Updated September 25, 2020
Taiwan: Select Political and Security Issues
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
(ROC), is an island democracy of 23.6 million people
Taiwan until 1987, when popular pressure forced it to allow
located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China.
political liberalization. Taiwan held its first direct
U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1,
parliamentary election in 1992 and its first direct
1979, when the Carter Administration established
presidential election in 1996. The May 2016 inauguration
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China
of current President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic
(PRC) and broke formal diplomatic ties with self-ruled
Progressive Party (DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful
Taiwan, over which the PRC claims sovereignty. The
transfer of political power from one party to another.
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et
In January 2020 elections, voters elected President Tsai to a
seq.), enacted on April 10, 1979, provides a legal basis for
second four-year term with 57.1% of the vote. The DPP lost
this unofficial bilateral relationship. It also includes
7 seats in the 113-seat legislature, but retained its majority,
commitments related to Taiwan’s security. For discussion
with 61 seats. The KMT now controls 38 seats, a gain of 3.
of economic issues, see CRS In Focus IF10256, U.S.-
The results empowered Tsai to move forward with an
Taiwan Trade Relations, by Karen M. Sutter.
agenda includes demanding “respect from China” for what
Taiwan’s Modern History
she calls Taiwan’s “separate identity.” Events in Hong
In 1949, after losing a civil war on mainland China to the
Kong are credited with contributing to Tsai’s strong
Communist Party of China, the ROC’s ruling party, the
showing in the election. Taiwan’s widely lauded response
Kuomintang (KMT), moved the ROC seat of government to
to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic
Taipei. The KMT continued to assert the ROC to be the
has since bolstered public support for her further.
sole legitimate government of all China. In 1971, however,
U.S. Commitments Related to Taiwan
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the
PRC’s representatives as “the only legitimate
The PRC seeks to enforce a “one China principle,” under
representatives of China to the United Nations,” and
which other countries affirm that Taiwan is part of China.
expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the
The United States adheres to its own “one-China policy,”
ROC’s then-leader. Taiwan remains outside the United
which the Trump Administration presents as based on U.S.-
Nations. Taiwan today claims “effective jurisdiction” over
PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972, 1978, and
Taiwan, the archipelagos of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,
1982, the TRA, and the “Six Assurances” that President
and some smaller islands. It also claims disputed islands in
Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan in 1982, shortly
the East and South China Seas.
before the release of the third U.S.-PRC joint communiqué.
In the communiqués, the United States recognized the PRC
Figure 1. Taiwan
as the “sole legal government of China”; acknowledged, but
did not affirm, “the Chinese position that there is but one
China and Taiwan is part of China”; and pledged to
maintain only unofficial relations with Taiwan. In the 1982
communique, the United States stated “that it intends
gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan.”
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
Relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through the
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere and is staffed by
U.S. government personnel assigned or detailed to AIT.)
It is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using
sufficient self-defense capability.”
data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
The Six Assurances, which the Trump Administration
declassified in 2020, include assurances that the United
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Taiwan: Select Political and Security Issues
States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms sales
Taiwan Strait transits in 2020, compared to 10 in all of
to Taiwan, did not agree to set a date for ending such arms
2019. On June 9, 2020, a U.S. Navy C-40 transport plane
sales, and did not agree “to take any position regarding
flew over Taiwan with Taiwan’s permission.
sovereignty over Taiwan.” The same declassified cable
The PRC, Taiwan, and “One China”
states that U.S. commitments to China on Taiwan arms
sales are “premised on a continuation of the PRC policy of
The PRC maintains that mainland China and Taiwan are
seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.”
parts of “one China” whose sovereignty cannot be divided.
The PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law commits Beijing to
In September 2020 Senate testimony, Assistant Secretary of
“do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell
peaceful unification” with Taiwan. It states, however, that
confirmed that it remains U.S. policy to leave the question
in the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from China, or if the
of Taiwan’s sovereignty “undecided and to be worked out
PRC concludes that possibilities for peaceful unification
between the two parties,” meaning Taiwan and the PRC. He
have been exhausted, “the state shall employ non-peaceful
emphasized that the United States insists that PRC-Taiwan
means and other necessary measures to protect China’s
differences “be resolved peacefully and through dialogue,
sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In 2019, PRC leader
not with coercion or use of force.” The TRA does not
Xi Jinping recommitted the PRC to peaceful unification,
require the United States to defend Taiwan, but states that it
but reserved the option to use force. He called for exploring
is U.S. policy to maintain the capacity to do so, creating
“a Taiwan plan for ‘one country, two systems,’” a reference
“strategic ambiguity” regarding the U.S. role in the event of
to an arrangement under which mainland China and Taiwan
conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.
would be parts of one country, but maintain different
Trump Administration Policy
political and other systems, as in Hong Kong. After China’s
June 2020 imposition of a national security law on Hong
The Trump Administration has sought to strengthen
Kong, President Tsai declared the approach “not viable.”
bilateral relations with Taiwan, even as the Administration
states that it remains committed to the framework of
Unlike her KMT predecessor, President Tsai has not
unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations. In August 2020, Secretary
endorsed the “1992 consensus,” under which Taiwan and
of Health and Human Services Alex Azar became the first
the PRC acknowledged “one China,” but retained their own
U.S. cabinet member to visit Taiwan since 2014. In
interpretations of what it meant. In a BBC interview after
September 2020, Under Secretary of State for Economic
her reelection, Tsai said, “We don’t have a need to declare
Growth, Energy, and the Environment Keith Krach became
ourselves an independent state. We are an independent
the highest-ranking State Department official to visit
country already and we call ourselves the Republic of
Taiwan since 1979. In January and May 2020, U.S.
China (Taiwan).” In 2016, the PRC suspended contacts
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo issued statements
with Taiwan’s government over Tsai’s unwillingness to
congratulating Tsai, respectively, on her reelection and the
endorse the “1992 consensus.”
start of her second term, making him the highest-level U.S.
Since 2016, the PRC has established diplomatic relations
official ever to have issued such statements. The PRC has
with eight countries that previously recognized Taiwan:
urged the United States to “stop official interactions and
first the Gambia, then Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the
moves aimed at upgrading substantive relations with
Taiwan” and
Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the
increased its military activity near Taiwan.
Solomon Islands, and Kiribati. The PRC has stepped up
An increasingly prominent element of U.S. policy is an
military patrols and exercises around Taiwan, including
effort to help Taiwan strengthen its relations with other
sending military aircraft across the median line of the
countries, particularly the 15 countries that maintain
Taiwan Strait. The PRC has also blocked Taiwan’s
diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than the PRC. In
attendance as an observer at annual World Health Assembly
2019, Japan joined the United States and Taiwan as a
meetings, which Taiwan attended from 2009 to 2016. The
formal member of the Global Cooperation and Training
PRC has offered carrots, too: 2018’s “31 measures” and
Framework, which convenes workshops to share Taiwan’s
2019’s “26 measures” sought to improve living and
expertise with other countries. Also in 2019, the United
working conditions for Taiwan people in mainland China.
States and Taiwan launched Indo-Pacific Democratic
Select Legislation in the 116th Congress
Governance Consultations, to help Indo-Pacific countries
address governance challenges, and a new Pacific Islands
Section 1258 of the Senate-passed National Defense
Dialogue, to help “meet the development needs of Taiwan’s
Authorization Act for FY2021 (S. 4049) would state that it
diplomatic partners in the Pacific.” The United States is
is U.S. policy that U.S. Armed Forces will maintain the
also partnering with Taiwan to provide development
capacity “to deny a ‘fait accompli’ operation by the [PRC]
assistance in the Western Hemisphere, home to nine of
to rapidly seize control of Taiwan.” Both the Senate bill and
Taiwan’s diplomatic partners.
the House-passed William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2021 (H.R. 6395) would
Although the United States terminated its Mutual Defense
urge “practical training and military exercises” with
Treaty with Taiwan in 1980, it engages with Taiwan’s
Taiwan. The Senate bill would state that it is U.S. policy for
military through dialogues, training, and arms sales, with a
such activities to include, “as appropriate, the Rim of the
focus on encouraging Taiwan to field “credible, resilient,
Pacific exercise, combined training at the National Training
and cost-effective capabilities.” The Trump Administration
Center at Fort Erwin, and bilateral naval exercises and
has notified Congress of 14 proposed major Foreign
training.” Both bills would call for port calls in Taiwan with
Military Sales cases for Taiwan, with a combined value of
U.S. Navy hospital ships USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy.
about $13.2 billion. The U.S. Navy has so far conducted 11
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Taiwan: Select Political and Security Issues
IF10275
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 46 · UPDATED