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Libya and U.S. Policy
Twelve years after a 2011 uprising that toppled longtime
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence and Timeline
authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to
make a transition to stable governing arrangements.
Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim
governments (Figure 1), but militias, local leaders, and
subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons
have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs.
The postponement of planned elections in 2021, Libyans’
continuing lack of consensus over constitutional and legal
arrangements, the potential fragility of a United Nations
(U.N.)-backed ceasefire, and the reemergence of
institutional rivalry are prolonging Libya’s instability and
pose challenges for U.S. decisionmakers.
Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent
Libya from serving as a permissive environment for
transnational terrorist groups and have taken different
approaches to conflict and competition among Libyans. The
Biden Administration supports the holding of new elections
in Libya and has used U.S. influence to bolster U.N.-led
mediation efforts to that end. Congress has appropriated
funds to enable U.S. diplomacy and aid programs, and some
Members have called for more assertive U.S. engagement.
War, Ceasefire, and a Deferred Election
2011 Uprising topples Muammar al Qadhafi.
Conflict reerupted in Libya in April 2019, when a coalition
2012 Parliamentary elections. Transitional cabinet seated.
of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector
2014 Elections for constitutional drafting body and parliament.
Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army (LNA,
Disputed results fuel conflict. U.S. diplomats depart.
alt. “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,” LAAF), attempted to
2015 International mediation yields agreement to form
seize the capital, Tripoli, from the internationally
Government of National Accord (GNA).
recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Russia,
2016 House of Representatives (HOR) withholds GNA
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and leaders of
endorsement. Islamic State forces defeated in Sirte with
Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR, an interim
U.S. military support.
parliament last elected in 2014) backed the LNA. With
2018 Libyan National Army (LNA) controls eastern Libya.
Turkish military support, the GNA and anti-LNA western
2019 LNA offensive against Tripoli; Turkey intervenes.
Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw. Libya has
2020 U.N. supports ceasefire negotiations, selects Libyan
remained divided since, with foreign forces still present,
Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) members. LPDF agrees to
and opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west
roadmap, plans December 2021 elections.
of Sirte (Figure 1). During 2020, multilateral diplomatic
2021 LPDF selects Interim Executive Authority members. HOR
initiatives helped achieve a ceasefire, and the U.N. has
approves interim Government of National Unity (GNU).
deployed civilian monitors at Libyans’ request.
U.N. Security Council endorses ceasefire monitoring and
In 2021, members of a U.N.-appointed Libyan Political
election date, but election postponed.
Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and the HOR approved an interim
2022 HOR selects replacement interim government. GNU
executive authority and Government of National Unity
leaders object and retain control of the capital. U.N.-led
(GNU) to replace the GNA, with a mandate to serve until
talks seek consensus on constitutional basis for election.
elections or through June 2022. In 2021, the U.N. Support
Protests and militia clashes suggest enduring tensions.
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated discussions among
Source: Prepared by CRS using ArcGIS and media reporting.
LPDF members, the HOR, and the High Council of State
Competing Governments Reemerge
(HCS, an advisory representative body) in an attempt to
In the wake of the election postponement, consultation and
establish a constitutional and legal basis for parliamentary
and presidential elections planned for December 24, 2021.
political competition among Libyans intensified. Haftar, the
LNA, and competing western Libyan militias remain
However, disputes over candidacy criteria and
powerful security actors with diverse political aims and
constitutional and legal issues persisted, leading to an
indefinite postponement of the elections. U.N. and U.S.
influence. HOR Speaker Aqilah Saleh, who had stepped
back from his role in 2021 to seek election as president,
officials have sought to preserve momentum toward
moved to dismiss GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid
elections, amid contending Libyan proposals and initiatives.
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Libya and U.S. Policy
Dabaiba and the GNU cabinet. Dabaiba, who also had
relation to Russia, Egypt, Turkey, France, Italy, and the
presented himself as a presidential candidate in spite of a
UAE.
previous pledge not to do so, has asserted a continuing
U.S. Special Envoy for Libya Ambassador Richard Norland
mandate and refused to yield to anything but a nationally
has led U.S. diplomatic engagement since 2019. U.S.
elected government. In February 2022, the HOR endorsed
officials operate from a Libya External Office at the U.S.
former GNA Interior Minister Fathi Bashaga as Prime
Embassy in Tunisia. The executive branch continues to
Minister-designate, and, in March 2022, endorsed
Bashaga’s proposed cabinet
assess requirements to reestablish a lasting U.S. diplomatic
. Bashaga made multiple
presence in Libya. Congress may consult with the
attempts to enter and assert authority in Tripoli, but met
Administration on related security needs and costs.
resistance from Dabaiba and local militias, resulting in
some armed confrontations and the defeat of Bashaga allies.
Terrorism and Foreign Military Forces
Bashaga and his would-be government continue to operate
U.N. and U.S. reporting describe transnational terrorist
in eastern Libya but have no effective national authority.
threats in Libya as reduced and contained. Successive U.S.
Libya’s fiscal and economic dependence on the oil and gas
Administrations have sought to foster the departure from
Libya of foreign military forces and mercenaries. The U.S.
sector make Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC), the
military has monitored and reported on the activities of
Central Bank, and budgetary and fiscal processes objects of
Russian mercenaries and military equipment in Libya. Press
intense competition, as rivals seek access to oil export
accounts suggest that some Russian mercenaries may have
revenues to pay salaries, provide subsidies, and otherwise
left Libya to support operations in Ukraine, although Libya
generate political and security support. In July 2022,
reportedly remains a logistical hub for their operations in
Dabaiba replaced longtime NOC Chairman Mustafa Sanalla
sub-Saharan Africa. Forces in eastern Libya shot down a
with Farhat Bengdara. Allies of Haftar and the LNA
U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle there in August 2022; U.S.
subsequently suspended their protest blockade of national
investigation continues. Turkish military advisers train and
oil facilities, which had severely reduced oil exports. As of
assist western Libyan forces in accord with a 2019 Turkey-
January 2023, Bengdara continued to lead the NOC.
GNA security agreement. The LNA and its opponents
reportedly have used fighters from Syria, Chad, and Sudan.
Libya has the largest proven crude oil reserves in
Sanctions and U.N. Bodies
Africa, but conflict, political rivalry, and neglected
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
infrastructure impede the energy sector’s operations
travel sanctions on entities threatening peace in Libya,
and limit its potential. Oil revenues accrue to a
undermining the political transition, or supporting others
National Oil Corporation account for transfer to the
who do so. U.S. executive orders provide for comparable
Central Bank to support government spending.
U.S. sanctions. The Security Council has extended
UNSMIL’s mandate through October 2023.
The political path forward is uncertain. In September 2022,
Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal became the Special
Humanitarian Needs and Migration
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Libya.
The U.N. estimates more than 800,000 people in Libya (out
Bathily has consulted with Libyan and foreign parties since
of 7 million) require some form of humanitarian aid. U.N.
to build consensus on a constitutional basis for planned
agencies have identified nearly 680,000 foreign migrants,
elections. As of January 2023, key differences between
more than 134,000 internally displaced persons, and more
Libyan leaders remained unresolved. HOR Speaker Saleh
than 44,700 refugees in Libya. Migrants remain especially
and LNA leaders reportedly insist on terms that would
vulnerable to extortion and other abuses. The State
allow Haftar to stand as a candidate, which Haftar’s
Department reported in 2022 that “endemic corruption and
opponents reject. Military officers of the Joint Military
militias’ influence over government ministries contributed
Commission (“5+5”) that negotiated the 2020 ceasefire met
to the GNU’s inability to effectively address human
under U.N. auspices in Sirte in October 2022 and
trafficking.”
established a subcommittee on disarmament,
Issues in the 118th Congress
demobilization, and reintegration.
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
U.S. Policy and Selected Issues
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
During and prior to armed clashes in 2019 and 2020, rival
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011. The Biden
executive authorities based in western and eastern Libya
Administration sought $44.5 million in FY2023 funding for
competed for power and recognition. International
Libya aid programs, and in 2022 named Libya as a priority
mediators intended the formation of the GNU and the
country for the purposes of the Global Fragility Act (Title V
holding of new elections to provide a basis for the
of Division J, P.L. 116-94). The 117th Congress did not
reunification of Libyan institutions and an end to serial
include House-passed Libya-related provisions in the
interim arrangements. U.S. officials have supported U.N.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023
leadership of these initiatives, emphasized the importance
(P.L. 117-263) that would have authorized future U.S.
of maintaining the ceasefire and the neutrality of
assistance, enacted U.S. sanctions in statute, and established
institutions such as the NOC, and sought to avoid
new reporting requirements.
accusations of illegitimate interference by not insisting on
specific outcomes. U.S. officials encourage dialogue among
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Libyans and have stated that elections are required to
Affairs
resolve disputes over legitimacy. U.S. officials continue to
balance Libya-related concerns with other U.S. goals in
IF11556
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Libya and U.S. Policy
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11556 · VERSION 23 · UPDATED