

Updated April 6, 2022
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China
Progressive Party (DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful
(ROC), is a democracy of 23.5 million people located
transfer of political power from one party to another. In
across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. Its
2020, Tsai won a second four-year term and her party
government claims “effective jurisdiction” over the island
retained its majority in Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative
of Taiwan, the archipelagos of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu,
Yuan. In her October 10, 2021, National Day address, Tsai
and some smaller islands. It also claims disputed islands in
called on Taiwan’s people to renew four commitments: to
the East and South China Seas. U.S.-Taiwan relations have
“a free and democratic constitutional system,” that Taiwan
been unofficial since January 1, 1979, when the Carter
and the PRC “should not be subordinate to each other,” “to
Administration established diplomatic relations with the
resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty,”
People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) and broke
and that Taiwan’s future “must be decided in accordance
diplomatic ties with self-ruled Taiwan, over which the PRC
with the will of the Taiwanese people.”
claims sovereignty. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA,
U.S. Commitments Related to Taiwan
P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.) provides a legal basis
for this unofficial bilateral relationship. See also CRS In
The PRC seeks to enforce a “one China principle,” which
Focus IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations.
defines Taiwan as part of China, and the PRC as the sole
Modern History and Current Events
legal government representing China. The United States
adheres to its own “one-China policy,” guided by: the TRA;
In 1949, after losing a civil war on mainland China to the
U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972, 1978, and
Communist Party of China (CPC), the ROC’s then-ruling
1982; and “Six Assurances” that President Ronald Reagan
party, the Kuomintang (KMT), moved the ROC
communicated to Taiwan in 1982. The U.S. government’s
government to Taiwan. The KMT continued to assert that
long-standing position has been that Taiwan’s political
the ROC was the sole legitimate government of all China
status remains unresolved.
until 1991. In 1971, U.N. General Assembly Resolution
2758 recognized the PRC’s representatives as “the only
Key provisions of the TRA include the following:
legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations,”
Relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through the
and expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private
ROC’s then-leader. Taiwan remains outside the U.N. today.
corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same
functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere.)
Figure 1. Taiwan
The United States “will make available to Taiwan such
defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.”
“The President is directed to inform the Congress
promptly of any threat to the security or the social or
economic system of the people on Taiwan and any
danger to the interests of the United States arising
therefrom. The President and the Congress shall
determine, ... appropriate action by the United States in
response to any such danger.”
In the communiqués, the United States recognized the PRC
government as the “sole legal government of China”;
acknowledged, but did not endorse, “the Chinese position
that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China”;
and pledged to maintain only unofficial relations with
Taiwan. The 1982 Six Assurances include assurances that
in negotiating the 1982 U.S.-PRC communiqué, the United
States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms sales
Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using
to Taiwan, set a date for ending such arms sales, or “take
data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” President
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. has at times sent mixed messages about
The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on
his view of Taiwan’s political status.
Taiwan until 1987, when it yielded to public pressure for
political liberalization. The May 2016 inauguration of
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
current President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic
Taiwan, but states that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
capacity to do so, creating strategic ambiguity about U.S.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. Some
organizations, including by blocking Taiwan’s attendance
observers, including some Members of Congress, have
as an observer at annual World Health Assembly meetings.
advocated abandoning the strategic ambiguity policy in
Taiwan is attempting to make itself resilient to PRC
favor of a clear U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan.
economic, political, diplomatic, and military coercion.
Cross-Strait Challenges
Taiwan’s asymmetric military strategy aims to deter, and if
The PRC maintains that mainland China and Taiwan are
necessary, defeat PRC attacks. Taiwan’s military is
parts of “one China” whose sovereignty cannot be divided.
professional and technologically advanced, but it enjoys
The PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law commits Beijing to
less than one-tenth the budget of the PRC’s military and
working toward “peaceful unification” with Taiwan. It
faces equipment, readiness, and personnel challenges. The
states, however, that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession”
Tsai Administration is pursuing new policies intended to
harden the island’s defenses, bolster its image on the
from China, or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for
peaceful unification have been exhausted, “the state shall
international stage, and combat PRC influence operations.
employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures
U.S. Policy Responses
to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In a
Senior Biden Administration officials have repeatedly
November 2021 virtual meeting with President Biden, PRC
raised concerns about the PRC’s “continued military,
leader Xi Jinping said, “We have patience and will strive
diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan.”
for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost
According to the White House’s
sincerity and efforts.” He warned, however
readout of the Biden-Xi
: “should the
virtual meeting, Biden underscored “that the United States
separatist forces for Taiwan independence provoke us, force
strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo
our hands or even cross the red line, we will be compelled
or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”
to take resolute measures.” He did not define “red line.”
Beijing cut off communication with Tsai’s government in
Recent administrations have sought to help Taiwan retain
its remaining diplomatic relationships and expand its
2016, citing her unwillingness to endorse a formula known
as “the 1992 consensus
unofficial ones, although some observers criticize punitive
.” The consensus stipulates that the
U.S. actions against countries severing diplomatic relations
KMT and the CPC agreed that Taiwan and mainland China
are parts of “one China,”
with Taiwan as ineffective or even counterproductive. The
without agreeing on what “China”
U.S. and Taiwan involve like-minded governments in co-
means. In November 2021, the PRC government announced
that it had placed Taiwan’s premier, foreign minister, and
hosting workshops under the U.S.-Taiwan-Japan Global
Cooperation and Training Framework. The State
parliamentary speaker on a blacklist, barring their affiliated
Department in April 2021 issued new guidelines to federal
institutions from cooperating with PRC entities and their
agencies pursuant to the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020
financial supporters from doing business in the PRC.
(P.L. 116-260) that encourage working-level meetings with
Taiwan is the primary focal point of PRC military
Taiwan counterparts in federal buildings.
modernization and strategy. For decades, Taiwan’s military
was more advanced than China’s and unquestionably able
The United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty
with Taiwan in 1980, but engages in security cooperation
to deter a PRC invasion. As China’s air, naval, missile, and
with Taiwan, most concretely through arms sales. The vast
amphibious forces have become more capable, the balance
majority of Taiwan’s arms imports are from the United
of power across the Taiwan Strait has shifted significantly
in the PRC’s f
States, and the island is among the top recipients of U.S.
avor. In June 2021 testimony, Chairman of
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). As of December 2021, 32
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley stated that
Xi has challenged China’s military to develop the capability
active duty U.S. military personnel were deployed to
Taiwan. The two militaries also conduct regular dialogues,
to take Taiwan by 2027. Concerns about whether or when
training, and other cooperative security activities. The U.S.
the PRC could attack Taiwan have become more acute as
Navy conducts near-monthly transits of the Taiwan Strait.
PRC military operations near Taiwan have become more
sophisticated and frequent. China’s armed forces regularly
Taiwan generally enjoys widespread congressional support.
conduct exercises near Taiwan that showcase the kinds of
As PRC coercion against Taiwan has intensified in recent
capabilities they likely would employ in a cross-Strait
years, many Members have introduced legislation aiming to
conflict. Chinese military aircraft have conducted more than
support Taiwan’s international engagement, boost U.S.-
1,400 air sorties into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification
Taiwan economic and cultural engagement, and enhance
Zone since September 2020.
Taiwan’s security; some Members have signaled support
through congressional delegations (Beijing has strongly
The PRC government has sought to isolate Taiwan
condemned these visits). Members of Congress, and U.S.
internationally. Since 2016, 9 former Taiwan diplomatic
policymakers and experts more generally, disagree at
partners have switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC,
times—with each other, and with counterparts in Taiwan—
leaving Taiwan with 14 diplomatic partners. Taiwan
about how Taiwan can most effectively defend itself. Some
maintains unofficial offices in an additional 59 countries,
argue Taiwan must focus more on developing so-called
though the PRC insists that these offices not include the
word “Taiwan” in their names.
asymmetric, instead of conventional, capabilities. Some
In 2021, the PRC
Members have introduced legislation that would expand
downgraded diplomatic ties with Lithuania and imposed a
U.S. influence over Taiwan’s defense strategy by
de facto trade embargo against the country after it allowed
Taiwan to open a “
incentivizing Taiwan to procure U.S.-approved arms.
Taiwanese Representative Office” there.
The PRC has worked to exclude Taiwan from international
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Taiwan: Political and Security Issues
IF10275
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10275 · VERSION 58 · UPDATED