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Libya and U.S. Policy
Eleven years after a 2011 uprising that toppled long-time
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence and Timeline
authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to
make a transition to stable governing arrangements.
Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim
governments (Figure 1), but militias, local leaders, and
subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons
have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs.
The postponement of planned elections in 2021, Libyans’
continuing lack of consensus over constitutional and legal
arrangements, the potential fragility of a United Nations
(U.N.)-backed ceasefire, and the reemergence of
institutional rivalry threaten Libya’s stability and pose
challenges for U.S. decisionmakers.
Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent
Libya from serving as a permissive environment for
transnational terrorist groups and have taken different
approaches to conflict and competition among Libyans. The
Biden Administration supports the holding of new elections
in Libya and has used U.S. influence to bolster U.N.-led
mediation efforts to that end. Congress has appropriated
funds to enable U.S. diplomacy and aid programs, and some
Members have called for more assertive U.S. engagement.
War, Ceasefire, and a Deferred Election
2011 Uprising topples Muammar al Qadhafi.
Conflict reerupted in Libya in April 2019, when a coalition
2012 Parliamentary elections. Transitional cabinet seated.
of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector
2014 Elections for constitutional drafting body and parliament.
Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army (LNA,
Disputed results fuel conflict. U.S. diplomats depart.
alt. “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,” LAAF), attempted to
2015 International mediation yields agreement to form
seize the capital, Tripoli, from the internationally
Government of National Accord (GNA).
recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Russia,
2016 House of Representatives (HOR) withholds GNA
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and leaders of
endorsement. Islamic State forces defeated in Sirte with
Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR, an interim
U.S. military support.
parliament last elected in 2014) backed the LNA. With
2018 Libyan National Army (LNA) controls eastern Libya.
Turkish military support, the GNA and anti-LNA western
2019 LNA offensive against Tripoli; Turkey intervenes.
Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw. Libya has
2020 U.N. supports ceasefire negotiations, selects Libyan
remained divided since, with foreign forces still present,
Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) members. LPDF agrees to
and opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west
roadmap, plans December 2021 elections.
of Sirte (Figure 1). During 2020, multilateral diplomatic
2021 LPDF selects Interim Executive Authority members. HOR
initiatives helped achieve a ceasefire, and the U.N. has
approves interim Government of National Unity (GNU).
deployed civilian monitors at Libyans’ request.
U.N. Security Council endorses ceasefire monitoring and
In 2021, members of a U.N.-appointed Libyan Political
election date, but election postponed.
Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and the HOR approved an interim
2022 HOR selects replacement interim government. GNU
executive authority and Government of National Unity
leaders object and retain control of the capital. U.N.-led
(GNU) to replace the GNA, with a mandate to serve until
talks seek consensus on constitutional basis for election.
elections or through June 2022. In 2021, the U.N. Support
Protests and militia clashes suggest growing tensions.
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated discussions among
Source: Prepared by CRS using ArcGIS and media reporting.
LPDF members, the HOR, and the High Council of State
(HCS, an advisory representative body) in an attempt to
Competing Governments Reemerge
establish a constitutional and legal basis for parliamentary
In the wake of the election postponement, consultation and
and presidential elections planned for December 24, 2021.
political competition among Libyans has intensified. Haftar,
However, disputes over candidacy criteria and
the LNA, and competing western Libyan militias remain
constitutional and legal issues persisted, leading to an
powerful security actors with diverse political aims and
indefinite postponement of the elections. U.N. and U.S.
influence. HOR Speaker Aqilah Saleh, who had stepped
officials have sought to preserve momentum toward prompt
back from his role in 2021 to seek election as president,
elections, amid contending Libyan proposals and initiatives.
moved to dismiss GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid
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Libya and U.S. Policy
Dabaiba and the GNU cabinet. Dabaiba, who also had
U.S. Special Envoy for Libya Ambassador Richard Norland
presented himself as a presidential candidate in spite of a
has led U.S. diplomatic engagement since 2019. U.S.
previous pledge not to do so, has asserted a continuing
officials operate from a Libya External Office at the U.S.
mandate and refused to yield to anything but a nationally
Embassy in Tunisia. Press reports suggest U.S. officials are
elected government. In February 2022, the HOR endorsed
assessing requirements to reestablish a permanent U.S.
former GNA Interior Minister Fathi Bashaga as Prime
diplomatic presence in Libya. Congress may consult with
Minister-designate, and, in March, endorsed Bashaga’s
the Administration pursuant to security requirements.
proposed cabinet. U.S. officials encourage dialogue among
Terrorism and Foreign Military Forces
Libyans and have stated that elections are required to
U.N. and U.S. reporting describe transnational terrorist
resolve disputes over legitimacy.
threats in Libya as reduced and contained. Other U.S.
Since May, Bashaga’s attempts to enter and assert authority
priorities in Libya include preventing the resumption of
in Tripoli, resistance from Dabaiba and local militias, and
destabilizing conflict, encouraging political accommodation
struggles for control of the Libyan National Oil Corporation
and economic development, and fostering the departure
(NOC) have resulted in some armed confrontations. Libya’s
from Libya of foreign military forces and mercenaries. The
fiscal and economic dependence on the oil and gas sector
U.S. military supports U.S. diplomatic initiatives and has
make the NOC, the Central Bank, and budgetary and fiscal
monitored and reported on the activities of Russian
processes objects of intense competition, as rivals seek
mercenaries and military equipment in Libya. Press reports
access to oil export revenues to pay salaries, provide
suggest that some Russian mercenaries may have left Libya
subsidies, and otherwise generate political and security
to support operations in Ukraine, although Libya reportedly
support. In July, Dabaiba moved to replace long time NOC
remains a logistical hub for their operations in sub-Saharan
Chairman Mustafa Sanalla with Farhat Bengdara. Allies of
Africa. Turkish military advisers train and assist western
Haftar and the LNA subsequently suspended their protest
Libyan forces in accord with a 2019 Turkey-GNA security
blockade of national oil facilities, which had severely
agreement. The LNA and its opponents reportedly have
reduced national oil exports since April.
used fighters from Syria, Chad, and Sudan.
Sanctions and U.N. Bodies
Libya has the largest proven crude oil reserves in
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
Africa, but conflict, political rivalry, and neglected
travel sanctions on entities threatening peace in Libya,
infrastructure impede the energy sector’s operations
undermining the political transition, or supporting others
and limit its potential. Oil revenues accrue to a
who do so. U.S. executive orders provide for comparable
National Oil Corporation account for transfer to the
U.S. sanctions. In July, the Security Council extended
Central Bank to support government spending.
UNSMIL’s mandate through October 2022. The position of
Special Representative of the Secretary-General is vacant.
The political path forward is uncertain. Through June, U.N.
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General Stephanie
Humanitarian Needs, Migrants, and Food Security
Williams led talks that produced some agreement on a
The U.N. estimates more than 800,000 people in Libya (out
constitutional basis for elections, but key differences remain
of 7 million) will require some form of humanitarian aid in
unresolved, and U.N. consultations over Williams’
2022. U.N. agencies have identified more than 635,000
replacement are ongoing. HOR Speaker Saleh, his partners
foreign migrants, more than 168,000 internally displaced
among the LNA leadership, and their foreign backers have
persons, and more than 43,800 refugees in Libya. Migrants
proposed a longer election timeline and seek to appoint
remain especially vulnerable to extortion and other abuses.
additional figures under the HOR-designated government.
Libya imports most of its food, and the U.S. government
Military officers of the Joint Military Commission (“5+5”)
reports that Russia and Ukraine provide more than half of
that negotiated the October 2020 ceasefire met in Tripoli in
Libya’s wheat and grain supply. Rising food and fuel prices
July 2022 to resume military reunification talks. Violence
have created hardship for Libyan citizens, while oil facility
and militia mobilization in western Libya in July led U.N.
blockades have resulted in forgone oil export revenues.
and U.S. officials to reiterate calls for calm, dialogue, and
an end to unilateral steps involving state institutions.
Issues in the 117th Congress
U.S. Policy and Selected Issues
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
During and prior to the 2019-2020 clashes, rival executive
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011. In the 117th
authorities based in western and eastern Libya competed for
Congress, the House-passed version of the National
power and international recognition. International mediators
Defense Authorization Act of 2023 (H.R. 7900) includes a
intended the formation of the GNU and the holding of new
revised version of the previously House-passed Libya
elections to provide a basis for the reunification of Libyan
Stabilization Act (H.R. 1228; S. 379) that would authorize
institutions and an end to serial interim arrangements. U.S.
future U.S. assistance, enact U.S. sanctions in statute, and
officials supported U.N. leadership of these initiatives,
establish new reporting requirements. The Biden
emphasized the importance of maintaining the ceasefire and
Administration seeks $44.5 million in FY2023 funding for
the neutrality of institutions such as the NOC, and sought to
Libya programs.
avoid accusations of illegitimate interference by not
insisting on specific outcomes. U.S. officials have
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
maintained these approaches in 2022, while balancing
Affairs
Libya-related concerns with other U.S. goals in relation to
Russia, Egypt, Turkey, France, Italy, and the UAE.
IF11556
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Libya and U.S. Policy
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