Libya and U.S. Policy

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Updated December 15, 2023
Libya and U.S. Policy
Over a decade after a 2011 uprising that toppled longtime
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence and Timeline
authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to
make a transition to stable governing arrangements.
Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim
governments (Figure 1), but militias, local leaders, and
subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons
have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs.
The postponement of planned elections in 2021, Libyans’
continuing lack of consensus over electoral and
constitutional arrangements, the potential fragility of a
United Nations (U.N.)-backed ceasefire, and the
reemergence of institutional rivalry are prolonging Libya’s
instability and pose challenges for U.S. decisionmakers.
Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent
Libya from serving as a permissive environment for
transnational terrorist groups and have taken different
approaches to conflict and competition among Libyans. The
Biden Administration supports the holding of new elections
in Libya and has used U.S. influence to bolster U.N.-led
mediation efforts to that end. Congress has appropriated
funds to enable U.S. diplomacy and aid programs, and some
Members have called for more assertive U.S. engagement.

War, Ceasefire, and a Deferred Election
2011 Uprising topples Muammar al Qadhafi.
2012 Parliamentary elections. Transitional cabinet seated.
Conflict re-erupted in Libya in April 2019, when a coalition
2014 Elections for constitutional drafting body and parliament.
of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector
Disputed results fuel conflict. U.S. diplomats depart.
Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army (LNA,
2015 International mediation yields agreement to form
alt. “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,” LAAF), attempted to
Government of National Accord (GNA).
seize the capital, Tripoli, from the then-internationally
2016 House of Representatives (HOR) withholds GNA
recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Russia,
endorsement. Islamic State forces defeated in Sirte with
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and leaders of
U.S. military support.
Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR, an interim
2018 Libyan National Army (LNA) controls eastern Libya.
parliament last elected in 2014) backed the LNA. With
2019 LNA offensive against Tripoli; Turkey intervenes.
Turkish military support, the GNA and anti-LNA western
2020 U.N. supports ceasefire negotiations, selects Libyan
Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw. Libya has
Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) members. LPDF agrees to
remained divided since, with foreign forces still present,
roadmap, plans December 2021 elections.
and opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west
2021 LPDF selects Interim Executive Authority members. HOR
of Sirte (Figure 1). During 2020, multilateral diplomatic
approves interim Government of National Unity (GNU).
initiatives helped achieve a ceasefire, and the U.N. has
U.N. Security Council endorses ceasefire monitoring and
deployed civilian monitors at Libyans’ request.
election date, but election postponed.
In 2021, members of a U.N.-appointed Libyan Political
2022 HOR selects replacement interim government. GNU
Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and the HOR approved an interim
leaders retain control of the capital after militia clashes,
executive authority and Government of National Unity
2023 U.N. urges Libyans to organize elections. Violence flares in
(GNU) to replace the GNA, with a mandate to serve until
Tripoli and Benghazi. Extreme flooding strikes eastern
elections or through June 2022. The LPDF and HOR
Libya, kil ing more than 4,000 in Derna and displacing more
endorsed Abdul Hamid Dabaiba as GNU Prime Minister,
than 40,000 people, with 8,000 reported missing.
along with a three-member Presidential Council. The U.N.
Source: Prepared by CRS using ArcGIS and media reporting.
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated discussions
among the GNU, the HOR, and the High Council of State
U.N.: Governance Gaps Harm Libyans
(HCS, an advisory representative body), but was unable to
Since his selection in September 2022, Special
establish a constitutional and legal basis for parliamentary
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Libya
and presidential elections then-planned for December 24,
Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal has consulted with Libyans
2021. The elections were postponed indefinitely and have
and third parties and has attempted to build consensus on
yet to be rescheduled amid ongoing disputes over electoral
organizing and holding legislative and presidential elections
laws and the possibility of a new interim government.
on an agreed constitutional basis. Bathily has said that
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Libya and U.S. Policy
“most institutions lost their legitimacy years ago.” After
assess requirements to reestablish a lasting U.S. diplomatic
massive floods swept through eastern Libya in September
presence in Libya. Congress may consult with the
2023, killing thousands in the city of Derna, Bathily said
Administration on related plans, security needs, and costs.
“The Derna disaster has revealed severe governance
Terrorism and Foreign Military Forces
deficits... Had those governance issues been resolved at the
U.N. and U.S. reporting describe transnational terrorist
national level, they would have mitigated the impact of the
tragedy.”
threats in Libya as reduced and contained. Successive U.S.
Bathily opposes aspects of electoral laws and
governance proposals agreed to in 2023 by a “6+6
Administrations have sought to foster the departure from
Committee” of HOR and HSC members. UNSMIL
Libya of foreign military forces and mercenaries. The U.S.
is
military has monitored and reported on the activities of
organizing high-level national consultations on alternatives.
Russian mercenaries and military equipment in Libya. Press
HOR Speaker Aqilah Saleh and Prime Minister Dabaiba
accounts suggest that some Russian mercenaries may have
both sought election as President in 2021, and Saleh
left Libya to support operations in Ukraine, although Libya
continues to call for Dabaiba’s dismissal and the
reportedly remains a logistical hub for their operations in
replacement of the GNU cabinet. In May 2023, the HOR
sub-Saharan Africa. Forces in eastern Libya shot down a
appointed Osama Hamad to lead its appointed government.
U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle there in August 2022. Turkish
Dabaiba has asserted a continuing mandate and refused to
military advisers train and assist western Libyan forces, and
yield to anything but a nationally elected government.
Turkey recently approved the extension of its military
presence to 2026. The LNA and its opponents reportedly
Haftar, the LNA, and competing western Libyan militias
have used fighters from Syria, Chad, and Sudan.
remain powerful security actors with diverse political aims
and influence. Militia fighting killed dozens in Tripoli in
U.N. Bodies and U.N. and U.S. Sanctions
August 2023, and in October 2023 fighting followed the
The U.N. Security Council has extended UNSMIL’s
LNA’s arrest of a former GNA defense minister. Officers of
mandate through October 2024. The Council has authorized
the Joint Military Commission (“5+5”) that negotiated the
financial and travel sanctions on entities threatening peace
2020 ceasefire continue to meet under U.N. auspices.
in Libya, undermining the political transition, or supporting
Libya’s fiscal and economic dependence on the oil and gas
others who do so. U.S. executive orders provide for
comparable U.S. sanctions. In July 2023, the House did not
sector make the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC),
pass H.J.Res. 70, which would have rescinded the national
the Central Bank, and the state budget objects of intense
emergency related to Libya cited in Executive Orders
competition, as rivals seek access to oil export revenues to
13566 and 13726 that provide for U.S. sanctions.
pay salaries, provide subsidies, and otherwise generate
political and security support. In July 2023, Libya’s
Humanitarian Needs and Migration
Presidential Council established a High Financial Oversight
The U.N. estimates more than 500,000 people in Libya (out
Committee made up of representatives from competing
of 7 million) require some form of humanitarian aid,
factions to oversee public revenue and spending.
including the more than 250,000 affected by September
2023 flooding. U.N. agencies have identified nearly
Libya has the largest proven crude oil reserves in
700,000 foreign migrants, more than 50,000 internally
Africa, but conflict, political rivalry, and neglected
displaced persons, and more than 54,000 refugees and
infrastructure impede the energy sector’s operations
asylum seekers in Libya. Migrants remain vulnerable to
and limit its potential. Oil revenues nominally accrue
extortion, indefinite detention, sexual violence, and other
to a National Oil Corporation account for transfer to
abuses. The State Department reported in 2023 that
the Central Bank to support government spending. In
“Endemic corruption and militias’ influence over
practice, leaders of the NOC and the Central Bank at
government ministries contributed to the GNU’s inability to
times appear to manage funds for political purposes.
effectively address human trafficking.”
Issues in the 118th Congress
U.S. Policy and Selected Issues
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
The Biden Administration has backed U.N. mediation in
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011. The Biden
Libya with the goals of providing for the reunification of
Administration seeks $15.95 million in FY2024 funding for
Libyan institutions and an end to serial interim governing
aid in Libya, and in March 2023 sent Congress a 10-year
arrangements. Like their U.N. counterparts, U.S. officials
plan for aid in Libya pursuant to the Global Fragility Act
encourage dialogue among Libyans and have stated that
(Title V of Division J, P.L. 116-94), under which the
elections are required to resolve disputes over legitimacy.
Administration named Libya as a priority country in 2022.
U.S. diplomats have emphasized the importance of
The Senate Appropriations Committee report
maintaining the ceasefire and of impartial administration of
accompanying S. 2438 to provide for FY2024 foreign
institutions such as the NOC and Central Bank. In engaging
operations appropriations directs that the Administration
other third parties U.S. officials continue to balance Libya-
may not use Prevention and Stabilization Fund (PSF)
specific concerns with other U.S. goals relative to Russia,
monies for GFA programs in Libya.
Egypt, Turkey, France, Italy, and the UAE.
U.S. Special Envoy for Libya Ambassador Richard Norland
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
has led U.S. diplomatic engagement since 2019. U.S.
Affairs
officials operate from a Libya External Office at the U.S.
Embassy in Tunisia. The executive branch continues to
IF11556
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Libya and U.S. Policy


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