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Updated June 16, 2020
Libya and U.S. Policy
Conflict and COVID-19 Threaten Libya
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence
Libya has been wracked by major conflict since April 2019,
As of June 16, 2020
when the “Libyan National Army”/“Libyan Arab Armed
Forces” (LNA/LAAF) movement—a coalition of armed
groups led by Khalifa Haftar—launched a bid to seize the
capital, Tripoli, from local militias and the internationally
recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).
Fighters in western Libya rallied with Turkish military
support to blunt the LNA’s advance, and Haftar’s forces
withdrew from northwestern Libya in June 2020. Fighting
has continued in central Libya despite multilateral demands
for a ceasefire. LNA forces and local partners control much
of Libya’s territory and key oil production and export
infrastructure, directly or through militia allies (Figure 1).
The GNA and anti-LNA groups control Tripoli and the
western coast. Southern Libya is marginalized and faces
threats from criminals, rival ethnic militias, and terrorists.
Conflict dynamics shifted during the conflict as Russian-
national Wagner Group contractors intervened on behalf of
LNA forces, Turkey and the GNA concluded maritime and
security cooperation agreements, Turkey deployed fighters
and arms on behalf of the GNA, and outsiders shipped
weapons to both sides. U.S. officials, Russia, Egypt, and the
United Arab Emirates arm the LNA and aid its operations.
Turkey provides overt military support to anti-LNA forces.

Both sides have recruited Syrian militias to their ranks.
Source: Prepared by CRS using media and social media reporting.
State Department officials condemned “toxic foreign
interference” in March 2020, and have called for “a
Years of division and conflict have weakened the Libyan
sovereign Libya free of foreign intervention.”
health care system’s ability to mitigate COVID-19-related
risks. In April, Acting UNSMIL head Stephanie Williams
Non-government conflict observers estimate that fighting
said ongoing fighting was “reckless” and “inhumane,”
between LNA forces, GNA supporters, and anti-LNA
saying it was “stretching the capacity of local authorities
militias has killed more than 2,600 fighters, along with
and the health infrastructure that is already decimated.”
more than 450 civilians since April. Near Tripoli, conflict
has displaced more than 200,000 people, and put more than
U.S. and U.N. officials have condemned post-Berlin
300,000 in frontline areas, some of which were mined by
weapons shipments to Libya as violations of the U.N. arms
retreating LNA forces. More than 650,000 foreign migrants
embargo and called for a humanitarian ceasefire to allow
(largely from sub-Saharan Africa) also are in Libya and
the country to combat the spread of COVID-19, which, to
remain especially vulnerable.
date, appears to be limited. Following its retreat, the LNA
proposed a ceasefire and reengaged in U.N.-sponsored
In 2020, multilateral diplomatic initiatives have sought to
talks. Russia, Turkey, and Egypt also have reengaged
achieve and sustain a ceasefire between Libyan combatants
Libyan figures. Amid some continued fighting,
(Figure 2) as a precursor to renewed political reconciliation
humanitarian access is restricted. Oil production also
efforts. Russia and Turkey engineered a temporary truce in
remains disrupted, which threatens state finances.
January, but did not achieve a ceasefire. Meeting in Berlin,
Germany later in January, the five permanent members of
A Long-Troubled Transition
the U.N. Security Council along with other key foreign
Libya’s political transition has been disrupted by armed
actors jointly committed to supporting a series of new
non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and
arrangements aimed at durably ending the conflict. GNA
infighting of interim leaders for years. After an armed
and LNA figures attended, but did not formally commit to a
uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Muammar al
ceasefire. The Security Council endorsed the Berlin
Qadhafi in 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form
commitments in Resolution 2510. The U.N. Support
a stable government, address pressing security issues,
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) then supported intra-Libyan
reshape the country’s public finances, or create a viable
security, political, and economic discussions, but COVID-
framework for post-conflict reconciliation. Insecurity
19 concerns and resumed fighting undermined progress.
spread as local armed groups competed for influence and
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Libya and U.S. Policy
Figure 2. Libya: Principal Coalitions

Source: Prepared by CRS.
resources. Qadhafi’s rule compounded stabilization and
Diplomats have identified priorities for supporting a
transition challenges by depriving Libyans of experience in
ceasefire and defining a path toward the unification of state
self-government, preventing the development of civil
institutions and the holding of national elections. However,
society, and leaving state institutions weak.
key Libyan parties appear to have deep differences in their
preferred models for governance for the country, military
Armed militia groups, local leaders, and coalitions of
command, resource sharing, the role of Islam in public life,
national figures with competing foreign patrons have
and Libya’s international partnerships.
remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. The
U.N. Security Council praised Libya’s administration of
U.S. Policy and Outlook
elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting
For years, U.S. diplomats and officials have emphasized the
assembly in 2012 and 2014, but declining rates of
importance of a political solution, but U.S. actions have yet
participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum
to convince or compel Libyans and their various patrons to
political competition have marred the country’s democratic
disengage from confrontation. U.S. diplomats in 2020 have
exercises. Insecurity deepened amid terrorist attacks on
called “on all sides to lay down their arms” and for “an
U.S. and other international targets in 2012, and coalitions
immediate end to the conflict.” Officials identify
of rival armed groups clashed in 2014, driven by
counterterrorism as the top U.S. priority in Libya, and
overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and
balance Libya-related concerns with other goals with
transnational rivalries. In the conflict’s aftermath, the
foreign actors. U.S. officials have welcomed parts of an
country’s transitional institutions fragmented, and the LNA
Egyptian proposal to end the conflict, but back U.N.-led
movement began a long fight against Islamist groups and
dialogue as a preferred venue.
critics in and around Benghazi.
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
In December 2015, some Libyan leaders endorsed a U.N.-
travel sanctions on those responsible for threatening “the
brokered political agreement to create a Government of
peace, stability or security of Libya,” obstructing or
National Accord to oversee the completion of the transition.
undermining “the successful completion of its political
GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Sarraj and
transition,” or supporting others who do so. A U.N. arms
members of a GNA Presidency Council tried to implement
embargo is in place, but many actors, including some U.S.
the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement but faced resistance
partners, violate its provisions. In parallel to these U.N.
from defiant militias, scorn from a rival interim government
measures, U.S. executive orders provide for U.S. sanctions
and leaders of Libya’s House of Representatives in the east,
on those threatening peace in Libya. U.S. officials engage
and hostility from Khalifa Haftar’s LNA/LAAF movement.
Libyans and monitor U.S. aid programs via the Libya
This hostility erupted into conflict in 2019.
External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia.
On the surface, the conflict in Libya pits two primary
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
factions and their various foreign and local backers against
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
each other in what appears to be a straightforward contest
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011, and may
for control over the capital and the organs of state power.
consider proposals to authorize further assistance and to
However, beneath the surface, complicated local interests,
conduct additional oversight (H.R. 4644 and S. 2934). As
foreign agendas, personal grudges, identity-based concerns,
long as political consensus among Libyans remains elusive,
profit motives, and ideological rivalries shape political and
security conditions may create challenges for the return of
security developments. Leading Libyan coalitions suffer
U.S. diplomats to Libya and erect barriers to peace and the
from internal divisions and political legitimacy deficits
fuller development of U.S.-Libyan relations.
stemming from the extended, fractious nature of the
transition period. Victory or surrender by either side could
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
spur new fighting within their ranks. Outside powers have
Affairs
exploited these factors, frustrating mediation efforts.
IF11556
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Libya and U.S. Policy


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11556 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED