Updated October 7, 2022
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
China to the United Nations,” and expelled “the
(ROC), is a self-governing democracy of 23 million people
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the ROC’s then-
located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. Its
leader. Taiwan remains outside the U.N. today.
government claims “effective jurisdiction” over the island
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
of Taiwan, the archipelagos of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,
Taiwan until 1987, when it yielded to public pressure for
and other outlying islands. Taiwan also claims disputed
political liberalization. The May 2016 inauguration of
geographic features in the East and South China Seas.
current President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic
Competing interests among the United States, Taiwan, and
the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China)—
Progressive Party (DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful
namely
the PRC’s determination to unify with Taiwan,
transfer of political power from one party to another. Tsai
official and
won a second four-year term in 2020, and her party retained
popular Taiwan resistance to absorption by the PRC, and
its majority in Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan.
U.S. security commitments related to Taiwan—mean that
Taiwan is scheduled to hold local elections on November
the United States and China could someday be drawn into
armed conflict over Taiwan’s
26, 2022, and presidential and legislative elections in 2024.
fate.
On August 2-3, 2022, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi
U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1,
became the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan
1979, when the United States established diplomatic
since then-Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1997. She was
relations with the PRC and broke them with Taiwan, over
accompanied by five other Members of Congress. PRC
which the PRC claims sovereignty. The 1979 Taiwan
State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned
Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.)
the Speaker’s trip as a “reckless move” that “seriously
provides a legal basis for unofficial relations. See also CRS
undermined China’s sovereignty.” The PRC’s People’s
In Focus IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations.
Liberation Army (PLA) responded to the visit by
Figure 1. Taiwan
conducting exercises in six locations around Taiwan. PRC
state media portrayed the activities as intended to
demonstrate how the PLA could isolate and attack Taiwan,
including by blockading ports, attacking military bases on
Taiwan’s east coast, and controlling access to the Bashi
Channel in the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the
Philippines. The exercises, which included missile test-
launches over Taiwan, were unprecedented in scale and
established a “new normal” in which PLA ships and aircraft
now operate closer to Taiwan and with more regularity. The
PRC also announced unspecified sanctions against the
Speaker and her immediate family, cancelled U.S.-PRC
military dialogues, and suspended cooperation with the
United States in five areas, including counter-narcotics.
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Since 1979, the United States has maintained a “one-China
policy,” which it currently describes as being guided by the
Taiwan Relations Act; U.S.-PRC joint communiqués
concluded in 1972, 1978, and 1982; and “Six Assurances”
that President Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s
Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using
government in 1982. Under the one-China policy, the
data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
United States maintains official relations with the PRC and
unofficial relations with Taiwan, sells defensive arms to
Modern History and Current Events
Taiwan, supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait
In 1949, at the end of a civil war on mainland China against
differences, opposes any unilateral changes to the status
the Communist Party of China (CPC), the ROC’s then-
quo (without explicitly defining the status quo), and states
ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), moved the ROC
that it does not support independence for Taiwan. The U.S.
government to Taiwan. Until 1991, the KMT continued to
one-China policy is distinct from the PRC’s “one China
assert that the ROC government on Taiwan was the sole
principle,” which defines Taiwan as part of China.
legitimate government of all China. In 1971, however, U.N.
In the U.S.-China joint communiqués, the U.S. government
General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC’s
recognized the PRC government as the “sole legal
representatives as “the only legitimate representatives of
government of China,” and acknowledged, but did not
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
endorse, “the Chinese position that there is but one China
Beijing cut off communication with President Tsai’s
and Taiwan is part of China.” The Six Assurances include
government in 2016, citing her unwillingness to endorse a
assurances that in negotiating the 1982 communiqué, the
formula known as “the 1992 consensus.” The consensus
United States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms
stipulates that the KMT and the CPC agreed that Taiwan
sales to Taiwan or to “take any position regarding
and mainland China are parts of “one China,” without
sovereignty over Taiwan.” (See CRS In Focus IF11665,
agreeing on what “China” means. Xi’s government has also
President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan.)
sought to isolate Taiwan internationally. Since 2016, 9
former Taiwan diplomatic partners have switched
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
diplomatic recognition to the PRC, leaving Taiwan with 14
U.S. relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through
such partners. The PRC government has worked to exclude
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
Taiwan from participation in the work of U.N. agencies,
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
claiming that U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
“confirmed that Taiwan is a part of China.” In October
The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
2022, AIT Chairman James Moriarty accused the PRC of
“intensifying efforts to misuse” the resolution to “preclude
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the U.N. system.”
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.”
Taiwan’s Security
“The President is directed to inform the Congress
As the PLA has become more capable, the cross-Strait
promptly of any threat to the security or the social or
balance of military power has shifted in the PRC’s favor.
economic system of the people on Taiwan and any
Taiwan’s military is highly capable, but its budget is less
danger to the interests of the United States arising
than one-tenth of the PLA’s and it faces equipment,
therefrom. The President and the Congress shall
readiness, and personnel challenges. President Tsai’s
determine, ... appropriate action by the United States in
government has accused the PRC of using its growing
response to any such danger.”
military might to conduct a sustained campaign of
intimidation and coercion against the island. Near-daily
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
PLA operations in and above waters around Taiwan
Taiwan, but it states that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
increase the demands on Taiwan’s military to monitor and
capacity to do so, creating strategic ambiguity about U.S.
respond to such activities, and could compress the time
actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. Some
available for Taiwan to respond if the PLA attacks.
observers, including some Members of Congress, have
advocated abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity in
Taiwan’s military and civilian leaders and U.S. defense
favor of a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
officials broadly agree that Taiwan’s strategy to deter such
Supporters of ambiguity see it as having deterred
an attack should reflect the asymmetric cross-Strait power
provocations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait and as
balance by targeting PLA weaknesses and harnessing
incentivizing Taiwan to invest in its own defense.
Taiwan’s natural advantages, such as its fortress-like island
geography. They do not always agree, however, on how to
President Biden has sent mixed messages about U.S. policy.
implement such a strategy. Washington—Taiwan’s primary
Since August 2021, he has four times appeared to abandon
arms supplier—seeks to shape Taiwan’s planning and
strategic ambiguity. The most recent instance was in
procurement to focus on deterring an amphibious invasion.
September 2022, when a CBS News journalist asked, “So
Some in Taiwan argue this approach leaves Taiwan
unlike Ukraine, to be clear, sir, U.S. forces, U.S. men and
vulnerable to other forms of coercion short of an invasion.
women would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese
Uncertainty as to whether and how Washington might aid
invasion?” and the President answered, “Yes.” White
Taiwan in the event of an attack informs these debates.
House officials later said U.S. policy remains unchanged.
PRC Policy Toward Taiwan
Taiwan and the 117th Congress
On September 14, 2022, the Senate Foreign Relations
On August 10, 2022, the PRC released its first White Paper
Committee reported S. 4428, the Taiwan Policy Act of
on Taiwan in 22 years. It portrays “China’s complete
2022, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. On
reunification”—including unification with Taiwan—as a
September 29, 2022, Senators Menendez, Risch, and
“historic mission” for the Communist Party of China
Graham proposed the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 as
(CPC). The document states that “[n]ational reunification
Amendment 6340 to Senator Reed and Senator Inhofe’s
by peaceful means” is the CPC and PRC’s “first choice”
Amendment 5499 to the National Defense Authorization
and reaffirms the PRC’s proposal for a “One Country, Two
Act for FY2023 (H.R. 7900). Amendment 6340 includes
Systems” approach to “resolving the Taiwan question.” The
provisions that would change longstanding elements of U.S.
White Paper proposes that, “after reunification Taiwan will
policy toward Taiwan. Among other things, the amendment
enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative
would state that it is U.S. policy to support “the freedom of
region.” The PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in 2005,
the people of Taiwan to determine their own future,” make
states that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from China,
Taiwan eligible for Foreign Military Finance grant
or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for peaceful
assistance, and authorize $6.5 billion of appropriations for
unification have been exhausted, “the state shall employ
such assistance for FY2023 to FY2027. A companion bill,
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to
H.R. 9010, is pending in the House.
protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
IF10275
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 61 · UPDATED