Updated June 13, 2023
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
to assert that the ROC government on Taiwan was the sole
(ROC), is a self-governing democracy of 23 million people
legitimate government of all China. In 1971, however, U.N.
located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China.
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 recognized
U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1,
the PRC’s representatives as “the only legitimate
1979, when the United States established diplomatic
representatives of China to the United Nations,” and
relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the
broke them with the ROC. As a condition for diplomatic
ROC’s then-leader. Taiwan remains outside the U.N.
relations with the PRC, the U.S. government agreed to
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
withdraw U.S. military personnel from Taiwan within four
Taiwan until 1987, when it yielded to public pressure for
months and to terminate the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense
political liberalization. The May 2016 inauguration of
Treaty effective January 1, 1980. The 1979 Taiwan
President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party
Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §3301 et seq.)
(DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful transfer of political
provides a legal basis for unofficial relations. See also CRS
power from one party to another. Tsai won a second four-
In Focus IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations; CRS In
year term in 2020, and her party retained its majority in
Focus IF11665, President Reagan’s Six Assurances to
Taiwan’s parliament, the 113-member Legislative Yuan.
Taiwan; and CRS In Focus IF12371, Taiwan Presidents’
U.S. Transit Visits.
Taiwan is to hold presidential and legislative elections on
The PRC’s stated determination to unify w
January 13, 2024. After two consecutive terms as President,
ith Taiwan;
Tsai is ineligible to run again. Vice President Lai Ching-te
resistance to that prospect in Taiwan; and U.S. security
(William Lai) is the DPP nominee to succeed her. He has
interests and commitments related to Taiwan have led some
sought to present his party as the stronger defender of
U.S. policymakers, including some Members of Congress,
democracy. New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-Ih is the
to expand efforts to deter armed conflict over Taiwan.
candidate of the KMT, now Taiwan’s main opposition
Figure 1. Taiwan
party, which portrays itself as better positioned to lower
tensions with the PRC. Ko Wen-je, the candidate of the
Taiwan People’s Party, is a former Taipei mayor who is
seeking to draw voters from both the DPP and KMT.
President Tsai transited through the United States on her
way to and from Central America in March and April 2023.
House Speaker Kevin McCarthy met with her in California
on April 5, making him the highest-ranking U.S. official to
meet with a Taiwan President on U.S. soil in the era of
unofficial relations. The PRC condemned the meeting. The
PRC’s response included three days of joint military
exercises around Taiwan.
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Since 1979, the United States has maintained a “one-China
policy,” which it currently describes as being guided by the
TRA; U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972,
1978, and 1982; and “Six Assurances” that President
Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s government in
1982. Under the one-China policy, the United States
maintains official relations with the PRC and unofficial
Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using
relations with Taiwan, sells defensive arms to Taiwan,
data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
supports peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences,
Modern History
opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo (without
explicitly defining the status quo), and states that it does not
Taiwan was a colony of Japan from 1895 to 1945. The
support independence for Taiwan. The U.S. one-China
ROC, then based on mainland China, assumed control of
policy is distinct from the PRC’s “one China principle,”
Taiwan in 1945, after Japan’s defeat in World War II. Four
which defines Taiwan as part of China.
years later, after losing a civil war to the Communist Party
of China (CPC), the ROC’s then-ruling party, the
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
Kuomintang (KMT), moved the ROC government from
• U.S. relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through
mainland China to Taiwan. Until 1991, the KMT continued
the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
representation of Taiwan and its people in the United
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
Nations or any related organizations,” or “take a position on
• The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
the relationship between” the PRC and Taiwan, “or include
any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty.”
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
Taiwan’s Security
sufficient self-defense capability.”
As the CPC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has
• It is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United
modernized, the cross-Strait balance of military power has
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
shifted in the PRC’s favor. The Taiwan military’s budget is
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social
less than one-tenth that of the PLA’s, and Taiwan’s military
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
faces equipment, readiness, and personnel challenges. CIA
Director William J. Burns stated in February 2023 that Xi
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
Jinping has instructed the PLA to “be ready” to “conduct a
Taiwan, but by stating that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
successful invasion” of Taiwan by 2027, but added, “that
capacity to do so, the TRA creates “strategic ambiguity”
does not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion.”
about U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan.
Some observers, including some Members of Congress,
Taiwan’s government has accused the PRC of using its
have advocated a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
growing military might to conduct a sustained campaign of
Supporters of strategic ambiguity see it as having deterred
intimidation and coercion against the island. That campaign
provocations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Since
appeared to intensify in 2022, after then-House Speaker
August 2021, President Biden has four times stated that the
Nancy Pelosi became the highest-ranking U.S. official to
United States would defend Taiwan, appearing to abandon
visit Taiwan since 1997. Following her visit, the PLA
strategic ambiguity, although White House officials later
conducted large-scale exercises around the island, and ships
said U.S. policy remained unchanged.
and aircraft have operated closer to Taiwan and with greater
regularity ever since. Monitoring and responding to such
In the U.S.-PRC joint communiqués, the U.S. government
operations has taxed Taiwan’s military.
recognized the PRC government as the “sole legal
government of China,” and acknowledged, but did not
Taiwan and U.S. officials broadly agree that Taiwan’s
endorse, “the Chinese position that there is but one China
strategy to deter a PRC attack should target PLA
and Taiwan is part of China.” Among the Six Assurances
weaknesses and harness Taiwan’s natural advantages, such
are that in negotiating the 1982 joint communiqué, the
as its island geography. They sometimes disagree on how to
United States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms
implement such an asymmetric strategy. The United
sales to Taiwan or to revise the TRA.
States—Taiwan’s primary arms supplier—seeks to shape
Taiwan’s strategy to focus on deterring an amphibious
PRC Policy Toward Taiwan
invasion. Some in Taiwan argue this approach leaves
At the CPC’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, China’s
Taiwan vulnerable to military coercion short of an invasion.
top leader, Xi Jinping, referred to unification with Taiwan
Uncertainty as to whether and how Washington might aid
as necessary for “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Taiwan in the event of an attack informs these debates.
He reiterated the CPC’s preference for peaceful unification,
and its proposal for a “One Country, Two Systems”
Taiwan and the U.S. Congress
approach to governance of Taiwan. Xi also restated that the
In the 118th Congress, House-passed H.R. 1159 would
CPC “will never promise to renounce the use of force.” The
amend the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260) to
PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in 2005, states that in
require the Department of State to review its guidelines on
the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from China, or if the PRC
relations with Taiwan at least every two years and report to
concludes that possibilities for peaceful unification have
Congress, with reports including identification of
been exhausted, “the state shall employ non-peaceful means
opportunities to lift restrictions on relations with Taiwan.
and other necessary measures to protect China’s
House-passed H.R. 1151 would require the Secretary of
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
State to develop a strategy that would include supporting
Taiwan’s participation in the events and meetings of the
Beijing cut off communication with Taiwan’s government
International Civil Aviation Organization.
in 2016, citing President Tsai’s unwillingness to endorse a
formula known as “the 1992 consensus.” The consensus
In 2022, the 117th Congress passed the Taiwan Enhanced
stipulates that the KMT and the CPC agreed that Taiwan
Resilience Act (or TERA, Title LV, Subtitle A of the James
and mainland China are parts of “one China,” without
M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
agreeing on what “China” means. The PRC has also sought
Year 2023, P.L. 117-263). Among other things, the act
to isolate Taiwan internationally. In March 2023, Honduras
authorizes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance for
became the 10th former Taiwan diplomatic partner to
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan for the first time and mandates
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC since 2016,
“comprehensive” U.S.-Taiwan military training
leaving Taiwan with 13 diplomatic partners. The PRC
programming. The FMF assistance includes up to $2 billion
government has worked to exclude Taiwan from
a year in grant assistance for Taiwan through FY2027. The
participation in the work of U.N. agencies, claiming that
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) does
UNGA Resolution 2758 “confirmed that Taiwan is a part of
not appropriate funds for such grants for Taiwan.
China.” In the 118th Congress, H.R. 1176 would amend the
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
TAIPEI Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-135) to state, among other
things, that Resolution 2758 “did not address the issue of
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
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Taiwan: Political and Security Issues

IF10275


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 76 · UPDATED

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