Updated March 31, 2023
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
China to the United Nations,” and expelled “the
(ROC), is a self-governing democracy of 23 million people
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the ROC’s then-
located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. Its
leader. Taiwan is thus not a member of the U.N.
government claims “effective jurisdiction” over the island
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
of Taiwan, the archipelagos of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,
Taiwan until 1987, when it yielded to public pressure for
and other outlying islands. Taiwan also claims disputed
political liberalization. The May 2016 inauguration of
geographic features in the East and South China Seas.
President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party
U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1,
(DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful transfer of political
1979, when the United States established diplomatic
power from one party to another. Tsai won a second four-
relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
year term in 2020, and her party retained its majority in
broke them with Taiwan, over which the PRC claims
Taiwan’s parliament, the 113-member Legislative Yuan.
sovereignty. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L.
Taiwan is to hold presidential and legislative elections on
96-8; 22 U.S.C. §3301 et seq.) provides a legal basis for
January 13, 2024. After two consecutive terms as president,
unofficial relations. See also CRS In Focus IF10256, U.S.-
Tsai is ineligible to run again. Vice President Lai Ching-te
Taiwan Trade Relations.
(William Lai) is the DPP’s presumptive presidential
The PRC’s stated determination to unify with Taiwan, by
candidate. Other Taiwan political parties have yet to select
force if necessary; resistance in Taiwan to absorption by the
their presidential candidates. With the election looming,
PRC; and U.S. security interests and commitments related
Tsai on March 29, 2023, embarked on a 10-day trip to
to Taiwan have led some U.S. policymakers, including
Taiwan diplomatic partners Guatemala and Belize, with
some Members of Congress, to expand efforts to deter
“transit stops” planned in New York City and Los Angeles.
armed conflict over Taiwan.
Media reports indicate that Tsai’s April 5-7 Los Angeles
stop may include a meeting with the House Speaker and
Figure 1. Taiwan
other Members. After Tsai’s arrival in New York, a PRC
Foreign Ministry spokesperson accused the United States
and Taiwan of seeking to use Tsai’s transit stops “to
upgrade official exchanges and substantive relations,” and
urged the United States to “stop all forms of official
interaction with Taiwan.” The spokesperson called Taiwan
“the very core of China’s core interests” and “the first red
line that must not be crossed” in U.S.-PRC relations.
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Since 1979, the United States has maintained a “one-China
policy,” which it currently describes as being guided by the
TRA; U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972,
1978, and 1982; and “Six Assurances” that President
Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s government in
1982. Under the one-China policy, the United States
maintains official relations with the PRC and unofficial
relations with Taiwan, sells defensive arms to Taiwan,
supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences,
opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo (without
explicitly defining the status quo), and states that it does not
Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using
support independence for Taiwan. The U.S. one-China
data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
policy is distinct from the PRC’s “one China principle,”
Modern History
which defines Taiwan as part of China.
In 1949, as it was losing a civil war on mainland China to
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
the Communist Party of China (CPC), the ROC’s then-
U.S. relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through
ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), moved the ROC
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
government to Taiwan. Until 1991, the KMT continued to
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
assert that the ROC government on Taiwan was the sole
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
legitimate government of all China. In 1971, however, U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC’s
The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
representatives as “the only legitimate representatives of
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
Taiwan’s Security
sufficient self-defense capability.”
As the CPC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has
It is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United
modernized, the cross-Strait balance of military power has
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
shifted in the PRC’s favor. Taiwan’s military budget is less
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social
than one-tenth that of the PLA, and Taiwan’s military faces
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
equipment, readiness, and personnel challenges. CIA
Director William J. Burns stated in February 2023 that Xi
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
Jinping has instructed the PLA to “be ready” to “conduct a
Taiwan, but by stating that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
successful invasion” of Taiwan by 2027, but added, “that
capacity to do so, the TRA creates “strategic ambiguity”
does not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion.”
about U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan.
Some observers, including some Members of Congress,
Taiwan’s government has accused the PRC of using its
have advocated a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
growing military might to conduct a sustained campaign of
Supporters of strategic ambiguity see it as having deterred
intimidation and coercion against the island. That campaign
provocations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait and as
appeared to intensify in 2022, after then-House Speaker
incentivizing Taiwan to invest in its own defense. Since
Nancy Pelosi became the highest-ranking U.S. official to
August 2021, President Biden has four times stated that the
visit Taiwan since 1997. Following her visit, the PLA
United States would defend Taiwan, appearing to abandon
conducted large-scale exercises around the island, and ships
strategic ambiguity, although White House officials later
and aircraft have operated closer to Taiwan and with greater
said U.S. policy remained unchanged.
regularity ever since. Monitoring and responding to such
operations has taxed Taiwan’s military. Many analysts see
In the U.S.-PRC joint communiqués, the U.S. government
the PLA’s activities as intended to undermine the
recognized the PRC government as the “sole legal
confidence of Taiwan’s population and policymakers.
government of China,” and acknowledged, but did not
endorse, “the Chinese position that there is but one China
Taiwan and U.S. officials broadly agree that Taiwan’s
and Taiwan is part of China.” Among the Six Assurances
strategy to deter a PRC attack should target PLA
are that in negotiating the 1982 joint communiqué, the
weaknesses and harness Taiwan’s natural advantages, such
United States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms
as its island geography. They sometimes disagree on how to
sales to Taiwan. (See CRS In Focus IF11665, President
implement such an asymmetric strategy. The United
Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan.)
States—Taiwan’s primary arms supplier—seeks to shape
Taiwan’s
PRC Policy Toward Taiwan
strategy to focus on deterring an amphibious
invasion. Some in Taiwan argue this approach leaves
At the CPC’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, China’s
Taiwan vulnerable to military coercion short of an invasion.
top leader, Xi Jinping, referred to unification with Taiwan
Uncertainty as to whether and how Washington might aid
as “a historic mission and an unshakable commitment” and
Taiwan in the event of an attack informs these debates.
as necessary for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
He reiterated the CPC’s preference for peaceful unification,
Taiwan and the U.S. Congress
and its proposal for a “One Country, Two Systems”
Congress has been influential in shaping U.S.-Taiwan
approach to governance of Taiwan. Xi also restated,
relations. In 2022, the 117th Congress passed the Taiwan
however, that the CPC “will never promise to renounce the
Enhanced Resilience Act (or TERA, Title LV, Subtitle A of
use of force.” The PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in
the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act
2005, states that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from
for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263). Among other things,
China, or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for
the act authorizes Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
peaceful unification have been exhausted, “the state shall
assistance for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for the first time;
employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures
mandates “comprehensive” U.S.-Taiwan military training
to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
programming; and establishes a Taiwan Fellowship
Program in Taiwan for U.S. government officials.
Beijing cut off communication with Taiwan’s government
in 2016, citing President Tsai’s unwillingness to endorse a
The FMF assistance authorized by TERA includes up to $2
formula known as “the 1992 consensus.” The consensus
billion a year in loans and up to $2 billion a year in grant
stipulates that the KMT and the CPC agreed that Taiwan
assistance for Taiwan through FY2027. The Consolidated
and mainland China are parts of “one China,” without
Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) makes up to $2
agreeing on what “China” means. Xi’s government has also
billion available for FMF loans to Taiwan in FY2023, but—
sought to isolate Taiwan internationally. In March 2023,
sparking controversy in Taiwan—it does not appropriate
Honduras became the 10th former Taiwan diplomatic
funds for FMF grant assistance to Taiwan. (Taiwan’s
partner to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC since
government has indicated that it does not plan to make use
2016, leaving Taiwan with 13 diplomatic partners. The
of the FMF loan assistance.) President Biden’s FY2024
PRC government has worked to exclude Taiwan from
budget request includes a request for $113 million in FMF
participation in the work of U.N. agencies, claiming that
funds “to address emergent foreign policy priorities,” with
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758 “confirmed that
“priority partners” potentially including Taiwan.
Taiwan is a part of China.” In October 2022, then-AIT
Chairman James Moriarty accused the PRC of “intensifying
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
efforts to misuse” the resolution to “preclude Taiwan’s
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
meaningful participation in the U.N. system.”
IF10275
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 70 · UPDATED