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Libya and U.S. Policy
Eleven years after a 2011 uprising that toppled long-time
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence and Timeline
authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to
make a transition to stable governing arrangements.
Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim
governments (Figure 1), but militias, local leaders, and
subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons
have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs.
The postponement of planned elections in 2021, Libyans’
continuing lack of consensus over constitutional and legal
arrangements, the potential fragility of a United Nations
(U.N.)-backed ceasefire, and the reemergence of
institutional rivalry threaten Libya’s stability and pose
challenges for U.S. decisionmakers.
Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent
Libya from serving as a permissive environment for
transnational terrorist groups and have taken different
approaches to conflict and competition among Libyans. The
Biden Administration supports the holding of new elections
in Libya and has used U.S. influence to bolster U.N.-led
mediation efforts to that end. Congress has appropriated
funds to enable U.S. diplomacy and aid programs, and some
Members have called for more assertive U.S. engagement.
War, Ceasefire, and a Deferred Election
2011 Uprising topples Muammar al Qadhafi.
Conflict re-erupted in Libya in April 2019, when a coalition
2012 Parliamentary elections. Transitional cabinet seated.
of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector
2014 Constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections.
Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army (LNA,
Disputed results fuel conflict. U.S. diplomats depart.
alt. “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,” LAAF), attempted to
2015 International mediation yields agreement to form
seize the capital, Tripoli, from the internationally
Government of National Accord (GNA).
recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Russia,
2016 House of Representatives (HOR) withholds GNA
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and leaders of
endorsement. Islamic State forces defeated in Sirte with
Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR, an interim
U.S. military support.
parliament last elected in 2014) backed the LNA. With
2018 Libyan National Army (LNA) controls eastern Libya.
Turkish military support, the GNA and anti-LNA western
2019 LNA offensive against Tripoli; Turkey intervenes.
Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw. Libya has
2020 U.N. supports ceasefire negotiations, selects Libyan
remained divided since, with foreign forces still present,
Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) members. LPDF agrees to
and opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west
roadmap, plans December 2021 elections.
of Sirte (Figure 1). During 2020, multilateral diplomatic
2021 LPDF selects Interim Executive Authority members. HOR
initiatives helped achieve a ceasefire, and the U.N. has
approves interim Government of National Unity (GNU).
deployed civilian monitors at Libyans’ request.
U.N. Security Council endorses ceasefire monitoring and
In 2021, members of a U.N.-appointed Libyan Political
election date, but election postponed.
Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and the HOR approved an interim
2022 HOR selects replacement interim government and plans
executive authority and Government of National Unity
constitutional consultations and elections by May 2023.
(GNU) to replace the GNA, with a mandate to serve until
GNU leaders object and retain control of the capital.
elections or through June 2022. The U.N. Support Mission
Source: Prepared by CRS using ArcGIS and media reporting.
in Libya (UNSMIL) then facilitated discussions among
LPDF members, the HOR, and the High Council of State
Competing Governments Reemerge
(HCS, an advisory representative body) in an attempt to
In the wake of the election postponement, consultation and
establish a constitutional and legal basis for parliamentary
political competition among Libyans has intensified. HOR
and presidential elections planned for December 24, 2021.
Speaker Aqilah Saleh, who had stepped back from his role
However, disputes over candidacy criteria and
in 2021 to seek election as president, has moved to dismiss
constitutional and legal issues persisted, leading to an
GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba and the GNU
indefinite postponement of the elections. U.N. and U.S.
cabinet. Dabaiba, who also had presented himself as a
officials have sought to preserve momentum toward prompt
presidential candidate in spite of a previous pledge not to do
elections, amid contending Libyan proposals and initiatives.
so, has asserted a continuing mandate and refused to yield
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Libya and U.S. Policy
to anything but a nationally elected government. In
requirements for the reestablishment of a permanent U.S.
February 2022, the HOR endorsed former GNA Interior
diplomatic presence in Libya. Congress may consult with
Minister Fathi Bashaga as Prime Minister-designate, and, in
the Administration pursuant to security requirements.
March, endorsed Bashaga’s proposed cabinet. The HOR
Terrorism and Foreign Military Forces
also endorsed a process to establish a constitutional basis
U.N. and U.S. reporting describe transnational terrorist
for elections by May 2023.
threats in Libya as reduced and contained. Other U.S.
Bashaga’s attempts to assert authority in Tripoli and
priorities in Libya include preventing the resumption of
Dabaiba’s resistance underscore risks of armed
destabilizing conflict, encouraging political accommodation
confrontation. Brief violence and militia mobilization
and economic development, and fostering the departure
followed Bashaga’s arrival in Tripoli on May 17, 2022.
from Libya of foreign military forces and mercenaries. The
Bashaga departed amid the clashes, but a standoff persists,
U.S. military supports U.S. diplomatic initiatives and has
and he may seek to govern from Sirte. Haftar, the LNA, and
monitored and reported on the activities of Russian
competing western Libyan militias remain powerful
mercenaries and military equipment in Libya. Press reports
security actors with diverse political aims and influence.
suggest that some Russian mercenaries may have left Libya
The Libyan National Oil Corporation, the Central Bank,
to support operations in Ukraine, although Libya reportedly
and budgetary and fiscal processes remain subject to intense
remains a logistical hub for their operations in sub-Saharan
competition, as each side seeks access to Libyan oil export
Africa. Turkish military advisers train and assist western
revenues to pay salaries, provide subsidies, and otherwise
Libyan forces in accord with a 2019 Turkey-GNA security
generate political and security support. U.S. officials have
agreement. The LNA and its opponents reportedly have
avoided endorsing either government and are encouraging
used fighters from Syria, Chad, and Sudan.
dialogue between Bashaga and Dabaiba and engaging
Sanctions and U.N. Bodies
Libyans and other foreign counterparts to craft politically
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
neutral fiscal mechanisms for interim use.
travel sanctions on entities threatening peace in Libya,
undermining Libya’s political transition, or supporting
Libya has the largest proven crude oil reserves in
others who do so. U.S. executive orders provide for
Africa, but conflict, political rivalry, and neglected
comparable U.S. sanctions. The U.N. Security Council may
infrastructure impede the energy sector’s operations
consider the extension of UNSMIL’s mandate and proposed
and limit its potential. Political dispute-driven closures
reforms to the mission in April 2022. The position of
and blockades have shuttered some oil facilities since
Special Representative of the Secretary-General is vacant.
April 2022, lowering output. Oil revenues accrue to a
National Oil Corporation account for transfer to the
Humanitarian Needs and Migrants
Central Bank to support government spending.
The U.N. estimates more than 800,000 people in Libya (out
of 7 million) will require some form of humanitarian aid in
The political path forward is uncertain. U.N. Special
2022. U.N. agencies have identified more than 635,000
Adviser to the Secretary-General Stephanie Williams
foreign migrants, more than 168,000 internally displaced
continues to press Libyan factions to reach agreement to
persons, and more than 43,800 refugees in Libya. Migrants
enable prompt elections. HOR Speaker Saleh, his partners
remain especially vulnerable to extortion and other abuses.
among the LNA leadership, and their foreign backers
Conflict Hampers COVID-19 Response
envision a longer timeline: their approach could further
Years of division and conflict have weakened the Libyan
entrench the HOR-designated government, undermine
health care system’s ability to mitigate risks from COVID-
Dabaiba and the LNA’s western Libyan opponents, and
strengthen the HOR’s influence over constitutional and
19. As of mid-April 2022, Libyan officials have reported
more than 500,000 COVID-19 cases and more than 6,400
electoral processes.
COVID-19 deaths. Testing and case tracking are limited.
U.S. Policy and Selected Issues
Issues in the 117th Congress
During and prior to the 2019-2020 clashes, rival executive
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
authorities based in western and eastern Libya similarly
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
competed for power and international recognition.
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011, including
International mediators intended the formation of the GNU
under the FY2022 omnibus (P.L. 117-103). In the 117th
and the holding of new elections to provide a basis for the
Congress, H.R. 1228 and S. 379 would authorize future
reunification of Libyan institutions and an end to serial
U.S. assistance, enact U.S. sanctions in statute, and
interim arrangements. U.S. officials supported U.N.
establish new reporting requirements. The House-passed
leadership of these initiatives, emphasized the importance
H.R. 7311, the Countering Malign Russian Activities in
of maintaining the ceasefire, and sought to avoid
Africa Act, would require reporting on foreign entities that
accusations of illegitimate interference by not insisting on
have supported Russian mercenaries or Russian armed
specific outcomes. U.S. officials have maintained these
forces in Libya and analysis of whether such entities meet
approaches in 2022, while balancing Libya-related concerns
U.S. sanctions criteria. The Biden Administration seeks
with other U.S. goals in relation to foreign actors, including
$44.5 million in FY2023 funding for Libya programs.
Russia, Egypt, Turkey, France, Italy, and the UAE.
U.S. Special Envoy for Libya Ambassador Richard Norland
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
leads U.S. diplomatic engagement, and U.S. officials
Affairs
operate from a Libya External Office at the U.S. Embassy
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in Tunisia. Press reports suggest U.S. officials are assessing
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Libya and U.S. Policy
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