Updated April 29, 2024
Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations
Introduction
the government of all China. In 1971, U.N. General
Taiwan, which also calls itself the Republic of China
Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC’s
representatives as “the only legitimate representatives of
(ROC), is a self-governing democracy of 23.5 million
China to the United Nations,” and expelled “the
people located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland
China. The United States terminated diplomatic relations
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the ROC’s then-
with the ROC on January 1, 1979, in order to establish
leader. In a December 1978 U.S.-PRC joint communiqué,
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China
the United States, too, recognized the PRC as “the sole
(PRC), which claims sovereignty over Taiwan. U.S.
legal Government of China,” and stated that it would
henceforth maintain “unofficial” relations with Taiwan.
relations with Taiwan have been unofficial since that date.

In establishing relations with the PRC, the U.S. government
The KMT maintained martial law on Taiwan until 1987,
agreed to withdraw U.S. military personnel from Taiwan
when it yielded to public pressure for political
and terminate the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, as of
liberalization. Taiwan held its first direct election for the
January 1, 1980. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA,
legislature, the Legislative Yuan (LY), in 1992, and its first
P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.) provides a legal basis
direct election for president in 1996.
for unofficial relations.
2024 Political Transition
In its most recent fact sheet on U.S. relations with Taiwan,
Taiwan held presidential and legislative elections on
issued in May 2022, the U.S. State Department refers to the
January 13, 2024. Term limits made President Tsai Ing-wen
United States and Taiwan as enjoying “a robust unofficial
relationship.” The
of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ineligible to run
fact sheet describes Taiwan as “a key
again. The DPP’s presidential candidate was Lai Ching-te
U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific,” and states that the United
States and Taiwan “
(William Lai), Tsai’s Vice President. He won with 40.05%
share similar values, deep commercial
of the vote in a three-way race. The DPP is the first party to
and economic links, and strong people-to-people ties.”
win a third consecutive presidential term by direct election.
Figure 1. Taiwan
In the 113-seat LY, the DPP lost its majority. No party won
a majority, the first such outcome since 2004. The KMT,
now Taiwan’s leading opposition party and supportive of
greater engagement with the PRC, won 52 seats, to the
DPP’s 51. KMT-aligned independents won 2 seats. The
Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), founded in 2019 with the
goal of challenging the dominance of the DPP and KMT,
won 8 seats, meaning it holds the balance of power in the
LY. The new LY took office on February 1 and elected Han
Kuo-yu of the KMT as its new president, or speaker.
Lai and Vice-President-elect Hsiao Bi-khim are scheduled
to be inaugurated on May 20. Lai’s announced cabinet
appointments include familiar figures from the Tsai
Administration in key national security roles. Current
Presidential Secretary General Lin Chia-lung is to be
Foreign Minister, succeeding Joseph Wu, who is to lead the
National Security Council, replacing Wellington Koo, who
is to be Defense Minister. On the campaign trail, Lai
pledged continuity with President Tsai’s policies, including

“four commitments” on cross-Strait relations that she first
Source: Graphic by CRS.
articulated in 2021. They are commitments (1) to “a free
Modern History
and democratic constitutional system,” (2) to the principle
that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of
Taiwan was a colony of Japan from 1895 to 1945. The
China should not be subordinate to each other,” (3) “to
government of the ROC, then based on mainland China,
resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty,”
assumed control of Taiwan in 1945, after Japan’s defeat in
and (4) to the principle that “the future of the Republic of
World War II. In 1949, after the forces of the Communist
China (Taiwan) must be decided in accordance with the
Party of China (CPC) wrested control of mainland China
will of the Taiwanese people.” The PRC has assailed the
from ROC forces in a civil war, the Kuomintang (KMT)-led
second item, in particular, for implying that the cross-Strait
ROC government retreated to Taiwan, and the CPC
relationship is akin to two separate states. Pre-election, the
established the PRC on mainland China. The United States
PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office urged Taiwan voters to reject
continued to recognize the ROC government on Taiwan as
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Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations
Lai, warning that by following Tsai’s policies, he would
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to
bring Taiwan “closer to war and recession.”
protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Beijing cut off communication with Taiwan’s government
in 2016, citing President Tsai’s unwillingness to endorse a
Since 1979, U.S. government policy has been to follow
KMT-CPC-agreed formula, “the 1992 consensus.” It holds
what U.S. officials refer to as a U.S. “one-China policy”
that Taiwan and mainland China are parts of “one China,”
with regard to Taiwan. The Biden Administration describes
with different interpretations of what “China” means. In
the U.S. one-China policy as guided by (1) the TRA; (2)
April 2024, Xi hosted former Taiwan President Ma Ying-
U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972, 1978, and
jeou of the KMT (in office 2008-2016) for a historic
1982; and (3) “Six Assurances” that President Ronald
meeting in Beijing. On his return to Taiwan, Ma publicly
Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s government in 1982.
counseled President-elect Lai to “pledge not to follow the
The PRC has repeatedly stated that it regards U.S. policy
and actions related to Taiwan as “the most important and
path of Taiwan independence” and “return to the common
political foundation of the ‘1992 consensus.’”
sensitive issue” in U.S.
In April 25,
-China relations. (See CRS In Focus
2024, remarks, Lai said he was “eagerly looking forward to
IF12503, Taiwan: The Origins of the U.S. One-China
China having the confidence to engage with the legitimate
Policy, and CRS In Focus IF11665, President Reagan’s Six
government elected by the people of Taiwan,” and warned
Assurances to Taiwan.)
that if the PRC interacts only with Taiwan’s opposition, “it
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
won’t gain the trust and support” of Taiwan’s people.
• U.S. relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through
The PRC has long sought to isolate Taiwan internationally,
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
including by inducing Taiwan’s diplomatic partners to
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
recognize the PRC diplomatically instead. (See CRS In
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
Focus IF12646, Taiwan’s Position in the World.)
• The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
Taiwan’s Security
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
In 2023, CIA Director William J. Burns stated that Xi had
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
instructed the PLA to “be ready” to “conduct a successful
sufficient self-defense capability.”
invasion” of Taiwan by 2027, but added, “that does not
• It is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United
mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion.” U.S.-
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
Taiwan defense cooperation has grown closer as the PRC
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social
has stepped up its military activities near Taiwan. (See CRS
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
In Focus IF12481, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues and
CRS Report R48044, Taiwan Defense Issues for Congress.)
The TRA creates “strategic ambiguity” by not specifying
whether the United States would defend Taiwan in the
U.S.-Taiwan Economic Ties
event of a PRC attack. Since 2021, President Biden has four
Taiwan was the 8th-largest U.S. trading partner in 2023.
times stated that the United States would defend Taiwan,
Taiwan is a key link in U.S. global semiconductor and
appearing to abandon strategic ambiguity, although White
technology supply chains and the global center for the
House officials later said U.S. policy remained unchanged.
production of advanced chips. In June 2023, the United
On the eve of Taiwan’s 2024 election, a senior Biden
States and Taiwan signed the first agreement under a U.S.-
Administration official said President Biden had outlined
Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade. (See CRS In Focus
U.S. policy to his PRC counterpart, Xi Jinping, in
IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Economic Relations.)
November 2023, as: “[W]e oppose any unilateral changes
Taiwan and the 118th Congress
to the status quo from either side. We do not support
In the 118th Congress, enacted legislation related to Taiwan
Taiwan independence. We support cross-Strait dialogue,
includes the United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century
and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by
Trade First Agreement Implementation Act (P.L. 118-13),
peaceful means, free from coercion, in a manner that is
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024 (P.L.
acceptable to the people on both sides of the Strait. We do
118-31), and P.L. 118-50, making emergency supplemental
not take a position on the ultimate resolution of cross-Strait
appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30,
differences, provided they are resolved peacefully.”
2024, and for other purposes. Senate-passed S.J.Res. 62
PRC Policy Toward Taiwan
would nullify a rule opening the U.S. market to beef from
At the CPC’s 20th
Paraguay. The White House “strongly opposes” the
Party Congress in October 2022, PRC
leader Xi referred to unification with Taiwan as necessary
legislation, in part because of concerns that it could lead
for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” He reiterated
Paraguay to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan. House-
the CPC’s preference for peaceful unification, and its
passed legislation pending in the Senate includes H.R.
proposal for a “One Country, Two Systems” approach to
7024, which would seek to provide relief from U.S.-Taiwan
governance of Taiwan. Xi also restated that the CPC “will
double taxation; the Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act (H.R.
never promise to renounce the use of force” to unify with
540); the Pressure Regulatory Organizations to End
Taiwan. The PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in 2005,
Chinese Threats to Taiwan (PROTECT Taiwan) Act (H.R.
states that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from China,
803); H.R. 1159, related to Department of State guidance to
or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for peaceful
federal agencies on contacts with Taiwan; and the Taiwan
unification have been exhausted, “the state shall employ
International Solidarity Act (H.R. 1176).
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations

IF10275
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 80 · UPDATED

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