Updated January 10, 2023
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations,”
(ROC), is a self-governing democracy of 23 million people
and expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the
located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. Its
ROC’s then-leader. Taiwan remains outside the U.N. today.
government claims “effective jurisdiction” over the island
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
of Taiwan, the archipelagos of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,
Taiwan until 1987, when it yielded to public pressure for
and other outlying islands. Taiwan also claims disputed
political liberalization. The May 2016 inauguration of
geographic features in the East and South China Seas.
President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party
Competing interests among the United States, Taiwan, and
the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China)—
(DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful transfer of political
namely
the PRC’s determination to unify with Taiwan,
power from one party to another. Tsai won a second four-
official and
year term in 2020, and her party retained its majority in
popular Taiwan resistance to absorption by the PRC, and
Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan is to
U.S. security interests and commitments related to
hold presidential and legislative elections in 2024.
Taiwan—raise the specter of U.S.-PRC armed conflict over
Taiwan’s fate.
In August 2022, then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi became
the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan since 1997.
U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1,
The PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) responded to
1979, when the United States established diplomatic
the visit by conducting exercises in six locations around
relations with the PRC and broke them with Taiwan, over
Taiwan. PRC state media portrayed the activities as
which the PRC claims sovereignty. The 1979 Taiwan
intended to demonstrate how the PLA could isolate and
Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.)
attack Taiwan, including by blockading ports, attacking
provides a legal basis for unofficial relations. See also CRS
military bases on Taiwan’s east coast, and controlling
In Focus IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations.
access to the Bashi Channel in the Luzon Strait between
Figure 1. Taiwan
Taiwan and the Philippines. The exercises, which included
missile test-launches over Taiwan, were unprecedented in
scale and established a “new normal” in which PLA ships
and aircraft now operate closer to Taiwan and with more
regularity. The PRC also suspended some cooperation with
the United States and announced sanctions against Pelosi
and her family. Pelosi’s successor as Speaker in the 118th
Congress, Kevin McCarthy, stated in July 2022 that he, too,
would like to lead a delegation to Taiwan as Speaker.
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Since 1979, the United States has maintained a “one-China
policy,” which it currently describes as being guided by the
TRA; U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972,
1978, and 1982; and “Six Assurances” that President
Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s government in
1982. Under the one-China policy, the United States
maintains official relations with the PRC and unofficial
relations with Taiwan, sells defensive arms to Taiwan,
supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences,
opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo (without
Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using
explicitly defining the status quo), and states that it does not
data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
support independence for Taiwan. The U.S. one-China
policy is distinct from the PRC’s “one China principle,”
Modern History and Current Events
which defines Taiwan as part of China.
Facing defeat at the hands of the Communist Party of China
In the U.S.-China joint communiqués, the U.S. government
(CPC) in a civil war on mainland China, in 1949, the
recognized the PRC government as the “sole legal
ROC’s then-ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), moved
government of China,” and acknowledged, but did not
the ROC government to Taiwan. Until 1991, the KMT
endorse, “the Chinese position that there is but one China
continued to assert that the ROC government on Taiwan
and Taiwan is part of China.” The Six Assurances include
was the sole legitimate government of all China. In 1971,
assurances that in negotiating the 1982 communiqué, the
however, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758
United States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms
recognized the PRC’s representatives as “the only
sales to Taiwan or to “take any position regarding
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
sovereignty over Taiwan.” (See CRS In Focus IF11665,
agreeing on what “China” means. Xi’s government has also
President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan.)
sought to isolate Taiwan internationally. Since 2016, 9
former Taiwan diplomatic partners have switched
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
diplomatic recognition to the PRC, leaving Taiwan with 14
U.S. relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through
such partners. The PRC government has worked to exclude
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
Taiwan from participation in the work of U.N. agencies,
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
claiming that U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
“confirmed that Taiwan is a part of China.” In October
The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
2022, AIT Chairman James Moriarty accused the PRC of
“intensifying efforts to misuse” the resolution to “preclude
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the U.N. system.”
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.”
Taiwan’s Security
“The President is directed to inform the Congress
As the PLA has become more capable, the cross-Strait
promptly of any threat to the security or the social or
balance of military power has shifted in the PRC’s favor.
economic system of the people on Taiwan and any
Taiwan’s military is highly capable, but its budget is less
danger to the interests of the United States arising
than one-tenth of the PLA’s and it faces equipment,
therefrom. The President and the Congress shall
readiness, and personnel challenges. President Tsai’s
determine, ... appropriate action by the United States in
government has accused the PRC of using its growing
response to any such danger.”
military might to conduct a sustained campaign of
intimidation and coercion against the island. Near-daily
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
PLA operations in and above waters around Taiwan
Taiwan, but it states that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
increase the demands on Taiwan’s military to monitor and
capacity to do so, creating strategic ambiguity about U.S.
respond to such activities, and could compress the time
actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. Some
available for Taiwan to respond if the PLA attacks.
observers, including some Members of Congress, have
advocated abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity in
Taiwan’s military and civilian leaders and U.S. defense
favor of a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
officials broadly agree that Taiwan’s strategy to deter such
Supporters of ambiguity see it as having deterred
an attack should reflect the asymmetric cross-Strait power
provocations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait and as
balance by targeting PLA weaknesses and harnessing
incentivizing Taiwan to invest in its own defense.
Taiwan’s natural advantages, such as its fortress-like island
geography. They do not always agree, however, on how to
President Biden has sent mixed messages about U.S. policy.
implement such a strategy. Washington—Taiwan’s primary
Since August 2021, he has four times appeared to abandon
arms supplier—seeks to shape Taiwan’s planning and
strategic ambiguity. The most recent instance was in
procurement to focus on deterring an amphibious invasion.
September 2022, when a CBS News journalist asked, “So
Some in Taiwan argue this approach leaves Taiwan
unlike Ukraine, to be clear, sir, U.S. forces, U.S. men and
vulnerable to other forms of coercion short of an invasion.
women would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese
Uncertainty as to whether and how Washington might aid
invasion?” and the President answered, “Yes.” White
Taiwan in the event of an attack informs these debates.
House officials later said U.S. policy remains unchanged.
PRC Policy Toward Taiwan
Taiwan and the U.S. Congress
Congress has been influential in shaping U.S.-Taiwan
At the CPC’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, China’s
relations through legislation and participation in
top leader, Xi Jinping, referred to unification with Taiwan
longstanding and emerging debates over whether or how
as “a historic mission and an unshakable commitment” and
the United States should support Taiwan. In 2022, the 117th
as necessary for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Congress passed the most comprehensive Taiwan-related
He reiterated the CPC’s preference for peaceful unification,
legislation since the TRA in the form of the Taiwan
and its proposal for a “One Country, Two Systems”
Enhanced Resilience Act (or TERA, Title LV, Subtitle A of
approach to governance of Taiwan. (An August 2022 PRC
the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act
White Paper on Taiwan states that a post-unification
for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263). Among other things,
Taiwan would “enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a
the act authorizes Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
special administrative region” of the PRC.) Xi also warned,
assistance for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for the first time;
however, that the CPC “will never promise to renounce the
mandates “comprehensive” U.S.-Taiwan military training
use of force.” The PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in
programming; and establishes fellowships in Taiwan for
2005, states that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from
U.S. government officials. The FMF assistance authorized
China, or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for
by TERA includes up to $2 billion a year in loans and up to
peaceful unification have been exhausted, “the state shall
$2 billion a year in grant assistance for Taiwan through
employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures
FY2027. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L.
to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
117-328) makes up to $2 billion available for FMF loans to
Beijing cut off communication with President Tsai’s
Taiwan in FY2023, but does not appropriate funds for FMF
government in 2016, citing her unwillingness to endorse a
grant assistance to Taiwan.
formula known as “the 1992 consensus.” The consensus
stipulates that the KMT and the CPC agreed that Taiwan
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
and mainland China are parts of “one China,” without
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
IF10275
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 64 · UPDATED