Updated April 4, 2022
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
retained its majority in Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative
(ROC), is an electoral democracy of 23.5 million people
Yuan. In her October 10, 2021, National Day address, Tsai
residing on one large and numerous small islands across the
called on Taiwan’s people to renew four commitments: to
Taiwan Strait from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
“a free and democratic constitutional system,” that Taiwan
U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1,
and the PRC “should not be subordinate to each other,” “to
1979, when the Carter Administration established
resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty,”
diplomatic relations with the PRC and broke diplomatic ties
and that Taiwan’s future “must be decided in accordance
with self-ruled Taiwan, over which the PRC claims
with the will of the Taiwanese people.”
sovereignty. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L.
U.S. Commitments Related to Taiwan
96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.) provides a legal basis for
this unofficial bilateral relationship. See also CRS In Focus
The PRC seeks to enforce a “one China principle,” which
IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations, by Karen M. Sutter.
defines Taiwan as part of China, and the PRC as the sole
Modern History and Current Events
legal government representing China. The United States
adheres to its own “one-China policy,” guided by: the TRA;
In 1949, after losing a civil war on mainland China to the
U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972, 1978, and
Communist Party of China (CPC), the ROC’s then-ruling
1982; and “Six Assurances” that President Ronald Reagan
party, the Kuomintang (KMT), moved the ROC
communicated to Taiwan in 1982. The U.S. government’s
government to Taiwan. The KMT continued to assert that
long-standing position has been that Taiwan’s political
the ROC was the sole legitimate government of all China
status remains unresolved.
until 1991. In 1971, U.N. General Assembly Resolution
2758 recognized the PRC’s representatives as “the only
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations,”
 Relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through the
and expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
ROC’s then-leader. Taiwan remains outside the U.N. today.
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
Figure 1. Taiwan
 The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.”
 “The President is directed to inform the Congress
promptly of any threat to the security or the social or
economic system of the people on Taiwan and any
danger to the interests of the United States arising
therefrom. The President and the Congress shall
determine, ... appropriate action by the United States in
response to any such danger.”
In the communiqués, the United States recognized the PRC
government as the “sole legal government of China”;
acknowledged, but did not endorse, “the Chinese position
that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China”;
and pledged to maintain only unofficial relations with
Taiwan. The 1982 Six Assurances include assurances that
in negotiating the 1982 U.S.-PRC communiqué, the United
States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms sales
Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using
to Taiwan, set a date for ending such arms sales, or “take
data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” President
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. has at times sent mixed messages about
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
his view of Taiwan’s political status.
Taiwan until 1987, when it yielded to public pressure for
political liberalization. The May 2016 inauguration of
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
current President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic
Taiwan, but states that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
Progressive Party (DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful
capacity to do so, creating strategic ambiguity about U.S.
transfer of political power from one party to another. In
actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. Some
2020, Tsai won a second four-year term and her party
observers, including some Members of Congress, have
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
advocated abandoning the strategic ambiguity policy in
Taiwan pursues a range of policies in an effort to make
favor of a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
itself resilient to PRC economic, political, diplomatic, and
Cross-Strait Challenges
military coercion. Taiwan’s asymmetric military strategy
aims to deter, and, if necessary, defeat PRC attacks.
The PRC maintains that mainland China and Taiwan are
Taiwan’s military is professional and technologically
parts of “one China” whose sovereignty cannot be divided.
advanced, but it enjoys less than one-tenth the budget of
The PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law commits Beijing to
China’s military and faces equipment, readiness, and
working toward “peaceful unification” with Taiwan. It
personnel challenges. The Tsai Administration is pursuing
states, however, that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession”
new policies intended to harden the island’s defenses,
from China, or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for
bolster its image on the international stage, and combat
peaceful unification have been exhausted, “the state shall
PRC influence operations.
employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures
to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In a
U.S. Policy Responses
November 2021 virtual meeting between President Biden
Senior Biden Administration officials have repeatedly
and PRC leader Xi Jinping, Xi said, “We have patience and
raised concerns about the PRC’s “continued military,
will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with
diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan.”
utmost sincerity and efforts.” He warned, however, that,
According to the White House’s readout of the Biden-Xi
“should the separatist forces for Taiwan independence
virtual meeting, Biden underscored “that the United States
provoke us, force our hands or even cross the red line, we
strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo
will be compelled to take resolute measures.” He did not
or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”
define China’s “red line.”
Recent administrations have sought to help Taiwan retain
Beijing cut off communication with Tsai’s government in
its remaining diplomatic relationships and expand its
2016, citing her unwillingness to endorse a formula known
unofficial ones, although some observers criticize punitive
as “the 1992 consensus.” The consensus stipulates that the
U.S. actions against countries severing diplomatic relations
KMT and the CPC agreed that Taiwan and mainland China
with Taiwan as ineffective or even counterproductive. The
are parts of “one China,” without agreeing on what “China”
U.S. and Taiwan involve like-minded governments in co-
means. In November 2021, the PRC government announced
hosting workshops under the U.S.-Taiwan-Japan Global
that it had placed Taiwan’s premier, foreign minister, and
Cooperation and Training Framework. The State
parliamentary speaker on a blacklist, barring their affiliated
Department in April 2021 issued new guidelines to federal
institutions from cooperating with PRC entities and their
agencies pursuant to the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020
financial supporters from doing business in the PRC.
(P.L. 116-260) that encourage working-level meetings with
Taiwan counterparts in federal buildings.
Taiwan is the primary focal point of PRC military
modernization and strategy. For decades, Taiwan’s military
The United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty
was more advanced than China’s and unquestionably able
with Taiwan in 1980, but engages in security cooperation
to deter a PRC invasion. As China’s air, naval, missile, and
with Taiwan, most concretely through arms sales. The vast
amphibious forces have become more capable, the balance
majority of Taiwan’s arms imports are from the United
of power across the Taiwan Strait has shifted significantly
States, and the island is among the top recipients of U.S.
in the PRC’s favor. In June 2021 testimony, Chairman of
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). As of December 2021, 32
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley stated that
active duty U.S. military personnel were deployed to
Xi has challenged China’s military to develop the capability
Taiwan. The two militaries also conduct regular dialogues,
to take Taiwan by 2027. Concerns about whether or when
training, and other cooperative security activities.
the PRC could attack Taiwan have become more acute as
Taiwan generally enjoys widespread congressional support.
PRC military operations near Taiwan have become more
As PRC coercion against Taiwan has intensified in recent
sophisticated and frequent. China’s armed forces regularly
years, many Members have introduced legislation aiming to
conduct exercises near Taiwan that showcase the kinds of
support Taiwan’s international engagement, boost U.S.-
capabilities they likely would employ in a cross-Strait
Taiwan economic and cultural engagement, and enhance
conflict. Chinese military aircraft have conducted more than
Taiwan’s security; some Members have signaled support
1,400 air sorties into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification
through congressional delegations (Beijing has strongly
Zone since September 2020.
condemned these visits). Members of Congress, and U.S.
The PRC government has sought to isolate Taiwan
policymakers and experts more generally, disagree at
internationally. Since 2016, 9 former Taiwan diplomatic
times—with each other, and with counterparts in Taiwan—
partners have switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC,
about how Taiwan can most effectively defend itself. Some
leaving Taiwan with 14 diplomatic partners. Taiwan
argue Taiwan must focus more on developing so-called
maintains unofficial offices in an additional 59 countries,
asymmetric, instead of conventional, capabilities. Some
though the PRC insists that these offices not include the
Members have introduced legislation that would expand
word “Taiwan” in their names. In 2021, the PRC
U.S. influence over Taiwan’s defense strategy by
downgraded diplomatic ties with Lithuania and imposed a
incentivizing Taiwan to procure U.S.-approved arms.
de facto trade embargo against the country after it allowed
Taiwan to open a “Taiwanese Representative Office” there.
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
The PRC has worked to exclude Taiwan from international
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
organizations, including by blocking Taiwan’s attendance
IF10275
as an observer at annual World Health Assembly meetings.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 56 · UPDATED

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