Updated March 10, 2021
Libya and U.S. Policy
Libyans Reach Truce, Look to Elections
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence
Ten years after a 2011 uprising toppled longtime
authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to
make a transition to stable governing arrangements.
Militias, local leaders, and coalitions of national figures
backed by competing foreign patrons have remained the
most powerful arbiters of public affairs.
Conflict re-erupted in Libya in April 2019, when a coalition
of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector
Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army
movement (LNA, in Arabic: “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,”
LAAF) leveraged support from Russia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Egypt to attempt to seize the capital, Tripoli,
from the interim Government of National Accord (GNA)
and local militias. With Turkish military support, the GNA
and western Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw.
Libya has remained divided since, with opposing forces
separated by a line of control west of Sirte (Figure 1).
From April 2019 through December 2020, fighting between
LNA forces, GNA supporters, and anti-LNA militias killed
more than 500 civilians and displaced more than 200,000
people according to United Nations (U.N.) estimates. U.S.
and U.N. officials have condemned “persistent” weapons
shipments to Libya as violations of the U.N. arms embargo.

2011 Uprising topples Muammar al Qadhafi.
Since 2020, new multilateral diplomatic initiatives have
2012 Parliamentary elections. Transitional cabinet seated.
sought to achieve a ceasefire among warring Libyan
2014 Constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections.
groups, reduce foreign interference, and relaunch political
Disputed results fuel conflict. U.S. diplomats depart.
reconciliation. Meeting in Berlin in January 2020, Libyan
2015 International mediation yields agreement to form
rivals and foreign powers agreed to a 55-point agenda,
Government of National Accord (GNA).
including the establishment of a GNA-LNA Joint Military
2016 Parliament withholds endorsement of GNA. Islamic
Commission (JMC, or “5+5” because of its ten members) to
State forces defeated in Sirte with U.S. military support.
consult on requirements for a ceasefire. After U.N.-backed
2018 Libyan National Army consolidates control in east Libya.
talks succeeded in October 2020 in establishing an interim,
2019 Libyan National Army launches offensive against Tripoli.
90-day ceasefire, U.N. officials selected and convened a 75-
2020 U.N. supports ceasefire negotiations, selects Libyan
member Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) to restart
Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) members. LPDF agrees
the country’s disrupted political transition.
to roadmap, plans December 2021 elections.
Meeting under U.N. auspices, LPDF members agreed that
2021 LPDF selects Interim Executive Authority members.
Libya would hold a constitutional referendum prior to
HOR approves Government of National Unity cabinet.
national parliamentary and executive elections on
Source: Prepared by CRS using media and social media reporting.
December 24, 2021 (the seventieth anniversary of Libyan
Tobruk to serve as chairman of the Presidential Council,
independence). The LPDF also adopted rules for the
with southerner Musa Al Koni and westerner Abdullah Al
selection of an interim executive authority to govern until
Lafi as his deputies. Misratan engineer and former Qadhafi-
the elections and oversee preparations. The Biden
era official Abdul Hamid Dabaiba was chosen as Prime
Administration supports maintaining the ceasefire and has
Minister-designate. On March 10, the House of
pledged to assist in preparations for the planned elections.
Representatives (HOR, Libya’s interim parliament, last
Interim Executive Authority Approved
elected in 2014) approved Dabaiba’s proposed cabinet. U.S.
On February 5, members of the LPDF voted to select
Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland extended his
members for an interim three-person Presidential Council
“congratulations on the formation of an interim unity
and interim Prime Minister. Choosing from lists that each
government to set the stage for elections in December.”
drew members from Libya’s western, eastern, and southern
Though many key actors have released statements
regions, the LPDF narrowly selected a list of less well
welcoming the LPDF and HOR decisions, Libyan factions
known figures over a list that included serving officials.
and their foreign supporters appear to retain deep
The LPDF chose Mohamed Menfi of the eastern city of
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Libya and U.S. Policy
differences in their preferred models for governance for the
Conflict Hampers COVID-19 Response
country, military command arrangements, resource sharing,
Years of division and conflict have weakened the Libyan
the role of Islam in public life, and Libya’s international
health care system’s ability to mitigate risks from the
partnerships. Recent protests have demanded better services
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). In August 2020,
and economic relief.
then-Acting UNSMIL head Stephanie Williams called
Security Conditions Remain Tense
“fragmented governance” a “serious obstacle to the
COVID-19 response,” but UNSMIL reported in January
According to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya
(UNSMIL), “
2021 that it expected COVID-19 response plans would be
a de facto truce” prevailed in central Libya as
consolidated in the near future. Libyan officials have
of January 2021, and LNA forces have fortified positions
reported more than 126,000 cases of COVID-19 and nearly
along a front south and west of Sirte. The October 2020
2,000 COVID-19 deaths, but there are clear limits in testing
ceasefire agreement called for the departure of mercenaries
and gaps in public health monitoring capacity.
and foreign fighters along with the suspension of foreign
training and the departure of trainers. However, as of
U.S. Policy and Outlook
February 2021, mercenaries reportedly remain in Libya,
U.S. officials engage Libyans and monitor U.S. aid
including forces affiliated with the Wagner Group of
programs via the Libya External Office (LEO) at the U.S.
Russia. On January 22, 2021, press reports citing U.S.
Embassy in Tunisia. For years, U.S. diplomats and officials
officials reported that Wagner Group mercenaries were
have emphasized political solutions to Libya’s conflicts, but
constructing sophisticated defensive fortifications in LNA-
have not convinced or compelled Libyans and their various
controlled central Libya. Both sides have recruited and
patrons to disengage from confrontation. U.S. diplomats in
deployed Syrian militias. Turkish military advisers continue
July 2020 stated U.S. “opposition to all foreign
to train and assist GNA forces in accord with a 2019
interference,” while engaging with all sides in an “active
Turkey-GNA security agreement. Weapons shipments to
neutrality” approach. U.S. officials support the UNSMIL-
both sides reportedly continue.
led negotiation processes and (as noted) have called on all
U.N. officials estimate that as many as 1.2 million Libyans
parties in Libya and foreign governments to support the
will require some form of humanitarian assistance in 2021.
decisions reached by the LPDF. Officials identify
Recent U.N. data has identified more than 574,000 foreign
counterterrorism as the top U.S. priority in Libya, and
migrants, more than 316,000 internally displaced persons,
balance Libya-related concerns with other U.S. goals in
and nearly 44,000 refugees in Libya. Migrants remain
relation to foreign actors.
especially vulnerable to extortion and other abuses.
The U.S. military supported U.S. diplomatic initiatives and
U.N. Recommends Ceasefire Monitoring Mission
monitored and reported on the activities of Russian
In December 2020, U.N. Secretary-General António
mercenaries and military equipment in Libya during 2020.
Guterres recommended that the Security Council amend
U.S. forces have conducted intermittent targeted strikes
UNSMIL’s mandate to include support for a ceasefire
against terrorist targets in Libya (most recently
monitoring mechanism. Guterres relayed the request of the
acknowledging strikes in September 2019) citing authority
Libyan JMC for “unarmed, non-uniformed individual
under the 2001 AUMF as well as constitutional authorities.
international monitors to be deployed under the auspices of
According to UNSMIL, as of 2021, the Islamic State
the United Nations.” According to the Secretary-General,
organization and Al Qaeda fighters have been
Libyan interlocutors “have also conveyed their firm
“operationally weakened” in Libya but remain a threat.
position that no deployment of foreign forces of any kind,
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
including United Nations uniformed personnel [i.e.
travel sanctions on those responsible for threatening “the
peacekeepers], should occur on Libyan territory.” In
peace, stability or security of Libya,” obstructing or
February, the Security Council directed the Secretary-
undermining “the successful completion of its political
General to deploy an advance monitoring mission.
transition,” or supporting others who do so. In parallel to
UNSMIL is a “special political mission” and receives U.S.
these U.N. measures, U.S. executive orders provide for U.S.
financial support indirectly through U.S. funding for the
sanctions on those threatening peace in Libya.
United Nations via the Contributions to International
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
Organizations (CIO) account. Former U.N. Iraq and
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
Lebanon envoy Ján Kubiš began serving as U.N. Special
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011. In the 117th
Envoy for Libya and head of UNSMIL on February 8.
Congress, companion legislation introduced in the House of
Oil Sector Recovers, Finances Strained
Representatives and Senate (H.R. 1228 and S. 379), would
Libya has the largest proven crude oil reserves in Africa,
authorize future U.S. assistance, provide a legislative basis
but conflict challenges and neglected infrastructure threaten
for U.S. sanctions, and establish new reporting
the energy sector’s operations. As of February, Libya
requirements. Congress allocated not less than $30 million
produced more than 1 million barrels of oil per day, down
in FY2021 aid for “stabilization assistance for Libya,
from 1.4 million barrels per day in 2011. Oil revenues
including support for a United Nations-facilitated political
accrue to a National Oil Corporation account in accordance
process and border security” under P.L. 116-260.
with an U.N.-brokered agreement. Since 2011, public debt
has deepened and currency reserves have declined. Millions
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
of Libyan households depend on public sector employment
Affairs
and subsidies, which dominate state spending.
IF11556
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Libya and U.S. Policy


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11556 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED

---