used in
both ICBM and IRBM defense roles. Although we have only tested the GBIs against IRBMs
(ranges less than 5,000 km), it is currently our only interceptor designed against ICBMs. The
earliest operational date of the 2006 proposed architecture is 2017 and more likely 2018
considering the host nation approvals that would have been required to construct the
facilities. When deployed in 2017 the European based GBIs could be consumed by an attack
of 5 IRBMs aimed at NATO countries, leaving no two-stage GBIs to contribute to U.S.
ICBM defense. Therefore, the previously proposed European Defense architecture is
insufficient to counter large raid sizes. Under the Phased, Adaptive Approach, the SM-3
Block IIB would be able to accommodate a large IRBM and ICBM missile threat and
diversify the technology that we are using to counter Iranian ICBMs, providing a layered
defense.
We have made significant advances in missile defense technologies that enable the Phased
Adaptive Approach. First, the interceptors we are developing are smaller, faster and have
greater on-board discrimination capability. The sea-based Aegis BMD SM-3 interceptor
would provide a very capable weapon for this particular mission due to its high acceleration,
burn out velocity, proven track record (for the SM-3 IA), and our ability to rapidly increase
the number of interceptors at any launch site. Since we began testing the operationally
configured SM-3 Block 1A missile in June 2006, we successfully intercepted the target in 8
out of 9 attempts. We are also taking a deliberate approach to the development and testing of
the next generation kill vehicle for the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 1B, which has a more
advanced seeker and a fire control system that uses external sensors as well as its ship’s
radar. We have already demonstrated the higher risk components of the new kill vehicle: the
solid propellant Divert and Attitude Control System, new seeker, and fire control system
with good results. The first test of the SM-3 1B is scheduled for the winter of 2011.
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The area of greatest opportunity for increased missile defense capability involves our
achievements in developing faster and more accurate Command Control, Battle
Management, and Communication capabilities, which combine data from a network of many
different sensors (especially sensors that track missiles in the early phases of their flight),
rather than using single large radars. Key to our successful intercept of the ailing satellite in
February 2008 was our ability to combine data from sensors around the world and provide a
highly accurate track of the satellite to an Aegis ballistic missile defense ship and launch the
modified SM-3 1A prior to the ship’s radar seeing the satellite. We have had many other
demonstrations of these capabilities to date, to include the most recent intercept test of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system last December, when we combined the tracks of
satellites, early warning radars, Sea Based X-band radar and forward-based radars on land
and at sea to provide the GBIs with a very accurate targeting track. Additionally, we have
also demonstrated the capability of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as highly accurate forward-
based missile defense sensors in the Navy’s “Stellar Daggers” series of intercept tests last
spring. Last week, we launched a pair of demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS) satellites that will detect and track ballistic missiles over their entire flight.
Over the next few years we will conduct several tests using the tracking capabilities of these
STSS demonstration satellites, including the launching of an interceptor from an Aegis ship,
to intercept ballistic missile targets. Finally, at our External Sensors Laboratory at Schriever
Air Force Base, Colorado, we continue to develop new algorithms and combine new sensor
data to achieve even more accurate tracks than any individual sensor could produce.
A more advanced variant of the SM-3 has been under development since FY 2006. This
interceptor will have the range to defend all of NATO from only a few small sites. This SM-
3 is also more affordable than GBIs (you can buy four to seven production variants of the
SM-3s (IA or IB) for the cost of one GBI). But the key attribute is that we can launch SM-3s
from sea or sites on land, which gives us great flexibility in locating the interceptor launch
point between the origin of the threat launch and the area we are trying to protect—a key
enabler to intercepting threat missiles early in flight. One advantage of land-based SM-3s
over the previous GBI missile field proposal is that they can be relocated if the direction of
the threat changes rather than waiting the more than five years needed to construct a new
GBI missile field.
I would note that the new Phased Adaptive Approach offers greater opportunities for our
close allies, including Poland and the Czech Republic, to collaborate on the missile defense
architecture—by hosting sites or providing funding or capabilities that could be linked to
provide a network of missile defenses. Likewise, the radars at Armavir and Gabala could
augment the proposed sensor network and that type of cooperation could perhaps be a
catalyst for Russia to join countries participating in our cooperative development of missile
defense technologies.
An additional advantage of the Phased Adaptive Approach is that efforts over the next
several years to develop, test, and procure the sensor, command and control, and interceptor
upgrades for deployment of this architecture have application in the United States and
theaters other than Europe.
We are committed to fully funding this program as we prepare for the next budget
submission to Congress. However, it is important that we have relief from rescissions and the
flexibility to spend the unused FY 2009 RDT&E and some MILCON dollars associated with
the previous European Site proposal. With relief from some of the constraints placed on our
FY 2009 budget and some redirection of FY 2010 funds, we believe we can pursue this new
architecture within our FY 2010 budget request.
I would note that both House and Senate authorizing committees very presciently included
provisions in this year’s National Defense Authorization bill that permit the Department to
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use FY 2009 and FY 2010 funding for an alternative architecture once the Secretary of
Defense certifies that this architecture is as cost-effective, technically reliable, and
operationally available as the previous program. I believe the President’s new plan meets
these criteria and would strongly reinforce NATO’s overall approach to missile defense.
My assessment is that executing this approach is challenging, but no more challenging than
the development of other missile defense technologies. It is more adaptable, survivable,
affordable, and responsive than the previous proposal, and it enhances the resulting defense
of the U.S. homeland and our European Allies. There will be setbacks, but the engineering is
executable and development risks are manageable.
I look forward to discussing the specifics of the Phased, Adaptive Approach with Members
and staff in this and other forums.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 39

39 Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before
the House Armed Services Committee Regarding Missile Defense in Europe, Thursday, October 1, 2009, 9 pp.
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Appendix B. Aegis BMD Flight Tests
Table B-1 summarizes Aegis BMD exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric flight tests since
January 2002.
Table B-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests Since January 2002
Name of
Cumulative
Cumulative
Date Country Flight Test
Successful?
Successes
Attempts
Exo-atmospheric (using SM-3 missile)

1/25/02 US
FM-2
Yes
1
1
6/13/02 US
FM-3
Yes
2
2
11/21/02 US
FM-4
Yes
3
3
6/17/03
US
FM-5
No
3 4
12/11/03 US
FM-6
Yes
4
5
2/24/05
US
FTM 04-1 (FM-7)
Yes
5
6
11/17/05
US
FTM 04-2 (FM-8)
Yes
6
7
6/22/06 US
FTM
10
Yes
7
8
12/7/06
US
FTM 11
No
7 9
4/26/07
US
FTM 11 Event 4
Yes
8
10
6/22/07 US
FTM
12
Yes
9
11
8/31/07 US
n/a
Yes
10
12
11/6/07
US FTM
13
Yes
11
13
Yes 12
14
12/17/07 Japan
JFTM
1
Yes
13
15
11/1/08
US PACBLITZ
08
Yes
14
16


No
14 17
11/19/08
Japan
JFTM 2
No
14 18
7/30/09
US
FTM 17
Yes 15 19
10/28/09
Japan
JFTM 3
Yes 16 20
Endo-atmospheric (using SM-2 missile)

5/24/06 US
n/a
Yes
1
1
6/5/08 US
FTM
14
Yes
2
2
3/26/09 US Stellar
Daggers
Yes
3
3
Combined total for exo- and endo-atmospheric tests

n/a US
and
n/a
19
23
Japan
Source: Prepared by CRS based on MDA briefing to CRS and CBO on March 18, 2010, and DOD data.
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Details On Selected Exo-Atmospheric (SM-3) Flight Tests
June 22, 2006, Test. This was the first test to use the 3.6 version of the Aegis BMD system.40
December 7, 2006, Test. This was the first unsuccessful flight test since June 2003. MDA stated
that the ninth test
was not completed due to an incorrect system setting aboard the Aegis-class cruiser USS
Lake Erie prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the ship. The incorrect
configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship from launching the first of
the two interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch
of two missiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally
not launched.
The planned test was to involve the launch of a Standard Missile 3 against a ballistic missile
target and a Standard Missile 2 against a surrogate aircraft target. The ballistic missile target
was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii and the aircraft target
was launched from a Navy aircraft. The USS Lake Erie (CG 70), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and
the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate TROMP were all successful in detecting and tracking
their respective targets. Both targets fell into the ocean as planned.
After a thorough review, the Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Navy will determine a
new test date.41
A news article about the ninth test stated:
“You can say it’s seven of nine, rather than eight of nine,” Missile Defense Agency
spokesman Chris Taylor said of the second failure in tests of the system by the agency and
the Navy....
The drill was planned to demonstrate the Navy’s ability to knock down two incoming
missiles at once from the same ship.
“In a real world situation it is possible, maybe even probable, that in addition to engaging a
ballistic missile threat that was launched, you may be engaging a surface action,” said Joe
Rappisi before the test. He is director for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system at
Lockheed Martin, the primary contractor for the program.
The test would have marked the first time a ship has shot down one target in space and
another target in the air at the same time.
The test presented a greater challenge to the ship’s crew and the ballistic missile defense
system than previous tests, Rappisi said. The multiple target scenario is also closer to what
sailors might actually face in battle.
The U.S. Pacific Fleet has been gradually installing missile surveillance and tracking
technology on many of its destroyers and cruisers amid concerns about North Korea’s long-
range missile program.

40 Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Test Results in Successful ‘Hit To Kill’ Intercept,” June 22, 2006 (06-
NEWS-0018).
41 Untitled Missile Defense Agency “For Your Information” statement dated December 7, 2006 (06-FYI-0090).
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It is also installing interceptor missiles on many of its ships, even as the technology to track
and shoot down incoming missiles is being developed and perfected.
The Royal Netherlands Navy joined the tracking and monitoring off Kauai to see how its
equipment works. The Dutch presence marked the first time a European ally has sent one of
its vessels to participate in a U.S. ballistic missile defense test.42
A subsequent news article stated:
the test abort of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system Dec. 7 resulted from human
error, [MDA Director USAF Lt. Gen. Henry] Obering says.... Both the ballistic missile and
aircraft targets launched as planned, but the first interceptor failed to fire because an operator
had selected an incorrect setting for the test. Officials then aborted before the second could
boost.
Aegis missile defense system tests are at a standstill until officials are able to identify an
appropriate ballistic missile target. The one used Dec. 7 was the last of its kind, Obering
says, leaving them empty handed in the near future.43
Another article stated:
Philip Coyle, a former head of the Pentagon’s testing directorate, gives the Navy credit for
“discipline and successes so far” in its sea-based ballistic missile defense testing program.
Coyle is now a senior adviser at the Center for Defense Information.
“The U.S. Navy has an enviable track record of successful flight intercept tests, and is
making the most of its current, limited Aegis missile defense capabilities in these tests,”
Coyle told [Inside the Navy] Dec. 7.
“Difficulties such as those that delayed the latest flight intercept attempt illustrate the
complexity of the system, and how everything must be carefully orchestrated to achieve
success,” Coyle added. “Nevertheless, this particular setback won’t take the Navy long to
correct.”44
April 26, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test:
involved the simultaneous engagements of a ballistic missile “unitary” target (meaning that
the target warhead and booster remain attached) and a surrogate hostile air target....
The test demonstrated the [Aegis ship’s] ability to engage a ballistic missile threat and
defend itself from attack at the same time. The test also demonstrated the effectiveness of
engineering, manufacturing, and mission assurance changes in the solid divert and attitude
control system (SDACS) in the kinetic kill weapon. This was the first flight test of all the
SM-3 Block IA’s upgrades, previously demonstrated in ground tests.45

42 David Briscoe, “Test Interceptor Missile Fails To Launch,” NavyTimes.com, December 8, 2006.
43 Amy Butler, “GMD Trial Delayed Until Spring; Aegis Failure Human Error,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
December 19, 2006.
44 Zachary M. Peterson, “Sea-Based Missile Defense Test Fails Due To ‘Incorrect Configuration,’” Inside the Navy,
December 11, 2006.
45 Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept,” April 26, 2007 (07-NEWS-
0032).
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A press report on the test stated that the hostile air target was an anti-ship cruise missile. The
article stated that the scenario for the test
called for the [Aegis ship] to come under attack from a cruise missile fired by an enemy
plane.... A Navy plane fired the cruise missile target used in the test.46
June 22, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test
was the third intercept involving a separating target and the first time an Aegis BMD-
equipped destroyer was used to launch the interceptor missile. The USS Decatur (DDG 73),
using the operationally-certified Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Weapon System (BMD 3.6)
and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA missile successfully intercepted the target
during its midcourse phase of flight....
An Aegis cruiser, USS Port Royal (CG 73), a Spanish frigate, MÉNDEZ NÚÑEZ (F-104),
and MDA’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) mobile ground-based radar
also participated in the flight test. USS Port Royal used the flight test to support development
of the new Aegis BMD SPY-1B radar signal processor, collecting performance data on its
increased target detection and discrimination capabilities. MÉNDEZ NÚÑEZ, stationed off
Kauai, performed long-range surveillance and track operations as a training event to assess
the future capabilities of the F-100 Class. The THAAD radar tracked the target and
exchanged tracking data with the Aegis BMD cruiser.
This event marked the third time that an allied military unit participated in a U.S. Aegis
BMD test, with warships from Japan and the Netherlands participating in earlier tests.47
August 31, 2007, Test. MDA has publicly noted the occurrence of this test and the fact that it
resulted in a successful intercept,48 but states that the details about the test are classified.49 MDA
does not appear to have issued a news release about this flight test following the completion of
the test, as it has for other Aegis BMD flight tests.50
November 6, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test involved:
a multiple simultaneous engagement involving two ballistic missile targets.... For the first
time, the operationally realistic test involved two unitary “non-separating” targets, meaning
that the target’s warheads did not separate from their booster rockets....

46 Audrey McAvoy, “Aegis Missile Test Successful,” NavyTimes.com, April 27, 2007.
47 Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept Achieved,” June 22, 2007 (07-NEWS-
0037).
48 See for example, slide 8 in the 20-slide briefing entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense Program Overview For The
Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series,” dated June 20, 2008, presented by Lieutenant General Trey Obering, USAF,
Director, Missile Defense Agency. Source for briefing: InsideDefense.com (subscription required). Each slide in the
briefing includes a note indicating that it was approved by MDA for public release on June 13, 2008. Slide 8 lists Aegis
BMD midcourse flight tests conducted since September 2005, including a test on August 31, 2007. The slide indicates
with a check mark that the flight test was successful. A success in this test is also needed to for the total number of
successful intercepts to match the reported figure.
49 An email from MDA to CRS dated June 30, 2008, states that the flight test “was a hit to kill intercept test but details
about the test are classified.”
50 MDA’s website, when accessed on June 30, 2008, did not show a news release issued on of soon after August 31,
2007, that discusses this test.
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At approximately 6:12 p.m. Hawaii Standard Time (11:12 p.m. EST), a target was launched
from the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Moments
later, a second, identical target was launched from the PMRF. The USS Lake Erie’s Aegis
BMD Weapon System detected and tracked the targets and developed fire control solutions.
Approximately two minutes later, the USS Lake Erie’s crew fired two SM-3 missiles, and
two minutes later they successfully intercepted the targets outside the earth’s atmosphere
more than 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean and 250 miles northwest of Kauai....
A Japanese destroyer also participated in the flight test. Stationed off Kauai and equipped
with the certified 3.6 Aegis BMD weapon system, the guided missile destroyer JS Kongo
performed long-range surveillance and tracking exercises. The Kongo used the test as a
training exercise in preparation for the first ballistic missile intercept test by a Japanese ship
planned for later this year. This event marked the fourth time an allied military unit
participated in a U.S. Aegis BMDS test.51
December 17, 2007, Test. In this flight test, a BMD-capable Japanese Aegis destroyer used an
SM-3 Block IA missile to successfully intercept a ballistic missile target in a flight test off the
coast of Hawaii. It was the first time that a non-U.S. ship had intercepted a ballistic missile using
the Aegis BMD system.52
November 1, 2008, Test. This flight test was reportedly the first U.S. Navy Aegis BMD flight test
conducted by the Navy, without oversight by MDA. The test involved two Aegis ships, each
attempting to intercept a ballistic missile. The SM-3 fired by the first Aegis ship successfully
intercepted its target, but the SM-3 fired by the second Aegis ship did not intercept its target. A
press release from the U.S. Third Fleet (the Navy’s fleet for the Eastern Pacific) states that:
Vice Adm. Samuel J. Locklear, Commander, U.S. Third Fleet announced today the
successful Navy intercept of a ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean during Fleet
Exercise Pacific Blitz. This was the first Fleet operational firing to employ the Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) against a ballistic missile target. Command and control of this mission
resided with Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, based in San Diego, Calif.
Pearl Harbor-based Aegis destroyers, USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) and USS Hopper (DDG
70), which have been upgraded to engage ballistic missiles, fired SM-3 missiles at separate
targets. During this event, a short-range ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific
Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Upon detecting and tracking
the target, USS Paul Hamilton, launched a SM-3 missile, resulting in a direct-hit intercept.
Following USS Paul Hamilton’s engagement, PMRF launched another target. USS Hopper
successfully detected, tracked and engaged the target. The SM-3 followed a nominal
trajectory, however intercept was not achieved. Extensive analysis of the flight mission will
be used to improve the deployed Aegis BMD system.53

51 Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense “Hit to Kill” Intercept Achieved,” November 6, 2007 (07-
NEWS-0051).
52 John Liang, “Japanese Destroyer Shoots Down Ballistic Missile Test Target,” Inside Missile Defense, December 19,
2007; “Japanese Aegis Destroyer Wins Test By Killing Target Missile With SM-3 Interceptor,” Defense Daily,
December 18, 2007; Reuters, “Japanese Ship Downs Missile In Pacific Test,” New York Times, December 18, 2007: 8;
Audrey McAvoy, “Japan Intercepts Missile In Test Off Hawaii,” NavyTimes.com, December 17, 2007.
53 Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, Public Affairs Office, press release 23-08, dated November 1, 2008, entitled “Navy
Intercepts Ballistic Missile Target in Fleet Exercise Pacific Blitz.” See also Dave Ahearn, “One of Two Missiles Hit In
Aegis Test; Navy For First Time Runs Test Instead of MDA,” Defense Daily, November 4, 2008: 1-2.
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November 19, 2008, Test. This was the second Japanese flight test, and involved a single ballistic
missile target. The test did not result in a successful intercept. MDA states that:
Rear Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Director General of Operations and Plans, for the Japanese
Maritime Staff Office (MSO), Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and Lt. General
Henry “Trey” Obering, United States Missile Defense Agency director, announced the
completion today of a cooperative sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense intercept flight
test off the coast of Kauai in Hawaii. The event, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 2
(JFTM-2), marked the second attempt by an Allied naval ship to intercept a ballistic missile
target with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense. Target performance, interceptor missile launch and flyout, and operation of
the Aegis Weapon System by the crew were successful, but an intercept was not achieved.
The JFTM-2 was a test of the newest engagement capability of the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS CHOKAI (DDG-
176). At approximately 4:21 pm (HST), 11:21 am (Tokyo time) a ballistic missile target was
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. JS
CHOKAI crew members detected and tracked the target using an advanced on-board radar.
The Aegis Weapon System then developed a fire control solution, and at approximately 4:24
pm (HST), 11:24 am (Tokyo time) on Nov 20, a single Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block IA
was launched. Approximately two minutes later, the SM-3 failed to intercept the target.
There is no immediate explanation for the failed intercept attempt. More information will be
available after a thorough investigation. The JS CHOKAI crew performance was excellent in
executing the mission. JFTM-2 was the second time that a Japanese ship was designated to
launch the interceptor missile, a major milestone in the growing cooperation between Japan
and the U.S.54
A November 21, 2008, press report states that:
An Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) test by the Japanese destroyer Chokai (DDG-176)
ended in failure when the Standard Missile-3 Block 1A interceptor lost track of the target
missile in the final seconds before a planned hit-to-kill.
The Chokai and its crew performed well throughout the test, and the SM-3 also performed
flawlessly through its first three stages, according to Rear Adm. Brad Hicks, the U.S. Navy
Aegis ballistic missile defense program director. He spoke with several reporters in a
teleconference around midnight ET Wednesday-Thursday, after the test in the area of the
Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii.
This was the second Aegis BMD test failure in less than a month.
These latest two failures come as some Democrats in Congress are poised to cut spending on
missile defense programs when they convene next year to consider the Missile Defense
Agency budget for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2010....
Still, in the coming money debates next year, missile defense advocates will be able to point
out that even including the Hopper and Chokai failures, the record for the Aegis tests is an
overwhelming 16 successful hits demolishing target missiles out of 20 attempts.

54 Missile Defense Agency press release 08-News-0087, dated November 19, 2008, entitled “Japan/U.S. Missile
Defense Flight Test Completed.”
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Those successes included the first Japanese attempt. The Japanese destroyer Kongo (DDG-
173) successfully used its SM-3 interceptor to kill a target missile. The difference in tests is
that the Kongo crew was advised beforehand when the target missile would be launched,
while the Chokai crew wasn’t....
[Hicks] said a board will be convened to examine why the latest test failed. Hicks declined to
speculate on why the SM-3 interceptor missed the target. “I’m confident we’ll find out the
root cause” of the Chokai interceptor failure to score a hit, he said.
However, he was asked by Space & Missile Defense Report whether the prior SM-3
successes make it unlikely the Chokai failure stems from some basic design flaw in all SM-
3s, and whether it is more likely that the Chokai SM-3 failed because of some flaw or glitch
in just that one interceptor.
Hicks said that is likely.
“Obviously, we believe this is hopefully related to this one interceptor,” and doesn’t reflect
any basic design flaw in the SM-3 interceptors, he said.
The Chokai test failure cost Japan a $55 million loss, he said, adding, “It wasn’t cheap.”...
In the Chokai test, the target missile was launched from Barking Sands, and about three
minutes later the Chokai crew had spotted the target, the Aegis system had developed a
tracking and hit solution, and the SM-3 interceptor was launched.
The first, second and third stages of the interceptor performed nominally, without problems,
but then came the fourth stage. The nosecone components opened to expose the kill vehicle
area, and somehow the program to track the target missile failed.
“It lost track,” Hicks said, only seconds before the hit would have been achieved.
If the kill had occurred, it would have been about 100 nautical miles (roughly 115 statute
miles) above Earth, and some 250 miles away from Barking Sands, Hicks said.
It took the interceptor about two minutes flight time to reach the near miss with the target
missile.
Meanwhile, the Hamilton was nearby watching the test. The Hamilton Aegis system
successfully spotted and tracked the target, and developed a simulated solution and simulated
interceptor launch that, if it had been real, would have resulted in a successful hit on the
target, Hicks said. The Hamilton didn’t cue the Chokai, however. “It was strictly Chokai’s
engagement,” Hicks said.55
July 30, 2009, Test. MDA states that:
In conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Pacific Fleet ships and crews
successfully conducted the latest Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) at-sea firing event
on July 30. During this event, entitled Stellar Avenger, the Aegis BMD-equipped ship, USS
Hopper (DDG 70), detected, tracked, fired and guided a Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block
(Blk) IA to intercept a sub-scale short range ballistic missile. The target was launched from

55 Dave Ahearn, “Japanese Aegis Missile Defense Test Fails, But Aegis Record Is 16 Hits In 20 Tries,” Defense Daily,
November 21, 2008: 5-6.
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the Kauai Test Facility, co-located on the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking
Sands, Kauai. It was the 19th successful intercept in 23 at-sea firings, for the Aegis BMD
Program, including the February 2008 destruction of the malfunctioning satellite above the
earth’s atmosphere. Stellar Avenger was part of the continual evaluation of the certified and
fielded Aegis BMD system at-sea today.
At approximately 5:40 pm (HST), 11:40 pm (EDT), a target was launched from PMRF.
Three U.S. Navy Aegis BMD-equipped ships, the cruiser, USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and
destroyers USS Hopper (DDG 70) and USS O'Kane (DDG 77) detected and tracked the
target with their SPY radars. Each developed fire control solutions. At 5:42 pm (HST), 11:42
pm (EDT) the crew of USS Hopper fired one SM-3 Blk IA missile. The USS Hopper’s Aegis
BMD Weapon System successfully guided the SM-3 to a direct body to body hit,
approximately two minutes after leaving the ship. The intercept occurred about 100 miles
above the Pacific Ocean. USS O'Kane conducted a simulated engagement of the target. USS
Lake Erie, with its recently installed upgraded Aegis BMD 4.0.1 Weapons System, detected
and tracked the same target.56
A July 31, 2009, press report states:
The test was the first Aegis BMD exercise to feature two versions of the software in a single
event, according to Lisa Callahan, Lockheed’s vice president for ballistic missile defense
programs.
A goal of the exercises was to test the Aegis system’s ability to discern all the different parts
and pieces of a ballistic missile, Nick Bucci, Lockheed’s director for Aegis BMD
development programs, told reporters July 29 during a pre-exercise conference call.
Three more flight tests this fall will further test the system’s discrimination capabilities,
Bucci added, with each test becoming more complex. The last test will “be against a pretty
darn complex target,” he said.
The July 30 tests also validated fixes put in place after a BMD test last November involving
a missile launched from the Aegis BMD Japanese destroyer Chokai failed to intercept its
target, according to MDA spokesman Chris Taylor. The improvements—which were
successful in the most recent test—involved fixes to the Solid Divert Attitude Control
System.
The Chokai is the second of four Japanese Aegis ships being upgraded with BMD capability.
A third ship, the Myoko, is scheduled to carry out a BMD test this fall.57
An August 3, 2009, press report states:
This test was added to the schedule to evaluate changes made after last year’s failed attempt
to intercept a target with an SM-3 Block IA launched by a Japanese Aegis-equipped ship ....
After the Nov. 19 test, MDA officials said, “Target performance, interceptor missile launch
and flyout, and operation of the Aegis Weapon System by the crew were successful, but an
intercept was not achieved.”

56 Missile Defense Agency press release 09-News-0015, dated July 31, 2009, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Test Successful.”
57 Christopher P. Cavas, “Aegis BMD Test Successful,” DefenseNews.com, July 31, 2009.
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A root cause has not been identified, and an MDA spokesman did not say whether fixes have
been made to hardware or operational procedures resulting from the failure review. It is also
unclear why a subscale target was used in the July 30 trial.58
An August 4, 2009, press report states:
[Rear Admiral Alan “Brad” Hicks, Aegis/SM-3 program manager for MDA], said that a
November [2008] failure of an SM-3 Block IA... during a flight-test was attributable to poor
adherence to processes on Raytheon’s assembly line in Tucson, Ariz.
This was isolated to that missile, and it was the result of perturbations to the build process
encountered when shifting from development to production operations.
During the November test, a Japanese Aegis-equipped ship fired the interceptor and it flew
“perfectly,” Hicks said. In the endgame, a failure of the divert and attitude control system on
the unitary kill vehicle led to a miss.
The July 30 demonstration using a U.S. ship “restored confidence” for the Japanese that the
miss last fall was an isolated incident, he says. 59
October 28, 2009, Test. This was the third Japanese flight test, and it involved a single ballistic
missile target. MDA states that:
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the United States Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) announced the successful completion of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) intercept flight test, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, off the coast of Kauai in
Hawaii. The event, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 3 (JFTM-3), marked the third time
that a JMSDF ship has successfully engaged a ballistic missile target, including two
successful intercepts, with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by
Aegis BMD.
The JFTM-3 test event verified the newest engagement capability of the Japan Aegis BMD
configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS MYOKO (DDG-175). At
approximately 6:00pm (HST), 1:00 pm Tokyo time on Oct 28, a separating, medium-range
ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands,
Kauai, Hawaii. JS MYOKO crew members detected and tracked the target. The Aegis
Weapon System then developed a fire control solution and, at approximately 6:04pm (HST),
1:04 pm Tokyo time a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA interceptor missile was
launched. Approximately 3 minutes later, the SM-3 successfully intercepted the target
approximately 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. JFTM-3 is a significant milestone in the
growing cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the area of missile defense.
Also participating in the test, were the Pearl Harbor-based USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and USS
Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) which detected and tracked the target and conducted a simulated
engagement.60

58 Amy Butler, “SM-3 Scores Hit After Fixes Implemented,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 3, 2009: 5.
59 Amy Butler, “SM-3 Upgrade Program Cost Increases,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 4, 2009: 1-2. For
more news reports on this test, see Dan Taylor, “Navy Conducts Aegis BMD Test, New Baseline System Participates,”
Inside the Navy, August 3, 2009; Daniel Wasserbly, “US Aegis BMD System Achieves Trial Success,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly
, August 5, 2009: 8.
60 Missile Defense Agency press release 09-News-0021, dated October 28, 2009, entitled “Japan/U.S. Missile Defense
Flight Test Successful.” Some defense trade press reports state that the test occurred on October 27 rather than October
(continued...)
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Endo-Atmospheric (SM-2 Block IV) Flight Tests
The Aegis BMD system using the SM-2 BLock IV interceptor has achieved three successful
endo-atmospheric intercepts in three at-sea attempts, the first occurring on May 24, 2006,61 the
second on June 5, 2008,62 and the third between March 24 and March 26, 2009.63
May 2010 Criticism of Claimed Successes in Flight Tests
In a May 2010 magazine article and a supplementary white paper, two professors with scientific
backgrounds—George Lewis and Theodore Postol—criticized DOD claims of successes in Aegis
(and other DOD) BMD flight tests, arguing that
the Defense Department’s own test data show that, in combat, the vast majority of
“successful” SM-3 experiments would have failed to destroy attacking warheads. The data
also show potential adversaries how to defeat both the SM-3 and the GMD [ground-based
missile defense] systems, which share the same serious flaws that can be readily exploited by
adversaries.64
The criticisms made by Lewis and Postol were reported in a May 18, 2010, New York Times
article.65 In response to the criticisms and the New York Times article, MDA issued a press release
and other information defending the flight tests and arguing that the criticisms are based on
inaccurate or incomplete information.66


(...continued)
28. See, for example, Christopher P. Cavas, “Japanese Destroyer Conducts Successful BMD Test,” NavyTimes.com,
October 28, 2009; and Amy Butler and Michael Bruno, “SM-3 Scores Hit In Japanese Test,” Aerospace Daily &
Defense Report
,” October 29, 2009: 3.
61 See Missile Defense Agency, “First at-Sea Demonstration of Sea-Based Terminal Capability Successfully
Completed,” May 24, 2006 (06-FYI-0079); Gregg K. Kakesako, “Missile Defense System Makes History,” Honolulu
Star-Bulletin
, May 25, 2006; Audrey McAvoy, “Ship Shoots Down Test Missile For The First Time,” NavyTimes.com,
May 25, 2006; “Navy, MDA Announce First Terminal Sea-Based Intercept,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May
26, 2006; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Conducts First Sea-Based Terminal Phase Missile Defense Test,” Inside the
Navy
, May 29, 2006; and Jeremy Singer, “Sea-Based Terminal May Boost U.S. Missile Defense Capability,” Space
News (www.space.com)
, June 12, 2006.
62 See Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense Intercept,” June 5, 2008 (08-NEWS-0068);
Dave Ahearn, “Aegis, SM-2 Interceptors Kill Target Missile In Terminal-Phase Success,” Defense Daily, June 6, 2008.
63 “Navy Completes Air and Ballistic Missile Exercise,” Navy News Service, March 26, 2009.
64 George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan, Arms Control Today,
May 2010: 24-32. The quoted passage appears on page 26. The associated white paper is George N. Lewis and
Theodore A. Postol, A Technically Detailed Description of Flaws in the SM-3 and GMD Missile Defense Systems
Revealed by the Defense Department’s Ballistic Missile Test Data
, May 3, 2010, 13 pp.
65 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Review Cites Flaws In U.S. Antimissile Program,” New York Times, May
18, 2010: 1.
66 Missile Defense Agency news release entitled “Missile Defense Agency Responds to New York Times Article,” 10-
News-0005, May 18, 2010; Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense Agency Response to Request for Information,
Standard Missile – 3 Interceptor Testing
, May 18, 2010, 2 pp.; Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense Agency
Response to Request for Information, Response to New York Times May 18, 2010, article regarding SM-3 testing
, May
18, 2010, 3 pp.; Richard Lehner, “Missile Defense Agerncy Responds to New York Times Article,” DOD Live
(www.dodlive.mil)
, May 18, 2010; Transcript of Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable With Richard Lehner,
Spokesman, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Subject: Standard Missile 3 Test Program, May 18, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Author Contact Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610


Congressional Research Service
59