Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
August 6, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33745
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program

Summary
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for
conducting BMD operations. Under MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy
Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 24 at the end of FY2011 to 41 at the end of FY2018.
Under the Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD
operations, BMD-capable Aegis ships are operating in European waters to defend Europe from
potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran. On October 5, 2011, the United
States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis
ships are to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at Rota, Spain, in FY2014 and FY2015. BMD-
capable Aegis ships also operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional
defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. On
March 15, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced that it is dropping the fourth and
final phase of the EPAA and canceling the development program for the Aegis SM-3 Block IIB
interceptor missile that was to be deployed under that phase.
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2014 budget requests a total of
$2,087.2 million in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts,
including funding for Aegis Ashore sites that are to be part of the EPAA. MDA’s budget also
includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the
Aegis BMD program.
Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:
• the impact on the Aegis BMD program of the March 1, 2013, sequester on
FY2013 funding and unobligated prior-year funding for the program;
• the potential impact on the Aegis BMD program of a possible sequester later this
year or early next year on FY2014 funding and unobligated prior-year funding
for the program;
• U.S. vs. European naval contributions to European BMD;
• the lack of a target for simulating the endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight
of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile; and
• concurrency and technical risk in the Aegis BMD program.

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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Aegis Ships ................................................................................................................................ 1
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers ........................................................................ 1
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers .............................................................. 2
Projected Aegis Ship Force Levels ...................................................................................... 2
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies ............................................................................................... 3
Aegis BMD System ................................................................................................................... 3
Versions of Aegis BMD System .......................................................................................... 3
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles ......................................................................................... 3
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD .......................................... 6
Planned Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Interceptors ................................. 8
Home Ports of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships ............................................................................... 9
Pacific vs. Atlantic Fleet Homeporting ............................................................................... 9
October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain ................................................ 9
Aegis BMD Flight Tests .......................................................................................................... 10
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program ....................................................... 12
Japan .................................................................................................................................. 12
Other Countries ................................................................................................................. 12
FY2014 Funding Request ........................................................................................................ 13
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 13
Impact of March 1, 2013, Sequester on FY2013 Funding ...................................................... 13
Potential Impact of Possible Late 2013/Early 2014 Sequester on FY2014 Funding ............... 14
U.S. vs. European Naval Contributions to European BMD .................................................... 14
Target for Simulating Endo-Atmospheric Flight of DF-21 ASBM ......................................... 15
Concurrency and Technical Risk in Aegis BMD Program ...................................................... 16
SM-3 Block IB Missile ..................................................................................................... 16
SM-3 Block IIA Missile .................................................................................................... 18
SM-6 Missile ..................................................................................................................... 18
Aegis Ashore ..................................................................................................................... 20
Legislative Activity for FY2014 .................................................................................................... 22
Summary of Action on FY2014 MDA Funding Request ........................................................ 22
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960/S. 1197) ........................................ 23
House ................................................................................................................................. 23
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 27
FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397/S. 1429) ......................................................... 39
House ................................................................................................................................. 39
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 39

Tables
Table 1. Versions of Aegis BMD System ......................................................................................... 6
Table 2. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Missiles ............................................. 8
Table 3. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts, FY2013-FY2018 ............................................... 13
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Table 4. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2014 Request for MDA Procurement
and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program ......................................................................... 22
Table A-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests Since January 2002............................................................... 41

Appendixes
Appendix A. Aegis BMD Flight Tests ........................................................................................... 40
Appendix B. Homeporting of U.S. Navy Aegis BMD Ships at Rota, Spain ................................. 56
Appendix C. Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program ........................................ 59
Appendix D. Earlier Oversight Issues Relating to SM-3 Block IIB Missile ................................. 66

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 70

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Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic
missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and
the Navy, and gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD
operations. Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD
capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base.
Background
Aegis Ships
The Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the
Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays,
weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus. The
Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship
cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface threats. The system was first deployed
by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers
A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered
service between 1983 and 1994. The first five (CGs 47 through 51), which were built to an earlier
technical standard in certain respects, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize
and were removed from service in 2004-2005.
As a cost-saving measure, the Navy’s FY2014 budget proposes retiring 7 of the remaining 22
Aegis cruisers in FY2015, years before the end of their 35-year expected service lives. The
Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget had made a similar proposal to retire 7 of the 22 cruisers in
FY2013 and FY2014.1 One of the seven cruisers proposed for early retirement under the FY2013
budget had been given a capability for BMD operations;2 some or all of the other six were
scheduled to be modified for BMD operations at some point. Congress, in acting on the Navy’s
proposed FY2013 budget, did not accept the proposed early retirements, and instead instructed
the Navy to keep these seven cruisers in service. Section 8103 of the FY2013 DOD
appropriations act (Division C of H.R. 933/P.L. 113-6 of March 26, 2013, the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013) established a Ship Modernization, Operations and
Sustainment Fund to fund the continued operation and support of these seven cruisers (and also
two amphibious ships that were proposed for early retirements) in FY2013 and FY2014. The

1 The seven ships were Cowpens (CG-63), Anzio (CG-68), Vicksburg (CG-69), and Port Royal (CG-73), which were
proposed for retirement in FY2013, and Gettysburg (CG-64), Chosin (CG-65), and Hue City (CG-66), which were
proposed for retirement in FY2014. These ships entered service between 1991 (Cowpens) and 1994 (Port Royal); their
35-year service lives would extend to between 2026 and 2029. Port Royal was the last of the 27 ships in the class (i.e.,
it is the youngest ship in the class). Of the 22 Aegis cruisers currently in service, the oldest is Bunker Hill (CG-52),
which entered service in 1986.
2 The ship that has already been given a capability for BMD operations is Port Royal (CG-73).
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seven cruisers that the Navy’s FY2014 budget proposes for early retirements in FY2015 are the
same seven cruisers that were proposed for early retirements under the FY2013 budget.3
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers4
62 Flight I/II and Flight IIA DDG-51s Procured in FY1985-FY2005
A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first
entered service in 1991 and the 62nd entered service in FY2012. The first 28 ships, known as
Flight I/II DDG-51s, are scheduled to remain in service until age 35. The next 34 ships, known as
Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design changes and are scheduled to remain in service
until age 40.
No DDG-51s Procured in FY2006-FY2009
No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured
three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does not use the Aegis
system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy plans do not call
for modifying DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable.
11 Flight IIA DDG-51s Procured or Programmed for FY2010-FY2016
Procurement of DDG-51s resumed in FY2010. One Flight IIA DDG-51 was procured in FY2010,
two more were procured in FY2011, one more was procured in FY2012, and three more were
procured in FY2013. Navy plans call for procuring four more Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY2014-
FY2016. The ship procured in FY2010 is scheduled to enter service in FY2016.
Flight III DDG-51s Programmed Starting in FY2016
Navy plans call for shifting to procurement of a new version of the DDG-51, called the Flight III
version, starting in FY2016.5 The Flight III version is to be equipped with a new radar, called the
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), that is more capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on
all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers.
Projected Aegis Ship Force Levels
The Navy’s FY2014 30-year (FY2014-FY2043) shipbuilding plan projects that the total number
of Aegis cruisers and destroyers will be between 80 and 90 for most of the 30-year period.6

3 The seven cruisers proposed for early retirement in FY2015 under the FY2014 budget submission are identified in
Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2014, May 2013, p. 21
(Table A1-1).
4 For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
5 Of the two DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2016, one is to be the final Flight IIA ship, and the other is to
be the first Flight III ship.
6 For a table showing the total number of cruisers and destroyers each year from FY2014 through FY2043, see CRS
(continued...)
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Aegis Ships in Allied Navies
Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now
operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Spain, and Norway.7
Aegis BMD System8
Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to
the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor
missiles. In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s
procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are to be built from the start with a BMD capability.
Versions of Aegis BMD System
Currently fielded versions of the Aegis BMD system are called the 3.6.1 version and the newer
and more capable 4.0.1 and 4.0.2 versions. MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly
capable versions in coming years; these planned versions are called 5.0, 5.0 CU (meaning
capability upgrade), and 5.1. Improved versions feature improved processors and software, and
are to be capable of using improved versions of the SM-3 interceptor missile (see Table 1).
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles
The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the
Standard Missile-2 Block IV (SM-2 Block IV). The SM-2 Block IV is to be succeeded in coming
years by a BMD version of the new SM-6 interceptor.
SM-3 Midcourse Interceptor
The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric
intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit-
to-kill” warhead, called a kinetic warhead, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead
by colliding with it.

(...continued)
Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke. A similar table can be found in CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke. The totals shown in these two reports include the
three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers, which are to enter service in FY2014, FY2016, and FY2018; these non-
Aegis ships would need to be subtracted out of the figures shown in the tables to get the figures for the total number of
Aegis ships.
7 The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version
of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar.
8 Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to
CRS and CBO analysts in March 2010, March 2011, March 2012, and April 2013.
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MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable versions of the SM-3 in coming years.
The current version, called the SM-3 Block IA, is now being supplemented by the more capable
SM-3 Block IB. These are to be followed by the even more capable SM-3 Block IIA.
Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target
seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting
its course.
In contrast to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster stage at the
bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block IIA version
is to have a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform 21
inches provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout
velocity (a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater
than that of the Block IA and IB versions,9 as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The
United States and Japan have cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA
version, with Japan funding a significant share of the effort.10
Until recently, a more capable missile called the SM-3 Block IIB was also planned. Compared to
the Block IIA, the Block IIB version was to include a lighter kill vehicle, flexible propulsion, and
upgraded fire control software.11 On March 15, 2013, however, the Department of Defense
(DOD) announced that it was
• “restructuring” (i.e., canceling) the SM-3 Block IIB program;
• shifting funding from SM-3 Block IIB program to other BMD efforts
(specifically, the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) BMD program in Alaska and
to earlier versions of the SM-3); and
• dropping Phase IV of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA—see
discussion below), which was to feature the deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB
missile.12

9 Some press reports and journal articles, most now a decade or more old, report unconfirmed figures on the burnout
velocities of various SM-3 missile configurations (some of which were proposed but ultimately not pursued). See, for
example, J. D. Marshall, The Future Of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, point paper dated October 15, 2004, accessed
online at http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/259.pdf; “STANDARD Missile-3 Destroys a Ballistic Missile Target
in Test of Sea-based Missile Defense System,” Raytheon news release circa January 26, 2002; Gopal Ratnam, “U.S.
Navy To Play Larger Role In Missile Defense, Defense News, January 21-27, 2002: 10; Hans Mark, “A White Paper on
the Defense Against Ballistic Missiles,” The Bridge, Summer 2001, pp. 17-26, accessed online at http://www.nae.edu/
nae/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/NAEW-63BM86/$FILE/BrSum01.pdf?OpenElement; Michael C. Sirak, “White House
Decision May Move Sea-Based NMD Into Spotlight,” Inside Missile Defense, September 6, 2000: 1; Henry F. Cooper
and J.D. Williams, “The Earliest Deployment Option—Sea-Based Defenses,” Inside Missile Defense, September 6,
2000 (guest perspective; including graphic on page 21); Robert Holzer, “DoD Weighs Navy Interceptor Options,
Defense News, July 24, 2000: 1, 60 (graphic on page 1); and Robert Holzer, “U.S. Navy Gathers Strength, Allies in
NMD Showdown,” Defense News, March 15, 1999: 1, 42 (graphic on page 1).
10 The cooperative research effort has been carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999.
The effort has focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the
second-stage propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone. The Block IIA development effort includes the development of a
missile, called the Block II, as a stepping stone to the Block IIA. As a result, the Block IIA development effort has
sometimes been called the Block II/IIA development effort. The Block II missile is not planned as a fielded capability.
11 Source: H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010 (the House Armed Services Committee report on H.R. 5136, the FY2011
defense authorization bill), p. 196.
12 As part of a March 15, 2013, statement announcing changes in BMD programs, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
(continued...)
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MDA states that that SM-3 Block IBs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $12
million to $15 million, and that SM-3 Block IIAs have an estimated unit procurement cost of
about $20 million to $24 million.
SM-2 and SM-6 Terminal Interceptors
The SM-2 Block IV is designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo-
atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is
equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead.
The existing inventory of SM-2 Block IVs—72 as of February 2012—was created by modifying
SM-2s that were originally built to intercept aircraft and ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs
were modified, and 3 have been used in BMD flight tests, leaving the current remaining inventory
of 72.
MDA and Navy plans call for developing and procuring a more capable terminal-phase BMD
interceptor based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the successor to the SM-2 air defense missile).
The initial version of the SM-6 BMD interceptor, called Increment 1, is to enter service around
2015; a subsequent version, called Increment 2, is to enter service around 2018.
Table 1 summarizes the various versions of the Aegis BMD system and correlates them with the
phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA; see below) for European BMD
operations.

(...continued)
stated that “we are restructuring the SM-3 IIB program. As many of you know, we had planned to deploy the SM-3 IIB
as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. The purpose was to add to the protection of the U.S. homeland
already provided by our current GBIs against missile threats from the Middle East. The timeline for deploying this
program had been delayed to at least 2022 due to cuts in congressional funding. Meanwhile, the threat matures. By
shifting resources from this lagging program to fund the additional GBIs as well as advanced kill vehicle technology
that will improve the performance of the GBI and other versions of the SM-3 interceptor, we will be able to add
protection against missiles from Iran sooner while also providing additional protection against the North Korean
threat.” (Missile Defense Announcement, As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, The Pentagon, Friday,
March 15, 2013, accessed March 20, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1759.)
Following this announcement, Secretary Hage and two other DOD officials—James Miller, the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, and Admiral James Winnefeld, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—took questions
from the press. One questioner asked whether DOD was dropping Phase IV of the EPAA. Undersecretary Miller
replied: “Yes, the—the prior plan had four phases. The third phase involved the deployment of interceptors in Poland.
And we will continue with phases one through three. In the fourth phase, in the previous plan, we would have added
some additional—an additional type of interceptors, the so-called SM-3 IIB would have been added to the mix in
Poland. We no longer intend to—to add them to the mix, but we'll continue to have the same number of deployed
interceptors in Poland that will provide coverage for all of NATO in Europe.” (DOD news transcript, “DOD News
Briefing on Missile Defense from the Pentagon,” March 15, 2013, accessed March 20, 2013, at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5205.)
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Table 1. Versions of Aegis BMD System
EPAA Phase
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
Version of Aegis BMD system
3.6.1
4.0.1
5.0/5.0 CU
5.1
Certified for initial use
2006
2012
2015
2018
OTE assessment
2008
2014
2016
2020

SM-3 Block IA
X
X
X
X
SM-3 Block IB

X
X
X
SM-3 Block IIA



X

SM-2 Block IV
X


X
SM-6 Increment 1


X

SM-6 Increment 2



X

SRBM Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
MRBM Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
IRBM Limited
Yes
Yes
Enhanced
ICBM Noa Noa Noa Limited

Launch on remote
Initial
Enhanced
Yes
Yes
Engage on remote
No
No
No
Yes
Source: MDA briefings to CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), April 2013.
Notes: OTE is operational test and evaluation. SRBM is short-range ballistic missile; MRBM is medium-range
ballistic missile; IRBM is intermediate-range ballistic missile; ICBM is intercontinental ballistic missile. Launch
on remote
is the ability to launch the interceptor using data from off-board sensors. Engage on remote is
the ability to engage targets using data from off-board sensors.
a. Cannot intercept ICBMs, but the system has a long-range search and track (LRS&T) capability—an ability to
detect and track ballistic missiles at long ranges.
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD
On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new approach for regional BMD
operations called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The first application of the approach is in
Europe, and is called the European PAA (EPAA). EPAA calls for using BMD-capable Aegis
ships, a land-based radar in Europe, and eventually two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and
Poland to defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran. MDA stated
in 2012 that
The Department [of Defense] met its commitment for EPAA Phase 1 by deploying Aegis
BMD ships and a land-based radar in Europe by the end of 2011. Deliveries in the next three
EPAA phases include
• Aegis Ashore in Romania with SM-3 IB interceptors in the 2015 timeframe (Phase 2),
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• Aegis Ashore in Poland with SM-3 IIA interceptors in the 2018 timeframe (Phase 3),
and
• SM-3 IIB interceptors and early intercept capability in the 2020 timeframe (Phase 4)
The United States will also pursue phased adaptive approaches in the Asia Pacific and the
Middle East by building on current efforts.13
On March 15, 2013, DOD announced that it is
• “restructuring” (i.e., canceling) the SM-3 Block IIB program;
• shifting funding from SM-3 Block IIB program to other BMD efforts
(specifically, the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) BMD program in Alaska and
to earlier versions of the SM-3); and
• dropping Phase IV of the EPAA, which was to feature the deployment of the SM-
3 Block IIB missile.14
Each Aegis Ashore site in the EPAA is to include a structure housing an Aegis system similar to
the deckhouse on an Aegis ship and 24 SM-3 missiles launched from a re-locatable Vertical
Launch System (VLS) based on the VLS that is installed in Navy Aegis ships.
Although BMD-capable Aegis ships have deployed to European waters in the past, the first
BMD-capable Aegis ship officially deployed to European waters as part of the EPAA departed its
home port of Norfolk, VA, on March 7, 2011, for a deployment to the Mediterranean that lasted
several months.15

13 Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 President’s Budget Submission, Missile
Defense Agency, Justification Book Volume 2a, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide
, February
2012, pp. xix-xx.
14 As part of a March 15, 2013, statement announcing changes in BMD programs, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
stated that “we are restructuring the SM-3 IIB program. As many of you know, we had planned to deploy the SM-3 IIB
as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. The purpose was to add to the protection of the U.S. homeland
already provided by our current GBIs against missile threats from the Middle East. The timeline for deploying this
program had been delayed to at least 2022 due to cuts in congressional funding. Meanwhile, the threat matures. By
shifting resources from this lagging program to fund the additional GBIs as well as advanced kill vehicle technology
that will improve the performance of the GBI and other versions of the SM-3 interceptor, we will be able to add
protection against missiles from Iran sooner while also providing additional protection against the North Korean
threat.” (Missile Defense Announcement, As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, The Pentagon, Friday,
March 15, 2013, accessed March 20, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1759.)
Following this announcement, Secretary Hage and two other DOD officials—James Miller, the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, and Admiral James Winnefeld, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—took questions
from the press. One questioner asked whether DOD was dropping Phase IV of the EPAA. Undersecretary Miller
replied: “Yes, the—the prior plan had four phases. The third phase involved the deployment of interceptors in Poland.
And we will continue with phases one through three. In the fourth phase, in the previous plan, we would have added
some additional—an additional type of interceptors, the so-called SM-3 IIB would have been added to the mix in
Poland. We no longer intend to—to add them to the mix, but we'll continue to have the same number of deployed
interceptors in Poland that will provide coverage for all of NATO in Europe.” (DOD news transcript, “DOD News
Briefing on Missile Defense from the Pentagon,” March 15, 2013, accessed March 20, 2013, at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5205.)
15 Karen Parrish, “Milestone nears for European Missile Defense Plan,” American Forces Press Service, March 2, 2011
(accessed online at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62997); Untitled “Eye On The Fleet” news item,
Navy News Service, March 7, 2011 (accessed online at http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=98184); “Warship
With Radar Going To Mediterranean,” Washington Post, March 2, 2011; Brock Vergakis, “US Warship Deploys to
(continued...)
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Planned Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and
SM-3 Interceptors

As shown in Table 2, under the proposed FY2014 budget, the number of BMD-capable Navy
Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 24 at the end of FY2011 to 41 at the end of FY2018.
Table 2. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Missiles

FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18
BMD-capable Aegis ships
BMD conversions of existing Aegis cruisers and destroyers (cumulative totals)
3.6.1
version 22 24 22 19 17 17 17 17
4.0.1
version 2 4 6 9 9 9 9 9
5.0/5.0
CU
version
0 1 3 4 6 7 8 10
5.1
version
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Subtotal
24 29 31 32 32 33 35 37
New Aegis destroyers procured in FY2010 and beyond, with BMD installed during construction (cumulative totals)
5.0
version
0 0 0 0 0 3 3 4
TOTAL

24 29 31 32 32 36 38 41
SM-3 missile procurement (annual quantities)
Block
IA
23
14 0 0 0 0 0 0
Block
IB
0 14 46 52 72 72 72 72
Block
IIA
0 0 0 0 22 0 12 16
Total
23 28 46 52 94 72 84 88
SM-3 missile deliveries/inventory
Block
I/IA
102/82 113/93 113/90 141/118 150/118 150/101 150/83 150/58
Block
IB
1/0 3/0 25/18 39/29 85/68 137/120
209/192
281/264
Block
IIA
0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 10/6
Total
103/82 116/93 138/108 180/147 235/186 287/221 359/275 441/328
Source: MDA data received by CRS on April 16, 2013.
Regarding the planned increase over time in the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships, Vice
Admiral Thomas Copeman, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, stated in an interview published
in March 2013 that
The ballistic missile defense [BMD] ships—the cruisers, the DDGs [guided-missile
destroyers] that are equipped to conduct ballistic missile defense—again, are a very high
demand [item]. They are going on eight- to 10-month deployments, coming back for short
periods of time, and having to go again just because of the demand signal in the

(...continued)
Mediterranean to Protect Europe Form Ballistic Missiles, Canadian Press, March 7, 2011.
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Mediterranean, in the Middle East, and having to keep them forward deployed in the Seventh
Fleet [Western Pacific] area of operations.16
Home Ports of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships
Pacific vs. Atlantic Fleet Homeporting
As of March 2013, 15 of the Navy’s 27 BMD-capable Aegis ships were homeported in the
Pacific, including 5 at Yokosuka, Japan, 5 at Pearl Harbor, HI, and 5 at San Diego, CA. The other
12 BMD-capable Aegis ships were homeported in the Atlantic, with 10 at Norfolk, VA, and 2 at
Mayport, FL.
October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain
On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the
EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis ships are to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at the naval
base at Rota, Spain.17 The four ships are the destroyers Ross (DDG-71) and Donald Cook (DDG-
75), which are to move to Rota in FY2014, and the destroyers Carney (DDG-64) and Porter
(DDG-78), which are to move to Rota in FY2015. As of early 2012, Carney was homeported at
Mayport, FL, and the other three ships were homeported at Norfolk.18 The move is to involve an
estimated 1,239 military billets (including 1,204 crew members for the four ships and 35 shore-
based support personnel),19 and about 2,100 family members.20
The Navy estimates the up-front costs of transferring the four ships at $92 million in FY2013, and
the recurring costs of basing the four ships in Spain rather than in the United States at roughly
$100 million per year.21

16 “Navigating. Warfighting, Maintaining,” Sea Power, March 2013: 31. Materials in brackets as in original, except for
“[item]” and “[Western Pacific],” which were added here.
17 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed October 6, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/
search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
18 See “Navy Names Forward Deployed Ships to Rota, Spain,” Navy News Service, February 16, 2012, accessed online
at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=65393; Kate Wiltrout, “Three Norfolk-Based Navy Ships To
Move To Spain,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 17, 2012; “Bound for Spain, Inside the Navy, February 20, 2012.
19 Source: Navy information paper dated March 8, 2012, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on
March 9, 2012.
20 Source: Navy briefing slides dated February 27, 2012, provided by the Navy to CRS on March 9, 2012.
21 Source: Navy briefing slides dated February 27, 2012, provided by the Navy to CRS on March 9, 2012. The briefing
slides state that the estimated up-front cost of $92 million includes $13.5 million for constructing a new weapon
magazine, $0.8 million for constructing a pier laydown area, $3.4 million for constructing a warehouse, $5.0 million for
repairing an existing facility that is to be used as an administrative/operations space, and $69.3 million for conducting
maintenance work on the four ships in the United States prior to moving them to Rota. The briefing states that the
estimated recurring cost of $100 million per year includes costs for base operating support, annual PCS (personnel
change of station) costs, a pay and allowances delta, annual mobile training team costs, ship maintenance work, the
operation of a Ship Support Activity, and higher fuel costs associated with a higher operating tempo that is maintained
by ships that are homeported in foreign countries.
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Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65
miles northwest of the Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have
been homeported at Rota at various points in the past, most recently in 1979.22
For additional background information on the Navy’s plan to homeport four BMD-capable Aegis
destroyers at Rota, Spain, see Appendix B.
Aegis BMD Flight Tests
DOD states that since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 22 successful exo-
atmospheric intercepts in 28 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 3 successful intercepts in
4 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships), and 3 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in 3 attempts
using the SM-2 Block IV missile, making for a combined total of 25 successful intercepts in 31
attempts.
In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii
used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance
satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit.23 Including this intercept in the count increases the totals
to 23 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 29 attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 26
successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 32 attempts using both SM-3 and SM-2 Block
IV missiles.
A December 2012 report on various DOD acquisition programs from DOD’s Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E’s annual report for FY2012—stated, in the
section on the Aegis BMD program, that

22 Source: Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.
23 The modifications to the ship’s Aegis BMD midcourse system reportedly involved primarily making changes to
software. DOD stated that the modifications were of a temporary, one-time nature. Three SM-3 missiles reportedly
were modified for the operation. The first modified SM-3 fired by the cruiser successfully intercepted the satellite at an
altitude of about 133 nautical miles (some sources provide differing altitudes). The other two modified SM-3s (one
carried by the cruiser, another carried by an engage-capable Aegis destroyer) were not fired, and the Navy stated it
would reverse the modifications to these two missiles. (For additional information, see the MDA discussion available
online at http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_one_time_mission.html, and also Peter Spiegel, “Navy Missile Hits Falling
Spy Satellite,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2008; Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Navy Missile Hits Satellite,
Pentagon Says,” Washington Post, February 21, 2008; Thom Shanker, “Missile Strikes A Spy Satellite Falling From Its
Orbit,” New York Times, February 21, 2008; Bryan Bender, “US Missile Hits Crippled Satellite,” Boston Globe,
February 21, 2008; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Hits Wayward Satellite On First Attempt,” NavyTimes.com, February
21, 2008; Dan Nakaso, “Satellite Smasher Back At Pearl,” Honolulu Advertiser, February 23, 2008; Zachary M.
Peterson, “Lake Erie CO Describes Anti-Satellite Shot,” NavyTimes.com, February 25, 2008; Anne Mulrine, “The
Satellite Shootdown: Behind the Scenes,” U.S. News & World Report, February 25, 2008; Nick Brown, “US Modified
Aegis and SM-3 to Carry Out Satellite Interception Shot,” Jane’s International Defence Review, April 2008: 35.)
MDA states that the incremental cost of the shoot-down operation was $112.4 million when all costs are included.
MDA states that this cost is to be paid by MDA and the Pacific Command (PACOM), and that if MDA is directed to
absorb the entire cost, “some realignment or reprogramming from other MDA [program] Elements may be necessary to
lessen significant adverse impact on [the] AEGIS [BMD program’s] cost and schedule.” (MDA information paper
dated March 7, 2008, provided to CRS on June 6, 2008. See also Jason Sherman, “Total Cost for Shoot-Down of Failed
NRO Satellite Climbs Higher,” InsideDefense.com, May 12, 2008.)
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Assessment
• In FY12, Aegis BMD demonstrated the capability to perform end-to-end engagements
against non-separating and simple separating short-range ballistic missiles with the Aegis
BMD 4.0 system and SM-3 Block IB interceptors.
• In response to the anomalous behavior observed during the SM-3 Block IA flyout in FTM-
15 (April 2011), the program redesigned a component in the third stage rocket motor, which
is common to both the Block IA and Block IB interceptors. The newly redesigned
component was flown in FTM-18 and performed successfully.
• The failed intercept in FTM-16 Event 2 (September 2011) is currently being addressed by
the program. The program conducted three initial ground firing tests of the SM-3 third stage
rocket motor to further understand the FTM-16 anomaly. Subsequently, the program
conducted three ground firings of the third stage rocket motor to further verify that it
functions properly using newly-adjusted firing parameters. Two more ground firings are
planned before the end of the calendar year to close-out actions from the FTM-16 failure
review board.
• GT-04 series ground tests in early FY12, which addressed EPAA Phase 1, showed that
improvements in interoperability are needed between the various elements and sensors that
are part of the EPAA Phase 1 defense architecture, including the Aegis BMD 3.6.1 system
that continues to take part in these tests after completion of its FOT&E.
• The near-simultaneous engagement of an anti-air warfare target during FTI-01 verified ship
self-defense capability while conducting a ballistic missile engagement even though the SM-
3 Block IA interceptor missed its target. The MDA is investigating the cause of the missed
intercept; however, their efforts will be hindered because Kill Weapon telemetry was lost
during key portions of the engagement flyout.
• No LRS&T events are planned for Aegis BMD 4.0 until FTG‑08. Aegis BMD has tested
that capability only once during a flight test (FTG-06a in December 2010) and in ground
testing to date. Further live-target testing of this capability is needed to allow for an
assessment.
Recommendations
• Status of Previous Recommendations. The program partially addressed the single
recommendation from FY11 when it conducted FTM-18 testing with the redesigned
component in the SM-3 third stage rocket motor (to address the FTM-15 anomaly). Flight
testing to demonstrate the correction for the FTM-16 Event 2 failure has not yet taken place.
• FY12 Recommendations. The program should:
1. Conduct further live-target testing of the Aegis BMD 4.0.2 LRS&T capability using long-
range targets to provide additional data on that capability for the Aegis BMD 4.0.2 system.
2. Engage a medium-range target before the Full-Rate Production Decision for the SM-3
Block IB interceptor to support an assessment of midcourse defense capability.24

24 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2012 Annual Report, December 2012, p. 283.
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For further discussion of Aegis BMD flight tests—including a May 2010 magazine article and
supplementary white paper in which two professors with scientific backgrounds criticize DOD
claims of successes in Aegis (and other DOD) BMD flight tests—see Appendix A.
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program
Japan
Japan’s interest in BMD, and in cooperating with the United States on the issue, was heightened
in August 1998 when North Korea test-fired a Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile that flew over Japan
before falling into the Pacific.25 In addition to cooperating with the United States on development
of technologies for the SM-3 Block IIA missile, Japan is modifying all six of its Aegis destroyers
with at least an approximate equivalent of the 3.6.1 version Aegis BMD system. As of December
2010, four of Japan’s Aegis ships had received the 3.6.1-equivaent modification.26 A July 7, 2013,
press report states that the other two ships are being modified and are likely reenter service as
BMD-capable ships by 2018. The same press report stated that Japan will likely procure two
additional Aegis ships in FY2015 and FY2016, and that the ships would enter service by FY2020,
increasing Japan’s fleet of Aegis ships to eight.27 An August 15, 2012, press report stated that the
United States and Japan were discussing the option of equipping the fifth and sixth Japanese
Aegis destroyers with an approximate equivalent of the 5.1 version of the Aegis BMD system, so
that the ships could fire the SM-3 Block IIA missile.28 Japanese BMD-capable Aegis ships have
conducted four flight tests of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor, achieving three
successful exo-atmospheric intercepts.
Other Countries
Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD
system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Spain, Germany, Denmark, South Korea, and Australia. As mentioned earlier, Spain, South
Korea, and Australia either operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other
countries operate destroyers and frigates with different combat systems that may have potential
for contributing to BMD operations.
For additional background information on allied participation and interest in the Aegis BMD
program, see Appendix C.

25 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and
Prospects
, by Richard P. Cronin. This archived report was last updated on March 19, 2002. See also CRS Report
RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
26 John Liang, “Japan To Increase Aegis BMD Ship Fleet From Four To Six,” Inside the Navy, December 27, 2010.
27 Kyodo news service, “Japan Eyes Two New Aegis Destroyers To Counter N. Korea Missile Threat,” Japan Times,
July 7, 2013.
28 Jim Wolf, “US, Japan Said Discussing Missile-Defense Ship Upgrades,” Reuters.com, August 15, 2012.
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FY2014 Funding Request
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. As shown in Table 3, MDA’s proposed FY2014
budget requests a total of $2,087.2 million in procurement and research and development funding
for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for Aegis Ashore sites that are to be part of the EPAA,
which is referred to in the table as funding for the land-based SM-3. MDA’s budget also includes
operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis
BMD program.
Table 3. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts, FY2013-FY2018
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
Procurement (PE 0208866C)
Aegis Ashore Phase III
0
131.4
256.3
38.6
63.9
71.6
Aegis BMD
523.6
580.8
746.7
745.3
1,018.2
1,094.0
Aegis Initial Spares
0
0
20.0
46.4
46.5
47.9
SUBTOTAL Procurement
523.6
712.2
1,023.0
830.3
1,128.6 1,213.5
Research, development, test & evaluation (RDT&E)
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C)
897.5
937.1
987.7
1,074.9
880.5
876.7
Aegis SM-3 IIB (PE 0603902C)
55.5
0
0
0
0
0
Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C)
249.9
129.4
124.5
51.9
55.8
32.9
Aegis SM-3 IIA (PE 0604881C)
425.6
308.5
230.5
128.7
41.0
0
SUBTOTAL RDT&E
1,628.5
1,375.0
1,342.7
1,255.5
977.3
909.6
TOTAL
2,152.1
2,087.2
2,365.7
2,085.8 2,105.9 2,123.1
Source: FY2014 MDA briefings materials and FY2014 MDA budget-justification books for MDA for Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide (Volume 2a) and for Procurement, Defense-Wide (Volume 2b).
Note: Figures for FY2013 are MDA estimates of appropriated levels as reduced by the March 1, 2013,
sequestration; FY2014 figures are requested; FY2015-FY2018 figures are programmed.
Issues for Congress
Impact of March 1, 2013, Sequester on FY2013 Funding
One issue for Congress concerns the impact on the Aegis BMD program of the March 1, 2013,
sequester on FY2013 funding (and unobligated prior-year funding) for the program. For the Aegis
BMD program, this could affect areas such as research and development work on new versions of
the Aegis BMD system, procurement of SM-3 interceptors missiles, adding BMD capabilities to
Aegis ships (or upgrading those capabilities), military construction funding for the Aegis BMD
program, and operations and maintenance funding for the Aegis BMD program.29

29 Source: Navy briefing dated February 28, 2013. The Navy states that the figure of $81 million in approximate and
(continued...)
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Potential Impact of Possible Late 2013/Early 2014 Sequester on
FY2014 Funding

Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential impact on the Aegis BMD program of
a possible sequester on FY2014 funding (and unobligated prior-year funding) for the program
that might occur in late 2013 or early 2014 under the terms of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S.
365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011).
U.S. vs. European Naval Contributions to European BMD
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns European naval contributions to
European BMD capabilities and operations compared to U.S. naval contributions to European
BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of worldwide operational demands for U.S.
Navy Aegis ships. A May 30, 2013, press report states:
As the missile threats from Iran and North Korea have advanced in recent years, the U.S. has
become more invested in Navy cruisers and destroyers that carry the high-tech Aegis radar
system and dozens of missile interceptors.
As a result, the ballistic missile defense destroyers and cruisers are a growing capability that
is in hot demand from military commanders across the Middle East, Europe and the
Pacific....
... the increasing requirements for the ships also exact another toll on the already strained
naval forces. Commanders are routinely forced to extend the ships’ deployments, keeping
sailors at sea for longer periods and shrinking their time at home.
The USS Stout, which is pierside at the Norfolk Naval Station, returned from its deployment
to the Persian Gulf region in June 2011, and its crew is now preparing to go back out this
summer. While most Navy cruisers and destroyers deploy for about 6-1/2 months, and then
spend more than three years at home, the missile defense warships are spending up to 7-1/2
months deployed and get a bit more than two years at home between tours.
“They are the most stressed, they have the highest operational tempo of all our forces,”
[Admiral Bill] Gortney [Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command] said. “What we’re
trying to do in the Navy is to meet that demand at an acceptable personnel tempo for our
sailors and their families, as well as allow us to continue to do the maintenance so these ships
go to their service life.”30
Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following:
• How does the total value of European naval contributions to European BMD
capabilities and operations compare to the total value of the U.S. contributions to
European BMD capabilities and operations?

(...continued)
subject to refinement.
30 Lolita C. Baldor, “Navy Ships Form First Line Of Missile Defense,” Yahoo.com (Associated Press), May 30, 2013.
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• Given anticipated reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending resulting
from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011), as
well as the potential for giving BMD capabilities to European navy ships (see
“Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program” in “Background”) or
for European countries to purchase Aegis ashore systems, should the United
States seek increased investment by European countries in their regional BMD
capabilities so as to reduce the need for assigning BMD-capable U.S. Navy Aegis
ships to the EPAA? Why should European countries not pay a greater share of the
cost of the EPAA, since the primary purpose of the EPAA is to defend Europe
against theater-range missiles?
Target for Simulating Endo-Atmospheric Flight of DF-21 ASBM
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the lack of a target for simulating the
endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile. DOD’s
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), in a December 2011 report (DOT&E’s
annual report for FY2011), stated:
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Target
A threat representative Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) target for operational open-air
testing has become an immediate test resource need. China is fielding the DF-21D ASBM,
which threatens U.S. and allied surface warships in the Western Pacific. While the Missile
Defense Agency has exo-atmospheric targets in development, no program currently exists
for an endo-atmospheric target. The endo-atmospheric ASBM target is the Navy’s
responsibility, but it is not currently budgeted. The Missile Defense Agency estimates the
non-recurring expense to develop the exo-atmospheric target was $30 million with each
target costing an additional $30 million; the endo-atmospheric target will be more expensive
to produce according to missile defense analysts. Numerous Navy acquisition programs will
require an ASBM surrogate in the coming years, although a limited number of targets (3-5)
may be sufficient to validate analytical models.31
A February 28, 2012, press report stated:
“Numerous programs will require” a test missile to stand in for the Chinese DF-21D,
“including self-defense systems used on our carriers and larger amphibious ships to counter
anti-ship ballistic missiles,” [Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test
and evaluation] said in an e-mailed statement....
“No Navy target program exists that adequately represents an anti-ship ballistic missile’s
trajectory,” Gilmore said in the e-mail. The Navy “has not budgeted for any study,
development, acquisition or production” of a DF-21D target, he said.
Lieutenant Alana Garas, a Navy spokeswoman, said in an e-mail that the service
“acknowledges this is a valid concern and is assessing options to address it. We are unable to
provide additional details.”...

31 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2011 Annual Report, December 2011, p. 294.
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Gilmore, the testing chief, said his office first warned the Navy and Pentagon officials in
2008 about the lack of an adequate target. The warnings continued through this year, when
the testing office for the first time singled out the DF-21D in its annual public report....
The Navy “can test some, but not necessarily all, potential means of negating anti-ship
ballistic missiles,” without a test target, Gilmore said.32
The December 2012 report from DOT&E (i.e., DOT&E’s annual report for FY2012) did not
further discuss this issue; a January 21, 2013, press report stated that this is because the details of
the issue are classified.33
Concurrency and Technical Risk in Aegis BMD Program
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is development-production concurrency and
technical risk there is in the Aegis BMD program. Below are comments from GAO reports on
concurrency and technical risk in certain parts of program.
SM-3 Block IB Missile
An April 2013 GAO report stated the following regarding the SM-3 Block IB missile:
In 2012, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB was able to partially overcome the production and
testing issues exacerbated by its concurrent development and production strategy. MDA
prematurely began purchasing SM-3 Block IB missiles beyond the number needed for
developmental testing in 2010. In 2011, developmental issues arose when the program
experienced a failure in its first developmental flight test and an anomaly in a separate SM-3
Block IA flight test, in a component common with the SM-3 Block IB. As a result,
production was disrupted when MDA slowed production of the SM-3 Block IB interceptors
and reduced planned quantities from 46 to 14. In 2012, the program was able to successfully
conduct two flight tests which allowed the program to address some of the production issues
by demonstrating a fix made to address one of the 2011 flight test issues. However,
development issues continue to delay the program’s fiscal year 2012 schedule and
production. For example, MDA experienced further difficulties completing testing of a new
maneuvering component—contributing to delays for a third flight test needed to validate the
SM-3 Block IB capability and also subsequently delaying a production decision for certain
components from December 2012 to February 2013.
In order to avoid further disruptions to the production line, the program plans to award the
next production contract for some missile components needed for the next order of 29 SM-3
Block IB missiles in February 2013—before the third flight test can verify the most recent
software modifications. The program then plans to award the contract to complete this order
upon conducting a successful flight test planned for the third quarter of fiscal year 2013.The
program is at risk for costly retrofits, additional delays and further production disruptions if
issues are discovered during this flight test.34

32 Tony Capaccio, “Navy Lacks Targets To Test U.S. Defenses Against China Missile,” Bloomberg Government
(bgov.com)
, February 28, 2012.
33 Christopher J. Castelli, “DOD Testing Chief Drops Public Discussion Of ASBM Target Shortfall,” Inside the Navy,
January 21, 2013.
34 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition
Management
, GAO-13-432, April 2013, pp. 22-23.
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The April 2013 GAO report includes an appendix with additional in-depth discussion of
concurrency and technical risk in the SM-3 Block IB program.35
A March 2013 GAO report stated:
Technology and Design Maturity
According to the program, all five of its critical technologies—the third-stage rocket motor,
throttleable divert attitude control system (TDACS), reflective optics, two-color warhead
seeker, and kinetic warhead advanced signal processor—are mature. However, while the
program completed TDACS qualification in February 2013, after many delays and additional
cost, its flight test program continues to experience disruptions. In 2011, the program
observed two anomalies with the third-stage rocket motor during flight tests, including the
failure of the first flight test, which led to a reassessment of the program’s cost and schedule
and failure investigations. Since then, the program has concluded the investigations,
determining that it needed to redesign a component of the rocket motor and institute a
software change in the Aegis weapon system. Both changes have been implemented, but
only one successfully fight tested. The flight test of the Aegis software change was delayed
because of challenges with the qualification of the TDACS. Initial assessments of the
software change indicate minimal effect on the operational performance. A full resolution of
the issue would require a redesign of the third-stage rocket motor—which is currently
unfunded. The cost of the investigations and subsequent modifications caused by last year’s
failures is estimated at $149 million. Production Maturity
Following anomalies with the third-stage rocket motor, the program delayed SM-3 IB
procurement decisions by about a year and slowed acceptance of both SM-3 IA and SM-3 IB
missiles already in production until failure investigations were completed and a redesign
introduced. Additionally, the program reduced SM-3 IB procurement quantities in fiscal year
2012 in order to free up funding to investigate the failures, develop solutions, and confirm
those solutions in ground and flight tests. As a result, rather than the planned 46 missiles, the
program bought only 14 SM-3 IB missiles in fiscal year 2012, adjusting its production
quantities for the third time in three years. The program also purchased additional 14 SM-3
IA missiles, again delaying plans to cancel production of that variant. The program
conducted the SM-3 IB manufacturing readiness review in May 2012, which resulted in a
conditional pass, largely due to issues with the qualification of the TDACS. Continued
challenges with the qualification of that component delayed a key test until the third quarter
of fiscal year 2013. In order to avoid further disruptions to the production line, the program
seeks permission to award the next production contract for some components of the next
order of up to 29 additional missiles in February 2013—before a flight test can verify the
recent software modifications. The program currently plans to begin operational missile
production in fiscal year 2013 if four more intercept tests are completed successfully.
Other Program Issues
The program is developing an improved SM-3 IB missile, designed to intercept additional
complex threats. The software upgrade will be available in 2014, and cost an additional
$86.6 million over the course of five years.
As requested, we reviewed whether individual subcontracting reports from the prime
contractor for the program were accepted on eSRS [Electronic Subcontracting Reporting

35 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition
Management
, GAO-13-432, April 2013, Appendix II on pp. 52-59.
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System]. The government uses subcontracting reports on eSRS as one method of monitoring
small business participation. As of December 2012, eSRS indicated that neither of the
subcontracting reports for SM-3 IB’s two contracts had been accepted.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office provided technical
comments, which were incorporated where deemed appropriate.36
SM-3 Block IIA Missile
An April 2013 GAO report stated the following regarding the SM-3 Block IIA missile:
MDA has taken steps to reduce acquisition risk by decreasing the overlap between
technology development and product development for two of its programs—the Aegis BMD
SM-3 Block IIA and the [now-terminated] SM-3 Block IIB programs. Reconciling gaps
between requirements and available resources before product development begins makes it
more likely that a program will meet cost, schedule, and performance targets.

The Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA program added time and money to the program to
extend development. Following significant technology development problems with four
components, MDA delayed the system preliminary design review—during which a program
demonstrates that the technologies and resources available are aligned with requirements—
for more than 1 year, thereby reducing its acquisition risk. As a result, in March 2012,
following additional development of the four components, the program was able to
successfully complete the review.37
The April 2013 GAO report includes an appendix with additional in-depth discussion of
concurrency and technical risk in the SM-3 Block IIA program.38
SM-6 Missile
A March 2013 GAO stated the following regarding the SM-6 missile:
Technology, Design, and Production Maturity
According to the program office, all SM-6 critical technologies are mature and its design is
stable; however, the program remains at risk of further design changes pending testing to
verify correction of failures. The program obtained approval at development start to conduct
limited developmental testing because the risk of integrating the legacy AMRAAM missile
seeker with the Standard Missile was perceived to be low. However, over half of the SM-6’s
at-sea developmental flight tests experienced anomalies or resulted in failure with multiple
issues that have been attributed to these legacy components. The program proceeded with
operational testing in June 2011 and the missile failed 5 of 12 tests. According to the

36 Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-
294SP, March 2013, p. 50.
37 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition
Management
, GAO-13-432, April 2013, p. 21.
38 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition
Management
, GAO-13-432, April 2013, Appendix IV on pp. 70-72.
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program office, the Navy’s operational test organization concluded that the missile is
effective, but a determination of suitability and reliability is pending the completing of
supplemental testing.
The SM-6 program has proven out its production processes, but has not yet demonstrated
that its critical processes are in control or that the missiles produced perform reliably.
According to the program, the sample size needed for measuring processes control will not
be achieved until 2014.
Other Program Issues
The SM-6’s highly concurrent testing and production strategy has resulted in design changes
and schedule delays. In 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics approved low-rate production of up to 19 missiles before completing
developmental testing and required the program to complete developmental testing prior to
awarding additional contracts. The Under Secretary subsequently approved the award of two
additional low-rate production contracts before this testing was complete. After numerous
developmental test failures, the program proceeded into operational testing where the high
failure rate continued. In February 2012, the Under Secretary of Defense approved an
acquisition strategy update which extended low-rate production through fiscal year 2012 and
delayed the full-rate production decision until fiscal year 2013 to allow for supplemental
testing. In addition, multiple SM-6 capabilities will not be fully tested until full-rate
production is well underway. According to officials, the program plans to have 387 of 1,200
missiles under contract by the end of fiscal year 2014, prior to the fielding the Naval
Integrated Fire Control- Counter Air From the Sea capability, which enables its over-the-
horizon capabilities.
As requested, we reviewed whether individual subcontracting reports from the prime
contractor for the program were accepted on eSRS [Electronic Subcontracting Reporting
System]. The government uses subcontracting reports on eSRS as one method of monitoring
small business participation. As of December 2012, eSRS indicated that the subcontracting
report for SM-6’s contract has not been accepted.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy disagreed with our assertion that the
missile has not been demonstrated to perform reliably. According to officials, supplemental
testing was successfully completed in November 2012 and the program expects the missile
to be assessed as reliable. The program office also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated where deemed appropriate.
GAO Response
While program officials expect the SM-6 to be assessed as reliable, the Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation reported in January 2013 that data from supplemental testing are
insufficient to verify correction of problems found in operational testing and concluded that
the missile does not meet the flight reliability criteria established by the Under Secretary of
Defense. Our reviews of DOD weapons systems confirm that production costs are minimized
when a fully integrated, capable prototype is demonstrated to show that the system will work
as intended in a reliable manner.39

39 Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-
294SP, March 2013, p. 124.
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Aegis Ashore
An April 2013 GAO report stated the following regarding the Aegis Ashore program:
The Aegis Ashore program, as we reported in April 2012, initiated product development and
established cost, schedule, and performance baselines prior to completing the preliminary
design review. Further, we reported that this sequencing increased technical risks and the
possibility of cost growth by committing to product development with less technical
knowledge than recommended by acquisition best practices and without ensuring that
requirements were defined, feasible, and achievable within cost and schedule constraints. In
addition, the program committed to buy components necessary for manufacturing prior to
conducting flight tests to confirm the system worked as intended. As a result, any design
modifications identified through testing would need to be retrofitted to produced items at
additional cost. However, the MDA Director stated in March 2012 that the Aegis Ashore
development is low risk because of its similarity to the sea-based Aegis BMD.41
Nonetheless, this concurrent acquisition plan means that knowledge gained from flight tests
cannot be used to guide the construction of Aegis Ashore installations or the procurement of
components for operational use.40
The April 2013 GAO report also stated:
As we reported in April 2012, the instability of content in the Aegis Ashore program’s
resource baseline obscures our assessment of the program’s progress. MDA prematurely set
the baseline before program requirements were understood and before the acquisition
strategy was firm. The program established its baseline for product development for the
Romania and Hawaii facilities in June 2010 with a total cost estimate of $813 million.
However 3 days later, when the program submitted this baseline to Congress in the 2010
BAR [BMDS (ballistic missile defense system) Accountability Report], it increased the total
cost estimate by 19 percent, to $966 million. Since that time, the program has added a
significant amount of content to the resource baseline to respond to acquisition strategy
changes and requirements that were added after the baseline was set. Because of these
adjustments, from the time the total estimated cost for Aegis Ashore in Romania and Hawaii
was first approved in June 2010 at $813 million, it has nearly doubled to its estimate of $1.6
billion reported in the February 2012 BAR. These major adjustments in program content
made it impossible to understand annual or longer-term program progress.
These adjustments also affected the schedule baseline for Aegis Ashore. For example, many
new activities were added to the baseline in 2012. In addition, comparing the estimated dates
for scheduled activities listed in the 2012 BAR to the dates baselined in the 2010 BAR is
impossible in some cases because activities from the 2010 BAR were split into multiple
events, renamed, or eliminated all together in the 2012 BAR. MDA also redistributed
planned activities from the Aegis Ashore schedule baselines into several other Aegis BMD
schedule baselines. For example, activities related to software for Aegis Ashore were moved
from the Aegis Ashore baseline and were split up and added to two other baselines for the
second generation and modernized Aegis weapon systems software. Rearranging content
made tracking the progress of these activities against the prior year and original baseline very
difficult and in some cases impossible. As a result, appendix III contains a limited schedule
assessment of near-term and long-term progress based on activities we were able to track in
the BAR. 41

40 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition
Management
, GAO-13-432, April 2013, pp. 24-25.
41 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition
(continued...)
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The April 2013 GAO report also stated:
Developing and deploying new missile defense systems in Europe to aid in defense of
Europe and the United States is a highly complex effort. We reported last year that several of
the individual systems that comprise the current U.S. approach to missile defense in
Europe—called the European Phased Adaptive Approach—have schedules that are highly
concurrent. Concurrency entails proceeding into product development before technologies
are mature or into production before a significant amount of independent testing has
confirmed that the product works as intended. Such schedules can lead to premature
purchases of systems that impair operational readiness and may result in problems that
require extensive retrofits, redesigns, and cost increases. A key challenge, therefore, facing
DOD is managing individual system acquisitions to keep them synchronized with the
planned time frames of the overall U.S. missile defense capability planned in Europe. MDA
still needs to deliver some of the capability planned for the first phase of the U.S. missile
defense in Europe and is grappling with delays to some systems and/or capabilities planned
in each of the next three major deployments. MDA also is challenged by the need to develop
the tools, the models and simulations, to understand the capabilities and limitations of the
individual systems before they are deployed. Because of technical limitations in the current
approach to modeling missile defense performance, MDA recently chose to undertake a
major new effort that it expects will overcome these limitations. However, MDA and the
warfighters will not benefit from this new approach until at least half of the four planned
phases have deployed....
As we reported in December 2010, the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe commits
MDA to delivering systems and associated capabilities on a schedule that requires
concurrency among technology, design, testing, and other development activities. We
reported in April 2012 that deployment dates were a key factor in the elevated levels of
schedule concurrency for several programs. We also reported at that time that concurrent
acquisition strategies can affect the operational readiness of our forces and risk delays and
cost increases.
DOD declared Phase 1 operational in December 2011, but the systems delivered do not yet
provide the full capability planned for the phase. MDA deployed, and the warfighter
accepted, Phase 1 with the delivery of an AN/TPY-2 radar, an Aegis BMD ship with SM-3
Block IA missiles, an upgrade to C2BMC, and the existing space-based sensors. Given the
limited time between the September 2009 announcement of the U.S. missile defense in
Europe and the planned deployment of the first phase in 2011, that first phase was largely
defined by existing systems that could be quickly deployed. MDA planned to deploy the first
phase in two stages—the systems described above by December 2011 and upgrades to those
systems in 2014. Although the agency originally planned to deliver the remaining
capabilities of the first phase in 2014, an MDA official told us that MDA now considers
these capabilities to be part of the second phase and these capabilities may not be available
until 2015.
In addition, independent organizations determined that some of the capabilities that were
delivered did not work as intended. For example, the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation reported that there were some interoperability and command and control
deficiencies. This organization also reported that MDA is currently investigating these
deficiencies.

(...continued)
Management, GAO-13-432, April 2013, pp. 33-34.
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According to MDA documentation, systems and associated capabilities for the next phases
are facing delays, either in development or in integration and testing.
• For Phase 2, some capabilities, such as an Aegis weapon system software upgrade, may not
be available. MDA officials stated they are working to resolve this issue.
• For Phase 3, some battle management and Aegis capabilities are currently projected to be
delayed and the initial launch of a planned satellite sensor system—PTSS—is delayed.
• For [the now-terminated] Phase 4, deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB missile [was]
delayed from 2020 to 2022, and full operational capability of PTSS [was] delayed to no
sooner than 2023.42
The April 2013 GAO report includes an appendix with additional in-depth discussion of
concurrency and technical risk in the Aegis Ashore program.43
Legislative Activity for FY2014
Summary of Action on FY2014 MDA Funding Request
Table 4 summarizes congressional action on the FY2014 request for MDA procurement and
research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program.
Table 4. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2014 Request for MDA
Procurement and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding)

Authorization
Appropriation
Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.

HAC
SAC
Conf.
Procurement (PE 0208866C)
Aegis Ashore Phase III
131.4
131.4
131.4

131.4
131.4

Aegis BMD
580.8
580.8
580.8

580.8
580.8

Subtotal Procurement
712.2
712.2
712.2

712.2
712.2

Research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C)
937.1
937.1
937.1

937.1
910.1

Land-based SM-3 (PE0604880C)
129.4
129.4
129.4

129.4
129.4

Aegis SM-3 IIA (PE0604881C)
308.5
308.5
308.5

308.5
308.5

Subtotal RDT&E
1,375.0
1,375.0
1,375.0

1,375.0
1,348.0

TOTAL
2,087.2
2,087.2
2,087.2

2,087.2
2,060.2

Source: For request: FY2014 MDA briefing materials and FY2014 budget-justification books for MDA for
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide (Volume 2a) and for Procurement, Defense-Wide

42 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition
Management
, GAO-13-432, April 2013, pp. 35 and 37-38.
43 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition
Management
, GAO-13-432, April 2013, Appendix III on pp. 60-69.
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(Volume 2b). For HASC: H.Rept. 113-102, pp. 407, 445, 446. For SASC: S.Rept. 113-44, pp. 315, 353, 354.
For HAC: H.Rept. 113-113, pp. 203, 256, 257. For SAC: S.Rept. 113-85, pp. 134, 174, 178.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference.
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1960/S. 1197)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 113-102 of June 7, 2013) on H.R.
1960, recommended the funding levels shown in Table 4.
Section 238 of H.R. 1960 as reported states:
SEC. 238. NATO AND THE PHASED, ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE
IN EUROPE.
(a) NATO Funding-
(1) PHASE I OF EPAA- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the President shall consult with the North Atlantic Council and the Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (in this section referred to as `NATO’) on—
(A) the funding of the phased, adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe; and
(B) establishing a plan for NATO to provide at least 50 percent of the infrastructure and
operations and maintenance costs of phase I of the phased, adaptive approach to missile
defense in Europe.
(2) PHASES II AND III OF EPAA- The President shall use the NATO Military Common-
Funded Resources process to seek to fund at least 50 percent of the costs for phases II and III
of the phased, adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe.
(3) REPORTS- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and each
180-day period thereafter, the President shall submit to the congressional defense
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the funding provided by NATO
pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2).
(b) Interceptors- If the Secretary of Defense determines that it is useful to the interests of the
United States, the Secretary shall seek to engage with members of NATO to establish a
NATO common pool of Aegis standard missile-3 block IA, standard missile-3 block IB, and
standard missile-3 block IIA interceptors to defend NATO members through the phased,
adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe.
Regarding Section 238, H.Rept. 113-102 states:
Section 238—NATO and the Phased, Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe
This section would require, not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, that
the President shall consult with the North Atlantic Council and the Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the funding of the Phased, Adaptive
Approach to missile defense in Europe to establish a plan for NATO to provide at least 50
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percent of the costs of operations and maintenance, and infrastructure, of Phase I of that
system.
This section would further require the President to use the NATO Military Common-Funded
Resources process to seek at least 50 percent funding support of the costs for Phases II and
III of that missile defense system. This section would also require the Secretary of Defense,
if he determines it useful, to seek establishment by NATO of a common pool of Aegis
Standard Missile 3 missile interceptors. (Page 109)
H.Rept. 113-102 also states:
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System
The budget request contained $937.5 million in PE 63892C for the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS).
The Aegis BMDS is the world’s most proven naval missile defense system and the sea-based
element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System. Aegis BMD plays an active role in
protecting the United States and U.S. deployed forces from enemy ballistic missile attack.
The Aegis BMD system has been included in the Administration’s Phased Adaptive
Approach to European Defense and has undergone an extensive and successful testing
regime. The budget request included funding to meet significant capability and test
milestones related to the evolution of the Aegis Weapons System and the test and
deployment of new missile defense capabilities, including Launch on Remote technology.
The committee recommends $937.5 million, the full amount of the request, in PE 63892C for
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense.
Request for multi-year procurement authority for Standard Missile–3 Block IB beginning
in FY15
The committee notes the successful FTM–19 flight test on May 16, 2013, which again
demonstrated the robust design and performance of the Standard Missile–3 Block IB missile.
With over $4.0 billion programmed for this missile across the FYDP, the committee strongly
encourages the Department to request multi-year procurement authority for SM–3 Block IB
beginning in fiscal year 2015.
The committee notes there could be savings in a multi-year procurement, such a contractual
arrangement for SM–3 Block IB could yield savings equivalent to an entire additional year
of production at current planned rates. The Department is directed to report to the
congressional defense committees by December 31, 2013, with a recommendation on
whether SM–3 Block IB could use multi-year or advanced procurement authority beginning
in fiscal year 2015. If such authorities are requested, an estimate of what cost savings would
accrue shall be required.
Service Life Extension Program for Standard Missile–3 Block IA missile interceptor
The committee is aware that the United States has completed procurement of additional
Standard Missile–3 block IA interceptors and is planning to begin procurement of the block
IB interceptor, which has a more capable seeker than the IA interceptor.
The committee is also aware that the United States has acquired a substantial inventory of
block IA interceptors, many of which will soon begin to reach the end-of-design-life. The
committee is aware that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is currently studying whether
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and how to conduct a service life extension program (SLEP) of the block IA interceptor and
such a program could extend the lifetime of this substantial inventory of block IA missiles by
approximately fifty percent.
The committee believes such a SLEP should therefore be carefully studied and, if the results
are promising, such a program should be promptly carried out. The committee believes that
by carrying out this SLEP, MDA could come closer to meeting the requirements of the
combatant commanders for missile interceptor inventory.
Standard Missile–3 Block IB ballistic missile interceptor
The committee is aware that the Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) block IB program will be
transitioning from development to production in the next calendar year, after several delays.
The committee is eager that the combatant commanders receive the block IB missile, which
will be more capable than the IA missile that is presently the mainstay of the Aegis ballistic
missile defense system fleet. Combatant commanders continue to state their demand for
additional assets in theater to support ballistic missile defense mission requirements.
According to the Missile Defense Agency, it will procure 52 of these improved missile
interceptors in fiscal year 2014, and 72 missiles per year each year through the fiscal year
2014 Future Years Defense Program. The committee supports this procurement.
The committee is aware of the challenges moving to procurement and the challenges of
significantly increasing delivery quantities. The committee expects to be informed of any
challenges meeting the increased production rate. The committee also expects to be informed
of the progress of the FTM–19, 21, and 22 tests, which are required to get the IB missile
certified for full rate production. The committee is eager to see full rate production when
these maritime flight test events are successfully completed. (Pages 72-73)
The report also states:
Solid Divert and Attitude Control System
The budget request contained $309.2 million in PE 63175C for Ballistic Missile Defense
Technology. Of this amount, $24.0 million was requested for the continued development,
post SM–3 IIB termination, of an enhanced Solid Divert and Attitude Control System
(SDACS).
In the committee report (H. Rept. 112–479) accompanying the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the committee expressed its concerns about the
possibility of relying on a single provider of SDACS technology. The committee is pleased
that, with the termination of the SM–3 IIB, the Missile Defense Agency is taking steps to
ensure there is an additional opportunity for diversity in the industrial base for this critical
technology.
The committee recommends $24.0 million, the full amount requested, in PE 63175C for
development of Solid Divert and Attitude Control System technology. (Page 75)
The report also states:
Common Kill Vehicle for missile defense
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The budget request contained $309.2 million in PE 63175C for Ballistic Missile Defense
Technology. Of this amount, $70.0 million was requested for the Common Kill Vehicle
Technology (CKVT) program.
The committee is aware that approximately $20.0 million of the funds appropriated for the
Standard Missile 3 block IIB program in fiscal year 2013 are to be redirected to the CKVT
program by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
The committee understands that MDA’s intention for the CKVT program is to: enable the
consolidation of the development of kill vehicles; develop a modular, open kill vehicle
architecture; transition a more capable kill vehicle to the Ground-based Interceptor and the
Standard Missile 3; and evolve to a multiple kill vehicle payload. The committee supports
these developmental goals.
The committee is also aware that, pursuant to section 225 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239), the Missile Defense Agency
is developing a plan for a next generation exo-atmospheric kill vehicle. Section 225 also
requires the Director, Missile Defense Agency to submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the plan.
The committee finds that the budget justification material regarding the CKVT program was
insufficient, lacked necessary details, and should be further revised to include a date for
initial operating capability, as well as a plan to transition to a development program based on
full and open competition in time to support current and future interceptor procurement. The
committee directs the Missile Defense Agency to provide a briefing to the congressional
defense committees on such information by July 31, 2013, as well as for it to be included in
the report required by section 225 of Public Law 112–239.
In addition, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency to determine an
alternate program element (PE) in the fiscal year 2015 budget submission to fund the
Common Kill Vehicle Technology and Capability Development program. It should balance
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system equities in a potential Common Kill Vehicle
Technology and Capability Development program, as well as those possessed by the Aegis
ballistic missile defense program. In addition, the committee recommends a new PE for
fiscal year 2014.
The committee recommends no funds, a decrease of $70.0 million, in PE 63175C for the
Common Kill Vehicle Technology program. Further, the committee recommends $70.0
million, an increase of $70.0 million, in a new PE for the Common Kill Vehicle Technology
and Capability Development program. (Pages 75-76)
The report also states:
Electro Magnetic Rail Gun for Missile Defense
The committee notes that the U.S. Navy has been conducting long-term research into
electromagnetic railgun technology to support naval surface fire support missions. The
committee is aware that pursuant to section 243 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81), the Secretary of the Navy provided an
unclassified and classified report on the development, future deployment, and operational
challenges of this technology. The committee is also aware that the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition wrote in response to this reporting
requirement that, ‘‘[p]reliminary analysis shows that a tactical railgun ... has the potential to
provide lethal effectiveness ... for antiship ballistic missile defense.’’ The committee
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acknowledges significant challenges ahead in developing, integrating, and deploying such
technology, as with many technology development programs.
Additionally, the committee is aware that the Department has established a new effort within
the Strategic Capabilities Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to leverage the
Navy’s program to explore the development a land-based railgun. As noted in the committee
report (H. Rept. 112–479) for the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2013,
the committee is interested in the potential utility in accelerating some electromagnetic
railgun efforts for land-based area defense.
The committee finds these developments encouraging, and urges the Director, Missile
Defense Agency to examine these activities in order to determine their potential application,
if they can provide additional capability, to broader ballistic missile defense missions of the
Missile Defense Agency. (Pages 79-80)
The report also states:
Next generation Aegis missile—Standard Missile 3 block IIB
The committee is aware that on March 15, 2013, the Secretary of Defense announced that the
Administration would propose to restructure the Standard Missile (SM) 3 block IIB program
in the budget request for fiscal year 2014. The Missile Defense Agency has made it clear that
this decision was driven by congressional reductions in technology development in fiscal
years 2012–13, as well as technical challenges related to the projected capability of the
missile and related to sea-basing the prospective missile interceptor.
The committee is also aware that the Government and its industry partners both made
significant investments in the development of the SM–3 IIB missile. The committee believes
that it would be imprudent and short-sighted to walk away from these investments and to
leave no program of record for the continued improvement of the SM–3 system. The
committee encourages the Missile Defense Agency to use these investments as much as
possible to improve and inform the development of the Aegis ballistic missile defense
system SM–3 IIA interceptor, planned to be fielded in fiscal year 2018, as well as a follow-
on system. Therefore, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency to provide
a briefing to the congressional defense committees by November 15, 2013, on the potential
for a concept development program for leveraging the investments made in the SM–3 IIB
program by the United States and industry to continue to improve the SM–3 IIA missile
through an evolved or iterative variant, for example an SM–3 IIA+. (Page 92)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 113-44 of June 20, 2013) on S.
1197, recommended the funding levels shown in Table 4.
Section 231 of S. 1197 as reported states:
SEC. 231. HOMELAND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Ballistic Missile Defense Review of February 2010 stated as its first policy priority
that `the United States will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited
ballistic missile attack’ and that `an essential element of the United States’ homeland
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ballistic missile defense strategy is to hedge against future uncertainties, including both the
uncertainty of future threat capabilities and the technical risks inherent to our own
development plans’.
(2) The United States currently has an operational Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system with 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) deployed in Alaska and California,
protecting all of the United States, including the East Coast, against the threat of limited
ballistic missile attack from both North Korea and Iran. During 2013, senior military and
civilian defense leaders have stated repeatedly that they have confidence in the ability of the
current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to protect the United States from limited
ballistic missile attack from North Korea and Iran.
(3) On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a series of planned
steps to enhance United States homeland ballistic missile defense, to stay ahead of the future
missile threat from North Korea and Iran. These steps include the deployment of 14
additional Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, by 2017, a nearly 50 percent
increase in the number of such interceptors deployed by the United States.
(4) In response to provocative behavior and public threats by North Korea to launch missiles
at the United States, the Department of Defense took a number of actions to enhance United
States homeland missile defense capabilities, including deployment of the Sea-Based X-band
radar into the Pacific Ocean.
(5) Before the March 15, 2013, announcement by Secretary of Defense Hagel, General
Robert Kehler, Commander of the United States Strategic Command, testified that `I am
confident that we can defend against a limited attack from Iran, although we are not in the
most optimum posture to do that today ... it doesn't provide total defense today’. Shortly after
the announcement by Secretary Hagel, General Charles Jacoby, Commander of the United
States Northern Command, testified that `we have the capability of limited defense right
now. And I think it’s not optimum and I think that we've made some important steps forward
in what was rolled out. And I think we need to continue to assess the threat and make sure
we stay ahead of it’.
(6) As its highest near-term priority, the Missile Defense Agency is designing a correction to
the problem that caused a December 2010 flight test failure of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system using the Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II) model of exo-atmospheric kill
vehicle, and plans to demonstrate the correction through flight testing, including an intercept
test, before resuming production, assembly, or refurbishment of additional Capability
Enhancement-II kill vehicles.
(7) The Department of Defense has a program to improve the performance and reliability of
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. According to Department officials, the goal of
the Ground-Based Interceptor reliability program is to double the number of threat
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that the current United States inventory of
Ground-Based Interceptors could defeat, thereby effectively doubling the capability of the
current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.
(8) The Missile Defense Agency, working with the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation and with United States Strategic Command, has developed a comprehensive
Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) for missile defense, with flight tests for the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense system planned through fiscal year 2023, including salvo testing,
multiple simultaneous engagement testing, and operational testing. The current test plan
includes an additional intercept flight test using the Capability Enhancement-I kill vehicle,
scheduled for mid-2013, to demonstrate the reliability enhancements to Ground-Based
Interceptors quipped with that kill vehicle. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
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reviewed and approved the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system test plan and pace,
including the plan to demonstrate the correction of the Capability Enhancement-II kill
vehicle.
(9) In May, 2013, Vice Admiral James Syring, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency,
testified to Congress that he is seeking to improve the performance and reliability of the
Ground-Based Interceptors, and to make the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system `more
operationally effective and cost-effective’, including by improving its sensors,
discrimination, kill assessment, and battle management. He testified that these improvements
are `absolutely needed’ and are `equally important to interceptors’ in terms of staying ahead
of the threat.
(10) As part of its United States homeland defense hedging strategy, the Department of
Defense has already decided upon or implemented a number of actions to improve the
missile defense posture of the United States to stay ahead of the evolving threat of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles from North Korea and Iran. These include the following
actions:
(A) As announced by Secretary of Defense Hagel, the Department plans to deploy 14
additional Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, by 2017, to deploy a second
AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan, and to pursue an advanced kill vehicle technology development
program.
(B) The Missile Defense Agency has completed construction of Missile Field-2 at Fort
Greely, Alaska, with eight extra silos available to deploy the additional operational Ground-
Based Interceptors announced by Secretary of Defense Hagel.
(C) The Department plans to refurbish the 6 prototype silos in Missile Field-1 at Fort Greely,
Alaska, to deploy the additional Ground-Based Interceptors announced by Secretary of
Defense Hagel.
(D) The Missile Defense Agency plans to deploy an in-flight interceptor communication
system data terminal at Fort Drum, New York, to enhance the performance of Ground-Based
Interceptors defending the eastern United States against possible future missile threats from
Iran.
(E) The Missile Defense Agency is continuing the development and testing of the two-stage
Ground-Based Interceptor for possible deployment in the future, if needed.
(F) The Missile Defense Agency plans to upgrade the early warning radars in Clear, Alaska,
and Cape Cod, Massachusetts, to enhance the ability to defend the United States homeland
against potential future Intercontinental Ballistic Missile threats from North Korea and Iran.
(G) The Missile Defense Agency is evaluating sites for a possible future United States
homeland ballistic missile defense interceptor site in the United States, in compliance with
section 227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-239),
and will complete an Environmental Impact Statement for the best suited sites by early 2016,
in case the President decides to proceed with the deployment of such a site.
(11) As part of its United States homeland missile defense hedging strategy, the Department
of Defense is considering additional options to enhance the future United States posture and
capability to defend the homeland, including the feasibility, advisability, and affordability of
deploying additional Ground-Based Interceptors beyond the 14 Ground-Based Interceptors
announced by Secretary of Defense Hagel, including possibly at a missile defense site on the
East Coast of the United States.
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(12) In discussing the possible benefits of a potential additional missile defense interceptor
site in the United States, General Jacoby testified that `exploring a third site is an important
next step. What a third site gives me, whether it’s on the East Coast or an alternate location,
would be increased battle space. That means increased opportunity for me to engage threats
from either Iran or North Korea’.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) it is a national priority to defend the United States homeland against the threat of limited
ballistic missile attack from North Korea and Iran;
(2) the currently deployed Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, with 30 Ground-Based
Interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, provides protection of the entire United
States homeland, including the East Coast, against the threat of limited ballistic missile
attack from North Korea and Iran, although this capability can and should be improved;;
(3) it is essential for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to achieve the levels of
reliability, availability, sustainability, and operational performance that will allow it to
continue providing protection of the United States homeland against limited ballistic missile
attack and to stay ahead of the threat as it develops;
(4) the Missile Defense Agency should, as its highest priority, correct the problem that
caused the December 2010 Ground-based Midcourse Defense system flight test failure and
demonstrate the correction through flight testing, including a successful intercept test, before
resuming production of the Capability Enhancement-II kill vehicle, in order to provide
confidence that the system will work as intended;
(5) the Department of Defense should continue to enhance the performance and reliability of
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, and enhance the capability of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (including through improved sensors, discrimination, kill
assessment, exo-atmospheric kill vehicles, and battle management) to provide improved
capability to defend the United States homeland against the evolving missile threats from
North Korea and Iran;
(6) the Missile Defense Agency should continue its robust, rigorous, and realistic testing of
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, as described in the Integrated Master Test
Plan, including salvo testing, multiple simultaneous engagement testing, and operational
testing;
(7) the Department of Defense has taken a number of prudent, affordable, cost-effective, and
operationally significant steps to hedge against the possibility of future growth in the ballistic
missile threat to the United States homeland from North Korea and Iran, including the
planned deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors; and
(8) the Department of Defense should continue to evaluate the evolving long-range missile
threat from North Korea and Iran and consider further possibilities for prudent, affordable,
cost-effective, and operationally significant steps to improve the posture of the United States
to defend the United States homeland against possible future growth in the threat from North
Korea and Iran.
(c) Report on Potential Future Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense Options-
(1) REPORT REQUIRED- Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on
potential future options for enhancing United States homeland ballistic missile defense.
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(2) ELEMENTS- The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the current assessment of the threat to the United States from long-range
ballistic missiles of North Korea and Iran, and an assessment of the projected future threat
through 2022, including a discussion of confidence levels and uncertainties in such threat
assessment.
(B) A description of the current United States homeland ballistic missile defense capability
to defend against the current threat of limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea and
Iran.
(C) A description of planned improvements to the current United States homeland ballistic
missile defense system, and the capability enhancements that would result from such planned
improvements, including—
(i) deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska;
(ii) missile defense upgrades of early warning radars at Clear, Alaska, and Cape Cod,
Massachusetts;
(iii) deployment of an In-Flight Interceptor Communications System Data Terminal at Fort
Drum, New York; and
(iv) improvements to the effectiveness and reliability of the Ground-Based Interceptors and
the overall Ground-based Midcourse defense system.
(D) A description of potential additional future United States homeland ballistic missile
defense options, in addition to those described in subparagraph (C), if future ballistic missile
threats warrant deployment of such options to increase United States homeland ballistic
missile defense capabilities, including—
(i) deployment of a missile defense interceptor site on the East Coast;
(ii) deployment of a missile defense interceptor site in another location in the United States,
other than on the East Coast;
(iii) expansion of Missile Field-1 at Fort Greely, Alaska, to an operationally available 20-silo
configuration, to permit further interceptor deployments;
(iv) deployment of additional Ground-Based Interceptors for the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system at Fort Greely, Alaska, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, or both;
(v) deployment of additional missile defense sensors, including possibly an X-band radar on
the East Coast or elsewhere, to enhance system tracking and discrimination;
(vi) enhancements to the operational effectiveness, cost effectiveness, and overall
performance of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system through improvements to
system reliability, discrimination, battle management, exo-atmospheric kill vehicle
capability, and related functions;
(vii) the potential for future enhancement and deployment of the Standard Missile-3 Block
IIA interceptor to augment United States homeland ballistic missile defense;
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(viii) missile defense options to defend the United States homeland against ballistic missiles
that could be launched from vessels on the seas around the United States, including the Gulf
of Mexico, or other ballistic missile threats that could approach the United States from the
south, should such a threat arise in the future; and
(ix) any other options the Secretary considers appropriate.
(3) EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL OPTIONS- For each option described under paragraph
(2)(D), the Secretary shall provide an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of such
option. The evaluation of each such option shall include consideration of the following:
(A) Technical feasibility.
(B) Operational effectiveness and utility against the projected future threat.
(C) Cost, cost effectiveness, and affordability.
(D) Schedule considerations.
(E) Agility to respond to changes in future threat evolution.
(4) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS- Based on the evaluation required by
paragraph (3), the Secretary shall include in the report required by paragraph (1) such
findings, conclusions, and recommendations as the Secretary considers appropriate for
potential future options for United States homeland ballistic missile defense.
(5) FORM- The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
Regarding Section 231, S.Rept. 113-44 states:
Homeland ballistic missile defense (sec. 231)
The committee recommends a provision that would express the sense of Congress
concerning homeland ballistic missile defense, and require the Secretary of Defense to
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of a range of potential future options for
enhancing homeland ballistic missile defense, including the possible deployment of a missile
defense interceptor site on the East Coast, and the possible deployment of an additional
sensor on the East Coast. The provision would require the Secretary to submit a report on the
evaluation, including such findings, conclusions, and recommendations as the Secretary
considers appropriate, for potential future options for homeland ballistic missile defense.
The United States currently has an operational homeland ballistic missile defense system, the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, with 30 Ground-based Interceptors
(GBIs) deployed in Alaska and California. In appearances before the committee during 2013,
numerous senior military leaders testified that they are confident in the ability of the current
GMD system to protect the entire United States, including the East Coast, from limited
ballistic missile attacks from North Korea and Iran. The committee agrees with the
Department of Defense that this homeland missile defense capability can and should be
improved.
The committee notes that, on March 15, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a
series of steps planned to enhance homeland ballistic missile defense, as part of the
homeland missile defense hedge strategy, to stay ahead of the evolving long-range missile
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threat from North Korea and Iran. These steps include: the deployment of an additional 14
GBIs at Fort Greely, Alaska—a nearly 50 percent increase—by 2017; the deployment of a
second AN/TPY–2 missile defense radar in Japan; the evaluation of potential sites in the
United States for possible future deployment of a missile defense interceptor site; and the
establishment of a new common kill vehicle technology development program.
One element of the decision announced by Secretary Hagel was the cancelation of the
previous plan to develop the Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) Block IIB interceptor missile for
Phase 4 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense. Twenty-four SM–3
IIB missiles had originally been intended for deployment at an Aegis Ashore interceptor site
in Poland in 2020, to augment the GMD system in defending the United States from possible
future long-range Iranian missiles. However, congressional funding reductions and technical
challenges had delayed the program beyond 2022, with significant uncertainties about its
ability to accomplish the intended mission. Secretary Hagel made clear that the U.S.
commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missile defense ‘‘remains
ironclad,’’ including the planned Aegis Ashore interceptor site deployments in Romania in
2015 and Poland in 2018. According to Secretary Hagel, these deployments “will still be
able to provide coverage of all European NATO territory as planned by 2018.”
As Secretary Hagel and other Department of Defense officials explained, deploying the
additional 14 GBIs in Alaska would provide additional homeland defense at least 5 years
sooner against both North Korea and Iran, and at far less cost than the SM–3 IIB program.
Funds from the canceled SM–3 IIB program were redirected for the deployment of the
additional 14 GBIs and for the new common kill vehicle technology development program.
They also explained that, before the 14 additional GBIs are deployed, the GMD system
would have to be tested and demonstrated successfully in an intercept test, to provide
confidence that the system would work as intended.
This “fly before you buy” commitment is needed to demonstrate the successful correction of
the problem that caused a GMD flight test failure in December 2010 with the Capability
Enhancement-II (CE–II) kill vehicle. The Government Accountability Office estimates that
correcting this problem and demonstrating its success in flight tests will cost more than $1.2
billion and has caused program delays of several years. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
has halted all assembly, integration, manufacture, and refurbishment of GBIs with CE–II kill
vehicles until the CE–II correction is successfully demonstrated in flight testing, including an
intercept flight test planned for early 2014. The committee commends MDA for this “fly
before you buy” approach, and notes that further procurement of GBIs, planned to replace
the 14 GBIs that will be deployed by 2017, would also depend upon successful
demonstration that the CE–II kill vehicle will work as intended. The committee expects the
GBI industry team to show the same level of commitment to demonstrating success in
correcting the CE–II problems.
In testimony before the committee, Vice Admiral James Syring, the Director of MDA,
explained that improvements to the GMD “kill chain,” particularly in sensors,
discrimination, and kill assessment, would provide an “absolutely needed benefit” that would
be “equally important to interceptors” in staying ahead of the evolving threat from North
Korea and Iran. The committee strongly supports Admiral Syring’s priority to improving the
overall performance and effectiveness of the GMD system, and notes that these
enhancements are intended to be cost-effective, timely, and affordable. Consequently, the
committee directs the Director of MDA to provide a report to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 1, 2014, explaining the specific GMD kill chain
enhancements that would be most beneficial to overall GMD effectiveness, including any
improvements in GBI reliability and performance, and how and when MDA proposes to
achieve those enhancements. (Pages 38-40)
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Section 232 of H.R. 1960 as reported states:
SEC. 232. REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In the introduction to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review of February 2010, Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates wrote that `I have made defending against near-term regional
threats a top priority of our missile defense plans, programs and capabilities’.
(2) In describing the threat of regional ballistic missiles, the report of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review stated that `there is no uncertainty about the existence of regional threats.
They are clear and present. The threat from short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the United States
deploys forces and maintains security relationships is growing at a particularly rapid pace’.
(3) North Korea has hundreds of regional ballistic missiles, including short-range Scud
missiles and medium-range Nodong missiles. North Korea also has publicly displayed, but
not flight-tested, intermediate-range Musudan missiles. These regional missiles can reach
United States forces and allies in South Korea and Japan, and perhaps Guam. In the spring of
2013, North Korea made public threats to use nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles against
South Korea, Japan, and Guam.
(4) In response to these threats from North Korea, the United States deployed Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense ships, armed with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, to the waters near the
Korean Peninsula, and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to Guam. It
also deployed the Sea-Based X-band missile defense radar into the Pacific Ocean to enhance
United States missile defense capabilities. On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Hagel
announced a series of planned steps to enhance missile defense, including the deployment of
a second AN/TPY-2 missile defense radar in Japan to improve regional and homeland
defense against North Korean missiles. As part of their response to the provocations of North
Korea, South Korea deployed vessels equipped with Aegis missile defense radars, and Japan
deployed its Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships, equipped with Standard Missile-3
interceptors.
(5) Iran has the largest inventory of regional ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with
hundreds of missiles that can reach as far as southeastern Europe and all of the Middle East,
including Israel. Iran is improving its existing missiles and developing new and longer-range
regional missiles.
(6) In September 2009, President Barack Obama announced that he had accepted the
unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
establish a European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, designed to
protect deployed United States forces, allies, and partners in Europe against the large and
growing threat of ballistic missiles from Iran.
(7) In November 2010, at the Lisbon Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) decided to adopt the core mission of missile defense of its population, territory, and
forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed to enhance its missile defense
command and control system, the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, to
provide a North Atlantic Treaty Organization command and control capability. This is in
addition to voluntary contributions of missile defense capabilities from individual nations.
(8) During 2011, the United States successfully implemented Phase 1 of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach, including deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey,
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deployment of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ship in the eastern Mediterranean Sea with
Standard Missile-3 Block IA interceptors, and the establishment of a missile defense
command and control system in Germany.
(9) Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach is planned for deployment around
2015, and is planned to include the deployment of Standard Missile-3 Block IB interceptors
on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships and at an Aegis Ashore site in Romania.
(10) Phase 3 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach is planned for deployment around
2018, and is planned to include the deployment of Standard Missile-3 Block IIA interceptors
on Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships and at an Aegis Ashore site in Poland.
(11) At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization announced it had achieved an `interim capability’ for the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization missile defense system, including initial capability of its Active
Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system at a command and control facility in
Germany.
(12) The United States has a robust program of missile defense cooperation with Israel,
including joint development of the Arrow Weapon System and the new Arrow-3 interceptor,
designed to defend Israel against ballistic missiles from Iran. These jointly developed missile
defense systems are designed to be interoperable with United States ballistic missile
defenses, and these interoperable systems are tested in large joint military exercises, such as
`Austere Challenge’ in 2012. The United States has also deployed an AN/TPY-2 radar in
Israel to enhance missile defense against missiles from Iran.
(13) The United States is working with the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council on
enhanced national and regional missile defense capabilities against the growing missile threat
from Iran. As part of this effort, the United Arab Emirates plans to purchase two Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense batteries, as well as other equipment. During 2012, the United
States deployed an AN/TPY-2 radar in the United States Central Command area of
responsibility to enhance missile defense capability of forward-deployed United States
forces, allies, and partners against missiles from Iran.
(14) The United States has a strong program of missile defense cooperation with Japan,
including the co-development of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA interceptor for the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense system, intended to be deployed in Phase 3 of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach, the Japanese fleet of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships using
Standard Missile-3 Block IA interceptors, and the United States deployment of two
AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan.
(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the threat from regional ballistic missiles, particularly from North Korea and Iran, is
serious and growing, and puts at risk forward-deployed United States forces, allies, and
partners in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, and the Middle East;
(2) the Department of Defense has an obligation to provide force protection of forward-
deployed United States forces and facilities from regional ballistic missile attack;
(3) the United States has an obligation to meet its security commitments to its allies,
including ballistic missile defense commitments;
(4) the Department of Defense has a balanced program of investment and capabilities to
provide for both homeland defense and regional defense against ballistic missiles, consistent
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with the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and with the prioritized and integrated needs of
the commanders of the combatant commands;
(5) elements of United States regional missile defenses enhance and enable the homeland
defense capabilities of the United States, including forward-deployed radars and defense of
critical forward-deployed missile defense systems;
(6) the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense is an appropriate and prudent
response to the existing and growing ballistic missile threat from Iran to forward-deployed
United States forces, allies, and partners in Europe;
(7) the Department of Defense should, as a high priority, continue to develop, test, and plan
to deploy Phases 2 and 3 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, including the planned
Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland;
(8) the Department of Defense should also continue with its other phased and adaptive
regional missile defense efforts tailored to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region;
(9) European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are making valuable
contributions to missile defense in Europe, by hosting elements of United States missile
defense systems on their territories, through individual national contributions to missile
defense capability, and by collective funding and development of the Active Layered Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense system;
(10) the actions taken by the Department of Defense to improve its regional missile defense
posture in response to the provocative actions and threats of North Korea were prudent and
appropriate and demonstrated the flexible and adaptive nature of its regional missile defense
capabilities, which allows for surge deployments to meet regional contingencies in a timely
manner; and
(11) Japan and South Korea are making notable progress in enhancing their missile defense
capabilities, in partnership with the United States, to protect against regional missiles from
North Korea.
(c) Report-
(1) REPORT REQUIRED- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
on the status and progress of regional missile defense programs and efforts.
(2) ELEMENTS- The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the overall risk assessment from the most recent Global Ballistic
Defense Assessment of regional missile defense capabilities relative to meeting the
operational needs of the commanders of the geographic combatant commands, including the
need for force protection of United States forward-deployed forces and capabilities and for
defense of allies and partners.
(B) An assessment whether the currently planned European Phased Adaptive Approach and
other planned regional missile defense approaches and capabilities of the United States meet
the integrated priorities of the commanders of the geographic combatant commands in an
affordable and balanced manner.
(C) A description of the progress made in the development and testing of elements of
systems intended for deployment in Phases 2 and 3 of the European Phased Adaptive
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Approach, including the Standard Missile-3 Block IB and IIA interceptors and the Aegis
Ashore system.
(D) A description of the manner in which elements of regional missile defense architectures,
such as forward-based X-band radars in Japan, Israel, Turkey, and the area of responsibility
of the United States Central Command, contribute to the enhancement of the homeland
defense of the United States.
(E) A description of the manner in which enhanced integration of offensive military
capabilities and defensive missile defense capabilities will fit into regional missile defense
planning and force structure assessments.
(3) FORM- The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
Regarding Section 232, S.Rept. 113-44 states:
Regional ballistic missile defense (sec. 232)
The committee recommends a provision that would express the sense of Congress
concerning the importance of regional ballistic missile defense and would require the
Secretary of Defense to prepare a report on the status and progress of efforts to enhance
regional ballistic missile defense capabilities.
The committee notes that regional ballistic missile defenses provide a critical force
protection capability for forward deployed U.S. forces, as well as for allies and partners,
against missile threats from countries such as North Korea and Iran. North Korea’s public
threats in the spring of 2013 to use ballistic missiles against South Korea, Japan, and Guam
served as a stark reminder of the importance of regional missile defenses and the need to
expand and improve U.S. regional missile defense capabilities.
Regional missile defenses are a high priority for geographic combatant commanders.
Lieutenant General Richard P. Formica, USA, Commander of U.S. Army Space and Missile
Defense Command, and Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense, under U.S. Strategic Command, testified in May 2013 that the
Global Ballistic Missile Defense Assessment for 2012 concluded that the operational risk for
regional missile defenses is higher than the homeland missile defense risk. The Department
of Defense is pursuing increased regional missile defense capabilities, such as the European
Phased Adaptive Approach and similar approaches tailored to other regions, including
cooperation with allies and partners.
The committee supports the continued development, testing, and deployment of regional
missile defense capabilities such as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system and its
associated Standard Missile-3 interceptors, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
systems. The committee notes that missile defense tests over the last year have demonstrated
increasing capability for these systems, including the capability to launch on remote sensor
data. (Page 40)
S.Rept. 113-44 also states:
Common kill vehicle technology program
On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a series of steps planned
to enhance homeland ballistic missile defense, to stay ahead of the evolving long-range
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missile threat from North Korea and Iran. One of the steps announced is the creation of a
new program proposed in the President’s budget request to develop advanced and common
kill vehicle technologies for the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and future variants of the
Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) interceptor for the Navy’s Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
program.
The objectives of the program are to develop common technologies, subsystems, or
components that could be used in either kill vehicle, and to advance the state-of-the-art kill
vehicle capability, including propulsion, electronics, navigation, seeker optics,
discrimination, and communications. Advances in these kill vehicle technologies could
provide significant improvements in the effectiveness of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense systems, and the overall Ballistic
Missile Defense System, which are high priority objectives for the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) and the combatant commands that rely on these systems.
Given that the program was first announced in mid-March, the committee understands it is
still at the beginning stage of program concept development, and does not yet have a well-
defined long-term plan in place. This is understandable for a new research and development
program, but the committee expects MDA to provide more definition and clarity on the long-
term plan for the Common Kill Vehicle Technology Development program.
Section 225 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law
112–239) requires the Director of MDA to develop a long-term plan to modify and upgrade
the current GBI Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, and the competitive development of a next-
generation kill vehicle for the GBI. The provision also requires the Director to report to
Congress on the plan by July 2013. The committee expects that the new Common Kill
Vehicle Technology Development program will be compatible and consistent with the intent
of Section 225.
One key element of any future kill vehicle program will be advanced propulsion for the
Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS) that steer the kill vehicle into the target
warhead, including solid-fueled DACS that are currently used on all SM–3 variants. The
committee notes that MDA plans to rely on the industrial base for innovation and
competition for this Common Kill Vehicle Technology Development program. However,
with the termination of the SM–3 IIB program, one of the two industry contractors with solid
DACS expertise is at risk of ending their work and their ability to contribute to this program.
With these concerns in mind, the committee directs MDA to provide a report to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2014, setting forth the long-term
plan and objectives for the Common Kill Vehicle Technology Development program,
including an explanation of how it intends to maintain a competitive industrial base to
implement the program.
The committee supports the efforts of MDA to develop technology for a next generation high
performance, high reliability, and highly producible kill vehicle, which MDA says could be
ready before the end of the decade. A next generation kill vehicle would have enhanced
discrimination capabilities and the potential for volume kill capability. The committee
encourages the MDA to move the program as expeditiously as possible from research and
development into product development, based on demonstrated technical progress and
consistent with sound acquisition practices, and to transfer this effort from the Ballistic
Missile Defense Technology Development program element into a new program element
dedicated to the development of a next generation kill vehicle for the Ground-Based
Interceptor and future variants of the Standard Missile-3 interceptor. The committee expects
MDA to fully incorporate the lessons learned from the previously terminated Multiple Kill
Vehicle program to avoid the problems encountered in that program. (Pages 60-61)
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FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397/S. 1429)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 113-113 of June 17, 2013) on H.R.
2397, recommended the funding levels shown in Table 4.
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 113-85 of August 1, 2013) on S.
1429, recommended the funding levels shown in Table 4. The report states that the $27 million
reduction in research and development funding recommended for Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) is
for “Restoring acquisition accountability: Aegis BMD 5.1 development cost growth.” (Page 178,
line 88) The report states:
Acquisition Accountability in Development Programs.—The fiscal year 2014 budget request
includes $937,056,000 to continue the development of multiple spirals of Aegis ballistic
missile defense [BMD] capabilities. While the Committee notes the repeated success of the
Aegis weapons system, the budget request includes roughly $500,000,000 for the concurrent
development of Aegis BMD 4.0, Aegis BMD 5.0, and Aegis BMD 5.1. Since 2007, MDA
has obligated over $450,000,000 for development of Aegis BMD 5.1, and the budget request
for Aegis BMD 5.1 in fiscal year 2014 is $239,000,000. Despite the significant investment
made to date in Aegis BMD 5.1 and the funding increase requested in fiscal year 2014, MDA
has not completed an acquisition program baseline for Aegis BMD 5.1. Further, the
Government Accountability Office in its April 2013 report identified unstable baselines as
well as cost growth in the Aegis program. Therefore, the Committee does not fully support
the increase sought for Aegis BMD 5.1, and recommends a reduction of $27,000,000. (Pages
180-181; material in brackets as in original.)
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Appendix A. Aegis BMD Flight Tests
Summary of Test Flights
Table A-1 presents a DOD summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. As shown in
the table, DOD states that since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 22 successful
exo-atmospheric intercepts in 28 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 3 successful
intercepts in 4 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships), and 3 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in
3 attempts using the SM-2 Block IV missile, making for a combined total of 25 successful
intercepts in 31 attempts.
In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii
used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance
satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit—an operation called Burnt Frost. Including this intercept
in the count increases the totals to 23 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 29 attempts using
the SM-3 missile, and 26 successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 32 attempts using
both SM-3 and SM-2 Block IV missiles.
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Table A-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests Since January 2002
Name of
Cumulative Cumulative
Date
Country
flight test
Target
Successful?
successes
attempts
Exo-atmospheric (using SM-3 missile)
1/25/02
US
FM-2
Unitary TTV short-range target
Yes
1
1
6/13/02
US
FM-3
Unitary TTV short-range target
Yes
2
2
11/21/02
US
FM-4
Unitary TTV short-range target
Yes
3
3
6/18/03
US
FM-5
Unitary TTV short-range target
No
3
4
12/11/03
US
FM-6
Unitary TTV short-range target
Yes
4
5
2/24/05
US
FTM 04-1 (FM-7)
Unitary TTV short-range target
Yes
5
6
11/17/05
US
FTM 04-2 (FM-8)
Separating medium-range target
Yes
6
7
6/22/06
US
FTM 10
Separating medium-range target
Yes
7
8
12/7/06
US
FTM 11
Unitary TTV short-range target
No
7
9
4/26/07
US
FTM 11 Event 4
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target
Yes
8
10
6/22/07
US
FTM 12
Separating medium-range target
Yes
9
11
8/31/07
US
FTM-11a
Classified
Yes
10
12
11/6/07
US
FTM 13
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target
Yes
11
13


Unitary ARAV-A short-range target
Yes
12
14
12/17/07
Japan
JFTM-1
Separating medium-range target
Yes
13
15
11/1/08
US
Pacific Blitz
Short-range missile target
Yes
14
16


Short-range missile target
No
14
17
11/19/08
Japan
JFTM-2
Separating medium-range target
No
14
18
7/30/09
US
FTM-17
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target
Yes
15
19
10/27/09
Japan
JFTM-3
Separating medium-range target
Yes
16
20
10/28/10
Japan
JFTM-4
Separating medium-range target
Yes
17
21
4/14/11
US
FTM-15
LV-2 intermediate range target
Yes
18
22
9/1/11
US
FTM-16
Short-range ballistic missile target
No
18
23
5/9/12
US
FTM-16 E2a
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target
Yes
19
24
6/26/12
US
FTM-18
Separating ballistic missile target
Yes
20
25
10/25/12
US
FTI-01
Short-range ballistic missile target
No
20
26
2/12/13
US
FTM-20
Unitary medium-range target
Yes
21
27
5/16/13
US
FTM-19
Separating short-range target
Yes
22
28
Endo-atmospheric (using SM-2 missile)
5/24/06
US
Pacific Pheonix
Unitary short-range target
Yes
1
1
6/5/08
US
FTM-14
Unitary short-range target
Yes
2
2
3/26/09
US
Stellar Daggers
Short-range ballistic missile target
Yes
3
3
Combined total for exo- and endo-atmospheric above tests
25
31
Source: Table adapted from table presented in MDA fact sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,”
accessed on May 17, 2013, at http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis_tests.pdf.
Notes: TTV is target test vehicle; ARAV is Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle. In addition to the flight tests
shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S.
satellite—an operation called Burnt Frost. Including this intercept in the count increases the totals to 23
successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 29 attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 26 successful exo- and endo-
atmospheric intercepts in 32 attempts using both SM-3 and SM-2 Block IV missiles.
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May 2010 Criticism of Claimed Successes in Flight Tests
In a May 2010 magazine article and supplementary white paper, two professors with scientific
backgrounds—George Lewis and Theodore Postol—criticized DOD claims of successes in Aegis
(and other DOD) BMD flight tests, arguing that
the Defense Department’s own test data show that, in combat, the vast majority of
“successful” SM-3 experiments would have failed to destroy attacking warheads. The data
also show potential adversaries how to defeat both the SM-3 and the GMD [ground-based
missile defense] systems, which share the same serious flaws that can be readily exploited by
adversaries.44
The criticisms made by Lewis and Postol were reported in a May 18, 2010, New York Times
article.45 In response to the criticisms and the New York Times article, MDA issued a press release
and other information defending the flight tests and arguing that the criticisms are based on
inaccurate or incomplete information.46
Details on Selected Exo-Atmospheric (SM-3) Flight Tests Since June
2006

June 22, 2006, Test. This was the first test to use the 3.6 version of the Aegis BMD system.47
December 7, 2006, Test. This was the first unsuccessful flight test since June 2003. MDA stated
that the ninth test
was not completed due to an incorrect system setting aboard the Aegis-class cruiser USS
Lake Erie prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the ship. The incorrect
configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship from launching the first of
the two interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch
of two missiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally
not launched.
The planned test was to involve the launch of a Standard Missile 3 against a ballistic missile
target and a Standard Missile 2 against a surrogate aircraft target. The ballistic missile target
was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii and the aircraft target
was launched from a Navy aircraft. The USS Lake Erie (CG 70), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and

44 George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” Arms Control
Today
, May 2010: 24-32. The quoted passage appears on p. 26. The associated white paper is George N. Lewis and
Theodore A. Postol, A Technically Detailed Description of Flaws in the SM-3 and GMD Missile Defense Systems
Revealed by the Defense Department’s Ballistic Missile Test Data
, May 3, 2010, 13 pp.
45 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Review Cites Flaws In U.S. Antimissile Program,” New York Times, May
18, 2010: 1.
46 Missile Defense Agency news release entitled “Missile Defense Agency Responds to New York Times Article,” 10-
News-0005, May 18, 2010; Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense Agency Response to Request for Information,
Standard Missile – 3 Interceptor Testing
, May 18, 2010, 2 pp.; Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense Agency
Response to Request for Information, Response to New York Times May 18, 2010, Article Regarding SM-3 Testing
,
May 18, 2010, 3 pp.; Richard Lehner, “Missile Defense Agerncy Responds to New York Times Article,” DOD Live
(http://www.dodlive.mil), May 18, 2010; Transcript of Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable With Richard
Lehner, Spokesman, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Subject: Standard Missile 3 Test Program, May 18, 2010.
47 Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Test Results in Successful ‘Hit To Kill’ Intercept,” June 22, 2006 (06-
NEWS-0018).
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the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate TROMP were all successful in detecting and tracking
their respective targets. Both targets fell into the ocean as planned.
After a thorough review, the Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Navy will determine a
new test date.48
A news article about the ninth test stated:
“You can say it’s seven of nine, rather than eight of nine,” Missile Defense Agency
spokesman Chris Taylor said of the second failure in tests of the system by the agency and
the Navy....
The drill was planned to demonstrate the Navy’s ability to knock down two incoming
missiles at once from the same ship.
“In a real world situation it is possible, maybe even probable, that in addition to engaging a
ballistic missile threat that was launched, you may be engaging a surface action,” said Joe
Rappisi before the test. He is director for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system at
Lockheed Martin, the primary contractor for the program.
The test would have marked the first time a ship has shot down one target in space and
another target in the air at the same time.
The test presented a greater challenge to the ship’s crew and the ballistic missile defense
system than previous tests, Rappisi said. The multiple target scenario is also closer to what
sailors might actually face in battle.
The U.S. Pacific Fleet has been gradually installing missile surveillance and tracking
technology on many of its destroyers and cruisers amid concerns about North Korea’s long-
range missile program.
It is also installing interceptor missiles on many of its ships, even as the technology to track
and shoot down incoming missiles is being developed and perfected.
The Royal Netherlands Navy joined the tracking and monitoring off Kauai to see how its
equipment works. The Dutch presence marked the first time a European ally has sent one of
its vessels to participate in a U.S. ballistic missile defense test.49
A subsequent news article stated:
the test abort of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system Dec. 7 resulted from human
error, [MDA Director USAF Lt. Gen. Henry] Obering says.... Both the ballistic missile and
aircraft targets launched as planned, but the first interceptor failed to fire because an operator
had selected an incorrect setting for the test. Officials then aborted before the second could
boost.
Aegis missile defense system tests are at a standstill until officials are able to identify an
appropriate ballistic missile target. The one used Dec. 7 was the last of its kind, Obering
says, leaving them empty handed in the near future.50

48 Untitled Missile Defense Agency “For Your Information” statement dated December 7, 2006 (06-FYI-0090).
49 David Briscoe, “Test Interceptor Missile Fails To Launch,” NavyTimes.com, December 8, 2006.
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Another article stated:
Philip Coyle, a former head of the Pentagon’s testing directorate, gives the Navy credit for
“discipline and successes so far” in its sea-based ballistic missile defense testing program.
Coyle is now a senior adviser at the Center for Defense Information.
“The U.S. Navy has an enviable track record of successful flight intercept tests, and is
making the most of its current, limited Aegis missile defense capabilities in these tests,”
Coyle told [Inside the Navy] Dec. 7.
“Difficulties such as those that delayed the latest flight intercept attempt illustrate the
complexity of the system, and how everything must be carefully orchestrated to achieve
success,” Coyle added. “Nevertheless, this particular setback won’t take the Navy long to
correct.”51
April 26, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test:
involved the simultaneous engagements of a ballistic missile “unitary” target (meaning that
the target warhead and booster remain attached) and a surrogate hostile air target....
The test demonstrated the [Aegis ship’s] ability to engage a ballistic missile threat and
defend itself from attack at the same time. The test also demonstrated the effectiveness of
engineering, manufacturing, and mission assurance changes in the solid divert and attitude
control system (SDACS) in the kinetic kill weapon. This was the first flight test of all the
SM-3 Block IA’s upgrades, previously demonstrated in ground tests.52
A press report on the test stated that the hostile air target was an anti-ship cruise missile. The
article stated that the scenario for the test
called for the [Aegis ship] to come under attack from a cruise missile fired by an enemy
plane.... A Navy plane fired the cruise missile target used in the test.53
June 22, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test
was the third intercept involving a separating target and the first time an Aegis BMD-
equipped destroyer was used to launch the interceptor missile. The USS Decatur (DDG 73),
using the operationally-certified Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Weapon System (BMD 3.6)
and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA missile successfully intercepted the target
during its midcourse phase of flight....
An Aegis cruiser, USS Port Royal (CG 73), a Spanish frigate, MÉNDEZ NÚÑEZ (F-104),
and MDA’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) mobile ground-based radar
also participated in the flight test. USS Port Royal used the flight test to support development

(...continued)
50 Amy Butler, “GMD Trial Delayed Until Spring; Aegis Failure Human Error,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
December 19, 2006.
51 Zachary M. Peterson, “Sea-Based Missile Defense Test Fails Due To ‘Incorrect Configuration,’” Inside the Navy,
December 11, 2006.
52 Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept,” April 26, 2007 (07-NEWS-
0032).
53 Audrey McAvoy, “Aegis Missile Test Successful,” NavyTimes.com, April 27, 2007.
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of the new Aegis BMD SPY-1B radar signal processor, collecting performance data on its
increased target detection and discrimination capabilities. MÉNDEZ NÚÑEZ, stationed off
Kauai, performed long-range surveillance and track operations as a training event to assess
the future capabilities of the F-100 Class. The THAAD radar tracked the target and
exchanged tracking data with the Aegis BMD cruiser.
This event marked the third time that an allied military unit participated in a U.S. Aegis
BMD test, with warships from Japan and the Netherlands participating in earlier tests.54
August 31, 2007, Test. MDA has publicly noted the occurrence of this test and the fact that it
resulted in a successful intercept,55 but states that the details about the test are classified.56 MDA
does not appear to have issued a news release about this flight test following the completion of
the test, as it has for other Aegis BMD flight tests.57
November 6, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test involved:
a multiple simultaneous engagement involving two ballistic missile targets.... For the first
time, the operationally realistic test involved two unitary “non-separating” targets, meaning
that the target’s warheads did not separate from their booster rockets....
At approximately 6:12 p.m. Hawaii Standard Time (11:12 p.m. EST), a target was launched
from the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Moments
later, a second, identical target was launched from the PMRF. The USS Lake Erie’s Aegis
BMD Weapon System detected and tracked the targets and developed fire control solutions.
Approximately two minutes later, the USS Lake Erie’s crew fired two SM-3 missiles, and
two minutes later they successfully intercepted the targets outside the earth’s atmosphere
more than 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean and 250 miles northwest of Kauai....
A Japanese destroyer also participated in the flight test. Stationed off Kauai and equipped
with the certified 3.6 Aegis BMD weapon system, the guided missile destroyer JS Kongo
performed long-range surveillance and tracking exercises. The Kongo used the test as a
training exercise in preparation for the first ballistic missile intercept test by a Japanese ship
planned for later this year. This event marked the fourth time an allied military unit
participated in a U.S. Aegis BMDS test.58

54 Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept Achieved,” June 22, 2007 (07-NEWS-
0037).
55 See for example, slide 8 in the 20-slide briefing entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense Program Overview For The
Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series,” dated June 20, 2008, presented by Lieutenant General Trey Obering, USAF,
Director, Missile Defense Agency. Source for briefing: InsideDefense.com (subscription required). Each slide in the
briefing includes a note indicating that it was approved by MDA for public release on June 13, 2008. Slide 8 lists Aegis
BMD midcourse flight tests conducted since September 2005, including a test on August 31, 2007. The slide indicates
with a check mark that the flight test was successful. A success in this test is also needed to for the total number of
successful intercepts to match the reported figure.
56 An e-mail from MDA to CRS dated June 30, 2008, states that the flight test “was a hit to kill intercept test but details
about the test are classified.”
57 MDA’s website, when accessed on June 30, 2008, did not show a news release issued on of soon after August 31,
2007, that discusses this test.
58 Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense “Hit to Kill” Intercept Achieved,” November 6, 2007 (07-
NEWS-0051).
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December 17, 2007, Test. In this flight test, a BMD-capable Japanese Aegis destroyer used an
SM-3 Block IA missile to successfully intercept a ballistic missile target in a flight test off the
coast of Hawaii. It was the first time that a non-U.S. ship had intercepted a ballistic missile using
the Aegis BMD system.59
November 1, 2008, Test. This flight test was reportedly the first U.S. Navy Aegis BMD flight test
conducted by the Navy, without oversight by MDA. The test involved two Aegis ships, each
attempting to intercept a ballistic missile. The SM-3 fired by the first Aegis ship successfully
intercepted its target, but the SM-3 fired by the second Aegis ship did not intercept its target. A
press release from the U.S. Third Fleet (the Navy’s fleet for the Eastern Pacific) states that
Vice Adm. Samuel J. Locklear, Commander, U.S. Third Fleet announced today the
successful Navy intercept of a ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean during Fleet
Exercise Pacific Blitz. This was the first Fleet operational firing to employ the Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) against a ballistic missile target. Command and control of this mission
resided with Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, based in San Diego, Calif.
Pearl Harbor-based Aegis destroyers, USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) and USS Hopper (DDG
70), which have been upgraded to engage ballistic missiles, fired SM-3 missiles at separate
targets. During this event, a short-range ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific
Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Upon detecting and tracking
the target, USS Paul Hamilton, launched a SM-3 missile, resulting in a direct-hit intercept.
Following USS Paul Hamilton’s engagement, PMRF launched another target. USS Hopper
successfully detected, tracked and engaged the target. The SM-3 followed a nominal
trajectory, however intercept was not achieved. Extensive analysis of the flight mission will
be used to improve the deployed Aegis BMD system.60
November 19, 2008, Test. This was the second Japanese flight test, and involved a single ballistic
missile target. The test did not result in a successful intercept. MDA states that
Rear Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Director General of Operations and Plans, for the Japanese
Maritime Staff Office (MSO), Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and Lt. General
Henry “Trey” Obering, United States Missile Defense Agency director, announced the
completion today of a cooperative sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense intercept flight
test off the coast of Kauai in Hawaii. The event, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 2
(JFTM-2), marked the second attempt by an Allied naval ship to intercept a ballistic missile
target with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense. Target performance, interceptor missile launch and flyout, and operation of
the Aegis Weapon System by the crew were successful, but an intercept was not achieved.
The JFTM-2 was a test of the newest engagement capability of the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS CHOKAI (DDG-
176). At approximately 4:21 pm (HST), 11:21 am (Tokyo time) a ballistic missile target was
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. JS
CHOKAI crew members detected and tracked the target using an advanced on-board radar.

59 John Liang, “Japanese Destroyer Shoots Down Ballistic Missile Test Target,” Inside Missile Defense, December 19,
2007; “Japanese Aegis Destroyer Wins Test By Killing Target Missile With SM-3 Interceptor,” Defense Daily,
December 18, 2007; Reuters, “Japanese Ship Downs Missile In Pacific Test,” New York Times, December 18, 2007: 8;
Audrey McAvoy, “Japan Intercepts Missile In Test Off Hawaii,” NavyTimes.com, December 17, 2007.
60 Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, Public Affairs Office, press release 23-08, dated November 1, 2008, entitled “Navy
Intercepts Ballistic Missile Target in Fleet Exercise Pacific Blitz.” See also Dave Ahearn, “One of Two Missiles Hit In
Aegis Test; Navy For First Time Runs Test Instead of MDA,” Defense Daily, November 4, 2008: 1-2.
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The Aegis Weapon System then developed a fire control solution, and at approximately 4:24
pm (HST), 11:24 am (Tokyo time) on Nov 20, a single Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block IA
was launched. Approximately two minutes later, the SM-3 failed to intercept the target.
There is no immediate explanation for the failed intercept attempt. More information will be
available after a thorough investigation. The JS CHOKAI crew performance was excellent in
executing the mission. JFTM-2 was the second time that a Japanese ship was designated to
launch the interceptor missile, a major milestone in the growing cooperation between Japan
and the U.S.61
A November 21, 2008, press report states that
An Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) test by the Japanese destroyer Chokai (DDG-176)
ended in failure when the Standard Missile-3 Block 1A interceptor lost track of the target
missile in the final seconds before a planned hit-to-kill.
The Chokai and its crew performed well throughout the test, and the SM-3 also performed
flawlessly through its first three stages, according to Rear Adm. Brad Hicks, the U.S. Navy
Aegis ballistic missile defense program director. He spoke with several reporters in a
teleconference around midnight ET Wednesday-Thursday, after the test in the area of the
Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii.
This was the second Aegis BMD test failure in less than a month.
These latest two failures come as some Democrats in Congress are poised to cut spending on
missile defense programs when they convene next year to consider the Missile Defense
Agency budget for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2010....
Still, in the coming money debates next year, missile defense advocates will be able to point
out that even including the Hopper and Chokai failures, the record for the Aegis tests is an
overwhelming 16 successful hits demolishing target missiles out of 20 attempts.
Those successes included the first Japanese attempt. The Japanese destroyer Kongo (DDG-
173) successfully used its SM-3 interceptor to kill a target missile. The difference in tests is
that the Kongo crew was advised beforehand when the target missile would be launched,
while the Chokai crew wasn’t....
[Hicks] said a board will be convened to examine why the latest test failed. Hicks declined to
speculate on why the SM-3 interceptor missed the target. “I’m confident we’ll find out the
root cause” of the Chokai interceptor failure to score a hit, he said.
However, he was asked by Space & Missile Defense Report whether the prior SM-3
successes make it unlikely the Chokai failure stems from some basic design flaw in all SM-
3s, and whether it is more likely that the Chokai SM-3 failed because of some flaw or glitch
in just that one interceptor.
Hicks said that is likely.
“Obviously, we believe this is hopefully related to this one interceptor,” and doesn’t reflect
any basic design flaw in the SM-3 interceptors, he said.

61 Missile Defense Agency press release 08-News-0087, dated November 19, 2008, entitled “Japan/U.S. Missile
Defense Flight Test Completed.”
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The Chokai test failure cost Japan a $55 million loss, he said, adding, “It wasn’t cheap.”...
In the Chokai test, the target missile was launched from Barking Sands, and about three
minutes later the Chokai crew had spotted the target, the Aegis system had developed a
tracking and hit solution, and the SM-3 interceptor was launched.
The first, second and third stages of the interceptor performed nominally, without problems,
but then came the fourth stage. The nosecone components opened to expose the kill vehicle
area, and somehow the program to track the target missile failed.
“It lost track,” Hicks said, only seconds before the hit would have been achieved.
If the kill had occurred, it would have been about 100 nautical miles (roughly 115 statute
miles) above Earth, and some 250 miles away from Barking Sands, Hicks said.
It took the interceptor about two minutes flight time to reach the near miss with the target
missile.
Meanwhile, the Hamilton was nearby watching the test. The Hamilton Aegis system
successfully spotted and tracked the target, and developed a simulated solution and simulated
interceptor launch that, if it had been real, would have resulted in a successful hit on the
target, Hicks said. The Hamilton didn’t cue the Chokai, however. “It was strictly Chokai’s
engagement,” Hicks said.62
July 30, 2009, Test. MDA states that
In conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Pacific Fleet ships and crews
successfully conducted the latest Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) at-sea firing event
on July 30. During this event, entitled Stellar Avenger, the Aegis BMD-equipped ship, USS
Hopper (DDG 70), detected, tracked, fired and guided a Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block
(Blk) IA to intercept a sub-scale short range ballistic missile. The target was launched from
the Kauai Test Facility, co-located on the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking
Sands, Kauai. It was the 19th successful intercept in 23 at-sea firings, for the Aegis BMD
Program, including the February 2008 destruction of the malfunctioning satellite above the
earth’s atmosphere. Stellar Avenger was part of the continual evaluation of the certified and
fielded Aegis BMD system at-sea today.
At approximately 5:40 pm (HST), 11:40 pm (EDT), a target was launched from PMRF.
Three U.S. Navy Aegis BMD-equipped ships, the cruiser, USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and
destroyers USS Hopper (DDG 70) and USS O'Kane (DDG 77) detected and tracked the
target with their SPY radars. Each developed fire control solutions. At 5:42 pm (HST), 11:42
pm (EDT) the crew of USS Hopper fired one SM-3 Blk IA missile. The USS Hopper’s Aegis
BMD Weapon System successfully guided the SM-3 to a direct body to body hit,
approximately two minutes after leaving the ship. The intercept occurred about 100 miles
above the Pacific Ocean. USS O'Kane conducted a simulated engagement of the target. USS
Lake Erie, with its recently installed upgraded Aegis BMD 4.0.1 Weapons System, detected
and tracked the same target.63

62 Dave Ahearn, “Japanese Aegis Missile Defense Test Fails, But Aegis Record Is 16 Hits In 20 Tries,” Defense Daily,
November 21, 2008: 5-6.
63 Missile Defense Agency press release 09-News-0015, dated July 31, 2009, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Test Successful.”
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A July 31, 2009, press report states:
The test was the first Aegis BMD exercise to feature two versions of the software in a single
event, according to Lisa Callahan, Lockheed’s vice president for ballistic missile defense
programs.
A goal of the exercises was to test the Aegis system’s ability to discern all the different parts
and pieces of a ballistic missile, Nick Bucci, Lockheed’s director for Aegis BMD
development programs, told reporters July 29 during a pre-exercise conference call.
Three more flight tests this fall will further test the system’s discrimination capabilities,
Bucci added, with each test becoming more complex. The last test will “be against a pretty
darn complex target,” he said.
The July 30 tests also validated fixes put in place after a BMD test last November involving
a missile launched from the Aegis BMD Japanese destroyer Chokai failed to intercept its
target, according to MDA spokesman Chris Taylor. The improvements—which were
successful in the most recent test—involved fixes to the Solid Divert Attitude Control
System.
The Chokai is the second of four Japanese Aegis ships being upgraded with BMD capability.
A third ship, the Myoko, is scheduled to carry out a BMD test this fall.64
An August 3, 2009, press report states:
This test was added to the schedule to evaluate changes made after last year’s failed attempt
to intercept a target with an SM-3 Block IA launched by a Japanese Aegis-equipped ship ....
After the Nov. 19 test, MDA officials said, “Target performance, interceptor missile launch
and flyout, and operation of the Aegis Weapon System by the crew were successful, but an
intercept was not achieved.”
A root cause has not been identified, and an MDA spokesman did not say whether fixes have
been made to hardware or operational procedures resulting from the failure review. It is also
unclear why a subscale target was used in the July 30 trial.65
An August 4, 2009, press report states:
[Rear Admiral Alan “Brad” Hicks, Aegis/SM-3 program manager for MDA], said that a
November [2008] failure of an SM-3 Block IA... during a flight-test was attributable to poor
adherence to processes on Raytheon’s assembly line in Tucson, Ariz.
This was isolated to that missile, and it was the result of perturbations to the build process
encountered when shifting from development to production operations.
During the November test, a Japanese Aegis-equipped ship fired the interceptor and it flew
“perfectly,” Hicks said. In the endgame, a failure of the divert and attitude control system on
the unitary kill vehicle led to a miss.
The July 30 demonstration using a U.S. ship “restored confidence” for the Japanese that the
miss last fall was an isolated incident, he says.66

64 Christopher P. Cavas, “Aegis BMD Test Successful,” DefenseNews.com, July 31, 2009.
65 Amy Butler, “SM-3 Scores Hit After Fixes Implemented,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 3, 2009: 5.
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October 27, 2009, Test. This was the third Japanese flight test, and it involved a single ballistic
missile target. MDA states that
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the United States Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) announced the successful completion of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) intercept flight test, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, off the coast of Kauai in
Hawaii. The event, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 3 (JFTM-3), marked the third time
that a JMSDF ship has successfully engaged a ballistic missile target, including two
successful intercepts, with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by
Aegis BMD.
The JFTM-3 test event verified the newest engagement capability of the Japan Aegis BMD
configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS MYOKO (DDG-175). At
approximately 6:00pm (HST), 1:00 pm Tokyo time on Oct 28, a separating, medium-range
ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands,
Kauai, Hawaii. JS MYOKO crew members detected and tracked the target. The Aegis
Weapon System then developed a fire control solution and, at approximately 6:04pm (HST),
1:04 pm Tokyo time a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA interceptor missile was
launched. Approximately 3 minutes later, the SM-3 successfully intercepted the target
approximately 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. JFTM-3 is a significant milestone in the
growing cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the area of missile defense.
Also participating in the test, were the Pearl Harbor-based USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and USS
Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) which detected and tracked the target and conducted a simulated
engagement.67
October 28, 2010, Test. This was the fourth Japanese flight test, and it involved a single ballistic
missile target. MDA states that
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the United States Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) announced the successful completion of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) intercept flight test, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, off the coast of Kauai in
Hawaii.
The event marked the fourth time that a JMSDF ship has engaged a ballistic missile target,
including three successful intercepts, with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability
provided by Aegis BMD.
The JFTM-4 test event verified the newest engagement capability of the Japan Aegis BMD
configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS KIRISHIMA. At
approximately 5:06 p.m. (HST), 12:06 p.m. Tokyo time on Oct. 29, 2010, a separating 1,000
km class ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at
Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii.

(...continued)
66 Amy Butler, “SM-3 Upgrade Program Cost Increases,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 4, 2009: 1-2. See
also Dan Taylor, “Navy Conducts Aegis BMD Test, New Baseline System Participates,” Inside the Navy, August 3,
2009; Daniel Wasserbly, “US Aegis BMD System Achieves Trial Success,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 5, 2009: 8.
67 Missile Defense Agency press release 09-News-0021, dated October 28, 2009, entitled “Japan/U.S. Missile Defense
Flight Test Successful.” See also Christopher P. Cavas, “Japanese Destroyer Conducts Successful BMD Test,”
NavyTimes.com, October 28, 2009; and Amy Butler and Michael Bruno, “SM-3 Scores Hit In Japanese Test,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,” October 29, 2009: 3.
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JS KIRISHIMA crew members detected and tracked the target. The Aegis Weapon System
then developed a fire control solution and launched a Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block IA
missile. Approximately three minutes later, the SM-3 successfully intercepted the target
approximately 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. JFTM-4 is a significant milestone in the
growing cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the area of missile defense.
Also participating in the test was USS LAKE ERIE and USS RUSSELL, Aegis ships which
cooperated to detect, track and conduct a simulated intercept engagement against the same
target.68
April 15, 2011, Test. MDA states that this flight test “was the most challenging test to date, as it
was the first Aegis BMD version 3.6.1 intercept against an intermediate-range target (range 1,864
to 3,418 [statute] miles) and the first Aegis BMD 3.6.1 engagement relying on remote tracking
data.” MDA states that
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Navy sailors aboard the Aegis destroyer USS
O’KANE (DDG 77), and Soldiers from the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command
operating from the 613th Air and Space Operations Center at Hickam Air Force Base,
Hawaii, successfully conducted a flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
element of the nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense System, resulting in the intercept of a
separating ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean. This successful test demonstrated
the capability of the first phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
announced by the President in September, 2009.
At 2:52 a.m. EDT (6:52 p.m. April 15 Marshall Island Time), an intermediate-range ballistic
missile target was launched from the Reagan Test Site, located on Kwajalein Atoll in the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, approximately 2,300 miles southwest of Hawaii. The target
flew in a northeasterly direction towards a broad ocean area in the Pacific Ocean. Following
target launch, a forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-band transportable radar, located on Wake
Island, detected and tracked the threat missile. The radar sent trajectory information to the
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system, which
processed and transmitted remote target data to the USS O’KANE. The destroyer, located to
the west of Hawaii, used the data to develop a fire control solution and launch the SM-3
Block IA missile approximately 11 minutes after the target was launched.
As the IRBM target continued along its trajectory, the firing ship’s AN/SPY-1 radar detected
and acquired the ballistic missile target. The firing ship’s Aegis BMD weapon system
uplinked target track information to the SM-3 Block IA missile. The SM-3 maneuvered to a
point in space as designated by the fire control solution and released its kinetic warhead. The
kinetic warhead acquired the target, diverted into its path, and, using only force of a direct
impact, destroyed the threat in a “hit-to-kill” intercept.
During the test the C2BMC system, operated by Soldiers from the 94th Army Air and Missile
Defense Command, received data from all assets and provided situational awareness of the
engagement to U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic
Command.

68 Missile Defense Agency press release 10-News-0016, dated October 29, 2010, entitled “Joint Japan-U.S. Missile
Defense Flight Test Successful.” See also Marina Malenic, “Japanese Aegis Destroyer Successfully Completes Missile-
Intercept Test,” Defense Daily, November 1, 2010: 6.
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The two demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance Satellites (STSS), launched by
MDA in 2009, successfully acquired the target missile, providing stereo “birth to death”
tracking of the target.
Today’s event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-15 (FTM-15), was the most
challenging test to date, as it was the first Aegis BMD version 3.6.1 intercept against an
intermediate-range target (range 1,864 to 3,418 [statute] miles) and the first Aegis BMD
3.6.1 engagement relying on remote tracking data. The ability to use remote radar data to
engage a threat ballistic missile greatly increases the battle space and defended area of the
SM-3 missile.
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will
spend the next several months conducting an extensive assessment and evaluation of system
performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.69
September 1, 2011, Test. This flight test, which did not result in an intercept, was the first flight
test of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor. MDA states that it
was unable to achieve the planned intercept of a ballistic missile target during a test over the
Pacific Ocean exercising the sea-based element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS).
At approximately 3:53 a.m. Hawaii Standard Time (9:53 a.m. EDT) a short-range ballistic
missile target was launched from the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai,
Hawaii. Approximately 90 seconds later, a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block 1B interceptor
missile was launched from the cruiser USS LAKE ERIE (CG-70) but an intercept of the
target was not achieved.
This was the first flight test of the advanced SM-3 Block 1B interceptor missile. Program
officials will conduct an extensive investigation to determine the cause of the failure to
intercept.70
May 9, 2012, Test. MDA states that this flight test “was the first successful live fire intercept test
of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor and the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system.”
MDA states that
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS LAKE ERIE
(CG 70) successfully conducted a flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
system, resulting in the first intercept of a short-range ballistic missile target over the Pacific
Ocean by the Navy’s newest Missile Defense interceptor, the Standard Missile – 3 (SM-3)
Block IB.
At 8:18 p.m. Hawaiian Standard Time (2:18 a.m. EDT May 10) the target missile was
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, located on Kauai, Hawaii. The target flew
on a northwesterly trajectory towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific Ocean. Following
target launch, the USS LAKE ERIE detected and tracked the missile with its onboard

69 Missile Defense Agency press release 11-News-0007, dated April 15, 2011, entitled “Sea-based Missile Defense
Flight Test Results in Successful Intercept.”
70 Missile Defense Agency press release 11-News-0016, dated September 1, 2011, entitled “Sea-Based Missile Defense
Test Conducted.” See also Amy Butler, “Upgraded Ballistic Missile Killer Fizzles In First Flight Test,” Aerospace
Daily & Defense Report
, September 2, 2011: 3; and Mike McCarthy, “Sea-Based Missile Defense Test Fails,” Defense
Daily
, September 2, 2011: 2-3.
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AN/SPY-1 radar. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon
system, developed a fire control solution and launched the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block
IB interceptor.
The USS LAKE ERIE continued to track the target and sent trajectory information to the
SM-3 Block IB interceptor in-flight. The SM-3 maneuvered to a point in space, as designated
by the fire control solution, and released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead acquired
the target, diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and
destroyed the threat in a hit-to-kill intercept.
Today’s event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-16 (FTM-16) Event 2a, was the first
successful live fire intercept test of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor and the second-generation
Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system. Previous successful intercepts were conducted with the
Aegis BMD 3.6.1 weapon system and the SM-3 Block IA interceptor, which are currently
operational on U.S. Navy ships deployed across the globe....
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will
conduct an extensive assessment and evaluation of system performance based upon telemetry
and other data obtained during the test.71
June 26, 2012, Test. MDA states that this flight test “was the second consecutive successful
intercept test of the SM-3 Block IB missile and the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon
system.” MDA states that
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and U.S. Navy sailors in the USS LAKE ERIE (CG
70) successfully conducted a flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
system, resulting in the intercept of a separating ballistic missile target over the Pacific
Ocean by the Navy’s newest missile defense interceptor missile, the Standard Missile-3
(SM-3) Block IB.
At 11:15 pm Hawaii Standard Time, June 26 (5:15 am EDT June 27), the target missile was
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, located on Kauai, Hawaii. The target flew
on a northwesterly trajectory towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific Ocean. Following
target launch, the USS LAKE ERIE detected and tracked the missile with its onboard
AN/SPY-1 radar. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon
system, developed a fire control solution and launched the SM-3 Block IB missile.
The USS LAKE ERIE continued to track the target and sent trajectory information to the
SM-3 Block IB missile in-flight. The SM-3 maneuvered to a point in space, as designated by
the fire control solution, and released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead acquired the
target, diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and
destroyed the threat in a hit-to-kill intercept.
Today’s test event was the second consecutive successful intercept test of the SM-3 Block IB
missile and the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system. The first successful
SM-3 Block IB intercept occurred on May 9, 2012. Today’s intercept is a critical
accomplishment for the second phase of the President’s European Phased Adaptive
Approach consisting of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor employed in an Aegis Ashore system
in Romania in 2015.

71 Missile Defense Agency press release 12-News-0007, dated May 9, 2012, entitled “Second-Generation Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test.”
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Initial indications are that all components performed as designed resulting in a very accurate
intercept.72
October 25, 2012, Test. MDA states that in this flight test,
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Army soldiers from the 94th and 32nd Army Air
and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC); U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS
FITZGERALD (DDG 62); and airmen from the 613th Air and Space Operations Center
successfully conducted the largest, most complex missile defense flight test ever attempted
resulting in the simultaneous engagement of five ballistic missile and cruise missile targets.
An integrated air and ballistic missile defense architecture used multiple sensors and missile
defense systems to engage multiple targets at the same time....
The USS FITZGERALD successfully engaged a low flying cruise missile over water. The
Aegis system also tracked and launched an SM-3 Block 1A interceptor against a Short-
Range Ballistic Missile. However, despite indication of a nominal flight of the SM-3 Block
1A interceptor, there was no indication of an intercept of the SRBM.73
February 12, 2013, Test. MDA states that in this flight test,
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS LAKE ERIE
(CG 70) successfully conducted a flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
system, resulting in the intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile target over the Pacific
Ocean by a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA guided missile.
At 11:10 p.m. HST (4:10 a.m. EST) a unitary medium-range ballistic missile target was
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, on Kauai, Hawaii. The target flew
northwest towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific Ocean.
The in-orbit Space Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstrators (STSS-D) detected and
tracked the target, and forwarded track data to the USS LAKE ERIE. The ship, equipped
with the second-generation Aegis BMD weapon system, used Launch on Remote doctrine to
engage the target.
The ship developed a fire control solution from the STSS-D track and launched the SM-3
Block IA guided missile approximately five minutes after target launch. The SM-3
maneuvered to a point in space and released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead
acquired the target reentry vehicle, diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct
impact, engaged and destroyed the target.
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will
assess and evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during
the test.
Today’s event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-20 (FTM-20), was a demonstration
of the ability of space-based assets to provide mid-course fire control quality data to an

72 Missile Defense Agency press release 12-News-0008, dated June 27, 2012, entitled “Second-Generation Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense System Completes Second Successful Intercept Flight Test.”
73 Missile Defense Agency press release 12-News-0011, dated October 25, 2012, entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense
System Engages Five Targets Simultaneously During Largest Missile Defense Flight Test in History.”
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Aegis BMD ship, extending the battlespace, providing the ability for longer range intercepts
and defense of larger areas.74
May 16, 2013, Test. MDA states that in this flight test,
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS LAKE ERIE
(CG-70) successfully conducted a flight test today of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) system, resulting in the intercept of a separating ballistic missile target over the
Pacific Ocean by the Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapon System and a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
Block IB missile.
At 5:25 p.m. (Hawaii Time, 11:25 p.m. EDT), May 15, a separating short-range ballistic
missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, on Kauai, Hawaii. The
target flew northwest towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific Ocean. Following target
launch, the USS LAKE ERIE (CG-70) detected and tracked the missile with its onboard
AN/SPY-1 radar. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD weapon
system, developed a fire control solution and launched the SM-3 Block IB missile. The SM-3
maneuvered to a point in space based on guidance from Aegis BMD Weapons Systems and
released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead acquired the target reentry vehicle,
diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and destroyed the
target.
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will
assess and evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during
the test.
This test exercised the latest version of the second-generation Aegis BMD Weapon System
and Standard Missile, providing capability for engagement of longer-range and more
sophisticated ballistic missiles.
Last night’s event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-19 (FTM-19), was the third
consecutive successful intercept test of the Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapon System and the SM-3
Block IB guided missile. Previous successful ABMD 4.0 SM-3 Block IB intercepts occurred
on May 9, 2012 and June 26, 2012. Other Aegis BMD intercepts have employed the ABMD
3.6 and 4.0 with the SM-3 Block IA missile, which is currently operational on U.S. Navy
ships deployed across the globe.75
Endo-Atmospheric (SM-2 Block IV) Flight Tests
The Aegis BMD system using the SM-2 Block IV interceptor has achieved three successful endo-
atmospheric intercepts in three at-sea attempts, the first occurring on May 24, 2006,76 the second
on June 5, 2008,77 and the third on March 26, 2009.78

74 Missile Defense Agency press release 13-News-0002, dated February 13, 2013, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense Intercepts Target Using Space Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstrators (STSS-D) Data.” See also
Troy Clarke, “Space-Based Sensors Star in “Stellar Eyes” Missile Defense Test,” Navy News Service, February 13,
2013.
75 Missile Defense Agency press release 13-News-0005, dated May 16, 2013, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test.” See also Mike McCarthy, “Aegis Missile Intercept Successful,”
Defense Daily, May 17, 2013: 7-8; and Amy Butler, “MDA Conducts Two Successful Flight Tests,” Aerospace Daily
& Defense Report
, May 176, 2013: 3.
76 See Missile Defense Agency, “First at-Sea Demonstration of Sea-Based Terminal Capability Successfully
(continued...)
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Appendix B. Homeporting of U.S. Navy Aegis BMD
Ships at Rota, Spain

This appendix presents additional background information on the Navy’s plan to homeport four
BMD-capable Aegis destroyers at Rota, Spain.
As part of the October 5, 2011, U.S.-Spain joint announcement of the plan, the Prime Minister of
Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, stated in part:
This meeting marks a step forward on the path that we set for ourselves less than a year ago
at the Lisbon Summit, aiming to make NATO an Alliance that is “more effective, engaged
and efficient than ever before”, in the words of [NATO] Secretary-General Rasmussen.
At that historic Summit, decisions of enormous importance for the future of the Alliance
were taken, such as the New Strategic Concept to face the new challenges of the 21st century,
and the establishment of a new command structure that is leaner and more flexible, and
improved.
Besides these two important innovations, and as a consequence of them, the allies decided to
develop an Anti-Missile Defence System.…
As you will recall, as a consequence of this new structure launched in Lisbon, Spain obtained
an installation of great importance within NATO’s Command and Control Structure: the
Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain.
This Centre, together with the Centre in Uedem, Germany, will form part of the air command
and control system which is to include the anti-missile defence that the Alliance is going to
implement.
Together with this land-based component of the new air defence system, I can inform you
that Spain is also going to support, starting in 2013, an important part of the system’s naval
element.
In recent months, the different options have been studied, and finally, it was decided that
Spain should be the site for this component of the system, due to its geostrategic location and
its position as gateway to the Mediterranean.
Specifically, the United States is going to deploy, as its contribution to NATO’s Anti-Missile
Defence System, a total of four vessels equipped with the AEGIS system, to be based in
Rota.

(...continued)
Completed,” May 24, 2006 (06-FYI-0079); Gregg K. Kakesako, “Missile Defense System Makes History,” Honolulu
Star-Bulletin
, May 25, 2006; Audrey McAvoy, “Ship Shoots Down Test Missile For The First Time,” NavyTimes.com,
May 25, 2006; “Navy, MDA Announce First Terminal Sea-Based Intercept,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May
26, 2006; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Conducts First Sea-Based Terminal Phase Missile Defense Test,” Inside the
Navy
, May 29, 2006; and Jeremy Singer, “Sea-Based Terminal May Boost U.S. Missile Defense Capability,” Space
News (www.space.com)
, June 12, 2006.
77 See Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense Intercept,” June 5, 2008 (08-NEWS-0068);
Dave Ahearn, “Aegis, SM-2 Interceptors Kill Target Missile In Terminal-Phase Success,” Defense Daily, June 6, 2008.
78 “Navy Completes Air and Ballistic Missile Exercise,” Navy News Service, March 26, 2009.
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This means that Rota is going to become a support centre for vessel deployment, enabling
them to join multinational forces or carry out NATO missions in international waters,
particularly in the Mediterranean….
Moreover, this initiative will have a positive impact, in socio-economic terms, on our
country, and most especially on the Bay of Cadiz.
Permanently basing four vessels in Rota will require investing in the Base’s infrastructure,
and contracts with service providers, thus generating approximately a thousand new jobs,
both directly and indirectly.
For the shipyards, and for Spain’s defence industry, the foreseeable impact will also be
highly positive, as the USA is considering conducting the vessels’ maintenance and upkeep
at the nearby San Fernando shipyards, in the province of Cadiz. In addition, there will be
significant transfer of state-of-the-art technology, from which Spain can benefit.79
As part of the same joint announcement, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated in part:
With four Aegis ships at Rota, the alliance is significantly boosting combined naval
capabilities in the Mediterranean, and enhancing our ability to ensure the security of this vital
region. This relocation of assets takes place as part of the United States’ ongoing effort to
better position forces and defensive capabilities in coordination with our European allies and
partners.
This announcement should send a very strong signal that the United States is continuing to
invest in this alliance, and that we are committed to our defense relationship with Europe
even as we face growing budget constraints at home.…
Alongside important agreements that were recently concluded with Romania, Poland, and
Turkey, Spain’s decision represents a critical step in implementing the European Phased
Adaptive Approach, as our leaders agreed to in Lisbon.…
Beyond missile defense, the Aegis destroyers will perform a variety of other important
missions, including participating in the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, as well as joining
in naval exercises, port visits, and maritime security cooperation activities….
The agreement also enables the United States to provide rapid and responsive support to the
U.S. Africa and U.S. Central Commands, as needed.80
An October 5, 2011, press report stated:
A senior U.S. defense official said making the [ships’] base at Rota, on Spain’s southwestern
Atlantic coast near Cadiz, would reduce the numbers of [BMD-capable Aegis] ships needed
for the [EPAA] system.

79 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm.
80 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed October 6, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/
search/display.asp?story_id=63109.
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“You [would] probably need 10 of these ships if they were based in the eastern U.S. to be
able to ... transit across the ocean back and forth to [keep the same number on] patrol in the
Med,” he said.
The U.S. official said the United States was committed to having at least one ship on station
at all times in the eastern Mediterranean, where their anti-missile missiles would be most
effective. Having them based in Rota would enable more than one to be in the eastern
Mediterranean as needed.
The ships also would be part of the pool of vessels available to participate in standing NATO
maritime groups, which are used to counter piracy and for other missions, he said.81
An October 10, 2011, press report stated:
“Our plan is to have the first couple [of ships] there in 2014 and the next two in about 2015,”
said Cmdr. Marc Boyd, spokesman for [U.S. Navy] 6th Fleet. Boyd added: “It’s really early
in the process and we haven’t selected any of the ships yet.” Boyd said the shift will bring an
estimated 1,300 sailors and Navy civilians and 2,100 dependents to Naval Station Rota,
which would double the base’s ranks. Naval Station Rota spokesman Lt. j.g. Jason Fischer
said the base now has 1,067 sailors….
The three piers at the base primarily support Navy ships passing through on port calls.
Boyd said 6th Fleet is considering plans to add base infrastructure and maintenance facilities
to support the ships, as well as additional housing for crews, “but the base is pretty suited as
it is now.”82


81 David Brunnstrom and David Alexander, “Spain To Host U.S. Missile Defense Ships,” Reuters, October 5, 2011.
Ellipsis as in original.
82 Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76.
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Appendix C. Allied Participation and Interest in
Aegis BMD Program

This appendix presents additional background information on allied participation and interest in
the Aegis BMD program.
A March 18, 2013, press report states:
Raytheon has discussed a possible pooling arrangement with three navies in northern Europe
to make its SM-3 ballistic missile inter-ceptor more affordable, according to a senior
company executive.
Speaking after a successful test of a new data link enabling the SM-3 to communicate with
X-band radars operated by Dutch, Danish and Ger-man warships, George Mavko, director of
European missile defense at Raytheon Missile Systems, said the idea of a pooling
arrangement had been raised by the company, even though none of the countries are pursuing
procurement at this point....
While all three European navies have expressed an interest in the capability of the SM-3 to
engage ballistic missiles at ranges outside the atmosphere, none appear close to actually
procuring the missiles....
Instead, led by the Dutch, the initial moves appear focused on updating naval X-band radars
and other systems so they can provide target data to SM-3 missiles even if they can’t
prosecute their own attack....
Aside from the pooling idea, Raytheon also recently opened discussions with the U.S.
Missile Defense Agency over co-production of SM-3 systems in Europe to sweeten any
future deal, Mavko said....
Small bits of the missile are already produced in Europe, although it was “too early to imply
the U.S. is willing to release any major subsystems to other countries for co-production,”
Mavko said....
Raytheon has been cooperating with the Dutch Navy for several years, exploring the
potential of the SM-3 to talk to X-band radars. The Dutch have co-funded a study with the
U.S. government on the feasibil-ity of a dual-band data link; the study is due to be extended
into a second phase. The German government has agreed to participate this time.83
A March 11, 2013, press report states:
The Eurosam SAMP/T surface-to-air missile system has destroyed a representative theater
ballistic missile during a test in France.
The March 6 test saw a joint Italian and French team engage an aircraft-launched target using
an Aster 30 missile fired from the Biscarosse missile test center on the Bay of Biscay coast.

83 Andrew Chuter, “Raytheon Pushes European SM-3 Missile Pool,” Defense News, March 18, 2013: 4.
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According to French government defense procurement agency the DGA, the operational
evaluation firing was jointly carried out by the Italian 4th Artillery Regiment of Mantova with
the French military airborne test center (CEAM) of Mont-de-Marsan. In a change from
previous interceptions, the SAMP/T used Link 16 data links to provide target information.
The test also was the first to use what Eurosam calls a NATO environment in terms of
command and control of the weapon, rather than simply using French sensors.
The company says the firing was as “close to what would be an operational use for an anti-
theater ballistic missile mission under the aegis of the alliance Active Layered Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense program.”
The company adds, “The NATO Ballistic Missile Defense Operations Cell, located in
Ramstein, Germany, was in the loop via Link 16 network.”84
Another March 11, 2013, press report states:
Joint US and European testing of command, control, communications and radar systems are
underway to demonstrate the feasibility of integration of European radars and command and
control systems into a future missile defense systems based on the planned European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) utilizing the several AEGIS destroyers or cruisers to be based in
Spain, land-based SM-3 interceptors to be stationed in Romania and Poland, along with
SPY-2 radars sites. These assets are to be complemented by a number of European deployed
radar sites.
In recent weeks tests were carried out to evaluate such integration. Last week Raytheon
reported about a recent trial that showed that a radar used by Dutch, German and Danish
navies could provide target information to the interceptor. The current radar installed on the
Dutch frigates is incompatible with the AEGIS/SM-3 link operating over S-band. The
demonstration which took place at the Den Helder military test range validated a datalink
that allows the missile to receive information from the Thales sensor while retaining the
ability to communicate with Aegis combat ships used by the U.S. Navy. Generally, The
Dutch, German and Danish navies datalinks are operating on X bands, while Norway, Spain
and the U.S. operate AEGIS frigates communicating with their interceptors over the S band.
To avoid unique configurations of missiles, Raytheon has developed a dual-band datalink
which enables the same missile to communicate in both bands. This dual-band datalink was
first tested in 2011.85
A March 8, 2013, press report states:
The British Royal Navy is exploring the possibility of outfitting its newest class of destroyers
with a ballistic missile defense capability.
The Defence Ministry said this week it wants to examine the potential for the Type 45
destroyers to play a role in defending the United Kingdom and allies from the threat of
ballistic missiles. The ministry said it will build on its relationship with the Pentagon’s
Missile Defense Agency to look at the option....

84 Tony Osborne, “European SAMP/T Destroys Ballistic Missile In Test,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, March
11, 2013: 3.
85 Tamir Eshel, “Integrating European Radars with AEGIS/SM-3 Missile Defenses,” Defense Update (http://defense-
update.com), March 11, 2013, accessed March 20, 2013 at http://defense-update.com/20130311_integrating-european-
radars-with-aegissm-3-missile-defenses.html.
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The joint Defence Ministry and industry-run U.K. Missile Defence Center (MDC) plans to
take part in a trial that for the first time will use a Type 45 in a research and development
program with their American counterparts.
That will involve testing the Sampson radar, which is part of the Sea Viper missile system, in
detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, the ministry said.
The is no program to deploy ballistic missile defense on Type 45s but the MDC has in recent
years been exploring the option for the destroyers.
“It will be a step change to be able to work so closely with such a ship in an emerging area of
defense,” MDC head Simon Pavitt said in a statement. “Working with an operational
platform will make a significant difference to our level of understanding and could contribute
both financially and technically towards any future program.”86
An October 2012 article stated:
The Royal Netherlands Navy’s (RNLN’s) four De Zeven Provincien-class LCF air defence
and command frigates are to receive a substantially upgraded and rearchitectured SMART-L
D-band volume search radar that will give the ships a ballistic missile defence (BMD) early
warning capability.
Thales Nederland received a EUR116 million (USD145 million) contract from the
Netherlands’ Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) in June 2012 for the new extended-
range sensor known as ‘SMART-L EWC’. This new variant of SMART-L, which builds oni
the results of a previous Extended Long Range (ELR) capability demonstration, will push
instrumented range out to 2,000 km; improve elevation coverage; introduce new wave forms
and processing optimised for the detection and tracking of very-high-velocity ballistic
missile targets at altitude; and enable estimation of trajectories, launch sites and points of
impact. At the same time, all SMART-L volume air search functionality will be retained.87
A journal article published in the summer of 2012 states:
Today the steady growth of Aegis-capable ships in the U.S. Navy—as well as an increasing
number of world navies fielding such ships—presents new opportunities and challenges....
... the Aegis BMD capabilities present in the navies of U.S. allies and friends can now
provide the Global Maritime Partnership with a means to address the “high end” of the kill
chain with combined, coordinated, ballistic-missile defense: the Aegis BMD Global
Enterprise.
This potential is already manifest in the Asia-Pacific region in the close working relationship
between the United States and Japan. Korea and Australia could well join this Aegis network
soon, giving the four governments the means to address not only territorial BMD but also
coordinated BMD of fleet units operating together. In Europe, plans are well along to
provide robust territorial defense of European nations with ALTBMD [active layered theater

86 Mike McCarthy, “U.K. Examining Sea-Based Missile Defense,” Defense Daily, March 8, 2013: 10. See also “British
Destroyer to Participate in U.S. Missile Defense Trials,” Defense Update (http://defense-update.com), March 7, 2013,
accessed March 27, 2013, at http://defense-update.com/20130307_british-destroyer-to-participate-in-u-s-missile-
defense-trials.html.
87 Kate Tringham, “Warning Signs: Netherlands Evolves SMART-L Radar For Ballistic Missile Defence Mission,”
Jane’s International Defence Review, October 2012: 28-29.
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BMD] and the EPAA. Together, these systems provide a nascent BMD capability today and
promise an even more robust capability as the EPAA evolves over the next decade and a
half.
But as demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya, NATO and the nations of Europe
have equities often well beyond the territorial boundaries of the European continent. Also, a
European military deployed beyond Europe’s borders will always have a naval component.
This is therefore a propitious time to begin to link European allies more completely into an
Aegis BMD Global Enterprise in much the same way the U.S. Navy is linked to its Asia-
Pacific partners—Japan today, Korea soon, and thereafter Australia in the near future—in a
high-end Aegis BMD Global Maritime Partnership....
The diffusion of Aegis BMD capability abroad is occurring quietly. Governments that have
made naval force-structure investment decisions based primarily on inwardly focused
national interests have discovered that their investments also enable them to combine their
resources in collective defense....
This effort to create a broad BMD enterprise builds on the current participation of allied
navies in the Aegis program. This global effort started with a foreign military sales
relationship with Japan, subsequently expanded to relationships with Australia and Korea,
and now includes a commercial connection with Spain as well as an enterprise between
Norway and Spain.22 Several other states have expressed interest in acquiring the Aegis
weapon system and Aegis BMD. Importantly, Australia and other countries that are
acquiring the Aegis system are stipulating that the systems they buy must have the capability
of adding BMD in the future....
In Europe, the decision as to whether and how to connect the European NATO allies’ short-
and medium-range theater missile-defense systems to the U.S. long-range missile defense
system will be critical to the coherence of alliance-wide BMD. A high level of commitment
to international partnership on the parts of both the United States and its allies—already
evinced by ALTBMD and C2BMC shared situational-awareness tests—will encourage
interoperability initiatives. This interoperability will, in turn, help ensure the success of the
U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach....
Close cooperation in the area of Aegis BMD between the United States and Japan, possibly
Korea, and potentially Australia does not in itself qualify as an “Aegis BMD Global
Enterprise.” But to include European nations in an Aegis-afloat enterprise of capabilities
approaching those planned for the ALTBMD/EPAA system would....
European navies are now deployed worldwide fulfilling the vision of a Global Maritime
Partnership: supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting in Libya, conducting
antipiracy patrols in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, and supporting humanitarian
assistance operations around the world. There could be no more propitious time to begin to
link more completely European allies in an Aegis BMD Global Enterprise, in much the same
way the U.S. Navy is now linked to its Asia-Pacific partners in a high-end Aegis BMD
Global Maritime Partnership....
But it is unlikely that such a venture would succeed without ongoing U.S. leadership, the
same sort of leadership that is supporting sea-based Aegis BMD for territorial and fleet
ballistic-missile defense today in the northeast Pacific as well as sea-based and land-based
ballistic territorial missile defense in Europe. Clearly, U.S. leadership could be what
accelerates the morphing of a now-nascent Aegis BMD Global Enterprise in Europe into a
global Aegis BMD afloat capability....
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There is a growing worldwide commitment to Aegis ballistic-missile defense, a commitment
with broad potential to field an international global enterprise capable of defending against
the most imminent, and growing, threat to nations and navies, on land and at sea alike—the
threat of ballistic missiles, particularly those armed with weapons of mass destruction.88
A May 7, 2012, press report states:
The German Navy’s fleet of frigates could be upgraded to deploy Raytheon’s [RTN]
Standard Missile-3 to participate in NATO’s ballistic missile defense program if the
modifications were approved by the government, Germany’s top naval officer recently said.
Vice Admiral Axel Schimpf, the counterpart to the U.S. Navy’s chief of naval operations,
said in a recently published article that the F124 frigates are capable of being upgraded to
play a vital role in ballistic missile defense (BMD).
“The German Navy, with the F124 Frigates in their current configuration, has a weapon
system at their disposal which forms the basis for capability enhancements for (German)
armed forces’ participation in various roles,” according to a translation of an article he
penned in Marine Forum, a publication of the German Maritime Institute.
One option, Schimpf said, would be to upgrade the F124s’ SMART-L and Active Phased
Array Radar (APAR) combat management system, along with the Mk-41 vertical launch
system to accommodate the SM-3....
The enhancements would be one way for Germany to participate in the Obama
administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) embraced by NATO, and
could be done in cooperation with Denmark or the Netherlands, Schimpf said....
The German government has not made on decisions on whether to adapt its frigates for
ballistic missile defense, and Germany’s role in EPAA is the source of ongoing political
discussions in Berlin ahead of NATO’s May 20-21 summit in Chicago....
Only a handful of NATO allies deploy the Aegis combat system on ships, and Germany is
not one of them. Germany’s combat system does not operate on an S-band frequency used on
Aegis. Raytheon, however, says it has developed a duel band data link that would allow the
combat system on allied ships to talk to the SM-3 and guide it to targets.89
An October 3, 2011, press report stated that
The Netherlands, which has had a longtime interest in a missile shield, is pressing ahead to
build up its own capabilities. The Dutch defense ministry plans to expand the capabilities of
the Thales Smart-L radar on Dutch frigates to take on BMD roles. The program’s value is
estimated at €100-250 million, including logistics support and spares.
Other European navies using the sensor may follow the Dutch lead.
Dutch Defense Minister Hans Hillen notes that the Smart-L effort would help address the
BMD sensor shortage within the NATO alliance. Citing NATO’s decision last year to take a

88 Brad Hicks, George Galdorisi, and Scott C. Truver, “The Aegis BMD Global Enterprise,” Naval War College
Review
, Summer 2012: 65-80.
89 Mike McCarthy, “Raytheon’s SM-3 An Option For German Role In Missile Defense, Admiral Says,” Defense Daily,
May 7, 2012: 9.
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more expansive approach to BMD, Hillen says Smart-L could give the ALTBMD [Active
Layered Theater BMD] command-and control backbone the required long-range target-
detection analysis to help identify where a threat originates.
The Netherlands has already carried out a sensor trial for the expanded role in cooperation
with the U.S. Navy. The move does not include the purchase of Raytheon Standard Missile
SM-3 interceptors.
Both hardware and software modifications to the combat management system are needed.
All four [of the Dutch navy’s] De Zeven Provincien-class frigates would be modified to
ensure that two can be deployed, even as one is in maintenance and the fourth is being
readied for operations.
Thales is due to complete a series of studies to prepare for the acquisition of the upgrade in
the third quarter of 2012. The goal is to have the first frigates ready for operations by 2017.
All four should be upgraded by the end of that year.
Although the Netherlands is leading the program, other Smart-L users, including the German
navy and Denmark, have been monitoring the effort. France also has shown interest in the
system, Hillen said in a letter to legislators.
France also wants to upgrade its Aster 30 interceptor to give it a basic BMD capability,
although a formal contract has not been awarded….
Raytheon, meanwhile, is still fighting to win a foothold for its Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) in
Europe. The company continues its push to persuade continental navies to embrace the SM-3
Block 1B for missile defense roles, and says it has largely validated the dual-mode data link
that would be key to the concept.
The data link would feature both S- and X-band capability—the former to support the Aegis
radar system used by the U.S. and others, and the latter for the Smart-L/APAR (active
phased array radar) combination used, for instance, by the Dutch navy.90
A September 2011 press report states:
The gulf in sea-based ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability between the navies of
NATO’s European member states and the US Navy (USN) was brought into stark relief by
the recent deployment of the Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Monterey to the Mediterranean
and Black Sea region, as the first element of the United States’ European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA) for missile defence....
However, this situation is about to change as European NATO nations are committing their
naval assets to BMD in response to evolving alliance policy towards developing a BMD
architecture to protect the continent from perceived threats emanating from the Middle East.
NATO embarked on an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System
(ALTBMDS) programme in September 2005, following a two-year feasibility study. Its

90 Robert Wall, Amy Svitak, and Amy Butler, “Supporting Role,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 3,
2011: 28-29. A shorter version of the story was published as Robert Wall, “Dutch Press Forward On Ship-Based
Missile Defense Effort,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 27, 2011: 4. See also Menno Steketee, “Dutch
Frigates to Gain BMD Capability,” Jane’s Navy International (Janes.com), September 28, 2011. (The print version of
the report appeared under the same article title in the November 2011 issue of Jane’s Navy International, page 8.
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initial focus was the protection of deployed alliance forces and high-value assets against
short- and medium-range threats. At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, political leaders
from NATO states committed to expanding that remit to include the defence of the alliance’s
European territory.
ALTBMD is providing a C2 framework on which to build a scalable and adaptable BMD
‘system of systems’ architecture, integrating new national systems as they are committed to
the alliance and enabling a complete lower- and upper-layer capability covering Europe to be
fielded. The first of these, Capability 1, with initial operational capability planned for the
2012 timeframe, integrates C2 infrastructure, sensors and ground-based Patriot interceptors.
The expansion to provide upper-layer defence is due to achieve full operational capability
between 2015 and 2016.
The US contribution to this architecture is the EPAA set out by the Obama administration in
September 2009....
There is evidence that the EPAA has acted as a spur for some European nations to make a
more coherent contribution to the NATO BMD construct, particularly in the maritime
domain, as they seek to maintain sovereignty in the development and integration of
indigenous BMD systems and defence of their territories.
A number of classes of the latest generation of anti-air warfare (AAW) combatants with the
potential to acquire a BMD capability are either operational or entering service in the navies
of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK. These
offer the attributes of flexibility in deployment, mobility and sustainability inherent in naval
platforms and could operate as effective sensor nodes even without an organic intercept
capability.
They would be able to forward deploy close to the origin of the threat and act as force
multipliers in this role by providing early warning of launches and cueing of off-board
interceptor systems with the provision of timely and accurate impact point prediction and
missile tracks, together with launch point prediction for counter-targeting.91

91 Charles Hollosi, “European Fleets Respond to Ballistic Missile Threats,” Jane’s Navy International, September
2011: 23-24, 26-30.
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Appendix D. Earlier Oversight Issues Relating to
SM-3 Block IIB Missile

On March 15, 2013, DOD announced that it is
• “restructuring” the SM-3 Block IIB program;
• shifting funding from SM-3 Block IIB program to other BMD efforts
(specifically, the Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) BMD program in Alaska and
to earlier versions of the SM-3); and
• dropping Phase IV of the EPAA, which was to feature the deployment of the SM-
3 Block IIB missile.92
Prior to this announcement, potential oversight issues for Congress related to the SM-3 Block IIB
interceptor included the prospective capability of the Block IIB missile for conducting certain
kinds of intercepts called “early intercepts” as part of the EPAA, and concurrency and technical
risk in the Block IIB development effort. This appendix presents information on those two issues
as it existed prior to DOD’s March 15, 2013, announcement.
Capability of Block IIB Interceptor
A June 13, 2011, press report stated:
When asked what the Pentagon’s plan is for countermeasures if early intercept does not
materialize with the [SM-3 Block] IIB in 2020, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials
simply state: “We fully expect to have a viable early-intercept capability with the SM-3
Block IIB in the 2020 time period.”...

92 As part of a March 15, 2013, statement announcing changes in BMD programs, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
stated that “we are restructuring the SM-3 IIB program. As many of you know, we had planned to deploy the SM-3 IIB
as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. The purpose was to add to the protection of the U.S. homeland
already provided by our current GBIs against missile threats from the Middle East. The timeline for deploying this
program had been delayed to at least 2022 due to cuts in congressional funding. Meanwhile, the threat matures. By
shifting resources from this lagging program to fund the additional GBIs as well as advanced kill vehicle technology
that will improve the performance of the GBI and other versions of the SM-3 interceptor, we will be able to add
protection against missiles from Iran sooner while also providing additional protection against the North Korean
threat.” (Missile Defense Announcement, As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, The Pentagon, Friday,
March 15, 2013, accessed March 20, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1759.)
Following this announcement, Secretary Hage and two other DOD officials—James Miller, the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, and Admiral James Winnefeld, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—took questions
from the press. One questioner asked whether DOD was dropping Phase IV of the EPAA. Undersecretary Miller
replied: “Yes, the—the prior plan had four phases. The third phase involved the deployment of interceptors in Poland.
And we will continue with phases one through three. In the fourth phase, in the previous plan, we would have added
some additional—an additional type of interceptors, the so-called SM-3 IIB would have been added to the mix in
Poland. We no longer intend to—to add them to the mix, but we'll continue to have the same number of deployed
interceptors in Poland that will provide coverage for all of NATO in Europe.” (DOD news transcript, “DOD News
Briefing on Missile Defense from the Pentagon,” March 15, 2013, accessed March 20, 2013, at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5205.)
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At issue today is whether the architecture as envisioned is achievable; and the piece most
critics question is the plan to achieve early intercept and protect the Eastern U.S. from an
Iranian ICBM attack.
USAF Gen. (ret.) Lester Lyles, who led the MDA when it was called the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization, is co-chairing a Defense Science Board task force review of the early-
intercept strategy with Adm. (ret.) William Fallon, who headed U.S. Pacific Command. The
report is being written and will likely be briefed to Pentagon leaders in the fall.
Lyles declines to discuss his findings until they are briefed to the Pentagon. Industry and
government sources familiar with the study have different views on what the findings will
be. Some say the task force questions the ability to achieve early intercept with the time and
money available. Others say the report will outline what can be achieved with the current
strategy.
Whatever the outcome, the results are likely to influence the SM-3 IIB program, whether it
moves forward and, if it does, what the missile will look like. The IIB is the notional long-
range missile killer that will be fielded in Phase IV by 2020 for early intercept to fulfill the
promise of protecting the Eastern U.S. and most of Europe from an Iranian ICBM attack....
GMD advocates point to the option of placing interceptors at Fort Drum, N.Y., to provide a
deeper magazine and coverage for the Eastern U.S.....
The question of whether a IIB missile can achieve early intercept, and how to do it, is likely
be to sorted out this summer. The Defense Science Board will report its findings, and the
MDA is likely to request funding for the IIB strategy in the fiscal 2013 budget proposal that
is due to Congress next February.93
A June 17, 2011, press report states:
A Defense Science Board (DSB) report on early missile intercept is already prompting
discussion on Capitol Hill over how U.S. strategic forces are funded.
The Obama administration is pursuing the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
defense, which by 2020 would develop the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor to protect the U.S.
and Europe against long-range missiles from North Korea and Iran. In April, Boeing,
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon each won concept definition and program planning awards
worth at least $41 million.
But the DSB study, led by retired Air Force Gen. Lester Lyles and retired Navy Adm.
William Fallon, casts doubt on a central capability of that interceptor—primarily the ability
to hit an incoming missile before it deploys countermeasures, according to Senate
Republican aides. The study’s unclassified version also finds that the goal of early
interception may lead to a less-capable system overall and rather than investing in the
interceptor, improvements to radars, satellites and communications are also important, an
aide says.
With that information, already a critical question is emerging on Capitol Hill: During a
deficit crisis, should the government be spending $1.7 billion over the next five years to
develop the SM-3 Block IIB if its ultimate goal is in doubt?

93 Amy Butler, “End Game,” Aviation Week & Space Technology,” June 13, 2011: 40.
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At least the rationale for pursuing the interceptor—replacing a missile defense site based in
Poland and the Czech Republic—is in line for scrutiny.
“If the administration continues to sell early interceptors as a way of going after
countermeasures, that’s not going to work,” one aide says.
So in that case, does it make sense to continue working on the IIB missile for other reasons?
And if not, what are the alternatives?
One camp could emerge in support of upgrades to the current Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system or the creation of a site in the eastern United States. Another group may
want to improve on the capabilities of the Raytheon-led SM-3 Block IIA.94
A July 6, 2011, letter to the editor from the two co-chairmen of the DSB task force in question
and the chairman of the full DSB stated:
The Defense Science Board (DSB) is now completing a review on Science and Technology
Issues of Early Intercept (EI) Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility as a concept to enhance
missile defense....
In previous work, the DSB found the EI concept helpful in national missile defense against
long-range ballistic missiles. In the current review, EI, as defined by the study’s terms of
reference, was judged less helpful in regional missile defense against shorter range regional
ballistic missiles....
The DSB concluded that the Missile Defense Agency is on the right track in developing
European Phased Adapted Approach (EPAA) options, including continued evolution of the
SM-3 family of missiles, which will expand the battle space and provide more engagement
opportunities in the regional defense provided by the EPAA. The DSB also examined the
potential in the EPAA context for EI in regional defense against short-range missiles before
threat payloads could be deployed, and concluded that this was not a viable option because
of technical constraints - primarily related to the very short payload deployment times and
the present absence of adequate sensors/Ballistic Missile C3 to overcome this.
The fact that this form of EI is not viable in shorter-range regional applications does not
imply that either SM-3 family interceptors or the EPAA concept are flawed. In general, EI,
including intercepts of longer- range missiles before the threat missile reaches apogee, can
provide for multiple engagement opportunities and more effective defenses.
MDA is on the right track in pursuing this capability for national missile defense, and
examining the potential application in regional defense as a function of the range of threat
missiles.
The DSB did not conclude that EI is flawed. Nor did they conclude that the EPAA approach
or the SM-3 family were flawed. The DSB did conclude that EI would have a very limited
role in regional defense against shorter range missile threats.95

94 Jen DiMascio, “DSB Report Raises Questions About SM-3 Block IIB Costs,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
June 17, 2011: 4.
95 Letter to the editor from Admiral William J. Fallon, U.S. Navy, retired, task force co-chairman; General Lester
Lyles, U.S. Air Force, retired, task force co-chairman and DSB vice chairman; and Paul G. Kaminski, DSB chairman,
published under the title “‘Early Intercept’ Not Flawed,” Washington Times, July 6, 2011: B2.
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Concurrency and Technical Risk in Block IIB Development Effort
A March 2012 GAO report stated the following regarding the SM-3 Block IIB missile:
Current Status
The SM-3 Block IIB program entered technology development in July 2011 and awarded
three contracts to conduct trade studies, define missile configurations, and produce
development plans. One contractor will be selected for system development in 2013. The
SM-3 Block IIB program is developing advance seeker and other technologies that cut across
the SM-3’s variants through a technology risk-reduction program.
According to a tentative schedule, the SM-3 Block IIB program plans to enter system
development prior to holding a preliminary design review, raising the possibility of cost and
schedule growth. The program is conducting a series of reviews to receive engineering
insight into each contractor’s design. While these reviews will provide important knowledge,
we have reported that before starting system development, programs should hold key
engineering reviews, culminating in the preliminary design review, to ensure that the
proposed design can meet defined, feasible requirements within cost, schedule, and other
system constraints. Beyond the crosscutting technologies the program is developing, it is
taking steps to develop technology maturation plans that will include demonstrating
technologies in a relevant environment using a representative model or prototype before the
SM-3 Block IIB enters system development. The three contractors’ plans are expected to
outline the level of investment required to demonstrate this degree of technology maturity by
2014. Program officials have not yet defined the specific critical technologies for the SM-3
Block IIB, which could hamper these efforts. Unlike most major defense acquisition
programs, MDA programs are not required to demonstrate technologies in a relevant
environment prior to system development, so decision makers will have to hold the program
accountable for ensuring the technologies mature as intended....
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA noted the
SM-3 Block IIB’s primary mission is early intercept of long-range ballistic missiles. One
system development contract will be competitively awarded in fiscal year 2014. MDA has
identified key missile technologies and made investments to reduce development risks. Prior
to system development, there will be a government-only system requirements review. MDA
also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.96
An April 2012 GAO report stated the following:
The program has high levels of concurrency because it plans to commit to product
development prior to holding a PDR [preliminary design review]....
The need to meet the 2020 time frame announced by the President to field the SM-3 Block
IIB for European PAA Phase IV is a key driver for the high levels of concurrency. The
program is following some sound acquisition practices by awarding competitive contracts to
multiple contractors to develop options for missile configurations and mature key
technologies as well as planning to compete the product development contract. However,
while the program is holding a series of reviews that will provide engineering insight into the
SM-3 Block IIB design, we have previously reported that before starting development,
programs should hold key system engineering events, culminating in the PDR, to ensure that

96 Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-12-
400SP, March 2012, p. 140.
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requirements are defined and feasible and that the proposed design can meet those
requirements within cost, schedule, and other system constraints. In addition, based on the
initial schedule developed by the program and prior history of SM-3 interceptor
development, the SM-3 Block IIB program will need to commit to building the first flight
test vehicle prior to holding the PDR in order to remain on the planned test schedule.
According to MDA, this approach is a low risk development if the program is funded at
requested levels. The agency stated that the achievement of an initial operating capability
will be based on technical progress and execution of a “fly before buy” approach. 97
The April 2012 GAO report recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct MDA to “ensure
that the SM-3 Block IIB requirements are defined and feasible and that the proposed design can
meet those requirements within cost, schedule, and other system constraints by delaying the
commitment to product development until the program completes a successful preliminary design
review.”98


Author Contact Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610



97 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:]Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing
Concurrency
, GAO-12-486, April 2012, pp. 22-23; see also Appendix VI (pp. 58-64).
98 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:]Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing
Concurrency
, GAO-12-486, April 2012, pp. 28.
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