Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations
Updated February 23, 2024
Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations
Introduction
the government of all China. In 1971, U.N. General
Taiwan, which calls itself the “Republic of China, Taiwan,”
Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC’s
representatives as “the only legitimate representatives of
is a self-governing democracy of 23.5 million people
located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. The
China to the United Nations,” and expelled “the
United States terminated diplomatic relations with the
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the ROC’s then-
Republic of China (ROC) on January 1, 1979, in order to
leader. In a December 1978 U.S.-PRC joint communiqué,
establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of
the United States, too, recognized the PRC as “the sole
China (PRC), which claims sovereignty over Taiwan. U.S.
legal Government of China,” and stated that it would
relations with Taiwan have been unofficial since that date.
henceforth maintain “unofficial” relations with Taiwan.
In establishing relations with the PRC, the U.S. government
The KMT maintained martial law on Taiwan until 1987,
agreed to withdraw U.S. military personnel from Taiwan
when it yielded to public pressure for political
and terminate the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, as of
liberalization. Taiwan held its first direct election for the
January 1, 1980. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA,
legislature, the Legislative Yuan (LY), in 1992, and its first
P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §3301 et seq.) provides a legal basis
direct election for president in 1996.
for unofficial relations.
January 2024 Elections
In its most recent fact sheet on U.S. relations with Taiwan,
Taiwan held presidential and legislative elections on
issued in May 2022, the U.S. State Department refers to the
January 13, 2024. Taiwan presidents are limited to two
United States and Taiwan as enjoying “a robust unofficial
relationship.” The
four-year terms, making President Tsai Ing-wen of the
fact sheet describes Taiwan as “a key
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ineligible to run again.
U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific,” and states that the United
Tsai’s
States and Taiwan “
Vice President, Lai Ching-te (William Lai), was the
share similar values, deep commercial
DPP’s presidential candidate and won with 40.05% of the
and economic links, and strong people-to-people ties.”
vote in a three-way race. The DPP is the first party to win a
Figure 1. Taiwan
third consecutive presidential term by direct election.
In the 113-seat LY, the DPP lost its majority. No party won
a majority, the first such outcome since 2004. The KMT,
now Taiwan’s leading opposition party and supportive of
greater engagement with the PRC, won 52 seats, to the
DPP’s 51. KMT-aligned independents won 2 seats. The
Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), founded in 2019 with the
goal of challenging the dominance of the DPP and KMT,
won 8 seats, meaning it holds the balance of power in the
LY. The new LY took office on February 1 and elected Han
Kuo-yu of the KMT as its new president, or speaker.
Lai and Vice-President-elect Hsiao Bi-khim are scheduled
to be inaugurated on May 20. What Lai says in his
inauguration speech, including about relations across the
Taiwan Strait, and whom he appoints to key government
positions may provide indications of his policy inclinations.
On the campaign trail, Lai pledged continuity with
President Tsai’s policies, including “four commitments” on
cross-Strait relations that she first articulated in 2021. They
Sources: Graphic by CRS.
are commitments (1) to “a free and democratic
constitutional system,” (2) to the principle that “the
Modern History
Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China
Taiwan was a colony of Japan from 1895 to 1945. The
should not be subordinate to each other,” (3) “to resist
government of the ROC, then based on mainland China,
annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty,” and (4)
assumed control of Taiwan in 1945, after Japan’s defeat in
to the principle that “the future of the Republic of China
World War II. In 1949, after the forces of the Communist
(Taiwan) must be decided in accordance with the will of the
Party of China (CPC) wrested control of mainland China
Taiwanese people.” The PRC, which insists that Taiwan is
from ROC forces in a civil war, the Kuomintang (KMT)-led
part of China, has assailed the second commitment as
ROC government retreated to Taiwan, and the CPC
implying that the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan
established the PRC on mainland China. The United States
is akin to two separate states. Before the election, the PRC’s
continued to recognize the ROC government on Taiwan as
Taiwan Affairs Office urged Taiwan voters to reject Lai,
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Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations
warning that by following Tsai’s policies, Lai would bring
never promise to renounce the use of force” to unify with
Taiwan “closer to war and recession.”
Taiwan. The PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in 2005,
states that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from China,
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for peaceful
Since 1979, U.S. government policy has been to follow
unification have been exhausted, “the state shall employ
what U.S. officials refer to as a U.S. “one-China policy”
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to
with regard to Taiwan. The Biden Administration describes
protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
the U.S. one-China policy as guided by (1) the TRA; (2)
Beijing cut off communication with Taiwan’s government
U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972, 1978, and
in 2016, citing President Tsai’s unwillingness to endorse a
1982; and (3) “Six Assurances” that President Ronald
formula known as “the 1992 consensus.” That KMT-CPC
Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s government in 1982.
consensus held that Taiwan and mainland China are parts of
The PRC has repeatedly stated that it regards U.S. policy
“one China,”
and actions related to Taiwan as “the most important and
with different interpretations of what “China”
sensitive issue” in U.S.
means. The PRC has given no indication that it intends to
-China relations. (See CRS In Focus
restore communication during Lai’s presidency.
IF12503, Taiwan: The Origins of the U.S. One-China
Policy, and CRS In Focus IF11665, President Reagan’s Six
The PRC has sought to isolate Taiwan internationally. After
Assurances to Taiwan.)
the January 2024 election, Nauru became the 11th country to
switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the PRC since
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
2016, leaving 12 countries that maintain diplomatic
• U.S. relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through
relations with Taiwan as the Republic of China. The PRC
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
government has also worked to exclude Taiwan from U.N.
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
agencies, asserting that UNGA Resolution 2758 “confirmed
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
that Taiwan is a part of China.” In the 118th Congress,
• The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
House-passed H.R. 1176 would amend the TAIPEI Act of
2019 (P.L. 116-135) to state that Resolution 2758 “did not
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
in the United Nations or any related organizations,” or
sufficient self-defense capability.”
“include any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty.”
• It is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United
Taiwan’s Security
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social
CIA Director William J. Burns stated in 2023 that Xi
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
Jinping has instructed the PLA to “be ready” to “conduct a
successful invasion” of Taiwan by 2027, but added, “that
The TRA creates “strategic ambiguity” by not specifying
does not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion.”
whether the United States would defend Taiwan in the
As the PRC has stepped up its military activities near
event of a PRC attack. Since 2021, President Biden has four
Taiwan, U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation has grown
times stated that the United States would defend Taiwan,
closer. Since 2023, the defense relationship has included
appearing to abandon strategic ambiguity, although White
U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF). (See CRS In Focus
House officials later said U.S. policy remained unchanged.
IF12481, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues.)
On the eve of the 2024 Taiwan election, a senior Biden
U.S.-Taiwan Economic Ties
Administration official said President Biden had outlined
U.S. policy to his PRC counterpart, Xi Jinping, in
Taiwan was the 8th-largest U.S. trading partner in 2023.
November 2023, as: “[W]e oppose any unilateral changes
Taiwan is a key link in U.S. global semiconductor and
to the status quo from either side. We do not support
technology supply chains and the global center for the
Taiwan independence. We support cross-Strait dialogue,
production of advanced chips. In June 2023, the United
and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by
States and Taiwan signed the first agreement under a U.S.-
peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner that is
Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade. (See CRS In Focus
acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait. We do
IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations.)
not take a position on the ultimate resolution of cross-Strait
Taiwan and the U.S. Congress
differences, provided they are resolved peacefully.”
In the 118th Congress, enacted legislation includes the
The U.S. government efforts to build international support
United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade First
for Taiwan include joint administration of the Global
Agreement Implementation Act (P.L. 118-13) and the
Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), a platform
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024 (P.L. 118-
for Taiwan to share its expertise with the world through
31), with many provisions related to security cooperation
workshops in and beyond Taiwan.
with Taiwan. The Senate-passed National Security
PRC Policy Toward Taiwan
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024 ( H.R. 815) would
include funds for defense articles and services for Taiwan.
At the CPC’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, PRC
The House-passed Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act (H.R.
leader Xi referred to unification with Taiwan as necessary
540) would require U.S. support for Taiwan’s membership
for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” He reiterated
in the International Monetary Fund, a financial agency of
the CPC’s preference for peaceful unification, and its
the U.N. that confines membership to countries.
proposal for a “One Country, Two Systems” approach to
governance of Taiwan. Xi also restated that the CPC “will
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
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Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations
IF10275
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 78 · UPDATED