

 
Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
Program: Background and Issues for Congress 
Ronald O'Rourke 
Specialist in Naval Affairs 
June 9, 2015 
Congressional Research Service 
7-5700 
www.crs.gov 
RL33745 
 
Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
Summary 
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for 
conducting BMD operations. Under MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy 
Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 33 at the end of FY2015 to 48 at the end of FY2020. The 
figure for FY2020 may include up to four BMD-capable Aegis cruisers in reduced operating 
status as part of a program to modernize 11 existing Aegis cruisers. 
Under the Administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD 
operations, BMD-capable Aegis ships are operating in European waters to defend Europe from 
potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran. BMD-capable Aegis ships also 
operate in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential 
ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. 
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides 
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2016 budget requests a total of 
$1,843.4 million in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, 
including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania that are to be part of the 
EPAA. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military 
construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. 
Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: 
•  MDA’s request for multiyear procurement (MYP) authority for SM-3IB 
interceptors; 
•  burden-sharing—how European naval contributions to European BMD 
capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to European 
BMD capabilities and operations; 
•  the adequacy of planned procurement annual quantities of SM-3 interceptors; 
•  the lack of a target for simulating the endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight 
of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile; and 
•  concurrency and technical risk in the Aegis BMD program. 
 
 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
Contents 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
Aegis Ships ................................................................................................................................ 1 
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers ........................................................................ 1 
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers .............................................................. 2 
Projected Aegis Ship Force Levels ...................................................................................... 2 
Aegis Ships in Allied Navies ............................................................................................... 3 
Aegis BMD System ................................................................................................................... 3 
Versions of Aegis BMD System .......................................................................................... 3 
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles .........................................................................................  3 
Summary of Aegis BMD Versions ...................................................................................... 5 
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD .......................................... 6 
Planned Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Interceptors ................................. 6 
October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain....................................................... 7 
Aegis BMD Flight Tests ............................................................................................................ 8 
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program ....................................................... 11 
Japan .................................................................................................................................. 11 
Other Countries ................................................................................................................. 12 
FY2016 Funding Request ........................................................................................................ 12 
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 13 
Request for Multiyear Procurement (MYP) Authority for SM-3IB Interceptors .................... 13 
Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. European Naval Contributions to European BMD ......................... 13 
Adequacy of Planned Procurement Quantities of SM-3 Missiles ........................................... 14 
Target for Simulating Endo-Atmospheric Flight of DF-21 ASBM ......................................... 14 
Concurrency and Technical Risk in Aegis BMD Program ...................................................... 15 
Aegis System Modernized Software ................................................................................. 15 
SM-3 Block IB Missile ..................................................................................................... 16 
SM-3 Block IIA Missile .................................................................................................... 20 
Aegis Ashore ..................................................................................................................... 21 
Legislative Activity for FY2016 .................................................................................................... 25 
Summary of Action on FY2016 MDA Funding Request ........................................................ 25 
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1735/S. 1376) ........................................ 26 
House ................................................................................................................................. 26 
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 29 
FY2016 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2685) ....................................................................... 30 
House ................................................................................................................................. 30 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Versions of Aegis BMD System ......................................................................................... 5 
Table 2. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Missiles ............................................. 7 
Table 3. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts, FY2015-FY2020 ............................................... 12 
Table 4. Planned SM-3 Missile Procurement Quantities ............................................................... 14 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
Table 5. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2016 Request for MDA Procurement 
and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program ......................................................................... 26 
Table A-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests Since January 2002............................................................... 32 
 
Appendixes 
Appendix A. Aegis BMD Flight Tests ........................................................................................... 31 
Appendix B. Homeporting of U.S. Navy Aegis BMD Ships at Rota, Spain ................................. 50 
Appendix C. Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program ........................................ 53 
 
Contacts 
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 63 
 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
Introduction 
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Aegis ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and 
the Navy, and gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD 
operations. Congress’s decisions on the Aegis BMD program could significantly affect U.S. BMD 
capabilities and funding requirements, and the BMD-related industrial base. 
Background 
Aegis Ships 
The Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the 
Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays, 
weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus. The 
Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s for defending ships against aircraft, anti-ship 
cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface threats, and subsurface threats. The system was first deployed 
by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated many times since. The Navy’s Aegis ships include 
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers. 
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Aegis Cruisers 
Overview 
A total of 27 CG-47s (CGs 47 through 73) were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and 
FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five ships in the class (CGs 
47 through 51), which were built to an earlier technical standard in certain respects, were judged 
by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005, 
leaving 22 ships in operation (CGs 52 through 73). 
“2-4-6” Program for Modernizing 11 Existing Aegis Cruisers 
In accordance with congressional direction in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act 
and FY2015 DOD Appropriations Act, the Navy is implementing a so-called “2-4-6” program for 
modernizing the 11 youngest Aegis cruisers. Under the 2-4-6 program, no more than two of the 
cruisers are to enter the modernization program each year, none of the cruisers is to remain in 
reduced status for modernization for more than four years, and no more than six of the cruisers 
are to be in the program at any given time. Among the 11 Aegis cruisers that are to be modernized 
under this program are four that are BMD-capable—CG-67 (Shiloh), CG-70 (Lake Erie), CG-72 
(Vella Gulf), and CG-73 (Port Royal). 
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Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Aegis Destroyers1 
Flight I/II and Flight IIA DDG-51s Procured in FY1985-FY2005 
A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first 
entered service in 1991 and the 62nd entered service in FY2012. The first 28 ships, known as 
Flight I/II DDG-51s, are scheduled to remain in service until age 35. The next 34 ships, known as 
Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design changes and are scheduled to remain in service 
until age 40. 
No DDG-51s Procured in FY2006-FY2009 
No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009. The Navy during this period instead procured 
three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does not use the Aegis 
system and does not include a capability for conducting BMD operations. Navy plans do not call 
for modifying DDG-1000s to make them BMD-capable. 
Flight IIA DDG-51s Procured or Programmed for FY2010-FY2016 
Procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s resumed in FY2010. A total of 10 were procured in FY2010-
FY2015. Navy plans call for procuring one more Flight IIA DDG-51 in FY2016. 
Flight III DDG-51s Programmed Starting in FY2016 
Navy plans call for shifting DDG-51 procurement to a new version of the DDG-51 design, called 
the Flight III version, starting with the second of the two DDG-51s requested for procurement for 
FY2016. DDG-51s procured in FY2017 are to be Flight III DDG-51s. The Flight III version is to 
be equipped with a new radar, called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), that is more 
capable than the SPY-1 radar installed on all previous Aegis cruisers and destroyers. 
Projected Aegis Ship Force Levels 
The Navy’s FY2015 30-year (FY2015-FY2043) shipbuilding plan projects that the total number 
of Aegis cruisers and destroyers will be between 80 and 97 during the 30-year period.2 
                                                                  
1 For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: 
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 
2 For a table showing the total number of cruisers and destroyers each year from FY2015 through FY2044, see CRS 
Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald 
O'Rourke. The totals shown in these two reports include the three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers, which are to 
enter service in FY2014, FY2016, and FY2018; these non-Aegis ships would need to be subtracted out of the figures 
shown in the tables to get the figures for the total number of Aegis ships. 
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Aegis Ships in Allied Navies 
Sales of the Aegis system to allied countries began in the late 1980s. Allied countries that now 
operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, Spain, and Norway.3  
Aegis BMD System4 
Aegis ships are given a capability for conducting BMD operations by incorporating changes to 
the Aegis system’s computers and software, and by arming the ships with BMD interceptor 
missiles. In-service Aegis ships can be modified to become BMD-capable ships, and DDG-51s 
procured in FY2010 and subsequent years are to be built from the start with a BMD capability. 
Versions of Aegis BMD System 
Currently fielded versions of the Aegis BMD system are called the 3.6.X version and the newer 
and more capable 4.X version. MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable 
versions in coming years; these planned versions are called 5.0, 5.0 CU (meaning capability 
upgrade), and 5.1. Improved versions feature improved processors and software, and are to be 
capable of using improved versions of the SM-3 interceptor missile (see Table 1 below). BMD-
capable Aegis ships can have their BMD capabilities upgraded from earlier versions to later 
versions. 
Aegis BMD Interceptor Missiles 
The BMD interceptor missiles used by Aegis ships are the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and the 
Standard Missile-2 Block IV (SM-2 Block IV). The SM-2 Block IV is to be succeeded in coming 
years by a BMD version of the new SM-6 interceptor. 
SM-3 Midcourse Interceptor 
The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles above the atmosphere (i.e., exo-atmospheric 
intercept), in the midcourse phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is equipped with a “hit-
to-kill” warhead, called a kinetic vehicle, that is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead 
by colliding with it. 
MDA and Navy plans call for fielding increasingly capable versions of the SM-3 in coming years. 
The current version, called the SM-3 Block IA, is now being supplemented by the more capable 
SM-3 Block IB. These are to be followed by the even more capable SM-3 Block IIA. 
                                                                  
3 The Norwegian ships are somewhat smaller than the other Aegis ships, and consequently carry a reduced-size version 
of the Aegis system that includes a smaller, less-powerful version of the SPY-1 radar. 
4 Unless stated otherwise, information in this section is taken from MDA briefings on the Aegis BMD program given to 
CRS and CBO analysts on the MDA’s FY2016 and prior-year budget submissions. 
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Compared to the Block IA version, the Block IB version has an improved (two-color) target 
seeker, an advanced signal processor, and an improved divert/attitude control system for adjusting 
its course. 
In contrast to the Block IA and 1B versions, which have a 21-inch-diameter booster stage at the 
bottom but are 13.5 inches in diameter along the remainder of their lengths, the Block IIA version 
has a 21-inch diameter along its entire length. The increase in diameter to a uniform 21 inches 
provides more room for rocket fuel, permitting the Block IIA version to have a burnout velocity 
(a maximum velocity, reached at the time the propulsion stack burns out) that is greater than that 
of the Block IA and IB versions,5 as well as a larger-diameter kinetic warhead. The United States 
and Japan have cooperated in developing certain technologies for the Block IIA version, with 
Japan funding a significant share of the effort.6 
MDA states that that SM-3 Block IBs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $10 
million to $12 million, and that SM-3 Block IIAs have an estimated unit procurement cost of 
about $20 million to $24 million. 
SM-2 and SM-6 Terminal Interceptors 
The SM-2 Block IV is designed to intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere (i.e., endo-
atmospheric intercept), during the terminal phase of an enemy ballistic missile’s flight. It is 
equipped with a blast fragmentation warhead. The existing inventory of SM-2 Block IVs—72 as 
of February 2012—was created by modifying SM-2s that were originally built to intercept 
aircraft and ASCMs. A total of 75 SM-2 Block IVs were modified, and 3 have been used in BMD 
flight tests. 
MDA and Navy plans call for developing and procuring a more capable terminal-phase BMD 
interceptor based on the SM-6 air defense missile (the successor to the SM-2 air defense missile). 
The initial version of the SM-6 BMD interceptor, called Increment 1, is to enter service around 
the end of 2015 or early 2016;7 a subsequent version, called Increment 2, is to enter service 
around 2018. 
                                                                  
5 Some press reports and journal articles, all of which are now a decade or more old, report unconfirmed figures on the 
burnout velocities of various SM-3 missile configurations (some of which were proposed but ultimately not pursued). 
See, for example, J. D. Marshall, The Future Of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, point paper dated October 15, 2004, 
accessed online at http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/259.pdf; “STANDARD Missile-3 Destroys a Ballistic Missile 
Target in Test of Sea-based Missile Defense System,” Raytheon news release circa January 26, 2002; Gopal Ratnam, 
“U.S. Navy To Play Larger Role In Missile Defense, Defense News, January 21-27, 2002: 10; Hans Mark, “A White 
Paper on the Defense Against Ballistic Missiles,” The Bridge, Summer 2001, pp. 17-26, accessed online at 
http://www.nae.edu/nae/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/NAEW-63BM86/$FILE/BrSum01.pdf?OpenElement; Michael C. 
Sirak, “White House Decision May Move Sea-Based NMD Into Spotlight,” Inside Missile Defense, September 6, 2000: 
1; Henry F. Cooper and J.D. Williams, “The Earliest Deployment Option—Sea-Based Defenses,” Inside Missile 
Defense, September 6, 2000 (guest perspective; including graphic on page 21); Robert Holzer, “DoD Weighs Navy 
Interceptor Options, Defense News, July 24, 2000: 1, 60 (graphic on page 1); and Robert Holzer, “U.S. Navy Gathers 
Strength, Allies in NMD Showdown,” Defense News, March 15, 1999: 1, 42 (graphic on page 1). 
6 The cooperative research effort has been carried out under a U.S.-Japan memorandum of agreement signed in 1999. 
The effort has focused on risk reduction for four parts of the missile: the sensor, an advanced kinetic warhead, the 
second-stage propulsion, and a lightweight nose cone. The Block IIA development effort includes the development of a 
missile, called the Block II, as a stepping stone to the Block IIA. As a result, the Block IIA development effort has 
sometimes been called the Block II/IIA development effort. The Block II missile is not planned as a fielded capability. 
7 “Raytheon Evolving SM-6 To Terminal Defense By End Of Next Year,” Defense Daily, September 9, 2014: 6. 
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Summary of Aegis BMD Versions 
Table 1 summarizes the various versions of the Aegis BMD system as reflected in the FY2015 
budget submission (data for the FY2016 budget submission is not available) and correlates them 
with the phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA; see below) for European 
BMD operations. 
Table 1. Versions of Aegis BMD System 
(As reflected in FY2015 budget submission; data for FY16 submission not available) 
EPAA Phase 
Phase I 
Phase II 
Phase III 
Version of Aegis BMD system 
3.6.X 
4.X 
5.0/5.0 CU 
5.1 
Certified for use 
2006 
2012 
2014/2015 
2018 
OTE assessment 
2008 
2014 
2016 
2020 
SM-3 missile variants used for exo-atmospheric intercepts 
SM-3 Block IA 
X 
X 
X 
X 
SM-3 Block IB 
Xa X  X  X 
SM-3 Block IIA 
 
 
 
X 
SM-2 and SM-6 missile variants used for endo-atmospheric (terminal) intercepts 
SM-2 Block IV 
X 
 
X 
 
SM-6 Increment 1 
 
X 
X 
X 
SM-6 Increment 2 
 
 
 
X 
Types of ballistic missiles that can be countered 
SRBM Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
MRBM Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
IRBM 
Yes (Limited) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (Enhanced) 
ICBM Nob Nob Nob Nob 
Capability for launch on remote or engage on remote 
Launch on remote 
Yes (Initial) 
Yes (Enhanced) 
Yes (Enhanced) 
Yes (Enhanced) 
Engage on remote 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on MDA FY2015 budget briefing. Data for FY2016 budget submission not 
available. 
Notes: OTE is operational test and evaluation. SRBM is short-range ballistic missile; MRBM is medium-range 
ballistic missile; IRBM is intermediate-range ballistic missile; ICBM is intercontinental ballistic missile. Launch 
on remote is the ability to launch the interceptor using data from off-board sensors. Engage on remote is 
the ability to engage targets using data from off-board sensors. 
a.  Capability for using SM-3 Block IB added through capability, maintenance, and inventory update for the 3.6.3 
version.  
b.  Cannot intercept ICBMs, but the system has a long-range search and track (LRS&T) capability—an ability to 
detect and track ballistic missiles at long ranges. In the FY2014 budget submission, the 5.1 version was 
described as having “some limited” capability against ICBMs. 
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European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European BMD 
On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new approach for regional BMD 
operations called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The first application of the approach is in 
Europe, and is called the European PAA (EPAA). EPAA calls for using BMD-capable Aegis 
ships, a land-based radar in Europe, and eventually two Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and 
Poland to defend Europe against ballistic missile threats from countries such as Iran. 
Phase I of EPAA involved deploying Aegis BMD ships and a land-based radar in Europe by the 
end of 2011. Phase II involves establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Romania with SM-3 IB 
interceptors in the 2015 timeframe. Phase 3 involves establishing the Aegis Ashore site in Poland 
with SM-3 IIA interceptors in the 2018 timeframe. Each Aegis Ashore site in the EPAA is to 
include a structure housing an Aegis system similar to the deckhouse on an Aegis ship and 24 
SM-3 missiles launched from a re-locatable Vertical Launch System (VLS) based on the VLS that 
is installed in Navy Aegis ships. 
Although BMD-capable Aegis ships have deployed to European waters before 2011, the first 
BMD-capable Aegis ship officially deployed to European waters as part of the EPAA departed its 
home port of Norfolk, VA, on March 7, 2011, for a deployment to the Mediterranean that lasted 
several months.8 
Planned Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and 
SM-3 Interceptors 
As shown in Table 2, under MDA and Navy plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis 
ships is scheduled to grow from 33 at the end of FY2015 to 48 at the end of FY2020. The figures 
in the table may include up to four BMD-capable Aegis cruisers in reduced operating status as 
part of the 2-4-6 program for modernizing 11 existing Aegis cruisers (see “Ticonderoga (CG-47) 
Class Aegis Cruisers” above). 
                                                                  
8 Karen Parrish, “Milestone nears for European Missile Defense Plan,” American Forces Press Service, March 2, 2011 
(accessed online at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62997); Untitled “Eye On The Fleet” news item, 
Navy News Service, March 7, 2011 (accessed online at http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=98184); “Warship 
With Radar Going To Mediterranean,” Washington Post, March 2, 2011; Brock Vergakis, “US Warship Deploys to 
Mediterranean to Protect Europe Form Ballistic Missiles, Canadian Press, March 7, 2011. 
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Table 2. Numbers of BMD-Capable Aegis Ships and SM-3 Missiles 
FY16 
FY17 
FY18 
FY19 
FY20 
 FY14 
FY15 
(req.) 
(proj.) 
(proj.) 
proj.) 
(proj.) 
BMD-capable Aegis ships 
3.6 
version 
21 17 14 13 11  8  7 
4.X 
version 
7  9  10 12 13 15 18 
5.0 CU version 
2 
3 
8 
11 
10 
6 
6 
5.1 
version 
0 0 0 0 4 11 16 
Subtotal 
30 29 32 36 38 40 47 
Ships 
undergoing 
BMD 
upgrade 
3 4 3 1 2 3 1 
TOTAL 
 
33 33 35 37 40 43 48 
SM-3 missile cumulative deliveries / inventory (including RDT&E purchases) 
Block 
I/IA 
142/119 150/118 150/101 150/83 150/58 150/44 150/33 
Block 
IB 
39/28  60/47  107/94  145/131 179/164 209/192 261/244 
Block 
IIA 
0/0 0/0 0/0 2/2 11/7 
17/12 
21/15 
Total 
181/147 210/165 257/195 297/216 340/229 376/248 432/292 
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on MDA FY2016 budget submission. 
October 5, 2011, Announcement of Homeporting in Spain 
On October 5, 2011, the United States, Spain, and NATO jointly announced that, as part of the 
EPAA, four BMD-capable Aegis ships are to be forward-homeported (i.e., based) at the naval 
base at Rota, Spain.9 The four ships are the destroyers Ross (DDG-71) and Donald Cook (DDG-
75), which are to move to Rota in FY2014, and the destroyers Carney (DDG-64) and Porter 
(DDG-78), which are to move to Rota in FY2015. As of early 2012, Carney was homeported at 
Mayport, FL, and the other three ships were homeported at Norfolk.10 The move is to involve an 
estimated 1,239 military billets (including 1,204 crew members for the four ships and 35 shore-
based support personnel),11 and about 2,100 family members.12 The Navy estimates the up-front 
costs of transferring the four ships at $92 million in FY2013, and the recurring costs of basing the 
four ships in Spain rather than in the United States at roughly $100 million per year.13 
                                                                  
9 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime 
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed 
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also 
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed October 6, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/
search/display.asp?story_id=63109. 
10 See “Navy Names Forward Deployed Ships to Rota, Spain,” Navy News Service, February 16, 2012, accessed online 
at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=65393; Kate Wiltrout, “Three Norfolk-Based Navy Ships To 
Move To Spain,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 17, 2012; “Bound for Spain, Inside the Navy, February 20, 2012. 
11 Source: Navy information paper dated March 8, 2012, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to CRS on 
March 9, 2012. 
12 Source: Navy briefing slides dated February 27, 2012, provided by the Navy to CRS on March 9, 2012. 
13 Source: Navy briefing slides dated February 27, 2012, provided by the Navy to CRS on March 9, 2012. The briefing 
slides state that the estimated up-front cost of $92 million includes $13.5 million for constructing a new weapon 
magazine, $0.8 million for constructing a pier laydown area, $3.4 million for constructing a warehouse, $5.0 million for 
(continued...) 
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Rota is on the southwestern Atlantic coast of Spain, a few miles northwest of Cadiz, and about 65 
miles northwest of the Strait of Gibraltar leading into the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy ships have 
been homeported at Rota at various points in the past, most recently in 1979.14 For additional 
background information on the Navy’s plan to homeport four BMD-capable Aegis destroyers at 
Rota, Spain, see Appendix B. 
Aegis BMD Flight Tests 
DOD states that since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 26 successful exo-
atmospheric intercepts in 32 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 3 successful intercepts in 
4 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships), and 3 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in 3 attempts 
using the SM-2 Block IV missile, making for a combined total of 29 successful intercepts in 35 
attempts. 
In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii 
used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance 
satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit.15 Including this intercept in the count increases the totals 
to 27 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 33 attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 30 
successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 36 attempts using both SM-3 and SM-2 Block 
IV missiles. 
                                                                  
(...continued) 
repairing an existing facility that is to be used as an administrative/operations space, and $69.3 million for conducting 
maintenance work on the four ships in the United States prior to moving them to Rota. The briefing states that the 
estimated recurring cost of $100 million per year includes costs for base operating support, annual PCS (personnel 
change of station) costs, a pay and allowances delta, annual mobile training team costs, ship maintenance work, the 
operation of a Ship Support Activity, and higher fuel costs associated with a higher operating tempo that is maintained 
by ships that are homeported in foreign countries. 
14 Source: Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76. 
15 The modifications to the ship’s Aegis BMD midcourse system reportedly involved primarily making changes to 
software. DOD stated that the modifications were of a temporary, one-time nature. Three SM-3 missiles reportedly 
were modified for the operation. The first modified SM-3 fired by the cruiser successfully intercepted the satellite at an 
altitude of about 133 nautical miles (some sources provide differing altitudes). The other two modified SM-3s (one 
carried by the cruiser, another carried by an engage-capable Aegis destroyer) were not fired, and the Navy stated it 
would reverse the modifications to these two missiles. (For additional information, see the MDA discussion available 
online at http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_one_time_mission.html, and also Peter Spiegel, “Navy Missile Hits Falling 
Spy Satellite,” Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2008; Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Navy Missile Hits Satellite, 
Pentagon Says,” Washington Post, February 21, 2008; Thom Shanker, “Missile Strikes A Spy Satellite Falling From Its 
Orbit,” New York Times, February 21, 2008; Bryan Bender, “US Missile Hits Crippled Satellite,” Boston Globe, 
February 21, 2008; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Hits Wayward Satellite On First Attempt,” NavyTimes.com, February 
21, 2008; Dan Nakaso, “Satellite Smasher Back At Pearl,” Honolulu Advertiser, February 23, 2008; Zachary M. 
Peterson, “Lake Erie CO Describes Anti-Satellite Shot,” NavyTimes.com, February 25, 2008; Anne Mulrine, “The 
Satellite Shootdown: Behind the Scenes,” U.S. News & World Report, February 25, 2008; Nick Brown, “US Modified 
Aegis and SM-3 to Carry Out Satellite Interception Shot,” Jane’s International Defence Review, April 2008: 35.) 
MDA states that the incremental cost of the shoot-down operation was $112.4 million when all costs are included. 
MDA states that this cost is to be paid by MDA and the Pacific Command (PACOM), and that if MDA is directed to 
absorb the entire cost, “some realignment or reprogramming from other MDA [program] Elements may be necessary to 
lessen significant adverse impact on [the] AEGIS [BMD program’s] cost and schedule.” (MDA information paper 
dated March 7, 2008, provided to CRS on June 6, 2008. See also Jason Sherman, “Total Cost for Shoot-Down of Failed 
NRO Satellite Climbs Higher,” InsideDefense.com, May 12, 2008.) 
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The Aegis BMD development effort, including Aegis BMD flight tests, is often described as 
following a development philosophy long-held within the Aegis program office of “build a little, 
test a little, learn a lot,” meaning that development is done in manageable steps, then tested and 
validated before moving on to the next step.16 
A January 2015 report on various DOD acquisition programs from DOD’s Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E’s annual report for FY2014—stated the following in 
the section on the Aegis BMD program: 
Assessment 
• Flight testing and supporting modeling and simulation demonstrated that Aegis BMD 4.0 
has the capability to engage and intercept non-separating, simple-separating, and complex-
separating ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase with SM-3 Block IB guided missiles. 
However, flight testing and modeling and simulation did not test the full range of expected 
threat types, threat ground ranges, and threat raid sizes. Details can be found in the classified 
December 2014 Aegis BMD IOT&E Report. 
• Reliability and maintainability data from FY14, in combination with data collected during a 
maintenance demonstration and previous flight testing, suggest that overall Aegis BMD 4.0 
Weapon System availability is adequate for the midcourse defense mission against short- and 
medium‑range ballistic missiles. Testing showed that improvements in Aegis BMD 
hardware reliability are needed, although the impact on operational availability was not 
significant due to the low repair times. 
• The limited number of SM-3 Block IB firings (nine) and the two, third-stage rocket motor 
(TSRM) failures (FTM-16 Event 2 in FY11 and the second missile failure in FTM-21 in 
FY13) lower certainty in overall SM-3 Block IB missile reliability. The program addressed 
and tested a correction for the first of the SM-3 TSRM problems when it modified the 
TSRM’s inter-pulse delay time. The Aegis BMD program has exercised the new inter-pulse 
delay without incident in three flight tests and a number of ground-based static firings. The 
correction, however, did not prevent the TSRM failure in the second of two salvo-launched 
SM-3 Block IB guided missiles in FTM-21, which also suffered a reliability failure of the 
TSRM aft nozzle area during second pulse operations of the two-pulse motor (the first 
missile had already achieved a successful intercept). The MDA established a Failure Review 
Board (FRB) to determine the root cause of this failure and the Board has uncovered enough 
evidence to determine that a re-design is needed for the TSRM nozzle. The program has a 
preliminary design for the new nozzle, and began the ground testing of new design concepts 
in FY14. The new design will be retrofittable into current SM-3 Block IA and Block IB 
missiles. 
• Flight testing and modeling and simulation have demonstrated the Aegis BMD 4.0 
capability to perform the LRS&T mission, albeit with only a single threat. Additionally, the 
FTG-07 mission in FY13 highlighted the need to further explore and refine tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the transmission and receipt of Aegis BMD track data 
for GMD use. 
                                                                  
16 See, for example, “Aegis BMD: “Build a Little, Test a Little, Learn a Lot”,” USNI blog, March 15, 2010, accessed 
September 11, 2013, at http://blog.usni.org/2010/03/15/aegis-bmd-build-a-little-test-a-little-learn-a-lot, and “Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for the George C. Marshall Institute, RADM Alan 
B. Hicks, USN, Aegis BMD Program Director, August 3, 2009, slide 16 of 20, entitled “Some of our Philosophies In a 
Nutshell (1 of 2),” accessed September 11, 2011, at http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/743.pdf. 
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• Testing of the Aegis BMD 4.0 system did not evaluate automated engagement coordination 
in flight testing; due to lack of ship availability. However, the MDA tested it during Ground 
Test Focused-04e and it will be operationally tested during FOT&E. 
• The program demonstrated that Aegis Ashore can fire, detect, and control an SM-3 Block 
IB guided missile during AACTV-01. This is an important first step toward proving that 
Aegis Ashore can perform missile defense operations similar to those on an Aegis BMD ship 
for the defense of Europe as part of EPAA Phase 2. An engagement of a ballistic missile 
target by Aegis Ashore will take place in Event 1 of Flight Test Operational-02 (FTO-02) in 
FY15. 
• During FTX-20, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 destroyer (Aegis BMD 5.0 with Capability 
Upgrade) successfully detected, tracked, and conducted a simulated engagement of a 
separating medium-range ballistic missile target. 
• During FTM-25, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1-configured destroyer, operating in integrated air 
and missile defense priority mode, intercepted a short-range ballistic missile target using an 
SM-3 Block IB guided missile while simultaneously engaging two subsonic cruise missile 
targets using two SM-2 Block IIIA missiles. 
• The MDA continues to utilize Aegis BMD ships and HWIL representations of the Aegis 
BMD 4.0 and 3.6 variants, which has helped to refine TTPs and overall interoperability of 
the system with the BMDS. However, the test events routinely demonstrated that inter 
element coordination and interoperability are still in need of improvement. 
Recommendations 
• Status of Previous Recommendations. 
- The program has not addressed the first two recommendations (out of five) from FY13 to 
conduct: 
▪▪ Flight testing of the Aegis BMD 4.0 remote authorized engagement capability against a 
medium-range ballistic missile or intermediate-range ballistic missile target using an SM-3 
Block IB guided missile. FTO-02 Event 2, scheduled for 4QFY15, is planned to demonstrate 
this capability. 
▪▪ Operationally realistic testing that exercises Aegis BMD 4.0’s improved engagement 
coordination with THAAD and Patriot 
- The program addressed the third recommendation from FY13 to continue to assess an 
Aegis BMD 4.0 intercept mission during which the ship simultaneously engages an anti-air 
warfare target to verify BMD/anti-air warfare capability, when it conducted the FTM-25 
mission using Aegis Baseline 9.C1. 
- The program partially addressed the fourth recommendation from FY13 to use the FRB 
process to identify the failure mechanism responsible for the FTM-21 second missile failure 
and determine the underlying root cause that may be common to both the FTM-16 Event 2 
and FTM-21 second missile failures. The MDA established an FRB following FTM-21 and, 
although it is still ongoing, preliminary findings from the FRB have pointed to a similar root 
cause, prompting the program to begin a re-design of the TSRM nozzle. 
- The program partially addressed the fifth recommendation from FY13 to deliver sufficient 
Aegis BMD 4.0 validation data and evidence to support BMDS modeling and simulation 
verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of the Aegis HWIL and digital models. 
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They did so when the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force provided VV&A 
evidence for the digital models used for element-level performance analyses in support of the 
operational assessment of the Aegis BMD 4.0 system with SM-3 Block IB guided missiles. 
Aegis BMD provided V&V data from element post-flight reconstruction events for FTM-16 
Event 2, FTM-18, and FTM-21, based on BMDS Operational Test Agency performance 
parameters and acceptability criteria as evidence supporting accreditation of Aegis BMD 
HWIL models participating in BMDS level ground testing. The BMDS Operational Test 
Agency is reviewing the data for an accreditation recommendation. 
• FY14 Recommendations. The program should: 
1. Conduct flight tests or high-fidelity modeling and simulation analyses to demonstrate the 
Aegis BMD 4.0 system’s capability to perform LRS&T of a raid of long- range threats. 
2. Determine the appropriate LRS&T TTPs for the transmission and receipt of Aegis BMD 
4.0 track data for GMD use. 
3. Ensure that sufficient flight testing of the Aegis Baseline 9.C1 system is conducted to 
allow for VV&A of the modeling and simulation suite to cover the full design to Aegis BMD 
battlespace of threat ballistic missiles. 
4. Conduct sufficient ground and flight testing of the re‑designed SM-3 Block IB TSRM 
nozzle after completion and installation of the new design concept to prove the new design 
works under the most stressing operational flight conditions.17 
For further discussion of Aegis BMD flight tests—including a May 2010 magazine article and 
supplementary white paper in which two professors with scientific backgrounds criticize DOD 
claims of successes in Aegis (and other DOD) BMD flight tests—see Appendix A. 
Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program 
Japan 
Japan’s interest in BMD, and in cooperating with the United States on the issue, was heightened 
in August 1998 when North Korea test-fired a Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile that flew over Japan 
before falling into the Pacific.18 In addition to cooperating with the United States on development 
of technologies for the SM-3 Block IIA missile, Japan is modifying all six of its Aegis destroyers 
with Aegis BMD system, and in November 2013 announced plans to procure two additional 
Aegis destroyers and equip them as well with the Aegis BMD system, which will produce an 
eventual Japanese force of eight BMD-capable Aegis destroyers. Japanese BMD-capable Aegis 
ships have conducted four flight tests of the Aegis BMD system using the SM-3 interceptor, 
achieving three successful exo-atmospheric intercepts. 
                                                                  
17 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report, January 2015, pp. 305-306. 
18 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL31337, Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and 
Prospects, by Richard P. Cronin. This archived report was last updated on March 19, 2002. See also CRS Report 
RL33436, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery. 
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Other Countries 
Other countries that MDA views as potential naval BMD operators (using either the Aegis BMD 
system or some other system of their own design) include the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Germany, Denmark, South Korea, and Australia. As mentioned earlier, Spain, South 
Korea, and Australia either operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis ships. The other 
countries operate destroyers and frigates with different combat systems that may have potential 
for contributing to BMD operations. 
For additional background information on allied participation and interest in the Aegis BMD 
program, see Appendix C. 
FY2016 Funding Request 
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides 
additional funding for BMD-related efforts. As shown in Table 3, MDA’s proposed FY2016 
budget requests a total of $1,843.4 million in procurement and research and development funding 
for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for the two Aegis Ashore sites that are to be part of the 
EPAA, which is referred to in the table as funding for the land-based SM-3. MDA’s budget also 
includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the 
Aegis BMD program. 
Table 3. MDA Funding for Aegis BMD Efforts, FY2015-FY2020 
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding) 
FY16 
FY17 
FY18 
FY19 
FY20 
 FY15 
(req.) 
(proj.) 
(proj.) 
(proj.) 
(proj.) 
Procurement funding 
Aegis BMD (line 24) 
643.8 
558.9 
836.7 
959.5 
1,152.3 
1,096.6 
Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line 25) 
0 
147.8 
51.7 
20.8 
78.7 
198.2 
Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 27) 
225.8 
30.6 
62.9 
70.6 
0 
0 
SUBTOTAL Procurement 
869.6 
737.3 
951.3 
1,050.9  1,231.0  1,294.8 
RDT&E funding 
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 82) 
764.2 
843.4 
762.7 
748.4 
564.8 
579.6 
Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line 108) 
89.6 
55.1 
89.9 
131.4 
101.9 
80.4 
Land-based SM-3 (PE 0604880C) (line 110) 
123.4 
35.0 
40.8 
30.5 
20.2 
22.1 
Aegis SM-3 IIA (PE 0604881C) (line 111) 
263.7 
172.6 
66.8 
0 
0 
0 
SUBTOTAL RDT&E 
1,240.9 
1,106.1 
960.2 
910.3 
686.9 
682.1 
TOTAL  
2,110.5 
1,843.4 
1,911.5 
1,961.2  1,917.9  1,976.9 
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2016 MDA budget-justification books for MDA for Research, 
Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide (Volume 2a) and for Procurement, Defense-Wide (Volume 2b). 
a.  The table includes only line items for which funding is requested in FY2016-FY2020; the total shown for 
FY2015 consequently excludes funding for line items that received funding in FY2015, but for which no 
funding is requested for FY2016-FY2020.  
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Issues for Congress 
Request for Multiyear Procurement (MYP) Authority for SM-3IB 
Interceptors 
One issue for Congress for FY2016 is MDA’s request for authority to use a multiyear 
procurement (MYP) contract for acquiring SM-3 Block IBs to be procured in FY2016-FY2019. 
Compared to using annual contracting (aka single year procurement, or SYP), MDA estimates 
that using an MYP contract for procuring these missiles would reduce their combined 
procurement cost by $306.4 million, or about 14%. 
In considering whether to grant MDA’s request for authority to use an MYP contract for SM-3 
Block IB procurement in FY2016-FY2019, questions that Congress may consider include 
whether the SM-3 Block IB procurement program meets the statutory requirements to qualify for 
MYP, whether MDA’s savings estimate is accurate, and whether the savings are enough to justify 
the loss of flexibility for making year-to-year changes in procurement quantities in response to 
strategic or budgetary changes that would result from using an MYP contract.19 
Burden Sharing: U.S. vs. European Naval Contributions to 
European BMD 
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns burden sharing—how European naval 
contributions to European BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions 
to European BMD capabilities and operations, particularly in light of constraints on U.S. defense 
spending, worldwide operational demands for U.S. Navy Aegis ships, and calls by some U.S. and 
European observers (particularly after Russia’s actions in March 2014 to gain control of Crimea) 
for increased defense efforts by NATO countries in Europe. Potential oversight issues for 
Congress include the following: 
•  How does the total value of European naval contributions to European BMD 
capabilities and operations compare to the total value of the U.S. naval 
contributions (including the Aegis Ashore sites) to European BMD capabilities 
and operations? 
•  Given constraints on U.S. defense spending, worldwide operational demands for 
U.S. Navy Aegis ships,20 and calls by some U.S. and European observers for 
increased defense efforts by NATO countries in Europe—as well as the potential 
for European countries to purchase or build BMD-capable Aegis ships, upgrade 
existing ships with BMD capabilities, or purchase Aegis ashore systems—should 
the United States seek increased investment by European countries in their 
regional BMD capabilities so as to reduce the need for assigning BMD-capable 
                                                                  
19 For more on MYP contracting, including the statutory requirements that must be met to qualify for MYP, see CRS 
Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and 
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz. 
20 See, for example, Lance M. Bacon, “Missile Defense Ships Face Arms Race, High Op Tempo,” Navy Times, January 
31, 2015. 
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U.S. Navy Aegis ships to the EPAA? Why should European countries not pay a 
greater share of the cost of the EPAA, since the primary purpose of the EPAA is 
to defend Europe against theater-range missiles? 
Adequacy of Planned Procurement Quantities of SM-3 Missiles 
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the adequacy of planned procurement 
quantities of SM-3 interceptors to be procured. Congressional concerns over this issue were 
heightened by the FY2015 budget submission, which included 132 fewer SM-3 interceptors in 
FY2014-FY2018 than the FY2014 submission, a reduction of about 42%. Table 4 compares 
annual SM-3 procurement quantities in the FY2014, FY2015, and FY2016 budget submissions. 
Table 4. Planned SM-3 Missile Procurement Quantities 
As shown in FY2014 and FY2015 budget submissions 
 
FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 
FY14 budget 
72 
72 
84 
88 
n/a 
n/a 
FY15 
budget 
30 48 52 54 72 n/a 
FY16 
budget 
49 40 60 65 71 76 
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2014-FY2016 MDA budget-justification books. n/a is not available. 
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following: 
•  To what extent are the year-to-year changes in planned annual procurement 
quantities shown in Table 4 the result of revised assessments of operational 
requirements for SM-3 missiles, as opposed to other factors, such as constraints 
on planned levels of defense spending? 
•  What are the potential operational impacts of these year-to-year changes in 
planned annual procurement quantities? 
•  What impact, if any, do these year-to-year changes planned annual procurement 
quantities have on SM-3 unit procurement costs? 
Target for Simulating Endo-Atmospheric Flight of DF-21 ASBM 
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the lack of a target for simulating the 
endo-atmospheric (i.e., final) phase of flight of China’s DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile. DOD’s 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), in a December 2011 report (DOT&E’s 
annual report for FY2011), stated: 
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Target 
A threat representative Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) target for operational open-air 
testing has become an immediate test resource need. China is fielding the DF-21D ASBM, 
which threatens U.S. and allied surface warships in the Western Pacific. While the Missile 
Defense Agency has exo-atmospheric targets in development, no program currently exists 
for an endo-atmospheric target. The endo-atmospheric ASBM target is the Navy’s 
responsibility, but it is not currently budgeted. The Missile Defense Agency estimates the 
non-recurring expense to develop the exo-atmospheric target was $30 million with each 
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target costing an additional $30 million; the endo-atmospheric target will be more expensive 
to produce according to missile defense analysts. Numerous Navy acquisition programs will 
require an ASBM surrogate in the coming years, although a limited number of targets (3-5) 
may be sufficient to validate analytical models.21 
A February 28, 2012, press report stated: 
“Numerous programs will require” a test missile to stand in for the Chinese DF-21D, 
“including self-defense systems used on our carriers and larger amphibious ships to counter 
anti-ship ballistic missiles,” [Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test 
and evaluation] said in an e-mailed statement.... 
“No Navy target program exists that adequately represents an anti-ship ballistic missile’s 
trajectory,” Gilmore said in the e-mail. The Navy “has not budgeted for any study, 
development, acquisition or production” of a DF-21D target, he said. 
Lieutenant Alana Garas, a Navy spokeswoman, said in an e-mail that the service 
“acknowledges this is a valid concern and is assessing options to address it. We are unable to 
provide additional details.”... 
Gilmore, the testing chief, said his office first warned the Navy and Pentagon officials in 
2008 about the lack of an adequate target. The warnings continued through this year, when 
the testing office for the first time singled out the DF-21D in its annual public report.... 
The Navy “can test some, but not necessarily all, potential means of negating anti-ship 
ballistic missiles,” without a test target, Gilmore said.22 
The December 2012 report from DOT&E (i.e., DOT&E’s annual report for FY2012) did not 
further discuss this issue; a January 21, 2013, press report stated that this is because the details of 
the issue are classified.23 
Concurrency and Technical Risk in Aegis BMD Program 
Another potential oversight issue for Congress is development-production concurrency and 
technical risk there is in the Aegis BMD program. Below are comments from Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports and a Missile Defense Executive Board report to Congress 
and on concurrency and technical risk in certain parts of Aegis BMD program. 
Aegis System Modernized Software 
An April 2014 GAO report on BMD programs stated the following regarding efforts to develop 
modernized software for the Aegis system: 
                                                                  
21 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2011 Annual Report, December 2011, p. 294. 
22 Tony Capaccio, “Navy Lacks Targets To Test U.S. Defenses Against China Missile,” Bloomberg Government 
(bgov.com), February 28, 2012. 
23 Christopher J. Castelli, “DOD Testing Chief Drops Public Discussion Of ASBM Target Shortfall,” Inside the Navy, 
January 21, 2013. 
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[A] Seventeen-month delay in associated development efforts by the Navy increased MDA 
program cost. To offset this increase, MDA reduced its engineering support which could 
affect its ability to resolve development challenges if significant issues arise prior to 
delivery. 
Discovery of software defects continues to outpace the program’s ability to fix them; fixes 
may have to be implemented after software is delivered.24 
SM-3 Block IB Missile 
An April 7, 2014, press report stated: 
The Pentagon is delaying a full-rate production review of Raytheon’s Standard Missile-3 
Block IB pending an investigation of a September 2013 intercept failure that could lead to 
the modification of a component also used in the deployed Block IA variant of the missile. 
The review, scheduled for fiscal year 2014, is being pushed off until FY-15, the Defense 
Department revealed in a March 24 response to a draft Government Accountability Office 
report, which included the response, on April 1.25 
An April 2014 GAO report on BMD programs—the one referred to in the press report above—
stated: 
The Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB program largely overcame previous development 
challenges and successfully intercepted all targets in its last three flight tests.... These tests 
are required for a full production decision—the last key production authorization by the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics that would allow MDA 
to produce the remaining 415 interceptors. However, a missile failure of the second 
interceptor launched during the September 2013 test could increase production risk if design 
changes are needed.... 
As we found in April 2013, the SM-3 Block IB production line has been repeatedly disrupted 
since 2011 due to flight test anomalies caused by malfunctions in two separate sections of 
the third-stage rocket motor, and development challenges with the throttleable divert and 
attitude control system—components that maneuver the interceptor in its later stages of 
flight. These challenges delayed the SM-3 Block IB full production authorization by more 
than two years to fiscal year 2015. Largely resolving these previous challenges, in fiscal year 
2013 the program received permission to procure 33 additional initial production missiles. 
Although MDA initially planned to award a contract for 29 SM-3 Block IB missiles in fiscal 
year 2013, it bought four additional missiles in August 2013 to recover an earlier reduction. 
That reduction occurred to provide funds to resolve technical and production issues. Based 
on successful intercepts of the last three flight tests, the program also received permission to 
buy 52 more interceptors in fiscal year 2014. 
Despite the three successful intercepts, the effect of the missile failure in September 2013 on 
the upcoming full production decision remains unclear. Before the program enters into full 
production, MDA’s acquisition management instruction requires it to demonstrate to the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics that there are no 
                                                                  
24 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:]Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and 
Improving Accountability, GAO-14-351, April 2014, p. 14. 
25 Jason Sherman, “DOD Delays Full-Rate Production Review For SM-3 Block IB,” Inside the Navy, April 7, 2014. 
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significant risks to production and that the planned production quantities are affordable and 
fully funded. The permission to enter full production is also based on independent 
assessments of the weapon’s effectiveness and suitability by the DOD’s Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation and the Navy’s Commander Operational Test & Evaluation 
Force. Although the failure investigation is ongoing, preliminary results indicate that the 
failure occurred in the third-stage rocket motor, a component common to the SM-3 Block IA, 
which is nearing the end of its production. Different issues with that same component have 
contributed to previous SM-3 Block IB schedule delays and production disruptions. While 
the precise cause of the September 2013 failure is under review, MDA documentation 
indicates that it could potentially result in design changes to the third-stage rocket motor and 
changes to manufacturing processes. Additionally, retrofits may be required for SM-3 Block 
IB and SM-3 Block IA interceptors that were already produced. If design changes are 
necessary, program documentation indicates that they will not be flight tested until the fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 2015, just prior to the planned deployment of the SM-3 Block IB to 
support the regional defense of Europe and 6 months after its planned full production 
decision. Consequently, until the program thoroughly understands the extent of needed 
modifications, if any, and their effects on performance as demonstrated though testing, its 
production strategy is at risk of cost growth and schedule delays. MDA has experienced 
these consequences in other elements when it pursued design changes concurrently with 
production.26 
The GAO report recommended that 
To the extent that MDA determines hardware or software modifications are required to 
address the September 2013 Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB failure, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense direct, 
a) the Director of the MDA to verify the changes work as intended through subsequent flight 
testing, and 
b) the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics to delay the 
decision to approve the program’s full production until such testing demonstrates that the 
redesigned missile is effective and suitable.27 
The GAO report stated that DOD 
partially concurred with our first recommendation to flight test any modifications that may 
be required to the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB as a result of September 2013 failure, before 
the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics approves full 
production. In its comments, DOD acknowledged that if modifications are required they will 
be tested, but added that the type of testing—flight or ground testing—will depend on the 
magnitude of such modifications. The department also believes that the component currently 
tied to the failure, has a successful testing history and thus expects to meet the reliability 
requirement needed for the full production decision in fiscal year 2015. However, there have 
now been three flight test anomalies associated with this component over the last three years. 
According to Aegis BMD officials, they are considering design changes for this component. 
Since the fiscal year 2015 full production decision is the commitment by the Under Secretary 
of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics to produce several hundred missiles, 
                                                                  
26 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:]Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and 
Improving Accountability, GAO-14-351, April 2014, pp. 17-19. 
27 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:]Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and 
Improving Accountability, GAO-14-351, April 2014, pp. 27-28. 
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this decision should be supported by an assessment of the final product under operational 
mission conditions to ensure that it is effective and suitable. As such, we maintain our 
recommendation that before the program is approved for full production, flight testing 
should demonstrate that any modifications work as intended.28 
A July 2013 report to Congress by the Missile Defense Executive Board stated the following 
regarding concurrency in the SM-2 Block IB missile: 
MDA received an early decision from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) for initial production of 14 Standard Missile 
(SM)-3 Block IB missiles. This procurement will provide for timely availability of missiles 
to support the EPAA Phase 2 Warfighter requirement. This procurement will also sustain 
suppliers, maintain qualified production lines and maintain SM-3 Block IB missile unit costs. 
Risk of concurrency is mitigated by the positive results of several SM-3 Block IB flight tests 
that informed the initial production decision. Subsequently, USD(AT&L) provided an early 
production decision to procure long lead material for the next lot of 29 SM-3 Block IB 
missiles and missile canisters. This decision will further enable production missiles to be 
delivered on a schedule to meet inventory requirements for EPAA Phase 2. The next planned 
production decisions to approve SM-3 Block IB “all-up-rounds” will also be informed by 
additional BMDS tests, an initial operational test and evaluation in accordance with title 10, 
U.S.C., and Knowledge Points (KPs).... 
The SM-3 Block IB program office also uses a series of BMDS KPs to identify information 
to make key decisions about acquisition life-cycle phase transition, funding, technology 
selections, capability demonstrations, program continuation, selecting an alternative course 
of action, and managing program risk. MDA KPs are critical to managing development risk 
at an acceptable level and informing decisions to incorporate technological advances sought 
by the Warfighter to counter the rapidly advancing threat. This knowledge-based approach 
measures progress and guides development and production to support an acceptable balance 
between schedule and risk. Using knowledge-based acquisition decisions in addition to a 
manageable balance of parallel development and production directly supports BMDS EPAA 
Phase 2 Warfighter requirements. 
In June 2010, through the MDA acquisition oversight process, the alread ongoing SM-3 
Block IB (with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense version 4.0.1) was established in the product 
development phrase and initial acquisition baselines were set. Development concurrency was 
mitigated early in the program by leveraging the capability in the SM-3 Block IA missile 
before acquiring any SM-3 Block IB missiles. SM-3 Block IB missiles use many of the same 
components as the SM-3 Block IA, including the entire booster stack. The SM-3 Block IB 
offers more capability against a greater threat set because of improvements in the kinetic 
warhead (KW). These improvements include a two-color seeker, all reflective optics, an 
advanced signal processor, and a throttleable control system. 
To support SM-3 Block IB development, ground tests were conducted to reduce risk and 
validate test conditions that are often difficult to duplicate in flight tests. The ground tests 
mitigated development risk before starting SM-3 Block IB flight tests in 3rd Quarter FY 
2011. As a result of problems discovered during flight tests FTM-15 and FTM-16 E2, MDA 
received congressional approval to convert procurement appropriation funding to research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding to resolve those problems before 
resuming flight tests. Analysis of the flight test results drove additional development to one 
                                                                  
28 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:]Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and 
Improving Accountability, GAO-14-351, April 2014, pp. 28-29. 
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legacy component as well as an update to the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) version 4.0.2 
before the SM-3 Block IB began production. The program office is currently taking delivery 
of RDT&E missile placed on contract during FY2011. Based on the long lead-time for 
production, some material had to be procured before flight testing. These RDT&E missiles 
are supporting final development and testing of the SM-3 Block IB missile. 
By direction of the Office of Management and Budget, in 3rd Quarter FY 2012 the program 
office received a decision from USD(AT&L) to start initial production with the authorization 
to acquire the first 14 SM-3 Block IB missiles using procurement appropriations. This 
decision was based on positive results from several SM-3 Block IB flight tests (FTM-16E2a 
and initial results from FTM-18). This overlap between final aspects of product development 
and initial production is necessary to sustain suppliers and maintain bioth qualified 
production lines and SM-3 Block IB missile unit costs. 
In addition to the successful flight tests FTM-16E2a and FTM-18 already flown, a number of 
ground tests and final verification and qualification tests on critical SM-3 Block IB 
components were conducted prior to the USD(AT&L) decision to authorize long lead 
material procurement for the next 29 missiles. These steps mitigated potential concurrency 
between final product development and early material procurement necessary for the next lot 
of production SM-3 Block IB missiles. Additionally, potential concurrency and concurrency 
mitigation were reviewed by the MDA Director at the SM-3 Block IB Developmental 
Baseline Review in 2nd Quarter FY 2013 and progress towards mitigating concurrency is 
reviewed quarterly by the MDA Director during the SM-3 Block IB BER [Baseline 
Execution Review]. Finally, the SM-3 Block IB program office plans to participate in a 
number of additional flight tests tests [sic] including an initial operational test and evaluation 
in accordance with title 10, U.S.C. (i.e.;, FTM-19, FTM-21, and FTM-22) and complete 
BMDS KPs to inform the USD(AT&L) decision to approve production of SM-3 Block IB 
missiles through FY 2017. These sequential production decisions, informed by tailored 
component qualification tests, other ground tests, and flight tests, minimize concurrency, 
validate progression from one acquisition phase to the next, and will maintain the schedule 
necessary to satisfy BMDS EPAA Phase 2 Warfighter requirements.29 
An April 2013 GAO report stated the following regarding the SM-3 Block IB missile: 
In 2012, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB was able to partially overcome the production and 
testing issues exacerbated by its concurrent development and production strategy. MDA 
prematurely began purchasing SM-3 Block IB missiles beyond the number needed for 
developmental testing in 2010. In 2011, developmental issues arose when the program 
experienced a failure in its first developmental flight test and an anomaly in a separate SM-3 
Block IA flight test, in a component common with the SM-3 Block IB. As a result, 
production was disrupted when MDA slowed production of the SM-3 Block IB interceptors 
and reduced planned quantities from 46 to 14. In 2012, the program was able to successfully 
conduct two flight tests which allowed the program to address some of the production issues 
by demonstrating a fix made to address one of the 2011 flight test issues. However, 
development issues continue to delay the program’s fiscal year 2012 schedule and 
production. For example, MDA experienced further difficulties completing testing of a new 
maneuvering component—contributing to delays for a third flight test needed to validate the 
SM-3 Block IB capability and also subsequently delaying a production decision for certain 
components from December 2012 to February 2013. 
                                                                  
29 Missile Defense Executive Board Report to Congress on Concurrency in Development of Ballistic Missile Defense 
System Capability, July 2013, pp. 3 and 7-9. Posted online at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), September 27, 
2013. The report was directed by page 82 of the House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 112-479 of May 
11, 2012) on H.R. 4310, the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act. 
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In order to avoid further disruptions to the production line, the program plans to award the 
next production contract for some missile components needed for the next order of 29 SM-3 
Block IB missiles in February 2013—before the third flight test can verify the most recent 
software modifications. The program then plans to award the contract to complete this order 
upon conducting a successful flight test planned for the third quarter of fiscal year 2013.The 
program is at risk for costly retrofits, additional delays and further production disruptions if 
issues are discovered during this flight test.30 
The April 2013 GAO report includes an appendix with additional in-depth discussion of 
concurrency and technical risk in the SM-3 Block IB program.31 
SM-3 Block IIA Missile 
A July 2013 report to Congress by the Missile Defense Executive Board stated the following 
regarding concurrency in the SM-2 Block IIA missile: 
In 2010, MDA began an acquisition oversight process to establish SM-3 Block IIA and 
ABMD [Aegis BMD] 5.1 in the technology development phase and set initial technology 
acquisition baselines. 
The program office will complete development and initial testing of the SM-3 Block IIA 
using a structured systems engineering approach that aligns with MDA acquisition policy 
and processes. In February 2010, the SCD [SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development] 
Executive Steering Committee approved the SCD KP [Knowledge Point] plan. The 33 
identified KPs define the critical knowledge required during development to ensure 
successful design and initial testing. The structured systems engineering and knowledge-
based approach eliminates development concurrency for required capability delivery within 
planned cost and schedule. Additionally, the program office’s progress towards mitigating 
concurrency is reviewed quarterly by the MDA Director during the SM-3 Block IIA BER 
[Baseline Execution Review]. 
The program office has begun a robust development and test process using hardware; major 
test events and KPs precede major acquisition milestones. For example, the program office 
successfully demonstrated subsystem functional performance and completed subsystem 
preliminary design reviews (PDRs) for all critical SM-3 Block IIA subsystems (e.g., third 
stage rocket motor (TSRM), second stage rocket motor (SSRM), booster, nosecone, divert 
attitude control system (DACS), and the KW [kinetic warhead]) well in advance of the 
March 2012 system PDR. The subsystem reviews used data from computer in the loop (CIL) 
tests and data fro[m] hardware testing from two full-duration DACS valve hot-fire tests, 
three Japanese rocket motor firings, and Japanese nosecone separation testing. 
SM-3 Block IIA will continue this rigorous engineering review process focused on hardware 
performance to prepare and inform the move from the technology development phase to 
product development. The SCD critical design review (CDR) of the interface with the Aegis 
BMD 5.1 weapon system for organic operation will be complete before the full SM-3 Block 
IIA production development decision in the 2nd Quarter FY 2014. The SCD CDR will use 
data from both hardware in the loop (HIL) and CIL tests, and data from hardware tests like a 
                                                                  
30 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 
Management, GAO-13-432, April 2013, pp. 22-23. 
31 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 
Management, GAO-13-432, April 2013, Appendix II on pp. 52-59. 
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restrained firing of the MK-72 booster, a propulsion test vehicle test, and hot-fire test events 
on the DACS, SSRN, and TSRM. The full system CRS (planned for 1st Quarter FY 2015) 
will incorporate results from the missile system CDRs, VLS CDRs, canister CDR, KPs, and 
testing, using organic ABMD 5.1 weapon and missile system interface. 
The rigorous engineering process will continue to inform decisions as SM-3 Block IIA 
moves from product development to the production phase. Performance data from HIL and 
CIL tests will be augmented with flight test data to support knowledge-based decisions. 
Initial flight tests will focus on validating propulsion system performance in flight using 
CTVs [control test vehicles]. Subsequent flight tests will demonstrate missile functionality 
and intercept capability, and prior to a full production decision, will culminate in an initial 
operational test and evaluation in accordance with title 10, U.S.C. Flight tests will be spaced 
from 1 year to 6 months so that lessons learned are incorporated into the design before the 
next test.32 
An April 2013 GAO report stated the following regarding the SM-3 Block IIA missile: 
MDA has taken steps to reduce acquisition risk by decreasing the overlap between 
technology development and product development for two of its programs—the Aegis BMD 
SM-3 Block IIA and the [now-terminated] SM-3 Block IIB programs. Reconciling gaps 
between requirements and available resources before product development begins makes it 
more likely that a program will meet cost, schedule, and performance targets. 
• 
The Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA program added time and money to the program to 
extend development. Following significant technology development problems with four 
components, MDA delayed the system preliminary design review—during which a program 
demonstrates that the technologies and resources available are aligned with requirements—
for more than 1 year, thereby reducing its acquisition risk. As a result, in March 2012, 
following additional development of the four components, the program was able to 
successfully complete the review.33 
The April 2013 GAO report includes an appendix with additional in-depth discussion of 
concurrency and technical risk in the SM-3 Block IIA program.34 
Aegis Ashore 
An April 2014 GAO report on BMD programs states the following regarding the Aegis Ashore 
development effort: 
MDA plans to complete development of the first operational facility and award a contract to 
begin the second before flight testing demonstrates that the facility works with the Aegis 
modernized weapon system software and interceptors as intended. 
                                                                  
32 Missile Defense Executive Board Report to Congress on Concurrency in Development of Ballistic Missile Defense 
System Capability, July 2013, pp. 9-10. Posted online at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), September 27, 
2013. The report was directed by page 82 of the House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 112-479 of May 
11, 2012) on H.R. 4310, the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act. 
33 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 
Management, GAO-13-432, April 2013, p. 21. 
34 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 
Management, GAO-13-432, April 2013, Appendix IV on pp. 70-72. 
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Flight test delays and cancellations, as well as challenges with development of the Aegis 
modernized weapon system software increase the risk of discovering performance issues that 
may require fixes after operational deployment.35 
A July 2013 report to Congress by the Missile Defense Executive Board stated the following 
regarding concurrency in the SM-2 Block IB missile: 
The Aegis Ashore element is leveraging and reusing the development and design from 
several United States Navy programs with similar components. For example, the Aegis 
Ashore vertical launch system (VLS) is the same system previously procured for the cruiser 
and destroyer programs. The deckhouse design is similar to the destroyer configuration for 
the Aegis SPY radar arrays. The Aegis Ashore program office will also use a number of 
BMDS KPs [Knowledge Points] and flight tests, including an operational test at the Pacific 
Missile Range Facility, from other MDA elements to mitigate risk and inform major program 
decisions.... 
In June 2010, through the MDA acquisition oversight process, Aegis Ashore was established 
in the product development phase and initial acquisition baselines were set. The current 
Aegis Ashore acquisition strategy has balanced development concurrency with flight tests, 
military construction and component procurement decisions. It has an appropriately aligned 
strategy with the necessary levels of testing, monitored by knowledge-based decision points. 
Aegis Ashore uses ongoing development from United State navy ASW [Aegis Weapon 
System] program. The AWS supporting Aegis Ashore is the same system supporting all 
Aegis shipbuilding programs (past and present). Before the first Aegis Ashore flight test, the 
SM-3 Block IB missile will have been tested several times with the AWS. 
Significant activities during the Aegis Ashore product development phase include integrating 
the MK41 VLS launcher. The VLS housing is a stell modular structure because there is no 
ship structure to surround the launcher. This structure design is new, but replicates what was 
field-tested with other variant of the [S]tandard [M]issile at the White Sands Missile Range, 
New Mexico. The program office does not expect Aegis Ashore flight-testing to affect the 
technical design of the MK 41 VLS or the VLS housing. 
The deckhouse contains the AWS and hosts the operators who execute the Aegis Ashore 
mission. This structure is new, not based on an existing design, yet replicates the height and 
spacing of the Aegis SPY radar arrays similar to a destroyer configuration. Flight-testing is 
not expected to affect the technical design of the deckhouse. 
Aegis Ashore testing includes both weapon system testing to verify performance as the 
deckhouse is built up, and flight tests to verify communication and controlled fly out of the 
SM-3 from the MK 41 LVS launcher and will conclude with an operational test at the Pacific 
Missile Range Facility. This test approach is the same process used in Navy ship 
construction shake-down trials and combat systems qualifications. 
Planning continues for the production of the next and final Aegis Ashore system (based on 
current requirements and funding). This last system will support EPAA Phase 3. MDA 
notified USD(AT&L) of their intent to use procurement appropriation funding for Navy 
program offices to acquire material for this system. The Aegis Ashore program office 
expects to procure long lead material in 1st Quarter FY 2014. Although the previous Aegis 
Ashore system will not be completely developed and constructed before the final system 
                                                                  
35 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:]Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and 
Improving Accountability, GAO-14-351, April 2014, p. 14. 
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begins construction, the last Aegis Ashore system is also based on existing Navy programs 
and incorporate[s] updates from the previous developmental system. Ground and flight tests 
from the previous developmental system and other SM-3 flight tests are not expected to 
impact the design of the final Aegis Ashore system. Progress in maintaining mitigation of 
potential concurrency risks is reviewed quarterly by the MDA Director during the Aegis 
Ashore BER [Baseline Execution Review].36 
An April 2013 GAO report stated the following regarding the Aegis Ashore program: 
The Aegis Ashore program, as we reported in April 2012, initiated product development and 
established cost, schedule, and performance baselines prior to completing the preliminary 
design review. Further, we reported that this sequencing increased technical risks and the 
possibility of cost growth by committing to product development with less technical 
knowledge than recommended by acquisition best practices and without ensuring that 
requirements were defined, feasible, and achievable within cost and schedule constraints. In 
addition, the program committed to buy components necessary for manufacturing prior to 
conducting flight tests to confirm the system worked as intended. As a result, any design 
modifications identified through testing would need to be retrofitted to produced items at 
additional cost. However, the MDA Director stated in March 2012 that the Aegis Ashore 
development is low risk because of its similarity to the sea-based Aegis BMD.41 
Nonetheless, this concurrent acquisition plan means that knowledge gained from flight tests 
cannot be used to guide the construction of Aegis Ashore installations or the procurement of 
components for operational use.37 
The April 2013 GAO report also stated: 
As we reported in April 2012, the instability of content in the Aegis Ashore program’s 
resource baseline obscures our assessment of the program’s progress. MDA prematurely set 
the baseline before program requirements were understood and before the acquisition 
strategy was firm. The program established its baseline for product development for the 
Romania and Hawaii facilities in June 2010 with a total cost estimate of $813 million. 
However 3 days later, when the program submitted this baseline to Congress in the 2010 
BAR [BMDS (ballistic missile defense system) Accountability Report], it increased the total 
cost estimate by 19 percent, to $966 million. Since that time, the program has added a 
significant amount of content to the resource baseline to respond to acquisition strategy 
changes and requirements that were added after the baseline was set. Because of these 
adjustments, from the time the total estimated cost for Aegis Ashore in Romania and Hawaii 
was first approved in June 2010 at $813 million, it has nearly doubled to its estimate of $1.6 
billion reported in the February 2012 BAR. These major adjustments in program content 
made it impossible to understand annual or longer-term program progress. 
These adjustments also affected the schedule baseline for Aegis Ashore. For example, many 
new activities were added to the baseline in 2012. In addition, comparing the estimated dates 
for scheduled activities listed in the 2012 BAR to the dates baselined in the 2010 BAR is 
impossible in some cases because activities from the 2010 BAR were split into multiple 
events, renamed, or eliminated all together in the 2012 BAR. MDA also redistributed 
                                                                  
36 Missile Defense Executive Board Report to Congress on Concurrency in Development of Ballistic Missile Defense 
System Capability, July 2013, pp. 3 and 10-11. Posted online at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), September 
27, 2013. The report was directed by page 82 of the House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 112-479 of 
May 11, 2012) on H.R. 4310, the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act. 
37 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 
Management, GAO-13-432, April 2013, pp. 24-25. 
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planned activities from the Aegis Ashore schedule baselines into several other Aegis BMD 
schedule baselines. For example, activities related to software for Aegis Ashore were moved 
from the Aegis Ashore baseline and were split up and added to two other baselines for the 
second generation and modernized Aegis weapon systems software. Rearranging content 
made tracking the progress of these activities against the prior year and original baseline very 
difficult and in some cases impossible. As a result, appendix III contains a limited schedule 
assessment of near-term and long-term progress based on activities we were able to track in 
the BAR.38 
The April 2013 GAO report also stated: 
Developing and deploying new missile defense systems in Europe to aid in defense of 
Europe and the United States is a highly complex effort. We reported last year that several of 
the individual systems that comprise the current U.S. approach to missile defense in 
Europe—called the European Phased Adaptive Approach—have schedules that are highly 
concurrent. Concurrency entails proceeding into product development before technologies 
are mature or into production before a significant amount of independent testing has 
confirmed that the product works as intended. Such schedules can lead to premature 
purchases of systems that impair operational readiness and may result in problems that 
require extensive retrofits, redesigns, and cost increases. A key challenge, therefore, facing 
DOD is managing individual system acquisitions to keep them synchronized with the 
planned time frames of the overall U.S. missile defense capability planned in Europe. MDA 
still needs to deliver some of the capability planned for the first phase of the U.S. missile 
defense in Europe and is grappling with delays to some systems and/or capabilities planned 
in each of the next three major deployments. MDA also is challenged by the need to develop 
the tools, the models and simulations, to understand the capabilities and limitations of the 
individual systems before they are deployed. Because of technical limitations in the current 
approach to modeling missile defense performance, MDA recently chose to undertake a 
major new effort that it expects will overcome these limitations. However, MDA and the 
warfighters will not benefit from this new approach until at least half of the four planned 
phases have deployed.... 
As we reported in December 2010, the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe commits 
MDA to delivering systems and associated capabilities on a schedule that requires 
concurrency among technology, design, testing, and other development activities. We 
reported in April 2012 that deployment dates were a key factor in the elevated levels of 
schedule concurrency for several programs. We also reported at that time that concurrent 
acquisition strategies can affect the operational readiness of our forces and risk delays and 
cost increases. 
DOD declared Phase 1 operational in December 2011, but the systems delivered do not yet 
provide the full capability planned for the phase. MDA deployed, and the warfighter 
accepted, Phase 1 with the delivery of an AN/TPY-2 radar, an Aegis BMD ship with SM-3 
Block IA missiles, an upgrade to C2BMC, and the existing space-based sensors. Given the 
limited time between the September 2009 announcement of the U.S. missile defense in 
Europe and the planned deployment of the first phase in 2011, that first phase was largely 
defined by existing systems that could be quickly deployed. MDA planned to deploy the first 
phase in two stages—the systems described above by December 2011 and upgrades to those 
systems in 2014. Although the agency originally planned to deliver the remaining 
capabilities of the first phase in 2014, an MDA official told us that MDA now considers 
                                                                  
38 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 
Management, GAO-13-432, April 2013, pp. 33-34. 
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these capabilities to be part of the second phase and these capabilities may not be available 
until 2015. 
In addition, independent organizations determined that some of the capabilities that were 
delivered did not work as intended. For example, the Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation reported that there were some interoperability and command and control 
deficiencies. This organization also reported that MDA is currently investigating these 
deficiencies. 
According to MDA documentation, systems and associated capabilities for the next phases 
are facing delays, either in development or in integration and testing. 
• For Phase 2, some capabilities, such as an Aegis weapon system software upgrade, may not 
be available. MDA officials stated they are working to resolve this issue. 
• For Phase 3, some battle management and Aegis capabilities are currently projected to be 
delayed and the initial launch of a planned satellite sensor system—PTSS—is delayed. 
• For [the now-terminated] Phase 4, deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB missile [was] 
delayed from 2020 to 2022, and full operational capability of PTSS [was] delayed to no 
sooner than 2023.39 
The April 2013 GAO report includes an appendix with additional in-depth discussion of 
concurrency and technical risk in the Aegis Ashore program.40 
Legislative Activity for FY2016 
Summary of Action on FY2016 MDA Funding Request 
Table 5 summarizes congressional action on the FY2016 request for MDA procurement and 
research and development funding for the Aegis BMD program. 
                                                                  
39 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 
Management, GAO-13-432, April 2013, pp. 35 and 37-38. 
40 Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense[:] Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition 
Management, GAO-13-432, April 2013, Appendix III on pp. 60-69. 
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Table 5. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2016 Request for MDA 
Procurement and RDT&E Funding for Aegis BMD Program 
(In millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth; totals may not add due to rounding) 
  
Authorization 
Appropriation 
 
Request 
HASC SASC Final 
 HAC  SAC Final 
Procurement 
Aegis BMD (line 24) 
558.9 
679.4 
706.7 
 
657.0 
 
 
Aegis BMD Advance Procurement (line 25) 
147.8 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
 
Aegis Ashore Phase III (line 27) 
30.6 
30.6 
30.6 
 
30.6 
 
 
Subtotal 
Procurement 
737.3 
710.0 
737.3  
687.6   
Research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) 
Aegis BMD (PE 0603892C) (line 82) 
843.4 
870.7 
843.4 
 
822.4 
 
 
Aegis BMD Test (PE 0604878C) (line 108) 
55.1 
55.1 
55.1 
 
45.1 
 
 
Land-based SM-3 (PE0604880C) (line 110) 
35.0 
35.0 
35.0 
 
35.0 
 
 
Aegis SM-3 IIA (PE0604881C) (line 111) 
172.6 
172.6 
172.6 
 
172.6 
 
 
Subtotal 
RDT&E 
1,106.1 
1,133.4 
1,106.1  
1,075.1   
TOTAL  
1,843.4 
1,843.4 
1,843.4 
 
1,762.7 
 
 
Source: Table prepared by CRS. For request: FY2016 budget-justification books for MDA for Research, 
Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide (Volume 2a) and for Procurement, Defense-Wide (Volume 2b). 
For HASC: H.Rept. 114-102, p. 442 (procurement) and pp. 481 and 482 (RDT&E). For SASC: S.Rept. 114-49, 
p. 383 (procurement), and pp. 423 and 424 (RDT&E). For HAC: H.Rept. 114-139, p. 202, lines 24 and 25 and 
page 199, line 27 (procurement), and p. 266, line 82, p. 267, line 108, and p. 261, lines 110 and 111 (research and 
development). 
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is 
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference.  
FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1735/S. 1376) 
House 
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 114-102 of May 5, 2015) on H.R. 
1735, recommended the funding amounts shown in Table 5. 
H.Rept. 114-102 states: 
Procurement of Standard Missile-3 block IB interceptors 
The budget request included $548.9 million for procurement of Standard Missile-3, block IB 
interceptors (including canisters and advanced procurement funding). 
The committee is aware of the significant demand amongst the combatant commanders for 
inventory of the Standard Missile-3 block IB missile interceptor. The committee is also 
aware that because of recent flight and ground test challenges, the Department of Defense 
has decided to focus on continuing initial lot procurement of block IB missiles in fiscal year 
2016 and focusing on multiyear procurement, advanced procurement, and full rate 
production in subsequent years.  
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The committee has concerns about continuing procurement of block IB interceptors before 
resolution of the current technical uncertainties, though the committee notes that the planned 
flight tests of the block IB missile to prove out the technical fix will occur before any 
missiles procured in fiscal year 2016 would actually be delivered to the Missile Defense 
Agency. The committee has also been assured that the Missile Defense Agency will not take 
delivery of fiscal year 2015 procurement block IB interceptors until the fix has been proved 
out by flight test. 
The committee is also troubled that the technical challenges in the block IB program are 
leading to a higher price per unit for missiles the combatant commanders need. The 
committee expects the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to negotiate for the lowest 
possible per unit price, and to ensure all appropriate contractual remedies are used to offset 
the costs of these challenges. 
The committee recommends $521.6 million, a decrease of $27.3 million, for procurement of 
Standard Missile-3, block IB interceptors (including canisters). The committee notes that 
elsewhere in this Act, additional funding is recommended for Aegis BMD testing related to 
the block IB proof of concept. (Pages 45-46) 
Section 1024 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states: 
SEC. 1024. Limitation on the use of funds for removal of ballistic missile defense 
capabilities from Ticonderoga class cruisers. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for 
the Department of Defense may be used to remove ballistic missile defense capabilities from 
any of the 5 Ticonderoga class cruisers equipped with such capabilities until the Secretary of 
the Navy certifies to the congressional defense committees that the Navy has— 
(1) obtained the ballistic missile capabilities required by the most recent Navy Force 
Structure Assessment; or 
(2) determined to upgrade such cruisers with an equal or improved ballistic missile defense 
capability. 
Section 1668 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states: 
SEC. 1668. Missile defense capability in Europe. 
(a) Aegis Ashore sites.— 
(1) POLAND.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall 
ensure that the Aegis Ashore site to be deployed in the Republic of Poland has anti-air 
warfare capability upon such site achieving full operating capability. 
(2) ROMANIA.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 
shall develop and implement a plan to provide anti-air warfare capability to the Aegis Ashore 
site deployed in the Republic of Romania by not later than December 31, 2018. 
(3) EVALUATION OF CERTAIN MISSILES.—The Secretary shall evaluate the feasibility, 
benefit, and cost of using the evolved sea sparrow missile or the standard missile 2 in 
providing the anti-air warfare capability described in paragraphs (1) and (2). 
(b) Capabilities in European Command area of responsibility.— 
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(1) ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that a terminal high altitude area 
defense battery is available for rotational deployment to the area of responsibility of the 
United States European Command unless the Secretary notifies the congressional defense 
committees that such battery is needed in the area of responsibility of another combatant 
command. 
(2) PRE-POSITIONING SITES.—The Secretary of Defense shall examine potential sites in 
the area of responsibility of the United States European Command to pre-position a terminal 
high altitude area defense battery. 
(3) STUDIES.— 
(A) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
conduct studies to evaluate— 
(i) not fewer than three sites in the area of responsibility of the United States European 
Command for the deployment of a terminal high altitude area defense battery in the event 
that the deployment of such a battery is determined to be necessary; and 
(ii) not fewer than three sites in such area for the deployment of a Patriot air and missile 
defense battery in the event that such a deployment is determined to be necessary. 
(B) In evaluating sites under clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall 
determine which sites are best for defending— 
(i) the Armed Forces of the United States; and 
(ii) the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
(4) AGREEMENTS.—If the Secretary of Defense determines that a deployment described in 
clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (3)(A) is necessary and the appropriate host nation requests 
such a deployment, the President shall seek to enter into the necessary agreements with the 
host nation to carry out such deployment. 
Section 1676 of H.R. 1735 as reported by the committee states: 
SEC. 1676. Aegis Ashore capability development. 
(a) Evaluation.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with the 
Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, shall evaluate the role, 
feasibility, cost, and cost benefit of additional Aegis Ashore sites and upgrades to current 
ballistic missile defense system sensors to offset capacity demands on current Aegis ships, 
Aegis Ashore sites, and Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense capability and to 
meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. 
(2) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall— 
(A) review the evaluation conducted under paragraph (1); and 
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(B) submit to the congressional defense committees such evaluation and the results of such 
review. 
(b) Identification of FMS obstacles.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of State 
shall jointly identify any obstacles to foreign military sales of Aegis Ashore or co-financing 
of additional Aegis Ashore sites. Such evaluation shall include, with appropriate 
coordination with other agencies and departments of the Federal Government as appropriate, 
the feasibility of host nation manning or dual manning with the United States and such host 
nation. 
(2) SUBMISSION.— 
(A) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary 
shall provide to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an 
interim briefing on the identification of obstacles under paragraph (1). 
(B) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary 
shall submit to such committees a report on such identification. 
(c) Negotiations.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall seek to enter into host nation agreements for Aegis 
Ashore sites and co-financing and co-development opportunities as appropriate if the sites 
meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. 
(2) SUBMISSION.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
President shall transmit to the congressional defense, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the 
status of efforts to seek to enter into agreements described in paragraph (1). 
Senate 
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 114-49 of May 19, 2015) on S. 
1376, recommended the funding amounts shown in Table 5. 
S.Rept. 114-49 states: 
Standard Missile-3 block IB 
The budget request included $147.8 million in Procurement, Defense-wide, line 25, for the 
Missile Defense Agency for advanced procurement of the Standard Missile-3 IB (SM–3 IB) 
missile. The committee is concerned that this funding, in support of multi-year procurement, 
is early to need. The committee recommends a decrease of $147.8 million in Procurement, 
Defense-wide, line 25, for the Standard Missile-3 IB missile program. The committee 
recommends an increase of $147.8 million in Procurement, Defensewide, line 24, for the 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program distributed as follows: $117.9 million to increase 
SM–3 IB quantities from 40 to 49 missiles; $2.6 million to increase SM–3 IB canisters from 
41 to 50; and $27.3 million for missile test participation costs. (Page 282) 
Section 1643 of S. 1376 as reported by the committee states: 
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SEC. 1643. Air defense capability at North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile defense 
sites. 
(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the relevant combatant command, should ensure that arrangements are in 
place, including support from other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), to provide anti-air defense capability at all missile defense sites of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of phases 2 and 3 of the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach. 
(b) Reports.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report describing— 
(1) the plan to provide anti-air defense capability as described in subsection (a); and 
(2) the contributions being made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and members of 
such organization to support the provision of the capability described in such subsection. 
FY2016 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2685) 
House 
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 114-139 of June 5, 2015) on H.R. 
2685, recommended the funding amounts shown in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Appendix A. Aegis BMD Flight Tests 
Summary of Test Flights 
Table A-1 presents a DOD summary of Aegis BMD flight tests since January 2002. As shown in 
the table, DOD states that since January 2002, the Aegis BMD system has achieved 26 successful 
exo-atmospheric intercepts in 32 attempts using the SM-3 missile (including 3 successful 
intercepts in 4 attempts by Japanese Aegis ships), and 3 successful endo-atmospheric intercepts in 
3 attempts using the SM-2 Block IV missile, making for a combined total of 29 successful 
intercepts in 35 attempts. 
In addition, on February 20, 2008, a BMD-capable Aegis cruiser operating northwest of Hawaii 
used a modified version of the Aegis BMD system to shoot down an inoperable U.S. surveillance 
satellite that was in a deteriorating orbit—an operation called Burnt Frost. Including this intercept 
in the count increases the totals to 27 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 33 attempts using 
the SM-3 missile, and 30 successful exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in 36 attempts using 
both SM-3 and SM-2 Block IV missiles. 
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Table A-1. Aegis BMD Flight Tests Since January 2002 
Name of  
Cumulative   Cumulative 
Date 
Country 
flight test 
Target 
Successful? 
successes 
attempts 
Exo-atmospheric (using SM-3 missile) 
1/25/02 
US 
FM-2 
Unitary TTV short-range target 
Yes 
1 
1 
6/13/02 
US 
FM-3 
Unitary TTV short-range target 
Yes 
2 
2 
11/21/02 
US 
FM-4 
Unitary TTV short-range target 
Yes 
3 
3 
6/18/03 
US 
FM-5 
Unitary TTV short-range target 
No 
3 
4 
12/11/03 
US 
FM-6 
Unitary TTV medium-range target 
Yes 
4 
5 
2/24/05 
US 
FTM 04-1 (FM-7) 
Unitary TTV short-range target 
Yes 
5 
6 
11/17/05 
US 
FTM 04-2 (FM-8) 
Separating medium-range target 
Yes 
6 
7 
6/22/06 
US 
FTM 10 
Separating medium-range target 
Yes 
7 
8 
12/7/06 
US 
FTM 11 
Unitary TTV short-range target 
No 
7 
9 
4/26/07 
US 
FTM 11 Event 4 
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target 
Yes 
8 
10 
6/22/07 
US 
FTM 12 
Separating medium-range target 
Yes 
9 
11 
8/31/07 
US 
FTM-11a 
Classified 
Yes 
10 
12 
11/6/07 
US 
FTM 13 
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target 
Yes 
11 
13 
 
 
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target 
Yes 
12 
14 
12/17/07 
Japan 
JFTM-1 
Separating medium-range target 
Yes 
13 
15 
11/1/08 
US 
Pacific Blitz 
Short-range target 
Yes 
14 
16 
 
 
Short-range target 
No 
14 
17 
11/19/08 
Japan 
JFTM-2 
Separating medium-range target 
No 
14 
18 
7/30/09 
US 
FTM-17 
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target 
Yes 
15 
19 
10/27/09 
Japan 
JFTM-3 
Separating medium-range target 
Yes 
16 
20 
10/28/10 
Japan 
JFTM-4 
Separating medium-range target 
Yes 
17 
21 
4/14/11 
US 
FTM-15 
LV-2 intermediate range target 
Yes 
18 
22 
9/1/11 
US 
FTM-16 
Short-range target 
No 
18 
23 
5/9/12 
US 
FTM-16 E2a 
Unitary ARAV-A short-range target 
Yes 
19 
24 
6/26/12 
US 
FTM-18 
Separating medium-range target 
Yes 
20 
25 
10/25/12 
US 
FTI-01 
Short-range target 
No 
20 
26 
2/12/13 
US 
FTM-20 
Unitary medium-range target 
Yes 
21 
27 
5/15/13 
US 
FTM-19 
Separating short-range target 
Yes 
22 
28 
9/10/13 
US 
FTO-01 
Medium-range target 
Yes 
23 
29 
9/18/13 
US 
FTM-21 
Complex separating short-range target 
Yes 
24 
30 
10/3/13 
US 
FTM-22 
Medium-range target 
Yes 
25 
31 
11/6/14 
US 
FTM-25 
Short-range target 
Yes 
26 
32 
Endo-atmospheric (using SM-2 missile) 
5/24/06 
US 
Pacific Pheonix 
Unitary short-range target 
Yes 
1 
1 
6/5/08 
US 
FTM-14 
Unitary short-range target 
Yes 
2 
2 
3/26/09 
US 
Stellar Daggers 
Short-range target 
Yes 
3 
3 
Combined total for exo- and endo-atmospheric above tests 
29 
35 
Source: Table adapted from table presented in MDA fact sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Testing,” 
accessed on May 17, 2013, at http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis_tests.pdf. 
Notes: TTV is target test vehicle; ARAV is Aegis Readiness Assessment Vehicle. In addition to the flight tests 
shown above, there was a successful use of an SM-3 on February 20, 2008, to intercept an inoperative U.S. 
satellite—an operation called Burnt Frost. Including this intercept in the count increases the totals to 27 
successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 33 attempts using the SM-3 missile, and 30 successful exo- and endo-
atmospheric intercepts in 36 attempts using both SM-3 and SM-2 Block IV missiles. 
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May 2010 Criticism of Claimed Successes in Flight Tests 
In a May 2010 magazine article and supplementary white paper, two professors with scientific 
backgrounds—George Lewis and Theodore Postol—criticized DOD claims of successes in Aegis 
(and other DOD) BMD flight tests, arguing that 
the Defense Department’s own test data show that, in combat, the vast majority of 
“successful” SM-3 experiments would have failed to destroy attacking warheads. The data 
also show potential adversaries how to defeat both the SM-3 and the GMD [ground-based 
missile defense] systems, which share the same serious flaws that can be readily exploited by 
adversaries.41 
The criticisms made by Lewis and Postol were reported in a May 18, 2010, New York Times 
article.42 In response to the criticisms and the New York Times article, MDA issued a press release 
and other information defending the flight tests and arguing that the criticisms are based on 
inaccurate or incomplete information.43 
Details on Selected Exo-Atmospheric (SM-3) Flight Tests 
Since June 2006 
June 22, 2006, Test. This was the first test to use the 3.6 version of the Aegis BMD system.44 
December 7, 2006, Test. This was the first unsuccessful flight test since June 2003. MDA stated 
that the ninth test 
was not completed due to an incorrect system setting aboard the Aegis-class cruiser USS 
Lake Erie prior to the launch of two interceptor missiles from the ship. The incorrect 
configuration prevented the fire control system aboard the ship from launching the first of 
the two interceptor missiles. Since a primary test objective was a near-simultaneous launch 
of two missiles against two different targets, the second interceptor missile was intentionally 
not launched. 
The planned test was to involve the launch of a Standard Missile 3 against a ballistic missile 
target and a Standard Missile 2 against a surrogate aircraft target. The ballistic missile target 
was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii and the aircraft target 
was launched from a Navy aircraft. The USS Lake Erie (CG 70), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and 
                                                                  
41 George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” Arms Control 
Today, May 2010: 24-32. The quoted passage appears on p. 26. The associated white paper is George N. Lewis and 
Theodore A. Postol, A Technically Detailed Description of Flaws in the SM-3 and GMD Missile Defense Systems 
Revealed by the Defense Department’s Ballistic Missile Test Data, May 3, 2010, 13 pp. 
42 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Review Cites Flaws In U.S. Antimissile Program,” New York Times, May 
18, 2010: 1. 
43 Missile Defense Agency news release entitled “Missile Defense Agency Responds to New York Times Article,” 10-
News-0005, May 18, 2010; Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense Agency Response to Request for Information, 
Standard Missile – 3 Interceptor Testing, May 18, 2010, 2 pp.; Missile Defense Agency, Missile Defense Agency 
Response to Request for Information, Response to New York Times May 18, 2010, Article Regarding SM-3 Testing, 
May 18, 2010, 3 pp.; Richard Lehner, “Missile Defense Agerncy Responds to New York Times Article,” DOD Live 
(http://www.dodlive.mil), May 18, 2010; Transcript of Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable With Richard 
Lehner, Spokesman, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Subject: Standard Missile 3 Test Program, May 18, 2010. 
44 Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Test Results in Successful ‘Hit To Kill’ Intercept,” June 22, 2006 (06-
NEWS-0018). 
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the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate TROMP were all successful in detecting and tracking 
their respective targets. Both targets fell into the ocean as planned. 
After a thorough review, the Missile Defense Agency and the U.S. Navy will determine a 
new test date.45 
A news article about the ninth test stated: 
“You can say it’s seven of nine, rather than eight of nine,” Missile Defense Agency 
spokesman Chris Taylor said of the second failure in tests of the system by the agency and 
the Navy.... 
The drill was planned to demonstrate the Navy’s ability to knock down two incoming 
missiles at once from the same ship. 
“In a real world situation it is possible, maybe even probable, that in addition to engaging a 
ballistic missile threat that was launched, you may be engaging a surface action,” said Joe 
Rappisi before the test. He is director for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system at 
Lockheed Martin, the primary contractor for the program. 
The test would have marked the first time a ship has shot down one target in space and 
another target in the air at the same time. 
The test presented a greater challenge to the ship’s crew and the ballistic missile defense 
system than previous tests, Rappisi said. The multiple target scenario is also closer to what 
sailors might actually face in battle. 
The U.S. Pacific Fleet has been gradually installing missile surveillance and tracking 
technology on many of its destroyers and cruisers amid concerns about North Korea’s long-
range missile program. 
It is also installing interceptor missiles on many of its ships, even as the technology to track 
and shoot down incoming missiles is being developed and perfected. 
The Royal Netherlands Navy joined the tracking and monitoring off Kauai to see how its 
equipment works. The Dutch presence marked the first time a European ally has sent one of 
its vessels to participate in a U.S. ballistic missile defense test.46 
A subsequent news article stated: 
the test abort of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system Dec. 7 resulted from human 
error, [MDA Director USAF Lt. Gen. Henry] Obering says.... Both the ballistic missile and 
aircraft targets launched as planned, but the first interceptor failed to fire because an operator 
had selected an incorrect setting for the test. Officials then aborted before the second could 
boost. 
Aegis missile defense system tests are at a standstill until officials are able to identify an 
appropriate ballistic missile target. The one used Dec. 7 was the last of its kind, Obering 
says, leaving them empty handed in the near future.47 
                                                                  
45 Untitled Missile Defense Agency “For Your Information” statement dated December 7, 2006 (06-FYI-0090). 
46 David Briscoe, “Test Interceptor Missile Fails To Launch,” NavyTimes.com, December 8, 2006. 
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Another article stated: 
Philip Coyle, a former head of the Pentagon’s testing directorate, gives the Navy credit for 
“discipline and successes so far” in its sea-based ballistic missile defense testing program. 
Coyle is now a senior adviser at the Center for Defense Information. 
“The U.S. Navy has an enviable track record of successful flight intercept tests, and is 
making the most of its current, limited Aegis missile defense capabilities in these tests,” 
Coyle told [Inside the Navy] Dec. 7. 
“Difficulties such as those that delayed the latest flight intercept attempt illustrate the 
complexity of the system, and how everything must be carefully orchestrated to achieve 
success,” Coyle added. “Nevertheless, this particular setback won’t take the Navy long to 
correct.”48 
April 26, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test: 
involved the simultaneous engagements of a ballistic missile “unitary” target (meaning that 
the target warhead and booster remain attached) and a surrogate hostile air target.... 
The test demonstrated the [Aegis ship’s] ability to engage a ballistic missile threat and 
defend itself from attack at the same time. The test also demonstrated the effectiveness of 
engineering, manufacturing, and mission assurance changes in the solid divert and attitude 
control system (SDACS) in the kinetic kill weapon. This was the first flight test of all the 
SM-3 Block IA’s upgrades, previously demonstrated in ground tests.49 
A press report on the test stated that the hostile air target was an anti-ship cruise missile. The 
article stated that the scenario for the test 
called for the [Aegis ship] to come under attack from a cruise missile fired by an enemy 
plane.... A Navy plane fired the cruise missile target used in the test.50 
June 22, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test 
was the third intercept involving a separating target and the first time an Aegis BMD-
equipped destroyer was used to launch the interceptor missile. The USS Decatur (DDG 73), 
using the operationally-certified Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Weapon System (BMD 3.6) 
and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA missile successfully intercepted the target 
during its midcourse phase of flight.... 
An Aegis cruiser, USS Port Royal (CG 73), a Spanish frigate, MÉNDEZ NÚÑEZ (F-104), 
and MDA’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) mobile ground-based radar 
also participated in the flight test. USS Port Royal used the flight test to support development 
                                                                  
(...continued) 
47 Amy Butler, “GMD Trial Delayed Until Spring; Aegis Failure Human Error,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 
December 19, 2006. 
48 Zachary M. Peterson, “Sea-Based Missile Defense Test Fails Due To ‘Incorrect Configuration,’” Inside the Navy, 
December 11, 2006. 
49 Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept,” April 26, 2007 (07-NEWS-
0032). 
50 Audrey McAvoy, “Aegis Missile Test Successful,” NavyTimes.com, April 27, 2007. 
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of the new Aegis BMD SPY-1B radar signal processor, collecting performance data on its 
increased target detection and discrimination capabilities. MÉNDEZ NÚÑEZ, stationed off 
Kauai, performed long-range surveillance and track operations as a training event to assess 
the future capabilities of the F-100 Class. The THAAD radar tracked the target and 
exchanged tracking data with the Aegis BMD cruiser. 
This event marked the third time that an allied military unit participated in a U.S. Aegis 
BMD test, with warships from Japan and the Netherlands participating in earlier tests.51 
August 31, 2007, Test. MDA has publicly noted the occurrence of this test and the fact that it 
resulted in a successful intercept,52 but states that the details about the test are classified.53 MDA 
does not appear to have issued a news release about this flight test following the completion of 
the test, as it has for other Aegis BMD flight tests.54 
November 6, 2007, Test. MDA states that this test involved: 
a multiple simultaneous engagement involving two ballistic missile targets.... For the first 
time, the operationally realistic test involved two unitary “non-separating” targets, meaning 
that the target’s warheads did not separate from their booster rockets.... 
At approximately 6:12 p.m. Hawaii Standard Time (11:12 p.m. EST), a target was launched 
from the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Moments 
later, a second, identical target was launched from the PMRF. The USS Lake Erie’s Aegis 
BMD Weapon System detected and tracked the targets and developed fire control solutions. 
Approximately two minutes later, the USS Lake Erie’s crew fired two SM-3 missiles, and 
two minutes later they successfully intercepted the targets outside the earth’s atmosphere 
more than 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean and 250 miles northwest of Kauai.... 
A Japanese destroyer also participated in the flight test. Stationed off Kauai and equipped 
with the certified 3.6 Aegis BMD weapon system, the guided missile destroyer JS Kongo 
performed long-range surveillance and tracking exercises. The Kongo used the test as a 
training exercise in preparation for the first ballistic missile intercept test by a Japanese ship 
planned for later this year. This event marked the fourth time an allied military unit 
participated in a U.S. Aegis BMDS test.55 
                                                                  
51 Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense ‘Hit to Kill’ Intercept Achieved,” June 22, 2007 (07-NEWS-
0037). 
52 See for example, slide 8 in the 20-slide briefing entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense Program Overview For The 
Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series,” dated June 20, 2008, presented by Lieutenant General Trey Obering, USAF, 
Director, Missile Defense Agency. Source for briefing: InsideDefense.com (subscription required). Each slide in the 
briefing includes a note indicating that it was approved by MDA for public release on June 13, 2008. Slide 8 lists Aegis 
BMD midcourse flight tests conducted since September 2005, including a test on August 31, 2007. The slide indicates 
with a check mark that the flight test was successful. A success in this test is also needed to for the total number of 
successful intercepts to match the reported figure. 
53 An email from MDA to CRS dated June 30, 2008, states that the flight test “was a hit to kill intercept test but details 
about the test are classified.” 
54 MDA’s website, when accessed on June 30, 2008, did not show a news release issued on of soon after August 31, 
2007, that discusses this test. 
55 Missile Defense Agency, “Sea-Based Missile Defense “Hit to Kill” Intercept Achieved,” November 6, 2007 (07-
NEWS-0051). 
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December 17, 2007, Test. In this flight test, a BMD-capable Japanese Aegis destroyer used an 
SM-3 Block IA missile to successfully intercept a ballistic missile target in a flight test off the 
coast of Hawaii. It was the first time that a non-U.S. ship had intercepted a ballistic missile using 
the Aegis BMD system.56 
November 1, 2008, Test. This flight test was reportedly the first U.S. Navy Aegis BMD flight test 
conducted by the Navy, without oversight by MDA. The test involved two Aegis ships, each 
attempting to intercept a ballistic missile. The SM-3 fired by the first Aegis ship successfully 
intercepted its target, but the SM-3 fired by the second Aegis ship did not intercept its target. A 
press release from the U.S. Third Fleet (the Navy’s fleet for the Eastern Pacific) states that 
Vice Adm. Samuel J. Locklear, Commander, U.S. Third Fleet announced today the 
successful Navy intercept of a ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean during Fleet 
Exercise Pacific Blitz. This was the first Fleet operational firing to employ the Standard 
Missile-3 (SM-3) against a ballistic missile target. Command and control of this mission 
resided with Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, based in San Diego, Calif. 
Pearl Harbor-based Aegis destroyers, USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) and USS Hopper (DDG 
70), which have been upgraded to engage ballistic missiles, fired SM-3 missiles at separate 
targets. During this event, a short-range ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific 
Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. Upon detecting and tracking 
the target, USS Paul Hamilton, launched a SM-3 missile, resulting in a direct-hit intercept. 
Following USS Paul Hamilton’s engagement, PMRF launched another target. USS Hopper 
successfully detected, tracked and engaged the target. The SM-3 followed a nominal 
trajectory, however intercept was not achieved. Extensive analysis of the flight mission will 
be used to improve the deployed Aegis BMD system.57 
November 19, 2008, Test. This was the second Japanese flight test, and involved a single ballistic 
missile target. The test did not result in a successful intercept. MDA states that 
Rear Admiral Tomohisa Takei, Director General of Operations and Plans, for the Japanese 
Maritime Staff Office (MSO), Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and Lt. General 
Henry “Trey” Obering, United States Missile Defense Agency director, announced the 
completion today of a cooperative sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense intercept flight 
test off the coast of Kauai in Hawaii. The event, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 2 
(JFTM-2), marked the second attempt by an Allied naval ship to intercept a ballistic missile 
target with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense. Target performance, interceptor missile launch and flyout, and operation of 
the Aegis Weapon System by the crew were successful, but an intercept was not achieved. 
The JFTM-2 was a test of the newest engagement capability of the Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS CHOKAI (DDG-
176). At approximately 4:21 pm (HST), 11:21 am (Tokyo time) a ballistic missile target was 
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. JS 
CHOKAI crew members detected and tracked the target using an advanced on-board radar. 
                                                                  
56 John Liang, “Japanese Destroyer Shoots Down Ballistic Missile Test Target,” Inside Missile Defense, December 19, 
2007; “Japanese Aegis Destroyer Wins Test By Killing Target Missile With SM-3 Interceptor,” Defense Daily, 
December 18, 2007; Reuters, “Japanese Ship Downs Missile In Pacific Test,” New York Times, December 18, 2007: 8; 
Audrey McAvoy, “Japan Intercepts Missile In Test Off Hawaii,” NavyTimes.com, December 17, 2007. 
57 Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, Public Affairs Office, press release 23-08, dated November 1, 2008, entitled “Navy 
Intercepts Ballistic Missile Target in Fleet Exercise Pacific Blitz.” See also Dave Ahearn, “One of Two Missiles Hit In 
Aegis Test; Navy For First Time Runs Test Instead of MDA,” Defense Daily, November 4, 2008: 1-2. 
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The Aegis Weapon System then developed a fire control solution, and at approximately 4:24 
pm (HST), 11:24 am (Tokyo time) on Nov 20, a single Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block IA 
was launched. Approximately two minutes later, the SM-3 failed to intercept the target. 
There is no immediate explanation for the failed intercept attempt. More information will be 
available after a thorough investigation. The JS CHOKAI crew performance was excellent in 
executing the mission. JFTM-2 was the second time that a Japanese ship was designated to 
launch the interceptor missile, a major milestone in the growing cooperation between Japan 
and the U.S.58 
A November 21, 2008, press report states that 
An Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) test by the Japanese destroyer Chokai (DDG-176) 
ended in failure when the Standard Missile-3 Block 1A interceptor lost track of the target 
missile in the final seconds before a planned hit-to-kill. 
The Chokai and its crew performed well throughout the test, and the SM-3 also performed 
flawlessly through its first three stages, according to Rear Adm. Brad Hicks, the U.S. Navy 
Aegis ballistic missile defense program director. He spoke with several reporters in a 
teleconference around midnight ET Wednesday-Thursday, after the test in the area of the 
Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. 
This was the second Aegis BMD test failure in less than a month. 
These latest two failures come as some Democrats in Congress are poised to cut spending on 
missile defense programs when they convene next year to consider the Missile Defense 
Agency budget for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2010.... 
Still, in the coming money debates next year, missile defense advocates will be able to point 
out that even including the Hopper and Chokai failures, the record for the Aegis tests is an 
overwhelming 16 successful hits demolishing target missiles out of 20 attempts. 
Those successes included the first Japanese attempt. The Japanese destroyer Kongo (DDG-
173) successfully used its SM-3 interceptor to kill a target missile. The difference in tests is 
that the Kongo crew was advised beforehand when the target missile would be launched, 
while the Chokai crew wasn’t.... 
[Hicks] said a board will be convened to examine why the latest test failed. Hicks declined to 
speculate on why the SM-3 interceptor missed the target. “I’m confident we’ll find out the 
root cause” of the Chokai interceptor failure to score a hit, he said. 
However, he was asked by Space & Missile Defense Report whether the prior SM-3 
successes make it unlikely the Chokai failure stems from some basic design flaw in all SM-
3s, and whether it is more likely that the Chokai SM-3 failed because of some flaw or glitch 
in just that one interceptor. 
Hicks said that is likely. 
“Obviously, we believe this is hopefully related to this one interceptor,” and doesn’t reflect 
any basic design flaw in the SM-3 interceptors, he said. 
                                                                  
58 Missile Defense Agency press release 08-News-0087, dated November 19, 2008, entitled “Japan/U.S. Missile 
Defense Flight Test Completed.” 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
The Chokai test failure cost Japan a $55 million loss, he said, adding, “It wasn’t cheap.”... 
In the Chokai test, the target missile was launched from Barking Sands, and about three 
minutes later the Chokai crew had spotted the target, the Aegis system had developed a 
tracking and hit solution, and the SM-3 interceptor was launched. 
The first, second and third stages of the interceptor performed nominally, without problems, 
but then came the fourth stage. The nosecone components opened to expose the kill vehicle 
area, and somehow the program to track the target missile failed. 
“It lost track,” Hicks said, only seconds before the hit would have been achieved. 
If the kill had occurred, it would have been about 100 nautical miles (roughly 115 statute 
miles) above Earth, and some 250 miles away from Barking Sands, Hicks said. 
It took the interceptor about two minutes flight time to reach the near miss with the target 
missile. 
Meanwhile, the Hamilton was nearby watching the test. The Hamilton Aegis system 
successfully spotted and tracked the target, and developed a simulated solution and simulated 
interceptor launch that, if it had been real, would have resulted in a successful hit on the 
target, Hicks said. The Hamilton didn’t cue the Chokai, however. “It was strictly Chokai’s 
engagement,” Hicks said.59 
July 30, 2009, Test. MDA states that 
In conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Pacific Fleet ships and crews 
successfully conducted the latest Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) at-sea firing event 
on July 30. During this event, entitled Stellar Avenger, the Aegis BMD-equipped ship, USS 
Hopper (DDG 70), detected, tracked, fired and guided a Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block 
(Blk) IA to intercept a sub-scale short range ballistic missile. The target was launched from 
the Kauai Test Facility, co-located on the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Barking 
Sands, Kauai. It was the 19th successful intercept in 23 at-sea firings, for the Aegis BMD 
Program, including the February 2008 destruction of the malfunctioning satellite above the 
earth’s atmosphere. Stellar Avenger was part of the continual evaluation of the certified and 
fielded Aegis BMD system at-sea today. 
At approximately 5:40 pm (HST), 11:40 pm (EDT), a target was launched from PMRF. 
Three U.S. Navy Aegis BMD-equipped ships, the cruiser, USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and 
destroyers USS Hopper (DDG 70) and USS O'Kane (DDG 77) detected and tracked the 
target with their SPY radars. Each developed fire control solutions. At 5:42 pm (HST), 11:42 
pm (EDT) the crew of USS Hopper fired one SM-3 Blk IA missile. The USS Hopper’s Aegis 
BMD Weapon System successfully guided the SM-3 to a direct body to body hit, 
approximately two minutes after leaving the ship. The intercept occurred about 100 miles 
above the Pacific Ocean. USS O'Kane conducted a simulated engagement of the target. USS 
Lake Erie, with its recently installed upgraded Aegis BMD 4.0.1 Weapons System, detected 
and tracked the same target.60 
                                                                  
59 Dave Ahearn, “Japanese Aegis Missile Defense Test Fails, But Aegis Record Is 16 Hits In 20 Tries,” Defense Daily, 
November 21, 2008: 5-6. 
60 Missile Defense Agency press release 09-News-0015, dated July 31, 2009, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
Test Successful.” 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
A July 31, 2009, press report states: 
The test was the first Aegis BMD exercise to feature two versions of the software in a single 
event, according to Lisa Callahan, Lockheed’s vice president for ballistic missile defense 
programs. 
A goal of the exercises was to test the Aegis system’s ability to discern all the different parts 
and pieces of a ballistic missile, Nick Bucci, Lockheed’s director for Aegis BMD 
development programs, told reporters July 29 during a pre-exercise conference call. 
Three more flight tests this fall will further test the system’s discrimination capabilities, 
Bucci added, with each test becoming more complex. The last test will “be against a pretty 
darn complex target,” he said. 
The July 30 tests also validated fixes put in place after a BMD test last November involving 
a missile launched from the Aegis BMD Japanese destroyer Chokai failed to intercept its 
target, according to MDA spokesman Chris Taylor. The improvements—which were 
successful in the most recent test—involved fixes to the Solid Divert Attitude Control 
System. 
The Chokai is the second of four Japanese Aegis ships being upgraded with BMD capability. 
A third ship, the Myoko, is scheduled to carry out a BMD test this fall.61 
An August 3, 2009, press report states: 
This test was added to the schedule to evaluate changes made after last year’s failed attempt 
to intercept a target with an SM-3 Block IA launched by a Japanese Aegis-equipped ship .... 
After the Nov. 19 test, MDA officials said, “Target performance, interceptor missile launch 
and flyout, and operation of the Aegis Weapon System by the crew were successful, but an 
intercept was not achieved.” 
A root cause has not been identified, and an MDA spokesman did not say whether fixes have 
been made to hardware or operational procedures resulting from the failure review. It is also 
unclear why a subscale target was used in the July 30 trial.62 
An August 4, 2009, press report states: 
[Rear Admiral Alan “Brad” Hicks, Aegis/SM-3 program manager for MDA], said that a 
November [2008] failure of an SM-3 Block IA... during a flight-test was attributable to poor 
adherence to processes on Raytheon’s assembly line in Tucson, Ariz. 
This was isolated to that missile, and it was the result of perturbations to the build process 
encountered when shifting from development to production operations. 
During the November test, a Japanese Aegis-equipped ship fired the interceptor and it flew 
“perfectly,” Hicks said. In the endgame, a failure of the divert and attitude control system on 
the unitary kill vehicle led to a miss. 
The July 30 demonstration using a U.S. ship “restored confidence” for the Japanese that the 
miss last fall was an isolated incident, he says.63 
                                                                  
61 Christopher P. Cavas, “Aegis BMD Test Successful,” DefenseNews.com, July 31, 2009. 
62 Amy Butler, “SM-3 Scores Hit After Fixes Implemented,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 3, 2009: 5.  
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
October 27, 2009, Test. This was the third Japanese flight test, and it involved a single ballistic 
missile target. MDA states that 
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the United States Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) announced the successful completion of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) intercept flight test, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, off the coast of Kauai in 
Hawaii. The event, designated Japan Flight Test Mission 3 (JFTM-3), marked the third time 
that a JMSDF ship has successfully engaged a ballistic missile target, including two 
successful intercepts, with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by 
Aegis BMD.  
The JFTM-3 test event verified the newest engagement capability of the Japan Aegis BMD 
configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS MYOKO (DDG-175). At 
approximately 6:00pm (HST), 1:00 pm Tokyo time on Oct 28, a separating, medium-range 
ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, 
Kauai, Hawaii. JS MYOKO crew members detected and tracked the target. The Aegis 
Weapon System then developed a fire control solution and, at approximately 6:04pm (HST), 
1:04 pm Tokyo time a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA interceptor missile was 
launched. Approximately 3 minutes later, the SM-3 successfully intercepted the target 
approximately 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. JFTM-3 is a significant milestone in the 
growing cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the area of missile defense. 
Also participating in the test, were the Pearl Harbor-based USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and USS 
Paul Hamilton (DDG 60) which detected and tracked the target and conducted a simulated 
engagement.64 
October 28, 2010, Test. This was the fourth Japanese flight test, and it involved a single ballistic 
missile target. MDA states that 
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the United States Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) announced the successful completion of an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) intercept flight test, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, off the coast of Kauai in 
Hawaii.  
The event marked the fourth time that a JMSDF ship has engaged a ballistic missile target, 
including three successful intercepts, with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability 
provided by Aegis BMD. 
The JFTM-4 test event verified the newest engagement capability of the Japan Aegis BMD 
configuration of the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS KIRISHIMA. At 
approximately 5:06 p.m. (HST), 12:06 p.m. Tokyo time on Oct. 29, 2010, a separating 1,000 
km class ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at 
Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii.  
                                                                  
(...continued) 
63 Amy Butler, “SM-3 Upgrade Program Cost Increases,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 4, 2009: 1-2. See 
also Dan Taylor, “Navy Conducts Aegis BMD Test, New Baseline System Participates,” Inside the Navy, August 3, 
2009; Daniel Wasserbly, “US Aegis BMD System Achieves Trial Success,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 5, 2009: 8. 
64 Missile Defense Agency press release 09-News-0021, dated October 28, 2009, entitled “Japan/U.S. Missile Defense 
Flight Test Successful.” See also Christopher P. Cavas, “Japanese Destroyer Conducts Successful BMD Test,” 
NavyTimes.com, October 28, 2009; and Amy Butler and Michael Bruno, “SM-3 Scores Hit In Japanese Test,” 
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,” October 29, 2009: 3. 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
JS KIRISHIMA crew members detected and tracked the target. The Aegis Weapon System 
then developed a fire control solution and launched a Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block IA 
missile. Approximately three minutes later, the SM-3 successfully intercepted the target 
approximately 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. JFTM-4 is a significant milestone in the 
growing cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the area of missile defense. 
Also participating in the test was USS LAKE ERIE and USS RUSSELL, Aegis ships which 
cooperated to detect, track and conduct a simulated intercept engagement against the same 
target.65 
April 15, 2011, Test. MDA states that this flight test “was the most challenging test to date, as it 
was the first Aegis BMD version 3.6.1 intercept against an intermediate-range target (range 1,864 
to 3,418 [statute] miles) and the first Aegis BMD 3.6.1 engagement relying on remote tracking 
data.” MDA states that 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Navy sailors aboard the Aegis destroyer USS 
O’KANE (DDG 77), and Soldiers from the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command 
operating from the 613th Air and Space Operations Center at Hickam Air Force Base, 
Hawaii, successfully conducted a flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
element of the nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense System, resulting in the intercept of a 
separating ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean. This successful test demonstrated 
the capability of the first phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) 
announced by the President in September, 2009. 
At 2:52 a.m. EDT (6:52 p.m. April 15 Marshall Island Time), an intermediate-range ballistic 
missile target was launched from the Reagan Test Site, located on Kwajalein Atoll in the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, approximately 2,300 miles southwest of Hawaii. The target 
flew in a northeasterly direction towards a broad ocean area in the Pacific Ocean. Following 
target launch, a forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-band transportable radar, located on Wake 
Island, detected and tracked the threat missile. The radar sent trajectory information to the 
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system, which 
processed and transmitted remote target data to the USS O’KANE. The destroyer, located to 
the west of Hawaii, used the data to develop a fire control solution and launch the SM-3 
Block IA missile approximately 11 minutes after the target was launched. 
As the IRBM target continued along its trajectory, the firing ship’s AN/SPY-1 radar detected 
and acquired the ballistic missile target. The firing ship’s Aegis BMD weapon system 
uplinked target track information to the SM-3 Block IA missile. The SM-3 maneuvered to a 
point in space as designated by the fire control solution and released its kinetic warhead. The 
kinetic warhead acquired the target, diverted into its path, and, using only force of a direct 
impact, destroyed the threat in a “hit-to-kill” intercept.  
During the test the C2BMC system, operated by Soldiers from the 94th Army Air and Missile 
Defense Command, received data from all assets and provided situational awareness of the 
engagement to U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic 
Command.  
                                                                  
65 Missile Defense Agency press release 10-News-0016, dated October 29, 2010, entitled “Joint Japan-U.S. Missile 
Defense Flight Test Successful.” See also Marina Malenic, “Japanese Aegis Destroyer Successfully Completes Missile-
Intercept Test,” Defense Daily, November 1, 2010: 6. 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
The two demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance Satellites (STSS), launched by 
MDA in 2009, successfully acquired the target missile, providing stereo “birth to death” 
tracking of the target. 
Today’s event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-15 (FTM-15), was the most 
challenging test to date, as it was the first Aegis BMD version 3.6.1 intercept against an 
intermediate-range target (range 1,864 to 3,418 [statute] miles) and the first Aegis BMD 
3.6.1 engagement relying on remote tracking data. The ability to use remote radar data to 
engage a threat ballistic missile greatly increases the battle space and defended area of the 
SM-3 missile.  
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will 
spend the next several months conducting an extensive assessment and evaluation of system 
performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test.66 
September 1, 2011, Test. This flight test, which did not result in an intercept, was the first flight 
test of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor. MDA states that it 
was unable to achieve the planned intercept of a ballistic missile target during a test over the 
Pacific Ocean exercising the sea-based element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS).  
At approximately 3:53 a.m. Hawaii Standard Time (9:53 a.m. EDT) a short-range ballistic 
missile target was launched from the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai, 
Hawaii. Approximately 90 seconds later, a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block 1B interceptor 
missile was launched from the cruiser USS LAKE ERIE (CG-70) but an intercept of the 
target was not achieved.  
This was the first flight test of the advanced SM-3 Block 1B interceptor missile. Program 
officials will conduct an extensive investigation to determine the cause of the failure to 
intercept.67 
May 9, 2012, Test. MDA states that this flight test “was the first successful live fire intercept test 
of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor and the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system.” 
MDA states that 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS LAKE ERIE 
(CG 70) successfully conducted a flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
system, resulting in the first intercept of a short-range ballistic missile target over the Pacific 
Ocean by the Navy’s newest Missile Defense interceptor, the Standard Missile – 3 (SM-3) 
Block IB.  
At 8:18 p.m. Hawaiian Standard Time (2:18 a.m. EDT May 10) the target missile was 
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, located on Kauai, Hawaii. The target flew 
on a northwesterly trajectory towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific Ocean. Following 
target launch, the USS LAKE ERIE detected and tracked the missile with its onboard 
                                                                  
66 Missile Defense Agency press release 11-News-0007, dated April 15, 2011, entitled “Sea-based Missile Defense 
Flight Test Results in Successful Intercept.” 
67 Missile Defense Agency press release 11-News-0016, dated September 1, 2011, entitled “Sea-Based Missile Defense 
Test Conducted.” See also Amy Butler, “Upgraded Ballistic Missile Killer Fizzles In First Flight Test,” Aerospace 
Daily & Defense Report, September 2, 2011: 3; and Mike McCarthy, “Sea-Based Missile Defense Test Fails,” Defense 
Daily, September 2, 2011: 2-3. 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
AN/SPY-1 radar. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon 
system, developed a fire control solution and launched the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block 
IB interceptor.  
The USS LAKE ERIE continued to track the target and sent trajectory information to the 
SM-3 Block IB interceptor in-flight. The SM-3 maneuvered to a point in space, as designated 
by the fire control solution, and released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead acquired 
the target, diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and 
destroyed the threat in a hit-to-kill intercept. 
Today’s event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-16 (FTM-16) Event 2a, was the first 
successful live fire intercept test of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor and the second-generation 
Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system. Previous successful intercepts were conducted with the 
Aegis BMD 3.6.1 weapon system and the SM-3 Block IA interceptor, which are currently 
operational on U.S. Navy ships deployed across the globe.... 
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will 
conduct an extensive assessment and evaluation of system performance based upon telemetry 
and other data obtained during the test.68 
June 26, 2012, Test. MDA states that this flight test “was the second consecutive successful 
intercept test of the SM-3 Block IB missile and the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon 
system.” MDA states that 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and U.S. Navy sailors in the USS LAKE ERIE (CG 
70) successfully conducted a flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
system, resulting in the intercept of a separating ballistic missile target over the Pacific 
Ocean by the Navy’s newest missile defense interceptor missile, the Standard Missile-3 
(SM-3) Block IB.  
At 11:15 pm Hawaii Standard Time, June 26 (5:15 am EDT June 27), the target missile was 
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, located on Kauai, Hawaii. The target flew 
on a northwesterly trajectory towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific Ocean. Following 
target launch, the USS LAKE ERIE detected and tracked the missile with its onboard 
AN/SPY-1 radar. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon 
system, developed a fire control solution and launched the SM-3 Block IB missile.  
The USS LAKE ERIE continued to track the target and sent trajectory information to the 
SM-3 Block IB missile in-flight. The SM-3 maneuvered to a point in space, as designated by 
the fire control solution, and released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead acquired the 
target, diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and 
destroyed the threat in a hit-to-kill intercept. 
Today’s test event was the second consecutive successful intercept test of the SM-3 Block IB 
missile and the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system. The first successful 
SM-3 Block IB intercept occurred on May 9, 2012. Today’s intercept is a critical 
accomplishment for the second phase of the President’s European Phased Adaptive 
Approach consisting of the SM-3 Block IB interceptor employed in an Aegis Ashore system 
in Romania in 2015. 
                                                                  
68 Missile Defense Agency press release 12-News-0007, dated May 9, 2012, entitled “Second-Generation Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test.” 
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Initial indications are that all components performed as designed resulting in a very accurate 
intercept.69 
October 25, 2012, Test. MDA states that in this flight test, 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Army soldiers from the 94th and 32nd Army Air 
and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC); U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS 
FITZGERALD (DDG 62); and airmen from the 613th Air and Space Operations Center 
successfully conducted the largest, most complex missile defense flight test ever attempted 
resulting in the simultaneous engagement of five ballistic missile and cruise missile targets. 
An integrated air and ballistic missile defense architecture used multiple sensors and missile 
defense systems to engage multiple targets at the same time.... 
The USS FITZGERALD successfully engaged a low flying cruise missile over water. The 
Aegis system also tracked and launched an SM-3 Block 1A interceptor against a Short-
Range Ballistic Missile. However, despite indication of a nominal flight of the SM-3 Block 
1A interceptor, there was no indication of an intercept of the SRBM.70 
February 12, 2013, Test. MDA states that in this flight test, 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS LAKE ERIE 
(CG 70) successfully conducted a flight test of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
system, resulting in the intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile target over the Pacific 
Ocean by a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA guided missile.  
At 11:10 p.m. HST (4:10 a.m. EST) a unitary medium-range ballistic missile target was 
launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, on Kauai, Hawaii. The target flew 
northwest towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific Ocean.  
The in-orbit Space Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstrators (STSS-D) detected and 
tracked the target, and forwarded track data to the USS LAKE ERIE. The ship, equipped 
with the second-generation Aegis BMD weapon system, used Launch on Remote doctrine to 
engage the target.  
The ship developed a fire control solution from the STSS-D track and launched the SM-3 
Block IA guided missile approximately five minutes after target launch. The SM-3 
maneuvered to a point in space and released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead 
acquired the target reentry vehicle, diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct 
impact, engaged and destroyed the target. 
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will 
assess and evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during 
the test. 
Today’s event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-20 (FTM-20), was a demonstration 
of the ability of space-based assets to provide mid-course fire control quality data to an 
                                                                  
69 Missile Defense Agency press release 12-News-0008, dated June 27, 2012, entitled “Second-Generation Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense System Completes Second Successful Intercept Flight Test.” 
70 Missile Defense Agency press release 12-News-0011, dated October 25, 2012, entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense 
System Engages Five Targets Simultaneously During Largest Missile Defense Flight Test in History.” 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
Aegis BMD ship, extending the battlespace, providing the ability for longer range intercepts 
and defense of larger areas.71 
May 16, 2013, Test. MDA states that in this flight test, 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS LAKE ERIE 
(CG-70) successfully conducted a flight test today of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) system, resulting in the intercept of a separating ballistic missile target over the 
Pacific Ocean by the Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapon System and a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) 
Block IB missile.  
At 5:25 p.m. (Hawaii Time, 11:25 p.m. EDT), May 15, a separating short-range ballistic 
missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, on Kauai, Hawaii. The 
target flew northwest towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific Ocean. Following target 
launch, the USS LAKE ERIE (CG-70) detected and tracked the missile with its onboard 
AN/SPY-1 radar. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD weapon 
system, developed a fire control solution and launched the SM-3 Block IB missile. The SM-3 
maneuvered to a point in space based on guidance from Aegis BMD Weapons Systems and 
released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead acquired the target reentry vehicle, 
diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and destroyed the 
target. 
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. Program officials will 
assess and evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during 
the test. 
This test exercised the latest version of the second-generation Aegis BMD Weapon System 
and Standard Missile, providing capability for engagement of longer-range and more 
sophisticated ballistic missiles.  
Last night’s event, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-19 (FTM-19), was the third 
consecutive successful intercept test of the Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapon System and the SM-3 
Block IB guided missile. Previous successful ABMD 4.0 SM-3 Block IB intercepts occurred 
on May 9, 2012 and June 26, 2012. Other Aegis BMD intercepts have employed the ABMD 
3.6 and 4.0 with the SM-3 Block IA missile, which is currently operational on U.S. Navy 
ships deployed across the globe.72 
September 10, 2013, Test. MDA states that in this flight test, 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Operational 
Test Agency, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and 
U.S. Pacific Command, in conjunction with U.S. Army soldiers from the Alpha Battery, 2nd 
Air Defense Artillery Regiment, U.S. Navy sailors aboard the guided missile destroyer USS 
Decatur (DDG-73), and U.S. Air Force airmen from the 613th Air and Operations Center 
                                                                  
71 Missile Defense Agency press release 13-News-0002, dated February 13, 2013, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense Intercepts Target Using Space Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstrators (STSS-D) Data.” See also 
Troy Clarke, “Space-Based Sensors Star in “Stellar Eyes” Missile Defense Test,” Navy News Service, February 13, 
2013. 
72 Missile Defense Agency press release 13-News-0005, dated May 16, 2013, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test.” See also Mike McCarthy, “Aegis Missile Intercept Successful,” 
Defense Daily, May 17, 2013: 7-8; and Amy Butler, “MDA Conducts Two Successful Flight Tests,” Aerospace Daily 
& Defense Report, May 17, 2013: 3. 
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Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program 
 
successfully conducted a complex missile defense flight test, resulting in the intercept of two 
medium-range ballistic missile targets. The flight test was planned more than a year ago, and 
is not in any way connected to events in the Middle East. 
The test was conducted in the vicinity of the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site 
and surrounding areas in the western Pacific. The test stressed the ability of the Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
weapon systems to function in a layered defense architecture and defeat a raid of two near-
simultaneous ballistic missile targets. 
The two medium-range ballistic missile targets were launched on operationally realistic 
trajectories towards a defended area near Kwajalein. Along with overhead space assets 
providing launch alerts, an Army-Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control 
(AN/TPY-2) radar in Forward Based Mode detected the targets and relayed track 
information to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) 
system for further transmission to defending BMDS assets. 
The USS Decatur with its Aegis Weapon System detected and tracked the first target with its 
onboard AN/SPY-1 radar. The Aegis BMD weapon system developed a fire control solution, 
launched a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA missile, and successfully intercepted the 
target. 
In a demonstration of BMDS layered defense capabilities, a second AN/TPY-2 radar in 
Terminal Mode, located with the THAAD weapon system, acquired and tracked the target 
missiles. THAAD developed a fire control solution, launched a THAAD interceptor missile, 
and successfully intercepted the second medium-range ballistic missile target. THAAD was 
operated by soldiers from the Alpha Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment. As a 
planned demonstration of THAAD’s layered defense capabilities, a second THAAD 
interceptor was launched at the target destroyed by Aegis as a contingency in the event the 
SM-3 did not achieve an intercept. 
Initial indications are that all components performed as designed. MDA officials will 
extensively assess and evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data 
obtained during the test. 
The event, a designated Flight Test Operational-01 (FTO-01), demonstrated integrated, 
layered, regional missile defense capabilities to defeat a raid of two threat-representative 
medium-range ballistic missiles in a combined live-fire operational test. Soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen from multiple combatant commands operated the systems, and were provided a 
unique opportunity to refine operational doctrine and tactics while increasing confidence in 
the execution of integrated air and missile defense plans.73 
September 18, 2013, Test. MDA states that in this flight test, 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Navy sailors aboard 
the USS Lake Erie (CG 70) successfully conducted a flight test today of the Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD) system, resulting in the intercept of a complex separating short-
                                                                  
73 Missile Defense Agency press release 13-News-0007, dated September 10, 2013, entitled “Successful Missile 
Defense Test Against Multiple Targets.” See also Megan Eckstein, “Aegis BMDS, THAAD Successful In Complex 
MDA Flight Test,” Defense Daily, September 11, 2013: 1; and Amy Butler, “MDA Goes Two For Two In Operational 
Test,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 11, 2013: 4. 
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range ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean by the Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapon System 
and a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB guided missile. 
At approximately 2:30 p.m. Hawaii Standard Time (8:30 p.m. EDT), a complex separating 
short-range ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility on 
Kauai, Hawaii. The target flew northwest towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific Ocean. 
Following target launch, the USS Lake Erie detected and tracked the missile with its onboard 
AN/SPY-1 radar. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD weapon 
system, developed a fire control solution and launched two SM-3 Block IB guided missiles 
to engage the target. The first SM-3 that was launched successfully intercepted the target 
warhead. This was the first salvo mission of two SM-3 Block IB guided missiles launched 
against a single separating target. 
Program officials will assess and evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and 
other data obtained during the test. 
This test exercised the latest version of the second-generation Aegis BMD Weapon System, 
capable of engaging longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles. This was an 
operationally realistic test, in which the target’s launch time and bearing are not known in 
advance, and the target complex was the most difficult target engaged to date.74 
October 3, 2013, Test. MDA states that in this flight test, 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Navy sailors aboard 
the USS Lake Erie (CG 70) successfully conducted an operational flight test of the Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, resulting in the intercept of a medium-range 
ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean by the Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapon System and a 
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB guided missile. 
At approximately 7:33 p.m. Hawaii Standard Time, Oct. 3 (1:33 a.m. EDT, Oct.4), a 
medium-range ballistic missile target was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility 
on Kauai, Hawaii. The target flew northwest towards a broad ocean area of the Pacific 
Ocean. Following target launch, the USS Lake Erie detected and tracked the missile with its 
onboard AN/SPY-1 radar. The ship, equipped with the second-generation Aegis BMD 
weapon system, developed a fire control solution and launched the SM-3 Block IB guided 
missile to engage the target. The SM-3 maneuvered to a point in space and released its 
kinetic warhead. The kinetic warhead acquired the target reentry vehicle, diverted into its 
path, and, using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and destroyed the target. 
Program officials will assess and evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and 
other data obtained during the test. 
This test exercised the latest version of the second-generation Aegis BMD Weapon System, 
capable of engaging longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles.75 
                                                                  
74 Missile Defense Agency press release 13-News-0008, dated September 18, 2013, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test.” See also Mike McCarthy, “Pentagon Succeeds At Sea-
Based Missile Defense Test,” Defense Daily, September 20, 2013: 1; Amy Butler, “Aegis Intercepts In First-Ever Salvo 
Test,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 20, 2013: 3; and Jason Sherman and John Liang, “Missile 
Defense Agency’s SM-3 Block IB Intercepts Target In Salvo Fire,” Inside the Navy, September 23, 2013. 
75 Missile Defense Agency press release 13-News-0009, dated October 4, 2013, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test.” See also Michael Fabey, “Aegis Completes Another 
Intercept Test,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, October 7, 2013: 2; Jason Sherman, “SM-3 Block IB Completes 
(continued...) 
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November 6, 2014, Test. MDA states that in this flight test, 
The Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Navy Sailors aboard the USS 
John Paul Jones (DDG 53) successfully conducted a flight test today of the Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD) system, resulting in three successful near-simultaneous target 
engagements over the Pacific Ocean by the Aegis Baseline (BL) 9.C1 (BMD 5.0 Capability 
Upgrade) Weapon System configured ship. One short-range ballistic missile target was 
intercepted by a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB guided missile, while two low-flying 
cruise missile targets were engaged by Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IIIA guided 
missiles near-simultaneously. 
At approximately 12:03 p.m. (Hawaii Standard Time, 5:03 p.m. Eastern Standard Time) one 
short-range ballistic missile target and two cruise missile targets were launched from the 
Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on Kauai, Hawaii. Following the target launches, the 
USS John Paul Jones, in Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Radar Priority Mode, 
detected and tracked the missiles with its onboard AN/SPY-1 radar. 
The ship, equipped with the Aegis BMD weapon system, developed a fire control solution 
and launched one SM-3 Block IB guided missile to engage the ballistic missile target. The 
SM-3 missile maneuvered to a point in space and released its kinetic warhead. The kinetic 
warhead acquired the target’s reentry vehicle, diverted into its path, and destroyed the target 
with the sheer energy and force of direct impact. The ship also launched two SM-2 Block 
IIIA guided missiles to successfully engage the cruise missile targets. 
Program officials will evaluate system performance based upon telemetry and other data 
obtained during the test. 
This test, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-25 (FTM-25), was the first live-fire event 
of the Aegis Weapon System in IAMD Radar Priority Mode, engaging a ballistic missile 
target and a raid of cruise missile targets.76 
Endo-Atmospheric (SM-2 Block IV) Flight Tests 
The Aegis BMD system using the SM-2 Block IV interceptor has achieved three successful endo-
atmospheric intercepts in three at-sea attempts, the first occurring on May 24, 2006,77 the second 
on June 5, 2008,78 and the third on March 26, 2009.79 
                                                                  
(...continued) 
IOT&E With A Bang, Full-Rate Production Review,” Inside the Navy, October 7, 2013; Mike McCarthy, “Aegis 
Missile Defense Test Scores Hit,” Defense Daily, October 7, 2013: 4. 
76 Missile Defense Agency press release 14-News-0012, dated November 6, 2014, entitled “Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense System Completes Successful Intercept Flight Test.” See also Andrea Shalal, “U.S. Aegis System Zaps Cruise, 
Ballistic Missile Targets in Test,” Reuters (www.reuters.com), November 6, 2014; Mike McCarthy, “Aegis BMD Hits 
Three Targets In Simultaneous Test,” Defense Daily, November 10, 2014. 
77 See Missile Defense Agency, “First at-Sea Demonstration of Sea-Based Terminal Capability Successfully 
Completed,” May 24, 2006 (06-FYI-0079); Gregg K. Kakesako, “Missile Defense System Makes History,” Honolulu 
Star-Bulletin, May 25, 2006; Audrey McAvoy, “Ship Shoots Down Test Missile For The First Time,” NavyTimes.com, 
May 25, 2006; “Navy, MDA Announce First Terminal Sea-Based Intercept,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May 
26, 2006; Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Conducts First Sea-Based Terminal Phase Missile Defense Test,” Inside the 
Navy, May 29, 2006; and Jeremy Singer, “Sea-Based Terminal May Boost U.S. Missile Defense Capability,” Space 
News (www.space.com), June 12, 2006. 
78 See Missile Defense Agency, “Successful Sea-Based Missile Defense Intercept,” June 5, 2008 (08-NEWS-0068); 
(continued...) 
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Appendix B. Homeporting of U.S. Navy Aegis BMD 
Ships at Rota, Spain 
This appendix presents additional background information on the Navy’s plan to homeport four 
BMD-capable Aegis destroyers at Rota, Spain. 
As part of the October 5, 2011, U.S.-Spain joint announcement of the plan, the Prime Minister of 
Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, stated in part: 
This meeting marks a step forward on the path that we set for ourselves less than a year ago 
at the Lisbon Summit, aiming to make NATO an Alliance that is “more effective, engaged 
and efficient than ever before”, in the words of [NATO] Secretary-General Rasmussen. 
At that historic Summit, decisions of enormous importance for the future of the Alliance 
were taken, such as the New Strategic Concept to face the new challenges of the 21st century, 
and the establishment of a new command structure that is leaner and more flexible, and 
improved. 
Besides these two important innovations, and as a consequence of them, the allies decided to 
develop an Anti-Missile Defence System.… 
As you will recall, as a consequence of this new structure launched in Lisbon, Spain obtained 
an installation of great importance within NATO’s Command and Control Structure: the 
Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain. 
This Centre, together with the Centre in Uedem, Germany, will form part of the air command 
and control system which is to include the anti-missile defence that the Alliance is going to 
implement. 
Together with this land-based component of the new air defence system, I can inform you 
that Spain is also going to support, starting in 2013, an important part of the system’s naval 
element. 
In recent months, the different options have been studied, and finally, it was decided that 
Spain should be the site for this component of the system, due to its geostrategic location and 
its position as gateway to the Mediterranean. 
Specifically, the United States is going to deploy, as its contribution to NATO’s Anti-Missile 
Defence System, a total of four vessels equipped with the AEGIS system, to be based in 
Rota.  
This means that Rota is going to become a support centre for vessel deployment, enabling 
them to join multinational forces or carry out NATO missions in international waters, 
particularly in the Mediterranean…. 
                                                                  
(...continued) 
Dave Ahearn, “Aegis, SM-2 Interceptors Kill Target Missile In Terminal-Phase Success,” Defense Daily, June 6, 2008. 
79 “Navy Completes Air and Ballistic Missile Exercise,” Navy News Service, March 26, 2009. 
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Moreover, this initiative will have a positive impact, in socio-economic terms, on our 
country, and most especially on the Bay of Cadiz. 
Permanently basing four vessels in Rota will require investing in the Base’s infrastructure, 
and contracts with service providers, thus generating approximately a thousand new jobs, 
both directly and indirectly. 
For the shipyards, and for Spain’s defence industry, the foreseeable impact will also be 
highly positive, as the USA is considering conducting the vessels’ maintenance and upkeep 
at the nearby San Fernando shipyards, in the province of Cadiz. In addition, there will be 
significant transfer of state-of-the-art technology, from which Spain can benefit.80 
As part of the same joint announcement, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated in part: 
With four Aegis ships at Rota, the alliance is significantly boosting combined naval 
capabilities in the Mediterranean, and enhancing our ability to ensure the security of this vital 
region. This relocation of assets takes place as part of the United States’ ongoing effort to 
better position forces and defensive capabilities in coordination with our European allies and 
partners.  
This announcement should send a very strong signal that the United States is continuing to 
invest in this alliance, and that we are committed to our defense relationship with Europe 
even as we face growing budget constraints at home.… 
Alongside important agreements that were recently concluded with Romania, Poland, and 
Turkey, Spain’s decision represents a critical step in implementing the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach, as our leaders agreed to in Lisbon.…  
Beyond missile defense, the Aegis destroyers will perform a variety of other important 
missions, including participating in the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, as well as joining 
in naval exercises, port visits, and maritime security cooperation activities…. 
The agreement also enables the United States to provide rapid and responsive support to the 
U.S. Africa and U.S. Central Commands, as needed.81 
An October 5, 2011, press report stated: 
A senior U.S. defense official said making the [ships’] base at Rota, on Spain’s southwestern 
Atlantic coast near Cadiz, would reduce the numbers of [BMD-capable Aegis] ships needed 
for the [EPAA] system. 
“You [would] probably need 10 of these ships if they were based in the eastern U.S. to be 
able to ... transit across the ocean back and forth to [keep the same number on] patrol in the 
Med,” he said. 
                                                                  
80 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime 
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed 
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. 
81 “Announcement on missile defence cooperation by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime 
Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,” October 5, 2011, accessed 
October 6, 2011, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-107ADE55-FF83A6B8/natolive/opinions_78838.htm. See also 
“SECDEF Announces Stationing of Aegis Ships at Rota, Spain,” accessed October 6, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/
search/display.asp?story_id=63109. 
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The U.S. official said the United States was committed to having at least one ship on station 
at all times in the eastern Mediterranean, where their anti-missile missiles would be most 
effective. Having them based in Rota would enable more than one to be in the eastern 
Mediterranean as needed. 
The ships also would be part of the pool of vessels available to participate in standing NATO 
maritime groups, which are used to counter piracy and for other missions, he said.82 
An October 10, 2011, press report stated: 
“Our plan is to have the first couple [of ships] there in 2014 and the next two in about 2015,” 
said Cmdr. Marc Boyd, spokesman for [U.S. Navy] 6th Fleet. Boyd added: “It’s really early 
in the process and we haven’t selected any of the ships yet.” Boyd said the shift will bring an 
estimated 1,300 sailors and Navy civilians and 2,100 dependents to Naval Station Rota, 
which would double the base’s ranks. Naval Station Rota spokesman Lt. j.g. Jason Fischer 
said the base now has 1,067 sailors…. 
The three piers at the base primarily support Navy ships passing through on port calls. 
Boyd said 6th Fleet is considering plans to add base infrastructure and maintenance facilities 
to support the ships, as well as additional housing for crews, “but the base is pretty suited as 
it is now.”83 
 
                                                                  
82 David Brunnstrom and David Alexander, “Spain To Host U.S. Missile Defense Ships,” Reuters, October 5, 2011. 
Ellipsis as in original. 
83 Sam Fellman, “U.S. To Base Anti-Missile Ships in Spain,” Defense News, October 10, 2011: 76. 
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Appendix C. Allied Participation and Interest in 
Aegis BMD Program 
This appendix presents additional background information on allied participation and interest in 
the Aegis BMD program. 
Japan 
A September 16, 2014, press report states: 
The Japanese Defense Ministry is interested in acquiring Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Ashore 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) battery, according to an August report from the Japanese 
newspaper, Mainichi Shimbun. 
The paper reported the Defense Ministry is expected to spend “tens of millions of yen” as 
part of the Fiscal Year 2015 state budget for research into Aegis Ashore—which combines 
the Lockheed Martin SPY-1D radar with a battery of Raytheon Standard Missile-3 missiles. 
“The ministry intends to introduce new ground-based SM-3 missiles, in addition to the sea-
based SM-3s that the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) already possesses, to enhance 
Tokyo’s readiness to intercept ballistic missiles heading toward Japan,” according to the 
report.... 
Currently, Japan uses a combination of four Kongo-class Aegis-equipped guided missile 
destroyers armed with SM-3s for longer-range ballistic missile threats and Lockheed Martin 
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) mobile ground based interceptors for missiles closer 
to their targets. 
“There are concerns that PAC3s could not respond if a massive number of ballistic missiles 
were to be simultaneously launched toward Japan,” read the Mainichi report. 
Japan intends to double the amount of BMD destroyers to eight by 2018, according to local 
press reports. 
The Kongos ships use a legacy Aegis BMD configuration that do not allow the Aegis combat 
system to operate as BMD defense platforms and as anti-air warfare ships simultaneously. 
Japan is also exploring upgrading at least some of its ships to a more advanced Baseline 9 
configuration that would allow the ships to simultaneously act as a BMD and AAW 
platform. 
Aegis Ashore operates with a version of Baseline 9 that doesn’t include an AAW 
component, but given the similarities of the ground based system and the Aegis combat 
system onboard U.S. and Japanese ships, those capabilities could expand. 
“This is the Aegis weapon from a ship. It can do AAW, terminal defense and mid-course 
intercept,” Navy Capt. Jeff Weston, the Aegis Ashore program manager for the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) said last year during a USNI News interview at Lockheed Martin’s 
Aegis testing facility in Moorestown, N.J. 
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At the time, Weston said an U.S. Aegis Ashore battery would only concentrate on BMD. 
“We’re not going to do anti-air warfare in someone else’s country,” he said. 
However, a Japanese run installation could expand the missile offerings beyond the BMD 
optimized SM-3s. 
Depending on the configuration of the Aegis Ashore installation, the site could conceivably 
be expanded to include other AAW capabilities that would allow the site to handle multiple 
air threats in addition to a BMD mission.84 
Other Countries85 
A July 28, 2014, press report states: 
The Italian navy is working to develop the ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability of its 
Orizzonte-class air-defense ships and pave the way for BMD systems to be installed on a 
new class of ship to be launched in the early 2020s. 
Software engineers at the Italian navy’s programming center—known as Maricenprog—near 
the navy’s main dockyard at Taranto, have been developing tactical BMD capabilities for the 
ship as part of the country’s participation in the wider NATO tactical BMD program. The 
Italian defense ministry supports the effort with the land-based TPS-77 radar system and the 
SAMP-T ground-based air defense system, but wants to back up these efforts at sea with the 
Orizzonte or Horizon-class ships. 
According to Gianpaolo Blasi, director of Maricenprog, the program has already completed 
two of what NATO describe as Ensemble Tests (ET), which pave the way for entry into the 
NATO BMD program. The navy is preparing for a trial due to take place in 2015 that will 
see the Orizzonte-class vessel ITN Doria supporting and defending another—as yet 
unconfirmed—BMD-capable ship that will track and potentially engage a ballistic missile 
target. During the trials the Doria will act as shotgun, defending the missile-tracking vessel 
from conventional air threats that the other ship cannot deal with as it tracks the ballistic 
missile. 
The Doria will be able to transmit details of the engagement around the fleet through a 
tactical data link modified to carry BMD data.86 
A June 13, 2014, press report states: 
Talks between the U.S. and Australia have given fresh momentum to Washington’s plans to 
create a larger ballistic-missile defense shield for its allies in Asia. 
                                                                  
84 Sam LaGrone, “Report: Japan Interested in Aegis Ashore for Ballistic Missile Defense,” USNI News 
(http://news.usni.org), September 16, 2014. See also “Defense Ministry Mulls Introducing Ground-Based SM-3 
Interceptor Missiles,” Mainichi (http://mainichi.jp), August 9, 2014. 
85 In addition to the press reports shown in this section, see Robert Holzer and Scott Truver, “Aegis, Missile Defense 
and the US Pivot,” The Diplomat (http://thediplomat.com), July 30, 2014, for a discussion of developments in 
Australia, Japan, and South Korea. 
86 Tony Osborne, “Italian Navy Paves Way For Ship-Based BMD Capability,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 
July 28, 2014: 1-2. 
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According to a U.S. statement overnight, discussions between President Barack Obama and 
visiting Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott resulted in a commitment from Canberra for 
help in pushing forward with expanded missile-defense plans as a counter to North Korea.... 
Washington’s statement on Thursday [June 12] said the U.S. was now examining ways for 
Australia to participate in a bigger regional system using the country’s coming fleet of 
missile destroyers equipped with advanced Aegis radar capability. 
“We are…working to explore opportunities to expand cooperation on ballistic missile 
defense, including working together to identify potential Australian contributions to ballistic-
missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region,” the U.S. statement said. 
Australia is building a new fleet of warships that could be equipped to shoot down hostile 
missiles, as part of an ambitious military buildup that includes investments in new stealth-
fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, amphibious carriers and submarines. The revamp will cost 
close to 90 billion Australian dollars (US$85 billion) over a decade. 
“This might mean the Australian Defence Force could end up mounting advanced missiles 
on its Aegis-equipped air-warfare destroyers,” said security analyst James Brown of 
Australia’s Lowy Institute.87  
A September 16, 2013, press report states: 
One of the UK Royal Navy’s new Type 45 destroyers is conducting tests to establish 
whether the warships could provide British forces with theater ballistic-missile defense 
(TBMD) capabilities for the first time, according to the head of the Royal Navy. 
First Sea Lord Adm. Sir George Zambellas said during a speech to industry executives and 
military personnel on the opening day of the DSEi defense exhibition that the “type is on 
trials in the Pacific to explore the ballistic-missile defense capabilities that are ready to be 
exploited, bringing strategic opportunities to the vessel.” 
The Type 45 destroyer Daring, one of six Type 45s built by BAE Systems for the Royal 
Navy, has been in the Pacific for several weeks, having departed its Portsmouth base this 
summer for a wide-ranging nine-month deploy-ment, which the Royal Navy said in May 
would include science and technology trials. The work is being done as part of a US Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) research and development test.... 
In May, the UK Defence Ministry confirmed it was talking to Aster 30 partners France and 
Italy about developing an extended-range version of a missile already used by the French and 
Italian armies to intercept incoming missiles While there is no program to adapt the Type 45 
to include TBMD capability, the trials support the possibility of such a move once a decision 
whether to go down that route is made by the British government.88  
A March 18, 2013, press report states: 
Raytheon has discussed a possible pooling arrangement with three navies in northern Europe 
to make its SM-3 ballistic missile inter-ceptor more affordable, according to a senior 
company executive. 
                                                                  
87 Rob Taylor, “U.S. and Australia to Cooperate on Asian Missile-Defense Plans,” Wall Street Journal 
(http://online.wsj.com), June 13, 2014. 
88 Andrew Chuter, “UK Royal Navy Examines BMD Capabilities,” Defense News, September 16, 2013: 38. 
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Speaking after a successful test of a new data link enabling the SM-3 to communicate with 
X-band radars operated by Dutch, Danish and Ger-man warships, George Mavko, director of 
European missile defense at Raytheon Missile Systems, said the idea of a pooling 
arrangement had been raised by the company, even though none of the countries are pursuing 
procurement at this point.... 
While all three European navies have expressed an interest in the capability of the SM-3 to 
engage ballistic missiles at ranges outside the atmosphere, none appear close to actually 
procuring the missiles.... 
Instead, led by the Dutch, the initial moves appear focused on updating naval X-band radars 
and other systems so they can provide target data to SM-3 missiles even if they can’t 
prosecute their own attack.... 
Aside from the pooling idea, Raytheon also recently opened discussions with the U.S. 
Missile Defense Agency over co-production of SM-3 systems in Europe to sweeten any 
future deal, Mavko said.... 
Small bits of the missile are already produced in Europe, although it was “too early to imply 
the U.S. is willing to release any major subsystems to other countries for co-production,” 
Mavko said.... 
Raytheon has been cooperating with the Dutch Navy for several years, exploring the 
potential of the SM-3 to talk to X-band radars. The Dutch have co-funded a study with the 
U.S. government on the feasibil-ity of a dual-band data link; the study is due to be extended 
into a second phase. The German government has agreed to participate this time.89 
A March 11, 2013, press report states: 
The Eurosam SAMP/T surface-to-air missile system has destroyed a representative theater 
ballistic missile during a test in France. 
The March 6 test saw a joint Italian and French team engage an aircraft-launched target using 
an Aster 30 missile fired from the Biscarosse missile test center on the Bay of Biscay coast.  
According to French government defense procurement agency the DGA, the operational 
evaluation firing was jointly carried out by the Italian 4th Artillery Regiment of Mantova with 
the French military airborne test center (CEAM) of Mont-de-Marsan. In a change from 
previous interceptions, the SAMP/T used Link 16 data links to provide target information. 
The test also was the first to use what Eurosam calls a NATO environment in terms of 
command and control of the weapon, rather than simply using French sensors. 
The company says the firing was as “close to what would be an operational use for an anti-
theater ballistic missile mission under the aegis of the alliance Active Layered Theater 
Ballistic Missile Defense program.” 
The company adds, “The NATO Ballistic Missile Defense Operations Cell, located in 
Ramstein, Germany, was in the loop via Link 16 network.”90 
                                                                  
89 Andrew Chuter, “Raytheon Pushes European SM-3 Missile Pool,” Defense News, March 18, 2013: 4. 
90 Tony Osborne, “European SAMP/T Destroys Ballistic Missile In Test,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, March 
11, 2013: 3. 
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Another March 11, 2013, press report states: 
Joint US and European testing of command, control, communications and radar systems are 
underway to demonstrate the feasibility of integration of European radars and command and 
control systems into a future missile defense systems based on the planned European Phased 
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) utilizing the several AEGIS destroyers or cruisers to be based in 
Spain, land-based SM-3 interceptors to be stationed in Romania and Poland, along with 
SPY-2 radars sites. These assets are to be complemented by a number of European deployed 
radar sites. 
In recent weeks tests were carried out to evaluate such integration. Last week Raytheon 
reported about a recent trial that showed that a radar used by Dutch, German and Danish 
navies could provide target information to the interceptor. The current radar installed on the 
Dutch frigates is incompatible with the AEGIS/SM-3 link operating over S-band. The 
demonstration which took place at the Den Helder military test range validated a datalink 
that allows the missile to receive information from the Thales sensor while retaining the 
ability to communicate with Aegis combat ships used by the U.S. Navy. Generally, The 
Dutch, German and Danish navies datalinks are operating on X bands, while Norway, Spain 
and the U.S. operate AEGIS frigates communicating with their interceptors over the S band. 
To avoid unique configurations of missiles, Raytheon has developed a dual-band datalink 
which enables the same missile to communicate in both bands. This dual-band datalink was 
first tested in 2011.91 
A March 8, 2013, press report states: 
The British Royal Navy is exploring the possibility of outfitting its newest class of destroyers 
with a ballistic missile defense capability. 
The Defence Ministry said this week it wants to examine the potential for the Type 45 
destroyers to play a role in defending the United Kingdom and allies from the threat of 
ballistic missiles. The ministry said it will build on its relationship with the Pentagon’s 
Missile Defense Agency to look at the option.... 
The joint Defence Ministry and industry-run U.K. Missile Defence Center (MDC) plans to 
take part in a trial that for the first time will use a Type 45 in a research and development 
program with their American counterparts. 
That will involve testing the Sampson radar, which is part of the Sea Viper missile system, in 
detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, the ministry said. 
The is no program to deploy ballistic missile defense on Type 45s but the MDC has in recent 
years been exploring the option for the destroyers. 
“It will be a step change to be able to work so closely with such a ship in an emerging area of 
defense,” MDC head Simon Pavitt said in a statement. “Working with an operational 
platform will make a significant difference to our level of understanding and could contribute 
both financially and technically towards any future program.”92 
                                                                  
91 Tamir Eshel, “Integrating European Radars with AEGIS/SM-3 Missile Defenses,” Defense Update (http://defense-
update.com), March 11, 2013, accessed March 20, 2013, at http://defense-update.com/20130311_integrating-european-
radars-with-aegissm-3-missile-defenses.html. 
92 Mike McCarthy, “U.K. Examining Sea-Based Missile Defense,” Defense Daily, March 8, 2013: 10. See also “British 
Destroyer to Participate in U.S. Missile Defense Trials,” Defense Update (http://defense-update.com), March 7, 2013, 
(continued...) 
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An October 2012 article stated: 
The Royal Netherlands Navy’s (RNLN’s) four De Zeven Provincien-class LCF air defence 
and command frigates are to receive a substantially upgraded and rearchitectured SMART-L 
D-band volume search radar that will give the ships a ballistic missile defence (BMD) early 
warning capability. 
Thales Nederland received a EUR116 million (USD145 million) contract from the 
Netherlands’ Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) in June 2012 for the new extended-
range sensor known as ‘SMART-L EWC’. This new variant of SMART-L, which builds oni 
the results of a previous Extended Long Range (ELR) capability demonstration, will push 
instrumented range out to 2,000 km; improve elevation coverage; introduce new wave forms 
and processing optimised for the detection and tracking of very-high-velocity ballistic 
missile targets at altitude; and enable estimation of trajectories, launch sites and points of 
impact. At the same time, all SMART-L volume air search functionality will be retained.93 
A journal article published in the summer of 2012 states: 
Today the steady growth of Aegis-capable ships in the U.S. Navy—as well as an increasing 
number of world navies fielding such ships—presents new opportunities and challenges.... 
... the Aegis BMD capabilities present in the navies of U.S. allies and friends can now 
provide the Global Maritime Partnership with a means to address the “high end” of the kill 
chain with combined, coordinated, ballistic-missile defense: the Aegis BMD Global 
Enterprise. 
This potential is already manifest in the Asia-Pacific region in the close working relationship 
between the United States and Japan. Korea and Australia could well join this Aegis network 
soon, giving the four governments the means to address not only territorial BMD but also 
coordinated BMD of fleet units operating together. In Europe, plans are well along to 
provide robust territorial defense of European nations with ALTBMD [active layered theater 
BMD] and the EPAA. Together, these systems provide a nascent BMD capability today and 
promise an even more robust capability as the EPAA evolves over the next decade and a 
half. 
But as demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya, NATO and the nations of Europe 
have equities often well beyond the territorial boundaries of the European continent. Also, a 
European military deployed beyond Europe’s borders will always have a naval component. 
This is therefore a propitious time to begin to link European allies more completely into an 
Aegis BMD Global Enterprise in much the same way the U.S. Navy is linked to its Asia-
Pacific partners—Japan today, Korea soon, and thereafter Australia in the near future—in a 
high-end Aegis BMD Global Maritime Partnership.... 
The diffusion of Aegis BMD capability abroad is occurring quietly. Governments that have 
made naval force-structure investment decisions based primarily on inwardly focused 
national interests have discovered that their investments also enable them to combine their 
resources in collective defense.... 
                                                                  
(...continued) 
accessed March 27, 2013, at http://defense-update.com/20130307_british-destroyer-to-participate-in-u-s-missile-
defense-trials.html. 
93 Kate Tringham, “Warning Signs: Netherlands Evolves SMART-L Radar For Ballistic Missile Defence Mission,” 
Jane’s International Defence Review, October 2012: 28-29. 
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This effort to create a broad BMD enterprise builds on the current participation of allied 
navies in the Aegis program. This global effort started with a foreign military sales 
relationship with Japan, subsequently expanded to relationships with Australia and Korea, 
and now includes a commercial connection with Spain as well as an enterprise between 
Norway and Spain.22 Several other states have expressed interest in acquiring the Aegis 
weapon system and Aegis BMD. Importantly, Australia and other countries that are 
acquiring the Aegis system are stipulating that the systems they buy must have the capability 
of adding BMD in the future.... 
In Europe, the decision as to whether and how to connect the European NATO allies’ short- 
and medium-range theater missile-defense systems to the U.S. long-range missile defense 
system will be critical to the coherence of alliance-wide BMD. A high level of commitment 
to international partnership on the parts of both the United States and its allies—already 
evinced by ALTBMD and C2BMC shared situational-awareness tests—will encourage 
interoperability initiatives. This interoperability will, in turn, help ensure the success of the 
U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach.... 
Close cooperation in the area of Aegis BMD between the United States and Japan, possibly 
Korea, and potentially Australia does not in itself qualify as an “Aegis BMD Global 
Enterprise.” But to include European nations in an Aegis-afloat enterprise of capabilities 
approaching those planned for the ALTBMD/EPAA system would.... 
European navies are now deployed worldwide fulfilling the vision of a Global Maritime 
Partnership: supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting in Libya, conducting 
antipiracy patrols in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, and supporting humanitarian 
assistance operations around the world. There could be no more propitious time to begin to 
link more completely European allies in an Aegis BMD Global Enterprise, in much the same 
way the U.S. Navy is now linked to its Asia-Pacific partners in a high-end Aegis BMD 
Global Maritime Partnership.... 
But it is unlikely that such a venture would succeed without ongoing U.S. leadership, the 
same sort of leadership that is supporting sea-based Aegis BMD for territorial and fleet 
ballistic-missile defense today in the northeast Pacific as well as sea-based and land-based 
ballistic territorial missile defense in Europe. Clearly, U.S. leadership could be what 
accelerates the morphing of a now-nascent Aegis BMD Global Enterprise in Europe into a 
global Aegis BMD afloat capability.... 
There is a growing worldwide commitment to Aegis ballistic-missile defense, a commitment 
with broad potential to field an international global enterprise capable of defending against 
the most imminent, and growing, threat to nations and navies, on land and at sea alike—the 
threat of ballistic missiles, particularly those armed with weapons of mass destruction.94 
A May 7, 2012, press report states: 
The German Navy’s fleet of frigates could be upgraded to deploy Raytheon’s [RTN] 
Standard Missile-3 to participate in NATO’s ballistic missile defense program if the 
modifications were approved by the government, Germany’s top naval officer recently said.  
                                                                  
94 Brad Hicks, George Galdorisi, and Scott C. Truver, “The Aegis BMD Global Enterprise,” Naval War College 
Review, Summer 2012: 65-80. 
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Vice Admiral Axel Schimpf, the counterpart to the U.S. Navy’s chief of naval operations, 
said in a recently published article that the F124 frigates are capable of being upgraded to 
play a vital role in ballistic missile defense (BMD).  
“The German Navy, with the F124 Frigates in their current configuration, has a weapon 
system at their disposal which forms the basis for capability enhancements for (German) 
armed forces’ participation in various roles,” according to a translation of an article he 
penned in Marine Forum, a publication of the German Maritime Institute.  
One option, Schimpf said, would be to upgrade the F124s’ SMART-L and Active Phased 
Array Radar (APAR) combat management system, along with the Mk-41 vertical launch 
system to accommodate the SM-3....  
The enhancements would be one way for Germany to participate in the Obama 
administration’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) embraced by NATO, and 
could be done in cooperation with Denmark or the Netherlands, Schimpf said....  
The German government has not made on decisions on whether to adapt its frigates for 
ballistic missile defense, and Germany’s role in EPAA is the source of ongoing political 
discussions in Berlin ahead of NATO’s May 20-21 summit in Chicago.... 
Only a handful of NATO allies deploy the Aegis combat system on ships, and Germany is 
not one of them. Germany’s combat system does not operate on an S-band frequency used on 
Aegis. Raytheon, however, says it has developed a duel band data link that would allow the 
combat system on allied ships to talk to the SM-3 and guide it to targets.95 
An October 3, 2011, press report stated that 
The Netherlands, which has had a longtime interest in a missile shield, is pressing ahead to 
build up its own capabilities. The Dutch defense ministry plans to expand the capabilities of 
the Thales Smart-L radar on Dutch frigates to take on BMD roles. The program’s value is 
estimated at €100-250 million, including logistics support and spares. 
Other European navies using the sensor may follow the Dutch lead. 
Dutch Defense Minister Hans Hillen notes that the Smart-L effort would help address the 
BMD sensor shortage within the NATO alliance. Citing NATO’s decision last year to take a 
more expansive approach to BMD, Hillen says Smart-L could give the ALTBMD [Active 
Layered Theater BMD] command-and control backbone the required long-range target-
detection analysis to help identify where a threat originates. 
The Netherlands has already carried out a sensor trial for the expanded role in cooperation 
with the U.S. Navy. The move does not include the purchase of Raytheon Standard Missile 
SM-3 interceptors. 
Both hardware and software modifications to the combat management system are needed. 
All four [of the Dutch navy’s] De Zeven Provincien-class frigates would be modified to 
ensure that two can be deployed, even as one is in maintenance and the fourth is being 
readied for operations. 
                                                                  
95 Mike McCarthy, “Raytheon’s SM-3 An Option For German Role In Missile Defense, Admiral Says,” Defense Daily, 
May 7, 2012: 9. 
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Thales is due to complete a series of studies to prepare for the acquisition of the upgrade in 
the third quarter of 2012. The goal is to have the first frigates ready for operations by 2017. 
All four should be upgraded by the end of that year. 
Although the Netherlands is leading the program, other Smart-L users, including the German 
navy and Denmark, have been monitoring the effort. France also has shown interest in the 
system, Hillen said in a letter to legislators. 
France also wants to upgrade its Aster 30 interceptor to give it a basic BMD capability, 
although a formal contract has not been awarded…. 
Raytheon, meanwhile, is still fighting to win a foothold for its Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) in 
Europe. The company continues its push to persuade continental navies to embrace the SM-3 
Block 1B for missile defense roles, and says it has largely validated the dual-mode data link 
that would be key to the concept. 
The data link would feature both S- and X-band capability—the former to support the Aegis 
radar system used by the U.S. and others, and the latter for the Smart-L/APAR (active 
phased array radar) combination used, for instance, by the Dutch navy.96 
A September 2011 press report states: 
The gulf in sea-based ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability between the navies of 
NATO’s European member states and the US Navy (USN) was brought into stark relief by 
the recent deployment of the Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Monterey to the Mediterranean 
and Black Sea region, as the first element of the United States’ European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA) for missile defence.... 
However, this situation is about to change as European NATO nations are committing their 
naval assets to BMD in response to evolving alliance policy towards developing a BMD 
architecture to protect the continent from perceived threats emanating from the Middle East.  
NATO embarked on an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System 
(ALTBMDS) programme in September 2005, following a two-year feasibility study. Its 
initial focus was the protection of deployed alliance forces and high-value assets against 
short- and medium-range threats. At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, political leaders 
from NATO states committed to expanding that remit to include the defence of the alliance’s 
European territory.  
ALTBMD is providing a C2 framework on which to build a scalable and adaptable BMD 
‘system of systems’ architecture, integrating new national systems as they are committed to 
the alliance and enabling a complete lower- and upper-layer capability covering Europe to be 
fielded. The first of these, Capability 1, with initial operational capability planned for the 
2012 timeframe, integrates C2 infrastructure, sensors and ground-based Patriot interceptors. 
The expansion to provide upper-layer defence is due to achieve full operational capability 
between 2015 and 2016.  
                                                                  
96 Robert Wall, Amy Svitak, and Amy Butler, “Supporting Role,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 3, 
2011: 28-29. A shorter version of the story was published as Robert Wall, “Dutch Press Forward On Ship-Based 
Missile Defense Effort,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 27, 2011: 4. See also Menno Steketee, “Dutch 
Frigates to Gain BMD Capability,” Jane’s Navy International (Janes.com), September 28, 2011. (The print version of 
the report appeared under the same article title in the November 2011 issue of Jane’s Navy International, page 8. 
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The US contribution to this architecture is the EPAA set out by the Obama administration in 
September 2009....  
There is evidence that the EPAA has acted as a spur for some European nations to make a 
more coherent contribution to the NATO BMD construct, particularly in the maritime 
domain, as they seek to maintain sovereignty in the development and integration of 
indigenous BMD systems and defence of their territories.  
A number of classes of the latest generation of anti-air warfare (AAW) combatants with the 
potential to acquire a BMD capability are either operational or entering service in the navies 
of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK. These 
offer the attributes of flexibility in deployment, mobility and sustainability inherent in naval 
platforms and could operate as effective sensor nodes even without an organic intercept 
capability. 
They would be able to forward deploy close to the origin of the threat and act as force 
multipliers in this role by providing early warning of launches and cueing of off-board 
interceptor systems with the provision of timely and accurate impact point prediction and 
missile tracks, together with launch point prediction for counter-targeting.97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
97 Charles Hollosi, “European Fleets Respond to Ballistic Missile Threats,” Jane’s Navy International, September 
2011: 23-24, 26-30. 
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Author Contact Information 
 
Ronald O'Rourke 
   
Specialist in Naval Affairs 
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610 
 
 
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