May 20, 2020
Libya and U.S. Policy
Conflict and COVID-19 Threaten Libya
Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence
Libya has been wracked by major conflict since April 2019,
As of May 18, 2020
when the “Libyan National Army”/“Libyan Arab Armed
Forces” (LNA/LAAF) movement — a coalition of armed
groups led by Khalifa Haftar—launched a bid to seize the
capital, Tripoli, from local militias and the internationally
recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).
Fighters in western Libya rallied to blunt the LNA’s
advance, and inconclusive fighting has continued despite
multilateral demands for a ceasefire. As of May 2020, LNA
forces and local partners control much of Libya’s territory
and key oil production and export infrastructure directly or
through militia allies. GNA supporters and anti-LNA
groups retain control of the capital and have seized several
areas west of Tripoli since April 2020 with Turkish military
support. Southern Libya remains marginalized and faces
threats from criminals, rival ethnic militias, and terrorists.
Conflict dynamics have shifted since April 2019 following
the introduction of Russian-national Wagner Group
contractors into LNA forces, the conclusion of Turkey-
GNA maritime and security cooperation agreements,
Turkish deployments on behalf of the GNA, and expanded
weapons shipments to both sides. According to U.S.
officials, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates arm the
LNA, and Russia aids LNA operations. Turkey overtly

provides military support to GNA forces. Both sides have
Source: Prepared by CRS using media and social media reporting.
recruited Syrian militias to aid their respective war efforts.
State Department officials condemned “toxic foreign
Years of division and conflict have weakened the Libyan
interference” in March 2020, and have called for “a
health care system’s ability to mitigate COVID-19-related
sovereign Libya free of foreign intervention.”
risks. In April, Acting UNSMIL head Stephanie Williams
said ongoing fighting was “reckless” and “inhumane,”
Fighting between LNA forces, supporters of the GNA, and
saying it was “stretching the capacity of local authorities
anti-LNA militias in western Libya is estimated to have
and the health infrastructure that is already decimated.”
killed more than 2,200 fighters, along with hundreds of
civilians. In the capital region, the conflict has displaced
U.S. and U.N. officials have condemned post-Berlin
more than 200,000 people, and U.N. officials report that
weapons shipments to Libya as violations of the U.N. arms
nearly 345,000 people are in frontline areas. More than
embargo and called for a humanitarian ceasefire to allow
650,000 foreign migrants (largely from sub-Saharan Africa)
the country to combat the spread of COVID-19, which, to
also are in Libya and remain especially vulnerable.
date, appears to be limited. Notwithstanding a temporary
LNA ceasefire declaration for Islamic religious observances
In 2020, multilateral diplomatic initiatives have sought to
during Ramadan, fighting continues, humanitarian access is
achieve and sustain a ceasefire between Libyan combatants
restricted, and parties to the conflict have shut down
as a precursor to restarting political reconciliation efforts.
national oil production, threatening state finances.
Russia and Turkey engineered a temporary truce in January,
but did not achieve a ceasefire. Meeting in Berlin, Germany
A Long-Troubled Transition
later in January, the five permanent members of the U.N.
Libya’s political transition has been disrupted by armed
Security Council along with other key foreign actors jointly
non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and
committed to supporting a series of new arrangements with
infighting of interim leaders for years. After an armed
a goal of durably ending the conflict. GNA and LNA
uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Muammar al
figures attended, but did not formally commit to a ceasefire.
Qadhafi in 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form
The Security Council endorsed the Berlin commitments in
a stable government, address pressing security issues,
Resolution 2510. The U.N. Support Mission in Libya
reshape the country’s public finances, or create a viable
(UNSMIL) then supported intra-Libyan security, political,
framework for post-conflict reconciliation. Insecurity
and economic discussions, but COVID-19 concerns and
spread as local armed groups competed for influence and
resumed fighting have largely undermined progress.
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Libya and U.S. Policy
Figure 2. Libya: Principal Coalitions

Source: Prepared by CRS.
resources. Qadhafi’s rule compounded stabilization and
Diplomats have identified priorities for supporting a
transition challenges by depriving Libyans of experience in
ceasefire and defining a path toward the unification of state
self-government, preventing the development of civil
institutions and the holding of national elections. However,
society, and leaving state institutions weak.
key Libyan parties appear to have deep differences in their
preferred models for governance for the country, military
Armed militia groups, local leaders, and coalitions of
command, resource sharing, the role of Islam in public life,
national figures with competing foreign patrons have
and Libya’s international partnerships.
remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. The
U.N. Security Council praised Libya’s administration of
U.S. Policy and Outlook
elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting
For years, U.S. diplomats and officials have emphasized the
assembly in 2012 and 2014, but declining rates of
importance of a political solution for the country’s stability,
participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum
but U.S. actions have yet to convince or compel Libyans
political competition have marred the country’s democratic
and their various patrons to disengage from confrontation.
exercises. Insecurity deepened amid terrorist attacks on
U.S. diplomats have stated repeatedly in 2020 that the
U.S. and other international targets in 2012, and coalitions
United States does not support the LNA offensive and calls
of rival armed groups clashed in 2014, driven by
for “an immediate end to the conflict” and a return to
overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and
dialogue. Officials identify counterterrorism as the top U.S.
transnational rivalries. In the conflict’s aftermath, the
priority in Libya, and balance Libya-related concerns with
country’s transitional institutions fragmented, and the LNA
other objectives in engaging various foreign actors.
movement began a long fight against Islamist groups and
The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and
critics in and around Benghazi.
travel sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for
In December 2015, some Libyan leaders endorsed a U.N.-
threatening “the peace, stability or security of Libya,”
brokered political agreement to create a Government of
obstructing or undermining “the successful completion of
National Accord to oversee the completion of the transition.
its political transition,” or supporting others who do so. A
GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Sarraj and
U.N. arms embargo is in place, but, as noted above, several
members of a GNA Presidency Council tried to implement
international actors, including some U.S. partners, continue
the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement but faced resistance
to violate its provisions. In parallel to the U.N. embargo and
from defiant militias, scorn from a rival interim government
sanctions, U.S. executive orders provide for U.S. sanctions
and leaders of Libya’s House of Representatives in the east,
on those threatening peace in Libya. U.S. diplomats engage
and hostility from Khalifa Haftar’s LNA/LAAF movement.
Libyans and monitor U.S. aid programs via the Libya
This hostility erupted into conflict in 2019.
External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia.
On the surface, the conflict in Libya pits two primary
Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for
factions and their various foreign and local backers against
transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and
each other in what appears to be a straightforward contest
humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011, and may
for control over the capital and the organs of state power.
consider proposals to authorize further assistance and to
However, beneath the surface, complicated local interests,
conduct additional oversight (H.R. 4644 and S. 2934). As
foreign agendas, personal grudges, identity-based concerns,
long as political consensus among Libyans remains elusive,
profit motives, and ideological rivalries shape political and
security conditions may create challenges for the return of
security developments. Leading Libyan coalitions suffer
U.S. diplomats to Libya and erect barriers to peace and the
from internal divisions and political legitimacy deficits
fuller development of U.S.-Libyan relations.
stemming from the extended, fractious nature of the
transition period. Victory or surrender by either side could
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
spur new fighting within their ranks. Outside powers have
Affairs
exploited these factors, frustrating mediation efforts.
IF11556
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Libya and U.S. Policy


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