Updated April 26, 2023
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
the PRC’s representatives as “the only legitimate
(ROC), is a self-governing democracy of 23 million people
representatives of China to the United Nations,” and
located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China.
expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the
U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1,
ROC’s then-leader. Taiwan remains outside the U.N.
1979, when the United States established diplomatic
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
Taiwan until 1987, when it yielded to public pressure for
broke them with the ROC. As a condition for diplomatic
political liberalization. The May 2016 inauguration of
relations with the PRC, the U.S. government agreed to
President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party
withdraw U.S. military personnel from Taiwan within four
(DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful transfer of political
months and to terminate the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense
power from one party to another. Tsai won a second four-
Treaty effective January 1, 1980. The 1979 Taiwan
year term in 2020, and her party retained its majority in
Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §3301 et seq.)
Taiwan’s parliament, the 113-member Legislative Yuan.
provides a legal basis for unofficial relations. See also CRS
In Focus IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations.
Taiwan is to hold presidential and legislative elections on
The PRC’s stated determination to unify with Taiwan;
January 13, 2024. After two consecutive terms as President,
Tsai is ineligible to run again. Vice President Lai Ching-te
resistance to that prospect in Taiwan; and U.S. security
(William Lai) is the DPP nominee to succeed her. He has
interests and commitments related to Taiwan have led some
sought to present his party as the stronger defender of
U.S. policymakers, including some Members of Congress,
democracy. The KMT, now Taiwan’s main opposition
to expand efforts to deter armed conflict over Taiwan.
party, has yet to select its presidential candidate. It portrays
Figure 1. Taiwan
itself as better positioned to lower tensions with the PRC
and head off conflict. Also running is Ko Wen-je of the
Taiwan People’s Party, a former Taipei mayor, who is
seeking to draw voters from both the DPP and KMT.
President Tsai traveled overseas in the spring of 2023, with
transit stops in the United States. House Speaker Kevin
McCarthy met with Tsai in California, becoming the
highest-ranking U.S. official to meet with a Taiwan
president on U.S. soil in the era of unofficial relations. The
PRC condemned the meeting, with the CPC’s Taiwan Work
Office citing it as evidence that the DPP is “clinging to U.S.
support to seek independence.” The PRC’s response
included three days of joint military exercises around
Taiwan and an announcement from a provincial maritime
safety administration of a “special joint patrol and
inspection operation” of vessels in the Taiwan Strait, an
apparent attempt to demonstrate PRC sovereignty over
those waters. Taiwan authorities advised shipping
companies to refuse PRC attempts to board or inspect their
vessels; no such attempts were reported. (See CRS In Focus
IF12371, Taiwan Presidents’ U.S. Transit Visits.)
Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using
data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Modern History
Since 1979, the United States has maintained a “one-China
policy,” which it currently describes as being guided by the
Taiwan was a colony of Japan from 1895 to 1945. The
TRA; U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972,
ROC, then based on mainland China, assumed control of
1978, and 1982; and “Six Assurances” that President
Taiwan in 1945, after Japan’s defeat in World War II. Four
Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s government in
years later, after losing a civil war to the Communist Party
1982. Under the one-China policy, the United States
of China (CPC), the ROC’s then-ruling party, the
maintains official relations with the PRC and unofficial
Kuomintang (KMT), moved the ROC government from
relations with Taiwan, sells defensive arms to Taiwan,
mainland China to Taiwan. Until 1991, the KMT continued
supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences,
to assert that the ROC government on Taiwan was the sole
opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo (without
legitimate government of all China. In 1971, however, U.N.
explicitly defining the status quo), and states that it does not
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 recognized
support independence for Taiwan. The U.S. one-China
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
policy is distinct from the PRC’s “one China principle,”
leaving Taiwan with 13 diplomatic partners. The PRC
which defines Taiwan as part of China.
government has worked to exclude Taiwan from
participation in the work of U.N. agencies, claiming that
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
UNGA Resolution 2758 “confirmed that Taiwan is a part of
U.S. relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through
China.” In October 2022, then-AIT Chairman James
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
Moriarty accused the PRC of “intensifying efforts to
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
misuse” the UNGA resolution to “preclude Taiwan’s
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
meaningful participation in the U.N. system.”
The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
Taiwan’s Security
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
As the CPC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
modernized, the cross-Strait balance of military power has
sufficient self-defense capability.”
shifted in the PRC’s favor. The Taiwan military’s budget is
It is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United
less than one-tenth that of the PLA’s, and Taiwan’s military
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
faces equipment, readiness, and personnel challenges. CIA
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social
Director William J. Burns stated in February 2023 that Xi
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
Jinping has instructed the PLA to “be ready” to “conduct a
successful invasion” of Taiwan by 2027, but added, “that
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
does not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion.”
Taiwan, but by stating that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
capacity to do so, the TRA creates “strategic ambiguity”
Taiwan’s government has accused the PRC of using its
about U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan.
growing military might to conduct a sustained campaign of
Some observers, including some Members of Congress,
intimidation and coercion against the island. That campaign
have advocated a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
appeared to intensify in 2022, after then-House Speaker
Supporters of strategic ambiguity see it as having deterred
Nancy Pelosi became the highest-ranking U.S. official to
provocations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Since
visit Taiwan since 1997. Following her visit, the PLA
August 2021, President Biden has four times stated that the
conducted large-scale exercises around the island, and ships
United States would defend Taiwan, appearing to abandon
and aircraft have operated closer to Taiwan and with greater
strategic ambiguity, although White House officials later
regularity ever since. Monitoring and responding to such
said U.S. policy remained unchanged.
operations has taxed Taiwan’s military.
In the U.S.-PRC joint communiqués, the U.S. government
Taiwan and U.S. officials broadly agree that Taiwan’s
recognized the PRC government as the “sole legal
strategy to deter a PRC attack should target PLA
government of China,” and acknowledged, but did not
weaknesses and harness Taiwan’s natural advantages, such
endorse, “the Chinese position that there is but one China
as its island geography. They sometimes disagree on how to
and Taiwan is part of China.” Among the Six Assurances
implement such an asymmetric strategy. The United
are that in negotiating the 1982 joint communiqué, the
States—Taiwan’s primary arms supplier—seeks to shape
United States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms
Taiwan’s strategy to focus on deterring an amphibious
sales to Taiwan. (See CRS In Focus IF11665, President
invasion. Some in Taiwan argue this approach leaves
Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan.)
Taiwan vulnerable to military coercion short of an invasion.
PRC Policy Toward Taiwan
Uncertainty as to whether and how Washington might aid
Taiwan in the event of an attack informs these debates.
At the CPC’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, China’s
Taiwan and the U.S. Congress
top leader, Xi Jinping, referred to unification with Taiwan
as necessary for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
In the 118th Congress, House-passed H.R. 1159 would
He reiterated the CPC’s preference for peaceful unification,
amend the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260) to
and its proposal for a “One Country, Two Systems”
require the Department of State to review its guidelines on
approach to governance of Taiwan. Xi also restated that the
relations with Taiwan at least every two years and report to
CPC “will never promise to renounce the use of force.” The
Congress, with reports including identification of
PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in 2005, states that in
opportunities to lift restrictions on relations with Taiwan.
the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from China, or if the PRC
In 2022, the 117th Congress passed the Taiwan Enhanced
concludes that possibilities for peaceful unification have
Resilience Act (or TERA, Title LV, Subtitle A of the James
been exhausted, “the state shall employ non-peaceful means
M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
and other necessary measures to protect China’s
Year 2023, P.L. 117-263). Among other things, the act
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
authorizes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance for
Beijing cut off communication with Taiwan’s government
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for the first time and mandates
in 2016, citing President Tsai’s unwillingness to endorse a
“comprehensive” U.S.-Taiwan military training
formula known as “the 1992 consensus.” The consensus
programming. The FMF assistance includes up to $2 billion
stipulates that the KMT and the CPC agreed that Taiwan
a year in grant assistance for Taiwan through FY2027. The
and mainland China are parts of “one China,” without
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) does
agreeing on what “China” means. The PRC has also sought
not appropriate funds for such grants for Taiwan.
to isolate Taiwan internationally. In March 2023, Honduras
became the 10th former Taiwan diplomatic partner to
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC since 2016,
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
IF10275
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 74 · UPDATED