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Updated August 3, 2020
Libya and U.S. Policy
Conflict and COVID-19 Threaten Libya
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence
Major conflict erupted in Libya in April 2019, when the
As of June 16, 2020, No Major Changes as of August 3, 2020
“Libyan National Army”/“Libyan Arab Armed Forces”
(LNA/LAAF) movement—a coalition of armed groups led
by Khalifa Haftar—launched a bid to seize the capital,
Tripoli, from militias and the internationally recognized
Government of National Accord (GNA).
Fighters in western Libya rallied with Turkish military
support to blunt the LNA’s advance, and Haftar’s forces
withdrew from northwestern Libya in June 2020. The LNA
and its local partners control much of Libya’s territory and
key oil production and export infrastructure (Figure 1). The
GNA and anti-LNA groups control Tripoli and the western
coast and seek to assert control over the entire country.
Southern Libya is marginalized and faces threats from
criminals, rival ethnic militias, and terrorists. The U.S.
government supports a ceasefire, but the rival coalitions
(Figure 2) are preparing for more fighting in central Libya.
Conflict dynamics shifted in 2019 and early 2020 as
Russian-national Wagner Group contractors intervened on
behalf of the LNA, Turkey and the GNA concluded
maritime and security cooperation agreements, Turkey
deployed fighters and arms on behalf of the GNA, and
outsiders shipped weapons to both sides. According to U.S.
officials, Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates arm
the LNA and aid its operations. Turkey provides overt
Source: Prepared by CRS using media and social media reporting.
military support to anti-LNA forces. Both sides have
recruited and deployed Syrian militias. Egypt has prepared
Years of division and conflict have weakened the Libyan
to intervene militarily if GNA and Turkish forces advance
health care system’s ability to mitigate risks related to the
further east; GNA and Turkish forces seek to control all of
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). In April, Acting
Libya and demand that LNA forces and foreign mercenaries
UNSMIL head Stephanie Williams said ongoing fighting
withdraw beyond the “oil crescent” east of Sirte.
was “stretching the capacity of local authorities and the
health infrastructure that is already decimated.”
Nongovernment conflict observers estimate that fighting
between LNA forces, GNA supporters, and anti-LNA
U.S. and U.N. officials have condemned post-Berlin
militias has killed more than 2,400 fighters, along with
weapons shipments to Libya as violations of the U.N. arms
more than 430 civilians since April 2019. More than
embargo and called for a humanitarian ceasefire to allow
400,000 Libyans are internally displaced, and mines left by
the country to combat the spread of COVID-19. Following
retreating LNA forces are complicating the return of
its retreat, the LNA proposed a ceasefire and reengaged in
displaced civilians in western Libya. More than 650,000
U.N.-sponsored talks. Russia, Turkey, and Egypt also have
foreign migrants (largely from sub-Saharan Africa) also are
reengaged Libyan figures. Amid some continued fighting,
in Libya and remain especially vulnerable.
humanitarian access is restricted. Oil production also
remains disrupted, which threatens state finances.
In 2020, multilateral diplomatic initiatives have sought to
achieve and sustain a ceasefire as a precursor to renewed
A Long-Troubled Transition
political reconciliation efforts. Meeting in Berlin, Germany
Libya’s political transition has been disrupted by armed
in January, the five permanent members of the U.N.
nonstate groups and threatened by the indecision and
Security Council and other key foreign actors jointly
infighting of interim leaders for years. After an armed
committed to new arrangements aimed at permanently
uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Muammar al
ending the conflict. GNA and LNA figures attended, but
Qadhafi in 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form
did not commit to a ceasefire. The Security Council
a stable government, address pressing security issues,
endorsed the Berlin arrangements in Resolution 2510. The
reshape the country’s public finances, or create a viable
U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) then supported
framework for post-conflict reconciliation. Insecurity
security, political, and economic discussions, but pandemic
spread as local armed groups competed for influence and
concerns and renewed fighting undermined progress.
resources.
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Libya and U.S. Policy
Figure 2. Libya: Principal Coalitions
Source: Prepared by CRS.
Qadhafi’s rule compounded stabilization and transition
At present, key Libyan actors and their foreign supporters
challenges by depriving Libyans of experience in self-
appear to have deep differences in their preferred models
government, preventing the development of civil society,
for governance for the country, military command
and leaving state institutions weak. Armed militia groups,
arrangements, resource sharing, the role of Islam in public
local leaders, and coalitions of national figures with
life, and Libya’s international partnerships.
competing foreign patrons have remained the most
U.S. Policy and Outlook
powerful arbiters of public affairs.
For years, U.S. diplomats and officials have emphasized the
The U.N. Security Council praised Libya’s administration
importance of a political solution, but have not convinced
of elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional
or compelled Libyans and their various patrons to
drafting assembly in 2012 and 2014, but declining rates of
disengage from confrontation. U.S. diplomats in July 2020
participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum
stated U.S. “opposition to all foreign interference” and
political competition have marred the country’s democratic
described “the imperative of an immediate ceasefire,” while
exercises. Insecurity deepened amid terrorist attacks on
engaging with all sides in an “active neutrality” approach.
U.S. and other international targets in 2012, and coalitions
Officials identify counterterrorism as the top U.S. priority
of rival armed groups clashed in 2014, driven by
in Libya, and balance Libya-related concerns with other
overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and
U.S. goals in relation to foreign actors. U.S. officials back
transnational rivalries. In the conflict’s aftermath, the
U.N.-led dialogue to achieve a lasting ceasefire, define a
country’s transitional institutions fragmented, and the LNA
roadmap for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and
movement began a long fight against Islamist groups and
promote the transparent management of Libya’s oil
critics in and around Benghazi.
revenue.
In December 2015, some Libyan leaders endorsed a U.N.-
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
brokered political agreement to create a Government of
travel sanctions on those responsible for threatening “the
National Accord to oversee the completion of the transition.
peace, stability or security of Libya,” obstructing or
GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Sarraj and
undermining “the successful completion of its political
members of a GNA Presidency Council tried to implement
transition,” or supporting others who do so. A U.N. arms
the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) but faced
embargo is in place, but many actors, including some U.S.
resistance from defiant militias, scorn from a rival interim
partners, violate its provisions. In parallel to these U.N.
government and leaders of Libya’s House of
measures, U.S. executive orders provide for U.S. sanctions
Representatives (HOR) in the east, and hostility from
on those threatening peace in Libya. U.S. officials engage
Khalifa Haftar’s LNA/LAAF movement. This hostility
Libyans and monitor U.S. aid programs via the Libya
erupted into conflict in 2019.
External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia.
On the surface, the conflict in Libya pits two primary
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
factions and their various foreign and local backers against
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
each other in what appears to be a straightforward contest
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011. In July 2020,
for control over the capital and the organs of state power.
the House Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed the Libya
However, beneath the surface, complicated local interests,
Stabilization Act (H.R. 4644, see also S. 2934), which
foreign agendas, personal grudges, identity-based concerns,
would authorize future U.S. assistance, provide a legislative
profit motives, and ideological rivalries shape political and
basis for U.S. sanctions, and define mechanisms for
security developments. Leading Libyan coalitions suffer
additional oversight of U.S. policy.
from internal divisions and political legitimacy deficits
stemming from the extended, fractious nature of the
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
transition period. Victory or surrender by either side could
Affairs
spur new fighting within their ranks. Outside powers have
IF11556
exploited these factors, frustrating mediation efforts.
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Libya and U.S. Policy
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11556 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED