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Updated September 21, 2020
Libya and U.S. Policy
Conflict and COVID-19 Threaten Libya
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence
Major conflict erupted in Libya in April 2019, when the
As of September 2020
“Libyan National Army”/“Libyan Arab Armed Forces”
(LNA/LAAF) movement—a coalition of armed groups led
by Khalifa Haftar—launched a bid to seize the capital,
Tripoli, from militias and the internationally recognized
Government of National Accord (GNA).
Fighters in western Libya rallied with Turkish military
support to blunt the LNA’s advance, and Haftar’s forces
withdrew from northwestern Libya in June 2020. The LNA
and its local partners control much of Libya’s territory and
key oil production and export infrastructure (Figure 1). The
GNA and anti-LNA groups control Tripoli and the western
coast and seek to assert control over the entire country.
Southern Libya is marginalized and faces threats from
criminals, rival ethnic militias, and terrorists. The U.S.
government has supported a ceasefire, while rival coalitions
(Figure 2) have prepared to fight and restarted negotiations.
Conflict dynamics shifted in 2019 and early 2020 as
Russian-national Wagner Group contractors intervened on
behalf of the LNA, Turkey and the GNA concluded
maritime and security cooperation agreements, Turkey
deployed fighters and arms on behalf of the GNA, and
outsiders shipped weapons to both sides. According to U.S.
officials, Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates arm
the LNA and aid its operations. Turkey provides overt
Source: Prepared by CRS using media and social media reporting.
military support to anti-LNA forces. Both sides have
recruited and deployed Syrian militias. Egypt has prepared
Years of division and conflict have weakened the health
to intervene militarily if GNA and Turkish forces advance
care system’s ability to mitigate risks from the Coronavirus
further east; GNA and Turkish forces have sought to
Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Acting UNSMIL head
control all of Libya and demanded that LNA forces
Stephanie Williams has called “fragmented governance” a
withdraw beyond the “oil crescent” east of Sirte.
“
serious obstacle to the COVID-19 response,” and said in
August that humanitarian access remains restricted.
Nongovernment conflict observers estimate that fighting
between LNA forces, GNA supporters, and anti-LNA
U.S. and U.N. officials have condemned “persistent” post-
militias has killed more than 2,400 fighters, along with
Berlin weapons shipments to Libya as violations of the
more than 430 civilians since April 2019. More than
U.N. arms embargo and called for a humanitarian ceasefire
425,000 Libyans are internally displaced, and mines left by
to allow the country to combat the spread of COVID-19. In
retreating LNA forces have complicated the return of
August and September 2020, some GNA officials and their
displaced civilians in western Libya. More than 650,000
rivals in the House of Representatives (HOR) and interim
foreign migrants (largely from sub-Saharan Africa) also are
government each proposed different arrangements for a
in Libya and remain especially vulnerable.
ceasefire and, conditionally, to allow oil exports to resume.
Both sides were positioned to resume fighting if necessary.
In 2020, multilateral diplomatic initiatives have sought to
achieve and sustain a ceasefire as a precursor to renewed
A Long-Troubled Transition
political reconciliation efforts. Meeting in Berlin, Germany
Libya’s political transition has been disrupted by armed
in January, the five permanent members of the U.N.
nonstate groups and threatened by the indecision and
Security Council and other key foreign actors jointly
infighting of interim leaders for years. After an armed
committed to new arrangements aimed at permanently
uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Muammar al
ending the conflict. GNA and LNA figures attended, but
Qadhafi in 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form
did not commit to a ceasefire. The Security Council
a stable government, address security issues, reshape the
endorsed the Berlin arrangements in Resolution 2510. The
country’s finances, or create a viable framework for post-
U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) then supported
conflict reconciliation. Insecurity spread as local armed
security, political, and economic discussions, but pandemic
groups competed for influence and resources.
concerns and renewed fighting undermined progress.
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Libya and U.S. Policy
Figure 2. Libya: Principal Coalitions
Source: Prepared by CRS.
Qadhafi’s rule compounded stabilization and transition
Though some talks have resumed, Libyan factions and their
challenges by depriving Libyans of experience in self-
foreign supporters appear to retain deep differences in their
government, preventing the development of civil society,
preferred models for governance for the country, military
and leaving state institutions weak. Armed militia groups,
command arrangements, resource sharing, the role of Islam
local leaders, and coalitions of national figures with
in public life, and Libya’s international partnerships.
competing foreign patrons have remained the most
U.S. Policy and Outlook
powerful arbiters of public affairs.
For years, U.S. diplomats and officials have emphasized the
The U.N. Security Council praised Libya’s administration
importance of a political solution, but have not convinced
of elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional
or compelled Libyans and their various patrons to
drafting assembly in 2012 and 2014, but declining rates of
disengage from confrontation. U.S. diplomats in July 2020
participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum
stated U.S. “opposition to all foreign interference” and
political competition have marred the country’s democratic
described “the imperative of an immediate ceasefire,” while
exercises. Insecurity deepened amid terrorist attacks on
engaging with all sides in an “active neutrality” approach.
U.S. and other international targets in 2012, and coalitions
Officials identify counterterrorism as the top U.S. priority
of rival armed groups clashed in 2014, driven by
in Libya, and balance Libya-related concerns with other
overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and
U.S. goals in relation to foreign actors. U.S. officials in
transnational rivalries. In the conflict’s aftermath, the
August and September welcomed ceasefire proposals from
country’s transitional institutions fragmented, and the LNA
Libyans and back U.N.-led dialogue to achieve a ceasefire,
movement began a long fight against Islamist groups and
define a roadmap for the withdrawal of all foreign forces,
critics in and around Benghazi.
and promote the transparent management of oil revenues.
In December 2015, some Libyan leaders endorsed a U.N.-
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
brokered political agreement to create a Government of
travel sanctions on those responsible for threatening “the
National Accord to oversee the completion of the transition.
peace, stability or security of Libya,” obstructing or
GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Sarraj and
undermining “the successful completion of its political
members of a GNA Presidency Council tried to implement
transition,” or supporting others who do so. A U.N. arms
the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) but faced
embargo is in place, but many actors, including some U.S.
resistance from defiant militias, scorn from a rival interim
partners, violate its provisions. In parallel to these U.N.
government and HOR leaders in the east, and hostility from
measures, U.S. executive orders provide for U.S. sanctions
Khalifa Haftar’s LNA/LAAF movement. This hostility
on those threatening peace in Libya. U.S. officials engage
erupted into conflict in 2019.
Libyans and monitor U.S. aid programs via the Libya
External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia.
On the surface, the conflict in Libya pits two primary
factions and their various foreign and local backers against
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
each other in what appears to be a straightforward contest
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
for control over the capital and the organs of state power.
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011. In July 2020,
However, beneath the surface, complicated local interests,
the House Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed the Libya
foreign agendas, personal grudges, identity-based concerns,
Stabilization Act (H.R. 4644, see also S. 2934), which
profit motives, and ideological rivalries shape political and
would authorize future U.S. assistance, provide a legislative
security developments. Leading coalitions suffer from
basis for U.S. sanctions, and define mechanisms for
internal divisions and political legitimacy deficits stemming
additional oversight of U.S. policy.
from the extended, fractious nature of the transition. Poor
living conditions are fueling protests against the GNA and
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
eastern leaders. Victory or surrender by either side could
Affairs
spur new fighting within their ranks. Outside powers have
IF11556
exploited these factors, frustrating mediation efforts.
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Libya and U.S. Policy
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11556 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED