Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
~~April 1~~May 18, 2022 , 2022
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for

conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend
Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western

Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks
from countries such as North Korea and Iran. from countries such as North Korea and Iran. The number of BMD-capable Aegis ships has been growing over time. MDA’s FY2023~~MDA’s FY2022~~ budget submission states that “by the end of FY budget submission states that “by the end of FY ~~2022~~2023 there there
will be will be 4850 total BMDS [BMD total BMDS [BMD ~~system~~Systems] capable ] capable [Aegis] ships requiring maintenance support.” ships requiring maintenance support.”
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for
BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed ~~FY2021~~FY2023 budget budget ~~requested~~requests a total of $1, a total of $1,~~647.9~~659.1 million (i.e., about $1. million (i.e., about $1.67 billion) in billion) in
procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in
Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon)
funding for the Aegis BMD program. funding for the Aegis BMD program.
Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:
 whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding  whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding
requests for the program; requests for the program;
 the  the ~~impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the execution of Aegis BMD program efforts;~~
~~ what role, if any,~~adequacy of MDA’s cost estimating and its reporting of costs;  what role the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. homeland against attack from the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S. homeland against attack from
ICBMs; ICBMs;
 required  required ~~numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships~~ versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships; versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships;
 the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, and whether  the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, and whether
there are there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships,
such as establishing such as establishing ~~more~~additional Aegis Ashore sites; Aegis Ashore sites;
 allied burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to  allied burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to
U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations; U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations;
  ~~whether to procure and install an Aegis Ashore system on~~the role of the Aegis BMD program in a new missile defense system architecture for Guam; Guam;
 whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site;  whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site;
 the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations  the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations
and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles; and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles;
and and
 technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.  technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic
missile defense (BMD) program, a program carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) missile defense (BMD) program, a program carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
and the Navy that gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD and the Navy that gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD
operations. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of operations. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Department of
Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program. Defense (DOD) acquisition strategies and proposed funding levels for the Aegis BMD program.
Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD
capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base. capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base.
Background
Aegis Ships
All but three of the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are All but three of the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are
equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers,
software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that
defended Zeus. (The exceptions are the Navy’s three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers, defended Zeus. (The exceptions are the Navy’s three Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers,
which are discussed below.) The Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for which are discussed below.) The Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for
defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and
subsurface threats. The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated subsurface threats. The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated
many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers. Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers
A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and
FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs
47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged 47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged
by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005, by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005,
leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73)leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73). The Navy’s FY2023 budget submission proposes retiring five of the 22 ships in FY2023, 12 more in FY2024-FY2027, and the remaining five in years after FY2027. .
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis ~~Destroyers1~~
~~A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first~~
~~entered service in 1991 and the 62nd entered service in FY2012. The first 28 ships are~~ Destroyers The Navy began procuring DDG-51s in FY1985, and a total of 89 have been procured through FY2022. The first DDG-51 entered service in 1991, and a total of 70 have been delivered as of February 2022. Under the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission, the first DDG-51 is to be retired in FY2027. The DDG-51 design has been updated multiple times over the years. The first 28 DDG-51s are known as known as
Flight I/II DDG-51s. The next 34Flight I/II DDG-51s. The next 34 ~~ships~~, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some , known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some significant design design
changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar. changes, including the addition of a helicopter hangar.
~~No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured~~
~~the three above-mentioned Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does~~
~~not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy~~
~~plans do not call for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.2~~
~~Procurement of DDG-51s resumed in FY2010, following procurement of the three Zumwalt-class~~
~~destroyers. A total of 25 DDG-51s have been procured from FY2010 through FY2021. DDG-51s~~

~~1 For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS Report RL32109,~~ ~~Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:~~
~~Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~
~~2 For more on the DDG-1000 program, see CRS Report RL32109,~~ ~~Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:~~
~~Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~The version currently being procured, called the Flight III DDG-51 design, incorporates a new radar, called the SPY 6 radar (and prior to that, the Air and Missile Defense Radar, or AMDR), that is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on CG-47s and earlier DDG-51s. No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured the three above-mentioned Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does
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~~procured in FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a new version of the DDG-51 design~~
~~called the Flight III version. The Flight III version is to be equipped with a new radar, called the~~
~~SPY 6 radar (and prior to that, the Air and Missile Defense Radar, or AMDR), that is more~~
~~capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers.~~not use the Aegis system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy plans do not call for modifying the three DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.1
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies
Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now
operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Spain, and Norway.Australia, Spain, and Norway.32 Japan’s Aegis-equipped ships are BMD-capable. The Aegis- Japan’s Aegis-equipped ships are BMD-capable. The Aegis-
equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are currently not BMD-equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway are currently not BMD-
capable. capable.
Aegis BMD ~~System4~~System3
Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to
the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor
missiles. missiles. ~~In-service~~Older Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s
procured in FY2010 and subsequent years procured in FY2010 and subsequent years ~~are being~~have been built from the start with a BMD capability. built from the start with a BMD capability.
Versions and Capabilities of Aegis BMD System
Overview
The Aegis BMD system exists in multiple variants whose ascending numerical designations The Aegis BMD system exists in multiple variants whose ascending numerical designations
indicate ascending levels of capability. indicate ascending levels of capability. InAs part of MDA’s FY2022 budget submission, the designations of MDA’s FY2022 budget submission, the designations of
Aegis BMD system variants Aegis BMD system variants ~~have been~~were changed and consolidated to 4.X, 5.X, and 6.X changed and consolidated to 4.X, 5.X, and 6.X~~.5 These~~, with the X indicating multiple subvariants. (The 4.X variant, for example, includes the 4.1 and 4.2 subvariants.)4
BMD system variants correlate with certain versions (i.e., baselines, or BLs) of the overall Aegis BMD system variants correlate with certain versions (i.e., baselines, or BLs) of the overall Aegis
system, which have their own numbering system. The more recent BMD variants, in addition to system, which have their own numbering system. The more recent BMD variants, in addition to
being able to address more challenging BMD scenarios, give BMD-equipped ships a capability to being able to address more challenging BMD scenarios, give BMD-equipped ships a capability to
simultaneously perform both BMD operations against ballistic missiles and anti-air warfare simultaneously perform both BMD operations against ballistic missiles and anti-air warfare
(AAW) operations (aka air-defense operations) against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles. (AAW) operations (aka air-defense operations) against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles.
Figure 1 provides a 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) summary of the capabilities provides a 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) summary of the capabilities
of the more recent BMD variants and their correlation to Aegis system baselinesof the more recent BMD variants and their correlation to Aegis system baselines as of 2019. . BecausBecause Figure
1 was prepared in 2019, it uses the older designations for Aegis BMD system variants, rather than was prepared in 2019, it uses the older designations for Aegis BMD system variants, rather than
the new designations that the new designations that ~~have been~~were introduced as part of the MDA’s FY2022 budget submission. introduced as part of the MDA’s FY2022 budget submission.
The Aegis BMD system was originally designed primarily to intercept theater-range ballistic The Aegis BMD system was originally designed primarily to intercept theater-range ballistic
missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, missiles, meaning short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs,
and IRBMs, respectively). In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range ballistic and IRBMs, respectively). In addition to its capability for intercepting theater-range ballistic
~~missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system’s radar might be passed~~
~~to other U.S. BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles~~

3 1 For more on the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 2 The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version
of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar. of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar.
43 Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to
CRS and CBO analysts on the MDA’s CRS and CBO analysts on the MDA’s ~~FY2020~~FY2023 and prior-year budget submissions. and prior-year budget submissions.
54 The 4.X variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 3.6.X, 4.0.X, 4.1, and 4.2. The 5.X The 4.X variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 3.6.X, 4.0.X, 4.1, and 4.2. The 5.X
variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 5.0CU (with the CU standing for Capability variant is the new designation for the variants previously designated 5.0CU (with the CU standing for Capability
Upgrade) and 5.1. The 6.X variant is the new designation for the variant previously designated 6.0. Upgrade) and 5.1. The 6.X variant is the new designation for the variant previously designated 6.0.
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missiles, detection and tracking data collected by the Aegis BMD system’s radar might be passed to other U.S. BMD systems that are designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U.S. BMD (ICBMs), which might support intercepts of ICBMs that are conducted by those other U.S. BMD
systems. systems.
Figure 1. GAO Summary of Capabilities of Aegis BMD System Variants

Source: Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Delivery Delays Provide Opportunity for Increased
Testing to Better Understand Capability, GAO-19-387, June 2019, Table 5 on p. 31. , GAO-19-387, June 2019, Table 5 on p. 31.
April 2021 Press Report About Upcoming Test Against Mock Hypersonic Weapon
An April 14, 2021, press report stated An April 14, 2021, press report stated
The Missile Defense Agency, together with the U.S. Navy, plan to test an SM-6 missile The Missile Defense Agency, together with the U.S. Navy, plan to test an SM-6 missile
against an “advanced maneuvering threat,” a term that has been used in relation to against an “advanced maneuvering threat,” a term that has been used in relation to
unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, later this year. The Pentagon says that unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, later this year. The Pentagon says that
unspecified versions of the SM-6 have already demonstrated some degree of capability unspecified versions of the SM-6 have already demonstrated some degree of capability
against these types of weapons, examples of which Russia and China have already begun against these types of weapons, examples of which Russia and China have already begun
putting to service. A new variant of the SM-6, the Block IB, is already under development putting to service. A new variant of the SM-6, the Block IB, is already under development
and will itself be able to reach hypersonic speeds. and will itself be able to reach hypersonic speeds.
Barbara McQuiston, a senior U.S. official currently performing the duties of the Under Barbara McQuiston, a senior U.S. official currently performing the duties of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, including mention of the scheduled Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, including mention of the scheduled
~~SM-6 test in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee~~
~~on Defense yesterday….~~
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SM-6 test in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense yesterday…. “MDA [the Missile Defense Agency], in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, demonstrated “MDA [the Missile Defense Agency], in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, demonstrated
early capability against maneuvering threats during flight-testing of the Standard Missile early capability against maneuvering threats during flight-testing of the Standard Missile
(SM)-6 Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense, and it will further demonstrate this capability (SM)-6 Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) defense, and it will further demonstrate this capability
against an advanced maneuvering threat-representative target later this year,” according to against an advanced maneuvering threat-representative target later this year,” according to
McQuiston’s written testimony. “We will continue to advance our SBT capability to McQuiston’s written testimony. “We will continue to advance our SBT capability to
address the regional hypersonic threat and will test that capability in the FY 2024 address the regional hypersonic threat and will test that capability in the FY 2024
timeframe.”… timeframe.”…
This is not the first time the Pentagon has publicly discussed using a variant of the SM-6 This is not the first time the Pentagon has publicly discussed using a variant of the SM-6
for hypersonic defense. In March 2020, Mike Griffin, then the Under Secretary of Defense for hypersonic defense. In March 2020, Mike Griffin, then the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering, first revealed that this missile was among those being for Research and Engineering, first revealed that this missile was among those being
considered for this role and that there were plans to test one of them against an actual considered for this role and that there were plans to test one of them against an actual
hypersonic boost-glide vehicle sometime in the 2023 Fiscal Year. It’s not clear whether the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle sometime in the 2023 Fiscal Year. It’s not clear whether the
test Griffin was referring to is the one now scheduled for this year or the one that MDA test Griffin was referring to is the one now scheduled for this year or the one that MDA
now plans to carry out in the 2024 Fiscal Year.now plans to carry out in the 2024 Fiscal Year.65
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles
The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the ~~Standard7~~Standard6 Missile-3 (SM-3) and the Missile-3 (SM-3) and the
SM-6. SM-6.
SM-3 Midcourse Interceptor
The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric
intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit-intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit-
to-kill” warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead to-kill” warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead
by colliding with it. The current versions of the SM-3 missile include the SM-3 Block IA, the by colliding with it. The current versions of the SM-3 missile include the SM-3 Block IA, the
SM-3 Block IB, and the SM-3 Block IIA.SM-3 Block IB, and the SM-3 Block IIA.87
Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target
seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting
its course. Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster its course. Compared to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster
stage at the bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block stage at the bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block
IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform IIA version has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform
21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout 21 inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout
velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater
than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The than that of the Block IA and IB versions, as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The
United States and Japan cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version, United States and Japan cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version,
with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.98

65 Joseph Trevithick, “Navy SM-6 Missile Will Attempt To Swat Down A Mock Hypersonic Weapon,” Joseph Trevithick, “Navy SM-6 Missile Will Attempt To Swat Down A Mock Hypersonic Weapon,” The Drive, April , April
14, 2021. 14, 2021.
76 The Standard Missile is so named because it was originally developed, decades ago, as a surface-to-air (i.e., air The Standard Missile is so named because it was originally developed, decades ago, as a surface-to-air (i.e., air
defense) missile to serve as the common (i.e., standard) successor to the Navy’s then-existing collection of Talos, defense) missile to serve as the common (i.e., standard) successor to the Navy’s then-existing collection of Talos,
Terrier, and Tartar air defense missilesTerrier, and Tartar air defense missiles, (which were sometimes referred to collectively as the 3-T missileswhich were sometimes referred to collectively as the 3-T missiles). .
87 MDA and Navy plans at one point called for the SM-3 Block IIA to be succeeded by a still-more-capable interceptor MDA and Navy plans at one point called for the SM-3 Block IIA to be succeeded by a still-more-capable interceptor
called the SM-3 Block IIB. The effort to develop that missile, however, was ended years ago, and MDA at the time was called the SM-3 Block IIB. The effort to develop that missile, however, was ended years ago, and MDA at the time was
reportedly not pursuing any follow-on capabilities to the SM-3 Block IIA. (See, for example, Justin Doubleday, reportedly not pursuing any follow-on capabilities to the SM-3 Block IIA. (See, for example, Justin Doubleday,
“Missile Defense Agency Not Pursuing Follow-On to SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor,” “Missile Defense Agency Not Pursuing Follow-On to SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor,” Inside the Navy, October 24, , October 24,
2016.) 2016.)
98 The cooperative research effort was carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999. The The cooperative research effort was carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999. The
~~effort focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the second-stage~~
~~propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone.~~
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A March 31, 2020, press report stated A March 31, 2020, press report stated
Raytheon and the Missile Defense Agency are exploring options to extend the range of the Raytheon and the Missile Defense Agency are exploring options to extend the range of the
Standard Missile-3 Block IB—pushing the ballistic missile interceptor to dramatically Standard Missile-3 Block IB—pushing the ballistic missile interceptor to dramatically
expand a defended area by allowing the weapon to communicate with off-board radars—a expand a defended area by allowing the weapon to communicate with off-board radars—a
move that would require enhancing one of the Aegis ballistic missile defense system’s move that would require enhancing one of the Aegis ballistic missile defense system’s
newest features: Engage-on-Remote…. newest features: Engage-on-Remote….
MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill told Congress earlier this month that the new Engage- MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill told Congress earlier this month that the new Engage-
on-Remote capability provides “a seven-fold increase in missile defense coverage when on-Remote capability provides “a seven-fold increase in missile defense coverage when
compared to an autonomous Aegis platform.”compared to an autonomous Aegis platform.”109
SM-6 Terminal Interceptor
The SM-2 Block IV was MDA’s and the Navy’s initial sea-based terminal-phase BMD The SM-2 Block IV was MDA’s and the Navy’s initial sea-based terminal-phase BMD
interceptor. It was designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo-interceptor. It was designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo-
atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It was atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It was
equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead. A limited number of these missiles were produced equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead. A limited number of these missiles were produced
years ago.years ago.1110 The SM-2 Block IV has now been replaced by the SM-6. The SM-2 Block IV has now been replaced by the SM-6.
The SM-6 is MDA’s and the Navy’s more capable next-generation sea-based terminal-phase (i.e., The SM-6 is MDA’s and the Navy’s more capable next-generation sea-based terminal-phase (i.e.,
endo-atmospheric) BMD interceptor. It is based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the Navy’s endo-atmospheric) BMD interceptor. It is based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the Navy’s
successor to the SM-2 air defense missile). The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used successor to the SM-2 air defense missile). The SM-6 is a dual-capability missile that can be used
for either air defense (i.e., countering aircraft and ASCMs) or ballistic missile defense. A July 23, for either air defense (i.e., countering aircraft and ASCMs) or ballistic missile defense. A July 23,
2018, press report states the following: 2018, press report states the following:
The Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramatically The Defense Department has launched a prototype project that aims to dramatically
increase the speed and range of the Navy’s Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket increase the speed and range of the Navy’s Standard Missile-6 by adding a larger rocket
motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and motor to the ship-launched weapon, a move that aims to improve both the offensive and
defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system. defensive reach of the Raytheon-built system.
On Jan. 17 [2018], the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with On Jan. 17 [2018], the Navy approved plans to develop a Dual Thrust Rocket Motor with
a 21-inch diameter for the SM-6, which is currently fielded with aa 21-inch diameter for the SM-6, which is currently fielded with a 13.5-inch propulsion 13.5-inch propulsion
package. The new rocket motor would sit atop the current 21-inch booster, producing a package. The new rocket motor would sit atop the current 21-inch booster, producing a
new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB.new variant of the missile: the SM-6 Block IB.1211
Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
The number of BMD-capable Aegis ships has been growing over time. MDA’s FY2023~~MDA’s FY2022~~ budget submission states that “by the end of FY budget submission states that “by the end of FY ~~2022~~2023 there will be there will be 4850 total total
BMDS [BMD BMDS [BMD ~~system]~~ Systems] capable capable [Aegis] ships requiring maintenance support.”ships requiring maintenance support.”13
~~BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers Forward-Homeported in Spain~~
~~On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the~~
~~EPAA, four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers were to be forward-homeported (i.e.,~~

1012 effort focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the second-stage propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone. 9 Jason Sherman, “After MDA Demonstrates 7x Increase in Defended Area, Raytheon Pitching EOR for Older SM- Jason Sherman, “After MDA Demonstrates 7x Increase in Defended Area, Raytheon Pitching EOR for Older SM-
3s,” 3s,” Inside Defense, March 31, 2020. , March 31, 2020.
1110 The inventory of SM-2 Block IVs was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and The inventory of SM-2 Block IVs was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and
ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and at least 3 were used in BMD flight tests through February ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and at least 3 were used in BMD flight tests through February
2012. 2012.
1211 Jason Sherman, “Navy Looking to Increase Range, Speed of SM-6 with Larger Rocket Motor,” Jason Sherman, “Navy Looking to Increase Range, Speed of SM-6 with Larger Rocket Motor,” Inside the Navy, July , July
23, 2018. 23, 2018.
1312 Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year ~~2022 President’s Budget~~2023 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, , ~~May 2021, p. 12~~April 2022, p. 11. (This is . (This is
~~MDA’s~~the FY2023 budget justification book for budget justification book for MDA’s portion of the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide appropriation account.) the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide appropriation account.)
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BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers Forward-Homeported in Spain On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers were to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at the naval base at Rota, Spain.based) at the naval base at Rota, Spain.1413 The initial set of four ships was transferred to Rota in The initial set of four ships was transferred to Rota in
FY2014 and FY2015.FY2014 and FY2015.15 14 They They ~~are~~were reportedly scheduled to return to the United States and replaced reportedly scheduled to return to the United States and replaced
at Rota by a new set of four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in 2020-2022.at Rota by a new set of four BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in 2020-2022.1615
Navy officials have said that the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in Navy officials have said that the four Rota-based ships can provide a level of level of presence in
the Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be the Mediterranean for performing BMD patrols and other missions equivalent to what could be
provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U.S. east coast. The provided by about 10 BMD-capable Aegis ships that are homeported on the U.S. east coast. The
Rota homeporting arrangement thus effectively releases about six U.S. Navy BMD-capable Aegis Rota homeporting arrangement thus effectively releases about six U.S. Navy BMD-capable Aegis
ships for performing BMD patrols or other missions elsewhere. In February and March 2020, ships for performing BMD patrols or other missions elsewhere. In February and March 2020,
DOD officials testified that DOD is considering forward-homeporting an additional two BMD-DOD officials testified that DOD is considering forward-homeporting an additional two BMD-
capable Aegis destroyers at Rota, which would make for a total of six destroyers at the site.capable Aegis destroyers at Rota, which would make for a total of six destroyers at the site.1716
Navy officials Navy officials ~~have testified~~testified in 2020 that they support the idea. that they support the idea.1817
Aegis Ashore Sites
Two Navy-Operated Sites in Romania and Poland
The land-based version of the Aegis BMD system is called Aegis Ashore. There are two Aegis The land-based version of the Aegis BMD system is called Aegis Ashore. There are two Aegis
Ashore sites in Europe—one in Romania, and one in Poland. The sites are intended to help Ashore sites in Europe—one in Romania, and one in Poland. The sites are intended to help
defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran. Each Aegis Ashore site defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran. Each Aegis Ashore site
includes a structure housing an Aegis system that is similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship, includes a structure housing an Aegis system that is similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship,
and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a relocatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the
VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships.VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships.1918
The plan to establish the two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland was announced in 2009, The plan to establish the two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland was announced in 2009,
as part of a plan for providing regional BMD defense in Europe called the European Phased as part of a plan for providing regional BMD defense in Europe called the European Phased
~~Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Aegis Ashore site in Romania achieved operational certification~~

1413 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
~~October 6, 2011~~May 18, 2022, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also , at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed “SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed ~~August 27, 2020~~May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/, at https://web.archive.org/
web/20120117065346/http:/www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=63109. web/20120117065346/http:/www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65 miles northwest of Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65 miles northwest of
the Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have been homeported at Rota at various points the Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have been homeported at Rota at various points
in the past, most recently (prior to the current arrangement) in 1979. (Source: Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-in the past, most recently (prior to the current arrangement) in 1979. (Source: Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-
Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.) Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.)
1514 The four ships The four ships ~~are~~were the destroyers the destroyers Ross (DDG-71) and (DDG-71) and Donald Cook (DDG-75), which moved to Rota in FY2014, and (DDG-75), which moved to Rota in FY2014, and
the destroyers the destroyers Carney (DDG-64) and (DDG-64) and Porter (DDG-78), which moved to Rota in FY2015. (DDG-78), which moved to Rota in FY2015.
1615 See, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “USS Arleigh Burke Arrives in Spain, USS Donald Cook Will Head to See, for example, Mallory Shelbourne, “USS Arleigh Burke Arrives in Spain, USS Donald Cook Will Head to
Mayport,” Mayport,” USNI News, April 12, 2021. , April 12, 2021.
1716 See, for example, Paul McCleary, “EUCOM Calls For Two More Ships For Spanish Port,” See, for example, Paul McCleary, “EUCOM Calls For Two More Ships For Spanish Port,” Breaking Defense, ,
February 25, 2020; David B. Larter, “Push to Base Six US Navy Destroyers in Spain Could Be Gaining Steam,” February 25, 2020; David B. Larter, “Push to Base Six US Navy Destroyers in Spain Could Be Gaining Steam,”
Defense News, March 3, 2020. , March 3, 2020.
1817 See, for example, David B. Larter, “The US Navy’s Top Officer Declares Support for Basing 6 Destroyers in Spain,” See, for example, David B. Larter, “The US Navy’s Top Officer Declares Support for Basing 6 Destroyers in Spain,”
Defense News, March 5, 2020, March 5, 2020;. See also John Vandiver, “Rota to Gain Two US Destroyers by Middle of the Decade, EUCOM John Vandiver, “Rota to Gain Two US Destroyers by Middle of the Decade, EUCOM
Chief Says,” Chief Says,” Stars and Stripes, April 15, 2021. es, April 15, 2021.
1918 For additional discussion of the Aegis Ashore sites, see Edward Lundquist, “Aegis Ashore Adapts Sea-Based Missile For additional discussion of the Aegis Ashore sites, see Edward Lundquist, “Aegis Ashore Adapts Sea-Based Missile
Defense System to Protect Europe,” Defense System to Protect Europe,” National Defense, September 2016. , September 2016.
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Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Aegis Ashore site in Romania achieved operational certification in May 2016.19~~in May 2016.20~~ The site in Poland began construction in May The site in Poland began construction in May ~~2016,21 and it~~201620 and was initially was initially
scheduled to be completed in 2018. Its completion, however, has been delayedscheduled to be completed in 2018. Its completion, however, has been delayed ~~by four years,~~ to to
the end of 2022the end of 2022~~, due to~~ by construction contractor performance issues.construction contractor performance issues.2221 An April 2021 GAO report An April 2021 GAO report
on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following: on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following:
According to MDA officials, the Aegis Ashore site in Poland continues to experience According to MDA officials, the Aegis Ashore site in Poland continues to experience
delays owing to poor performance by the main construction contractor. Based on MDA’s delays owing to poor performance by the main construction contractor. Based on MDA’s
latest estimate of completion no earlier than fiscal year 2022, the site will be between three latest estimate of completion no earlier than fiscal year 2022, the site will be between three
and four years late. According to MDA, in February 2020, the Army Corps of Engineers and four years late. According to MDA, in February 2020, the Army Corps of Engineers
(which manages construction at the site) notified the main contractor that earnings from all (which manages construction at the site) notified the main contractor that earnings from all
future invoices would be retained, and released only upon the completion of certain key future invoices would be retained, and released only upon the completion of certain key
activities. MDA stated that the contractor did not meet these benchmarks and as a result activities. MDA stated that the contractor did not meet these benchmarks and as a result
had not been paid since February 2020. had not been paid since February 2020.
MDA currently attributes $79 million in cost increases to these delays. MDA currently attributes $79 million in cost increases to these delays.2322
Navy Interest in Divesting Aegis Ashore Sites It Operates
On January 11, 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Gilday, released a On January 11, 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Gilday, released a
guidance document for the Navy entitled guidance document for the Navy entitled CNO NavPlan (with NavPlan being short for navigation (with NavPlan being short for navigation
plan) that states plan) that states
To remain ahead of our competitors, we will divest ourselves of legacy capabilities that no To remain ahead of our competitors, we will divest ourselves of legacy capabilities that no
longer bring sufficient lethality to the fight. This includes divestment of experimental longer bring sufficient lethality to the fight. This includes divestment of experimental
Littoral Combat Ship hulls, legacy Cruisers, and older Dock Landing Ships. It also includes Littoral Combat Ship hulls, legacy Cruisers, and older Dock Landing Ships. It also includes
divesting non-core Navy missions like Aegis-ashore. Transferring shore-based Ballistic divesting non-core Navy missions like Aegis-ashore. Transferring shore-based Ballistic
Missile Defense sites to ground forces enables Sailors to focus on their core missions at Missile Defense sites to ground forces enables Sailors to focus on their core missions at
sea and frees up resources to increase our lethality.sea and frees up resources to increase our lethality.2423
A January 12, 2021, press report states A January 12, 2021, press report states
The chief of naval operation’s new call to focus on sea control and power projection could The chief of naval operation’s new call to focus on sea control and power projection could
lead the service to shed other non-core missions the Navy conducts today, such as manning lead the service to shed other non-core missions the Navy conducts today, such as manning
Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. Aegis Ashore missile defense sites.
The biggest problem is, no one else has agreed to take over that mission yet…. The biggest problem is, no one else has agreed to take over that mission yet….
… no one else operates Aegis systems today, and no one has yet agreed to take over Aegis … no one else operates Aegis systems today, and no one has yet agreed to take over Aegis
Ashore, Rear Adm. Paul Schlise, the director of surface warfare on the CNO’s staff Ashore, Rear Adm. Paul Schlise, the director of surface warfare on the CNO’s staff
(OPNAV N96), said today during a panel presentation at the Surface Navy Association’s (OPNAV N96), said today during a panel presentation at the Surface Navy Association’s
annual symposium. annual symposium.
~~“It’s been an ongoing discussion in the building here. Right now we’ve got the Aegis~~
~~Ashore sites in Europe, and there’s discussions about potentially more sites in other places.~~
~~The general discussion has been, this is not a core Navy mission. Sailors really belong at~~

2019 See, for example, Amy Forsythe, “U.S. Navy Aegis Ashore Base in Romania Hosts NATO Country Ambassadors,” See, for example, Amy Forsythe, “U.S. Navy Aegis Ashore Base in Romania Hosts NATO Country Ambassadors,”
Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), November 19, 2019; “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), November 19, 2019; “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense
Advocacy Alliance, accessed Advocacy Alliance, accessed ~~August 27, 2020; US~~ May 18, 2022, at https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/aegis-ashore/; US Naval Forces Europe-Africa, “Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Naval Forces Europe-Africa, “Aegis Ashore Missile Defense
System (AAMDS)-Romania Operationally Certified,” Defense-Aerospace.com, May 12, 2016. System (AAMDS)-Romania Operationally Certified,” Defense-Aerospace.com, May 12, 2016.
2120 See, for example, “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, accessed See, for example, “Aegis Ashore,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, accessed ~~August 27, 2020.~~
22May 18, 2022, at https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/aegis-ashore/. 21 See, for example, Rich Abott, “Aegis Ashore Poland Set To Be Operational By End Of 2022,” See, for example, Rich Abott, “Aegis Ashore Poland Set To Be Operational By End Of 2022,” Defense Daily, ,
November 22, 2021November 22, 2021; Jen Judson, “Construction of Aegis Ashore in Poland Nearing Completion,” Defense News, March 9, 2022. 22.
23 Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but
Annual Goals Unmet, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. , GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24.
2423 U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, CNO NavPlan, January 2021, p. 10. See also Richard R. Burgess, “CNO: , January 2021, p. 10. See also Richard R. Burgess, “CNO:
Divest Aegis Ashore Sites to Ground Forces,” Divest Aegis Ashore Sites to Ground Forces,” Seapower, January 11, 2021. , January 11, 2021.
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“It’s been an ongoing discussion in the building here. Right now we’ve got the Aegis Ashore sites in Europe, and there’s discussions about potentially more sites in other places. The general discussion has been, this is not a core Navy mission. Sailors really belong at sea serving in ships. And we’ve got a good number of highly qualified folks serving in sea serving in ships. And we’ve got a good number of highly qualified folks serving in
those sites, they’re going a great job,” he said. those sites, they’re going a great job,” he said.
“But I think what the CNO teed up is, is this a core Navy mission? I don’t think it is. And “But I think what the CNO teed up is, is this a core Navy mission? I don’t think it is. And
so there’s been some discussion with the Army. The Army, of course, has some missile so there’s been some discussion with the Army. The Army, of course, has some missile
defense capability and of course great soldiers that serve in those roles. But they don’t have defense capability and of course great soldiers that serve in those roles. But they don’t have
any experience with that [Aegis Combat System], the systems that have been installed or any experience with that [Aegis Combat System], the systems that have been installed or
are in progress in Romania and Poland. So that’s been a running discussion.” are in progress in Romania and Poland. So that’s been a running discussion.”
Schlise said the discussion is taking place at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level. Schlise said the discussion is taking place at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level.
Without any final decisions, though, the Navy could not shed Aegis Ashore spending in its Without any final decisions, though, the Navy could not shed Aegis Ashore spending in its
most recent budgeting work, the Fiscal Year 2022 request that will come out after the Biden most recent budgeting work, the Fiscal Year 2022 request that will come out after the Biden
administration comes in and can review it. administration comes in and can review it.
“For the purposes of this past budget cycle, it was just kind of tabled. So we’ll have to see “For the purposes of this past budget cycle, it was just kind of tabled. So we’ll have to see
where that discussion goes. As always, here in the building, it’s about money. So if that where that discussion goes. As always, here in the building, it’s about money. So if that
transition were to be considered and approved for moving forward, to transition it to transition were to be considered and approved for moving forward, to transition it to
another service, ‘who’s going to pay’ will of course be part of the discussion,” Schlise another service, ‘who’s going to pay’ will of course be part of the discussion,” Schlise
said.said.2524
Japan Planned and Later Canceled Two Sites
Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems that reportedly were to be Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems that reportedly were to be
located at Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) facilities in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and located at Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) facilities in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and
Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, and would be operated mainly by the GSDF (i.e., Japan’s Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, and would be operated mainly by the GSDF (i.e., Japan’s
army).army).2625 The two systems reportedly were to be equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar called The two systems reportedly were to be equipped with a new Lockheed-made radar called
the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) rather than the Raytheon-made SPY-6 AMDR that
is being installed on U.S. Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly were to go into operation by is being installed on U.S. Navy Flight III DDG-51s, and reportedly were to go into operation by
2023.2023.2726 On June 15, 2020, however, Japan announced that it had suspended implementation of its On June 15, 2020, however, Japan announced that it had suspended implementation of its
Aegis Ashore initiative due to cost growth and technical concerns.Aegis Ashore initiative due to cost growth and technical concerns.2827 On June 25, 2020, Japan On June 25, 2020, Japan
confirmed that it had canceled the plan for deploying the two Aegis Ashore sites.confirmed that it had canceled the plan for deploying the two Aegis Ashore sites.2928 A December 6, A December 6,
2020, press report stated 2020, press report stated

2524 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Wants to Shed Aegis Ashore Mission, But Army Still Hasn’t Agreed to Take It,” Megan Eckstein, “Navy Wants to Shed Aegis Ashore Mission, But Army Still Hasn’t Agreed to Take It,” USNI
News, January 12, 2021. , January 12, 2021.
2625 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Akita, Yamaguchi to Get Aegis Ashore/GSDF Involvement Expected to Strengthen Missile Yomiuri Shimbun, “Akita, Yamaguchi to Get Aegis Ashore/GSDF Involvement Expected to Strengthen Missile
Defense,” Defense,” The Japan News, November 11, 2017. See also Kyodo, “Japan Mulling News Missile Interceptor , November 11, 2017. See also Kyodo, “Japan Mulling News Missile Interceptor
Deployment to Guard Against North Korea,” Deployment to Guard Against North Korea,” South China Morning Post, November 11, 2017. , November 11, 2017.
2726 Anthony Capaccio, “Japan in Talks With U.S. on Buying Aegis Missile Defense,” Anthony Capaccio, “Japan in Talks With U.S. on Buying Aegis Missile Defense,” Bloomberg, November 7, 2017. , November 7, 2017.
2827 See, for example, Rich Abott, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Due To Technical And Cost Concerns,” See, for example, Rich Abott, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Due To Technical And Cost Concerns,” Defense Daily, ,
June 15, 2020; Sam LaGrone, “Japan Backing Away From Aegis Ashore,” June 15, 2020; Sam LaGrone, “Japan Backing Away From Aegis Ashore,” USNI News, June 15, 2020; Mari , June 15, 2020; Mari
Yamaguchi, “Japan to Scrap Costly Land-Based US Missile Defense System,” Yamaguchi, “Japan to Scrap Costly Land-Based US Missile Defense System,” Associated Press, June 15, 2020; Mike , June 15, 2020; Mike
Yeo, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Deployment, Pointing to Cost and Technical Issues,” Yeo, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Deployment, Pointing to Cost and Technical Issues,” Defense News, June 15, , June 15,
2020; Brad Glosserman, “Canceling Aegis Ashore Raises Problems—and Hopes,” 2020; Brad Glosserman, “Canceling Aegis Ashore Raises Problems—and Hopes,” Japan Times, June 17, 2020. , June 17, 2020.
Prior to the June 15, 2020, announcement, Japan had announced in early May that it would evaluate alternatives to the Prior to the June 15, 2020, announcement, Japan had announced in early May that it would evaluate alternatives to the
Akita Prefecture site due to strong local opposition to that site. (Masaya Kato, “Japan’s Missile Shield Deployment Akita Prefecture site due to strong local opposition to that site. (Masaya Kato, “Japan’s Missile Shield Deployment
Scuppered by Local Resistance,” Scuppered by Local Resistance,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 7, 2020.) , May 7, 2020.)
2928 Mari Yamaguchi (Associated Press), “Japan Confirms It’s Scrapping US Missile Defense System,” Mari Yamaguchi (Associated Press), “Japan Confirms It’s Scrapping US Missile Defense System,” Defense News, ,
June 25, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Japan Officially Ends Aegis Ashore Plans After National Security Council June 25, 2020; Megan Eckstein, “Japan Officially Ends Aegis Ashore Plans After National Security Council
Deliberations,” Deliberations,” USNI News, June 26, 2020. , June 26, 2020.
See also Grant Newsham “Abe’s Aegis Ashore Cancellation Doesn’t Add Up,” See also Grant Newsham “Abe’s Aegis Ashore Cancellation Doesn’t Add Up,” Asia Times, June 30, 2020; Lucy Craft,, June 30, 2020; Lucy Craft,
~~“Why Japan Scrapped a $4 Billion Missile Defense Purchase from the U.S.,” CBS News, July 2, 2020; Tim Kelly,~~
~~“Explainer: Strike Capability, Other Military Options on Table after Japan’s Aegis U-Turn,” Reuters, July 2, 2020;~~
~~Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan Is Canceling a U.S. Missile Defense System,” Foreign Policy, July 2, 2020; Bruce~~
~~Klingner, “Japan Undercuts Its Defense Against North Korean Missiles,” Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2020; Tim~~
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Japan will put new powerful Aegis radars on warships to upgrade its defences against Japan will put new powerful Aegis radars on warships to upgrade its defences against
possible ballistic missiles fired by North Korea after it cancelled plans to deploy them at possible ballistic missiles fired by North Korea after it cancelled plans to deploy them at
two ground-based stations, the Asahi newspaper reported. two ground-based stations, the Asahi newspaper reported.
Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s government is likely to approve the recommendation by Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s government is likely to approve the recommendation by
the country’s National Security Council before the end of the year, although any decision the country’s National Security Council before the end of the year, although any decision
on type of vessel or cost will be left until next year, the paper said, citing unidentified on type of vessel or cost will be left until next year, the paper said, citing unidentified
sources…. sources….
Deploying the new Aegis radars could cost twice as much and take up to three years longer Deploying the new Aegis radars could cost twice as much and take up to three years longer
to complete than the ground-based versions, which were expected cost of around $2 billion to complete than the ground-based versions, which were expected cost of around $2 billion
to build, a source with knowledge of the proposal told Reuters earlier…. to build, a source with knowledge of the proposal told Reuters earlier….
Fitted with Lockheed Martin Corp SPY-7 radars that will have at least three times the range Fitted with Lockheed Martin Corp SPY-7 radars that will have at least three times the range
of older Aegis systems deployed on Japanese navy destroyers, the upgrade will allow Japan of older Aegis systems deployed on Japanese navy destroyers, the upgrade will allow Japan
to use new interceptor missiles to target warheads in space fired by North Korea or other to use new interceptor missiles to target warheads in space fired by North Korea or other
potential foes, including China and Russia.potential foes, including China and Russia.3029
An August 19, 2021, press report stated An August 19, 2021, press report stated
A sea-based Aegis missile defense system could be the next program to be abandoned by A sea-based Aegis missile defense system could be the next program to be abandoned by
Tokyo. Tokyo.
The Japanese Defense Ministry does not plan to seek funds for it in the upcoming fiscal The Japanese Defense Ministry does not plan to seek funds for it in the upcoming fiscal
2022 budget. Citing government sources, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper said such a budget 2022 budget. Citing government sources, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper said such a budget
request will “likely be impossible over the next few years.”request will “likely be impossible over the next few years.”3130
Aegis BMD Development Philosophy and Flight Tests
The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, has been described as
following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of “build a little, following a development philosophy long held within the Aegis program office of “build a little,
test a little, learn a lot,” meaning that development is done in manageable steps, test a little, learn a lot,” meaning that development is done in manageable steps, ~~then~~with each step being tested and tested and
validated before moving on to the next step.validated before moving on to the next step.3231 “Why Japan Scrapped a $4 Billion Missile Defense Purchase from the U.S.,” CBS News, July 2, 2020; Tim Kelly, “Explainer: Strike Capability, Other Military Options on Table after Japan’s Aegis U-Turn,” Reuters, July 2, 2020; Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan Is Canceling a U.S. Missile Defense System,” Foreign Policy, July 2, 2020; Bruce Klingner, “Japan Undercuts Its Defense Against North Korean Missiles,” Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2020; Tim

Kelly and Yoshifumi Takemoto, “Exclusive: As Japan Weighs Missile-Defence Options, Raytheon Lobbies for Kelly and Yoshifumi Takemoto, “Exclusive: As Japan Weighs Missile-Defence Options, Raytheon Lobbies for
Lockheed’s $300 Million Radar Deal,” Reuters, July 30, 2020; Rieko Miki, “The Price of Peace: Why Japan Scrapped Lockheed’s $300 Million Radar Deal,” Reuters, July 30, 2020; Rieko Miki, “The Price of Peace: Why Japan Scrapped
a $4.2bn US Missile System,” a $4.2bn US Missile System,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 5, 2020; Loren Thompson, “Japan’s Rethink Of Aegis , August 5, 2020; Loren Thompson, “Japan’s Rethink Of Aegis
Ashore Could Tie Up Navy, Increase Costs And Cause Big Delays,” Ashore Could Tie Up Navy, Increase Costs And Cause Big Delays,” Forbes, August 11, 2020. , August 11, 2020.
On June 18, 2020, it was reported that the United States and Japan were in talks to address the technical issues Japan On June 18, 2020, it was reported that the United States and Japan were in talks to address the technical issues Japan
cited and explore potential paths forward for bolstering Japan’s ballistic missile defense capability. See Lara Seligman, cited and explore potential paths forward for bolstering Japan’s ballistic missile defense capability. See Lara Seligman,
“U.S. and Japan in Talks about ‘Alternatives’ to Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System,” “U.S. and Japan in Talks about ‘Alternatives’ to Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System,” Politico Pro, June 18, 2020; , June 18, 2020;
Idrees Ali, “U.S. in Talks with Japan after Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Suspension: Official,” Idrees Ali, “U.S. in Talks with Japan after Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Suspension: Official,” Reuters, June , June
18, 2020; Jason Sherman, “MDA Hopes to ‘Resolve’ Japan’s Aegis Ashore Concerns, Reinstate Project,” 18, 2020; Jason Sherman, “MDA Hopes to ‘Resolve’ Japan’s Aegis Ashore Concerns, Reinstate Project,” Inside
Defense, June 18, 2020; “U.S. Talking with Japan on Concerns over Halted Missile Defense Plan,” , June 18, 2020; “U.S. Talking with Japan on Concerns over Halted Missile Defense Plan,” Kyodo News, June , June
19, 2020. See also Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Eyes Offshore Options to Replace Aegis Defense System,” 19, 2020. See also Asahi Shimbun, “Japan Eyes Offshore Options to Replace Aegis Defense System,” Asahi Shimbun, ,
September 10, 2020. September 10, 2020.
3029 Reuters staff, “Japan to Put New Aegis Radars on Warships after Cancelling Ground Stations: Asahi,” Reuters staff, “Japan to Put New Aegis Radars on Warships after Cancelling Ground Stations: Asahi,” Reuters, ,
December 6, 2020. See also Agence France-Presse, “Japan Weighs Ships For Aegis Missile Defence System,” December 6, 2020. See also Agence France-Presse, “Japan Weighs Ships For Aegis Missile Defence System,”
Barron’s, December 9, 2020; Kyodo, “Cabinet Set to Approve Destroyers as Alternative to Aegis Ashore,” , December 9, 2020; Kyodo, “Cabinet Set to Approve Destroyers as Alternative to Aegis Ashore,” Japan
Times, November 28, 2020. , November 28, 2020.
3130 Chen Chuanren, “Japan’s Sea-Based Aegis System Faces Ax,” Chen Chuanren, “Japan’s Sea-Based Aegis System Faces Ax,” Aviation Week Network, August 19, 2021. , August 19, 2021.
3231 See, for example, “Aegis BMD: “Build a Little, Test a Little, Learn a Lot,” USNI blog, March 15, 2010, accessed See, for example, “Aegis BMD: “Build a Little, Test a Little, Learn a Lot,” USNI blog, March 15, 2010, accessed
~~September 11, 2013~~May 18, 2022, at http://blog.usni.org/2010/03/15/aegis-bmd-build-a-little-test-a-little-learn-a-lot, and “Aegis , at http://blog.usni.org/2010/03/15/aegis-bmd-build-a-little-test-a-little-learn-a-lot, and “Aegis
~~Ballistic Missile Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall Institute, RADM Alan~~
~~B. Hicks, USN, Aegis BMD Program Director, August 3, 2009, slide 16 of 20, entitled “Some of our Philosophies In a~~
~~Nutshell (1 of 2),” accessed August 27, 2020, at https://web.archive.org/web/20100706133017/https:/~~
~~www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/743.pdf.~~
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An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020
stated the following about testing of the Aegis BMD system: stated the following about testing of the Aegis BMD system:
In fiscal year 2020, the Aegis BMD program did not conduct any of the six planned flight In fiscal year 2020, the Aegis BMD program did not conduct any of the six planned flight
tests, deleting one and delaying the remaining five. Most notably, a major operational flight tests, deleting one and delaying the remaining five. Most notably, a major operational flight
test—FTO-03—was deleted, leaving the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor to enter initial test—FTO-03—was deleted, leaving the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor to enter initial
production with a single operational flight test. Some flight tests were initially delayed due production with a single operational flight test. Some flight tests were initially delayed due
to range availability and higher priority flights tests (such as FEX-01) and delays were then to range availability and higher priority flights tests (such as FEX-01) and delays were then
exacerbated by pandemic-driven travel restrictions. A congressionally mandated flight exacerbated by pandemic-driven travel restrictions. A congressionally mandated flight
test—FTM-44—pitting an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor against a simple ICBM, was test—FTM-44—pitting an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor against a simple ICBM, was
delayed, but executed in November 2020. delayed, but executed in November 2020.
The Aegis BMD program participated in three of five planned ground tests in fiscal year The Aegis BMD program participated in three of five planned ground tests in fiscal year
2020. The two ground tests were delayed due to the pandemic and the unavailability of the 2020. The two ground tests were delayed due to the pandemic and the unavailability of the
Poland Aegis Ashore site, respectively. Poland Aegis Ashore site, respectively.
All seven cybersecurity tests scheduled for fiscal year 2020 were consolidated into a single All seven cybersecurity tests scheduled for fiscal year 2020 were consolidated into a single
test, which was subsequently delayed.test, which was subsequently delayed.3332
For a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since 2002, For a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since 2002, see Table A-1 iin Appendix.
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program
Japan
Eight BMD-Capable Aegis Destroyers
Japan operates eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers—the eighth was commissioned into service Japan operates eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers—the eighth was commissioned into service
in March 2021.in March 2021.3433 Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in some of the flight tests Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have participated in some of the flight tests
of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (seof the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor (see Table A-1 iin Appendix).
Cooperative Development of SM-3 Block IIA Missile
As mentioned earlier, Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block IIA missile. Japan Japan cooperated with the United States on development the SM-3 Block IIA missile. Japan
developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of those developed certain technologies for the missile, and paid for the development of those
technologies, reducing the missile’s development costs for the United States. A July 6, 2018, technologies, reducing the missile’s development costs for the United States. A July 6, 2018,
press report states that “the U.S. and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation radar press report states that “the U.S. and Japan are looking to jointly develop next-generation radar
technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection range of technology that would use Japanese semiconductors to more than double the detection range of
the Aegis missile defense system.”the Aegis missile defense system.”35
~~Two Aegis Ashore Sites (Canceled)~~
~~As mentioned earlier, Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems, but~~
~~announced in June 2020 that it had canceled the plan.~~

3334 Missile Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall Institute, RADM Alan B. Hicks, USN, Aegis BMD Program Director, August 3, 2009, slide 16 of 20, entitled “Some of our Philosophies In a Nutshell (1 of 2),” accessed May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/web/20100706133017/https:/www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/743.pdf. 32 Government Accountability Office, Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but
Annual Goals Unmet, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. , GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24.
3433 See, for example, Xavier Vavasseur, “Japan Commissions New Maya-Class AEGIS Destroyer JS Haguro はぐろ See, for example, Xavier Vavasseur, “Japan Commissions New Maya-Class AEGIS Destroyer JS Haguro はぐろ
DDG-180,” DDG-180,” Naval News, March 19, 2021; Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan Commissions 8th Aegis Destroyer Haguro,” , March 19, 2021; Yomiuri Shimbun, “Japan Commissions 8th Aegis Destroyer Haguro,” Japan
News, March 20, 2021. , March 20, 2021.
3534 Nikkei staff writers, “US Taps Japan Radar Tech to Double Missile Defense Range,” Nikkei staff writers, “US Taps Japan Radar Tech to Double Missile Defense Range,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 6, , July 6,
2018. 2018.
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Two Aegis Ashore Sites (Canceled) As mentioned earlier, Japan had planned to procure and operate two Aegis Ashore systems, but announced in June 2020 that it had canceled the plan. South Korea
An October 12, 2018, press report states that “the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-An October 12, 2018, press report states that “the South Korean military has decided to buy ship-
based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, a top based SM-3 interceptors to thwart potential ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, a top
commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct. 12.”commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed Oct. 12.”3635
Other Countries
Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD
system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia. Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are Spain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia. Spain, South Korea, and Australia either operate, are
building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other countries operate destroyers and frigates building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other countries operate destroyers and frigates
with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations. with different combat systems that may have potential for contributing to BMD operations.
~~FY2022~~FY2023-FY2027 MDA Procurement and R&D Funding
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for additional funding for Aegis BMD-related efforts. Table 1 shows requested (FY2023) and projected (FY2024-FY2027) MDA procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts under MDA’s FY2023 budget submission. Table 1. FY2023-FY2027~~BMD-related efforts. Table 1 shows requested FY2022 MDA procurement~~
~~and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts. (DOD’s FY2022 budget~~
~~submission does not include line-item funding figures for the following four fiscal years.)~~
~~Research and development funding in the table for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis~~
~~Ashore sites. MDA’s budget also includes additional funding not shown in the table for~~
~~operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD~~
~~program.~~
~~Table 1. FY2021-FY2025~~ MDA Procurement and
R&D Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding) (In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
~~FY22~~
FY23
FY24
FY25
FY26 FY27

(req.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
(proj.)
Procurement

Aegis BMD (line Aegis BMD (line ~~31)~~
~~334.6~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~32) 402.2 378.7 362.8 496.9 506.8
(SM-3 Block IB missile quantity)
(4047)
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~(27) (24) (43) (43)
Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line ~~32)~~
~~17.5~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~33) 0 0 0 0 0
SM-3 Block IIA (line SM-3 Block IIA (line ~~34)~~
~~295.3~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~35) 338.0 458.2 479.2 460.5 457.9
(SM-3 Block IIA missile quantity)
(810)
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~(12) (12) (12) (12)
Aegis Ashore Phase III (line Aegis Ashore Phase III (line ~~38)~~
~~25.9~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~39) 30.1 2.4 1.0 0 0
Aegis BMD hardware and software (line Aegis BMD hardware and software (line ~~40)~~
~~81.8~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~41) 78.2 115.8 116.0 61.7 32.7
SUBTOTAL Procurement
~~755.1~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~848.5 955.1 959.0 1,019.1 997.4
Research and development

Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line ~~86)~~
~~732.5~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~83) 600.1 658.8 574.0 570.0 580.5
Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line ~~118)~~
~~117.1~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~113) 182.8 173.5 159.1 203.9 187.5
Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line ~~120)~~
~~43.2~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~115) 27.7 26.9 26.0 26.8 27.4
SUBTOTAL RDT&E
~~892.8~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~810.6 859.2 759.1 800.7 795.4 TOTAL 1,659.1 1,814.3 1,718.1 1,819.8 1,792.8
~~TOTAL~~
~~1,647.9~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~n/a~~
~~Source:~~ ~~Table prepared by CRS based on FY2022 MDA budget submission.~~

3635 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea to Buy Ship-Based Interceptors to Counter Ballistic Missile Threats,” Jeff Jeong, “South Korea to Buy Ship-Based Interceptors to Counter Ballistic Missile Threats,” Defense News, ,
October 12, 2018. October 12, 2018.
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Note: “n/a” means not available—DOD’s FY2022 budget submission does not include line-item funding figures
~~for FY2023-FY2026~~Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2023 MDA budget submission. Research and development funding in the table for the land-based SM-3 is funding for Aegis Ashore sites. MDA’s budget also includes additional funding not shown in the table for operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) for the Aegis BMD program. .
Issues for Congress
Annual Funding Request
One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and
research and development funding requests for the program. In considering this issue, Congress research and development funding requests for the program. In considering this issue, Congress
may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for the may consider various factors, including whether the work that MDA is proposing to fund for the
fiscal year in question is properly scoped and scheduled, and accurately priced. fiscal year in question is properly scoped and scheduled, and accurately priced.
~~COVID-19 Impact~~Estimating and Reporting Costs
Another issue for Congress concerns the Another issue for Congress concerns the ~~impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the execution of~~
~~Aegis BMD program efforts. A DOD point paper on COVID-19 impacts to DOD acquisition~~
~~programs from March 15, 2020, through June 20, 2020, stated that the impacts included, among~~
~~other things, “Aegis Program delays: SM-3 Block IIA production deliveries; Aegis Ashore Poland~~
~~construction (further delays); and Aegis Testing delays for Flight Test Missile (FTM)-44 (Aegis),~~
~~FTM-31, and FTM-33.”37 An April 2021 GAO report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile~~
~~defense systems in FY2020 stated the following:~~
~~Among the Aegis BMD programs, COVID-19 impacts have largely been limited to test~~
~~delays. SM-3 Block IB and IIA program officials reported no direct impact to their~~
~~production schedules, although in the case of the SM-3 Block IIA there have been impacts~~
~~on certain suppliers. AWS program officials reported that some ship-board software~~
~~upgrades would be delayed due to travel restrictions and isolation requirements.~~
~~MDA officials stated that neither the U.S. nor Polish governments imposed any COVID-~~
~~19 restrictions that would have limited construction activities at the Aegis Ashore site in~~
~~Poland.38~~
~~Potential for Intercepting ICBMs~~
~~Another issue for Congress is what role, if any,~~adequacy of MDA’s cost estimating and its reporting of costs. A February 2022 GAO report on MDA’s cost estimating and reporting of costs for missile defense programs, including the Aegis BMD program, states: The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is continuing efforts to deliver systems to the warfighter that will protect against enemy missiles. However, shortfalls persist with MDA’s program and flight test cost estimates and reporting. Program cost estimates. MDA continues to omit the military services’ operations and sustainment costs from the program life-cycle cost estimates.... By omitting these costs, MDA limits decision-makers’ insight into the full financial commitments needed for affordability and funding determinations.... Flight test cost estimates. Accuracy issues linger with MDA’s flight test cost estimates that could skew the agency’s annual $1.3 billion [flight test] funding request, such as not being regularly updated with actual costs. However, MDA is taking steps to improve these cost estimates by using a new cost model, among other things.... Program cost reporting. MDA continues to adjust program baselines without clear traceability over time. MDA also forgoes recurrent comparisons to the original baseline. Such adjustments and omissions impede decision-makers’ awareness of each program’s cost performance and total system cost.... Flight test cost reporting. Congress required MDA to report on flight test costs, but we found the information lacking due to the agency’s reporting methodology. MDA only accounted for about $1.3 billion of at least $3.5 billion in funding the agency requested for flight testing between March 2017 and September 2020. Moreover, the reporting requirement ended in December 2021. Without further reporting on complete flight test costs, Congress does not have information needed to facilitate holding the agency accountable for its spending.36 36 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Addressing Cost Estimating and Reporting Shortfalls Could Improve Insight into Full Costs of Programs and Flight Tests, GAO-22-104344, February 2022, highlights page (PDF page 2 of 58). Congressional Research Service 12 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program Potential for Intercepting ICBMs Another issue for Congress is what role the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the Aegis BMD program should play in defending
the U.S. homeland against attack from ICBMs. With the advent of the SM-3 Block IIA the U.S. homeland against attack from ICBMs. With the advent of the SM-3 Block IIA
interceptor, DOD is evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain interceptor, DOD is evaluating the potential for the Aegis BMD system to intercept certain
ICBMs. Section 1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 ICBMs. Section 1680 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91
of December 12, 2017) directed DOD to “conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if of December 12, 2017) directed DOD to “conduct a test to evaluate and demonstrate, if
technologically feasible, the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat technologically feasible, the capability to defeat a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat
using the standard missile 3 block IIA missile interceptor.” DOD’s January 2019 missile defense using the standard missile 3 block IIA missile interceptor.” DOD’s January 2019 missile defense
review report stated the following: review report stated the following:
The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense
architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to existing GBIs architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to existing GBIs
[ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland. [ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland.

~~37 Department of Defense, “FY 2020 DoD COVID-19 Response and Stimulus & COVID-19 Recovery Acquisition~~
~~Contract Cost Overrun,” undated point paper, 4 pp., posted at Inside Defense on August 6, 2020. For additional~~
~~discussion of COVID-19 impacts to Navy programs, see CRS Report RL32665,~~ ~~Navy Force Structure and~~
~~Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~
~~38 Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but~~
~~Annual Goals Unmet, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 23.~~
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This interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the This interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the
burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U.S. homeland against burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U.S. homeland against
evolving rogue states’ long-range missile capabilities. evolving rogue states’ long-range missile capabilities.
Congress has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an Congress has directed DoD to examine the feasibility of the SM-3 Blk IIA against an
ICBM-class target. MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020. Due to the ICBM-class target. MDA will test this SM-3 Blk IIA capability in 2020. Due to the
mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or mobility of sea-based assets, this new underlay capability will be surged in a crisis or
conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland. Land-based sites conflict to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland. Land-based sites
in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued.in the United States with this SM-3 Blk IIA missile could also be pursued.3937
On November 16, 2020, MDA announced that the congressionally directed ICBM-intercept flight On November 16, 2020, MDA announced that the congressionally directed ICBM-intercept flight
test, called FTM-44, had been conducted on that date and had resulted in a successful intercept of test, called FTM-44, had been conducted on that date and had resulted in a successful intercept of
the ICBM-representative target. MDA stated that “FTM-44, originally scheduled for May 2020, the ICBM-representative target. MDA stated that “FTM-44, originally scheduled for May 2020,
was delayed due to restrictions in personnel and equipment movement intended to reduce the was delayed due to restrictions in personnel and equipment movement intended to reduce the
spread of COVID-19. FTM-44 satisfies a Congressional mandate to evaluate the feasibility of the spread of COVID-19. FTM-44 satisfies a Congressional mandate to evaluate the feasibility of the
SM-3 Block IIA missile’s capability to defeat an ICBM threat before the end of 2020.”SM-3 Block IIA missile’s capability to defeat an ICBM threat before the end of 2020.”4038 A A
November 17, 2020, press report about the flight test stated that “the unarmed ICBM was a November 17, 2020, press report about the flight test stated that “the unarmed ICBM was a
replica of a target flown against the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system during a March replica of a target flown against the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system during a March
2019 flight test that featured a salvo launch of a pair of interceptors.”2019 flight test that featured a salvo launch of a pair of interceptors.”4139 An April 2021 GAO An April 2021 GAO
report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following: report on deliveries and testing of U.S. missile defense systems in FY2020 stated the following:
MDA’s effort to include the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a new “layered” homeland MDA’s effort to include the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a new “layered” homeland
defense against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats targeting the U.S. could defense against intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats targeting the U.S. could
introduce considerable cost, schedule, and performance uncertainty to a program that has introduce considerable cost, schedule, and performance uncertainty to a program that has
just entered initial production. The GMD weapon system currently provides defense just entered initial production. The GMD weapon system currently provides defense
against ICBMs, but this new effort would add the SM-3 Block IIA and THAAD weapon against ICBMs, but this new effort would add the SM-3 Block IIA and THAAD weapon
system as layers underneath that provided by GMD. For further details on the GMD and system as layers underneath that provided by GMD. For further details on the GMD and
THAAD weapon systems see their respective appendixes. THAAD weapon systems see their respective appendixes.
ICBM intercepts are more challenging than the IRBM intercepts for which the SM-3 IIA ICBM intercepts are more challenging than the IRBM intercepts for which the SM-3 IIA
was originally designed. MDA’s most recent attempt to createwas originally designed. MDA’s most recent attempt to create a system for intercepting a system for intercepting
ICBMs, known as the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), re-used some parts from the SM-3 ICBMs, known as the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), re-used some parts from the SM-3
Block IIA. DOD cancelled the RKV before it could complete development after significant Block IIA. DOD cancelled the RKV before it could complete development after significant
cost and schedule overruns and questions about the ability of the design to overcome cost and schedule overruns and questions about the ability of the design to overcome
specific performance risks. Parts re-used from the SM-3 Block IIA were implicated in some specific performance risks. Parts re-used from the SM-3 Block IIA were implicated in some
~~of the RKV’s performance shortfalls. Even so, planning for an anti-ICBM capability for~~
~~the SM-3 Block IIA continued during and even after the RKV’s termination.~~
~~Achieving such a capability will require surmounting several challenges. According to~~
~~MDA, during the November 2020 flight test named FTM-44, the SM-3 Block IIA struck a~~
~~simple ICBM target. This was not an operational test, however, and it was executed under~~
~~highly favorable conditions. More development work is needed for the SM-3 Block IIA to~~
~~support a layered homeland defense capability. MDA documents show that the agency now~~
~~plans to develop and procure an upgraded version of the SM-3 Block IIA for the specific~~
~~purpose of fulfilling the homeland defense mission.42~~

39 37 Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review 2019, released January 17, 2019, p. 55. David Axe, “The U.S. 19, released January 17, 2019, p. 55. David Axe, “The U.S.
Navy’s New Missile Defense Is a Bad Idea,” Navy’s New Missile Defense Is a Bad Idea,” National Interest, January 17, 2019. , January 17, 2019.
4038 Missile Defense Agency News release 20NEWS-0003, “U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test Missile Defense Agency News release 20NEWS-0003, “U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test
Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” November 16, 2020. Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” November 16, 2020.
4139 Jason Sherman, “SM-3 Block IIA Intercepts ICBM Target, Validating Potential for Homeland Defense Jason Sherman, “SM-3 Block IIA Intercepts ICBM Target, Validating Potential for Homeland Defense
‘Underlayer,’” ‘Underlayer,’” Inside Defense, November 17, 2020. , November 17, 2020.
~~42 Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but~~
~~Annual Goals Unmet, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. See also Jen Judson, “Watchdog Expresses Concern over Using~~
~~US Navy Interceptor for Homeland Missile Defense,” Defense News, April 29, 2021.~~
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Congressional Research Service 13 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program of the RKV’s performance shortfalls. Even so, planning for an anti-ICBM capability for the SM-3 Block IIA continued during and even after the RKV’s termination. Achieving such a capability will require surmounting several challenges. According to MDA, during the November 2020 flight test named FTM-44, the SM-3 Block IIA struck a simple ICBM target. This was not an operational test, however, and it was executed under highly favorable conditions. More development work is needed for the SM-3 Block IIA to support a layered homeland defense capability. MDA documents show that the agency now plans to develop and procure an upgraded version of the SM-3 Block IIA for the specific purpose of fulfilling the homeland defense mission.40
A May 13, 2021, press report stated A May 13, 2021, press report stated
The Missile Defense Agency proved that a Navy destroyer with a Standard Missile-3 Block The Missile Defense Agency proved that a Navy destroyer with a Standard Missile-3 Block
IIA can stop a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat, but more work remains to IIA can stop a simple intercontinental ballistic missile threat, but more work remains to
prove whether this combination could contribute to homeland defense, the MDA director prove whether this combination could contribute to homeland defense, the MDA director
said Wednesday [May 12]. said Wednesday [May 12].
Vice Adm. Jon Hill described the Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM) 44, which took Vice Adm. Jon Hill described the Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM) 44, which took
place in the Pacific in November after pandemic-related delays earlier in the year: A simple place in the Pacific in November after pandemic-related delays earlier in the year: A simple
ICBM target was launched from the Army’s Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test ICBM target was launched from the Army’s Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test
Site on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Satellites detected the launch, and a Site on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Satellites detected the launch, and a
slew of satellites and sensors, including on the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii, slew of satellites and sensors, including on the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii,
tracked the target. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John Finn (DDG-113), positioned tracked the target. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John Finn (DDG-113), positioned
hundreds of miles east of Hawaii, launched an SM-3 Block IIA missile from its deck based hundreds of miles east of Hawaii, launched an SM-3 Block IIA missile from its deck based
on its best fire control solution at the time, and the missile itself maneuvered to successfully on its best fire control solution at the time, and the missile itself maneuvered to successfully
hit the target as it received more information in flight. hit the target as it received more information in flight.
The goal of the test, Hill said while speaking at the annual McAleese FY 2022 Defense The goal of the test, Hill said while speaking at the annual McAleese FY 2022 Defense
Programs Conference, was “to prove that we have the ability to leverage the robustness in Programs Conference, was “to prove that we have the ability to leverage the robustness in
the [Aegis]the [Aegis] ~~program, so that was really the first test just to see if it’s feasible.~~ program, so that was really the first test just to see if it’s feasible. And we And we
learned a lot.” learned a lot.”
Hill said the crew of John Finn, with limited data due to limited sensor coverage across the Hill said the crew of John Finn, with limited data due to limited sensor coverage across the
vast Pacific, maneuvered the ship to get the highest probability of kill. vast Pacific, maneuvered the ship to get the highest probability of kill.
“It maneuvered, shot the missile; lots of uncertainty because of lack of sensor coverage for “It maneuvered, shot the missile; lots of uncertainty because of lack of sensor coverage for
such a long-range flight where we were doing the exercise. So what we actually saw was a such a long-range flight where we were doing the exercise. So what we actually saw was a
really high divert [from the missile]. So kind of two walkaways from that first test, which really high divert [from the missile]. So kind of two walkaways from that first test, which
is why I think it was really important, was that it was the longest propagated error or is why I think it was really important, was that it was the longest propagated error or
uncertainty that we’ve ever seen in any test. And then we had the highest divert—that uncertainty that we’ve ever seen in any test. And then we had the highest divert—that
meant the [SM-3 IIA] missile was maneuvering to actually take it out, and it still took it meant the [SM-3 IIA] missile was maneuvering to actually take it out, and it still took it
out, which is really great,” Hill continued. out, which is really great,” Hill continued.
“In terms of feasibility, did we accomplish the mission? Absolutely. Every test objective “In terms of feasibility, did we accomplish the mission? Absolutely. Every test objective
achieved in November.” achieved in November.”
Hill was asked about an April Government Accountability Office report that cited concerns Hill was asked about an April Government Accountability Office report that cited concerns
about the Aegis Combat System/SM-3 IIA pairing for the homeland defense mission—as about the Aegis Combat System/SM-3 IIA pairing for the homeland defense mission—as
opposed to the regional defense mission it was built for, to protect a high-value asset such opposed to the regional defense mission it was built for, to protect a high-value asset such
as an aircraft carrier from an intermediate-range missile—and whether the simple ICBM as an aircraft carrier from an intermediate-range missile—and whether the simple ICBM
target used in the November test was representative of the real world. target used in the November test was representative of the real world.
“So what’s next? What’s next is to go against a more complex intercontinental ballistic “So what’s next? What’s next is to go against a more complex intercontinental ballistic
missile threat, and maybe even change the scenario. This scenario was a defense of Hawaii missile threat, and maybe even change the scenario. This scenario was a defense of Hawaii
scenario against a rogue nation—you guess which one out there in the Pacific—and in the scenario against a rogue nation—you guess which one out there in the Pacific—and in the
40 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but Annual Goals Unmet, GAO 21-314, April 2021, p. 24. See also Jen Judson, “Watchdog Expresses Concern over Using US Navy Interceptor for Homeland Missile Defense,” Defense News, April 29, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program future we’re going to go to a more complex [threat], and that’s within the next couple future we’re going to go to a more complex [threat], and that’s within the next couple
years,” he said. years,” he said.
“So we’re still analyzing data from November, and then we’re going to make upgrades and “So we’re still analyzing data from November, and then we’re going to make upgrades and
changes to the combat system, and we’ll make changes to the missile in terms of threat set changes to the combat system, and we’ll make changes to the missile in terms of threat set
to take on a higher end class threat.” to take on a higher end class threat.”
MDA and the military services would have to further integrate systems together to make MDA and the military services would have to further integrate systems together to make
this a credible layer in the homeland defense network, Hill said. During the November test, this a credible layer in the homeland defense network, Hill said. During the November test,
the MDA commanded and controlled the event from the Missile Defense Interoperability the MDA commanded and controlled the event from the Missile Defense Interoperability
and Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colo., using the Command and Control Battle and Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colo., using the Command and Control Battle
Management and Communication System (C2BMC) to receive satellite and sensor data Management and Communication System (C2BMC) to receive satellite and sensor data
and feed it to John Finn, which fired its missile on remote without having access to the and feed it to John Finn, which fired its missile on remote without having access to the
sensor data itself. While that worked in a controlled environment, for a permanent sensor data itself. While that worked in a controlled environment, for a permanent
homeland defense mission the ship would need to be better integrated into U.S. Northern homeland defense mission the ship would need to be better integrated into U.S. Northern
Command’s network to fully share information and targeting data. Command’s network to fully share information and targeting data.
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Hill said that Aegis has been integrated to operate with the Terminal High Altitude Area Hill said that Aegis has been integrated to operate with the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense system, and THAAD has been integrated with the Patriot missile defense system, Defense system, and THAAD has been integrated with the Patriot missile defense system,
but MDA hasn’t integrated all the regional defense systems with homeland defense but MDA hasn’t integrated all the regional defense systems with homeland defense
systems. systems.
Beyond the actual integration and engineering work, Hill added that there was a policy Beyond the actual integration and engineering work, Hill added that there was a policy
question to answer, too. question to answer, too.
“Do we want ships in that role of being off the West Coast … defending against ICBMs as “Do we want ships in that role of being off the West Coast … defending against ICBMs as
a layer to the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense? That’s an incredible conversation, a layer to the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense? That’s an incredible conversation,
we’re having that now, and it’s hard to predict where it will go.” we’re having that now, and it’s hard to predict where it will go.”
Asked on Thursday during the Naval Postgraduate School’s acquisition research Asked on Thursday during the Naval Postgraduate School’s acquisition research
symposium if the Navy has the capacity and appetite to use destroyers for homeland symposium if the Navy has the capacity and appetite to use destroyers for homeland
defense, Hill said much of it comes down to what ships are available for the mission. defense, Hill said much of it comes down to what ships are available for the mission.
“I think if you asked Gen. [Glen] VanHerck from NORTHCOM about his confidence in “I think if you asked Gen. [Glen] VanHerck from NORTHCOM about his confidence in
defending the nation today, the answer would be confident. But as the threat evolves, right, defending the nation today, the answer would be confident. But as the threat evolves, right,
you start to see a little change in that view. And so it’s been viewed for a while that the you start to see a little change in that view. And so it’s been viewed for a while that the
Navy can play a role in that area, but it becomes an asset problem,” Hill said. “There are Navy can play a role in that area, but it becomes an asset problem,” Hill said. “There are
only so many ships we have up there. And they’re multi-mission ships, and they have a lot only so many ships we have up there. And they’re multi-mission ships, and they have a lot
of roles around the globe to execute.”of roles around the globe to execute.”4341
A June 22, 2021, press report stated A June 22, 2021, press report stated
The Pentagon’s No. 2 official has ordered 11 missile interceptors transferred from research The Pentagon’s No. 2 official has ordered 11 missile interceptors transferred from research
and development for possible deployment on Navy ships in the Pacific or European regions and development for possible deployment on Navy ships in the Pacific or European regions
after a test in November indicated they could stop an intercontinental ballistic missile. after a test in November indicated they could stop an intercontinental ballistic missile.
In the test, the USS John Finn intercepted a mock ICBM intended to simulate one that In the test, the USS John Finn intercepted a mock ICBM intended to simulate one that
could be launched at Hawaii by North Korea. The destroyer, operating near Hawaii, fired could be launched at Hawaii by North Korea. The destroyer, operating near Hawaii, fired
off one of the Standard Missile-3 model Block IIA interceptors built by Raytheon off one of the Standard Missile-3 model Block IIA interceptors built by Raytheon
Technologies Corp. at the target launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Technologies Corp. at the target launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.
Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks informed Congress May 27 of her rationale for Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks informed Congress May 27 of her rationale for
transferring the interceptors, although she didn’t disclose it publicly. transferring the interceptors, although she didn’t disclose it publicly.
“The missiles have conducted successful intercept tests and their deployment is in the “The missiles have conducted successful intercept tests and their deployment is in the
important interest of our national security,” Hicks spokesman Jamal Brown said in an email important interest of our national security,” Hicks spokesman Jamal Brown said in an email
41 Megan Eckstein, “MDA: Test of DDG, Standard Missile-3 IIA a Good Start, But More Work Needed on Homeland Defense Mission,” USNI News, May 13, 2021. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Planning Second SM-3 Block IIA Flight Test Against ICBM Target; New Development and Upgraded Interceptor Needed,” Inside Defense, May 12, 2021; Rich Abott, “MDA Planning Second Test of SM-3 IIA Against ICBM Target,” Defense Daily, May 17, 2021. Congressional Research Service 15 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program this month. The transfer to the Navy marks the first major missile defense initiative of the this month. The transfer to the Navy marks the first major missile defense initiative of the
Biden administration. Biden administration.
Although the Navy’s Aegis combat system, which launched the missile, and the interceptor Although the Navy’s Aegis combat system, which launched the missile, and the interceptor
“were not designed to defeat an ICBM-class target, this test demonstrated some potential “were not designed to defeat an ICBM-class target, this test demonstrated some potential
limited capability,” Vice Admiral Jon Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, said in limited capability,” Vice Admiral Jon Hill, director of the Missile Defense Agency, said in
testimony to Congress last week.testimony to Congress last week.4442
Required vs. Available Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
Another potential issue for Congress concerns required Another potential issue for Congress concerns required ~~numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships~~
versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships. Some observers versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships. Some observers ~~are concerned~~have expressed concern about the about the
potential operational potential operational implications of a shortfall in the available number of BMD-capable relative ~~implications of a shortfall in the available number of BMD-capable relative~~

~~43 Megan Eckstein, “MDA: Test of DDG, Standard Missile-3 IIA a Good Start, But More Work Needed on Homeland~~
~~Defense Mission,” USNI News, May 13, 2021. See also Jason Sherman, “MDA Planning Second SM-3 Block IIA~~
~~Flight Test Against ICBM Target; New Development and Upgraded Interceptor Needed,” Inside Defense, May 12,~~
~~2021; Rich Abott, “MDA Planning Second Test of SM-3 IIA Against ICBM Target,” Defense Daily, May 17, 2021.~~
~~44 Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Ships Close to Getting Interceptors That Could Stop an ICBM,” Bloomberg, June 22,~~
~~2021.~~
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to the required number. Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August to the required number. Regarding the required number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, an August
15, 2018, Navy information paper states the following: 15, 2018, Navy information paper states the following:
The [Navy’s] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA] The [Navy’s] 2016 Force Structure Assessment [FSA]4543 sets the requirement [for BMD- sets the requirement [for BMD-
capable ships] at 54 BMD-capable ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant capable ships] at 54 BMD-capable ships, as part of the 104 large surface combatant
requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and requirement, to meet Navy unique requirements to support defense of the sea base and
limited expeditionary land base sites…. limited expeditionary land base sites….
The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as The minimum requirement for 54 BMD ships is based on the Navy unique requirement as
follows. It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests for follows. It accepts risk in the sourcing of combatant commander (CCDR) requests for
defense of land. defense of land.
- 30 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups - 30 to meet CVN escort demand for rotational deployment of the carrier strike groups
- 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand - 11 INCONUS for independent BMD deployment demand
- 9 in forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operational timelines in - 9 in forward deployed naval forces (FDNF) Japan to meet operational timelines in
USINDOPACOM USINDOPACOM
- 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM. - 4 in FDNF Europe for rotational deployment in EUCOM.4644
Burden of BMD Mission on U.S. Navy Aegis Ships
A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the A related potential issue for Congress is the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the
Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to Navy’s fleet of Aegis ships, particularly since performing BMD patrols requires those ships to
operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U.S. Navy missions, operate in geographic locations that may be unsuitable for performing other U.S. Navy missions,
and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy
Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites. A June 16, 2018, press report states the Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites. A June 16, 2018, press report states the
following: following:
The U.S. Navy’s top officer wants to end standing ballistic missile The U.S. Navy’s top officer wants to end standing ballistic missile defense patrols and defense patrols and
transfer the mission to shore-based assets. transfer the mission to shore-based assets.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12 Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said in no uncertain terms on June 12
that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has that he wants the Navy off the tether of ballistic missile defense patrols, a mission that has
~~put a growing strain on the Navy’s hard-worn surface combatants, and the duty~~ 42 Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Ships Close to Getting Interceptors That Could Stop an ICBM,” Bloomberg, June 22, 2021. 43 The FSA is the Navy’s analysis, performed every few years, that establishes the Navy’s ship force structure requirements. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 44 Navy information paper dated August 15, 2018, entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capable Ships requirement,” provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CBO and CRS on August 15, 2018. The information paper was requested by CBO. Congressional Research Service 16 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program put a growing strain on the Navy’s hard-worn surface combatants, and the duty shifted shifted
towards more shore-based infrastructure. towards more shore-based infrastructure.
“Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers “Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers
and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Richardson said and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Richardson said
during his address at the U.S. Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum. “And if you during his address at the U.S. Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum. “And if you
know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant. know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant.
“You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile.
So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little
box, defending land.” box, defending land.”
Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long Richardson continued, saying the Navy could be used in emergencies but that in the long
term the problem demands a different solution. term the problem demands a different solution.
“It’s a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile “It’s a pretty good capability and if there is an emergent need to provide ballistic missile
defense, we’re there,” he said. “But 10 years down the road, it’s time to build something defense, we’re there,” he said. “But 10 years down the road, it’s time to build something

~~45 The FSA is the Navy’s analysis, performed every few years, that establishes the Navy’s ship force structure~~
~~requirements. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32665,~~ ~~Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:~~
~~Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~
~~46 Navy information paper dated August 15, 2018, entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Capable Ships~~
~~requirement,” provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CBO and CRS on August 15, 2018. The information~~
~~paper was requested by CBO.~~
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on land to defend the land. Whether that’s AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of on land to defend the land. Whether that’s AEGIS ashore or whatever, I want to get out of
the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense.” the long-term missile defense business and move to dynamic missile defense.”
The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the The unusually direct comments from the CNO come amid growing frustration among the
surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a steaming box surface warfare community that the mission, which requires ships to stay in a steaming box
doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that doing figure-eights for weeks on end, is eating up assets and operational availability that
could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia. could be better used confronting growing high-end threats from China and Russia.
The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface fleet. Amid the The BMD mission was also a factor in degraded readiness in the surface fleet. Amid the
nuclear threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of the nuclear threat from North Korea, the BMD mission began eating more and more of the
readiness generated in the Japan-based U.S. 7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation readiness generated in the Japan-based U.S. 7th Fleet, which created a pressurized situation
that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews, that caused leaders in the Pacific to cut corners and sacrifice training time for their crews,
an environment described in the Navy’s comprehensive review into the two collisions that an environment described in the Navy’s comprehensive review into the two collisions that
claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017. claimed the lives of 17 sailors in the disastrous summer of 2017.
Richardson said that as potential enemies double down on anti-access technologies Richardson said that as potential enemies double down on anti-access technologies
designed to keep the U.S. Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its designed to keep the U.S. Navy at bay, the Navy needed to focus on missile defense for its
own assets. own assets.
“We’re going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle “We’re going to need missile defense at sea as we kind of fight our way now into the battle
spaces we need to get into,” he said. “And so restoring dynamic maneuver has something spaces we need to get into,” he said. “And so restoring dynamic maneuver has something
to do with missile defense.to do with missile defense.4745
A June 23, 2018, press report states the following: A June 23, 2018, press report states the following:
The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it’s The threats from a resurgent Russia and rising China―which is cranking out ships like it’s
preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U.S. Navy Aegis preparing for war―have put enormous pressure on the now-aging [U.S. Navy Aegis
destroyer] fleet. Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the destroyer] fleet. Standing requirements for BMD patrols have put increasing strain on the
U.S. Navy’s surface ships. U.S. Navy’s surface ships.
The Navy now stands at a crossroads. BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that The Navy now stands at a crossroads. BMD, while a burden, has also been a cash cow that
has pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past decade. The has pushed the capabilities of the fleet exponentially forward over the past decade. The
game-changing SPY-6 air and missile defense radar destined for DDG Flight III, for game-changing SPY-6 air and missile defense radar destined for DDG Flight III, for
example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters. But a smaller example, is a direct response to the need for more advanced BMD shooters. But a smaller
fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions fleet, needed for everything from anti-submarine patrols to freedom-of-navigation missions
in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions. in the South China Sea, routinely has a large chunk tethered to BMD missions.
“Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and “Right now, as we speak, I have six multimission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers and
destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Chief of Naval destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Chief of Naval
Operations Adm. John Richardson said during an address at the recent U.S. Naval War Operations Adm. John Richardson said during an address at the recent U.S. Naval War
College’s Current Strategy Forum. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at College’s Current Strategy Forum. “You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at
45 David B. Larter, “The US Navy Is Fed Up with Ballistic Missile Defense Patrols,” Defense News, June 16, 2018. See also Paul McLeary, “Will Budget Crunch Pentagon Laser & Space Investments?” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2018. Congressional Research Service 17 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program intercepting that incoming missile. So we have six ships that could go anywhere in the intercepting that incoming missile. So we have six ships that could go anywhere in the
world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land.” world, at flank speed, in a tiny little box, defending land.”
And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are And for every six ships the Navy has deployed in a standing mission, it means 18 ships are
in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them. in various stages of the deployment cycle preparing to relieve them.
The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible The Pentagon, led by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, wants the Navy to be more flexible
and less predictable―“dynamic” is the buzzword of moment in Navy circles. What and less predictable―“dynamic” is the buzzword of moment in Navy circles. What
Richardson is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away from Richardson is proposing is moving standing requirements for BMD patrols away from
ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites, ships underway and all the associated costs that incurs, and toward fixed, shore-based sites,
and also surging the Navy’s at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat.... and also surging the Navy’s at-sea BMD capabilities when there is an active threat....
In a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO’s comments, Navy spokesman In a follow-up response to questions posed on the CNO’s comments, Navy spokesman
Cmdr. William Speaks said the Navy’s position is that BMD is an integral part of the Cmdr. William Speaks said the Navy’s position is that BMD is an integral part of the
service’s mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should “consider a more service’s mission, but where long-term threats exist, the Navy should “consider a more
persistent, land-based solution as an option.” persistent, land-based solution as an option.”

~~47 David B. Larter, “The US Navy Is Fed Up with Ballistic Missile Defense Patrols,” Defense News, June 16, 2018. See~~
~~also Paul McLeary, “Will Budget Crunch Pentagon Laser & Space Investments?” Breaking Defense, November 13,~~
~~2018.~~
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“This idea is not about the nation’s or the Navy’s commitment to BMD for the U.S. and “This idea is not about the nation’s or the Navy’s commitment to BMD for the U.S. and
our allies and partners―the Navy’s commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid,” our allies and partners―the Navy’s commitment to ballistic missile defense is rock-solid,”
Speaks said. “In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60 Speaks said. “In fact, the Navy will grow the number of BMD-capable ships from 38 to 60
by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability. by 2023, in response to the growing demand for this capability.
“The idea is about how to best meet that commitment. In alignment with our national “The idea is about how to best meet that commitment. In alignment with our national
strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this strategic documents, we have shifted our focus in an era of great power competition―this
calls us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission and calls us to think innovatively about how best to meet the demands of this mission and
optimize the power of the joint force.”... optimize the power of the joint force.”...
While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission While the idea of saving money by having fixed BMD sites and freeing up multimission
ships is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a retired ships is sensible, it may have unintended consequences, said Bryan McGrath, a retired
destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group. destroyer skipper and owner of the defense consultancy The FerryBridge Group.
“The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface “The BMD mission is part of what creates the force structure requirement for large surface
combatants,” McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO’s comments. combatants,” McGrath said on Twitter after Defense News reported the CNO’s comments.
“Absent it, the number of CG’s and DDG’s would necessarily decline. This may in fact be “Absent it, the number of CG’s and DDG’s would necessarily decline. This may in fact be
desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate desirable, depending on the emerging fleet architecture and the roles and missions debate
underway. Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive underway. Perhaps we need more smaller, multi-mission ships than larger, more expensive
ones. ones.
“But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi- “But it cannot be forgotten that while the mission is somewhat wasteful of a capable, multi-
mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission mission ship, the fact that we have built the ships that (among other things) do this mission
is an incredibly good thing. If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime sub-optimization is an incredibly good thing. If there is a penalty to be paid in peacetime sub-optimization
in order to have wartime capacity—should this not be considered a positive thing?” in order to have wartime capacity—should this not be considered a positive thing?”
McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis McGrath went on to say that the suite of combat systems that have been built into Aegis
have been in response to the BMD threat. And indeed, the crown jewels of the surface have been in response to the BMD threat. And indeed, the crown jewels of the surface
fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD fleet―Aegis Baseline 9 software, which allows a ship to do both air defense and BMD
simultaneously; the Aegis common-source library; the forthcoming SPY-6; cooperative simultaneously; the Aegis common-source library; the forthcoming SPY-6; cooperative
engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission.... engagement―have come about either in part or entirely driven by the BMD mission....
A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy’s shifting A Navy official who spoke on condition of anonymity, to discuss the Navy’s shifting
language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the Navy language on BMD, acknowledged the tone had shifted since the 2000s when the Navy
latched onto the mission. But the official added that the situation more than a decade later latched onto the mission. But the official added that the situation more than a decade later
has dramatically shifted. has dramatically shifted.
“The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly “The strategic environment has changed significantly since the early 2000s―particularly
in the western Pacific. We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as in the western Pacific. We have never before faced multiple peer rivals in a world as
interconnected and interdependent as we do today,” the official said. “Nor have we ever interconnected and interdependent as we do today,” the official said. “Nor have we ever
seen technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we see seen technologies that could alter the character of war as dramatically as those we see
emerging around us. China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move emerging around us. China and Russia have observed our way of war and are on the move
to reshape the environment to their favor.” to reshape the environment to their favor.”
Congressional Research Service 18 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ desire to use the force more In response to the threat and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ desire to use the force more
dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said. “This includes taking a dynamically, the Navy is looking at its options, the official said. “This includes taking a
look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete, look at how we employ BMD ships through the lens of great power competition to compete,
deter and win against those who threaten us.”deter and win against those who threaten us.”4846
A January 29, 2019, press report states the following: A January 29, 2019, press report states the following:
The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service’s top admiral The Navy is looking to get out of the missile defense business, the service’s top admiral
said today, and the Pentagon’s new missile defense review might give the service the off-said today, and the Pentagon’s new missile defense review might give the service the off-
ramp it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile ramp it has been looking for to stop sailing in circles waiting for ground-based missile
launches. launches.
This wasn’t the first time Adm. John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in This wasn’t the first time Adm. John Richardson bristled in public over his ships sailing in
“small boxes” at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other “small boxes” at sea tasked with protecting land, when they could be out performing other

~~48 David B. Larter, “As Threats Mount, US Navy Grapples with Costly Ballistic Missile Defense Mission,”~~ ~~Defense~~
~~News, June 23, 2018.~~
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missions challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and the missions challenging Chinese and Russian adventurism in the South China Sea and the
North Atlantic…. North Atlantic….
“We’ve got exquisite capability, but we’ve had ships protecting some pretty static assets “We’ve got exquisite capability, but we’ve had ships protecting some pretty static assets
on land for a decade,” Richardson said at the Brookings Institute. “If that [stationary] asset on land for a decade,” Richardson said at the Brookings Institute. “If that [stationary] asset
is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let’s build something on land and protect is going to be a long-term protected asset, then let’s build something on land and protect
that and liberate these ships from this mission.” that and liberate these ships from this mission.”
Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor Japan is already moving down the path of building up a more robust ground-based sensor
and shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed withand shooter layer, while also getting its own ships out to sea armed with the Aegis radar the Aegis radar
and missile defense system, both of which would free up American hulls from what and missile defense system, both of which would free up American hulls from what
Richardson on Monday called “the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for Richardson on Monday called “the small [geographic] boxes where they have to stay for
ballistic missile defense.”ballistic missile defense.”4947
Allied Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. Allied Contributions to Regional
BMD Capabilities
Another related potential issue for Congress concerns allied burden sharing—how allied Another related potential issue for Congress concerns allied burden sharing—how allied
contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to
overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U.S. overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U.S.
defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U.S. Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some defense spending, worldwide operational demands for U.S. Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some
U.S. observers for increased allied defense efforts. The issue can arise in connection with both U.S. observers for increased allied defense efforts. The issue can arise in connection with both
U.S. allies in Europe and U.S. allies in Asia. Regarding U.S. allies in Asia, a December 12, 2018, U.S. allies in Europe and U.S. allies in Asia. Regarding U.S. allies in Asia, a December 12, 2018,
press report states the following: press report states the following:
In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during In June, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson said during
a speech at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current a speech at the US Naval War College that the US Navy should terminate its current
practice of dedicating several US Navy warships solely for Ballistic Missile Defense practice of dedicating several US Navy warships solely for Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD). (BMD).
Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are Richardson wanted US warships to halt BMD patrols off Japan and Europe as they are
limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land-based limiting, restrictive missions that could be better accomplished by existing land-based
BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area BMD systems such as Patriot anti-missile batteries, the US Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system. Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and the Aegis Ashore anti-missile system.
In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has In the months since dropping his bombshell, Richardson—and much of the debate—has
gone quiet. gone quiet.
46 David B. Larter, “As Threats Mount, US Navy Grapples with Costly Ballistic Missile Defense Mission,” Defense News, June 23, 2018. 47 Paul McLeary, “The Navy Has Had Enough of Missile Defense And Sees Its Chance,” Breaking Defense, January 28, 2019. Congressional Research Service 19 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program “My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate “My guess is the CNO got snapped back by the Pentagon for exceeding where the debate
actually stood,” one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times. actually stood,” one expert on US naval affairs told Asia Times.
But others agree with him. Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US But others agree with him. Air Force Lt Gen Samuel A Greaves, the director of the US
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), acknowledges Richardson’s attempts to highlight how Missile Defense Agency (MDA), acknowledges Richardson’s attempts to highlight how
these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome “strain on the (US Navy’s) crews and these BMD patrols were placing unwelcome “strain on the (US Navy’s) crews and
equipment.” equipment.”
But there are complications. While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather But there are complications. While it may free US Navy warships for sea-control, rather
than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could than land defense, there is a concern that next- generation hypersonic cruise missiles could
defeat land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy’s Aegis-defeat land-based BMD systems, such as Aegis Ashore, while the US Navy’s Aegis-
equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in equipped warships offer the advantages of high-speed mobility and stealth, resulting in
greater survivability overall. greater survivability overall.
As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps other As Japan prepares to acquire its first Aegis Ashore BMD system – and perhaps other
systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and systems such as the THAAD system which has been deployed previously in Romania and

~~49 Paul McLeary, “The Navy Has Had Enough of Missile Defense And Sees Its Chance,” Breaking Defense, January~~
~~28, 2019.~~
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South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents South Korea – the possibility that the US Navy will end its important BMD role represents
abrupt change…. abrupt change….
Japan’s decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy Japan’s decision to deploy Aegis Ashore can fill in any gap created by a possible US Navy
cessation of BMD patrols. “The land-based option is more reliable, less logistically cessation of BMD patrols. “The land-based option is more reliable, less logistically
draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it draining, and despite being horrendously expensive, could be effective in the sense that it
provides a degree of reassurance to the Japanese people and US government, and provides a degree of reassurance to the Japanese people and US government, and
introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations,” said introduces an element of doubt of missile efficacy into [North Korean] calculations,” said
[Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University [Garren Mulloy, Associate Professor of International Relations at Daito Bunka University
in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa. in Saitama, Japan], adding, however, that these systems could not cover Okinawa.
“Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward- “Fixed sites in Japan could be vulnerable, and the Aegis vessels provide a flexible forward-
defense, before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions defense, before anything enters Japanese airspace, but with obviously limited reactions
times,” Mulloy said. “Aegis Ashore gives more reaction time – but over Japanese times,” Mulloy said. “Aegis Ashore gives more reaction time – but over Japanese
airspace.”… airspace.”…
The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific The silence about this sudden possible shift in the US defense posture in the western Pacific
is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo. However, the Trump is understandable: it is a sensitive topic in Washington and Tokyo. However, the Trump
administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support administration has urged its allies to pay more for their own defense needs and to support
US troops deployed overseas. US troops deployed overseas.
Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to proceed cautiously given the likelihood that neighbors might
view a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly aggressive view a move on BMD as evidence that Tokyo is adopting an increasingly aggressive
defense posture in the region. defense posture in the region.
But for them, it is a no-win situation. If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China But for them, it is a no-win situation. If the US does ditch the BMD patrol mission, China
and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances and North Korea might view the shift as equally menacing given that it greatly enhances
the US Navy’s maritime warfare capabilities.the US Navy’s maritime warfare capabilities.50
~~Potential Aegis Ashore Site on Guam~~
~~Another issue for Congress is whether to procure and install an Aegis Ashore system on Guam. A~~
~~July 21, 2020, press report stated~~
~~The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command told reporters today he wants the Aegis Ashore~~
~~ballistic~~48 Role of Aegis BMD in New Guam Missile Defense Architecture Another issue for Congress is the role of the Aegis BMD program in a new missile defense missile defense system architecture for Guam. After studying various possible BMD system architectures for Guam, DOD is proposing a system that would combine elements of the Aegis BMD system with elements of Army BMD systems. MDA’s proposed FY2023 budget requests funding to begin implementing its this BMD architecture for Guam. A March 30, 2022, press report states: The Missile Defense Agency’s initial plan for the architecture to protect Guam turns to proven systems to help the agency meet a 2026 fielding deadline, according Vice Adm. Jon Hill, the agency’s director. 48 Peter J. Brown, “Japan, US Silent over Ending Ballistic Missile Patrols,” Asia Times, December 12, 2018. Congressional Research Service 20 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program The defense of Guam from potential ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missile attacks has become a priority for the MDA, which is seeking $539 million in fiscal 2023 to continue to design and develop multiple-land based radar systems, procure weapon system components and initiate military construction planning and design activity. “Current forces are capable of defending Guam against today’s North Korean ballistic missile threats,” Dee Dee Martinez, the MDA’s comptroller said in a March 28 Pentagon budget briefing. “However, the regional threat to Guam, including from China, continues to rapidly evolve.”... The architecture will not be a fixed missile defense site like Aegis Ashore in Romania and Poland, Hill said. “Think of it as a distributed system.” He added that the agency is interested in using mobile launchers. The architecture will include Navy SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, the Patriot air-and-missile defense system and the Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD). A THAAD battery has been operating on Guam since 2013. Those elements will be connected through the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System, a command-and control-system that connects sensors and shooters on the battlefield. The agency will also use the Aegis weapon system’s fire control capability, Hill said. “Patriot [has] a fabulous capability for cruise missile defense, and that’s our first focus area,” Hill said. “And we have the ability within Aegis to enable that, but, right now, we are doing ballistic missiles, hypersonic, on the Aegis part of that overall integrated architecture and then the cruise missile piece will be with the Army systems.” While MDA is focused on using existing technology to make up the architecture, it will consider new technology, including the Mid-Range Capability missile the Army will field in FY23, as it becomes available, according to Hill.... “That topology of the island … it is a tough place,” Hill said. “An Aegis Ashore site is limited in what it can do because of the the rise and the fall of the hills, you got radar, it’s not a flat earth, and it’s certainly not flat on Guam, so we’ve done some really incredible work and analysis over the last couple years ... by dispersing the systems and making sure everything’s networked.”49~~system to bolster the defense of Guam from Chinese missiles.~~
~~The Aegis Ashore Baseline 10 system should be “the backbone of [a] homeland defense~~
~~system” for Guam, Adm. Phil Davidson said during a Defense Writers Group virtual~~
~~roundtable.~~
~~“The reason I’m a key advocate for that is first: it is technology that is available to us now~~
~~and could be delivered by 2026, when I believe the threat will require us to have a much~~
~~more robust capability than the combination of [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense],~~
~~which is deployed there now, and an Aegis ship in response can provide,” Davidson said.~~
~~Davidson said the current defense system for Guam is not adequate to thwart potential~~
~~Chinese missiles.~~
~~“When you look at the way the threat capability, threat capacity, is manifesting from China~~
~~in the future—whether it’s ballistic missiles from the land or whether it’s ballistic or cruise~~
~~missiles from air and maritime platforms—you are going to need a complete clock, a 360-~~
~~degree coverage in order to help defend Guam,” the admiral said.51~~

~~50 Peter J. Brown, “Japan, US Silent over Ending Ballistic Missile Patrols,” Asia Times, December 12, 2018.~~
~~51 Mallory Shelbourne, “Protecting Guam from Chinese Missiles is Top Priority for INDO-PACOM’s Davidson,”~~
USNI News, July 21, 2020. See also Mandy Mayfield, “Web Exclusive: Commander Wants Aegis Ashore Funding to
~~Defend Guam,” National Defense, July 21, 2020; Jason Sherman, “INDOPACOM: Aegis Ashore with SPY-6 Needed~~
~~on Guam by 2026 to Counter Chinese Ballistic, Cruise Missiles,” Inside Defense, July 21, 2020; and Aaron Mehta,~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

20

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~~A September 18, 2020, press report states~~
~~Guam urgently needs an Aegis Ashore missile defense system to protect vital military~~
~~assets from an increasingly aggressive China, according to the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific~~
~~Command.~~
~~“There are billions of dollars in defense capability on Guam,” Adm. Phil Davidson said~~
~~Thursday [September 17] during an online forum organized by the Missile Defense~~
~~Advocacy Alliance. “There needs to be some investment in defending that.”~~
~~The U.S. territory is home to air and naval bases and serves as a launching point for~~
~~strategic bombers. The Navy is also building facilities to house a Marine Corps air-ground~~
~~task force to accommodate a planned drawdown of Marines on Okinawa….~~
~~China’s ability to launch missiles from submarines ranging farther from shore means Guam~~
~~needs the 360-degree protection that Aegis can provide, he said.~~
~~Guam’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missile defense battery can~~
~~sense targets only within a 120-degree range, and it’s pointed at North Korea, Davidson~~
~~said.~~
~~“It’s going to require a much deeper 360-degree persistent capability,” he said, adding that~~
~~it’s important to invest in Guam’s missile defense now.~~
~~“It is not necessarily about designing or creating a defensive system that is impenetrable or~~
~~invulnerable against the entire missile inventory of a potential adversary. Rather it is about~~
~~developing a combat credible deterrent.”~~
~~INDOPACOM, in a report to Congress, put the cost of a system providing 360-degree air-~~
~~missile defense on Guam at just under $1.7 billion.~~
~~Davidson has requested funding for the system starting in the next fiscal year as part of a~~
~~Pacific Deterrence Initiative that parallel’s a similar program in Europe designed to deter~~
~~Russia.~~
~~Building Aegis Ashore is a pathway to defending against hypersonic missiles, Davidson~~
~~said, adding that China’s rocket force fires and exercises more often than that of any other~~
~~nation….~~
~~Rapidly growing capability in China and North Korea requires that Aegis be the starting~~
~~point for the defense of Guam, Davidson said.~~
~~“We can’t … wait for some perfect solution to manifest itself in 2035 or 2040. We are in~~
~~the threat environment now,” he said.52~~
~~A September 22, 2020, press report states~~
~~The Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system being eyed to bolster protection of Guam~~
~~could potentially be armed for strike missions to offset China’s current ballistic and cruise~~
~~missile advantage against U.S. forces, according to the top U.S. military official in the~~
~~region.~~
~~Adm. Phil Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, broached the possibility~~
~~of using Aegis Ashore for offense during a Sept. 17 online discussion hosted by the Missile~~
~~Defense Advocacy Alliance, acknowledging a capability the Defense Department~~

~~“INDOPACOM Head Wants Aegis Ashore in Guam by 2026,” Defense News, July 22, 2020. See also Bradley~~
~~Bowman and Maj. Shane Praiswater, “Guam needs Aegis Ashore,” Defense News, August 25, 2020.~~
~~52 Seth Robson, “Indo-Pacific Command Leader Underscores Need for Stronger Missile Defense on Guam,”~~ ~~Stars and~~
~~Stripes, September 18, 2020.~~
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~~disavowed for years while the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty remained~~
~~in force.53~~
~~Other observers have argued that an Aegis Ashore site at Guam would not be the most cost-~~
~~effective option for bolstering Guam’s defenses against potential missile attacks. A July 30, 2020,~~
~~opinion article states~~
~~The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said last week his top priority is establishing an~~
~~Aegis Ashore system on Guam by 2026. New air defenses will help protect U.S. citizens~~
~~and forces in Guam; but as Japan’s government found, Aegis Ashore may not be the best~~
~~option to protect military and civilian targets from growing and improving Chinese and~~
~~North Korean missile threats….~~
~~Although the current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery on Guam can defend~~
~~against some ballistic missiles, its single AN/TPY-2 radar is vulnerable and cannot provide~~
~~360-degree coverage. Moreover, THAAD’s focus on high altitudes makes it a poor fit to~~
~~defeat lower-flying aircraft or cruise missiles that would likely be used by China’s military~~
~~against Guam. The island needs a new air defense architecture.~~
~~Aegis Ashore is highly capable, but has its own limitations. Designed primarily to counter~~
~~small numbers of ballistic missiles, its fixed missile magazine and radar would be~~
~~vulnerable to attack and would fall short against the bombardment possible from China.~~
~~Instead of installing one or more Aegis Ashore systems on Guam, a more effective air and~~
~~missile defense architecture would combine the latest version of the Aegis Combat System~~
~~with a disaggregated system of existing sensors, effectors, and command-and-control~~
~~nodes. A distributed architecture would also be scalable, allowing air and missile defenses~~
~~to also protect U.S. citizens and forces operating in the Northern Marianas.~~
~~Guam’s geography enables longer-range sensing than would be possible from a ship or a~~
~~single Aegis Ashore radar. Fixed, relocatable and mobile radio frequency sensors should~~
~~be positioned around the island’s perimeter, such as compact versions of SPY-6 or Lower~~
~~Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor radars and the passive Army Long-Range Persistent~~
~~Surveillance system. During periods of heightened tension, passive and active radio~~
~~frequency and electro-optical/infrared sensors could also be deployed on unmanned aircraft~~
~~and stratospheric balloons to monitor over-the-horizon threats. This mixed architecture~~
~~would provide better collective coverage and be more difficult to defeat compared to one~~
~~or two fixed Aegis Ashore deckhouses.~~
~~To shoot down enemy missiles and aircraft, the architecture should field mobile,~~
~~containerized launchers for long-range interceptors like the SM-6 and SM-3 rather than~~
~~Aegis Ashore’s finite and targetable in-ground vertical launch magazines. They should be~~
~~complemented by medium- to short-range engagement systems to protect high-value~~
~~targets such as the Patriot, the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System or the~~
~~Army’s planned Indirect Fire Protection Capability, as well as non-kinetic defenses such~~
~~as high-powered microwave weapons and electronic warfare systems that could damage or~~
~~confuse the guidance systems on incoming missiles.~~
~~Today, destroyers patrol the waters around Guam to provide ballistic missile defense~~
~~capacity beyond that available with THAAD. A new distributed architecture would place~~
~~more capacity ashore to free surface combatants from missile defense duty. In a crisis or~~
~~conflict, the architecture could add capacity with surface action groups and combat air~~
~~patrols capable of intercepting threats at longer ranges.~~
~~Instead of Aegis Ashore’s large, single C2 node, a distributed architecture would virtualize~~
~~the Aegis Combat System to allow multiple facilities or mobile vehicles to serve as~~
~~miniature air operations centers. The mobility of sensors, effectors and C2 nodes in this~~

~~53 Jason Sherman, “INDOPACOM Chief: Aegis Ashore Guam Could One Day Be Armed for Strike to Counter China,”~~
Inside Defense, September 22, 2020.
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22

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~~architecture would enable the employment of camouflage, concealment and deception,~~
~~including decoys, to complicate enemy targeting and increase the number of weapons~~
~~needed to ensure a successful attack.~~
~~INDOPACOM’s plan for implementing new Guam air defenses should also apply lessons~~
~~from Japan’s aborted Aegis Ashore program, whose accelerated timeline contributed to the~~
~~selection of the least expensive and technically risky option—two fixed Aegis Ashore~~
~~systems—and the discounting of alternatives. Adm. Phil Davidson’s 2026 goal of~~
~~improving Guam’s defenses faces a similar risk.~~
~~Bound by an iron triangle, Guam’s air and missile defenses can be good, fast or cheap—~~
~~but not all three. If 2026 is held as a rigid constraint, the only solution able to meet the~~
~~schedule and requirements may be the familiar, and ineffective, fixed Aegis Ashore~~
~~architecture.~~
~~Compared to one or two Aegis Ashore sites, a distributed architecture may require slightly~~
~~more time to develop or funds to field. But a phased approach could introduce new systems~~
~~as funding becomes available and allow expanding the system’s capability to meet the~~
~~evolving threat. For example, SPY-6 radars, C2 bunkers and composite THAAD-Patriot-~~
~~NASAMS batteries could be fielded before 2026, quickly followed by the introduction of~~
~~mobile assets.~~
~~Guam and the Northern Marianas are essential to U.S. strategy and operations in the~~
~~Western Pacific. Their defenses have long been ignored, and Adm. Davidson should be~~
~~lauded for charting a path forward. A disaggregated architecture, however, will be more~~
~~likely to realize INDOPACOM’s vision of resilient and scalable air and missile defense.54~~
~~A March 4, 2021, press report stated~~
~~Building an Aegis Ashore facility on Guam would relieve three guided-missile destroyers~~
~~from missile defense work and make them available for Navy tasking, the head of U.S.~~
~~Indo-Pacific Command said Thursday [March 4].~~
~~Speaking at a virtual event hosted by the American Enterprise Institute, Adm. Phil~~
~~Davidson made the case for building a homeland missile defense system on Guam, which~~
~~he has said is his top priority, to protect the U.S. territory from Chinese missiles.~~
~~“The Guam defense system brings the same ability to protect Guam and the system itself~~
~~as the three DDGs it would otherwise take to carry out the mission,” Davidson said. “We~~
~~need to free up those guided-missile destroyers, who have multi-mission capability to~~
~~detect threats and finish threats under the sea, on the sea and above the sea, so that they can~~
~~move with a mobile and maneuverable naval forces that they were designed to protect and~~
~~provide their ballistic missile defense.”…~~
~~“It’s return on investment,” Davidson said when arguing for the missile defense system.~~
~~“For the cost it takes to build that facility and flesh it out, I free up at least three ships in~~
~~conflict and probably more ships in crisis. You know, in the deterrence phase they keep up~~
~~a rotation and do all that kind of stuff going forward,” he added, referring to the oft-cited~~
~~notion that it takes three ships total to keep one deployed forward due to the cycle for~~
~~maintenance, training and operations.~~
~~The INDOPACOM chief emphasized that Guam’s current use of the Army’s Terminal~~
~~High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system paired with an Aegis destroyer is not~~
~~sufficient to address the threat posed by China.~~
~~“It doesn’t provide for a 360-degree defense necessarily,” he said. “It’s really designed to~~
~~defend against a rogue shot from North Korea.”~~

~~54 Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark, “Guam’s Air Defense Should Learn Lessons from Japan’s Aegis Ashore,”~~
Defense News, July 30, 2020.
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~~Davidson pointed to China’s submarines and surface ships circumnavigating the Northern~~
~~Mariana Islands and Guam, arguing these actions show that China’s ballistic missiles,~~
~~cruise missiles and potential anti-ship ballistic missiles pose “a 360-degree threat” to~~
~~Guam.~~
~~“We must evolve the critical defense of our people, our platforms and our posture~~
~~initiatives, and it begins in Guam. Now, a highly capable, fully adaptable and proven~~
~~system like Aegis – established in a fixed location like Guam – will deliver persistent, 360-~~
~~degree integrated air and missile defense from the second island chain,” he said.55~~
~~A March 9, 2021, press report stated~~
~~Warning that China’s missile arsenal threatens Guam and the United States will have to~~
~~“fight for it,” the head of Indo-Pacific Command pitched lawmakers on building an Aegis~~
~~Ashore missile defense facility to guard the U.S. territory.~~
~~Adm. Phil Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee Tuesday [March 9] that~~
~~the island needs protection as the home of 170,000 U.S. citizens and service members, a~~
~~deepwater strategic port, fuel and munition stores and an airfield used to project U.S.~~
~~power. Guam would be key to responding to any conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.~~
~~“Guam is a target today. It needs to be defended, and it needs to be prepared for the threats~~
~~that will come in the future,” Davidson said. He added later: “China’s own Air Force has~~
~~put out a propaganda video showing their H-6 bomber force attacking Andersen Air Force~~
~~Base at Guam and distributed that quite publicly.”~~
~~While an Aegis Ashore system would counter ballistic missiles or cruise missiles launch~~
~~from the air, land and sea, the island’s existing anti-ballistic missile capability―the~~
~~Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system―“is not capable of meeting the current~~
~~trajectory of threats from China,” Davidson said.~~
~~“It’s the key piece that we’re missing, that signals to the region that the U.S. is a reliable~~
~~and committed security partner, that we are there to defend not only U.S. territory but our~~
~~interests abroad,” Davidson said of Aegis Ashore. He added it would show China it “can’t~~
~~knock Guam out with an easy shot and keep us out of the fight to present a fait accompli”~~
~~against Taiwan.~~
~~Davidson has previously said the $1.6 billion system is his top priority among $27 billion~~
~~in spending he’s proposed to continue a broader Pacific Deterrence Initiative through~~
~~2027….~~
~~The proposed Guam Defense System would consist of Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Combat~~
~~System Baseline 10; a solid-state radar such as the Raytheon SPY-6 or a variant of the~~
~~Lockheed SPY-7; the BAE Systems Mark 41 Vertical Launching System, and SM-3 or~~
~~SM-6 Missile, made by Raytheon.~~
~~Davidson argued in written testimony that the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense~~
~~Battle Command System and the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System~~
~~wouldn’t fit the bill because they “are not yet fully developed.” Any “recommendations for~~
~~additional studies, including a requirement for only mobile systems, disregard the~~
~~immediacy and complexity of the threat (2026) and the absolute need to integrate fires~~
~~across the region from a forward multi-domain command and control node west of the~~
~~International Date Line,” he said.56~~

~~55 Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: Aegis Ashore on Guam Would ‘Free Up’ 3 Navy Destroyers,” USNI News, March~~
~~4, 2021.~~
~~56 Joe Gould, “‘Guam Is a Target Today.’ Pacific Chief Pitches Aegis Ashore to Congress,” Defense News, March 9,~~
~~2021. See also Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Begins Work on Aegis Ashore for Guam,” Inside Defense, March 9, 2021.~~
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~~A June 24, 2021, press report stated~~
~~The head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has suggested that portions of a future Aegis~~
~~Ashore site on the strategic American island of Guam in the Pacific could go into bunkers~~
~~underground or onto mobile platforms. Ostensibly, this is due to Guam’s terrain and limited~~
~~overall space, but it also speaks to the potential vulnerabilities of such a facility, especially~~
~~in a major conflict with a near-peer adversary, such as China.~~
~~The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) director, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Jon Hill,~~
~~provided these and other details about the current state of plans for an Aegis Ashore~~
~~capability on Guam at an event that Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)~~
~~think tank hosted earlier this week. U.S. military officials have publicly said in the past that~~
~~their goal is for this site, whatever its configuration might be in the end, to be operational~~
~~by 2026.~~
~~“I can see Aegis being underground or mobile,“ Hill said. “It’s not new science separating~~
~~radars from weapons.”~~
~~The existing “Aegis Ashore may not be sufficient,” he added, referring to the general~~
~~structure of the existing and planned sites.57~~
~~An August 23, 2021, report by one observer recommended repurposing some Aegis cruisers that~~
~~the Navy, as part of its FY2021 budget submission, has proposed for retirement as interim missile~~
~~defense platforms for Guam, Palau, and Saipan, pending the deployment of more permanent~~
~~missile-defense systems for these locations. The report stated that~~
~~there are options that could be deployed to Guam today, which would measurably~~
~~complicate Chinese operational thinking in attacking and suppressing Guam. First, there~~
~~are three aging BMD-capable Ticonderoga-class cruisers (the CG-73, the CG-72, and the~~
~~CG-61) that the Navy has slated for decommissioning in 2022 due to high operational cost.~~
~~Their older analog radar systems, while still capable, have a limited capacity for engaging~~
~~multiple targets and require auxiliary systems to cool associated electronics. Second, the~~
~~cruise missile threat could be addressed by repurposing elements of the Army’s Counter~~
~~Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) systems.~~
~~Ticonderoga-class cruisers were designed to provide air defense to carrier strike groups,~~
~~with later upgrades that enabled ballistic missile defense. As retired Admiral and ex-~~
~~Commander of INDOPACOM Harry Harris recently argued, any future defense system for~~
~~Guam must be integrated across numerous systems—these cruisers do that already. Early~~
~~in their lifetime, these cruisers got the upgrades and space needed to support an Area Air~~
~~Defense Commander with associated communications, sensors, and weapons. With this in~~
~~mind, these ships could serve as an operational test bed for integrating newer systems, such~~
~~as the Army’s highly capable TPY-2 radar, into the targeting of the 120 missiles carried in~~
~~the cruiser’s vertical launch system....~~
~~Typically, when the Navy deploys a BMD warship to defend Guam, it loiters in waters~~
~~near the island or moored in port. Guam offers several protected anchorages that a moored~~
~~BMD-capable cruiser could move between without having to conduct prolonged~~
~~navigation. This potentially obviates the need for the Navy to man or maintain these ships~~
~~for independent at-sea operations—potentially escorted or towed between mooring sites.~~
~~This would enable putting the ship’s propulsion system in a state of reduced operational~~
~~readiness and reducing the crew, but to be clear, cost savings is a secondary consideration~~
~~to sustaining weapons capacity for defense (and potentially strike)....~~

~~57 Joseph Trevithick, “Guam’s New Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Could Go Underground And Mobile,”~~ ~~The~~
~~Drive, June 24, 2021. See also Harry Harris, “Aegis Ashore Too Limited For Guam: Former INDO-PACOM Head,”~~
Breaking Defense, July 9, 2021; Bradley Bowman and Mark Montgomery, “Fully Fund the Guam Defense System,”
War on the Rocks, July 29, 2021.
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~~Finally, there is further utility of these ships given recent offers by the government of Palau~~
~~to host U.S. forces, and increased U.S. attention on the Commonwealth of the Northern~~
~~Mariana Islands, specifically Saipan and Tinian, for a diversion airfield supporting forward~~
~~operations. As in Guam, mooring these cruisers at Palau and Saipan can set the foundation~~
~~for a regional defense network that can mature over time, as more capable systems come~~
~~online....~~
~~While neither C-RAM nor repurposing of aged BMD-capable cruisers represents a long-~~
~~term solution to the defense of Guam, together with THAAD, they do significantly improve~~
~~it. In the near term, these cruisers could provide added firepower, sensor coverage, and a~~
~~platform for integrated air and missile defense command and control until follow-on~~
~~dedicated systems arrive. Doing this also frees up three front-line AEGIS-equipped~~
~~destroyers for a range of other pressing missions.58~~
Conversion of Hawaii Aegis Test Site
Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an Another potential issue for Congress is whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an
operational land-based Aegis BMD site. DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report operational land-based Aegis BMD site. DOD’s January 2019 missile defense review report
states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that states, in a section on improving or adapting existing BMD systems, that
Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the Another repurposing option is to operationalize, either temporarily or permanently, the
Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Kauai, Hawaii, to strengthen the defense of
Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities. DoD will study this possibility to further Hawaii against North Korean missile capabilities. DoD will study this possibility to further
evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii. The United States evaluate it as a viable near-term option to enhance the defense of Hawaii. The United States
will augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean will augment the defense of Hawaii in order to stay ahead of any possible North Korean
missile threat. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an missile threat. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an
Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize Emergency Activation Plan that would enable the Secretary of Defense to operationalize
the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary’s decision to do so, the the Aegis Ashore test site in Kauai within 30 days of the Secretary’s decision to do so, the
steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements. This plan steps that would need to be taken, associated costs, and personnel requirements. This plan
49 Jen Judson, “MDA’s Plan to Protect Guam Relies on Field-Proven Systems,” Defense News, March 30, 2022. See also Rich Abott, “MDA Decides On Guam Defense Architecture,” Defense Daily, March 29, 2022; Jason Sherman, “DOD Picks SPY-7 for Land-Based Aegis, Giving Lockheed First U.S. Customer for New Radar,” Inside Defense, May 6, 2022. Congressional Research Service 21 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of will be delivered to USDA&S, USDR&E, and USDP within six months of the release of
the MDR.the MDR.5950
A January 25, 2019, press report states the following: A January 25, 2019, press report states the following:
The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the The Defense Department will examine the funding breakdown between the Navy and the
Missile Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii’s Aegis Ashore Missile Missile Defense Agency should the government make Hawaii’s Aegis Ashore Missile
Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency’s director. Defense Test Center into an operational resource, according to the agency’s director.
“Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews—that man that site—as “Today, it involves both Navy resources for the operational crews—that man that site—as
well as funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production and well as funds that come to MDA for research, development and test production and
sustainment,” Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding sustainment,” Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves said of the test center when asked how the funding
would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the would shake out between the Navy and MDA should the Pentagon move forward with the
recommendation.recommendation.6051
Potential Contribution from Lasers
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential for ship-based lasers to contribute in
coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have
on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles. Another CRS report discusses the on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles. Another CRS report discusses the

~~58 Brent D. Sadler,~~ ~~Repurposing Navy Cruisers Planned for Decommissioning: An Interim Capability for Countering~~
~~Chinese Missile Attacks on Guam, Heritage Foundation, August 23, 2021, pp. 4-5.~~
~~59 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review 2019, released January 17, 2019, pp. 55-56.~~
~~60 Mallory Shelbourne, “DOD to Determine Funding Breakdown for Aegis Ashore Repurposing,” Inside the Navy,~~
~~January 25, 2019.~~
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potential value of ship-based lasers for performing various missions, including, potentially, potential value of ship-based lasers for performing various missions, including, potentially,
terminal-phase BMD operations.terminal-phase BMD operations.6152
Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in Another potential oversight issue for Congress is technical risk and test and evaluation issues in
the Aegis BMD program. the Aegis BMD program.
July 2020 GAO Report
A July 2020 GAO report on the testing of U.S. BMD systems, including the Aegis BMD system, A July 2020 GAO report on the testing of U.S. BMD systems, including the Aegis BMD system,
stated the following: stated the following:
Aegis BMD demonstrated various capabilities in fiscal year 2019 tests and achieved Aegis BMD demonstrated various capabilities in fiscal year 2019 tests and achieved
independent accreditation for all its models used in operational ground tests. The Missile independent accreditation for all its models used in operational ground tests. The Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) conducted five Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) intercept Defense Agency (MDA) conducted five Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) intercept
flight tests in fiscal year 2019, successfully intercepting twoflight tests in fiscal year 2019, successfully intercepting two ballistic missile targets and ballistic missile targets and
three cruise missiles. Additionally, MDA also conducted Aegis BMD non-intercept flight three cruise missiles. Additionally, MDA also conducted Aegis BMD non-intercept flight
tests with live or simulated interceptors and targets, as well as five model-based ground tests with live or simulated interceptors and targets, as well as five model-based ground
tests that provided data on Aegis BMD interoperability and weapon system functionality tests that provided data on Aegis BMD interoperability and weapon system functionality
in various regional and Homeland Defense scenarios…. in various regional and Homeland Defense scenarios….
Aegis BMD testing also had some limitations. For instance, while most testing limitations Aegis BMD testing also had some limitations. For instance, while most testing limitations
are classified, DOT&E noted in its fiscal year 2019 assessment of Aegis BMD that MDA are classified, DOT&E noted in its fiscal year 2019 assessment of Aegis BMD that MDA
ground tests have routinely shown the need for improved inter-element coordination and ground tests have routinely shown the need for improved inter-element coordination and
interoperability to enhance engagement efficiency. Moreover, for the second year in a row, interoperability to enhance engagement efficiency. Moreover, for the second year in a row,
DOT&E noted that flight testing and models and simulations did not address all expected DOT&E noted that flight testing and models and simulations did not address all expected
threat types, ground ranges, and raid sizes for Aegis BMD. For instance, while Aegis BMD threat types, ground ranges, and raid sizes for Aegis BMD. For instance, while Aegis BMD
M&S tools were accredited for many scenarios, there were limitations for raid engagements M&S tools were accredited for many scenarios, there were limitations for raid engagements
due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of post-intercept due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of post-intercept
debris modeling. As we reported in June 2019, MDA planned to assess Aegis BMD 5.1 debris modeling. As we reported in June 2019, MDA planned to assess Aegis BMD 5.1
50 Department of Defense, Missile Defense Review 2019, released January 17, 2019, pp. 55-56. 51 Mallory Shelbourne, “DOD to Determine Funding Breakdown for Aegis Ashore Repurposing,” Inside the Navy, January 25, 2019. 52 See CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Congressional Research Service 22 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program raid performance for the first time in December 2018, but the test was de-scoped to a single raid performance for the first time in December 2018, but the test was de-scoped to a single
intercept due, in part, to a test range safety asset malfunction. While MDA planned to intercept due, in part, to a test range safety asset malfunction. While MDA planned to
conduct a raid the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020, according to technical comments we conduct a raid the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020, according to technical comments we
received from MDA at the end of our audit, that plan has been canceled. In the meantime, received from MDA at the end of our audit, that plan has been canceled. In the meantime,
the warfighter will have reduced information about how Aegis BMD 5.1 performs in these the warfighter will have reduced information about how Aegis BMD 5.1 performs in these
real-world-like scenarios. real-world-like scenarios.
MDA stayed on track to deliver the next generation of Aegis BMD capabilities. For MDA stayed on track to deliver the next generation of Aegis BMD capabilities. For
instance, MDA plans to deliver BMD 6.0 in the 2023 time frame to provide capabilities instance, MDA plans to deliver BMD 6.0 in the 2023 time frame to provide capabilities
against larger raids, better discrimination, and improved communication with its against larger raids, better discrimination, and improved communication with its
interceptors. Additionally, BMD 6.0 takes advantage of the Navy’s effort to replace the interceptors. Additionally, BMD 6.0 takes advantage of the Navy’s effort to replace the
Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar with a more capable AN/SPY-6 (V)1 and to overhaul the entire Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar with a more capable AN/SPY-6 (V)1 and to overhaul the entire
Aegis combat system. As we reported in June 2019, MDA and the Navy re-planned AWS Aegis combat system. As we reported in June 2019, MDA and the Navy re-planned AWS
Baseline 10.0, after a funding reduction of $31.45 million against BMD 6.05. While the Baseline 10.0, after a funding reduction of $31.45 million against BMD 6.05. While the
reduction resulted in delays to completion of some technical content, its delivery time reduction resulted in delays to completion of some technical content, its delivery time
frame did not change. In fiscal year 2019, the program remained on schedule, completing frame did not change. In fiscal year 2019, the program remained on schedule, completing
a planned review and participated in a Navy-funded developmental test of AN/SPY-6(V)1 a planned review and participated in a Navy-funded developmental test of AN/SPY-6(V)1
and FTX-34, demonstrating ballistic missile tracking capabilities. MDA efforts to deliver and FTX-34, demonstrating ballistic missile tracking capabilities. MDA efforts to deliver
integrated AWS Baseline 5.4 were also on track in fiscal year 2019 after the program integrated AWS Baseline 5.4 were also on track in fiscal year 2019 after the program
readjusted its schedule in fiscal year 2018…. readjusted its schedule in fiscal year 2018….

~~61 See CRS Report R44175,~~ ~~Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for~~
~~Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.~~
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According to MDA, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB program considers the schedule for According to MDA, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB program considers the schedule for
awarding a multi-year procurement contract, and enduring subcontractor quality issues, to awarding a multi-year procurement contract, and enduring subcontractor quality issues, to
be the two main risks facing the program. MDA officials stated that they expected to award be the two main risks facing the program. MDA officials stated that they expected to award
the multi-year procurement contract in the first quarter, fiscal year 2020. MDA had also the multi-year procurement contract in the first quarter, fiscal year 2020. MDA had also
stated that a delay in the award could cause production delays both to the United States and stated that a delay in the award could cause production delays both to the United States and
to foreign military sales. MDA’s current plans call for the multi-year procurement award to foreign military sales. MDA’s current plans call for the multi-year procurement award
in the second quarter, fiscal year 2020. in the second quarter, fiscal year 2020.
In addition, as we reported in 2019, MDA officials have noted that the Aegis BMD SM-3 In addition, as we reported in 2019, MDA officials have noted that the Aegis BMD SM-3
Block IB’s prime contractor has had difficulty ensuring that all subcontracted components Block IB’s prime contractor has had difficulty ensuring that all subcontracted components
meet defined specifications. Similar issues occurred in fiscal year 2019, each of which meet defined specifications. Similar issues occurred in fiscal year 2019, each of which
required resolution on a case-by-case basis. For example, MDA officials reported that an required resolution on a case-by-case basis. For example, MDA officials reported that an
important actuator was found to have contaminated lubricant, requiring the source of the important actuator was found to have contaminated lubricant, requiring the source of the
contamination to be tracked to a specific facility within the supply chain and the contamination to be tracked to a specific facility within the supply chain and the
procurement of new hardware. In addition, a divert valve was experiencing an increased procurement of new hardware. In addition, a divert valve was experiencing an increased
reject rate, slowing down deliveries of the Third Stage Rocket Motor. The program and the reject rate, slowing down deliveries of the Third Stage Rocket Motor. The program and the
contractor developed and implemented three corrective actions to address this issue and contractor developed and implemented three corrective actions to address this issue and
accelerate deliveries. Even so, problems such as these can result in months-long delays, accelerate deliveries. Even so, problems such as these can result in months-long delays,
and MDA reported that the introduction of improved quality controls drove up costs in and MDA reported that the introduction of improved quality controls drove up costs in
fiscal year 2019…. fiscal year 2019….
Following the failure of FTM-29 in January 2018, MDA re-organized the SM-3 Block IIA Following the failure of FTM-29 in January 2018, MDA re-organized the SM-3 Block IIA
schedule to allow it to identify the cause of the failure, implement changes, and then test schedule to allow it to identify the cause of the failure, implement changes, and then test
these changes to validate their efficacy. As we reported in May 2019, as a result of the test these changes to validate their efficacy. As we reported in May 2019, as a result of the test
failure, MDA and the government of Japan convened a failure review board to investigate failure, MDA and the government of Japan convened a failure review board to investigate
the causes of the test failure. The board’s conclusions identified the source of the failure. the causes of the test failure. The board’s conclusions identified the source of the failure.
To test the fixes identified through the FTM-29 failure review board, MDA added a new To test the fixes identified through the FTM-29 failure review board, MDA added a new
flight test to its schedule, FTM-45. Despite criticism from Department of Defense flight test to its schedule, FTM-45. Despite criticism from Department of Defense
stakeholders that FTM-45 would not be taxing enough to make up for the failure of FTM-stakeholders that FTM-45 would not be taxing enough to make up for the failure of FTM-
29, MDA successfully conducted the test, and thus validated the corrective actions, in 29, MDA successfully conducted the test, and thus validated the corrective actions, in
October 2018. October 2018.
Two months later, in December 2018, MDA conducted FTI-03, the first successful SM-3 Two months later, in December 2018, MDA conducted FTI-03, the first successful SM-3
Block IIA intercept of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and the first Block IIA intercept of an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and the first
successful SM-3 Block IIA intercept to use remote sensor data to guide the engagement, successful SM-3 Block IIA intercept to use remote sensor data to guide the engagement,
Congressional Research Service 23 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program known as Engage on Remote. However, as mentioned previously, the test’s initial plan was known as Engage on Remote. However, as mentioned previously, the test’s initial plan was
an intercept of two targets, but it was scaled down due to range safety issues. an intercept of two targets, but it was scaled down due to range safety issues.
MDA achieved its objective in FTI-03 by intercepting the target, but a more detailed review MDA achieved its objective in FTI-03 by intercepting the target, but a more detailed review
of the system’s performance revealed at least one issue. During the interceptor’s flight, the of the system’s performance revealed at least one issue. During the interceptor’s flight, the
attitude control system in the third stage rocket motor experienced a fault whereby a valve attitude control system in the third stage rocket motor experienced a fault whereby a valve
failed to respond to electronic instructions. A failure review board isolated the fault to a failed to respond to electronic instructions. A failure review board isolated the fault to a
specific component failing to provide adequate electric current. Seeking to avoid specific component failing to provide adequate electric current. Seeking to avoid
unnecessary work, the prime contractor temporarily suspended its operations in order to unnecessary work, the prime contractor temporarily suspended its operations in order to
identify the root cause and then develop and implement corrective actions. This suspension identify the root cause and then develop and implement corrective actions. This suspension
has affected delivery schedules for both third stage rocket motors and completed has affected delivery schedules for both third stage rocket motors and completed
interceptors. interceptors.
MDA originally planned for an initial production decision in December 2018, but two MDA originally planned for an initial production decision in December 2018, but two
issues delayed this decision. First, owing to the fact that the canceled Redesigned Kill issues delayed this decision. First, owing to the fact that the canceled Redesigned Kill
Vehicle re-used parts from the SM-3 Block IIA program, the Undersecretary of Defense Vehicle re-used parts from the SM-3 Block IIA program, the Undersecretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering requested a study to determine if the SM-3 Block IIA could for Research and Engineering requested a study to determine if the SM-3 Block IIA could
be affected by the issues which resulted in the RKV’s cancellation. Second, DOD officials be affected by the issues which resulted in the RKV’s cancellation. Second, DOD officials
recommended against any initial production decision until the issue observed in FTI-03 recommended against any initial production decision until the issue observed in FTI-03
was resolved. was resolved.
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MDA documents indicated that its officials believed an initial production decision was MDA documents indicated that its officials believed an initial production decision was
possible before the end of fiscal year 2019. The SM-3 Block IIA received a positive initial possible before the end of fiscal year 2019. The SM-3 Block IIA received a positive initial
production decision in October 2019.production decision in October 2019.6253
January 2021 DOT&E ~~Report~~Report54
A January 2021 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—A January 2021 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—
DOT&E’s annual report for FY2020—stated the following in its section on the Aegis BMD DOT&E’s annual report for FY2020—stated the following in its section on the Aegis BMD
program: program:
Assessment
• Aegis BMD continues to demonstrate a capability to intercept non-separating, simple- • Aegis BMD continues to demonstrate a capability to intercept non-separating, simple-
separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight with separating, and complex-separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight with
SM-3 missiles. Aegis BMD has also demonstrated a capability to intercept select ballistic SM-3 missiles. Aegis BMD has also demonstrated a capability to intercept select ballistic
missiles in the terminal phase of flight with SM-6 missiles. However, flight testing and missiles in the terminal phase of flight with SM-6 missiles. However, flight testing and
M&S [modeling and simulation] have not addressed all expected threat types, ground M&S [modeling and simulation] have not addressed all expected threat types, ground
ranges, and raid sizes. The MDA has used M&S to explore Aegis BMD raid engagement ranges, and raid sizes. The MDA has used M&S to explore Aegis BMD raid engagement
performance, but DOT&E has less confidence in these results because COMOPTEVFOR performance, but DOT&E has less confidence in these results because COMOPTEVFOR
[the Navy Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force] has been unable to accredit [the Navy Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force] has been unable to accredit
the models due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of the models due to the lack of validation data from live fire raid engagements and lack of
post-intercept debris modeling. post-intercept debris modeling.
• During Pacific Dragon—2020 [a Navy fleet exercise in August 2020], the MDA • During Pacific Dragon—2020 [a Navy fleet exercise in August 2020], the MDA
demonstrated Aegis BMD interoperability with Republic of Korea naval assets while demonstrated Aegis BMD interoperability with Republic of Korea naval assets while
conducting simulated ballistic missile engagements. The AAMDTC [Aegis Ashore Missile conducting simulated ballistic missile engagements. The AAMDTC [Aegis Ashore Missile
Defense Test Complex] demonstrated Aegis interoperability with Australian naval assets Defense Test Complex] demonstrated Aegis interoperability with Australian naval assets
while tracking ballistic missile targets. while tracking ballistic missile targets.
• DOT&E will provide an assessment of the FTM-44 [flight] test results and of the SBT • DOT&E will provide an assessment of the FTM-44 [flight] test results and of the SBT
[sea-based terminal] Increment 2 capability (based on the results of FTM-31 E1 and FTM-[sea-based terminal] Increment 2 capability (based on the results of FTM-31 E1 and FTM-
33) [flight tests] in separate reports. 33) [flight tests] in separate reports.
53 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Assessment of Testing Approach Needed as Delays and Changes Persist, GAO-20-432, July 2020, pp. 44, 45-46, 48-49, 51-52. 54 DOT&E’s annual report for FY2021, which is dated January 2022, includes a section that discusses missile defense systems in general but does not include a section specifically discussing the Aegis BMD system. Congressional Research Service 24 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program • MDA ground tests have routinely shown that inter-element coordination and • MDA ground tests have routinely shown that inter-element coordination and
interoperability need improvement to improve engagement efficiency; however, flight interoperability need improvement to improve engagement efficiency; however, flight
testing with multi-element engagement coordination has been limited. Aegis BMD has testing with multi-element engagement coordination has been limited. Aegis BMD has
exercised rudimentary engagement coordination with Terminal High-Altitude Area exercised rudimentary engagement coordination with Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense [THAAD] [BMD] firing units, but not with [the] Patriot [BMD system]. The MDA Defense [THAAD] [BMD] firing units, but not with [the] Patriot [BMD system]. The MDA
plans to exercise engagement coordination between those three theater elements during plans to exercise engagement coordination between those three theater elements during
Flight Test Operational (FTO)-05, but that flight test has been repeatedly delayed and is Flight Test Operational (FTO)-05, but that flight test has been repeatedly delayed and is
currently planned for FY28. currently planned for FY28.
• DOT&E and USD(R&E) [Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering] • DOT&E and USD(R&E) [Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering]
have prompted the MDA to establish a ground testing approach to support assessments of have prompted the MDA to establish a ground testing approach to support assessments of
missile reliability. DOT&E cannot assess SM-3 missile reliability with confidence until the missile reliability. DOT&E cannot assess SM-3 missile reliability with confidence until the
MDA is able to provide additional ground test data that simulate the in-flight environment. MDA is able to provide additional ground test data that simulate the in-flight environment.
• The MDA delivered results from a subset of the high-fidelity M&S operational test runs • The MDA delivered results from a subset of the high-fidelity M&S operational test runs
for record for the SM-3 IIA missile. The MDA found a problem in one of the models used for record for the SM-3 IIA missile. The MDA found a problem in one of the models used
to conduct the M&S runs. The MDA has identified a fix action and the test runs will be re-to conduct the M&S runs. The MDA has identified a fix action and the test runs will be re-
run and delivered in FY21. The data from these re-executed runs will support the DOT&E run and delivered in FY21. The data from these re-executed runs will support the DOT&E
assessment of the operational effectiveness of the SM-3 Block IIA missile in FY21. assessment of the operational effectiveness of the SM-3 Block IIA missile in FY21.
• COVID-19 impacts have delayed delivery of high-fidelity M&S operational test runs for • COVID-19 impacts have delayed delivery of high-fidelity M&S operational test runs for
record to support an assessment of SBT Increment 2 operational effectiveness. Verification record to support an assessment of SBT Increment 2 operational effectiveness. Verification

~~62 Government Accountability Office,~~ ~~Missile Defense[:] Assessment of Testing Approach Needed as Delays and~~
~~Changes Persist, GAO-20-432, July 2020, pp. 44, 45-46, 48-49, 51-52.~~
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and validation data from flight testing will not be available until FY21 to support model and validation data from flight testing will not be available until FY21 to support model
accreditation. M&S operational test runs for record will not be available until FY22. accreditation. M&S operational test runs for record will not be available until FY22.
• The developmental AN/SPY-6(V)1 radar continues to track ballistic missiles during • The developmental AN/SPY-6(V)1 radar continues to track ballistic missiles during
MDA flight tests. The radar detected and tracked the HGV [hypersonic glide vehicle] target MDA flight tests. The radar detected and tracked the HGV [hypersonic glide vehicle] target
in FEX-01. in FEX-01.
Recommendations
The MDA should: The MDA should:
1. Prioritize resources for FTO-05 to ensure this critical flight test occurs as soon as 1. Prioritize resources for FTO-05 to ensure this critical flight test occurs as soon as
possible. possible.
2. Conduct Aegis BMD midcourse and terminal phase flight testing with live fire intercepts 2. Conduct Aegis BMD midcourse and terminal phase flight testing with live fire intercepts
of raids of two or more ballistic missile targets to aid in the validation of M&S tools. of raids of two or more ballistic missile targets to aid in the validation of M&S tools.
3. Improve Aegis BMD high-fidelity M&S tools to incorporate post-intercept debris 3. Improve Aegis BMD high-fidelity M&S tools to incorporate post-intercept debris
modeling to better assess engagement performance in raid scenarios. modeling to better assess engagement performance in raid scenarios.
4. Provide data from high-fidelity ground tests to DOT&E to inform SM-3 Block IB Threat 4. Provide data from high-fidelity ground tests to DOT&E to inform SM-3 Block IB Threat
Upgrade and Block IIA missile reliability estimates. Upgrade and Block IIA missile reliability estimates.
5. Work with DOT&E and USD(R&E) to establish a ground testing approach to support 5. Work with DOT&E and USD(R&E) to establish a ground testing approach to support
assessments of missile reliability.assessments of missile reliability.6355
Regarding the SM-6 missile, the January 2021 DOT&E report also stated the following: Regarding the SM-6 missile, the January 2021 DOT&E report also stated the following:
Assessment
• As reported in the FY18 DOT&E SM-6 BLK I FOT&E [Follow-on Operational Test and • As reported in the FY18 DOT&E SM-6 BLK I FOT&E [Follow-on Operational Test and
Evaluation] Report, the SM-6 remains effective and suitable with the exception of the Evaluation] Report, the SM-6 remains effective and suitable with the exception of the
classified deficiency identified in the FY13 IOT&E [Initial Operational Test and classified deficiency identified in the FY13 IOT&E [Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation] Report and two additional problems discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLK Evaluation] Report and two additional problems discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLK
[block] I testing to verify corrected deficiencies. The SM-6 BLK IA FOT&E analysis is [block] I testing to verify corrected deficiencies. The SM-6 BLK IA FOT&E analysis is
consistent with prior reporting. consistent with prior reporting.
• While post-flight test data appears promising, DOT&E will assess the results of the • While post-flight test data appears promising, DOT&E will assess the results of the
developmental/engineering flight test to examine corrective actions to a classified developmental/engineering flight test to examine corrective actions to a classified
55 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY 2020 Annual Report, January 2021, p. 218. Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 30 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program performance deficiency discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLK verification of correction of performance deficiency discovered during FY17 SM-6 BLK verification of correction of
deficiency tests. This assessment will occur in FY21. deficiency tests. This assessment will occur in FY21.
Recommendations
The Navy should: The Navy should:
1. Fully assess the corrective actions implemented to address the additional problems 1. Fully assess the corrective actions implemented to address the additional problems
encountered during FY17 SM-6 BLK I verification of corrected deficiency tests by encountered during FY17 SM-6 BLK I verification of corrected deficiency tests by
conducting a verification of deficiency operational flight test. conducting a verification of deficiency operational flight test.
2. Plan and conduct lethality assessments for the SM-6 FCD [Future Capabilities 2. Plan and conduct lethality assessments for the SM-6 FCD [Future Capabilities
Demonstration] capabilities.Demonstration] capabilities.6456
Legislative Activity for ~~FY2022~~FY2023
Summary of Action on ~~FY2022~~FY2023 MDA Funding Request
Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the summarizes congressional action on the ~~FY2022~~FY2023 request for MDA procurement and request for MDA procurement and
research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program. research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program.

~~63 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY 2020 Annual Report, January 2021, p. 218.~~
~~64 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2020 Annual Report, January 2021, p. 168.~~
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~~Table 2. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2022~~ Table 2. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2023 MDA Funding Request
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding) (In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Enacted
HAC
SAC
Enacted
Procurement
Aegis BMD (line Aegis BMD (line ~~31)~~
~~334.6~~
~~334.6~~
~~334.6~~
~~334.6~~
~~334.6~~
~~334.6~~
~~334.6~~
32) 402.2 (SM-3 Block IB missile quantity)
(4047)
~~(40)~~
~~(40)~~
~~(40)~~
~~(34)~~
~~(34)~~
~~(40)~~
Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line ~~32)~~
~~17.5~~
~~17.5~~
~~17.5~~
~~17.5~~
~~17.5~~
~~17.5~~
~~17.5~~
33) 0 SM-3 Block IIA (line SM-3 Block IIA (line ~~34)~~
~~295.3~~
~~336.8~~
~~336.3~~
~~336.8~~
~~295.3~~
~~488.0~~
~~488.0~~
35) 338.0 (SM-3 Block IIA missile quantity)
(810)
~~(10)~~
~~(10)~~
~~(10)~~
~~(6)~~
~~(16)~~
~~(16)~~
Aegis Ashore Phase III (line Aegis Ashore Phase III (line ~~38)~~
~~25.9~~
~~25.9~~
~~25.9~~
~~25.9~~
~~25.9~~
~~25.9~~
~~25.9~~
39) 30.1 Aegis BMD hardware and software (line Aegis BMD hardware and software (line ~~40)~~
~~81.8~~
~~81.8~~
~~81.8~~
~~81.8~~
~~81.8~~
~~81.8~~
~~81.8~~
41) 78.2 Subtotal Procurement
~~755.1~~
~~796.6~~
~~796.1~~
~~796.6~~
~~755.1~~
~~947.8~~
~~947.8~~848.5
Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line ~~86)~~
~~732.5~~
~~780.9~~
~~780.9~~
~~694.4~~
~~633.5~~
~~646.0~~
~~639.5~~
83) 600.1 Aegis BMD test (PE 0604878C) (line Aegis BMD test (PE 0604878C) (line ~~118)~~
~~117.1~~
~~117.1~~
~~117.1~~
~~111.3~~
~~111.3~~
~~110.7~~
~~111.2~~
113) 182.8 Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line ~~120)~~
~~43.2~~
~~43.2~~
~~43.2~~
~~43.2~~
~~43.2~~
~~43.2~~
~~43.2~~
115) 27.7 Subtotal RDT&E
~~892.8~~
~~941.2~~
~~941.2~~
~~848.9~~
~~788.0~~
~~799.9~~
~~793.8~~810.6 TOTAL 1,659.1
~~TOTAL~~
~~1,647.9 1,737.8 1,737.3~~
~~1,645.5 1,543.1 1,747.7~~
~~1,741.7~~
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on DOD’s original Table prepared by CRS based on DOD’s original ~~FY2022~~FY2023 budget submission, committee and budget submission, committee and
conference reports, and explanatory statements on conference reports, and explanatory statements on ~~FY2022~~FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act and National Defense Authorization Act and ~~FY2022~~FY2023 DOD Appropriations Act. Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee. 56 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2020 Annual Report, January 2021, p. 168. Congressional Research Service 26 link to page 31
~~DOD Appropriations Act.~~
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
~~House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.~~
~~FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4350/S. 2792/S.~~
~~1605/P.L. 117-81)~~
~~House~~
~~The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-118 of September 10, 2021) on~~
~~H.R. 4350, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 2. The~~
~~recommended increase of $41.5 million for line 34 is for “Procure 2 additional all-up rounds.”~~
~~(Pages 396-397) The recommended increase of $48.4 million for line 86 is for “Navy SPY Radar~~
~~Digital Upgrade.” (Page 443)~~
~~H.Rept. 117-118 states:~~
~~Aegis radar~~
~~The committee recognizes that the rapid deployment of next-generation maritime radar~~
~~systems is required to address existing and emerging gaps in integrated air and missile~~
~~defenses, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the committee is concerned by~~
~~the apparent lack of alignment and congruent planning between three concurrent Aegis~~
~~Baseline radars funded at various stages of development or production across the Navy and~~
~~Missile Defense Agency. Specifically, the Navy budget includes funding for the backfit of~~
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~~AN/SPY–6(V), which began low-rate production in 2016 and will enter full-rate~~
~~production upon the award of a hardware production and sustainment contract anticipated~~
~~by the end of fiscal year 2021. The Navy budget also includes funding for the development~~
~~of a digital low noise amplifier modification to the existing AN/SPY–1 radar. At the same~~
~~time, the Missile Defense Agency budget includes funding for the development of a variant~~
~~of the Long Range Discrimination Radar for use in Aegis Ashore applications.~~
~~The committee believes there are opportunities to better leverage common, mature radar~~
~~technology in modernizing all Aegis-based platforms, including through U.S. Navy~~
~~weapon systems applications aboard existing surface ships, Homeland Defense Guam,~~
~~and/or defense of the continental United States from cruise missiles or air and missile~~
~~defense threats. Leveraging such commonality across platforms would serve as a means to~~
~~achieve critical distributed maritime operations objectives by expanding the number of~~
~~deployed netted sensors while also proliferating the number of sensors capable of~~
~~simultaneously defending against advanced air and missile defense threats. Moreover, the~~
~~committee believes that better aligning Aegis Baseline radar investments would also serve~~
~~to reduce risk and lower acquisition, lifecycle, and sustainment costs.~~
~~Therefore, the committee directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation~~
~~to conduct a review of the three Aegis Baseline radars included in the budget request for~~
~~fiscal year 2022 and to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later~~
~~than December 1, 2021, outlining the results of this review and making recommendations~~
~~for achieving greater affordability, commonality, and sustainability through improved~~
~~alignment of radar modernization investments. (Page 16)~~
~~H.Rept. 117-118 also states:~~
~~Layered Defense for the Homeland~~
~~The committee notes advances in long-range missile capabilities by rogue states,~~
~~particularly by making significant developments towards more sophisticated missile and~~
~~rocket technologies, from use of solid fuels to developing new submarine-launched~~
~~ballistic missiles. The committee continues to encourage the Department of Defense to~~
~~analyze and assess these variable threats posed by these missile and rocket capabilities, as~~
~~well as provide an analysis of gaps in homeland missile defense, with focus on missile~~
~~defense gaps along the east coast of the United States. As such, the committee looks~~
~~forward to receiving from the Department a report on layered homeland missile defense~~
~~system as directed by section 1648 of H.R. 6395, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry~~
~~National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, as passed by the House.~~
~~Further, the committee notes the successful test of the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) and~~
~~Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA against an intercontinental-range ballistic missile~~
~~(ICBM) in November 2020, and funding requested by the Missile Defense Agency to~~
~~continue development of a layered defense architecture. Therefore, the committee directs~~
~~the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with the Under Secretary of~~
~~Defense for Policy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commander of U.S. Northern~~
~~Command, to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by December~~
~~31, 2021, on development and deployment plans for using the AWS with SM–3 Block IIA~~
~~interceptors as part of a layered missile defense system. The report shall include:~~
~~(1) requirements for deploying a layered defense using the AWS and SM–3 Block IIA for~~
~~defense of the continental United States (CONUS);~~
~~(2) analysis of future AWS and SM–3 Block IIA locations that would support improved~~
~~defensive coverage of CONUS, and how the preferred location of Fort Drum, NY, for a~~
~~CONUS interceptor site using Ground-Based Interceptors could be leveraged for a future~~
~~layered defense system;~~
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~~(3) analysis of how deploying Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers for the~~
~~homeland missile defense mission would impact Navy readiness and global force~~
~~management;~~
~~(4) should land-based AWS systems be deployed for layered homeland defense, the~~
~~applicable manning strategy; and~~
~~(5) any applicable lessons learned from analysis conducted for the Guam Defense System~~
~~that could be applied to a layered homeland defense architecture, particularly for locations~~
~~previously evaluated and preferred for a CONUS interceptor site. (Page 281)~~
~~Senate~~
~~The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report S.Rept. 117-39 of September 22 [legislative~~
~~day, September 21], 2021) on S. 2792, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC~~
~~column of Table 2. The recommended increase of $41.0 million for line 34 is for “MDA UFR~~
~~[unfunded requirement]—Additional AURs [all-up rounds]”—that is, additional missiles. (Page~~
~~425) The recommended increase of $48.4 million for line 86 is for “MDA UFR—Radar~~
~~upgrades.” (Page 467)~~
Section 132 of S. 2792 as reported by the committee states:
~~SEC. 132. ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN RADAR INVESTMENT OPTIONS.~~
~~(a) ANALYSIS.—~~
~~(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation shall~~
~~conduct an analysis of covered radar systems operating with the Aegis combat system in~~
~~the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency in the future-years defense program.~~
~~(2) ELEMENTS.—The analysis conducted under paragraph (1) shall include the~~
~~following:~~
~~(A) An independent cost estimate of each covered radar systems described in paragraph~~
~~(1) and each variant thereof.~~
~~(B) An assessment of the capability provided by each such system and variant to address~~
~~current and future air and missile defense threats.~~
~~(C) In the case of covered radar systems operating with the Aegis combat system in the~~
~~Navy, an assessment of the capability and technical suitability of each planned~~
~~configuration for such systems to support current and future distributed maritime~~
~~operations in contested environments.~~
~~(b) REPORT.—Not later than March 1, 2022, the Director of Cost Assessment and~~
~~Program Evaluation shall submit to the congressional defense committees the following:~~
~~(1) A report on the results of the analysis conducted under subsection (a)(1).~~
~~(2) Such recommendations as the Director may have to achieve greater capability,~~
~~affordability, and sustainability across covered radar systems described in subsection~~
~~(a)(1), including variants thereof, during fiscal years 2022 through 2027, including whether~~
~~to maintain parallel paths with different systems configurations or to choose to pursue~~
~~fewer configurations.~~
~~(c) COVERED RADAR SYSTEMS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered radar~~
~~systems’’ includes the following:~~
~~(1) AN/SPY–1.~~
~~(2) AN/SPY–6.~~
~~(3) AN/SPY–7.~~
~~Regarding Section 132, S.Rept. 117-39 states:~~
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~~Analysis of certain radar investment options (sec. 132)~~
~~The committee recommends a provision that would require the Director of the Office of~~
~~Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to conduct an independent review of~~
~~the three radar systems supporting current Aegis combat systems of the Navy and the~~
~~Missile Defense Agency in the fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2027 timeframe. The~~
~~Director would be required to submit a report on the results of that analysis not later than~~
~~March 1, 2022, to the congressional defense committees.~~
~~The committee recognizes that the rapid deployment of next-generation maritime radar~~
~~systems will be required to address existing and emerging gaps in integrated air and missile~~
~~defense. To that end, the Navy intends to equip all new DDG–51 destroyers and the DDG–~~
~~X Large Surface Combatant with the AN/SPY–6 Air and Missile Defense Radar. The~~
~~AN/SPY–7 was chosen by the Missile Defense Agency to be the radar for Aegis Ashore~~
~~applications.~~
~~The committee supports efforts to leverage commonality among weapons systems and~~
~~believes additional opportunities may be available to employ this approach in modernizing~~
~~Aegis weapons systems aboard existing surface ships as well as in Aegis Ashore~~
~~applications. Employing common radar systems could reduce risk and lower life cycle~~
~~costs for the Department of Defense.~~
~~To clarify the options, the provision would require CAPE to analyze the costs and~~
~~capabilities of the current radars supporting Aegis combat systems. (Page 7)~~
~~Enacted~~
~~The joint explanatory statement for the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1605/P.L.~~
~~117-81 of December 27, 2021) recommends the funding levels shown in the authorization~~
~~enacted column of Table 2. The recommended increase of $41.5 million for line 34 is for “MDA~~
~~UFR [unfunded requirement]—Additional AURs [all-up rounds].” (PDF page 479 of 670) The~~
~~recommended net decrease of $38.094 million for line 86 includes a recommended reduction of~~
~~$86.494 million for “Layered homeland defense lack of requirement” and a recommended~~
~~increase of $48.4 million for “MDA UFR—Radar upgrades.” (PDF page 537 of 670). The~~
~~recommended reduction of $5.8 million for line 118 is for “Unjustified growth—AEGIS LHD~~
~~test funding early to need.” (PDF page 540 of 670)~~
Section 145 of the S. 1605/P.L. 117-81 states:
~~SEC. 145. ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN RADAR INVESTMENT OPTIONS.~~
~~(a) ANALYSIS REQUIRED.—~~
~~(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation shall~~
~~conduct an analysis of covered radar systems operating in the Navy and the Missile~~
~~Defense Agency over the period covered by the most recent future-years defense program~~
~~submitted to Congress under section 221 of title 10, United States Code.~~
~~(2) ELEMENTS.—The analysis conducted under paragraph (1) shall include the~~
~~following:~~
~~(A) An independent cost estimate of each covered radar system described in paragraph~~
~~(1) and each variant thereof.~~
~~(B) An assessment of the capability provided by each such system and variant to address~~
~~current and future air and missile defense threats.~~
~~(C) In the case of covered radar systems operating in the Navy, an assessment of the~~
~~capability and technical suitability of each planned configuration for such systems to~~
~~support current and future distributed maritime operations in contested environments.~~
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~~(b) REPORT.—Not later than May 1, 2022, the Director of Cost Assessment and Program~~
~~Evaluation shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes the~~
~~following:~~
~~(1) The results of the analysis conducted under subsection (a)(1).~~
~~(2) Such recommendations as the Director may have to achieve greater capability,~~
~~affordability, and sustainability across covered radar systems described in subsection~~
~~(a)(1), including variants thereof, during fiscal years 2022 through 2027, including~~
~~whether—~~
~~(A) to continue to develop and maintain each covered radar system separately; or~~
~~(B) to pursue fewer configurations of such systems.~~
~~(c) COVERED RADAR SYSTEMS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered radar~~
~~systems’’ means radar systems with the following designations an any variants thereof:~~
~~(1) AN/SPY–1.~~
~~(2) AN/SPY–3.~~
~~(3) AN/SPY–6.~~
~~(4) AN/SPY–7.~~
Section 1665 of S. 1605/P.L. 117-81 states (emphasis added):
~~SEC. 1665. GUAM INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.~~
~~(a) ARCHITECTURE AND ACQUISITION.—The Secretary of Defense, acting through~~
~~the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, and in coordination with the Commander of~~
~~the United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall identify the architecture and acquisition~~
~~approach for implementing a 360-degree integrated air and missile defense capability to~~
~~defend the people, infrastructure, and territory of Guam from the scope and scale of~~
~~advanced cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats that are expected to be fielded~~
~~during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.~~
~~(b) REQUIREMENTS.—The architecture identified under subsection (a) shall have the~~
~~ability to—~~
~~(1) integrate, while maintaining high kill chain performance against advanced threats, all~~
~~applicable—~~
~~(A) multi-domain sensors that contribute substantively to track quality and track custody;~~
~~(B) interceptors; and~~
~~(C) command and control systems;~~
~~(2) address robust discrimination and electromagnetic compatibility with other sensors;~~
~~(3) engage directly, or coordinate engagements with other integrated air and missile~~
~~defense systems, to defeat the spectrum of cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats expected~~
~~to be fielded during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act;~~
~~(4) leverage existing programs of record to expedite the development and deployment of~~
~~the architecture during the five-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this~~
~~Act, with an objective of achieving initial operating capability in 2025, including with~~
~~respect to—~~
~~(A) the Aegis ballistic missile defense system;~~
~~(B) standard missile–3 and –6 variants;~~
~~(C) the terminal high altitude area defense system;~~
~~(D) the Patriot air and missile defense system;~~
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~~(E) the integrated battle control system;~~
~~and~~
~~(F) the lower tier air and missile defense sensor and other lower tier capabilities, as~~
~~applicable;~~
~~(5) integrate future systems and interceptors, including directed energy-based kill systems,~~
~~that will also have the capability to detect, track, and defeat hypersonic missiles in the glide~~
~~and terminal phases, including integration of passive measures to protect assets in Guam;~~
~~and~~
~~(6) incentivize competition within the acquisition of the architecture and rapid procurement~~
~~and deployment wherever possible.~~
~~(c) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the~~
~~Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the architecture~~
~~and acquisition approach identified under subsection (a), including—~~
~~(1) an assessment of the development and implementation risks associated with each of the~~
~~elements identified under subsection (b); and~~
~~(2) a plan for expending funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made~~
~~available for fiscal year 2022 for such architecture.~~
~~(d) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise~~
~~made available for fiscal year 2022 for the Department of Defense for the Office of Cost~~
~~Assessment and Program Evaluation, not more than 80 percent may be obligated or~~
~~expended until the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional~~
~~defense committees the report under subsection (c).~~
~~The joint explanatory statement also states:~~
~~Sense of Congress on Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania~~
~~The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1650A) that would express the sense of~~
~~Congress on Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania.~~
~~The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.~~
~~The agreement does not include this provision.~~
~~We note that both Poland and Romania, which host Aegis Ashore sites, are vital allies of~~
~~the United States. We understand that the contributions provided by these Aegis Ashore~~
~~sites help ensure the defenses of Poland, Romania, the United States, and the member states~~
~~of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We believe it is vital that the construction of the~~
~~Aegis Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland, is completed and brought online at the earliest~~
~~possible date. (PDF page 383 of 670)~~
~~FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4432/S. XXXX/Division C of~~
~~H.R. 2471/P.L. 117-103)~~
~~House~~
~~The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 117-88 of July 15, 2021) on H.R.~~
~~4432, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 2.~~
~~Although the recommended funding levels for lines 31 and 34 are the same as the requested~~
~~figures, the quantities of missiles to be procured under those two funding lines have been reduced~~
~~by six missiles and two missiles, respectively, as shown in the table. (Page 228)~~
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~~The recommended reduction of $98.963 million for line 86 is for “Unjustified growth—AEGIS~~
~~LHD lack of validated requirement and acquisition strategy.” (Page 314) The recommended~~
~~reduction of $5.8 million for line 118 is for “Unjustified growth—AEGIS LHD test funding early~~
~~to need.” (Page 315)~~
~~Senate~~
~~The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the explanatory statement it released on October 18,~~
~~2021, for the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (S. XXXX), recommended the funding level~~
~~shown in the SAC column of Table 2.~~
~~The recommended increase of $192.7 million for line 34 is for “Program increase: Eight SM–3~~
~~IIA interceptors.” (PDF page 146 of 253)~~
~~The recommended decrease of $86.494 million for line 86 is for “Layered homeland defense lack~~
~~of requirement.” (PDF page 206 of 253)~~
~~The recommended decrease of $6.335 million for line 118 is for “Layered homeland defense lack~~
~~of requirement” ($5.849 million) and “FTX–26 delay” ($0.486 million). (PDF page 207 of 253)~~
~~The explanatory statement for S. XXXX released by the committee on October 18, 2021, states:~~
AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense.—The Committee notes emerging mass ballistic missile
~~raid strategies and supports the development of vital propulsion technology and expansion~~
~~of the controllable missile propulsion industrial base to defend against swarm attacks. (PDF~~
~~page 10 of 253)~~
~~Enacted~~
~~The joint explanatory statement for the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R.~~
~~2471/P.L. 117-103 of March 15, 2022, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022) provides the~~
~~funding levels shown in the appropriation enacted column of Table 2.~~
~~The $192.7 million increase for line 34 is for “Program increase—eight SM-3 IIA interceptors.”~~
~~(PDF page 252 of 263 of PDF Part 1.)~~
~~The net reduction of $92.963 million for line 86 includes a reduction of $98.963 million for~~
~~“Layered homeland defense lack of requirement” and an increase of $6.0 million for “Program~~
~~increase—lightweight telescope for advanced AEGIS interceptor.” (PDF page 93 of 165 of PDF~~
~~Part 2.)~~
~~The $5.849 reduction for line 118 is for “Layered homeland defense lack of requirement.” (PDF~~
~~page 94 of 165 of PDF Part 2.)~~

~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~link to page 42~~ Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Appendix. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests
Table A-1 presents a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. In addition presents a summary of reported Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. In addition
to the flight tests shown in the table, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser to the flight tests shown in the table, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser
operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3 operating northwest of Hawaii used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system with the SM-3
missile to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit. missile to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit.
Table A-1. Reported Aegis BMD Flight Tests From January 2002 to the Present
Name of flight
Cumulative Cumulative
Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
Exo-atmospheric (using SM-3 missile)
1/25/02 1/25/02
US US
FM-2 FM-2
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
1 1
1 1
6/13/02 6/13/02
US US
FM-3 FM-3
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
2 2
2 2
11/21/02 11/21/02
US US
FM-4 FM-4
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
3 3
3 3
6/18/03 6/18/03
US US
FM-5 FM-5
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
No
3 3
4 4
12/11/03 12/11/03
US US
FM-6 FM-6
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
4 4
5 5
2/24/05 2/24/05
US US
FTM 04-1 (FM-7) Unitary short-range (TTV) FTM 04-1 (FM-7) Unitary short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
5 5
6 6
11/17/05 11/17/05
US US
FTM 04-2 (FM-8) Separating short-range (MRT) FTM 04-2 (FM-8) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
6 6
7 7
6/22/06 6/22/06
US US
FTM 10 FTM 10
Separating short-range (TTV) Separating short-range (TTV)
Yes Yes
7 7
8 8
12/7/06 12/7/06
US US
FTM 11 FTM 11
Unitary short-range (TTV) Unitary short-range (TTV)
No
7 7
9 9
4/26/07 4/26/07
US US
FTM 11 FTM 11
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
8 8
10 10
Event 4 Event 4
6/22/07 6/22/07
US US
FTM 12 FTM 12
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
9 9
11 11
8/31/07 8/31/07
US US
FTM-11a FTM-11a
Classified Classified
Yes Yes
10 10
12 12
11/6/07 11/6/07
US US
FTM 13 FTM 13
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
11 11
13 13

Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
12 12
14 14
12/17/07 12/17/07
Japan Japan
JFTM-1 JFTM-1
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
13 13
15 15
11/1/08 11/1/08
US US
Pacific Blitz Pacific Blitz
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
14 14
16 16

Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
No
14 14
17 17
11/19/08 11/19/08
Japan Japan
JFTM-2 JFTM-2
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
No
14 14
18 18
7/30/09 7/30/09
US US
FTM-17 FTM-17
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
15 15
19 19
10/27/09 10/27/09
Japan Japan
JFTM-3 JFTM-3
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
16 16
20 20
10/28/10 10/28/10
Japan Japan
JFTM-4 JFTM-4
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
17 17
21 21
4/14/11 4/14/11
US US
FTM-15 FTM-15
Separating intermediate range Separating intermediate range
Yes Yes
18 18
22 22
(LV-2) (LV-2)
9/1/11 9/1/11
US US
FTM-16 E2 FTM-16 E2
Separating short-range (ARAV-B) Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
No
18 18
23 23
5/9/12 5/9/12
US US
FTM-16 E2a FTM-16 E2a
Unitary short-range (ARAV-A) Unitary short-range (ARAV-A)
Yes Yes
19 19
24 24
6/26/12 6/26/12
US US
FTM-18 FTM-18
Separating short-range (MRT) Separating short-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
20 20
25 25
10/25/12 10/25/12
US US
FTI-01 FTI-01
Separating short-range (ARAV-B) Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
No
20 20
26 26
2/12/13 2/12/13
US US
FTM-20 FTM-20
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
Yes Yes
21 21
27 27
(MRBM-T3) (MRBM-T3)
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Name of flight
Cumulative Cumulative
Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
5/15/13 5/15/13
US US
FTM-19 FTM-19
Separating short-range (ARAV- Separating short-range (ARAV-
Yes Yes
22 22
28 28
C) C)
9/10/13 9/10/13
US US
FTO-01 FTO-01
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
Yes Yes
23 23
29 29
(eMRBM-T1) (eMRBM-T1)
9/18/13 9/18/13
US US
FTM-21 FTM-21
Separating short-range (ARAV- Separating short-range (ARAV-
Yes Yes
24 24
30 30
C++) C++)
10/3/13 10/3/13
US US
FTM-22 FTM-22
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
Yes Yes
25 25
31 31
(ARAV-TTO-E) (ARAV-TTO-E)
11/6/14 11/6/14
US US
FTM-25 FTM-25
Separating short-range (ARAV-B) Separating short-range (ARAV-B)
Yes Yes
26 26
32 32
6/25/15 6/25/15
US US
FTO-02 E1 FTO-02 E1
Separating medium-range (IRBM Separating medium-range (IRBM
n n/aa
26 26
32 32
T1) T1)
10/4/15 10/4/15
US US
FTO-02 E2 FTO-02 E2
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
n n/ab
26 26
32 32
(eMRBM) (eMRBM)
10/20/15 10/20/15
US US
ASD-15 E2 ASD-15 E2
Separating short-range (Terrier Separating short-range (Terrier
Yes Yes
27 27
33 33
Orion) Orion)
11/1/15 11/1/15
US US
FTO-02 E2a FTO-02 E2a
Separating medium-range Separating medium-range
No
27 27
34 34
(eMRBM) (eMRBM)
12/10/15 12/10/15
US (Aegis US (Aegis
FTO02 E1a FTO02 E1a
Separating medium-range (IRBM Separating medium-range (IRBM
Yes Yes
28 28
35 35
Ashore) Ashore)
T1) T1)
2/3/17 2/3/17
US-Japan US-Japan
SFTM-01 SFTM-01
Separating medium-range (MRT) Separating medium-range (MRT)
Yes Yes
29 29
36 36
6/21/17 6/21/17
US-Japan US-Japan
SFTM-02 SFTM-02
Medium-range Medium-range
No
29 29
37 37
10/15/17 10/15/17
US US
FS17 FS17
Medium-range target Medium-range target
Yes Yes
30 30
38 38
1/31/18 1/31/18
US (Aegis US (Aegis
FTM-29 FTM-29
Intermediate-range target Intermediate-range target
No
30 30
39 39
Ashore) Ashore)
9/11/18 9/11/18
Japan Japan
JFTM-05 JFTM-05
Simple separating target Simple separating target
Yes Yes
31 31
40 40
10/26/18 10/26/18
US US
FTM-45 FTM-45
Medium range Medium range
Yes Yes
32 32
41 41
12/10/18 12/10/18
US (Aegis US (Aegis
FTI-03 FTI-03
Intermediate-range target Intermediate-range target
Yes Yes
33 33
42 42
Ashore) Ashore)
11/16/20 11/16/20
US US
FTM-44 FTM-44
ICBM target ICBM target
Yes Yes
34 34
43 43
5/26/21 and 5/26/21 and
US- US-
ASD/FS21c ASD/FS21c
Non-separating MRBM target Non-separating MRBM target
Y Yesc
35c 35c
44c 44c
30/2021 30/2021
Netherlands Netherlands
Endo-atmospheric (using SM-2 missile Block IV missile and [for MMW E1 and subsequent] SM-6 Dual 1 missile)
5/24/06 5/24/06
US US
Pacific Phoenix Pacific Phoenix
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
1 1
1 1
(Lance) (Lance)
6/5/08 6/5/08
US US
FTM-14 FTM-14
Unitary short-range target (FMA) Unitary short-range target (FMA)
Yes Yes
2 2
2 2
3/26/09 3/26/09
US US
Stellar Daggers Stellar Daggers
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
3 3
3 3
(Lance) (Lance)
7/28/15 7/28/15
US US
MMW E1 MMW E1
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
4 4
4 4
(Lance) (Lance)
7/29/15 7/29/15
US US
MMW E2 MMW E2
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
5 5
5 5
(Lance) (Lance)
12/14/16 12/14/16
US US
FTM-27 FTM-27
Unitary short-range target Unitary short-range target
Yes Yes
6 6
6 6
(Lance) (Lance)
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Name of flight
Cumulative Cumulative
Date
Country
test of exercise
Ballistic Missile Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
8/29/17 8/29/17
US US
FTM-27 E2 FTM-27 E2
Medium-range target (MRBM) Medium-range target (MRBM)
Yes Yes
7 7
7 7
5/29/21 5/29/21
US US
FTM-31 FTM-31
Medium-range target (MRBM) Medium-range target (MRBM)
No
7 7
8 8
7/24/21 7/24/21
US US
FTM-33 FTM-33
Two SRBM targets Two SRBM targets
Yes and Yes and
8 and 8 and
9 and 10 9 and 10
unconfirmedd unconfirmedd unconfirmedd
Sources: Table presented in MDA fact sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” February 2017, accessed Table presented in MDA fact sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” February 2017, accessed
on on ~~August 27, 2020~~May 18, 2022, at https://web.archive.org/web/20170929180757/https:/www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/, at https://web.archive.org/web/20170929180757/https:/www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/
aegis_tests.pdf, and (for flight tests subsequent to February 2017) MDA news releases. aegis_tests.pdf, and (for flight tests subsequent to February 2017) MDA news releases.
Notes: TTV is target test vehicle; is target test vehicle; ARAV is Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle. In addition to the flight tests is Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle. In addition to the flight tests
shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S. shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S.
satellite—an operation called Burnt Frost. satellite—an operation called Burnt Frost.
a. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of August 3, 2015, a. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of August 3, 2015,
had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 31 successful intercepts in 37 launches had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 31 successful intercepts in 37 launches
through July 29, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was considered a “no test” through July 29, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was considered a “no test”
event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD system or the SM-3 event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD system or the SM-3
interceptor. News reports state that the test was aborted due to a failure of the target missile. (Andrea interceptor. News reports state that the test was aborted due to a failure of the target missile. (Andrea
Shalal, “U.S. Skips Aegis Ashore Missile Test After Target Malfunction,” Shalal, “U.S. Skips Aegis Ashore Missile Test After Target Malfunction,” Reuters, June 26, 2015.) MDA’s table , June 26, 2015.) MDA’s table
similarly shows the test of December 7, 2006, as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA similarly shows the test of December 7, 2006, as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA
issued a news release on this test, which stated that an SM-3 was not launched “due to an incorrect system issued a news release on this test, which stated that an SM-3 was not launched “due to an incorrect system
setting aboard the Aegis-class cruiser USS setting aboard the Aegis-class cruiser USS Lake Erie prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the
ship. The incorrect configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship from launching the first ship. The incorrect configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship from launching the first
of the two [SM-3] interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch of two of the two [SM-3] interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch of two
missiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally not launched.” MDA missiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally not launched.” MDA
counts the test of December 7, 2006, as an unsuccessful intercept in its count of 31 successful intercepts in counts the test of December 7, 2006, as an unsuccessful intercept in its count of 31 successful intercepts in
37 launches through July 29, 2015. 37 launches through July 29, 2015.
b. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of November 10, b. MDA’s table shows this as a test that did not result in the launch of an SM-3. MDA as of November 10,
2015, had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 32 successful intercepts in 39 2015, had not issued a news release discussing this event. MDA’s count of 32 successful intercepts in 39
launches through November 1, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was launches through November 1, 2015, does not appear to include this test, suggesting that this was
considered a “no test” event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD considered a “no test” event—a test in which there was a failure that was not related to the Aegis BMD
system or the SM-3 interceptor. system or the SM-3 interceptor.
c. ASD/FS21 was an at-sea demonstration that occurred during a multilateral naval exercise called Formidable c. ASD/FS21 was an at-sea demonstration that occurred during a multilateral naval exercise called Formidable
Shield 2021. In the demonstration, a Dutch frigate used its radar to provide early warning track data to a Shield 2021. In the demonstration, a Dutch frigate used its radar to provide early warning track data to a
U.S. Navy destroyer that used the data to calculate a firing solution and launch its interceptor. Some press U.S. Navy destroyer that used the data to calculate a firing solution and launch its interceptor. Some press
reports state that ASD/FS21 involved two successful ballistic missile intercepts, rather than the one shown reports state that ASD/FS21 involved two successful ballistic missile intercepts, rather than the one shown
in the table. in the table.
d. MDA stated that “based on initial observations, one target was successful y intercepted. At this time, we d. MDA stated that “based on initial observations, one target was successful y intercepted. At this time, we
cannot confirm the second target was destroyed.” (“MDA Test Intercepts Target,” MDA News Release 21- cannot confirm the second target was destroyed.” (“MDA Test Intercepts Target,” MDA News Release 21-
NEWS-0012, July 24, 2021.) NEWS-0012, July 24, 2021.)

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs Specialist in Naval Affairs

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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

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