Updated February 17, 2023
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the ROC’s then-
(ROC), is a self-governing democracy of 23 million people
leader. Taiwan remains outside the U.N. today.
located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. Its
government claims “effective jurisdiction” over
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
the island
Taiwan until 1987, when it yielded to public pressure for
of Taiwan, the archipelagos of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,
political liberalization. The May 2016 inauguration of
and other outlying islands. Taiwan also claims disputed
President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party
geographic features in the East and South China Seas.
(DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful transfer of political
U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1,
power from one party to another. Tsai won a second four-
1979, when the United States established diplomatic
year term in 2020, and her party retained its majority in
relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan is to
broke them with Taiwan, over which the PRC claims
hold presidential and legislative elections in early 2024.
sovereignty. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L.
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
96-8; 22 U.S.C. §3301) provides a legal basis for unofficial
relations. See also CRS In Focus IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan
Since 1979, the United States has maintained a “one-China
Trade Relations.
policy,” which it currently describes as being guided by the
The PRC’s long
TRA; U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972,
-stated determination to unify with Taiwan,
1978, and 1982; and “Six Assurances” that President
by force if necessary; resistance in Taiwan to absorption by
Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s government in
the PRC; and U.S. security interests and commitments
1982. Under the one-China policy, the United States
related to Taiwan combine to create the risk of possible
maintains official relations with the PRC and unofficial
future U.S.-PRC armed conflict over Taiwan.
relations with Taiwan, sells defensive arms to Taiwan,
Figure 1. Taiwan
supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences,
opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo (without
explicitly defining the status quo), and states that it does not
support independence for Taiwan. The U.S. one-China
policy is distinct from the PRC’s “one China principle,”
which defines Taiwan as part of China.
In the communiqués, the U.S. government recognized the
PRC government as the “sole legal government of China,”
and acknowledged, but did not endorse, “the Chinese
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of
China.” The Six Assurances include statements to Taiwan
that in negotiating the 1982 joint communiqué with the
PRC, the United States did not agree to consult with the
PRC on arms sales to Taiwan or to “take any position
regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” (See CRS In Focus
IF11665, President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan.)
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
U.S. relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
Modern History
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
In 1949, as it was losing a civil war on mainland China to
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
the Communist Party of China (CPC), the ROC’s then-
sufficient self-defense capability.”
ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), moved the ROC
“The President is directed to inform the Congress
government to Taiwan. Until 1991, the KMT continued to
promptly of any threat to the security or the social or
assert that the ROC government on Taiwan was the sole
economic system of the people on Taiwan and any
legitimate government of all China. In 1971, however, U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC’s
danger to the interests of the United States arising
representatives as “the only legitimate representatives of
therefrom. The President and the Congress shall
China to the United Nations,” and expelled “t
determine... appropriate action by the United States in
he
response to any such danger.”
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
campaign appeared to step up in intensity in August 2022,
Taiwan, but it states that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi became the highest-
capacity to do so, creating “strategic ambiguity” about U.S.
ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan since 1997. The PLA
actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. Some
conducted large-scale exercises in six locations off the
observers, including some Members of Congress, have
island’s coast. The exercises included missile test-launches
advocated abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity in
over Taiwan. PLA ships and aircraft have operated closer to
favor of a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
the island with greater regularity ever since—often multiple
Supporters of ambiguity see it as having deterred
times per week—and monitoring and responding to such
provocations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait and as
operations has taxed Taiwan’s military. Many analysts see
incentivizing Taiwan to invest in its own defense.
the PLA activities as intended to undermine the confidence
of Taiwan’s population and policymakers.
President Biden has sent mixed messages about U.S. policy.
Since August 2021, he has four times stated that the United
Taiwan and U.S. officials broadly agree that Taiwan’s
States would defend Taiwan, appearing to abandon strategic
strategy to deter a PRC attack should address the
ambiguity, although White House officials later said U.S.
asymmetric cross-Strait power balance by targeting PLA
policy remained unchanged.
weaknesses and harnessing Taiwan’s natural advantages,
PRC Policy Toward Taiwan
such as its fortress-like island geography. They do not
always agree, however, on how to implement such a
At the CPC’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, China’s
strategy. The United States—Taiwan’s primary arms
top leader, Xi Jinping, referred to unification with Taiwan
supplier—seeks to shape Taiwan’s strategy to focus on
as “a historic mission and an unshakable commitment” and
deterring an amphibious invasion. Some in Taiwan argue
as necessary for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
this approach leaves Taiwan vulnerable to military coercion
He reiterated the CPC’s preference for peaceful unification,
short of an invasion. Uncertainty as to whether and how
and its proposal for a “One Country, Two Systems”
Washington might aid Taiwan in the event of an attack
approach to governance of Taiwan. Xi also restated,
informs these debates.
however, that the CPC “will never promise to renounce the
use of force.” The PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in
Taiwan and the U.S. Congress
2005, states that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from
Congress has been influential in shaping U.S.-Taiwan
China, or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for
relations. In 2022, the 117th Congress passed the most
peaceful unification have been exhausted, “the state shall
comprehensive Taiwan-related legislation since the TRA in
employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures
the form of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (or TERA,
to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Title LV, Subtitle A of the James M. Inhofe National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-
Beijing cut off communication with Taiwan’s government
263). Among other things, the act authorizes Foreign
in 2016, citing President Tsai’s unwillingness to endorse a
formula known as “the 1992 consensus
Military Financing (FMF) assistance for U.S. arms sales to
.” The consensus
Taiwan for the first time; mandates “comprehensive” U.S.-
stipulates that the KMT and the CPC agreed that Taiwan
Taiwan military training programming; and establishes a
and mainland China are parts of “one China,” without
Taiwan Fellowship Program in Taiwan for U.S.
agreeing on what “China” means. Xi’s government has also
government officials. In a December 28, 2022 statement,
sought to isolate Taiwan internationally. Since 2016, nine
Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry defended the fellowship
former Taiwan diplomatic partners have switched
program from domestic criticism, saying, “competent
diplomatic recognition to the PRC, leaving Taiwan with 14
Taiwanese agencies will ... assess whether to accept the
such partners. The PRC government has worked to exclude
U.S. plans,” and that it is “absolutely out of the question
Taiwan from participation in the work of U.N. agencies,
that any fellow could interfere in Taiwan’s internal affairs.”
claiming that U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758
“confirmed that Taiwan is a part of China.” In October
The FMF assistance authorized by TERA includes up to $2
2022, AIT Chairman James Moriarty accused the PRC of
billion a year in loans and up to $2 billion a year in grant
“intensifying efforts to misuse” the resolution to “preclude
assistance for Taiwan through FY2027. The Consolidated
Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the U.N. system.”
Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) makes up to $2
Taiwan’s Security
billion available for FMF loans to Taiwan in FY2023, but
does not appropriate funds for FMF grant assistance to
Taiwan’s military is highly capable, but its budget is less
Taiwan. Taiwan’s government has indicated that it does not
than one-tenth of the PLA’s and it faces equipment,
plan to make use of the FMF loan assistance. The Taiwan
readiness, and personnel challenges. As China’s military,
Foreign Ministry’s December 28, 2022, statement declares
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has modernized, the
“strengthening national defense and protecting the
cross-Strait balance of military power has shifted in the
homeland are Taiwan’s responsibility.” It adds, “The
PRC’s favor. Xi Jinping has instructed the PLA to “be
government will fulfill its obligations by ensuring that
ready” to “conduct a successful invasion” of Taiwan by
sufficient national defense budget is allocated to enhance
2027, according to February 2023 remarks by CIA Director
Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare capabilities.”
William J. Burns. Burns added, “that does not mean that
he’s decided to conduct an invasion.”
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
President Tsai’s government has accused the PRC of using
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
its growing military might to conduct a sustained campaign
IF10275
of intimidation and coercion against the island. That
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 68 · UPDATED