Updated April 15, 2022
Libya and U.S. Policy
Eleven years after a 2011 uprising that toppled long-time
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence and Timeline
authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to
make a transition to stable governing arrangements.
Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim
governments (Figure 1), but militias, local leaders, and
subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons
have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs.
The postponement of planned elections in 2021, Libyans’
continuing lack of consensus over constitutional and legal
arrangements, the potential fragility of a United Nations
(U.N.)-backed ceasefire, and the reemergence of
institutional rivalry threaten Libya’s stability and pose
challenges for U.S. decision makers.
Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent
Libya from serving as a permissive environment for
transnational terrorist groups and have taken different
approaches to conflict and competition among Libyans. The
Biden Administration supports the holding of new elections
in Libya and has used U.S. influence to bolster U.N.-led
mediation efforts to that end. Congress has appropriated
funds to enable U.S. diplomacy and aid programs, and some
Members have called for more assertive U.S. engagement.
War, Ceasefire, and a Deferred Election
Conflict re-erupted in Libya in April 2019, when a coalition

2011 Uprising topples Muammar al Qadhafi.
of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector
2012 Parliamentary elections. Transitional cabinet seated.
Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army (LNA,
2014 Constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections.
alt. “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,” LAAF), attempted to
Disputed results fuel conflict. U.S. diplomats depart.
seize the capital, Tripoli, from the internationally
2015 International mediation yields agreement to form
recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Russia,
Government of National Accord (GNA).
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and leaders of
Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR,
2016 House of Representatives (HOR) withholds GNA
an interim
endorsement. Islamic State forces defeated in Sirte with
parliament last elected in 2014) backed the LNA. With
U.S. military support.
Turkish military support, the GNA and anti-LNA western
2018 Libyan National Army (LNA) controls eastern Libya.
Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw. Libya has
2019 LNA offensive against Tripoli; Turkey intervenes.
remained divided since, with foreign forces still present,
2020 U.N. supports ceasefire negotiations, selects Libyan
and opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west
Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) members. LPDF agrees
of Sirte (Figure 1). During 2020, multilateral diplomatic
to roadmap, plans December 2021 elections.
initiatives helped achieve a ceasefire, and the U.N. has
2021 LPDF selects Interim Executive Authority members.
deployed civilian monitors at Libyans’ request.
HOR approves interim Government of National Unity
In 2021, members of a U.N.-appointed Libyan Political
(GNU). U.N. Security Council endorses ceasefire
Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and the HOR approved an interim
monitoring and election date, but election postponed.
executive authority and Government of National Unity
2022 HOR selects replacement interim government and plans
(GNU) to replace the GNA, with a mandate to serve until
constitutional consultations and elections by May 2023.
elections or through June 2022. The U.N. Support Mission
GNU leaders object and retain control of the capital.
in Libya (UNSMIL) then facilitated discussions among
Source: Prepared by CRS using ArcGIS and media reporting.
LPDF members, the HOR, and the High Council of State
Competing Governments Reemerge
(HCS, an advisory representative body) in an attempt to
establish a constitutional and legal basis for parliamentary
In the wake of the election postponement, consultation and
and presidential elections planned for December 24, 2021.
political competition among Libyans has intensified. HOR
However, disputes over candidacy criteria and
Speaker Aqilah Saleh, who had stepped back from his role
constitutional and legal issues persisted, leading to an
in 2021 to seek election as president, has moved to dismiss
indefinite postponement of the elections. U.N. and U.S.
GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba and the GNU
officials have sought to preserve momentum toward prompt
cabinet. Dabaiba, who also had presented himself as a
elections, amid contending Libyan proposals and initiatives.
presidential candidate in spite of a previous pledge not to do
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Libya and U.S. Policy
so, has asserted a continuing mandate and refused to yield
the Administration on related questions pursuant to
to anything but a nationally elected government. In
congressionally mandated security requirements.
February 2022, the HOR endorsed former GNA Interior
Terrorism and Foreign Military Forces
Minister Fathi Bashaga as Prime Minister-designate, and, in
U.N. and U.S. reporting describe transnational terrorist
March, endorsed Bashaga’s proposed cabinet. The HOR
threats in Libya as reduced and contained. Other U.S.
also endorsed a process to establish a constitutional basis
priorities in Libya include preventing the resumption of
for elections by May 2023.
destabilizing conflict, encouraging political accommodation
Bashaga’s initial attempt to assert authority in Tripoli and
and economic development, and fostering the departure
Dabaiba’s resistance created risks of armed confrontation,
from Libya of foreign military forces and mercenaries. The
and a standoff has persisted. The Libyan National Oil
U.S. military supports U.S. diplomatic initiatives and has
Corporation, the Central Bank, and budgetary and fiscal
monitored and reported on the activities of Russian
processes remain subject to intense competition, as each
mercenaries and military equipment in Libya. Press reports
side seeks access to Libyan oil export revenues to pay
suggest that some Russian mercenaries may have left Libya
salaries, provide subsidies, and otherwise generate political
to support operations in Ukraine, although Libya reportedly
and security support. Haftar, the LNA, and western Libyan
remains a logistical hub for their operations in sub-Saharan
militias remain powerful security actors with diverse
Africa. Turkish military advisers train and assist western
political aims and influence. U.S. officials have avoided
Libyan forces in accord with a 2019 Turkey-GNA security
endorsing either government and are encouraging dialogue
agreement. The LNA and its opponents reportedly have
between Bashaga and Dabaiba and engaging Libyans and
used fighters from Syria, Chad, and Sudan.
other foreign counterparts in discussions on crafting
Sanctions and U.N. Bodies
politically neutral fiscal mechanisms for interim use.
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
travel sanctions on entities threatening peace in Libya,
Libya has the largest proven crude oil reserves in
undermining Libya’s political transition, or supporting
Africa, but conflict, political rivalry, and neglected
others who do so. U.S. executive orders provide for
infrastructure impede the energy sector’s operations
comparable U.S. sanctions. The U.N. Security Council may
and limit its potential. Output temporarily fell below 1
consider the extension of UNSMIL’s mandate and proposed
million barrels of oil per day during March 2022 after
reforms to the mission in April 2022. The position of
politically influenced shutdowns. Oil revenues accrue
Special Representative of the Secretary-General is vacant.
to a National Oil Corporation account for transfer to
the Central Bank to support government spending.
Humanitarian Needs and Migrants
The U.N. estimates more than 800,000 people in Libya (out
The political path forward is uncertain. U.N. Special
of 7 million) will require some form of humanitarian aid in
Adviser to the Secretary-General Stephanie Williams
2022. U.N. agencies have identified more than 635,000
continues to press Libyan factions to reach agreement to
foreign migrants, more than 168,000 internally displaced
enable elections before the LPDF-GNU mandate expires in
persons, and more than 43,800 refugees in Libya. Migrants
June 2022. HOR Speaker Saleh, his partners among the
remain especially vulnerable to extortion and other abuses.
LNA leadership, and their foreign backers envision a longer
Conflict Hampers COVID-19 Response
timeline: their approach could further entrench the HOR-
Years of division and conflict have weakened the Libyan
designated government, undermine Dabaiba and the LNA’s
health care system’s ability to mitigate risks from COVID-
western Libyan opponents, and strengthen the HOR’s
19. As of mid-April 2022, Libyan officials have reported
influence over constitutional and electoral processes.
more than 500,000 COVID-19 cases and more than 6,400
U.S. Policy and Selected Issues
COVID-19 deaths. Testing and case tracking are limited.
During and prior to the 2019-2020 clashes, rival executive
Issues in the 117th Congress
authorities based in western and eastern Libya similarly
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
competed for power and international recognition.
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
International mediators intended the formation of the GNU
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011, including
and the holding of new elections to provide a basis for the
under the FY2022 omnibus (P.L. 117-103). In the 117th
reunification of Libyan institutions and an end to serial
Congress, H.R. 1228 and S. 379 would authorize future
interim arrangements. U.S. officials supported U.N.
U.S. assistance, enact U.S. sanctions in statute, and
leadership of these initiatives, emphasized the importance
establish new reporting requirements. The House Foreign
of maintaining the ceasefire, and sought to avoid
Affairs Committee-reported version of H.R. 7311, the
accusations of illegitimate interference by not insisting on
‘Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act,’
specific outcomes. U.S. officials have maintained these
would require reporting on foreign entities that have
approaches in 2022, while balancing Libya-related concerns
supported Russian mercenaries or Russian armed forces
with other U.S. goals in relation to foreign actors, including
operating in Libya and analysis of whether such entities
Russia, Egypt, Turkey, France, Italy, and the UAE.
meet U.S. sanctions criteria. The Biden Administration
U.S. Special Envoy for Libya Ambassador Richard Norland
seeks $44.5 million in FY2023 funding for Libya programs.
leads U.S. diplomatic engagement, and U.S. officials
operate from a Libya External Office at the U.S. Embassy
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
in Tunisia. Press reports suggest U.S. officials are assessing
Affairs
requirements for the reestablishment of a permanent U.S.
diplomatic presence in Libya. Congress may consult with
IF11556
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Libya and U.S. Policy


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11556 · VERSION 15 · UPDATED

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