Updated September 2, 2021
Libya and U.S. Policy
Ten years after the start of a 2011 uprising that toppled
In July 2021, UNSMIL head Ján Kubiš observed that, “the
longtime authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya
situation in Libya is becoming more difficult,
has yet to make a transition to stable governing
confrontational and tense. Institutional, political and
arrangements. Elections and diplomacy have produced a
individual interests stand in the way of agreeing on the
series of interim governments (Figure 1), but militias, local
necessary legal framework for holding the elections on 24
leaders, and coalitions of national figures backed by
December, as agreed in the LPDF road map, endorsed by
competing foreign patrons have remained the most
the Security Council.” He further warned that, “The unity
powerful arbiters of public affairs.
of the Joint Military Commission and the implementation of
the agreement could unravel if the political process remains
Conflict re-erupted in Libya in April 2019, when a coalition
stalled,” and said, “The continued presence of foreign
of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector
forces, mercenaries and foreign fighters also threatens the
Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army
ceasefire.”
movement (LNA, in Arabic: “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,”
In August 2021, he said, “time is running out.”
LAAF) leveraged support from Russia, the United Arab
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence
Emirates (UAE), and Egypt to attempt to seize the capital,
Tripoli, from an interim Government of National Accord
(GNA) and local militias. With Turkish military support,
the GNA and western Libyan militias forced the LNA to
withdraw. Libya has remained divided since, with foreign
forces remaining present and the main opposing coalitions
separated by a line of control west of Sirte (Figure 1).
During 2020, multilateral diplomatic initiatives helped
achieve a ceasefire, and in April 2021, the United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council endorsed plans to deploy civilian
ceasefire monitoring personnel at Libyans’ request.
Delegates to a U.N.-convened Libyan Political Dialogue
Forum and members of Libya’s House of Representatives
(HOR, interim parliament last elected in 2014) approved an
interim executive authority and interim Government of
National Unity (GNU) to replace the GNA in March 2021.
The U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is
facilitating discussions among LPDF members, the HOR,
and the High Council of State (HCS, an advisory
representative body) to establish a constitutional basis and
law for parliamentary and presidential elections planned for
December 24, 2021. U.S. officials continue to call for an
end to foreign interference in Libya and for holding the

elections as scheduled.
2011 Uprising topples Muammar al Qadhafi.
U.N. Endorses Ceasefire Monitoring
2012 Parliamentary elections. Transitional cabinet seated.
2014 Constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections.
In October 2020, U.N.-backed talks among members of a
Disputed results fuel conflict. U.S. diplomats depart.
Joint Military Commission (JMC, or “5+5” because of its
2015 International mediation yields agreement to form
equal make-up of GNA/LNA delegates) established a
Government of National Accord (GNA).
temporary ceasefire. The agreement called for the departure
2016 Parliament withholds endorsement of GNA. Islamic
of mercenaries and foreign fighters along with the
State forces defeated in Sirte with U.S. military support.
suspension of foreign training and the departure of trainers.
2018 Libyan National Army consolidates control in east Libya.
The ceasefire has held through August 2021, although
2019 Libyan National Army launches offensive against Tripoli.
foreign forces have not departed. In April 2021, the U.N.
2020 U.N. supports ceasefire negotiations, selects Libyan
Security Council endorsed Resolution 2570, approving the
Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) members. LPDF agrees
“scalable and incremental deployment” of ceasefire
to roadmap, plans December 2021 elections.
monitors and strongly urging member states “to respect and
2021 LPDF selects Interim Executive Authority members.
support the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement,
HOR approves interim Government of National Unity
including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and
cabinet. U.N. Security Council endorses ceasefire
mercenaries from Libya without delay.” Preparations for
monitoring and date for December 2021 election.
the monitoring mission are ongoing.
Source: Prepared by CRS using media and social media reporting.
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Libya and U.S. Policy
U.S. officials reported in January 2021 that forces affiliated
U.S. Policy and Outlook
with the Wagner Group of Russia were constructing
For years, U.S. diplomats and officials have emphasized
sophisticated defensive fortifications in LNA-controlled
political solutions to Libya’s conflicts, but have not
central Libya. Turkish military advisers continue to train
convinced or compelled Libyans and their various patrons
and assist western Libyan forces in accord with a 2019
to disengage from confrontation. U.S. officials support
Turkey-GNA security agreement. Both sides have recruited
UNSMIL-led negotiation processes and welcomed the
and deployed Syrian militias. Fighters from neighboring
establishment of the interim executive authority and GNU.
Chad left Libya in April 2021 and launched operations that
U.S. Special Envoy for Libya and Ambassador to Libya
resulted in the death of Chad’s long-time president, Idriss
Richard Norland emphasizes U.S. support for holding
Déby. The U.S. Embassy in Libya asserted that the Chadian
elections in December 2021 and for the withdrawal of
fighters’ offensive “again highlights the urgent need for a
foreign forces from Libya as required by the October 2020
unified, stable Libya with control over its borders.”
ceasefire agreement. In May 2021, a State Department
spokesperson said “t
Civilian Protection and Human Rights
his includes the need for the departure
of Russian mercenary and proxy forces, Turkish forces and
Through December 2020, fighting between LNA forces,
all foreign military forces, mercenaries, proxies and foreign
GNA supporters, and anti-LNA militias had killed more
fighters, including those from Syria, Chad and Sudan, and
than 500 civilians and displaced more than 200,000 people
the need to end any support for foreign military
according to U.N. estimates. The U.N. estimated that as
intervention, including from the UAE.” U.S. officials
many as 1.2 million people in Libya (out of 7 million)
continue to balance Libya-related concerns with other U.S.
would require some form of humanitarian assistance in
goals in relation to foreign actors.
2021. Access constraints have decreased since early 2020.
U.N. agencies have identified nearly 600,000 foreign
U.S. officials engage Libyans and monitor U.S. aid
migrants, more than 212,000 internally displaced persons,
programs via the Libya External Office (LEO) at the U.S.
and more than 42,000 refugees in Libya. Migrants remain
Embassy in Tunisia. Press reports suggest that the
especially vulnerable to extortion and other abuses.
Administration is assessing the security and logistical
Interim Government of National Unity
requirements necessary to return U.S. diplomats to Libya on
a full time basis. The U.S. military supports U.S. diplomatic
In 2020, U.N. officials selected and convened a 75-member
initiatives and has monitored and reported on the activities
Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) to restart the
country’s disrupted political transition.
of Russian mercenaries and military equipment in Libya.
Based on an agreed
roadmap, in February 2021, members of the LPDF
U.S. and U.N. officials cite persistent terrorist threats. U.S.
nominated an interim three-person Presidential Council and
forces have conducted targeted strikes against terrorist
interim Prime Minister to replace the GNA and lead the
targets in Libya citing the 2001 AUMF as well as
country until elections in December 2021. Mohamed Menfi
constitutional authorities. In July 2021, UNSMIL reported
of the eastern city of Tobruk serves as chairman of the
that the “lack of a centralized and coordinated approach”
Presidential Council, with southerner Musa Al Koni and
among Libyans is allowing space to a “renewed terrorist
westerner Abdullah Al Lafi as his deputies. On March 10,
threat by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic
the HOR approved the cabinet proposed by interim Prime
State/Da’esh, particularly in the south.”
Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, an engineer and former
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
Qadhafi-era official from the western city of Misrata.
travel sanctions on those responsible for threatening “the
Oil Sector Recovers, Finances Strained
peace, stability or security of Libya,” obstructing or
Libya has the largest proven crude oil reserves in Africa,
undermining “the successful completion of its political
but conflict, political rivalry, and neglected infrastructure
transition,” or supporting others who do so. In parallel to
impede the energy sector’s operations. As of July 2021,
these U.N. measures, U.S. executive orders provide for U.S.
Libya produced roughly 1.1 million barrels of oil per day,
sanctions on those threatening peace in Libya.
down from 1.4 million barrels per day in 2011. Oil revenues
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
accrue to a National Oil Corporation account in accordance
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
with an U.N.-brokered agreement. Since 2011, public debt
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011. In the 117th
has deepened and currency reserves have declined. Millions
Congress, H.R. 1228 and S. 379 would authorize future
of Libyan households depend on public sector employment
U.S. assistance, provide a legislative basis for U.S.
and subsidies, which dominate state spending. Ongoing
sanctions, and establish new reporting requirements.
disputes over the leadership of state financial institutions,
Congress allocated not less than $30 million in FY2021 aid
oil sector spending, and budget priorities underscore the
for “stabilization assistance for Libya, including support for
continued influence of political rivalries on state finances.
a United Nations-facilitated political process and border
Conflict Hampers COVID-19 Response
security” under P.L. 116-260. The Biden Administration
Years of division and conflict have weakened the Libyan
seeks $43 million in FY2022 funding for Libya programs.
health care system’s ability to mitigate risks from
The House Appropriations Committee recommended funds
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). In May 2021,
for Libya above FY2021 levels for FY2022 (H.R. 4373).
UNSMIL reported that “the COVID-19 pandemic
continued to overwhelm the health system in Libya.”
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Libyan officials have reported nearly 306,000 COVID-19
Affairs
cases and more than 4,180 COVID-19 deaths. Testing and
public health monitoring capacity remain limited.
IF11556
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Libya and U.S. Policy


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11556 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED

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