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Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of about 70 years, the U.S. role in the world—meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country's overall relationship to the rest of the world—is undergoing a potentially historic change. A change in the U.S. role in the world could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.
The U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i.e., over the past 70 years or so) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. A key element of that role has been to defend and promote the liberal international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II. Other key elements have been to defend and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible; and to oppose the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world.
The fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter of longstanding debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world. One major dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role.
The overall issue for Congress is how to respond to recent developments regarding the U.S. role in the world. Potential key issues for Congress include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
Congress's decisions on this issue could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.
This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding the U.S. role in the world, meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country's overall relationship to the rest of the world. Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of about 70 years, the U.S. role in the world is undergoing a potentially historic change. A change in the U.S. role in the world could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights. It could also have implications for future international order.
The overall issue for Congress is how to respond to recent developments regarding the U.S. role in the world. Congress's decisions on this issue could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.
A variety of other CRS reports address in greater depth specific policy areas mentioned in this report.
Appendix A provides a glossary of some key terms used in this report, including role in the world, grand strategy, international order/world order, unipolar/bipolar/tripolar/multipolar, Eurasia, regional hegemon, spheres-of-influence world, geopolitics, hard power, and soft power. In this report, the term U.S. role in the world is often shortened for convenience to U.S. role. Footnotes in this report with citations taking up more than 10 lines of type have had their citations transferred to Appendix B. Background on U.S. Role OverviewThe U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i.e., over the past 70 years or so) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. Observers over the years have referred to the U.S. role in the world since World War II using various terms and phrases that sometimes reflect varying degrees of approval or disapproval of that role. It has been variously described as that of global leader, leader of the free world, superpower, hyperpower, indispensable power, system administrator, world policeman, or world hegemon. Similarly, the United States has also been described as pursuing an internationalist foreign policy, a foreign policy of global engagement or deep engagement, a foreign policy that provides global public goods, a foreign policy of liberal order building, liberal internationalism, or liberal hegemony, an interventionist foreign policy, or a foreign policy of seeking primacy or world hegemony.
Key Elements Creation and Defense of Liberal International OrderA key element of the U.S. role in the world since World War II has been to defend and promote the liberal international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II.1 Although definitions of the liberal international order vary, key elements are generally said to include the following:
The liberal international order was created by the United States with the support of its allies in the years immediately after World War II. At that time, the United States was the only country with both the capacity and willingness to establish a new international order. U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order is generally viewed as reflecting a desire by U.S. policymakers to avoid repeating the major wars and widespread economic disruption and deprivation of the first half of the 20th century—a period that included World War I, the Great Depression, the rise of communism and fascism, the Ukrainian famine, the Holocaust, and World War II.
U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order is also generally viewed as an act of national self-interest, reflecting a belief among U.S. policymakers that it would strongly serve U.S. security, political, and economic objectives. Supporters of the liberal international order generally argue that in return for bearing the costs of creating and sustaining the liberal international order, the United States receives significant security, political, and economic benefits, including the maintenance of a favorable balance of power on both a global and regional level, and a leading or dominant role in establishing and operating global institutions and rules for international finance and trade. Indeed, some critics of the liberal international order argue that it is primarily a construct for serving U.S. interests and promoting U.S. world primacy or hegemony. As discussed later in this report, however, the costs and benefits for the United States of the liberal international order are a matter of debate.
Though often referred as if it is a fully developed or universally established situation, the liberal international order, like other international orders that preceded it, is
Some observers, emphasizing points like those above, argue that the liberal international order is more of a myth than a reality.3 Other observers, particularly supporters of the order, while acknowledging the limitations of the order, reject characterizations of it as a myth and emphasize its differences from international orders that preceded it.4
Defense and Promotion of Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights A second element of the U.S. role in the world since World War II has been to defend and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible. This element of the U.S. role is viewed as consistent not only with core U.S. political valuesThe overall U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i.e., over the past 70 years) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. A key aim of that role has been to promote and defend the open international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II. In addition to promoting and defending the open international order, the overall U.S. role is generally described as having been one of promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights, while criticizing and resisting authoritarianism where possible, and opposing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world.
Certain statements and actions from the Trump Administration have led to uncertainty about the Administration's intentions regarding the future U.S. role in the world. Based on those statements and actions, which the Administration often organizes under a theme of "America First," some observers have speculated that the Trump Administration may want to change the U.S. role in one or more ways. A change in the overall U.S. role could have profound implications for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy, for Congress as an institution, and for many federal policies and programs.
A major dimension of the debate over the U.S. role is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A second dimension concerns how to balance or combine the pursuit of narrowly defined U.S. interests with the goal of defending and promoting U.S. values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. A third dimension relates to the balance between the use of so-called hard power (primarily but not exclusively military combat power) and soft power (including diplomacy, development assistance, support for international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of elements of U.S. culture such as music, movies, television shows, and literature) in U.S. foreign policy.
An initial potential issue for Congress is to determine whether the Trump Administration wants to change the U.S. role, and if so, in what ways. A follow-on potential issue for Congress—arguably the central policy issue for this CRS report—is whether there should be a change in the U.S. role, and if so, what that change should be, including whether a given proposed change would be feasible or practical, and what consequences may result.
An initial aspect of this issue concerns Congress: what should be Congress's role, relative to that of the executive branch, in considering whether the U.S. role in the world should change, and if so, what that change should be? The Constitution vests Congress with several powers that can bear on the U.S. role in the world.
Another potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role would have any implications for the preservation and use of congressional powers and prerogatives relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy. A related issue is whether a change in the U.S. role would have any implications for congressional organization, capacity, and operations relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy.
Policy and program areas that could be affected, perhaps substantially or even profoundly, by a changed U.S. role include the role of allies and alliances in U.S. foreign policy; the organization of, and funding levels and foreign policy priorities for, the Department of State and U.S. foreign assistance; U.S. trade and international economic policy; defense strategy and budgets; and policies and programs related to homeland security, border security, immigration, and refugees.
This report presents background information and issues for Congress on the overarching U.S. foreign policy issue of the U.S. role in the world. Certain statements and actions from the Trump Administration have led to uncertainty about the Administration's intentions regarding the future U.S. role, and have intensified an ongoing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the public about what that role should be.
Decisions that Congress makes about the U.S. role could have substantial or even profound implications for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy, for Congress as an institution, and for many federal policies and programs.
This report includes (particularly in its appendixes) references to other CRS products that provide more in-depth discussions of specific policy and program areas bearing on the U.S. role. Congressional inquiries relating to the specific issue areas covered in those reports should be addressed to the authors of those reports.
In this report, the term U.S. role in the world is often shortened to U.S. role.
Key terms used in this report include the following:
The U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i.e., over the past 70 years) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. A key aim of that role has been to promote and defend the open international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II. Other terms used to refer to the open international order include the liberal international order, the postwar international order, and the U.S.-led international order. It is also referred to as a rules-based order. Key elements of this order are generally said to include the following:
The creation of the open international order in the years immediately after World War II, and the defense and promotion of that order over subsequent decades, is generally seen as reflecting a desire by policymakers to avoid repeating the history of destruction and economic disruption and deprivation of the first half of the 20th century, a period that included World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. Following World War II, the United States, along with its allies, led the creation of the open international order, and assumed the role generally described by observers as its leader and staunchest defender, largely because it was the only country with the resources and willingness to do so.
U.S. willingness to lead in the creation and sustainment of the open international order derived from a belief among U.S. policymakers that it reflected U.S. values and served U.S. security, political, and economic interests. In return for making significant and continuing investments in creating, sustaining, and enforcing the political, security, and economic institutions, organizations, and norms characterizing the open international order, the United States is viewed by supporters of the order as having received significant and continuing security, political, and economic benefits, including the maintenance of a favorable balance of power on both a global and regional level, and a leading or dominant role in establishing global rules for international trade and finance, and in operating the international organizations and institutions overseeing international trade and finance.
In addition to promoting and defending the open international order, the overall U.S. role since World War II is generally described as having been one of
Promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights, while criticizing and resisting authoritarianism where possible have been viewed as consistent not only with core U.S. political values and but also with the theory (sometimes called the democratic peace theory)5but also with the theory (sometimes called the democratic peace theory) that democratic countries are more responsive to the desires of their populations and consequently are less likely to wage wars of aggression or go to war with one another.
The goal of opposing 5
Prevention of Regional Hegemons in Eurasia
A third element of the U.S. role in the world since World War II has been to oppose the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world. This objective reflects a U.S. perspective on geopolitics and grand strategy developed during and in the years immediately after World War II. A key element of this perspective is a belief that, , including in particular a judgment that—given the amount of people, resources, and economic activity in Eurasia, —a regional hegemon in Eurasia would represent a concentration of power large enough to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests.
Commentators over the years have summarized the overall U.S. role since World War II using various terms and phrases that sometimes reflect varying degrees of approval or disapproval of that role. It has been variously described as that of global leader, leader of the free world, superpower, indispensable power, system administrator, world policeman, or world hegemon. Similarly, the United States has also been described as pursuing an internationalist foreign policy, a foreign policy of global engagement or deep engagement, a foreign policy that provides global public goods, a foreign policy of liberal order building, liberal internationalism, or liberal hegemony, an interventionist foreign policy, or a foreign policy of seeking primacy or world hegemony.
Although the U.S. role has been generally stable over the past 70 years, the specifics of U.S. foreign policy for implementing that role have changed frequently for various reasons, including changes in administrations and changes in the international security environment. Any definition of the overall U.S. role has room within it to accommodate some flexibility in the specifics of U.S. foreign policy.
Certain statements and actions from the Trump Administration have led to uncertainty about the Administration's intentions regarding the future U.S. role.6 (For some examples of statements from the Trump Administration bearing on the U.S. role in the world, see Appendix A). These statements and actions, which the Administration often organizes under a theme of "America First," have led some observers to conclude or speculate that the Trump Administration may want to change the U.S. role to one that, compared to the U.S. role of the past 70 years, would be one or more of the following:
Other statements and actions from the Trump Administration, however, have led some observers to conclude or speculate that the Trump Administration may not depart, at least not in a major way, from the role that the United States has played since World War II.8
Some observers, viewing the Obama Administration's reluctance to having the United States become more heavily involved in conflicts such as those in Syria and eastern Ukraine, believe that a change in the U.S. role in a direction of reduced U.S. leadership and engagement began under the Obama Administration, and that any actions in the same general direction by the Trump Administration would therefore continue or deepen (rather than initiate) such a change. Particularly for these observers, there is a question as to whether (or where, or to what extent) the policies of the Trump Administration represent a change from or continuity with the policies of the Obama Administration.9
Discussions about whether and how the Trump Administration might change the U.S. role have waxed and waned over time in response to specific administration statements and actions, with observers sometimes expressing a view that the administration has sent mixed signals or is evolving its position on these issues, or both. It can also be noted that some foreign policy changes implemented under the Trump Administration, even ones that might be dramatic, might not necessarily reflect or contribute to a changed U.S. role, and could be consistent with a continuation of the U.S. role of the past 70 years. The same might be said of changes in foreign policy operating style (e.g., President Trump's use of Twitter).
The fact that the U.S. role has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not mean that this role was necessarily the right one for the United States or that it would be the right one in the future, particularly if the international security environment is shifting. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of World War II has many defenders, the merits of that role have also been a matter of recurring debate over the years, with critics sometimes offering potential alternatives.
Discussions about the Trump Administration's intentions regarding the U.S. role in the world have intensified the ongoing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the public about what that role should be. This debate has been fueled in recent years in part by factors such as recent changes in the international security environment and projections regarding U.S. federal budget deficits and the U.S. debt (which can lead to constraints on funding available for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy activities).10
A major dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. Among U.S. strategists and foreign policy specialists, advocates of a more restrained U.S. role include (to cite a few examples) Andrew Bacevich, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble, and Stephen Walt. These and other authors have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role, depending on the specific person or organization advocating it. Terms such as offshore balancing, offshore control, realism, strategy of restraint, or retrenchment have been used to describe some of these variations.11 These variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role would not necessarily match in their details a changed U.S. role that might be pursued by the Trump Administration. The debate about the U.S. role in the world, moreover, is not limited to one between those who favor continued extensive engagement along the lines of the past 70 years and those who prefer some form of a more restrained role—other options are also being promoted.12
A second major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns how to balance or combine the pursuit of narrowly defined U.S. interests with the goal of defending and promoting U.S. values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. Participants in this debate again stake out varying positions.
A third dimension of the debate over the U.S. role in the world relates to the balance between the use of so-called hard power (primarily but not exclusively military combat power) and soft power (including diplomacy, development assistance, support for international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of elements of U.S. culture such as music, movies, television shows, and literature) in U.S. foreign policy.
The question of more engagement vs. less engagement, the question of the balance or mix of narrowly defined interests and broader values, and the question of the balance between hard power and soft power form three of the most important dimensions of the debate over the U.S. role.
A change in the overall U.S. role could have profound implications for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy, for Congress as an institution, and for many federal policies and programs. Below are brief discussions of some issues for Congress that could arise from a potential change in the U.S. role. For some of these discussions, appendixes at the end of this report provide references to additional articles and CRS reports providing more in-depth discussions.
An initial potential issue for Congress is to determine whether the Trump Administration wants to change the U.S. role, and if so, in what ways. Because many details of the Trump Administration's foreign policy have yet to be articulated and may be evolving, it is not clear that they will eventually add up to a desire to change the U.S. role in one or more ways. Potential questions that Congress may consider include the following:
A follow-on potential issue for Congress—arguably the central policy issue for this CRS report—is whether there should be a change in the U.S. role, and if so, what that change should be, including whether a given proposed change would be feasible or practical, and what consequences may result. The following sections discuss some aspects of this issue.
An initial aspect of this issue concerns Congress: what should be Congress's role, relative to that of the executive branch, in considering whether the U.S. role in the world should change, and if so, what that change should be? Regarding this question, it can be noted that Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution vests Congress with several powers that can bear on the U.S. role in the world,13 and that Article II, Section 2, states that the President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.
Congress can also influence the U.S. role in the world through, among other things, its "power of the purse" (including its control over appropriations for the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and foreign assistance programs), authorizations for the use of military force, approval of trade agreements and other agreements, the Senate's power to confirm the President's nominees for certain executive branch positions (including the Secretaries and other high-ranking officials in the Departments of State and Defense, as well as U.S. ambassadors), and general oversight of executive branch operations.
For a list of selected CRS reports discussing congressional powers and activities that can bear on Congress's role in determining the U.S. role in the world, see Appendix B.
As noted earlier, one major dimension of the debate on this question is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing an internationalist role that defends and promotes the open international order and resists the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia and a spheres-of-influence world, or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs and puts less U.S. effort into pursuing these goals. Those who advocate a more restrained U.S. role generally argue one or more of the following:
Those who advocate continuing the U.S. role of the past 70 years generally reject the above arguments, arguing the following, for example
Although the U.S. role in the world was generally stable over the past 70 years, the specifics of U.S. foreign policy for implementing that role have changed frequently for various reasons, including changes in administrations and changes in the international security environment. Definitions of the overall U.S. role have room within them to accommodate some flexibility in the specifics of U.S. foreign policy.
Longstanding Debate over Its MeritsThe fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter of longstanding debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world.
One major dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role.
A second major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns how to balance or combine the pursuit of narrowly defined material U.S. interests with the goal of defending and promoting U.S. or universal values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. A third major dimension concerns the balance in U.S. foreign policy between the use of hard power and soft power. Observers debating these two dimensions of the future U.S. role in the world stake out varying positions on these questions.
The longstanding debate over the U.S. role in the world is discussed further below in the "Issues for Congress" section of this report, particularly the part entitled "Should the U.S. Role Change?"
Issues for Congress Overview: Potential Key QuestionsThe overall issue for Congress is how to respond to recent developments regarding the U.S. role in the world. Potential key issues for Congress include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
Each of these issues is discussed briefly below.
Is the U.S. Role Changing, and If So, in What Ways? Some Observers See a Potentially Historic Change Some observers argue that under the Trump Administration, the U.S. role in the world is undergoing a potentially historic change. Although views among these observers vary in their specifics, a number of these observers argue that under the Trump Administration, the United States is voluntarily retreating from or abdicating the United States' post-World War II position of global leadership in favor of an approach to U.S. foreign policy that is more restrained, less engaged (or disengaged), more unilateralist, and/or less willing to work through international or multilateral institutions and agreements.7 Within that general assessment, these observers argue that the United States more specifically is doing one or more of the following:In support of this assessment, these observers tend to cite various actions by the Trump Administration, including the following:
the Administration's emphasis on its "America First" theme10 and the concept of national sovereignty applied to both the United States and other countries11 as primary guideposts for U.S. foreign policy; actions (particularly in 2017) that these observers view as intended to weaken or "hollow out" the State Department—including a relatively slow rate for forwarding nominations to fill senior positions in the department, and budget proposals to substantially reduce overall staffing and funding levels for the department—as well as proposed reductions in funding for U.S. foreign assistance programs; 12Among those who see less change in the U.S. role in the world under the Trump Administration, arguments as to whether that is a good or bad thing are to some degree the obverse of those outlined earlier regarding the views of those who argue that the U.S. role in the world is undergoing a potentially historic change under the Trump Administration. In general, supporters of the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years tend to support areas where they see less change under the Trump Administration, while those who advocate a more restrained U.S. role have expressed disappointment at what they view as insufficient movement by the Trump Administration in that direction.42
Some Assess That Change Began Prior to Trump Administration Some observers argue that if the U.S. is shifting to a more restrained role in the world, this change began not with the Trump Administration, but during the Obama Administration. In support of this view, these observers point to the Obama Administration's focus on reducing the U.S. military presence and ending U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in favor of focusing more on domestic U.S. rebuilding initiatives, the Obama Administration's restrained response to the conflict in Syria and to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and the Obama Administration's policy toward Russia in general.43 Other observers argue that a shift to a more restrained U.S. role in the world arguably began even sooner, under the George W. Bush Administration, when that administration did not respond more strongly to Russia's 2008 invasion and occupation of part of Georgia.44 For both groups of observers, a more restrained U.S. role in the world under the Trump Administration may represent not so much a shift in the U.S. role as a continuation or deepening of a change that began in a prior U.S. Administration.45 Others Say Degree of Change Is Currently Difficult to Assess Some observers argue that the question of whether the U.S. role is changing, and if so, in what ways, is difficult to assess, due to what these observers view as recurring mixed, contradictory, or incoherent signals from the Trump Administration on issues such as policy toward Russia, the value of NATO, policy toward North Korea, and trade policy, among other matters. For some of these observers, these mixed signals appear to be rooted in what these observers see as basic differences between President Trump and certain senior Administration officials (or differences among those officials) on these matters, and in what these observers characterize as an unpredictable, impulsive, or volatile approach by President Trump to making and announcing foreign policy decisions.46 Regarding the final point above, supporters of the Trump Administration argue that U.S. foreign policy had become too predictable for its own good, and that adding an element of unpredictability to U.S. foreign policy is therefore advantageous.47 The Administration's January 2018 unclassified summary of its supporting national defense strategy document, for example, states that U.S. military operations in the future will be "strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable," meaning predictable in terms of overall goals, but unpredictable in terms of specific tactics for achieving those goals.48 Critics, while not necessarily objecting to the value of a certain degree of operational unpredictability, argue that the Trump Administration, through its recurring mixed signals and President Trump's approach to decisionmaking, has taken the idea of unpredictability too far, raising potential doubts in other countries about U.S. policy goals, consistency, resolve, or reliability as an ally or negotiating partner.49 Some observers, viewing the difficulty of judging whether and how the U.S. role may have changed under the Trump Administration, have attempted to identify unifying characteristics of the Trump Administration's foreign policy or a so-called "Trump Doctrine." These observers have reached varying conclusions as to what those unifying characteristics or a Trump Doctrine might be.50 Potential Assessments Combining These PerspectivesThe above four perspectives—that there is a potentially historic change in the U.S. role; that there is less change, and more continuity; that if there is a change, it began prior to the Trump Administration; and that the degree of change is difficult to assess—are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Assessments combining aspects of more than one of these four perspectives are possible.
Should the U.S. Role Change? OverviewIn addition to the question of whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, another key issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role should change. As mentioned in the background section, the fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter of longstanding debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world.
Debate over the merits of the U.S. role in the world since World War II has been fueled in recent years by factors such as changes in the international security environment,51 projections of U.S. federal budget deficits and the U.S. debt (which can lead to constraints on funding available for pursuing U.S. foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy goals), and U.S. public opinion on matters relating to U.S. foreign policy. Developments during the Trump Administration regarding possible changes in the U.S. role in the world have further contributed to the debate.
Past Role vs. More Restrained Role As mentioned earlier, a major dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. Among U.S. strategists and foreign policy specialists, advocates of a more restrained U.S. role include (to cite a few examples) Andrew Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Ted Galen Carpenter, Christopher Preble, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, William Ruger, and Stephen Walt.52 These and other authors have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role. Terms such as offshore balancing, offshore control, realism, strategy of restraint, or retrenchment have been used to describe some of these variations.53 These variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role would not necessarily match in their details a changed U.S. role that might be pursued by the Trump Administration.54 Arguments in Favor of a More Restrained U.S. RoleObservers advocating a more restrained U.S. role in the world make various arguments regarding the United States and other countries. Arguments that they make relating to the United States include the following:
Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following:
Observers who support a continuation of the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years generally reject the above arguments and argue the opposite. Arguments that these observers make relating to the United States include the following:
As also noted earlier, a second major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns how to balance or combine the pursuit of narrowly defined U.S. interests with the goal of defending and promoting U.S. values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights.
Supporters of focusing primarily on narrowly defined U.S. interests argue, among other things, that deterring potential regional aggressors and resisting the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia can require working with allies and partner states that have objectionable records in terms of democracy, freedom, and human rights.
Supporters of maintaining a stronger focus on U.S. values in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy argue, among other things, that these values help attract friends and allies in other countries, adding to U.S. leverage, and are a source of U.S. strength in ideological competitions with authoritarian competitor states.
As also noted earlier, a third dimension of the debate over the U.S. role in the world relates to the balance between the use of so-called hard power (primarily but not exclusively military combat power) and soft power (including diplomacy, development assistance, support for international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of elements of U.S. culture such as music, movies, television shows, and literature) in U.S. foreign policy.
In presenting the Trump Administration's proposed FY2018 budget outline in March 2017, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Mick Mulvaney stated that it was not "a soft power budget. This is a hard power budget and that was done intentionally. The president very clearly wanted to send a message to our allies and to our potential adversaries that this is a strong-power administration."17 Under that budget outline, the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs were identified for proposed budget increases, with the Department of Defense receiving the largest share of the increase (primarily for addressing readiness-related issues), while other major departments and agencies, including the Department of State, were identified for proposed budget reductions, some of them substantial in percentage terms.18
The Administration's full FY2018 budget proposal, which was submitted on May 23, 2017, is generally consistent with the budget outline that was presented in March 2018. The proposed balance between funding for hard and soft power within the budget is one of many issues that Congress is examining as it reviews and marks up the FY2018 budget. Administration officials have defended their proposed budget, including the proposed balance between hard and soft power. Some Department of Defense officials, when questioned at hearings on the proposed FY2018 defense budget, have stated that a significant reduction in funding for the Department of State and other non-defense security agencies and programs could result in increased mission demands for Department of Defense.19
One additional potential consideration for Congress concerns what some commentators have referred to as the "U.S. brand" in foreign affairs, or, in other words, America's reputation or what America is seen to stand for.20 Some observers have argued that adopting a more skeptical and transactional approach to alliances, or placing less emphasis on freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, could tarnish or damage a U.S. reputation as a reliable alliance partner and moral leader. Were that to happen, these observers argue, the United States could experience more difficulty in the future in attempting to attract new allies or hold the moral high ground in dealing with authoritarian countries.
Others might argue that the value of the current U.S. brand on these issues is overrated, and that changing the U.S. role could help establish a new U.S. reputation centered, for example, on an image of a country that does not go abroad in search of enemies, and that attempts to set an example for others without acting in a high-handed manner or attempting to impose its values on others. This alternative brand, they might argue, has its own value in the current and evolving global environment.
Potential questions for Congress to consider include the following:
An additional potential consideration for Congress concerns U.S. public opinion, which can be an important factor in debates over the future U.S. role in the world. Among other things, public opinion can shape the political context (and can provide the impulse) for negotiating the terms of, and for considering whether to become party to, international agreements; it can influence debates on whether and how to employ U.S. military force; and it can influence policymaker decisions on funding levels for defense and foreign affairs activities.
Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following: As noted earlier, a third major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns the balance in U.S. foreign policy between the use of hard power and soft power. Some observers argue that a reduced reliance on soft power would undervalue soft power as a relatively low-cost tool for defending and promoting U.S. interests while making the United States more reliant on hard power, particularly military power, which might be a more expensive and/or less effective means for accomplishing certain goals.57 Other observers argue that the value of soft power is overrated, and that a greater reliance on hard power would be an appropriate response to an era of renewed great power competition.58 Within the overall debate over whether the U.S. role should change, one specific question relates to the costs and benefits of allies. As noted earlier, some observers believe that under the Trump Administration, the United States is becoming more skeptical of the value of allies, particularly those in Europe, and more transactional in managing U.S. alliance relationships. The U.S. approach to allies and alliances of the past 70 years reflected a belief that allies and alliances are of value to the United States for defending and promoting U.S. interests and for preventing the emergence of regional hegemons. This approach led to a global network of U.S. alliance relationships involving countries in Europe and North America (through NATO), East Asia (through a series of mostly bilateral treaties), and Latin America (through the multilateral Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known commonly as the Rio Treaty or Rio Pact). Skeptics of allies and alliances generally argue that their value to the United States is overrated; that allies are capable of defending themselves without U.S. help; that U.S. allies frequently act as free riders in their alliance relationships with the United States by shifting costs to the United States; that in the absence of U.S. help, these allies would do more on their own to balance against potential regional hegemons; and that alliances create a risk of drawing the United States into conflicts involving allies over issues that are not vital to the United States. U.S. public opinion can be an important factor in debates over the future U.S. role in the world. Among other things, public opinion canForeign policy specialists, strategists, and policymakers sometimes invoke U.S. public opinion poll results in debates on the U.S. role in the world. At least one has argued that the American people "always have been the greatest constraint on America's role in the world"22
Narrowly Defined Material U.S. Interests and U.S. and Universal Values
As also noted earlier, a second major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns how to balance or combine the pursuit of narrowly defined material U.S. interests with the goal of defending and promoting U.S. or universal values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. Supporters of focusing primarily on narrowly defined material U.S. interests argue, among other things, that deterring potential regional aggressors and resisting the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia can require working with allies and partner states that have objectionable records in terms of democracy, freedom, and human rights.55 Supporters of maintaining a stronger focus on U.S. and universal values in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy argue, among other things, that these values help attract friends and allies in other countries, adding to U.S. leverage, and are a source of U.S. strength in ideological competitions with authoritarian competitor states.56
Balance of Hard and Soft Power
Foreign policy specialists, strategists, and policymakers sometimes invoke U.S. public opinion poll results in debates on the U.S. role in the world. At least one has argued that the American people "always have been the greatest constraint on America's role in the world."60 One issue relating to U.S. public opinion that observers are discussing is the extent to which the U.S. public may now believe that U.S. leaders have broken a tacit social contract under which the U.S. public has supported the costs of U.S. global leadership in return for the promise of receiving certain benefits, particularly steady increases in real incomes and the standard of living. Appendix F provides additional background One issue relating to U.S. public opinion that observers are discussing is the extent to which the U.S. public may now believe that U.S. leaders have broken a tacit social contract under which the U.S. public has supported the costs of U.S. global leadership in return for the promise of receiving certain benefits, particularly steady increases in real incomes and the standard of living.
For additional information on U.S. public opinion regarding the U.S. role, see Appendix D.
Potential questions for Congress to consider—a number of them quite fundamental—include the following:
For examples of recent articles in which authors express varying views on what kind of role or grand strategy the United States should pursue in coming years, see Appendix E. And as mentioned earlier, for additional information on U.S. public opinion regarding the U.S. role, see Appendix D.
A potentially important issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role in the world would have any implications for the preservation and use of congressional powers and prerogatives relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy. A key question for Congress in this regard is whether the general pattern of presidential and congressional activities in these areas that developed over a 70-year period of general stability in the U.S. role—a pattern that developed in part as a result of deliberate delegations (or tacit ceding) of authority by Congress to the executive branch—would continue to be appropriate in a situation of a changed U.S. role. One observer states
Like other wide congressional grants of authority to the executive branch—the power to levy "emergency" tariffs comes to mind—the vast discretion over immigration Trump has inherited was a product of a different time.
Lawmakers during the post-World War II era assumed presidents of both parties agreed on certain broad lessons of prewar history, such as the need to remain widely engaged through trade and collective security, and the importance of humanitarian values—"soft power"—in U.S. foreign policy.
They did not anticipate today's breakdown in national consensus, much less that heirs to the America Firsters who had failed to attain national power before World War II could ever attain it afterward.24
Potential key questions for Congress include the following:
A related potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role would have any implications for congressional organization, capacity, and operations relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy. Congress's current organization, capacity, and pattern of operations for working on these issues evolved during a long period of general stability in the U.S. role, and may or may not be optimal for carrying out Congress's role in U.S. foreign policy given a changed U.S. role. Potential questions that Congress may consider include the following, among others:
One specific policy issue for Congress relating to the U.S. role concerns allies and alliances as an element in U.S. strategy and foreign policy. The current U.S. approach to allies and alliances reflects a belief that allies and alliances are of value to the United States for defending and promoting U.S. interests and for preventing the emergence of regional hegemons. This approach to allies and alliances has led to a global network of U.S. alliance relationships involving countries in Europe and North America (through NATO), East Asia (through a series of mostly bilateral treaties), and Latin America (through the multilateral Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known commonly as the Rio Treaty or Rio Pact). The approach to allies and alliances that some observers believe the Trump Administration may wish to pursue—an approach that would be more skeptical regarding the value to the United States of alliances, and more purely transactional—has led to a renewed debate over the value of allies and alliances as an element of U.S. strategy and foreign policy.
Skeptics of allies and alliances generally argue that their value to the United States is overrated, that allies are capable of defending themselves without U.S. help, that U.S. allies frequently act as free riders in their alliance relationships with the United States by shifting costs to the United States, and that alliances create a risk of drawing the United States into conflicts involving allies over issues that are not vital to the United States.
Supporters of the current U.S. approach to allies and alliances, while acknowledging the free-rider issue as something that needs to be managed, generally argue that alliances are needed and valuable for deterring potential regional aggressors and balancing against would-be potential hegemonic powers in Eurasia; that although allies might be capable of defending themselves without U.S. help, they might also choose, in the absence of U.S. help, to bandwagon with would-be regional hegemons (rather than contribute to efforts to balance against them); that alliances form a significant advantage for the United States in its dealings with other major powers, such as Russia and China (both of which largely lack similar alliance networks); that in addition to mutual defense benefit, alliances offer other benefits, particularly in peacetime, including sharing of intelligence, information, and technology and the cultivation of soft-power forms of cooperation; and that a transactional approach to alliances, which encourages the merits of each bilateral alliance relationship to be measured in isolation, overlooks the collective benefits of maintaining alliances with multiple countries in a region.
Potential questions for Congress include the following:
For examples of recent articles providing perspectives on the value of allies and alliances, see Appendix F.
Another set of policy and program issues for Congress relating to the U.S. role concerns the Department of State, U.S. participation in international organizations, and U.S. foreign assistance programs. The organization and annual funding levels of the Department of State, as well as policies and funding levels for U.S. participation in international organizations and U.S. foreign assistance programs, have evolved to reflect the generally stable U.S. role over the past 70 years—a role that has tended to assume U.S. leadership in global institutions and on issues such as foreign aid.
The Trump Administration is proposing substantial percentage reductions to the State Department's budget, U.S. funding for international organizations, and funding levels for U.S. foreign assistance programs. In addition, Secretary of State Tillerson is conducting a major review of the State Department's organization, and a number of high-ranking State Department positions remain unfilled. Potential question for Congress include the following:
For a list of selected CRS products providing overview discussions of the Department of State, U.S. participation in international organizations, and foreign assistance, see Appendix G.
Another specific policy and program issue for Congress relating to the U.S. role concerns trade and international economic policy. A key issue for Congress is whether the United States should shift to a trade policy that places less emphasis on multilateral trade organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and more emphasis on bilateral trade agreements and protectionist measures. Potential questions for Congress regarding trade include the following:
Another key issue for Congress relates to the international economic role of the United States. During and after World War II, the United States spearheaded the creation of an international economic order built around institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and the role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. This international economic order formed a key part of the postwar open international order, and U.S. leadership in creating, maintaining, and modifying this international economic order has similarly constituted a principal aspect of U.S. global leadership since World War II. Potential questions for Congress include the following:
For a list of selected CRS products providing overview discussions of trade and international economic policy, see Appendix H.
Another specific policy and program issue for Congress relating to the U.S. role concerns U.S. defense strategy, missions, budgets, plans, and programs. As discussed in another CRS report,27 the U.S. role of the past 70 years, particularly the U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, appears to be a major reason why the U.S. military is structured with significant strategic nuclear deterrent forces and also conventional force elements that are intended to enable the military to cross broad expanses of ocean and air space and then conduct sustained, large-scale military operations upon arrival. Force elements associated with this objective include, among other things
Consistent with a goal of being able to conduct sustained, large-scale military operations in distant locations, the United States also stations significant numbers of forces and supplies in forward locations in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and the Asia-Pacific.
A January 27, 2017, national security presidential memorandum on rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces signed by President Trump states: "Upon transmission of a new National Security Strategy to Congress, the Secretary [of Defense] shall produce a National Defense Strategy (NDS). The goal of the NDS shall be to give the President and the Secretary maximum strategic flexibility and to determine the force structure necessary to meet requirements."28
Potential questions for Congress include the following:
For a list of selected CRS products providing overview discussions of U.S. defense strategy, budgets, plans, and programs, see Appendix I.
Another specific policy and program issue for Congress relating to the U.S. role concerns homeland security, border security, immigration policy, and policy regarding refugees. The Trump Administration has emphasized tighter border security and tighter controls on immigration as two of its top goals, and has taken or proposed a number of controversial actions in these areas. Changes relating to homeland security, border security, immigration policy, and refugees can have many possible domestic as well as foreign implications for the United States. Potential questions for Congress in this area that relate to a possible change in the U.S. role in the world include the following:
For a list of selected CRS products providing overview discussions of homeland security, border security, immigration, and refugees, see Appendix J.
Appendix A.
Selected Trump Administration Statements Bearing on U.S. Role in World
This appendix presents some examples of statements from the Trump Administration bearing on the U.S. role in the world, with the most recent on top.
October 18, 2017, Speech by Secretary of State
In an October 18, 2017, speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated in part
As we look to the next 100 years, it is vital that the Indo-Pacific, a region so central to our shared history, continue to be free and open, and that's really the theme of my remarks to you this morning....
... another more profound transformation that's taking place, one that will have far-reaching implications for the next 100 years: The United States and India are increasingly global partners with growing strategic convergence.
Indians and Americans don't just share an affinity for democracy. We share a vision of the future.
The emerging Delhi-Washington strategic partnership stands upon a shared commitment upholding the rule of law, freedom of navigation, universal values, and free trade. Our nations are two bookends of stability—on either side of the globe—standing for greater security and prosperity for our citizens and people around the world.
The challenges and dangers we face are substantial. The scourge of terrorism and the disorder sown by cyber attacks threaten peace everywhere. North Korea's nuclear weapons tests and ballistic missiles pose a clear and imminent threat to the security of the United States, our Asian allies, and all other nations.
And the very international order that has benefited India's rise—and that of many others—is increasingly under strain.
China, while rising alongside India, has done so less responsibly, at times undermining the international, rules-based order even as countries like India operate within a framework that protects other nations' sovereignty.
China's provocative actions in the South China Sea directly challenge the international law and norms that the United States and India both stand for.
The United States seeks constructive relations with China, but we will not shrink from China's challenges to the rules-based order and where China subverts the sovereignty of neighboring countries and disadvantages the U.S. and our friends.
In this period of uncertainty and somewhat angst, India needs a reliable partner on the world stage. I want to make clear: with our shared values and vision for global stability, peace, and prosperity, the United States is that partner.
And with India's youth, its optimism, its powerful democratic example, and its increasing stature on the world stage, it makes perfect sense that the United States – at this time – should seek to build on the strong foundation of our years of cooperation with India. It is indeed time to double down on a democratic partner that is still rising—and rising responsibly—for the next 100 years.
But above all, the world—and the Indo-Pacific in particular—needs the United States and India to have a strong partnership....
Our two countries can be the voice the world needs to be, standing firm in defense of a rules-based order to promote sovereign countries' unhindered access to the planet's shared spaces, be they on land, at sea, or in cyberspace.
In particular, India and the United States must foster greater prosperity and security with the aim of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific—including the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and the nations that surround them—will be the most consequential part of the globe in the 21st century....
The world's center of gravity is shifting to the heart of the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. and India – with our shared goals of peace, security, freedom of navigation, and a free and open architecture – must serve as the eastern and western beacons of the Indo-Pacific. As the port and starboard lights between which the region can reach its greatest and best potential....
By the year 2050, India may boast the second largest economy in the world. India's population—with a median age of 25—is expected to surpass that of China's within the next decade. Getting our economic partnership right is critical.
Economic growth flows from innovative ideas. Fortunately, there are no two countries that encourage innovation better than the United States and India. The exchange of technologies and ideas between Bangalore and Silicon Valley is changing the world.
Prosperity in the 21st century and beyond will depend on nimble problem solving that harnesses the power of markets and emerging innovations in the Indo-Pacific. This is where the United States and India have a tremendous competitive advantage.
Our open societies generate high-quality ideas at the speed of free thought. Helping regional partners establish similar systems will deliver solutions to 21st century problems.
For that to happen, greater regional connectivity is essential.
From Silk Routes to Grand Trunk Roads, South Asia was for millennia a region bound together by the exchange of goods, people, and ideas.
But today it is one of the least economically integrated regions in the world; intra-regional trade has languished—sitting at around 4 or 5 percent of total trade....
One of the goals of greater connectivity is providing nations in the Indo-Pacific the right options when it comes to sustainable development.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation is one model of how we can achieve it. The program is committed to data, accountability, and evidence-based decision-making to foster the right circumstances for private investment....
But for prosperity to take hold in the Indo-Pacific, security and stability are required. We must evolve as partners in this realm too.
For India, this evolution will entail fully embracing its potential as a leading player in the international security arena. First and foremost, this means building security capacity....
Secretary [of Defense James] Mattis has said the world's two greatest democracies should have the two greatest militaries. I couldn't agree more.
When we work together to address shared security concerns, we don't just protect ourselves, we protect others....
And as we implement President Trump's new South Asia strategy, we will turn to our partners to ensure greater stability in Afghanistan and throughout the region. India is a partner for peace in Afghanistan and we welcome their assistance efforts.
Pakistan, too, is an important U.S. partner in South Asia. Our relationships in the region stand on their own merits. We expect Pakistan to take decisive action against terrorist groups based within their own borders that threaten their own people and the broader region. In doing so, Pakistan furthers stability and peace for itself and its neighbors, and improves its own international standing.
Even as the United States and India grow our own economic and defense cooperation, we must have an eye to including other nations which share our goals. India and the United States should be in the business of equipping other countries to defend their sovereignty, build greater connectivity, and have a louder voice in a regional architecture that promotes their interests and develops their economies. This is a natural complement to India's "Act East" policy.
We ought to welcome those who want to strengthen the rule of law and further prosperity and security in the region.
In particular, our starting point should continue to be greater engagement and cooperation with Indo-Pacific democracies.
We are already capturing the benefits of our important trilateral engagement between the U.S., India, and Japan. As we look ahead, there is room to invite others, including Australia, to build on the shared objectives and initiatives....
In other areas, we are long overdue for greater cooperation. The more we expand cooperation on issues like maritime domain awareness, cybersecurity, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the more the nations in the Indo-Pacific will benefit.
We also must recognize that many Indo-Pacific nations have limited alternatives when it comes to infrastructure investment programs and financing schemes, which often fail to promote jobs or prosperity for the people they claim to help. It's time to expand transparent, high-standard regional lending mechanisms – tools that will actually help nations instead of saddle them with mounting debt.
India and the United States must lead the way in growing these multilateral efforts.
We must do a better job leveraging our collective expertise to meet common challenges, while seeking even more avenues of cooperation to tackle those that are to come. There is a need and we must meet the demand.
The increasing convergence of U.S. and Indian interests and values offers the Indo-Pacific the best opportunity to defend the rules-based global system that has benefited so much of humanity over the past several decades.
But it also comes with a responsibility – for both of our countries to "do the needful" in support of our united vision of a free, open, and thriving Indo-Pacific.
The United States welcomes the growing power and influence of the Indian people in this region and throughout the world. We are eager to grow our relationship even as India grows as a world leader and power.
The strength of the Indo-Pacific has always been the interaction among many peoples, governments, economies, and cultures. The United States is committed to working with any nation in South Asia or the broader region that shares our vision of an Indo-Pacific where sovereignty is upheld and a rules-based system is respected.
It is time we act on our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, supported and protected by two strong pillars of democracy – the United States and India. Thank you for your kind attention.29
September 19, 2017, Speech by President Trump at United Nations
In a September 19, 2017, speech by President Trump before the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, President Trump stated in part
For more than 70 years, in times of war and peace, the leaders of nations, movements and religions have stood before this assembly. Like them, I intend to address some of the very serious threats before us today, but also the enormous potential waiting to be unleashed.
We live in a time of extraordinary opportunity. Breakthroughs in science, technology and medicine are curing illnesses and solving problems that prior generations thought impossible to solve.
But each day also brings news of growing dangers that threaten everything we cherish and value.
Terrorists and extremists have gathered strength and spread to every region of the planet. Rogue regimes represented in this body not only support terrorists, but threaten other nations and their own people with the most destructive weapons known to humanity.
Authority and authoritarian powers seek to collapse the values, the systems and alliances that prevented conflict and tilted the world toward freedom since World War II.
International criminal networks traffic drugs, weapons, people; force dislocation and mass migration; threaten our borders. And new forms of aggression exploit technology to menace our citizens.
To put it simply, we meet at a time of both immense promise and great peril.
It is entirely up to us whether we lift the world to new heights or let it fall into a valley of disrepair.
We have it in our power, should we so choose, to lift millions from poverty, to help our citizens realize their dreams and to ensure that new generations of children are raised free from violence, hatred and fear.
This institution was founded in the aftermath of two world wars to help shape this better future. It was based on the vision that diverse nations could cooperate to protect their sovereignty, preserve their security and promote their prosperity.
It was in the same period, exactly 70 years ago, that the United States developed the Marshall Plan to help restore Europe. Those three beautiful pillars, they're pillars of peace: sovereignty, security and prosperity.
The Marshall Plan was built on the noble idea that the whole world is safer when nations are strong, independent and free. As President Truman said in his message to Congress at that time, our support of European recovery is in full accord with our support of the United Nations. The success of the United Nations depends upon the independent strength of its members.
To overcome the perils of the present and to achieve the promise of the future, we must begin with the wisdom of the past. Our success depends on a coalition of strong and independent nations that embrace their sovereignty, to promote security, prosperity and peace for themselves and for the world.
We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions or even systems of government. But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation.
This is the beautiful vision of this institution. And this is the foundation for cooperation and success. Strong, sovereign nations let diverse countries with different values, different cultures and different dreams not just coexist, but work side by side on the basis of mutual respect. Strong, sovereign nations let their people take ownership of the future and control their own destiny. And strong, sovereign nations allow individuals to flourish in the fullness of the life intended by God.
In America, we do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to watch. This week gives our country a special reason to take pride in that example.
We are celebrating the 230th anniversary of our beloved Constitution, the oldest constitution still in use in the world today. This timeless document has been the foundation of peace, prosperity and freedom for the Americans, and for countless millions around the globe whose own countries have found inspiration in its respect for human nature, human dignity and the rule of law.
The greatest (sic) in the United States Constitution is its first three, beautiful words. They are "We the people." Generations of Americans have sacrificed to maintain the promise of those words, the promise of our country and of our great history.
In America the people govern, the people rule and the people are sovereign.
I was elected not to take power, but to give power to the American people where it belongs.
In foreign affairs, we are renewing this founding principle of sovereignty. Our government's first duty is to its people, to our citizens, to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to preserve their rights and to defend their values.
As president of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries, will always and should always put your countries first.
All responsible leaders have an obligation to serve their own citizens, and the nation-state remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition.
But making a better life for our people also requires us to work together in close harmony and unity to create a more safe and peaceful future for all people.
The United States will forever be a great friend to the world, and especially to its allies. But we can no longer be taken advantage of or enter into a one-sided deal where the United States gets nothing in return.
As long as I hold this office, I will defend America's interest above all else. But in fulfilling our obligations to our own nations, we also realize that it's in everyone's interest to seek a future where all nations can be sovereign, prosperous and secure.
America does more than speak for the values expressed in the United Nations charter. Our citizens have paid the ultimate price to defend our freedom and the freedom of many nations represented in this great hall. America's devotion is measured on the battlefields where our young men and women have fought and sacrificed alongside of our allies, from the beaches of Europe, to the deserts of the Middle East, to the jungles of Asia.
It is an eternal credit to the American character that even after we and our allies emerged victorious from the bloodiest war in history, we did not seek territorial expansion or attempt to oppose and impose our way of life on others.
Instead, we helped build institutions such as this one to defend the sovereignty, security and prosperity for all.
For the diverse nations of the world, this is our hope. We want harmony and friendship, not conflict and strife. We are guided by outcomes, not ideology. We have a policy of principled realism rooted in shared goals, interests and values.
That realism forces us to confront the question facing every leader and nation in this room. It is a question we cannot escape or avoid. We will (sic) slide down the path of complacency, numb to the challenges, threats and even wars that we face, or do we have enough strength and pride to confront those dangers today so that our citizens can enjoy peace and prosperity tomorrow?
If we desire to lift up our citizens, if we aspire to the approval of history, then we must fulfill our sovereign duties to the people we faithfully represent.
We must protect our nations, their interests and their futures. We must reject threats to sovereignty, from the Ukraine to the South China Sea. We must uphold respect for law, respect for borders and respect for culture, and the peaceful engagement these allow.
And just as the founders of this body intended, we must work together and confront together those who threaten us with chaos, turmoil and terror.
The scourge of our planet today is a small group of rogue regimes that violate every principle on which the United Nations is based. They respect neither their own citizens, nor the sovereign rights of their countries.
If the righteous many do not confront the wicked few, then evil will triumph. When decent people and nations become bystanders to history, the forces of destruction only gather power and strength..
No one has shown more contempt for other nations and for the well-being of their own people than the depraved regime in North Korea....
The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea. Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.
The United States is ready, willing and able. But hopefully, this will not be necessary.
That's what the United Nations is all about. That's what the United Nations is for. Let's see how they do.
It is time for North Korea to realize that the denuclearization is its only acceptable future.
The United Nations Security Council recently held two unanimous 15-to-nothing votes adopting hard-hitting resolutions against North Korea. And I want to thank China and Russia for joining the vote to impose sanctions, along with all of the other members of the Security Council. Thank you to all involved.
But we must do much more. It is time for all nations to work together to isolate the Kim regime until it ceases its hostile behavior.
We face this decision not only in North Korea. It is far past time for the nations of the world to confront another reckless regime, one that speaks openly of mass murder, vowing death to America, destruction to Israel and ruin for many leaders and nations in this room.
The Iranian government masks a corrupt dictatorship behind the false guise of a democracy. It has turned a wealthy country with a rich history and culture into an economically depleted rogue state whose chief exports are violence, bloodshed and chaos.
The longest suffering victims of Iran's leaders are, in fact, its own people. Rather than use its resources to improve Iranian lives, its oil profits go to fund Hezbollah and other terrorists that kill innocent Muslims and attack their peaceful Arab and Israeli neighbors.
This wealth, which rightly belongs to Iran's people, also goes to shore up Bashar al-Assad's dictatorship, fuel Yemen's civil war and undermine peace throughout the entire Middle East.
We cannot let a murderous regime continue these destabilizing activities while building dangerous missiles. And we cannot abide by an agreement if it provides cover for the eventual construction of a nuclear program.
The Iran deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into. Frankly, that deal is an embarrassment to the United States, and I don't think you've heard the last of it, believe me.
It is time for the entire world to join us in demanding that Iran's government end its pursuit of death and destruction. It is time for the regime to free all Americans and citizens of other nations that they have unjustly detained. And above all, Iran's government must stop supporting terrorists, begin serving its own people and respect the sovereign rights of its neighbors.
The entire world understands that the good people of Iran want change and, other than the vast military power of the United States, that Iran's people are what their leaders fear the most.
This is what causes the regime to restrict internet access, tear down satellite dishes, shoot unarmed student protesters and imprison political reformists.
Oppressive regimes cannot endure forever, and the day will come when the people will face a choice: Will they continue down the path of poverty, bloodshed and terror, or will the Iranian people return to the nation's proud roots as a center of civilization, culture and wealth, where their people can be happy and prosperous once again?
The Iranian regime's support for terror is in stark contrast to the recent commitments of many of its neighbors to fight terrorism and halt its finance.
In Saudi Arabia early last year, I was greatly honored to address the leaders of more than 50 Arab and Muslim nations. We agreed that all responsible nations must work together to confront terrorists and the Islamic extremism that inspires them.
We will stop radical Islamic terrorism, because we cannot allow it to tear up our nation, and indeed, to tear up the entire world. We must deny the terrorists safe haven, transit, funding and any form of support for their vile and sinister ideology. We must drive them out of our nations.
It is time to expose and hold responsible those countries who support and finance terror groups like Al Qaida, Hezbollah, the Taliban and others that slaughter innocent people.
The United States and our allies are working together throughout the Middle East to crush the loser terrorists and stop the reemergence of safe havens they use to launch attacks on all of our people.
Last month, I announced a new strategy for victory in the fight against this evil in Afghanistan. From now on, our security interests will dictate the length and scope of military operations, not arbitrary benchmarks and timetables set up by politicians. I have also totally changed the rules of engagement in our fight against the Taliban and other terrorist groups.
In Syria and Iraq, we have made big gains toward lasting defeat of ISIS. In fact, our country has achieved more against ISIS in the last eight months than it has in many, many years combined. We seek the deescalation of the Syrian conflict and a political solution that honors the will of the Syrian people.
The actions of the criminal regime of Bashar al-Assad, including the use of chemical weapons against his own citizens, even innocent children, shocked the conscience of every decent person. No society can be safe if banned chemical weapons are allowed to spread. That is why the United States carried out a missile strike on the air base that launched the attack.
We appreciate the efforts of the United Nations agencies that are providing vital humanitarian assistance in areas liberated from ISIS. And we especially thank Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon for their role in hosting refugees from the Syrian conflict.
The United States is a compassionate nation, and has spent billions and billions of dollars in helping to support this effort. We seek an approach to refugee resettlement that is designed to help these horribly treated people, and which enables their eventual return to their home countries to be part of the rebuilding process.
For the cost of resettling one refugee in the United States, we can assist more than 10 in their home region. Out of the goodness of our hearts, we offer financial assistance to hosting countries in the region, and we support recent agreements of the G-20 nations that will seek to host refugees as close to their home countries as possible. This is the safe, responsible and humanitarian approach.
For decades, the United States has dealt with migration challenges. Here in the Western Hemisphere, we have learned that over the long term uncontrolled migration is deeply unfair to both the sending and the receiving countries.
For the sending countries, it reduces domestic pressure to pursue needed political and economic reforms, and drains them of the human capital necessary to motivate and implement those reforms.
For the receiving countries, the substantial costs of uncontrolled migration are borne overwhelmingly by low-income citizens whose concerns are often ignored by both media and government.
I want to salute the work of the United Nations in seeking to address the problems that cause people to flee from their homes. The United Nations and African Union led peacekeeping missions to have invaluable contributions in stabilizing conflicts in Africa.
The United States continues to lead the world in humanitarian assistance, including famine prevention and relief in South Sudan, Somalia, and northern Nigeria and Yemen. We have invested in better health and opportunity all over the world, through programs like PEPFAR, which funds AIDS relief; the President's Malaria Initiative; the Global Health Security Agenda; the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery; and the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative, part of our commitment to empowering women all across the globe....
We also thank the secretary general for recognizing that the United Nations must reform if it is to be an effective partner in confronting threats to sovereignty, security and prosperity.
Too often, the focus of this organization has not been on results, but on bureaucracy and process. In some cases, states that seek to subvert this institution's noble ends have hijacked the very systems that are supposed to advance them.
For example, it is a massive source of embarrassment to the United Nations that some governments with egregious human rights records sit on the U.N. Human Rights Council.
The United States is one out of 193 countries in the United Nations, and yet we pay 22 percent of the entire budget and more. In fact, we pay far more than anybody realizes.
The United States bears an unfair cost burden. But, to be fair, if it could actually accomplish all of its stated goals, especially the goal of peace, this investment would easily be well worth it.
Major portions of the world are in conflict, and some, in fact, are going to Hell. But the powerful people in this room, under the guidance and auspices of the United Nations, can solve many of these vicious and complex problems.
The American people hope that one day soon the United Nations can be a much more accountable and effective advocate for human dignity and freedom around the world.
In the meantime, we believe that no nation should have to bear a disproportionate share of the burden militarily or financially. Nations of the world must take a greater role in promoting secure and prosperous societies in their own regions.
That is why, in the Western Hemisphere, the United States has stood against the corrupt, destabilizing regime in Cuba and embraced the enduring dream of the Cuban people to live in freedom.
My administration recently announced that we will not lift sanctions on the Cuban government until it makes fundamental reforms.
We have also imposed tough, calibrated sanctions on the socialist Maduro regime in Venezuela, which has brought a once-thriving nation to the brink of total collapse.
The socialist dictatorship of Nicolas Maduro has inflicted terrible pain and suffering on the good people of that country. This corrupt regime destroyed a prosperous nation by imposing a failed ideology that has produced poverty and misery everywhere it has been tried. To make matters worse, Maduro has defied his own people, stealing power from their elected representatives to preserve his disastrous rule.
The Venezuelan people are starving and their country is collapsing. Their democratic institutions are being destroyed. This situation is completely unacceptable, and we cannot stand by and watch.
As a responsible neighbor and friend, we and all others have a goal. That goal is to help them regain their freedom, recover their country and restore their democracy.
I would like to thank leaders in this room for condemning the regime and providing vital support to the Venezuelan people.
The United States has taken important steps to hold the regime accountable. We are prepared to take further action if the government of Venezuela persists on its path to impose authoritarian rule on the Venezuelan people.
We are fortunate to have incredibly strong and healthy trade relationships with many of the Latin American countries gathered here today. Our economic bond forms a critical foundation for advancing peace and prosperity for all of our people and all of our neighbors.
I ask every country represented here today to be prepared to do more to address this very real crisis. We call for the full restoration of democracy and political freedoms in Venezuela.
The problem in Venezuela is not that socialism has been poorly implemented, but that socialism has been faithfully implemented.
From the Soviet Union to Cuba to Venezuela, wherever true socialism or communism has been adopted, it has delivered anguish and devastation and failure. Those who preach the tenets of these discredited ideologies only contribute to the continued suffering of the people who live under these cruel systems.
America stands with every person living under a brutal regime. Our respect for sovereignty is also a call for action. All people deserve a government that cares for their safety, their interests and their well-being, including their prosperity.
In America, we seek stronger ties of business and trade with all nations of goodwill. But this trade must be fair and it must be reciprocal. For too long, the American people were told that mammoth multinational trade deals, unaccountable international tribunals and powerful global bureaucracies were the best way to promote their success.
But as those promises flowed, millions of jobs vanished and thousands of factories disappeared. Others gamed the system and broke the rules. And our great middle class, once the bedrock of American prosperity, was forgotten and left behind. But they are forgotten no more and they will never be forgotten again.
While America will pursue cooperation and commerce with other nations, we are renewing our commitment to the first duty of every government, the duty of (sic) our citizens. This bond is the source of America's strength and that of every responsible nation represented here today.
If this organization is to have any hope of successfully confronting the challenges before us, it will depend, as President Truman said some 70 years ago, on the independent strength of its members. If we are to embrace the opportunities of the future and overcome the present dangers together, there can be no substitute for strong, sovereign and independent nations; nations that are rooted in their histories and invested in their destinies; nations that seek allies to befriend not enemies to conquer, and most important of all, nations that are home to patriots, to men and women who are willing to sacrifice for their countries, their fellow citizens and for all that is best in the human spirit.
In remembering the great victory that led to this body's founding, we must never forget that those heroes who fought against evil, also fought for the nations that they loved. Patriotism led the Poles to die to save Poland, the French to fight for a free France, and the Brits to stand strong for Britain.
Today, if we do not invest ourselves, our hearts and our minds in our nations, if we will not build strong families, safe communities and healthy societies for ourselves, no one can do it for us. We cannot wait for someone else, for faraway countries or far off bureaucracies. We can't do it.
We must solve our problems to build our prosperity, to secure our future, or we will build vulnerable to decay, domination and defeat.
The true question for the United Nations today, for people all over the world who hope for better lives for themselves and their children, is a basic one: Are we still patriots? Do we love our nations enough to protect their sovereignty and to take ownership of their futures? Do we revere them enough to defend their interests, preserve their cultures and ensure a peaceful world for their citizens?
One of the greatest American patriots, John Adams, wrote that the American Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people. That was the moment when America awoke, when we looked around and understood that we were a nation. We realized who we were, what we valued and what we would give our lives to defend. From its very first moments, the American story is the story of what is possible when people take ownership of their future.
The United States of America has been among the greatest forces for good in the history of the world and the greatest defenders of sovereignty, security and prosperity for all. Now we are calling for a great reawakening of nations, for the revival of their spirits, their pride, their people and their patriotism.
History is asking us whether we are up to the task. Our answer will be a renewal of will, a rediscovery of resolve and a rebirth of devotion. We need to defeat the enemies of humanity and unlock the potential of life itself. Our hope is a word and world (sic) of proud, independent nations that embrace their duties, seek friendship, respect others and make common cause in the greatest shared interest of all, a future of dignity and peace for the people of this wonderful Earth.
This is the true vision of the United Nations, the ancient wish of every people and the deepest yearning that lives inside every sacred soul.
So let this be our mission and let this be our message to the world: We will fight together, sacrifice together and stand together for peace, for freedom, for justice, for family, for humanity and for the almighty god who made us all.30
July 31, 2017, Opinion Column from Secretary of Commerce
A July 31, 2017, opinion column from Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross stated
The Trump administration recently celebrated the workers and businesses that make this country great. The purpose of "Made in America Week" was to recognize that, when given a fair chance to compete, Americans can make and sell some of the best, most innovative products in the world.
Unfortunately, many governments across the globe have pursued policies that put American workers and businesses at a disadvantage. For these governments, President Trump and his administration have a clear message: It is time to rebalance your trade policies so that they are fair, free and reciprocal.
Many nations express commitment to free markets while criticizing the U.S. for what they characterize as a protectionist stance. Yet these very nations engage in unfair trading practices, erect barriers to American exports, and maintain significant trade surpluses with us. They argue that our $752.5 billion trade deficit in goods last year was simply a natural and inevitable consequence of free trade. So, they contend, America should have no complaints.
Our major trading partners issue frequent statements regarding their own free-trade bona fides, but do they practice what they preach? Or are they protectionists dressed in free-market clothing?
When it comes to trade in goods, our deficits with China and the EU are $347 billion and $146.8 billion, respectively. As the nearby chart shows, China's tariffs are higher than those of the U.S. in 20 of the 22 major categories of goods. Europe imposes higher tariffs than the U.S. in 17 of 22 categories, though the chart does show that the EU and China are much different regarding tariff rates.
The EU charges a 10% tariff on imported American cars, while the U.S. imposes only a 2.5% tariff on imported European cars. Today Europe exports 1.14 million automobiles to the U.S., nearly four times as many as the U.S. exports to Europe. China, which is the world's largest automobile market, has a 25% tariff on imported vehicles and imposes even higher tariffs on luxury vehicles.
In addition to tariffs, both China and Europe enforce formidable nontariff trade barriers against imports. Examples include onerous and opaque procedures for registering and gaining certification for imports; unscientific sanitary rules, especially with regard to agricultural goods; requirements that companies build local factories; and forced technology transfers. The list goes on.
Both China and Europe also bankroll their exports through grants, low-cost loans, energy subsidies, special value-added tax refunds, and below-market real-estate sales and leases, among other means. Comparable levels of government support do not exist in the U.S. If these countries really are free traders, why do they have such formidable tariff and nontariff barriers?
Until we make better deals with our trading partners, we will never know precisely how much of our deficit in goods is due to such trickery. But there can be no question that these barriers are responsible for a significant portion of our current trade imbalance.
China is not a market economy. The Chinese government creates national champions and takes other actions that significantly distort markets. Responding to such actions with trade remedies is not protectionist. In fact, the World Trade Organization specifically permits its members to take action when other countries are subsidizing, dumping and engaging in other unfair trade practices.
Consistent with WTO rules, the U.S. has since Jan. 20 brought 54 trade-remedy actions—antidumping and countervailing duty investigations—compared with 40 brought during the same period last year. The U.S. currently has 403 outstanding orders against 42 countries.
But unfortunately, in its annual reports, the WTO consistently casts the increase of trade enforcement cases as evidence of protectionism by the countries lodging the complaints. Apparently, the possibility never occurs to the WTO that there are more trade cases because there are more trade abuses.
The WTO should protect free and fair trade among nations, not attack those trade remedies necessary to ensure a level playing field. Defending U.S. workers and businesses against this onslaught should not be mislabeled as protectionism. Insisting on fair trade is the best way to ensure the long-term strength of the international trading system.
The Trump administration believes in free and fair trade and will use every available tool to counter the protectionism of those who pledge allegiance to free trade while violating its core principles. The U.S. is working to restore a level playing field, and under President Trump's leadership, we will do so.
This is a true free-trade agenda.31
July 13, 2017, Opinion Column by Two Senior Administration Officials
A July 13, 2017, opinion column from two senior Administration officials stated
President Trump just concluded a second overseas trip to further advance America's interests and values, and to strengthen our alliances around the world. Both this and his first trip demonstrated the resurgence of American leadership to bolster common interests, affirm shared values, confront mutual threats and achieve renewed prosperity.
Discussions with world leaders highlighted extraordinary potential: vast supplies of affordable energy, untapped markets that can be opened to new commerce, a growing number of young people seeking the chance to build better futures in their homelands and new partnerships among nations that can form the basis for lasting peace. At every opportunity abroad, President Trump articulated his vision for securing the American homeland, enhancing American prosperity and advancing American influence.
Meetings in Poland and at the Group of 20 summit conference in Germany focused on building coalitions to get the best possible outcomes for America and for our allies. The United States cannot be a passive member of international organizations. We are working with friends to confront common threats, seize mutually beneficial opportunities and press for solutions to shared problems.
In Warsaw, President Trump spoke to the Polish people and reiterated our commitment to mutual support and defense of Poland and our NATO allies against common threats. He affirmed that a "strong Poland is a blessing to Europe" and that "a strong Europe is a blessing to the West and to the world."
He also met with 12 leaders of the Three Seas nations and pledged America's commitment to expanding access to affordable and reliable energy in the Baltic States, Central Europe and the Balkans. Helping countries diversify their energy sources strengthens economies, creates jobs and prevents adversaries from using energy to intimidate or coerce. During a dinner President Trump hosted with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan in Hamburg, the leaders agreed on a common strategy to confront the threat of North Korea and ensure the security of Northeast Asia and the United States.
Central to President Trump's approach is that the United States will seek areas of agreement and cooperation while still protecting American interests. At the G-20, the United States supported open trade but insisted that it be fair. The G-20 communiqué recognized "the importance of reciprocal and mutually advantageous trade," and all leaders agreed to do more to eliminate excess capacity in industrial sectors such as steel. Because of American leadership, all G-20 nations joined together in making an urgent call "for the removal of market distorting subsidies and other types of support by governments" to "foster a truly level playing field."
The G-20 leaders agreed that a strong economy and a healthy planet are mutually reinforcing. America will continue to lead by example in demonstrating that market forces and technology-driven solutions are the most effective means of protecting the environment while fueling economic growth.
On migration, the leaders reaffirmed the "sovereign right of states to manage and control their borders." They discussed the need to "address the root causes of displacement" and create better opportunities for people to remain in their home countries and rebuild their communities.
Perhaps most important, President Trump affirmed on this trip that America First is grounded in American values – values that not only strengthen America but also drive progress throughout the world. America champions the dignity of every person, affirms the equality of women, celebrates innovation, protects freedom of speech and of religion, and supports free and fair markets.
For example, to help empower women across the globe, the United States joined with the World Bank in an initiative to provide more than $1 billion to advance entrepreneurship. This effort will help women in developing countries gain increased access to the capital, markets and networks needed to start and grow businesses in the modern economy. And the United States remains the world's single largest source of humanitarian assistance. At the G-20, we committed an additional $639 million to help save the lives of the millions of people threatened by famine – and called on other nations to join us in doing more to address this humanitarian catastrophe.
Of course, the United States – along with nations around the world – continues to face serious challenges, including the menace of terrorism and the threat of rogue regimes. Working with other nations allows us our best opportunity to address these challenges. For example, in a meeting with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, the two leaders affirmed the commitment made in Saudi Arabia to block funding for terrorists and those who advance their hateful ideology. In the formal communiqué on countering terrorism, all G-20 nations affirmed that we "strongly condemn all terrorist attacks worldwide and stand united and firm in the fight against terrorism and its financing." In many discussions with allies and partners at the G-20, leaders agreed that North Korea is a global threat that requires collective action.
America First is rooted in confidence that our values are worth defending and promoting. This is a time of great challenge for our friends and allies around the globe – but it is also a moment of extraordinary opportunity. The American delegation returned from the trip with tremendous optimism about the future and what the United States, our allies and our partners can achieve together.32
July 6, 2017, Speech by President Trump in Warsaw
In a July 6, 2017, speech in Warsaw, Poland, President Trump stated in part
We've come to your nation to deliver a very important message: America loves Poland, and America loves the Polish people. Thank you.
The Poles have not only greatly enriched this region, but Polish-Americans have also greatly enriched the United States, and I was truly proud to have their support in the 2016 election.
It is a profound honor to stand in this city, by this monument to the Warsaw Uprising, and to address the Polish nation that so many generations have dreamed of: a Poland that is safe, strong, and free.
President Duda and your wonderful First Lady, Agata, have welcomed us with the tremendous warmth and kindness for which Poland is known around the world. Thank you. My sincere—and I mean sincerely thank both of them. And to Prime Minister Syzdlo, a very special thanks also.
We are also pleased that former President Lech Walesa, so famous for leading the Solidarity Movement, has joined us today, also. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
On behalf of all Americans, let me also thank the entire Polish people for the generosity you have shown in welcoming our soldiers to your country. These soldiers are not only brave defenders of freedom, but also symbols of America's commitment to your security and your place in a strong and democratic Europe.
We are proudly joined on stage by American, Polish, British, and Romanian soldiers. Thank you. Thank you. Great job.
President Duda and I have just come from an incredibly successful meeting with the leaders participating in the Three Seas Initiative. To the citizens of this great region, America is eager to expand our partnership with you. We welcome stronger ties of trade and commerce as you grow your economies. And we are committed to securing your access to alternate sources of energy, so Poland and its neighbors are never again held hostage to a single supplier of energy.
Mr. President, I congratulate you, along with the President of Croatia, on your leadership of this historic Three Seas Initiative. Thank you.
This is my first visit to Central Europe as President, and I am thrilled that it could be right here at this magnificent, beautiful piece of land. It is beautiful. Poland is the geographic heart of Europe, but more importantly, in the Polish people, we see the soul of Europe. Your nation is great because your spirit is great and your spirit is strong.
For two centuries, Poland suffered constant and brutal attacks. But while Poland could be invaded and occupied, and its borders even erased from the map, it could never be erased from history or from your hearts. In those dark days, you have lost your land but you never lost your pride.
So it is with true admiration that I can say today, that from the farms and villages of your countryside to the cathedrals and squares of your great cities, Poland lives, Poland prospers, and Poland prevails.
Despite every effort to transform you, oppress you, or destroy you, you endured and overcame. You are the proud nation of Copernicus—think of that—Chopin, Saint John Paul II. Poland is a land of great heroes. And you are a people who know the true value of what you defend.
The triumph of the Polish spirit over centuries of hardship gives us all hope for a future in which good conquers evil, and peace achieves victory over war.
For Americans, Poland has been a symbol of hope since the beginning of our nation. Polish heroes and American patriots fought side by side in our War of Independence and in many wars that followed. Our soldiers still serve together today in Afghanistan and Iraq, combatting the enemies of all civilization.
For America's part, we have never given up on freedom and independence as the right and destiny of the Polish people, and we never, ever will.
Our two countries share a special bond forged by unique histories and national characters. It's a fellowship that exists only among people who have fought and bled and died for freedom.
The signs of this friendship stand in our nation's capital. Just steps from the White House, we've raised statues of men with names like Pułaski and Kościuszko. The same is true in Warsaw, where street signs carry the name of George Washington, and a monument stands to one of the world's greatest heroes, Ronald Reagan.
And so I am here today not just to visit an old ally, but to hold it up as an example for others who seek freedom and who wish to summon the courage and the will to defend our civilization. The story of Poland is the story of a people who have never lost hope, who have never been broken, and who have never, ever forgotten who they are.
AUDIENCE: Donald Trump! Donald Trump! Donald Trump!
PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you so much. Such a great honor. This is a nation more than one thousand years old. Your borders were erased for more than a century and only restored just one century ago.
In 1920, in the Miracle of Vistula, Poland stopped the Soviet army bent on European conquest. Then, 19 years later in 1939, you were invaded yet again, this time by Nazi Germany from the west and the Soviet Union from the east. That's trouble. That's tough.
Under a double occupation the Polish people endured evils beyond description: the Katyn forest massacre, the occupations, the Holocaust, the Warsaw Ghetto and the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, the destruction of this beautiful capital city, and the deaths of nearly one in five Polish people. A vibrant Jewish population—the largest in Europe—was reduced to almost nothing after the Nazis systematically murdered millions of Poland's Jewish citizens, along with countless others, during that brutal occupation.
In the summer of 1944, the Nazi and Soviet armies were preparing for a terrible and bloody battle right here in Warsaw. Amid that hell on earth, the citizens of Poland rose up to defend their homeland. I am deeply honored to be joined on stage today by veterans and heroes of the Warsaw Uprising.
AUDIENCE: (Chanting.)
PRESIDENT TRUMP: What great spirit. We salute your noble sacrifice and we pledge to always remember your fight for Poland and for freedom. Thank you. Thank you.
This monument reminds us that more than 150,000 Poles died during that desperate struggle to overthrow oppression.
From the other side of the river, the Soviet armed forces stopped and waited. They watched as the Nazis ruthlessly destroyed the city, viciously murdering men, women, and children. They tried to destroy this nation forever by shattering its will to survive.
But there is a courage and a strength deep in the Polish character that no one could destroy. The Polish martyr, Bishop Michael Kozal, said it well: "More horrifying than a defeat of arms is a collapse of the human spirit."
Through four decades of communist rule, Poland and the other captive nations of Europe endured a brutal campaign to demolish freedom, your faith, your laws, your history, your identity—indeed the very essence of your culture and your humanity. Yet, through it all, you never lost that spirit. Your oppressors tried to break you, but Poland could not be broken.
And when the day came on June 2nd, 1979, and one million Poles gathered around Victory Square for their very first mass with their Polish Pope, that day, every communist in Warsaw must have known that their oppressive system would soon come crashing down. They must have known it at the exact moment during Pope John Paul II's sermon when a million Polish men, women, and children suddenly raised their voices in a single prayer. A million Polish people did not ask for wealth. They did not ask for privilege. Instead, one million Poles sang three simple words: "We Want God."
In those words, the Polish people recalled the promise of a better future. They found new courage to face down their oppressors, and they found the words to declare that Poland would be Poland once again.
As I stand here today before this incredible crowd, this faithful nation, we can still hear those voices that echo through history. Their message is as true today as ever. The people of Poland, the people of America, and the people of Europe still cry out "We want God."
Together, with Pope John Paul II, the Poles reasserted their identity as a nation devoted to God. And with that powerful declaration of who you are, you came to understand what to do and how to live. You stood in solidarity against oppression, against a lawless secret police, against a cruel and wicked system that impoverished your cities and your souls. And you won. Poland prevailed. Poland will always prevail.
AUDIENCE: Donald Trump! Donald Trump! Donald Trump!
PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you. You were supported in that victory over communism by a strong alliance of free nations in the West that defied tyranny. Now, among the most committed members of the NATO Alliance, Poland has resumed its place as a leading nation of a Europe that is strong, whole, and free.
A strong Poland is a blessing to the nations of Europe, and they know that. A strong Europe is a blessing to the West and to the world. One hundred years after the entry of American forces into World War I, the transatlantic bond between the United States and Europe is as strong as ever and maybe, in many ways, even stronger.
This continent no longer confronts the specter of communism. But today we're in the West, and we have to say there are dire threats to our security and to our way of life. You see what's happening out there. They are threats. We will confront them. We will win. But they are threats.
AUDIENCE: Donald Trump! Donald Trump! Donald Trump!
PRESIDENT TRUMP: We are confronted by another oppressive ideology—one that seeks to export terrorism and extremism all around the globe. America and Europe have suffered one terror attack after another. We're going to get it to stop.
During a historic gathering in Saudi Arabia, I called on the leaders of more than 50 Muslim nations to join together to drive out this menace which threatens all of humanity. We must stand united against these shared enemies to strip them of their territory and their funding, and their networks, and any form of ideological support that they may have. While we will always welcome new citizens who share our values and love our people, our borders will always be closed to terrorism and extremism of any kind.
AUDIENCE: Donald Trump! Donald Trump! Donald Trump!
PRESIDENT TRUMP: We are fighting hard against radical Islamic terrorism, and we will prevail. We cannot accept those who reject our values and who use hatred to justify violence against the innocent.
Today, the West is also confronted by the powers that seek to test our will, undermine our confidence, and challenge our interests. To meet new forms of aggression, including propaganda, financial crimes, and cyberwarfare, we must adapt our alliance to compete effectively in new ways and on all new battlefields.
We urge Russia to cease its destabilizing activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, and its support for hostile regimes—including Syria and Iran—and to instead join the community of responsible nations in our fight against common enemies and in defense of civilization itself.
Finally, on both sides of the Atlantic, our citizens are confronted by yet another danger—one firmly within our control. This danger is invisible to some but familiar to the Poles: the steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people. The West became great not because of paperwork and regulations but because people were allowed to chase their dreams and pursue their destinies.
Americans, Poles, and the nations of Europe value individual freedom and sovereignty. We must work together to confront forces, whether they come from inside or out, from the South or the East, that threaten over time to undermine these values and to erase the bonds of culture, faith and tradition that make us who we are. If left unchecked, these forces will undermine our courage, sap our spirit, and weaken our will to defend ourselves and our societies.
But just as our adversaries and enemies of the past learned here in Poland, we know that these forces, too, are doomed to fail if we want them to fail. And we do, indeed, want them to fail. They are doomed not only because our alliance is strong, our countries are resilient, and our power is unmatched. Through all of that, you have to say everything is true. Our adversaries, however, are doomed because we will never forget who we are. And if we don't forget who are, we just can't be beaten. Americans will never forget. The nations of Europe will never forget. We are the fastest and the greatest community. There is nothing like our community of nations. The world has never known anything like our community of nations.
We write symphonies. We pursue innovation. We celebrate our ancient heroes, embrace our timeless traditions and customs, and always seek to explore and discover brand-new frontiers.
We reward brilliance. We strive for excellence, and cherish inspiring works of art that honor God. We treasure the rule of law and protect the right to free speech and free expression.
We empower women as pillars of our society and of our success. We put faith and family, not government and bureaucracy, at the center of our lives. And we debate everything. We challenge everything. We seek to know everything so that we can better know ourselves.
And above all, we value the dignity of every human life, protect the rights of every person, and share the hope of every soul to live in freedom. That is who we are. Those are the priceless ties that bind us together as nations, as allies, and as a civilization.
What we have, what we inherited from our—and you know this better than anybody, and you see it today with this incredible group of people—what we've inherited from our ancestors has never existed to this extent before. And if we fail to preserve it, it will never, ever exist again. So we cannot fail.
This great community of nations has something else in common: In every one of them, it is the people, not the powerful, who have always formed the foundation of freedom and the cornerstone of our defense. The people have been that foundation here in Poland—as they were right here in Warsaw—and they were the foundation from the very, very beginning in America.
Our citizens did not win freedom together, did not survive horrors together, did not face down evil together, only to lose our freedom to a lack of pride and confidence in our values. We did not and we will not. We will never back down.
AUDIENCE: Donald Trump! Donald Trump! Donald Trump!
PRESIDENT TRUMP: As long as we know our history, we will know how to build our future. Americans know that a strong alliance of free, sovereign and independent nations is the best defense for our freedoms and for our interests. That is why my administration has demanded that all members of NATO finally meet their full and fair financial obligation.
As a result of this insistence, billions of dollars more have begun to pour into NATO. In fact, people are shocked. But billions and billions of dollars more are coming in from countries that, in my opinion, would not have been paying so quickly.
To those who would criticize our tough stance, I would point out that the United States has demonstrated not merely with words but with its actions that we stand firmly behind Article 5, the mutual defense commitment.
Words are easy, but actions are what matters. And for its own protection—and you know this, everybody knows this, everybody has to know this—Europe must do more. Europe must demonstrate that it believes in its future by investing its money to secure that future.
That is why we applaud Poland for its decision to move forward this week on acquiring from the United States the battle-tested Patriot air and missile defense system—the best anywhere in the world. That is also why we salute the Polish people for being one of the NATO countries that has actually achieved the benchmark for investment in our common defense. Thank you. Thank you, Poland. I must tell you, the example you set is truly magnificent, and we applaud Poland. Thank you.
We have to remember that our defense is not just a commitment of money, it is a commitment of will. Because as the Polish experience reminds us, the defense of the West ultimately rests not only on means but also on the will of its people to prevail and be successful and get what you have to have. The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive. Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost? Do we have enough respect for our citizens to protect our borders? Do we have the desire and the courage to preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert and destroy it?
We can have the largest economies and the most lethal weapons anywhere on Earth, but if we do not have strong families and strong values, then we will be weak and we will not survive. If anyone forgets the critical importance of these things, let them come to one country that never has. Let them come to Poland. And let them come here, to Warsaw, and learn the story of the Warsaw Uprising.
When they do, they should learn about Jerusalem Avenue. In August of 1944, Jerusalem Avenue was one of the main roads running east and west through this city, just as it is today.
Control of that road was crucially important to both sides in the battle for Warsaw. The German military wanted it as their most direct route to move troops and to form a very strong front. And for the Polish Home Army, the ability to pass north and south across that street was critical to keep the center of the city, and the Uprising itself, from being split apart and destroyed.
Every night, the Poles put up sandbags amid machine gun fire—and it was horrendous fire—to protect a narrow passage across Jerusalem Avenue. Every day, the enemy forces knocked them down again and again and again. Then the Poles dug a trench. Finally, they built a barricade. And the brave Polish fighters began to flow across Jerusalem Avenue. That narrow passageway, just a few feet wide, was the fragile link that kept the Uprising alive.
Between its walls, a constant stream of citizens and freedom fighters made their perilous, just perilous, sprints. They ran across that street, they ran through that street, they ran under that street—all to defend this city. "The far side was several yards away," recalled one young Polish woman named Greta. That mortality and that life was so important to her. In fact, she said, "The mortally dangerous sector of the street was soaked in the blood. It was the blood of messengers, liaison girls, and couriers."
Nazi snipers shot at anybody who crossed. Anybody who crossed, they were being shot at. Their soldiers burned every building on the street, and they used the Poles as human shields for their tanks in their effort to capture Jerusalem Avenue. The enemy never ceased its relentless assault on that small outpost of civilization. And the Poles never ceased its defense.
The Jerusalem Avenue passage required constant protection, repair, and reinforcement, but the will of its defenders did not waver, even in the face of death. And to the last days of the Uprising, the fragile crossing never, ever failed. It was never, ever forgotten. It was kept open by the Polish people.
The memories of those who perished in the Warsaw Uprising cry out across the decades, and few are clearer than the memories of those who died to build and defend the Jerusalem Avenue crossing. Those heroes remind us that the West was saved with the blood of patriots; that each generation must rise up and play their part in its defense—and that every foot of ground, and every last inch of civilization, is worth defending with your life.
Our own fight for the West does not begin on the battlefield—it begins with our minds, our wills, and our souls. Today, the ties that unite our civilization are no less vital, and demand no less defense, than that bare shred of land on which the hope of Poland once totally rested. Our freedom, our civilization, and our survival depend on these bonds of history, culture, and memory.
And today as ever, Poland is in our heart, and its people are in that fight. Just as Poland could not be broken, I declare today for the world to hear that the West will never, ever be broken. Our values will prevail. Our people will thrive. And our civilization will triumph.
AUDIENCE: Donald Trump! Donald Trump! Donald Trump!
PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you. So, together, let us all fight like the Poles—for family, for freedom, for country, and for God.
Thank you. God Bless You. God bless the Polish people. God bless our allies. And God bless the United States of America.
Thank you. God bless you. Thank you very much.33
May 30, 2017, Opinion Column by Two Senior Administration Officials
A May 30, 2017, opinion column from two senior Administration officials stated
President Trump just returned from nine days in the Middle East and Europe that demonstrated his America First approach to ensuring security and prosperity for our nation. America will not lead from behind. This administration will restore confidence in American leadership as we serve the American people.
America First does not mean America alone. It is a commitment to protecting and advancing our vital interests while also fostering cooperation and strengthening relationships with our allies and partners. A determination to stand up for our people and our way of life deepens our friends' respect for America.
The president is unequivocal in declaring that America's primary interest is the safety and security of our citizens. In discussions overseas, Mr. Trump encouraged others to join the U.S. in doing more to defeat the terrorist organizations that threaten peaceful nations around the world. He challenged leaders of more than 50 Muslim-majority countries to stand together "against the murder of innocent Muslims, the oppression of women, the persecution of Jews, and the slaughter of Christians."
A strong stand against terrorism is consistent with values common across all the world's great religions. After the president's historic remarks, leader after leader of Muslim-majority nations reaffirmed the president's message and committed to confronting the terrorism and extremism that plague all civilized societies. To answer the call and address these grave concerns, Saudi Arabia launched a new Global Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology, and several Middle Eastern nations signed a memorandum of understanding to create the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center, with the mission of cutting off funds to terrorist organizations.
Ensuring American economic prosperity is also critical to our national interests. In Saudi Arabia, President Trump helped facilitate $110 billion in defense investments that will strengthen regional and American security and create American jobs. He also announced nearly $270 billion in agreements with private-sector enterprises from the U.S., spanning the financial-services, energy, technology, mining and manufacturing industries. These efforts will enhance job creation and investment in America.
While meeting with European Union leaders in Brussels, the president reiterated his concern about our trade deficits with many European nations. He also emphasized the importance of reciprocity in trade and commerce. Simply put, America will treat others as they treat us. At the Group of Seven in Taormina, Sicily, where President Trump further solidified his relationships with leaders of the world's largest market economies, the members came together in the official communiqué to stand firm "against all unfair trade practices" and to foster a truly level playing field.
Strong alliances and economically thriving partners are a third vital American interest. As the president stated in Brussels, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is rooted in "the courage of our people, the strength of our resolve, and the commitments that bind us together as one." While reconfirming America's commitment to NATO and Article 5, the president challenged our allies to share equitably the responsibility for our mutual defense. We came away with new outcomes for the first time in decades: More allies are stepping up to meet their defense commitments. By asking for more buy-in, we have deepened our relationships. That is not surprising. Alliances based on mutual respect and shared responsibility are strong. And strong alliances bolster American power.
In Israel, the president affirmed that a secure, prosperous and democratic Jewish state is central to American interests in the region. The president also met with Palestinian leadership because he understands the importance of American engagement in the pursuit of a historic peace deal between Israelis and Palestinians.
We are asking a lot of our allies and partners. But in return America will once again be a true friend to our partners and the worst foe to our enemies. The president's visit showed the power of both competing to advance interests and engaging to develop relationships and foster cooperation. We have a vital interest in taking the lead internationally to advance American military, political and economic strength.
We engage with the world not to impose our way of life but to "secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity." That means identifying the interests and principles that make America uncommon and advancing them in the Middle East, with our NATO allies, with the G-7 nations and beyond.
The president embarked on his first foreign trip with a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a "global community" but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage. We bring to this forum unmatched military, political, economic, cultural and moral strength. Rather than deny this elemental nature of international affairs, we embrace it.
At every stop in our journey, we delivered a clear message to our friends and partners: Where our interests align, we are open to working together to solve problems and explore opportunities. We let adversaries know that we will not only take their measure, deter conflict through strength, and defend our interests and values, but also look for areas of common interest that allow us to work together. In short, those societies that share our interests will find no friend more steadfast than the United States. Those that choose to challenge our interests will encounter the firmest resolve.
This historic trip represented a strategic shift for the United States. America First signals the restoration of American leadership and our government's traditional role overseas—to use the diplomatic, economic and military resources of the U.S. to enhance American security, promote American prosperity, and extend American influence around the world.34
May 3, 2017, Address by Secretary of State
In a May 3, 2017, address to Department of State employees, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated
So let's talk first about my view of how you translate "America first" into our foreign policy. And I think I approach it really that it's America first for national security and economic prosperity, and that doesn't mean it comes at the expense of others. Our partnerships and our alliances are critical to our success in both of those areas. But as we have progressed over the last 20 years—and some of you could tie it back to the post-Cold War era as the world has changed, some of you can tie it back to the evolution of China since the post-Nixon era and China's rise as an economic power, and now as a growing military power—that as we participated in those changes, we were promoting relations, we were promoting economic activity, we were promoting trade with a lot of these emerging economies, and we just kind of lost track of how we were doing. And as a result, things got a little bit out of balance. And I think that's—as you hear the President talk about it, that's what he really speaks about, is: Look, things have gotten out of balance, and these are really important relationships to us and they're really important alliances, but we've got to bring them back into balance.
So whether it's our asking of NATO members to really meet their obligations, even though those were notional obligations, we understand—and aspirational obligation, we think it's important that those become concrete. And when we deal with our trading partners—that things have gotten a little out of bounds here, they've gotten a little off balance—we've got to bring that back into balance because it's not serving the interests of the American people well.
So it doesn't have to come at the expense of others, but it does have to come at an engagement with others. And so as we're building our policies around those notions, that's what we want to support. But at the end of it, it is strengthening our national security and promoting economic prosperity for the American people, and we do that, again, with a lot of partners.
Now, I think it's important to also remember that guiding all of our foreign policy actions are our fundamental values: our values around freedom, human dignity, the way people are treated. Those are our values. Those are not our policies; they're values. And the reason it's important, I think, to keep that well understood is policies can change. They do change. They should change. Policies change to adapt to the—our values never change. They're constant throughout all of this.
And so I think the real challenge many of us have as we think about constructing our policies and carrying out our policies is: How do we represent our values? And in some circumstances, if you condition our national security efforts on someone adopting our values, we probably can't achieve our national security goals or our national security interests. If we condition too heavily that others must adopt this value that we've come to over a long history of our own, it really creates obstacles to our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests. It doesn't mean that we leave those values on the sidelines. It doesn't mean that we don't advocate for and aspire to freedom, human dignity, and the treatment of people the world over. We do. And we will always have that on our shoulder everywhere we go.
But I think it is—I think it's really important that all of us understand the difference between policy and values, and in some circumstances, we should and do condition our policy engagements on people adopting certain actions as to how they treat people. They should. We should demand that. But that doesn't mean that's the case in every situation. And so we really have to understand, in each country or each region of the world that we're dealing with, what are our national security interests, what are our economic prosperity interests, and then as we can advocate and advance our values, we should – but the policies can do this; the values never change.
And so I would ask you to just—to the extent you could think about that a little bit, I think it's useful, because I know this is probably, for me, it's one of the most difficult areas as I've thought about how to formulate policy to advance all of these things simultaneously. It's a real challenge. And I hear from government leaders all over the world: You just can't demand that of us, we can't move that quickly, we can't adapt that quickly, okay? So it's how do we advance our national security and economic interests on this hand, our values are constant over here.
So I give you that as kind of an overarching view of how I think about the President's approach of "America first." We must secure the nation. We must protect our people. We must protect our borders. We must protect our ability to be that voice of our values now and forevermore. And we can only do that with economic prosperity. So it's foreign policy projected with a strong ability to enforce the protection of our freedoms with a strong military. And all of you that have been at this a long time understand the value of speaking with a posture of strength—not a threatening posture, but a posture of strength. People know we can back it up....
So let me turn now quickly to the last thing I wanted to talk about, which is the future and where we're going. And I alluded to this a little bit when I was commenting about the post-Cold War era. And during the Cold War – and I've had this conversation with some of you in this room before in our interactions – in many respects the Cold War was a lot easier. Things were pretty clear, the Soviet Union had a lot of things contained, and I had a conversation with Secretary-General Guterres at the UN. He described it as during the Cold War, we froze history. History just stopped in its tracks because so many of the dynamics that existed for centuries were contained. They were contained with heavy authoritarianism. And when the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union broke up, we took all of that off and history regained its march. And the world got a whole lot more complicated. And I think that's what we see. It has become much more complicated in terms of old conflicts have renewed themselves because they're not contained now. So that's the world as it is and that's the world we have to engage with.
And so I'm going to – I'm saying this as a preface to as we get into thinking about how we should deliver on mission is to be thinking about how the way we have been delivering was in many ways shaped and as a residual of the Cold War era. And in many respects, we've not yet transitioned ourselves to this new reality either. And I don't say that just about the State Department, I say that about institutions globally. In fact, this is the – this – I had this same conversation with Secretary Guterres about the United Nations, that there are many institutions – and you can see when we have our conversations with NATO, another example, but there are many institutions around the world that were created during a different era. And so they were set up to deal with certain conditions and their processes and their organizations were set up, and as things have changed, we've not really fully adapted those. It's not that we've not recognized, but we've not fully adapted how we deliver on mission.
So one of the things, as we get into this opportunity to look at how we get our work done, is to think about the world as it is today and to leave behind – we've been – well, we do it this way because we've been doing it this way for the last 30 years or 40 years or 50 years, because all of that was created in a different environment. And so I think – I guess what I'm inviting all of you to do is to approach this effort that we're going to undertake with no constraints to your thinking – with none.35
White House Statement on America First Foreign Policy
A White House statement on the Administration's America First foreign policy that was posted at the start of the Trump Administration states
America First Foreign Policy
The Trump Administration is committed to a foreign policy focused on American interests and American national security.
Peace through strength will be at the center of that foreign policy. This principle will make possible a stable, more peaceful world with less conflict and more common ground.
Defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups will be our highest priority. To defeat and destroy these groups, we will pursue aggressive joint and coalition military operations when necessary. In addition, the Trump Administration will work with international partners to cut off funding for terrorist groups, to expand intelligence sharing, and to engage in cyberwarfare to disrupt and disable propaganda and recruiting.
Next, we will rebuild the American military. Our Navy has shrunk from more than 500 ships in 1991 to 275 in 2016. Our Air Force is roughly one third smaller than in 1991. President Trump is committed to reversing this trend, because he knows that our military dominance must be unquestioned.
Finally, in pursuing a foreign policy based on American interests, we will embrace diplomacy. The world must know that we do not go abroad in search of enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old friends become allies.
The world will be more peaceful and more prosperous with a stronger and more respected America.
Trade Deals Working For All Americans
For too long, Americans have been forced to accept trade deals that put the interests of insiders and the Washington elite over the hard-working men and women of this country. As a result, blue-collar towns and cities have watched their factories close and good-paying jobs move overseas, while Americans face a mounting trade deficit and a devastated manufacturing base.
With a lifetime of negotiating experience, the President understands how critical it is to put American workers and businesses first when it comes to trade. With tough and fair agreements, international trade can be used to grow our economy, return millions of jobs to America's shores, and revitalize our nation's suffering communities.
This strategy starts by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and making certain that any new trade deals are in the interests of American workers. President Trump is committed to renegotiating NAFTA. If our partners refuse a renegotiation that gives American workers a fair deal, then the President will give notice of the United States' intent to withdraw from NAFTA.
In addition to rejecting and reworking failed trade deals, the United States will crack down on those nations that violate trade agreements and harm American workers in the process. The President will direct the Commerce Secretary to identify all trade violations and to use every tool at the federal government's disposal to end these abuses.
To carry out his strategy, the President is appointing the toughest and smartest to his trade team, ensuring that Americans have the best negotiators possible. For too long, trade deals have been negotiated by, and for, members of the Washington establishment. President Trump will ensure that on his watch, trade policies will be implemented by and for the people, and will put America first.
By fighting for fair but tough trade deals, we can bring jobs back to America's shores, increase wages, and support U.S. manufacturing.36
January 20, 2017, Inaugural Speech by President Trump
In his January 20, 2017, inaugural speech, President Trump stated
Chief Justice Roberts, President Carter, President Clinton, President Bush, President Obama, fellow Americans, and people of the world: thank you.
We, the citizens of America, are now joined in a great national effort to rebuild our country and to restore its promise for all of our people.
Together, we will determine the course of America and the world for years to come.
We will face challenges. We will confront hardships. But we will get the job done.
Every four years, we gather on these steps to carry out the orderly and peaceful transfer of power, and we are grateful to President Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama for their gracious aid throughout this transition. They have been magnificent.
Today's ceremony, however, has very special meaning. Because today we are not merely transferring power from one Administration to another, or from one party to another – but we are transferring power from Washington, D.C. and giving it back to you, the American People.
For too long, a small group in our nation's Capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost.
Washington flourished – but the people did not share in its wealth.
Politicians prospered – but the jobs left, and the factories closed.
The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country.
Their victories have not been your victories; their triumphs have not been your triumphs; and while they celebrated in our nation's Capital, there was little to celebrate for struggling families all across our land.
That all changes – starting right here, and right now, because this moment is your moment: it belongs to you.
It belongs to everyone gathered here today and everyone watching all across America.
This is your day. This is your celebration.
And this, the United States of America, is your country.
What truly matters is not which party controls our government, but whether our government is controlled by the people.
January 20th 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again.
The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer.
Everyone is listening to you now.
You came by the tens of millions to become part of a historic movement the likes of which the world has never seen before.
At the center of this movement is a crucial conviction: that a nation exists to serve its citizens.
Americans want great schools for their children, safe neighborhoods for their families, and good jobs for themselves.
These are the just and reasonable demands of a righteous public.
But for too many of our citizens, a different reality exists: Mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities; rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation; an education system, flush with cash, but which leaves our young and beautiful students deprived of knowledge; and the crime and gangs and drugs that have stolen too many lives and robbed our country of so much unrealized potential.
This American carnage stops right here and stops right now.
We are one nation – and their pain is our pain. Their dreams are our dreams; and their success will be our success. We share one heart, one home, and one glorious destiny.
The oath of office I take today is an oath of allegiance to all Americans.
For many decades, we've enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry;
Subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military;
We've defended other nation's borders while refusing to defend our own;
And spent trillions of dollars overseas while America's infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay.
We've made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of our country has disappeared over the horizon.
One by one, the factories shuttered and left our shores, with not even a thought about the millions upon millions of American workers left behind.
The wealth of our middle class has been ripped from their homes and then redistributed across the entire world.
But that is the past. And now we are looking only to the future.
We assembled here today are issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power.
From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land.
From this moment on, it's going to be America First.
Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to benefit American workers and American families.
We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.
I will fight for you with every breath in my body – and I will never, ever let you down.
America will start winning again, winning like never before.
We will bring back our jobs. We will bring back our borders. We will bring back our wealth. And we will bring back our dreams.
We will build new roads, and highways, and bridges, and airports, and tunnels, and railways all across our wonderful nation.
We will get our people off of welfare and back to work – rebuilding our country with American hands and American labor.
We will follow two simple rules: Buy American and Hire American.
We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations of the world – but we do so with the understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first.
We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to follow.
We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones – and unite the civilized world against Radical Islamic Terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the Earth.
At the bedrock of our politics will be a total allegiance to the United States of America, and through our loyalty to our country, we will rediscover our loyalty to each other.
When you open your heart to patriotism, there is no room for prejudice.
The Bible tells us, "how good and pleasant it is when God's people live together in unity."
We must speak our minds openly, debate our disagreements honestly, but always pursue solidarity.
When America is united, America is totally unstoppable.
There should be no fear – we are protected, and we will always be protected.
We will be protected by the great men and women of our military and law enforcement and, most importantly, we are protected by God.
Finally, we must think big and dream even bigger.
In America, we understand that a nation is only living as long as it is striving.
We will no longer accept politicians who are all talk and no action – constantly complaining but never doing anything about it.
The time for empty talk is over.
Now arrives the hour of action.
Do not let anyone tell you it cannot be done. No challenge can match the heart and fight and spirit of America.
We will not fail. Our country will thrive and prosper again.
We stand at the birth of a new millennium, ready to unlock the mysteries of space, to free the Earth from the miseries of disease, and to harness the energies, industries and technologies of tomorrow.
A new national pride will stir our souls, lift our sights, and heal our divisions.
It is time to remember that old wisdom our soldiers will never forget: that whether we are black or brown or white, we all bleed the same red blood of patriots, we all enjoy the same glorious freedoms, and we all salute the same great American Flag.
And whether a child is born in the urban sprawl of Detroit or the windswept plains of Nebraska, they look up at the same night sky, they fill their heart with the same dreams, and they are infused with the breath of life by the same almighty Creator.
So to all Americans, in every city near and far, small and large, from mountain to mountain, and from ocean to ocean, hear these words:
You will never be ignored again.
Your voice, your hopes, and your dreams, will define our American destiny. And your courage and goodness and love will forever guide us along the way.
Together, We Will Make America Strong Again.
We Will Make America Wealthy Again.
We Will Make America Proud Again.
We Will Make America Safe Again.
And, Yes, Together, We Will Make America Great Again. Thank you, God Bless You, And God Bless America.37
Appendix B.
Selected CRS Products: Congress's Role in Determining U.S. Role
This appendix presents a list of some CRS products discussing congressional powers and activities that can bear on Congress's role in determining the U.S. role in the world. These products include the following:
Additional CRS products not listed above provide discussions of specific issues relating congressional powers and activities that can bear on Congress's role in determining the U.S. role in the world.
Appendix C.
Selected Articles: China's Role in World and Its Ideas About International Order
This appendix presents some examples of articles relating to China's emerging role in the world and its ideas about international order, with the most recent on top.
Simon Denyer, "Move Over America. China Now Presents Itself As the Model 'Blazing A New Trail' for the World," Washington Post, October 19, 2017.
Debra Killalea, "China's 30-Year Deadline to Rule the World," news.com.au, October 19, 2017.
Editorial Board, "China's President Just Laid Out a Worrying Vision for the World," Washington Post, October 18, 2017.
Philip Heijmans, "China's Plan to Buy Influence and Undermine Democracy," The Atlantic, October 18, 2017.
Thomas Kellogg, "China Is Getting Better at Undermining Global Human Rights," Foreign Policy, October 18, 2017.
Helen Clark, "China's Soft Power Turns Hard in Australia," Asia Times, October 17, 2017.
Anja Manuel, "China Is Quietly Reshaping the World," The Atlantic, October 17, 2017.
"China State Media Attacks Western Democracy Ahead of [Chinese Community Party] Congress," Reuters, October 17, 2017.
Graham T. Allison, "Behold the new Emperor of China," Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2017.
John Pomfret, "Xi Jinping's Quest to Revive Stalin's Communist Ideology," Washington Post, October 16, 2017.
"Xi Jinping Has More Clout Than Donald Trump. The World Should Be Wary," Economist, October 14, 2017.
Ian Johnson, "Xi Jinping and China's New Era of Glory," New York Times, October 13, 2017.
Sarah Cook, "Political Struggles at Home Shape Beijing's Meddling Abroad, Authoritarian Rule in China Poses a Growing Threat to Democracy Everywhere," The Diplomat, October 10, 2017.
Wang Peng, "Reshaping Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics," China Daily, October 10, 2017.
Colum Lynch and Elias Groll, "As U.S. Retreats From World Organizations, China Steps in to Fill the Void," Foreign Policy, October 6, 2017.
Nafeesa Syeed, "U.S. Intelligence Sees China's Military Expanding Bases Globally," Bloomberg, October 5, 2017.
Anne-Marie Brady, "China's Foreign Influence Offensive in the Pacific," War on the Rocks, September 29, 2017.
Jia Wenshan, "Chinese Solutions to Governance Problems," China Daily, September 12, 2017.
He Yafei, "New World Order Is the Inevitable Trend," China Daily, August 21, 2017.
Matthew P. Goodman and Jonathan E. Hillman, "Is China Winning the Scramble for Eurasia?" National Interest, August 21, 2017.
He Yafei, "The 'American Century' Has Come to Its End," Global Times, August 20, 2017.
Koh Swee Lean Collin, "America: China Doesn't Care about Your Rules-Based Order," National Interest, August 17, 2017.
John Grady, "Expert: Beijing's Belt and Road Plan is About Building a New Chinese-Led Order for the 21st Century," USNI News, August 3, 2017.
Steven Erlanger, "China Sees Opening Left by Trump in Europe, and Quietly Steps In," New York Times, July 5, 2017.
"China, B&R [Belt and Road] Countries to Take Lead in Global Economic Governance: Foreign Experts," People's Daily Online, June 26, 2017.
Andrew Browne, "Fitting Into Beijing's New World Order," Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017.
Natalie Liu, "China Expands Globally Amid Concerns Over its Mercantilist Policies," VOA News, May 25, 2017.
Jane Perlez and Keith Bradsher, "Xi Jinping Positions China at Center of New Economic Order," New York Times, May 14, 2017.
Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, "Behind China's $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order," New York Times, May 13, 2017.
"Is China Challenging the United States for Global Leadership?" Economist, April 1, 2017.
Uri Friedman, "What a World Led by China Might Look Like," The Atlantic, March 29, 2017.
Bjorn Jerden, et al., "Don't Call it the New Chinese Global Order (Yet)," Foreign Policy, March 7, 2017.
Zhao Minghao, "'Post-West' World Calls for New Structure," Global Times, February 28, 2017.
Zheping Huang, "Chinese President Xi Jinping Has Vowed to Lead the 'New World Order,'" Quartz, February 22, 2017.
Ross Terrill, "A Beijing Model? Xi Jinping's Version of Democracy," Weekly Standard, February 20, 2017.
Elizabeth C. Economy, "Beijing Is No Champion of Globalization," Council on Foreign Relations, January 22, 2017.
Robert Daly, "While the West Fiddles, China Races to Define the Future," Foreign Policy, January 20, 2017.
"Xi Calls for Reforms on Global Governance," Xinhuanet, September 28, 2016.
Liu Jie, "Commentary: Revamping Global Economic Governance in Due Course," Xinhuanet, September 1, 2016.
Simon Denyer, "The Internet Was Supposed to Foster Democracy. China Has Different Ideas," Washington Post, July 10, 2016.
Richard Fontaine and Mira Rapp-Hooper, "How China Sees World Order," National Interest, April 20, 2016.
Appendix D.
U.S. Public Opinion Regarding U.S. Role
This appendix presents additional information on recent U.S. public opinion regarding the U.S. role in the world.
Another issue for Congress—one that might be viewed as related to, or forming part of, the previous issue—is whether a change of some kind in the U.S. role, whether desirable or not, is unavoidable due to factors such as
Some observers—particularly those who advocate a more restrained U.S. role in the world—might argue that factors such as those above make a change of some kind in the U.S. role unavoidable, regardless of whether such a change is deemed desirable. Others—particularly those who advocate a continuation of the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years—might argue that factors such as those above might call for adjustments in the U.S. role, but not necessarily for a larger-scale change, and might even underscore the need for continuing the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years.
In assessing the question of whether a change of some kind in the U.S. role is unavoidable, key factors that Congress may consider include projected rates of economic growth and demographic change in both the United States and other countries, and the potential impacts of technological developments such as those relating to the internet; social media; cyber operations; digital manipulation of videos, photos, and other information (including so-called "deep fake" videos); additive manufacturing (aka 3D printing); cryptocurrencies; artificial intelligence; quantum computing; robotics; energy production and use; nanotechnology; and gene editing, to name just a few examples.61 How Are Other Countries Responding to a Possibly Changed U.S. Role?Another question for Congress concerns how other countries are responding to a possible change in the U.S. role in the world. The sections below provide some brief discussions on this question.
Authoritarian and Illiberal CountriesParticularly given the shift in the international security environment to an era of renewed great power competition, principally with China and Russia, as well as renewed ideological competition against 21st-century forms of authoritarianism and illiberal democracy in Russia, China, and other countries,62 the ways that China, Russia, and other authoritarian or illiberal governments respond to a possible change in the U.S. role in the world could have major implications for U.S. national security.
The question of how China may be responding to a possibly changed U.S. role is of particular potential significance because while certain countries, such as Russia, are viewed by some observers as wanting to erode or tear down the liberal international order, China is the only country (other than the United States) that is generally viewed as being potentially capable of acting on its own to build a successor world order.
Some observers believe that China has concluded, correctly or not, that the United States is retreating from or abandoning its role as global leader, and that China is responding to this assessment by expanding or accelerating its efforts to
Other observers perceive that some in China, viewing certain actions by the Trump Administration—including the Administration's "trade war" with China, the Administration's articulation of the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and actions aimed at countering China's growing control over the South China Sea—have concluded that the United States is seeking to contain China in a manner broadly consistent with how the United States pursued a policy of containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Still others argue that the Administration's trade actions are leading to closer relations between China and other countries (including U.S. allies in Europe) that do not support certain U.S. trade-related actions.64
RussiaSome observers believe that Russia, like China, has concluded, correctly or not, that the United States is retreating from or abandoning its role as global leader, and that Russia is responding to this assessment by continuing efforts aimed at
Although Russia, in the eyes of some of these observers, was originally hopeful about establishing better relations with the United States under the Trump Administration, these observers now perceive that Russia has largely given up on this possibility, and now sees a prospect of long-term confrontation with the United States.
While Russia is working more closely with China to reduce U.S. influence in Eurasia, observers also believe that Russia at the same time is wary of China's continued growth in wealth and power, and of how that might eventually lead to China becoming the dominant power in Eurasia, with Russia being relegated to a secondary or subordinate status.65 How that might affect Russia's response to a changed U.S. role in the world, particularly over the longer run, is not clear.66
Authoritarian and Illiberal Countries in GeneralSome observers argue that what they view as the Trump Administration's reduced or more selective emphasis on, or indifference to, defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, and on criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government, as well as President Trump's apparent affinity for, or admiration of, the leaders of authoritarian and illiberal governments, is emboldening the leaders of authoritarian and illiberal governments to take increased or accelerated actions—including actions for suppressing political opposition and dissent, and for reducing freedom of the press—that are aimed at consolidating or strengthening their authoritarian or illiberal forms of government and perhaps spreading them to other countries. Countries sometimes mentioned in connection with this point include China, Russia, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, the Philippines, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, to list some examples.
Actions by authoritarian and illiberal governments along these lines could contribute to a resurgent global challenge that some observers perceive to democracy as a form of government and to the idea that freedom, democracy, and human rights are universal values. The 2018 edition of Freedom House's annual report on freedom in the world, for example, states that
Political rights and civil liberties around the world deteriorated to their lowest point in more than a decade in 2017, extending a period characterized by emboldened autocrats, beleaguered democracies, and the United States' withdrawal from its leadership role in the global struggle for human freedom.
Democracy is in crisis. The values it embodies—particularly the right to choose leaders in free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and the rule of law—are under assault and in retreat globally….
For the 12th consecutive year, according to Freedom in the World, countries that suffered democratic setbacks outnumbered those that registered gains. States that a decade ago seemed like promising success stories—Turkey and Hungary, for example—are sliding into authoritarian rule….
The challenges within democratic states have fueled the rise of populist leaders who appeal to anti-immigrant sentiment and give short shrift to fundamental civil and political liberties….
The retreat of democracies is troubling enough. Yet at the same time, the world's leading autocracies, China and Russia, have seized the opportunity not only to step up internal repression but also to export their malign influence to other countries, which are increasingly copying their behavior and adopting their disdain for democracy. A confident Chinese president Xi Jinping recently proclaimed that China is "blazing a new trail" for developing countries to follow. It is a path that includes politicized courts, intolerance for dissent, and predetermined elections….
A long list of troubling developments around the world contributed to the global decline in 2017, but perhaps most striking was the accelerating withdrawal of the United States from its historical commitment to promoting and supporting democracy. The potent challenge from authoritarian regimes made the United States' abdication of its traditional role all the more important….
The Obama administration continued to defend democratic ideals in its foreign policy statements, but its actions often fell short, reflecting a reduced estimation of the United States' ability to influence world events and of the American public's willingness to back such efforts.
In 2017, however, the Trump administration made explicit—in both words and actions—its intention to cast off principles that have guided U.S. policy and formed the basis for American leadership over the past seven decades….
This marks a sharp break from other U.S. presidents in the postwar period, who cooperated with certain authoritarian regimes for strategic reasons but never wavered from a commitment to democracy as the best form of government and the animating force behind American foreign policy. It also reflects an inability—or unwillingness—by the United States to lead democracies in effectively confronting the growing threat from Russia and China, and from the other states that have come to emulate their authoritarian approach….
While the United States and other democratic powers grappled with domestic problems and argued about foreign policy priorities, the world's leading autocracies—Russia and China—continued to make headway. Moscow and Beijing are single-minded in their identification of democracy as a threat to their oppressive regimes, and they work relentlessly, with increasing sophistication, to undermine its institutions and cripple its principal advocates.67
Other observers argue that what they view as the Trump Administration's reduced or more selective emphasis on, or indifference to, defending and promoting human rights may be tacitly encouraging violations by other governments around the world of basic human rights—including extrajudicial killings, mass atrocities, and forced relocations—by sending a signal to those governments that they can commit such acts without having to fear repercussions from the United States.68 Still other observers, perhaps particularly supporters of the Trump Administration's foreign policy, might argue that violations of human rights predate the Trump Administration and are more of a consequence of changes in foreign governments and the international security environment. U.S. Allies and Current or Emerging Partner CountriesGiven the significant role of alliances and partner relationships in U.S. foreign policy and defense strategy, reactions by U.S. allies and current or emerging partner countries to a possible change in the U.S. role in the world could have major implications for U.S. national security. Among other things, they could affect specific U.S. foreign policy and defense initiatives that could depend on or benefit from allied or partner support. More generally, they could have implications for what are sometimes referred to as the balance-vs.-bandwagon and free-rider issues.
The balance-vs.-bandwagon issue refers to whether other countries choose to counter (i.e., balance against) potential regional hegemons, or instead become more accommodating or deferential toward (i.e., bandwagon with) those potential regional hegemons. For observers who assess that the United States has shifted to a more restrained U.S. role in the world, the situation provides a test—although not one with precisely the features they might have designed—of a question long argued by strategists, political scientists, and others involved in the debate over the merits of the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years: Would U.S. allies and partner countries respond to a more restrained U.S. role by taking stronger actions on their own to balance against potential regional hegemons in Eurasia (i.e., China and Russia), or would they instead respond by bandwagoning with those potential regional hegemons?
In discussions of the balance-vs.-bandwagon issue, supporters of continuing the U.S. role of the past 70 years tend to argue that a more restrained U.S. role in the world could encourage enough of these countries to bandwagon rather than balance that it would shift the global balance of power and regional balances of power against the United States. Those making this argument tend to believe that strong actions by the United States to balance against potential regional hegemons give other countries more confidence to do the same, encouraging what is (for these observers) a virtuous cycle in the direction of balancing against potential regional hegemons.
Supporters of a more restrained U.S. role in the world tend to argue the obverse—that a more restrained U.S. role would encourage more of these countries, out of a sense of self-preservation, to balance against rather than bandwagon with potential regional hegemons, helping to preserve global and regional balances of power that are favorable to the United States at lower cost to the United States. Those making this argument tend to believe that strong actions by the United States to balance against potential regional hegemons provide room for other countries to act as free riders under the U.S. security umbrella by reducing their own efforts to balance those potential regional hegemons, and that a more restrained U.S. role will help address a long-term challenge that some observers believe the United States has faced in reducing the free-rider effect among its allies.
Within the general issue of the status of the transatlantic alliance, the free-rider issue and how to address it has been a recurring concern for the United States in its relationship with its NATO allies, where it forms part of a longstanding issue sometimes referred to as the burden-sharing issue. Recently, the Trump Administration and its supporters have argued that President Trump's skeptical and critical views about NATO, combined with sustained pressure on NATO from the President Trump and senior Administration officials for those countries to spend more on their own defense capabilities, have had the effect of extracting stronger commitments from the NATO allies about increasing their defense spending levels. Critics of the Trump Administration agree with a goal of reducing free riding within the alliance where possible, but argue that the commitments on increased defense spending recently articulated by NATO allies do not go substantially beyond commitments those allies made prior to the start of the Trump Administration.
A number of European countries appear to have responded to a possible change in the U.S. role in the world by announcing an intention to take actions to increase their ability to act autonomously and independently from the United States. Actions that European countries might take autonomously or independent of the United States might or might not be viewed by U.S. observers as being in the U.S. interest. The member states of the European Union (EU) have announced steps to increase the EU's ability to act on security issues, and the Baltic and Nordic states (i.e., countries in Europe that are among those relatively close to Russia) have announced actions to increase their defense capabilities and work more closely with one another on defense and other security issues. European countries have also announced or taken steps to defend existing international trade arrangements and the continued implementation of the Iran nuclear agreement. Some press reports suggest that the Trump Administration's policies toward U.S. allies in Europe may have raised doubts among those allies about the reliability of the United States as an ally, and may have encouraged Germany to work more closely with Russia, at least on trade issues.70
In Asia and the Indo-Pacific, supporters of a more restrained U.S. role in the world might argue that Japan, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, and India are taking (or appear increasingly ready to take) greater actions to counter China in various parts of the Indo-Pacific region. Supporters of continuing the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years, on the other hand, might argue that the Philippines under Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte has adopted a largely nonconfrontational policy toward China regarding China's actions in the South China Sea,71 that the ASEAN countries as a group72 are split on the question of how much to confront China regarding China's actions in the South China Sea, that the question of policy toward China has been a matter of debate in Australia, and that there may be limits to how far and how fast India is willing to go in terms of increasing its efforts to counter China and cooperate with the United States, Japan, and Australia in countering China.
Japan responded to the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP negotiations by leading an effort to finalize the agreement among the 11 remaining partners in the pact—an action that may help forestall the emergence of a more China-centric trading system in the Indo-Pacific region, but which also left the United States on the outside of a major regional trade pact. Japan also supports the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific—indeed, officials in Japan (and India) articulated the Indo-Pacific concept before it was adopted as a policy initiative by the Trump Administration—and is taking a variety of actions to support the concept.73
Some observers argue that certain Latin American and African countries have concluded, correctly or not, that the United States has reduced its engagement with them, and as a consequence have become more open to Chinese overtures for expanded economic and other ties.74
Countries in GeneralObserving the reactions of various countries around the world to the Trump Administration's foreign policy, two observers stated in March 2018 that President Trump "is reshaping the way other states interact with America and with one another," and that "as Trump shakes up American policy, he is also shaking up the policies of countries around the globe." They state that:
These global responses, however, are neither as uniform nor as straightforward as one might expect. Policy responses to Trump's America First agenda can be separated into two baskets: those by countries that mostly decry Trump's rhetoric and policies as a crisis of American global leadership, and those by countries that mostly welcome those rhetoric and policies as an opportunity. Within those baskets, there are a total of nine analytically distinct—yet not mutually exclusive—approaches.75
These approaches run the gamut from resistance to appeasement to exploitation, and have varying prospects for the states pursuing them and varying implications for U.S. global interests. Some of these behaviors are relatively new; others existed prior to Trump and have simply been accentuated by his agenda. Yet all of these behaviors are shifting the relationship between the United States and the world, and all of them will affect the contours of the international environment. Both the prevalence and the effectiveness of these behaviors, in turn, will be affected by how Trump and his ever-shifting cast of advisers chart America's course during the remainder of his presidency, and by how permanent the changes Trump has already made turn out to be.
After surveying how various countries are responding, the authors conclude their discussion as follows:
Over a year into Trump's presidency, the basic patterns of the world's response are coming into sharper focus. Some countries are seeking to minimize or compensate for the effects of an America First agenda; others are seeking to make the most of them. Yet governments around the world are adjusting in some way or another, which is itself a testament to just how disruptive Trump's presidency has already been.
Some of the strategies that foreign actors are pursuing do have potential benefits for the United States, particularly insofar as they lead to greater and perhaps more equitable efforts to sustain the post-World War II international order. Yet there are inherent limits to allied efforts to pick up the geopolitical slack that the United States is creating, and America's own interests will not be as well served by those efforts as they would be by deeper U.S. engagement to shape key negotiations and outcomes. Other strategies, such as hijacking and exploiting the vacuum, are far more dangerous for the United States and the broader global order. Overall, it thus appears that the liabilities of these patterns of global adjustment significantly outweigh the benefits from a U.S. perspective. To put it more sharply, it is surely troubling that many democracies and longtime U.S. partners are scrambling to mitigate the effects of America First, while a number of revisionist or authoritarian powers look to take advantage.
Global adjustment to America First is a process, however, and one that has not reached its conclusion. Rather, in a climate of great geopolitical uncertainty, most states appear to be feeling their way and hedging their bets across a range of responses because they are unsure of which is optimal. Germany, for example, has pursued all five of the responses undertaken by states that are mostly discomfited by Trump's approach. Many other states have pursued a similarly diverse range of options as they try to discern where, precisely, Trump's America is headed.
This uncertainty leads to a further point, which is that the current instability in U.S. policy could easily shift the patterns of response we have described. Although the America First label and much of the president's rhetoric has remained relatively consistent, there have been significant debates within the administration on what it means in practice on any given policy dispute. The outcomes of those disputes, in turn, seem to be heavily dependent on the rising and declining influence of key personnel, which has itself been an especially fluid variable in this administration.… In short, if global reactions to Trump's presidency reflect global assessments of where that presidency is headed, then continued volatility in U.S. policy so far is likely to cause continued volatility in patterns of global response….
… international responses to America First will depend heavily on how lasting other countries assume that shift to be. If international observers conclude that America First is here to stay, then some approaches—hedging, exploiting the vacuum, America First as a model—will become more appealing, while others—riding out the storm, hugging and appeasing—will seem less feasible. If, however, states conclude that America First is more the aberration than the norm, they will be cautious about pursuing strategies that carry great risk should U.S. policy "snap back" in the foreseeable future. In this, as in so many areas, the effects of the Trump era will be determined by how long that era ends up lasting.76
The discussion above is only one perspective on the issue of how other countries are responding to a possible change in the U.S. role in the world. Other observers may differ regarding how to characterize the ways that certain countries are responding, or the resulting costs and benefits to the United States of those responses.77 Is a Changed U.S. Role Affecting World Order?Another issue for Congress is whether a changed U.S. role in the world is affecting world order in some way. As mentioned earlier, certain countries, such as Russia, are viewed by some observers as wanting to erode or tear down the liberal international order, while China is generally viewed as being potentially capable of acting on its own to build a successor world order. Whether caused primarily by a change in the U.S. role in the world or by one more other factors, a collapse of the liberal international order could lead to the emergence of a less ordered world or a new international order based on a different set of characteristics and values—outcomes that could have significant and potentially profound implications for U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity.
Some observers—particularly those who believe that the U.S. role is undergoing a potentially historic change—argue that the change in the U.S. role is contributing, perhaps substantially, to a weakening, erosion, or potential collapse of the liberal international order. Other observers argue that a weakening or erosion of the liberal international order is less a consequence of a changed U.S. role in the world, and more a reflection of the growth in wealth and power of China and other countries and the effect this is having on reducing U.S. dominance in world affairs.
Still other observers argue that the weakening, erosion, or potential collapse of the liberal international order has been exaggerated. They might argue that the U.S. role in the world has not changed as much as others have argued, that the institutions undergirding the order are stronger or more resilient than others have argued, that China is more interested in revising than replacing the liberal international order, that China and Europe are taking steps to buttress the trade aspects of the order, or some combination of these points.78
What Implications Might a Changed U.S. Role Have for Congress? Another issue for Congress is what implications a changed U.S. role might have for Congress, particularly regarding the preservation and use of congressional powers and prerogatives relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy, and more generally the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution vests Congress with several powers that can bear on the U.S. role in the world,79 while Article II, Section 2, states that the President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. Congress can also influence the U.S. role in the world through, among other things, its "power of the purse" (including its control over appropriations for the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and foreign assistance programs); authorizations for the use of military force; approval of trade agreements and other agreements; the Senate's power to confirm the President's nominees for certain executive branch positions (including the Secretaries and other high-ranking officials in the Departments of State and Defense, as well as U.S. ambassadors); and general oversight of executive branch operations.
While the Constitution enumerates certain specific powers for the Congress and the executive branch that bear on U.S. foreign policy, various observers over the years have argued that the Constitution in effect sets the stage for a perpetual debate regarding the relative roles of Congress and the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking. From a congressional perspective, questions in this debate in recent years have included
In a context of a potentially historic change in the U.S. role in the world, a key issue for Congress is whether the general pattern of presidential and congressional activities in foreign policy-related areas that developed over the past 70 years would continue to be appropriate in a situation of a changed U.S. role. Regarding this issue, one observer states
Like other wide congressional grants of authority to the executive branch—the power to levy "emergency" tariffs comes to mind—the vast discretion over immigration Trump has inherited was a product of a different time.
Lawmakers during the post-World War II era assumed presidents of both parties agreed on certain broad lessons of prewar history, such as the need to remain widely engaged through trade and collective security, and the importance of humanitarian values—"soft power"—in U.S. foreign policy.
They did not anticipate today's breakdown in national consensus, much less that heirs to the America Firsters who had failed to attain national power before World War II could ever attain it afterward.83
Congressional decisions on issues relating to the U.S. role in the world could include measures affecting areas such war powers, tariffs and trade negotiations, use of appropriated funds for foreign policy-related programs, and executive branch actions to keep Congress informed of about U.S. government operations in other countries.84
A related potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role would have any implications for congressional organization, capacity, and operations relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy. Congress's current organization, capacity, and pattern of operations for working on these issues evolved during a long period of general stability in the U.S. role, and may or may not be optimal for carrying out Congress's role in U.S. foreign policy given a changed U.S. role.85
How Might the Operation of Democracy in the United States Affect the U.S. Role?Another potential issue for Congress is how the operation of democracy in the United States might affect the U.S. role in the world, particularly in terms of defending and promoting democracy and criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government. During the Cold War—a period that featured an ongoing ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the relative merits of Western-style democracy and Soviet-style governance—the effective operation of U.S. democracy at the federal level and lower levels was viewed as helpful for arguing on the world stage that that Western-style democracy was superior, for encouraging other countries to adopt that model, and for inspiring people in the Soviet Union and other authoritarian countries to resist authoritarianism and seek change in the direction of more democratic forms of government. The ability of the United State to demonstrate the effectiveness of democracy as a form of government was something that in today's parlance would be termed an element of U.S. soft power.
The end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 and the start of the post-Cold War era in the early 1990s led to a diminution in the ideological debate about the relative merits of democracy versus authoritarianism as forms of government. As a possible consequence, there may have been less of a perceived need during this period for focusing on the question of whether the operation of U.S. democracy was being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other countries.86
As discussed in another CRS report, the shift in the international environment over the past few years from the post-Cold War era to a new situation featuring renewed great power competition has led to a renewed ideological debate about the relative merits of Western-style democracy versus 21st-century forms of authoritarian and illiberal government.87 Articles in China's state-controlled media, for example, sometimes criticize the operation of U.S. democracy and argue that China's form of governance is more advantageous.88 The potential issue for Congress is whether, in a period of renewed ideological competition, there is now once again a need for focusing more on the question of whether the operation of U.S. democracy was being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other countries.89 Would a Change in the U.S. Role Be Reversible?Another potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role in the world would at some point in the future be reversible, should U.S. policymakers in the future desire to return to a U.S. role in the world more like that of the past 70 years. Potential questions for Congress include the following:
Some key terms used in this report include the following:
Role in the world
The term role in the world generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the overall character, purpose, or direction of a country's participation in international affairs or the country's overall relationship to the rest of the world. A country's role in the world can be taken as a visible expression of its grand strategy (see next item). In this report, the term U.S. role in the world is often shortened for convenience to U.S. role.
Grand strategy
The term grand strategy generally refers in foreign policy discussions to a country's overall approach for securing its interests and making its way in the world, using all the national instruments at its disposal, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools (sometimes abbreviated in U.S. government parlance as DIME). A country's leaders might deem elements of a country's grand strategy to be secret, so that assessments, assumptions, or risks included in the strategy are not revealed to potential adversaries. Consequently, a country's leaders might say relatively little in public about the country's grand strategy. As mentioned above, however, a country's role in the world can be taken as a visible expression of its grand strategy. For the United States, grand strategy can be viewed as strategy at a global or interregional level, as opposed to U.S. strategies for individual regions, countries, or issues.91
International order/world order
The term international order or world order generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, norms, and practices that are intended to organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period. International orders tend to be established by major world powers, particularly in the years following wars between major powers, though they can also emerge at other times. Though often referred as if they are fully developed or firmly established situations, international orders are usually incomplete, partly aspirational, sometimes violated by their supporters, rejected (or at least not supported) by certain states and nonstate actors, and subject to various stresses and challenges.
Unipolar/bipolar/tripolar/multipolar
In foreign policy discussions, terms like unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar are sometimes used to refer to the number of top-tier world powers whose actions tend to characterize or give structure to a given historical period's international security situation. The Cold War that lasted from the late 1940s to the late 1980s or early 1990s is usually described as a bipolar situation featuring a competition between two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and their allies. The post-Cold War era, which followed the Cold War, is sometimes described as the unipolar moment, with the United States being the unipolar power, meaning the world's sole superpower.
As discussed in another CRS report,92 observers have concluded that in recent years, there has been a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new international security situation characterized by renewed great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia, leading observers to refer to the new situation as a tripolar or multipolar world. Observers who might list additional countries (or groups of countries, such as the European Union) as additional top-tier world powers, along with the United States, China, and Russia, might also use the term multipolar.
Eurasia
The term Eurasia is used in this report to refer to the entire land mass that encompasses both Europe and Asia, including its fringing islands, extending from Portugal on its western end to Japan on its eastern end, and from Russia's Arctic coast on its northern edge to India on its southern edge, and encompassing all the lands and countries in between, including those of Central Asia, Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Eurasia's fringing islands include, among others, the United Kingdom and Ireland in Europe, Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, the archipelagic countries of Southeast Asia, and Japan. There are also other definitions of Eurasia, some of which are more specialized and refer to subsets of the broad area described above.
Regional hegemon
The term regional hegemon generally refers to a country so powerful relative to the other countries in its region that it can dominate the affairs of that region and compel other countries in that region to support (or at least not oppose) the hegemon's key policy goals. The United States is generally considered to have established itself in the 19th century as the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere.
Spheres-of-influence world
The term spheres-of-influence world generally refers to a world that, in terms of its structure of international relations, is divided into multiple regions (i.e., spheres), each with its own hegemon. A spheres-of-influence world, like a multipolar world, is characterized by having multiple top-tier powers. In a spheres-of-influence world, however, at least some of those top-tier powers have achieved a status of regional hegemon, while in a multipolar world, few or none of those major world powers (other than the United States, the regional hegemon of the Western Hemisphere) have achieved a status of regional hegemon. As a result, in a spheres-of-influence world, international relations are more highly segmented on a regional basis than they are in a multipolar world.
Geopolitics
The term geopolitics is often used as a synonym for international politics or for strategy relating to international politics. More specifically, it refers to the influence of basic geographic features on international relations, and to the analysis of international relations from a perspective that places a strong emphasis on the influence of such geographic features. Basic geographic features involved in geopolitical analysis include things such as the relative sizes and locations of countries or land masses; the locations of key resources such as oil or water; geographic barriers such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges; and key transportation links such as roads, railways, and waterways.93
Hard power and soft power
In foreign policy discussions, the term hard power generally refers to coercive power, particularly military and economic power, while the term soft power generally refers to the ability to persuade or attract support, particularly through diplomacy, development assistance, support for international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of cultural elements such as music, movies, television shows, and literature.
Appendix B. Citations for Certain FootnotesThis appendix provides the citations to certain footnotes in the report. Citations for each footnote are generally listed with the most recent on top.
Citations for Footnote 7
See, for example:
Stephen Grand, "America's Foreign Policy Power Is Changing Under Trump; No Other Country Can Yet Match America in Terms of Power, But Washington No Longer Possesses the Ability to Shape World Events As It Did in the Cold War's Aftermath," National Interest, September 30, 2018.
Anne Gearan and David Nakamura, "Trump Delivers Defiant Defense of His Foreign Policy Approach to Skeptical U.N. Audience," Washington Post, September 25, 2018.
Colum Lynch, "Trump Takes Aim at Iran, China, and the Global System in Big U.N. Speech," Foreign Policy, September 25, 2018.
Vivian Salama, "At U.N., Trump Defends His Administration's Hard-Line Trade Policies; President Trump Criticized International Organizations and Alliances as Unaccountable, But Received Pushback from Other World Leaders," Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2018.
David Nakamura, "'I'm Not the President of the Globe': Trump Goes It Alone as He Faces World Leaders Amid Trade War Against China," Washington Post, September 23, 2018.
Griff Witte and Michael Birnbaum, "A Year of Trump's 'America First' Agenda Has Radically Changed the U.S. Role in the World," Washington Post, January 20, 2018.
Rebecca Kheel, "Trump Roils the Globe in First Year as Commander in Chief," The Hill, December 25, 2017.
Reuben Fischer-Baum and Julie Vitkovskaya, "How Trump is Changing America's Foreign Policy," Washington Post, updated August 10, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 8
See, for example:
John Micklethwait, Margaret Talev, and Jennifer Jacobs, "Trump Threatens to Pull U.S. Out of WTO If It Doesn't 'Shape Up,'" Bloomberg, August 30 (updated August 31), 2018.
Adam Taylor, "No President Has Used Sanctions and Tariffs Quite Like Trump," Washington Post, August 29, 2018.
Ana Swanson and Jack Ewiing, "Trump's National Security Claim for Tariffs Sets Off Crisis at W.T.O.," New York Times, August 12, 2018.
Ben White, Nancy Cook, Andrew Restuccia, and Doug Palmer, "Trump's Trade War Was Decades in the Making," Politico, July 9, 2018.
Greg Rushford, "Trump's War on the WTO," Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2018.
Zeeshan Aleem, "Trump Is Single-Handedly Trying to Blow Up International Trade," Vox, July 2, 2018.
Heather Long and Steven Mufson, "Trump Thinks He's Saving Trade. The Rest of the World Thinks He's Blowing It Up." Washington Post, June 2, 2018.
Peter Rough, "Trump's Views on Trade Aren't a Passing Fad," Foreign Policy, April 3, 2018.
"Disaster Management; The WTO Is Flawed. But the Trump Administration's Undermining of It Is Bad for the World and for America." Economist, December 9, 2017: 18.
Citations for Footnote 11
See, for example:
Uri Friedman, "Donald Trump Issues a Scathing Rejection of 'Globalism,'" Atlantic, September 25, 2018.
Dalibor Rohac, "What Donald Trump Got Right—and Wrong—About the United Nations," American Enterprise Institute, September 25, 2018.
Nahal Toosi, "Laughter, Frowns and Shrugs: Trump Speaks to the UN; President Tells World Leaders the US Would Always Put Its Interests Above Theirs, Rejecting the Rise of 'Globalism,'" Politico, September 25, 2018.
Katie Bo Williams, "A Solitary and Defiant Message to the UN In Trump's Second Speech," Defense One, September 25, 2018.
Farnaz Fassihi, "Trump to Emphasize 'Sovereignty' in U.S. Visit, Haley Says," Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018.
Anna Simons, "Yes, Mr. President—Sovereignty!" American Interest, October 10, 2017.
Rich Lowry, "Sovereignty Is Not a Dirty Word," National Review, September 22, 2017.
Max de Haldevang, "Trump Mentioned Sovereignty 21 Times in A Speech Heralding A New American Worldview," Quartz, September 19, 2017.
Greg Jaffe and Karen DeYoung, "In Trump's U.N. Speech, An Emphasis on Sovereignty Echoes His Domestic Agenda," Washington Post, September 19, 2017.
For more on the concept of sovereignty as applied to both the United States and other countries, see, for example, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, pp. I-II, 1, 4, 7, 9-10, 25, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46-52, 55.
For an alternative view, see Bruce Jones, "American Sovereignty Is Safe From the UN," Foreign Affairs, September 28, 2018.
Citations for Footnote 12
See, for example:
Robbie Gramer, "Washington Blame Game Ensues as Ambassador Posts Sit Empty; The Disappearance of the Saudi Journalist Jamal Khashoggi Spotlights a Staffing Problem," Foreign Policy, October 11, 2018.
Robbie Gramer, "Pompeo's Pledge to Lift Hiring Freeze at State Department Hits Big Snag," Foreign Policy, June 7, 2018.
Carol Morello, "More Than 200 Former Diplomats Are Alarmed at the State of American Diplomacy," Washington Post, March 28, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "The State Department Needs Rehab," Foreign Policy, March 5, 2018.
Jack Corrigan, "State Department Lost 12% of its Foreign Affairs Specialists in Trump's First 8 Months," Defense One, February 12, 2018.
Dan De Luce and Robbie Gramer, "State Department, USAID Face Drastic Budget Cut," Foreign Policy, February 12, 2018.
Carol Morello, "Foreign Aid Cuts Proposed, But 'Friends' Might Be Protected," Washington Post, February 12, 2018.
Jack Corrigan and Government Executive, "The Hollowing Out of the State Department Continues," Atlantic, February 11, 2018.
Gordon Adams and Robert Goldberg, "Rex Tillerson Is About to make a Terrible Mistake; The Knives Are Out for 'F' at the State Department. The Secretary Should Be Strengthening Rather Than Dismantling It." Foreign Policy, December 14, 2017 (the article identifies "F" a the State Department's foreign assistance planning and budgeting staff.).
Dexter Filkins, "How Rex Tillerson Wrecked the State Department," New Yorker, November 30, 2017.
Madeleine K. Albright, "The National Security Emergency We're Not Talking About," Washington Post, November 29, 2017.
Felicia Schwartz, "Tillerson Rebuts Criticism of State Department Staff Declines," Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2017.
Nicholas Burns and Ryan C. Crocker, "Dismantling the Foreign Service," New York Times, November 27, 2018.
Gardiner Harris, "Diplomats Sound the Alarm as They Are Pushed Out in Droves," New York Times, November 24, 2017.
Editorial Board, "The Trump Administration Is Making War on Diplomacy," New York Times, November 18, 2017.
Carol Morello, "State Department's Plan for Staff Cuts Causing New Worry in Congress," Washington Post, November 15, 2017.
Abigail Tracy,"'Total Bulls**t': Ex-Staffers Say Tillerson's 'Disdain' Is Killing the State Department," Vanity Fair, November 14, 2017. [The "**" was inserted by CRS. In the original article, the word is spelled out.]
Jason Zengerle," Rex Tillerson and the Unraveling of the State Department," New York Times, October 17, 2017.
Kevin Quealy, "'The Lowest-Profile State Department in 45 Years,' in 2 Charts," New York Times, August 1, 2017.
Robbie Gramer, Dan De Luce, and Colum Lynch, "How the Trump Administration Broke the State Department," Foreign Policy, July 31, 2017.
Roger Cohen, "The Desperation of Our Diplomats," New York Times, July 28, 2017.
Colum Lynch, "Tillerson to Shutter State Department War Crimes Office," Foreign Policy, July 17, 2017.
Steven Erlanger and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Once Dominant, the United States Finds Itself Isolated at G-20," New York Times, July 7, 2017.
Colum Lynch, "Trump's Budget Blueprint: Pulling Up the Diplomatic Drawbridge," Foreign Policy, March 16, 2017.
Nicholas Burns, "Trump's Cuts Would Cripple the Country's Diplomats When We Need Them Most," Washington Post, March 3, 2017.
For more on the State Department and U.S. foreign assistance programs, see, for example, CRS Report R45203, U.S. Department of State Personnel: Background and Selected Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
Citations for Footnote 19
See, for example:
Uri Friedman, "The President of the United States Asks, 'What's an Ally?'" Atlantic, October 15, 2018.
Philip Gordon and Ivo Daalder, "Trump's Biggest Gift to Putin; Qualifying and Conditioning the Notion of NATO's Defense Guarantee Is a Major Step on the Path to Abandoning It," Atlantic, July 19, 2018.
Eileen Sullivan, "Trump Questions the Core of NATO: Mutual Defense, Including Montenegro," New York Times, July 18, 2018.
Ezra Klein, "Why is Trump Undermining NATO and the EU? He Just Told Us." Vox, July 13, 2018.
Uri Friedman, "Trump vs. NATO: It's Not Just About the Money; The President's Emphasis on Spending Obscures a Much Deeper Skepticism of Alliances," Atlantic, July 12, 2018.
Ivan Krastev, "Sorry, NATO. Trump Doesn't Believe in Allies." New York Times, July 11, 2018.
Alex Ward, "Trump Blasted US Allies Within Minutes of Arriving at NATO Summit," Vox, July 11, 2018.
Paul Waldman, "Will Trump Destroy NATO and Every Other American Alliance?" Washington Post, July 9, 2018.
Krishnadev Calamur, "Trump Keeps His Friends Distant and His Enemies Closer," Atlantic, July 4, 2018.
John Hudson, Paul Sonne, Karen DeYoung, and Josh Dawsey, "U.S. Assessing Cost of Keeping Troops in Germany as Trump Battles with Europe," Washington Post, June 29, 2018.
Jay Nordlinger, "Trump, and Us, in the World," National Review, June 29, 2018.
Robbie Gramer, "Ahead of NATO Summit, U.S. President Exhorts Allies to Pay Up," Foreign Policy, June 27, 2018.
Ashley Parker, "Going It Alone: Trump Increasingly Relies on Unilateral Action to Wield Power," Washington Post, June 11, 2018.
Susan B. Glasser, "Under Trump, 'America First' Really Is Turning Out To Be America Alone," New Yorker, June 8, 2018.
Fred Kaplan, "The Free World's Landlord; Trump's Persistent Attacks on NATO Can Only Undermine America's Economy and Security," Slate, December 12, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 23
See, for example:
Ben Rhodes, "A Fatal Abandonment of American Leadership; The Disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi Drives Home the Consequences of the Trump Administration's Refusal to Champion Democratic Values Around the Globe," Atlantic, October 12, 2018.
David A. Graham, "The End of American Lip Service to Human Rights; The Administration's Reticence About the Disappearance of a Saudi Journalist Is Offensive, But It's Also Clarifying," Atlantic, October 12, 2018.
Krishnadev Calamur, "Nikki Haley's Concern for Human Rights Only Went So Far; The Outgoing U.S. Ambassador to the UN Criticized U.S. Allies Like Saudi Arabia, But Also Pulled Out of the UN Human Rights Council," Atlantic, October 9, 2018.
Thomas Carothers, "Can U.S. Democracy Policy Survive Trump?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 1, 2018.
Abby Bard, "Trump's UN Speech Hurts America and the International System; America Threatens to Let Everyone Fend for Themselves," National Interest, September 26, 2018.
David A. Andelman, "Trump Presides Over a Global Sunset to Democracy," CNN, June 18, 2018.
Joshua Keating, "Under Trump, the U.S. Is Becoming More of a Human Rights Outlaw," Slate, June 5, 2018; Robbie Gramer, "Human Rights Groups Bristling at State Department Report; What's Not in the Report Is As Important As What's In It," Foreign Policy, April 21, 2018.
Josh Rogin, "The Trump Administration Wants to Dismantle Ronald Reagan's 'Infrastructure of Democracy,'" Washington Post, March 4, 2018.
Richard Fontaine and Daniel Twining, "Defending America Means Defending Democracy," Foreign Policy, February 13, 2018.
Adrian A. Basora and Kenneth Yalowitz, "The Trump Team Is Underestimating the Power of Democracy," National Interest, January 28, 2018.
Nahal Toosi, "Leaked Memo Schooled Tillerson on Human Rights; A Tutorial from Policy Aide Brian Hook Followed the Secretary of State's Controversial Remarks About Balancing U.S. Values and Interests," Politico, December 19, 2017.
Dominic Tierney, "'Human Rights Are Largely Irrelevant to the Emerging Trump Doctrine,'" Atlantic," November 14, 2017.
Editorial Board, "Trump Loves Human Rights—When Convenient," Washington Post, November 14, 2017.
Stephen M. Walt, "Trump Isn't Sure If Democracy Is Better Than Autocracy; America's President Is Voluntarily Abdicating One of the Country's Biggest Strategic Advantages," Foreign Policy, November 13, 2017.
Sarah Wildman, "'America First' Means Human Rights Last During Trump's Visit to Asia," Vox, November 8, 2017.
Michael H. Fuchs, Shannon McKeown, and Brian Harding, "If Trump Forgets About Human Rights in Asia, the World Will Suffer," Foreign Policy, November 2, 2017.
Justin Worland, "Trump Administration Says It doesn't Want to 'Yell About' Human Rights," Time, November 2, 2017.
Joshua Keating, "Wait, Does the Trump Administration Care About Human Rights Now?" Slate, August 23, 2017.
Rukmani Bhatia, "Quietly Erasing Democracy Promotion at the U.S. State Department," Freedom House, August 8, 2017.
Josh Rogin, "State Department Considers Scrubbing Democracy Promotion from Its Mission," Washington Post, August 1, 2017.
Karen DeYoung, "Trump Takes a Selective Approach to the Promotion of Human Rights," Washington Post, April 25, 2017.
Doyle McManus, "Has the United States Abandoned Its Commitment to Human Rights?" Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2017.
Shannon N. Green, "When the U.S. Gives Up on Human Rights, Everyone Suffers," Foreign Policy, April 4, 2017.
Peter Baker, "For Trump, a Focus on U.S. Interests and a Disdain for Moralizing," New York Times, April 4, 2017.
See also:
Paul R. Pillar, "The U.S.-Canadian Relationship Must Remain Strong; The White House's Treatment of Canada Is Deeply Disturbing," National Interest, August 14, 2018.
Ashifa Kassam, "'We Don't Have a Single Friend': Canada's Saudi Spat Reveals Country is Alone; As Saudi Officials Lashed Out at Canada, the US Remained on the Sidelines, Signaling a Blatant Shift in the Relationship," Guardian, August 11, 2018.
Joshua Keating, "The Administration's Infuriating Both Sides-ing of the Canada-Saudi Arabia Dispute," Slate, August 8, 2018; Jonathan Lemire and Matthew Pennington, "AP Analysis: Trump Retreats from US Moral Leadership Stance," Associated Press, June 12, 2018.
Citations for Footnote 24
See, for example:
Colum Lynch, "In Parting Shot, Nikki Haley Shuns Human Rights Groups at U.N.; She Fashioned Herself a Human Rights Champion but Routinely Clashed with Potential Allies over the Human Rights Council," Foreign Policy, October 11, 2018.
Krishnadev Calamur, "Nikki Haley's Concern for Human Rights Only Went So Far; The Outgoing U.S. Ambassador to the UN Criticized U.S. Allies Like Saudi Arabia, But Also Pulled Out of the UN Human Rights Council," Atlantic, October 9, 2018.
For more on the United Nations Human Rights Council, including the U.S. withdrawal, see, for example:
CRS In Focus IF10861, Global Human Rights: Multilateral Bodies & U.S. Participation, by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report RL33608, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
Citations for Footnote 26
See, for example:
Emily Stewart, "Trump Says He and Kim Jong Un 'Fell in Love' over Denuclearization Letters; The President's Public Admiration of Brutal Dictators and Strongmen Continued at a Rally in West Virginia," Vox, September 30, 2018.
Marc Santora and Joanna Berendt, "Poland's Leader Finds an Ally in Trump, Even as He Brings Courts to Heel," New York Times, September 17, 20178.
Patrick Kingsley, "Hungary's Leader Was Shunned by Obama, but Has a Friend in Trump," New York Times, August 15, 2018.
Krishnadev Calamur, "Trump Keeps His Friends Distant and His Enemies Closer," Atlantic, July 4, 2018.
Edward-Isaac Dovere, "Donald Dreams of Dictators," Politico, June 15, 2018.
Philip Rucker, "'Dictator Envy': Trump's Praise of Kim Jong Un Widens His Embrace of Totalitarian Leaders," Washington Post, June 15, 2018.
Jack Crowe, "Trump Downplays Kim's Brutality, Says 'A Lot of People' Are Guilty of Atrocities," National Review, June 13, 2018.
Ishaan Tharoor, "Trump's Affinity for Dictators over Democrats," Washington Post, June 12, 2018.
William Saletan, "Trump's Favorite Animals," Slate, May 23, 2018.
Fred Hiatt, "McMaster Warned Against Officials Who 'Glamorize and Apologize' for Dictators. Hmm." Washington Post, April 8, 2018.
Krishnadev Calamur, "Nine Notorious Dictators, Nine Shout-Outs From Donald Trump," Atlantic, March 4, 2018.
Zack Beauchamp, "Trump Is Embracing a New Generation of Strongmen," Vox, February 27, 2018.
Zack Beauchamp, "A Top Adviser Says the Leaders Trump 'Most Admires' Are All Authoritarians," Vox, December 14, 2017.
Editorial Board, "President Trump's Thing for Thugs," New York Times, November 13, 2017.
Jay Nordlinger, "The American President and American Values," National Review, November 13, 2017.
Krishnadev Calamur, "Trump's Gratitude for the 'Bad Guys,'" The Atlantic, August 11, 2017.
Michael Gerson, "Trump's Embrace of Strongmen is a Very Bad Strategy," Washington Post, June 22, 2017.
Anne Applebaum, "How Trump Makes Dictators Stronger," Washington Post, May 4, 2017.
Philip Rucker, "Trump Keeps Praising International Strongmen, Alarming Human Rights Advocates," Washington Post, May 1, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 27
See, for example:
Abby Bard, "Trump's UN Speech Hurts America and the International System; America Threatens to Let Everyone Fend for Themselves," National Interest, September 26, 2018.
Michael Gerson, "Trump Is Smashing the Hopes of Oppressed People Everywhere," Washington Post, July 19, 2018.
Susan B. Glasser, "'No Way to Run a Superpower': The Trump-Putin Summit and the Death of American Foreign Policy," New Yorker, July 19 2018.
Will Inboden, "How Much Damage Did Trump Cause in Helsinki?" Foreign Policy, July 19, 2018.
Ishaan Tharoor, "Is Trump at War with the West?" Washington Post, July 18, 2018.
Rich Lowry, "Trump's Helsinki Discord; His Dismaying Comments Undercut the Country He Leads." National Review, July 17, 2018.
Zack Beauchamp, "Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and America's 'Geopolitical Suicide'; the Trump-Putin Meeting Reveals How Trump Is Killing American Power," Vox, July 16, 2018.
David Brooks, "The Murder-Suicide of the West; Trump Forcefully Caps Off Years of Deterioriation in European-American Ties," New York Times, July 16, 2018.
Abigail Tracy, "'Appalling,' 'A Mess,' 'Nothing Short of Cowardly': Washington Insiders Reel As Trump Caves to Putin in Helsinki," Vanity Fair, July 16, 2018.
Amy Zegart, "The Self-Inflicted Demise of American Power; The Effect of Trump's Foreign-Policy Doctrine Can Be Summed Up as 'Make America Weak Again,'" Atlantic, July 12, 2018.
Anne Applebaum, "Trump Hates the International Organizations That Are the Basis of U.S. Wealth, Prosperity and Military Power," Washington Post, July 2, 2018.
Jonathan S. Tobin, "Trump's G-7 Debacle: The Downside to 'America First'; Does Trump want an end to the Western alliance?" National Review, June 11, 2018.
Michael Mandelbaum, "America's Global Role in Question," American Interest, March 26, 2018.
Julie Smith, "At the Munich Security Conference, the United States Lacked Bravery and Leadership," Foreign Policy, February 20, 2018.
Fred Kaplan, "Don't Know What You've Got Til It's Gone; America's Retreat from the World Under Trump Has Shown Why We're Still the Indispensable Nation," Slate, January 19, 2018.
John R. Schindler, "The Year American Hegemony Ended," Observer, December 31, 2017.
Richard Haass, "America and the Great Abdication; Don't Mistake Donald Trump's Withdrawal from the World for Isolationism," Atlantic, December 28, 2017.
Laura Zhou and Viola Zhou, "Donald Trump's Early East Asia Summit Exit Casts Doubt Over US Ties to Asia," South China Morning Post, November 14 (updated November 15), 2017.
Adam Davidson, "How Trump Is Quietly Dismantling the Architecture of Global Governance," New Yorker, November 10, 2017.
Robert Delaney, "Donald Trump Has Ceded Global Leadership to China, Says Nixon Trip Aide," South China Morning Post, November 9, 2017.
"America's Global Influence Has Dwindled Under Donald Trump," Economist, November 9, 2017.
Fred Kaplan, "Lost in Asia; Trump's Trip Shows What Happens When a World Leader Is Set Adrift in the World with No Strategy or Goals." Slate, November 8, 2017.
Josef Joffe, "Donald Trump and the Future of U.S. Power; The President Underestimates the Unique Genius of Postwar American Grand Strategy: That by Serving Others' Interests, the United States Has Also Served Its Own." American Interest, November 3, 2017.
Eliot A. Cohen, "How Trump Is Ending the American Era," The Atlantic, October 2017.
Hal Brands, "How to Diminish a Superpower: Trump's Foreign Policy After Six Months," War on the Rocks, August 1, 2017.
Robert J. Samuelson, "Trump's Extraordinary Surrender of Power," Washington Post, July 9, 2017.
Tom Malinowski, "What America Stood For," The Atlantic, March 25, 2017.
Alissa J. Rubin, "Allies Fear Trump Is Eroding America's Moral Authority," New York Times, March 10, 2017.
Colin Kahl and Hal Brands, "Trump's Grand Strategic Train Wreck," Foreign Policy, January 31, 2017.
Richard Stengel, "The End of the American Century," The Atlantic, January 26, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 29
See, for example:
Richard Javad Heydarian, "Trump is Forcing China to Reassess its Strategy," National Interest, October 20, 2018.
Steven W. Mosher, "Trump Has China Quaking in its Boots," New York Post, October 6, 2018.
Krishnadev Calamur, "Trump Is Winning on Trade; The World Might Protest, But Ultimately Countries Have to Deal with the U.S.," Atlantic, October 1, 2018.
Damian Paletta and Erica Werner, "Trump Says USMCA Trade Deal with Mexico and Canada Proves Tough Talk and Tariffs Work," Washington Post, October 1, 2018.
Salvatore Babones, "Trump's Foreign Policy Successes Show Principled Realism in Action; Trump Has Overcome Internal Resistance and External Pressure to Deliver a Strong of Foreign Policy Successes," National Interest, September 26, 2018.
Brett D. Schaefer, "President Trump at the UN: An Unapologetic Defense of 'Principled Realism'; Donald Trump's United Nations Speech Took Stock of the Results of Eighteen Months of 'Principled Realism' in American Foreign Policy. The Record of Achievement Is Surprisingly Strong." National Interest, September 26, 2018.
Marc A. Thiessen, "Chaos or Not, Trump Is Racking Up a Record of Foreign Policy Success," Washington Post, September 18, 2018.
Randall Schweller, "Three Cheers for Trump's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2018: 133-143.
Daniel R. DePetris, "Great Expectations: Trump in Helsinki; Is This the Start of a Russian Reconciliation?" National Interest, July 16, 2018.
Harry J. Kazianis, "The Coming American-Russian Alliance Against China," American Conservative, July 16, 2018.
Washington Examiner, "Trump's Diplomatic Belligerence," Washington Examiner, July 12, 2018.
Edwin Feulner, "President Donald Trump and the New International Order," Heritage Foundation, June 15, 2018.
Conrad Black, "Trump's North Korean Policy Is Succeeding; He Has Secured Kim Jong-un's Acquiescence to the Agreed Objective." National Review, June 13, 2018.
Scott Simon, "A Perspective From A Pro-Trump Political Science Professor," NPR, June 9, 2018. (Interview with Randall Schweller.)
Raymond Tanter and Ivan Sascha Sheehan, "Trump's Foreign Policy Plans Put America First," National Interest, May 1, 2018.
Jonathan S. Tobin, "Trump Is Still the Leader of the Free World; Despite His Faults, His Realism on the Threat from Tehran Makes Him, and Not Macron or Merkel, the True Defender of the West." National Review, April 30, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "Has Trump Become a Realist? America Finally Has a President Who Grasps the Basic Logic of Offshore Balancing in the Middle East." Foreign Policy, April 17, 2018.
Christian Whiton, "China Gets Trumped," National Interest, April 5, 2018.
Bruno Macaes, "The Trump Doctrine," American Interest, March 29, 2018.
Josh Rogin, "The United States Is Finally Confronting China's Economic Aggression," Washington Post, March 25, 2018.
Carol Morello, "Head of USAID Defends Big Cuts in Foreign Aid Budget," Washington Post, March 21, 2018.
James Jay Carafano, "Inside Trump's National Security Team: Unmasking Captain Chaos," National Interest, March 7, 2018.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, "Trump Puts America Back in Asia," Daily Star, February 21, 2018.
Jeremy Hobson, "President Trump's Policies Mark 'Return To Realist Principles,' Scholar Says," WBUR, January 29, 2018. (Interview with Randall Schweller.).
Nile Gardiner, "Far from Being the Disaster His Critics Predicted, President Trump's World Strategy Is to Lead from the Front," Telegraph (UK), January 15, 2018.
Zack Beauchamp, "The Case for Trump's Foreign Policy, According to a Leading International Relations Scholar," Vox, January 11, 2018. (Reports on views of Randall Schweller.).
Andrew Exum, "What Trump Got Right in Foreign Policy in 2017," Atlantic, January 4, 2018.
Walter Russell Mead, "Trump Brings Foreign Policy Back to Earth," Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2017.
Joseph Bosco, "Trump's 'Principled Realism,'" Real Clear Defense, September 21, 2017.
See also Dmitri K. Simes, "A Trump Foreign Policy; With the Right Mix of Hard and Soft Power Coupled with Skillful Diplomacy, Trump Can Still Achieve Major Successes." National Interest, June 17, 2018.
James Jay Carafano, "The Real Meaning Behind Trump's UN Speech," National Interest, September 20, 2017.
Nile Gardiner, "At the UN, Trump Ends the Era of Leading From Behind," Heritage Foundation, September 20, 2017.
Jonathan S. Tobin, "Trumpian Rhetoric and U.S. Imperatives," National Review, September 20, 2017.
Eliott Abrams, "Trump's Successful U.N. Speech," National Review, September 19, 2017.
James Roberts and Brett Schaefer, "An Overhaul of America's Foreign Assistance Programs Is Long Overdue," Heritage Foundation, September 19, 2017.
Tom Rogan, "Trump's UN Speech Was A Grand Slam," Washington Examiner, September 19, 2017.
Stephen M. Walt, "What Trump Got Right About Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, August 28, 2017.
James Jay Carafano, "Trump and the Art of Rope-A-Dope Diplomacy," Heritage Foundation, August 14, 2017.
Paul Kengor, "Trump's Excellent Speech in Poland, on Poland, and About Poland," American Spectator, July 9, 2017.
Michael Barone, "Trump's 'Remarkable' Speech in Poland," Washington Examiner, July 6, 2017.
Robert Charles, "Trump Speech in Poland—Reagan Is Nodding," Fox News, July 6, 2017.
James P. Rubin, "Trump Is Huge in Poland. So, There's That." Politico, July 6, 2017.
Brett D. Schaefer, "Trump's Budget Grasps What Congress Doesn't: America's Global Leadership Doesn't Come Free," Heritage Foundation, May 29, 2017.
Theodore R. Bromund, "Donald Trump is Right To Cut the State Department's Budget," Heritage Foundation, March 27, 2017.
James M. Roberts, "Why Trump's Budget Proposal for the State Department Makes Sense," Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2017.
Al Mariam, "Trump's Suspicion of Foreign Aid to Africa Is Right on The Money" The Hill, March 9, 2017.
James M. Roberts, "The US Needs a New Foreign Aid Model," Heritage Foundation, March 7, 2017.
Randall L. Schweller, "A Third-Image Explanation for Why Trump Now: A Response to Robert Jervis' 'President Trump and IR [international relations] Theory," ISSF Policy Series, February 8, 2017.
Brett D. Schaefer, "Trump's Plan to Reduce UN Spending Is a Step in the Right Direction," Heritage Foundation, February 2, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 30
See, for example:
Henry R. Nau, "Return of the Balance of Power; But the Problem Is Neither Nationalism nor Globalism. In Today's World, the Two Are Complementary." National Interest, October 18, 2018.
Ted Galen Carpenter, "Where Is Trump's Alleged Isolationism? If You Look At His Actions and Not His Words, You Won't Find It." National Interest, October 9, 2018.
Dalibor Rohae, "The New NAFTA Shows Trump's Protectionism Can Be Curbed," American Enterprise Institute, October 2, 2018.
Reid Standish, "Europe Should Look to What the United States Does—Not What Trump Says," Foreign Policy, August 3, 2018.
James Kirchick, "Trump Wants to Destroy the World Order. So What? Whatever the President's Intentions, His Efforts to Rock the Foundation of International Politics Are Hopeless," Foreign Policy, July 26, 2018.
Noah Bierman, "Trump Talks Tough, But After 15 Months, He's Actually Been Risk Averse When It Comes To Military Force," Task and Purpose, April 30, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "Trump's Sound and Fury Has Signified Nothing, The President's Style Has Been Unique, But the Substance of His Foreign Policy Is Surprisingly Familiar," Foreign Policy, January 30, 2018.
Gerald F. Seib, "Trump's 'America First' Message Is a Case of Rhetoric vs. Reality—So Far," Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2018.
Christopher A. Preble, "The World Is Reacting to Trump's Words—Not His Actions," National Interest, January 10, 2018.
David Gordon and Michael O'Hanlon, "President Trump's Twitter-Fueled Foreign Policy: Not As Bad As You Might Think," USA Today, January 5, 2018.
Curt Mills, "Can America's Foreign Policy Be Restrained?" National Interest, December 12, 2017.
Jacob Heilbrunn, "Is Trump Really a Foreign-Policy Populist?; We Haven't Seen the Sharp Realignment You'd Have Expected from the Campaign." National Interest, November 30, 2017.
Uri Friedman, "What's Dangerous About Donald Trump's Foreign Policy? His Unorthodox Approach Has Frightened Some Observers. But It's His More Conventional Moves That Have Cost the Most Lives." Atlantic, November 26, 2017.
Curt Mills, "A Year on, Foreign Policy Restrainers Assess the Trump Administration," National Interest, November 7, 2017.
Brett D. Schaefer, "Trump's "Rocketman" Speech Marked a Welcome Return to Assertive U.S. Foreign Policy," Heritage Foundation, September 26, 2017.
David French, "A Donald Trump Speech, a Barack Obama Foreign Policy," National Review, September 19, 2017.
Joshua Keating, "The Blob Ate Donald Trump," Slate, August 22, 2017.
Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Beltway Foreign-Policy 'Blob' Strikes Back," American Conservative, May 26, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 31
See, for example:
Alex Ward, "Trump's China Strategy Is the Most Radical in Decades—and It's Failing," Vox, September 18, 2018.
Joel Gehrke, "Pentagon Vows to 'Confront and Compete' with China," Washington Examiner, August 7, 2018.
Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of James Monroe," Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2018.
Diego Leiva, "The Monroe Doctrine Revival," Interpreter, February 14, 2018.
Daniel P. Vajdich, "Trump Should Abide by His Own National Security Strategy," Foreign Policy, January 24, 2018.
Benjamin H. Firedman, "Trump's Conventional National Security Strategy," National Interest, January 11, 2018.
Philippe Le Corre and Erik Brattberg, "Trump's New Strategy Is America's Old Strategy: Gathering Allies," National Interest, January 7, 2018.
Don Tse and Larry Ong, "Trump's National Security Strategy a Timely Counter to China's Expansionism," Real Clear Defense, January 4, 2018.
James S. Robbins, "The National Security Strategy Will Work; It Is the Difference Between 'Leading from Behind' and Actually Leading." National Interest, December 28, 2017.
Zalmay Khalilzad, "Trump Has Unveiled a Strong National Security Strategy," National Interest, December 26, 2017.
Walter Russell Mead, "Trump's 'Blue Water' Foreign Policy; The Administration's New Security Strategy Is Reminiscent of Pax Britannica," Wall Street Journal, December 25, 2017.
Patrick Porter, "Tradition's Quiet Victories: Trumps National Security Strategy," War on the Rocks, December 22, 2017.
Niharika Tagotra, "The US National Security Strategy and Great Power Relations; The NSS Institutionalizes Trends in U.S. Engagement with Both China and India." Diplomat, December 20, 2017.
Dan Blumenthal, "Trump Sets the Tone on China: America Will Not Be Challenged," The Hill, December 19, 2017.
Andrew Browne, "Trump's New National-Security Policy: Paper Tiger or Hidden Dragon? Some Experts Say the Writing Is Already on the Wall for the U.S. in the Struggle for Dominance in Asia," Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2017.
Editorial Board, "Trump's Security Strategy Is Sound, If He Believes It," Bloomberg, December 19, 2017.
Thomas Wright, "The National Security Strategy Papers Over a Crisis; The Document Itself Is Generally Coherent. But Can the Bureaucracy Contain the President?" Atlantic, December 19, 2017.
Dov Zakheim, "Two Cheers for Trump's National Security Strategy; Its Survey of the World is Mostly Accurate, but the Discussion of Domestic Policy Falls Flat," Foreign Policy, December 19, 2017.
Anne Gearan, "National Security Strategy Plan Paints China, Russia as U.S. Competitors," Washington Post, December 18, 2017.
Mike Green, "The NSS and the China Challenge; The President and His Team Deserve Credit for Formulating a Coherent, Cohesive Approach to Battling Beijing." Foreign Policy, December 18, 2017.
Jacob Heilbrunn, "Decoding Trump's New National Security Strategy; What the Document Reveals Most Clearly is the Mental Scaffolding of the Trump Administration, Which Is to Seek American Dominance," National Interest, December 18, 2017.
James Stavridis, "Trump's National Security Strategy Is Shockingly Normal; The White House's 'Four Pillars' Could Have Emerged from a Hillary Clinton Administration," Bloomberg, December 18, 2017.
Patrick Tucker, "New National Security Strategy See s Rising Russia, Retreat on 'Democratic Peace,'" Defense One, December 18, 2017.
For alternative reactions to the NSS, see:
James Stavridis, "The Danger of Trump's National Security Plan Is In What It Doesn't Say," Time, January 11, 2018.
Ian Ona Johnson and Ionut Popescu, "The Missing Element in Trump's NSS: A Competitive National Strategy," National Interest, January 2, 2018.
Jeremy Maxie, "Trump's National Security Strategy: Long on Realism, Short on Geoeconomics," Diplomat, December 23, 2017.
Salman Ahmed, "Trump Has Set a Scary Strategic Precedent; There's a Reason Why Other Administrations Didn't Plan National Security This Way," Foreign Policy, December 21, 2017.
Richard Fontaine, "Trump Should Mind the Gaps in His National Security Strategy," War on the Rocks, December 21, 2017.
Daniel Goure, "The Trump National Security Strategy in One Word: Sovereignty," Real Clear Defense, December 21, 2017.
Susan E. Rice, "Susan Rice: When America No Longer Is a Global Force for Good," New York Times, December 20, 2017.
Daniel W. Drezner, "A Straussian National Security Strategy; There Is a Massive Disconnect Between Trump's Speech and His National Security Strategy. Why?" Washington Post, December 19, 2017.
Kori Schake, "How to Grade Trump's National Security Strategy on a Curve; Strategizing for This President Isn't Easy. But That Excuse Only Gets You So Far." Foreign Policy, December 19, 2017.
Eliot A. Cohen, "Three Ways to Read Trump's National Security Strategy; Is It Better Approached as a Sacred Text, or Examined Like the Scat of a Shaggy, Woodland Beast?" Atlantic, December 18, 2017.
Joshua Keating, "Trump National Security Strategy Isn't the Slightest Bit Worried About Threat of Climate Change," Slate, December 18, 2017.
Fred Kaplan, "Strategic Confusion; Donald Trump's New National Security Strategy Will Baffle Allies and Delight Foes," Slate, December 18, 2017.
David Frum, "A National-Security Strategy Devoid of Values," Atlantic, December 12, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 39
See, for example:
Dave Majumdar, "Trump Has Big Plans for Asia. Well, More Like the 'Indo-Pacific' Region." National Interest, April 3, 2018.
Jeff M. Smith, "Unpacking the Free and Open Indo-Pacific," War on the Rocks, March 14, 2018.
Peter Martin, Justin Sink, and Iain Marlow, "Trump Discovers 'Indo-Pacific' on Asia Tour in Boost for India," Bloomberg, November 14, 2017.
Rush Doshi, "Trump's 'Indo-Pacific Dream' Stumbles—But China Alone Won't Fill the Void," War on the Rocks, November 15, 2017.
Nikhil Sonnad, "'Indo-Pacific' Is the Trump Administration's New Name for Asia," Defense One, November 8, 2017.
Nirmal Ghosh, "Asia-Pacific? Think Indo-Pacific, Says the US, As It Pursues a Wider Asian Strategy," Straits Times, November 7, 2017.
Louis Nelson, "In Asia, Trump Keeps Talking About Indo-Pacific," Politico, November 7, 2017.
For more on the FOIP, see, for example:
White House, "President Donald J. Trump's Administration is Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," July 20, 2018, accessed August 21, 2018, at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-administration-advancing-free-open-indo-pacific/.
Department of State, "Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific," July 30, 2018, accessed August 21, 2018, at: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/07/284829.htm.
Department of State, "Briefing on The Indo-Pacific Strategy," April 2, 2018, accessed August 21, 2018, at: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280134.htm
U.S. Department of State, "Remarks on 'America's Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,'" remarks by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Indo-Pacific Business Forum, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC, July 30, 2018.
Daniel Blumenthal, "The Outlines of Trump's Asia Strategy," American Interest, November 17, 2017
"Donald Trump Still Has No Proper Asia Policy; But Asia Hands in Washington Are Not Working Against Him," Economist, September 13, 2018.
Tom Switzer, "Leadership in Asia: Don't Count the U.S. Out," Strategist (ASPI), October 19, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 41
See, for example:
Krishnadev Calamur, "Nikki Haley's Concern for Human Rights Only Went So Far; The Outgoing U.S. Ambassador to the UN Criticized U.S. Allies Like Saudi Arabia, But Also Pulled Out of the UN Human Rights Council," Atlantic, October 9, 2018.
Edwin J. Feulner, "'Moral Clarity Becomes a Casualty of the Need to Placate Tyrants,'" Heritage Foundation, July 25, 2018.
Theodore R. Bromund, "U.S. Right to Quit Human Rights Panel," Heritage Foundation, June 26, 2018.
Brett D. Schaefer, "America Is Right to Leave the UN Human Rights Council," Heritage Foundation, June 22, 2018.
Jimmy Quinn, "America's Withdrawal from the UNHRC Is a Win for Human-Rights Promotion; There's More to Be Gained at the U.N. by Sidelining Dictators Through Structural Reform Than by Abetting Their Treachery Through Acquiescence." National Review, June 21, 2018.
Brett D. Schaefer, "U.S. Withdrawal From the UN Human Rights Council Is the Right Decision," Heritage Foundation, June 21, 2018.
Brett D. Schaefer, "U.S. Makes the Right Call to Quit UN Human Rights Council," Heritage Foundation, June 19, 2018.
"Relative Moralism; Unnoticed by Donald Trump, the Government He Heads is Still Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in the World," Economist, December 9, 2017: 32, 34.
Citations for Footnote 43
See, for example:
Joe Scarborough, "Trump is Harming the Dream of America More Than Any Foreign Adversary Ever Could," Washington Post, September 10, 2018.
Victor Davis Hanson, "Peter Beinart's Amnesia; NATO's Problems, Putin's Aggression, and American Passivity Predate Trump, Who Had My Vote in 2016 — a Vote I Don't Regret." National Review, July 17, 2018.
Robert Kagan, "Things Will Not Be Okay," Washington Post, July 12, 2018.
Paul Miller, "Reassessing Obama's Legacy of Restraint," War on the Rocks, March 6, 2017.
John Vinocur, "Obama's European Legacy," Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2017.
Thomas Donnelly, "Retreat from Reliability," Weekly Standard, June 12, 2017.
Eli Lake, "Obama Choked on Russia Long Before the 2016 Election," Bloomberg, June 27, 2017.
Lawrence J. Haas, "Encouraging Putin's Recklessness, From Obama to Trump, Washington's Muddled Response to Russia's Behavior Has Left Putin Emboldened," U.S. News & World Report, June 27, 2017.
James Kirchick, "Why It's Hard to Take Democrats Seriously on Russia," Politico, July 24, 2017
Paul Miller, "Reassessing Obama's Legacy of Restraint," War on the Rocks, March 6, 2017.
For articles predating the start of the Trump Administration that make similar arguments, see, for example:
Kenneth R. Weinstein, "Brexit Has Nothing on Obama's Global Amexit," Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2016.
Fred Hyatt, "The U.S. Steps Back from the World Stage, and the Consensus for Leadership Dissolves," Washington Post, July 31, 2016.
Lee Smith, "Who Lost NATO?" Weekly Standard, August 1, 2016.
Charles Krauthammer, "The Price of Powerlessness," Washington Post, August 18, 2016.
William A. Galston, "Obama's Toothless Foreign Policy," Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2016.
John Hannah, "Russia's Middle East Offensive," Foreign Policy, September 13, 2016.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen "The United States Must Be the World's Policeman," Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2016.
Daniel Henninger, "Aleppo Is Obama's Sarajevo," Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2016.
Charles Krauthammer, "The Stillborn Legacy of Barack Obama," Washington Post, October 6, 2016.
Benjamin Runkle, "First as Tragedy, Then as Farce: The Echoes of Woodrow Wilson in Barack Obama's Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, October 19, 2016.
Frederic C. Hof, "Russia and Risk: Who is Answerable?" Atlantic Council, November 1, 2016.
Leon Wieseltier, "Aleppo's Fall Is Obama's Failure," Washington Post, December 15, 2016.
Stephen F. Hayes, "Obama's Syria Legacy Is a Betrayal of 'Who We Are,'" Weekly Standard, December 21, 2016.
Asle Toje, "A Sad Metaphor," American Interest, December 21, 2016.
Leonid Bershidsky, "The U.S. Is Now a Country That Can Be Ignored," Bloomberg, December 21, 2016.
Uri Friedman, "Obama: Reaching Out to Adversaries, Alienating Allies," Atlantic, December 31, 2016.
See also:
Victor Davis Hanson, "Was the Pre-Trump World Normal or Abnormal?" National Review, August 21, 2018.
J.J. McCullough, "Does the World Actually Want American Leadership?; Only When It Follows European Priorities." National Review, June 11, 2018.
Citations for Footnote 46
See, for example:
Stephen Tankel, "Has Trump Read His Own Counterterrorism Strategy? The President's Views Don't Seem to Line Up with Those of His Team." Foreign Policy, October 12, 2018.
Aaron Blake, "What Putin Whispers in Trump's Ear," Washington Post, September 19, 2018.
Curt Mills, "The Rise of John Bolton; John Bolton, National Security Advisor, Appears to Be Charting a Foreign Policy Course of His Own," National Interest, September 14, 2018.
Mark Landler, "Bolton Expands on His Boss's Views, Except on North Korea," New York Times, September 10, 2018.
Zack Cooper, "A Tale of Two Asia Policies," War on the Rocks, September 7, 2018.
Helene Cooper and Julian E. Barnes, "U.S. Officials Scrambled Behind the Scenes to Shield NATO Deal From Trump," New York Times, August 9, 2018.
Amanda Macia, "Trump and Defense Secretary Mattis Often Appear at Odds on Key Policies. Here's a Breakdown of Their Differences," CNBC, July 31, 2018.
Fred Kaplan, "The 'Reverse Kissinger' Theory of Trump and Putin Doesn't Hold Up," Slate, July 27, 2018.
Uri Friedman, "Secretary of a State of Confusion," Atlantic, July 26, 2018.
Robin Wright, "The Trump Administration Struggles to Defend Its Unruly Foreign Policy," New Yorker, July 26, 2018.
Nahal Toosi and Stephanie Murray, "Trump Team Tries to Show Spine on Russia," Politico, July 25, 2018.
Bryan Bender, "Pompeo, Mattis on Cleanup Duty After Trump Diplomatic Blowups," Politico, July 24, 2018.
Abigail Tracy, "'There Is a Reason We Tried to Kill This': After Helsinki, The Deep State Fears Trump Cannot Be Saved," Vanity Fair, July 19, 2018.
Amy Cheng and Humza Jilani, "Trump on Putin: The U.S. President's Views, In His Own Words; A History of Contradictory Statements from 2015 to the Present," Foreign Policy, July 18, 2018.
David Nakamura and Carol Morello, "'To What End?': Trump's Disruptive Diplomacy Inspires Fears Over U.S. Standing Abroad," Washington Post, July 17, 2018.
Missy Ryan and Carol Morello, "No One Can Explain What Trump's Russia Summit Means, Not Even the U.S. Government," Washington Post, July 17, 2018.
Ashley Parker, "'Very Much Counter to the Plan,' Trump Defies Advisers in Embrace of Putin," Washington Post, July 16, 2018.
Mark Landler and Julie Hirschfield Davis, "Trump Opens His Arms to Russia. His Administration Closes Its Fist," New York Times, July 14, 2018.
Rebecca Ballhaus and Laurence Norman, "Trump Reaffirms Commitment to NATO After Strained Emergency Meeting; President Says It Is 'Unnecessary' for the U.S. to Withdraw After Demanding That Allies Immediately Meet Military-Spending Goal," Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2018.
David M. Herszenhorn and Lili Bayer, "Trump's Whiplash NATO Summit; President Says US Can Go It Alone If Allies Don't Meet Spending Target," Politico, July 12, 2018.
David M. Herszenhorn, "Trump at NATO: From 'Sad' to 'Tremendous,'" Politico, July 11, 2018.
Philip Rucker and Ashley Parker, "Confusion and Squabbling Undermine Trump's Steps Forward on the World Stage," Washington Post, May 20, 2018.
Dion Nissenbaum, "In His Foreign Policy, Trump Values Action Over D.C.'s Caution," Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2018.
Jonah Goldberg, "Trump's Message to Syria Is a Muddled One; The Strike on Syria Was the Right Call, But the Reason Why Is More Unclear." National Review, April 18, 2018.
Greg Jaffe, John Hudson, and Philip Rucker, "Trump, A Reluctant Hawk, Has Battled His Top Aides on Russia and Lost," Washington Post, April 15, 2018.
Emily Tamkin and Robbie Gramer, "Will the Real Trump Russia Policy Please Stand Up?" Foreign Policy, April 2, 2018.
Brian Bennett, "McMaster Caught in the Middle as Mattis and Tillerson Maneuver to Constrain Trump on National Security Issues," Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2018.
Dave Majumdar, "Is McMaster Breaking with Trump's Foreign Policy Vision?" National Interest, February 26, 2018.
Andrew Exum, "The Burden of Trump's National-Security Staff," Atlantic, February 19, 2018.
Thomas Wright, "Trump Wants Little to Do With His Own Foreign Policy; The Clash Between America First and the Global Shift to Great-Power Competition," Atlantic, January 31, 2018.
Josh Lederman and Matthew Lee, "For Trump's Security Advisers, Tempering an Impetuous Boss," Associated Press, January 18, 2018.
Hal Brands, "Trump Doesn't Believe in His Own Foreign Policy. Does That Matter?" Foreign Policy, January 16, 2018.
Peter Beinart, "Trump Doesn't Seem to Buy His Own National Security Strategy; The Notion of 'Principled Realism' May Please Foreign-Policy Advisers, But It's Not Clear the President Knows What It Is." Atlantic, December 19, 2017.
Roger Cohen, "Trump's National Security Strategy Is a Farce," New York Times, December 19, 2017.
Paul Pillar, "America Alone," National Interest, December 19, 2017.
Ishaan Tharoor, "Trump's Tough Talk Can't Hide the Incoherence of His Foreign Policy," Washington Post, December 19, 2017.
Eliana Johnson, "Don't Call Trump Strategy a 'Return to Sanity,' Aide Says; Even As he Unveiled a Strategy Document Warning About Moscow's Intentions, the President Still Hailed Cooperation with Vladimir Putin," Politico, December 18, 2017.
Mark Lander and David E. Sanger, "Trump Delivers a Mixed Message on His National Security Approach," New York Times, December 18, 2017.
Kate Brannen, "Trump's National Security Strategy is Decidedly Non-Trumpian; An Exclusive Preview of the White House's Plan Highlights the Wide Gulf between What the President Says and What He Does." Atlantic, December 8, 2017.
Ishaan Tharor, "Trump's 'Principled Realism' Is an Incoherent Mess," Washington Post, September 20, 2017.
Daniel L. Davis, "Is H. R. McMaster's Worldview Compatible with the President's?" National Interest, September 28, 2017.
John Cassidy, "There Is No Trump Doctrine, Only Contradictions and Bluster," New Yorker, September 21, 2017.
Krishnadev Calamur, "'The President Speaks for Himself,'" The Atlantic, August 27, 2017.
Daniel Politi, "Did Secretary of State Rex Tillerson Just Turn on Trump?" Slate, August 27, 2017.
James Kitfield, "Trump's Generals Are Trying to Save the World. Starting With the White House." Politico, August 4, 2017.
Richard Haass, "Donald Trump and the Danger of 'Adhocracy,'" The Atlantic, July 18, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 49
See, for example:
Stephen M. Walt, "Does It Matter That Trump Is a Liar?" Foreign Policy, September 17, 2018.
Jackson Diehl, "Trump's Foreign Policy Has Devolved into Chaos," Washington Post, September 16, 2018; Max Boot, "Why Would Any Ally Trust the United States Ever Again?" Washington Post, September 5, 2018.
Andrew Restuccia, "In Abrupt Shift, Trump Makes Nice with EU, Gets Tough on Russia," Politico, July 25, 2018.
David M. Herszenhorn and Jacopo Barigazzi, "'Very Stable' Trump? European Leaders Beg to Differ," Politico, July 12, 2018.
David Frum, "Trump's Reckoning Arrives; The President's Unpredictability Once Worked to His Advantage—But Now, It Is Producing a Mounting List of Foreign Policy Failures," Atlantic, May 24, 2018.
Brent D. Griffiths, "Trump's Approach Is Hurting the U.S., Foreign Policy Experts Say," Politico, May 14, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "America Can't Be Trusted Anymore, It's Hard to Be Powerful When Nobody Believes a Word You Say," Foreign Policy, April 10, 2018.
Steven Erlanger, "Trump's Twitter Threats Put American Credibility on the Line," New York Times, January 7, 2018.
Paul D. Miller, "Trump's Nationalism Is Arbitrary, Dangerous, Incoherent, and Silly," Foreign Policy, January 3, 2018.
Susan B. Glasser, "Donald Trump's Year of Living Dangerously; It's Worse Than You Think," Politico, January/February 2018.
Robert B. Zoellick, "The Peril of Trump's Populist Foreign Policy; His Style of Deal-Making Prizes Uncertainty and Brinkmanship, Without a Plan for What Comes Next," Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2017.
Kathy Gilsinan, "What Happens When No One Believes American Threats?" The Atlantic, August 14, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 50
See, for example:
Henry R. Nau, "Return of the Balance of Power; But the Problem Is Neither Nationalism nor Globalism. In Today's World, the Two Are Complementary." National Interest, October 18, 2018.
Nahal Toosi, "Some See Christian First Bias in Trump Foreign Policy," Politico, October 4, 2018.
Harry J. Kazianis, "Trump Doctrine Just Declared at UN—and It's Called 'Maximum Pressure,'" The Hill, September 25, 2018.
Danielle Allen, "Trump's Foreign Policy Is Perfectly Coherent," Washington Post, July 23, 2018.
Alex Ward, "What We Learned from Trump's Worst Foreign Policy Week Ever," Vox, July 20, 2018.
Jonah Goldberg, "The Trump Doctrine Is Trumpism Writ Large; How 'Make America Great Again' Translates on the World Stage," National Review, July 11, 2018.
Dov S. Zakheim, "Trump's Perilous Path; To the Extent Donald Trump Has a Strategy, It Is One Grounded in Assumptions and Realities That Were Far More Relevant 150 Years Ago Than They Are Today," National Interest, June 18, 2018. (For a response, see Conrad Black, "No, Donald Trump Is Not Millard Fillmore or James Buchanan," National Interest, August 22, 2018.)
Jeffrey Goldberg, "A Senior White House Official Defines the Trump Doctrine: 'We're America, Bitch,'" Atlantic, June 11, 2018.
Jeremi Suri, "Trump's Kaiser Wilhelm Approach to Diplomacy; For the U.S. President, Like the Last German Monarch, Foreign Policy Is All About Personal Ego, Not National Interests," Foreign Policy, May 29, 2018.
David A. Graham, "Trump Almost Always Folds," Atlantic, May 23, 2018.
Fred Hiatt, "Trump Is Proving to Be the Most Predictable of Presidents," Washington Post, May 20, 2018.
Daniel Levy, "Trump Is Following, Not Leading," Foreign Policy, May 11, 2018.
Uri Friedman, "Trumpism: Speak Loudly and Carry a Big Stick," Atlantic, April 6, 2018.
Mark Landler, "On Foreign Policy, President Trump Reverts to Candidate Trump," New York Times, April 3, 2018.
William Saletan, "Trump's Perversion; He Rewards America's Enemies and Punishes Its Friends," Slate, March 11, 2018.
Joshua Zeitz, "How Trump Is Making Us Rethink American Exceptionalism," Politico, January 7, 2018.
John Bew and David Martin Jones, "Is There a Trump Doctrine?" National Interest, December 22, 2017.
Karen DeYoung, "Trump's Foreign Policy Driven by Campaign Vows, Instinct and Unconventional Thinking," Washington Post, December 10, 2017.
Peter Beinart, "Trump Insults People From Afar, Then Praises Them in Person," Atlantic, November 9, 2017.
Uri Friedman, "Donald Trump, Dealbreaker," The Atlantic, October 12, 2017.
Stephen M. Walt, "The Donald Trump-Kaiser Wilhelm Parallels Are Getting Scary," Foreign Policy, October 12, 2017.
Paul R. Pillar, "The Operational Code of President Trump," National Interest, October 10, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 52
See, for example:
John J. Mearsheimer, "The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International realities; An Excerpt from John Mearsheimer's Latest Book," National Interest, October 5, 2018.
Daniel L. Davis, "Reagan's Powerful Legacy Is Being Squandered," National Interest, September 15, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "America Needs the Muhammad Ali Doctrine," Foreign Policy, August 24, 2018.
Jacob Heilbrunn, "How America's Wars Have Created Piles of Debt (And Little Strategic Benefit)," National Interest, August 21, 2018.
Daniel L. Davis, "America Cannot Keep Hoping the Military Will Solve Everything," National Interest, August 19, 2018.
Christopher A. Preble, "Is This the End of the Liberal World Order?" National Interest, August 3, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "Why I Didn't Sign Up to Defend the International Order," Foreign Policy, August 1, 2018.
William Ruger, Michael C. Desch, "Conservatism, Realism and Foreign Policy: Kissing Cousins if Not Solutions," National Interest, July 30, 2018.
Ted Galen Carpenter, "Russia Is Not the Soviet Union," National Interest, July 28, 2018.
Doug Bandow, "The Case for Refashioning NATO," National Interest, July 10, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "The World Wants You to Think Like a Realist," Foreign Policy, May 30, 2018.
William Ruger, "To Defend America, Don't Overreach," New York Times, March 19, 2018.
Ted Galen Carpenter, "America Needs to Get Back to the Basics I Foreign Policy," National Interest, February 25, 2018.
Doug Bandow, "Europe Still Doesn't Take Its Own Defense Seriously," National Interest, February 24, 2018.
William Ruger, "Groupthink, Not the Deep State, Is the Real Culprit," National Interest, February 18, 2018.
Christopher A. Preble, "Americans Aren't Ready for Another Big War," National Interest, January 17, 2018.
Monica Duffy Toft, "Why is American Addicted to Foreign Interventions?" National Interest, December 10, 2017.
Stephen M. Walt, "Who's Afraid of a Balance of Power? The United States Is Ignoring the Most Basic Principle of International Relations, to Its Own Detriment," Foreign Policy, December 8, 2017.
Doug Bandow, "Why Isn't Europe Preparing for a War with Russia?" National Interest, December 4, 2017.
Christopher A. Preble, "Libertarianism and Restraint," National Interest, November 28, 2017.
Doug Bandow, "Endless War Is No Honor to America's Veterans," National Interest, November 19, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 56
See, for example:
James Traub, "American Can't Win Great-Power Hardball; As Other Countries Rise, Global Stability Depends on the United States Holding Onto Its Moralism." Foreign Policy, November 16, 2017.
Stephen M. Walt, "Trump Isn't Sure If Democracy Is Better Than Autocracy; America's President Is Voluntarily Abdicating One of the Country's Biggest Strategic Advantages," Foreign Policy, November 13, 2017.
Joshua Muravchik, "What Trump and Tillerson Don't Get About Democracy Promotion," Washington Post, August 4, 2017.
Nicole Bibbins Sedaca, "What Trump and Tillerson Get Wrong About Democracy Promotion," Foreign Policy, August 4, 2017.
Kate Bateman, "Wanted: A Trump Team Foreign-Policy Plan with Democratic Values," National Interest, June 5, 2017; Elliott Abrams, "Does Trump Care About Human Rights?" Politico, May 24, 2017.
Joshua Keating, "Trump and Tillerson's Shortsighted Contempt for Human Rights," Slate, May 4, 2017.
"What Rex Tillerson Gets Right About American Values—and What He Gets Wrong," Washington Post, May 4, 2017.
Heather Timmons, "The Trump Presidency is Systematically Destroying Any Global Moral High Ground the US Had Left," Quartz, March 13, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 59
For additional discussion on the costs and benefits of allies, see, for example:
Doug Bandow, "The Dangers of Creating a New Arab Alliance; Donald Trump Doesn't Like the Original NATO, So Why Does He Want a Second One?" National Interest, October 1, 2018.
Kevin Baron, "On the Campaign Trail for NATO, With Secretary General Stoltenberg," Defense One, September 14, 2018.
Courtney McBride, "NATO Chief Defends Value of Military Alliance," Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2018.
Brian Blankenship, "Control vs. Cost-Sharing: The Dilemma at the Heart of NATO," War on the Rocks, August 7, 2018.
Melanie W. Sisson, "NATO Isn't Cheap—and It's Still Worth the Price," National Interest, July 28, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "NATO Isn't What You Think It Is," Foreign Policy, July 26, 2018.
Matthew Continetti, "Why NATO Matters; The Atlantic Alliance is Crucial to American Deterrence," National Review, July 21, 2018.
Rich Lowry, "Don't Dismiss NATO's Faraway Members; Any Chink in the Alliance Undermines the Strength of the Whole Organization." National Review, July 20, 2018.
Jay Nordlinger, "Tiny, Faraway Countries and Us," National Review, July 20, 2018.
David French, "Yes, We Should Fight for Montenegro; Allied Military Hegemony Keeps the Peace." National Review, July 18, 2018.
Peter Beinart, "What's the Point of NATO, Anyway? Trump Isn't the First Republican to Ask That Question," Atlantic, July 12, 2018.
Daniel Fried, "The Meaning of the Western Alliance; It Wasn't Just Military Strength That Won the Cold War," Atlantic, July 12, 2018.
Ira Strauss, "NATO: The Greatest Bargain America Ever Got," National Interest, July 12, 2018.
Christian Whiton, "NATO Is Obsolete," National Interest, July 6, 2018; Hugh White, "Why Is America Still Defending Europe?; Washington Doesn't Have to Bear the Cost of Maintaining Forces in Europe," National Interest, July 3, 2018.
Mark Hertling, "NATO Matters, and Trump's Trashing of It Is Dangerous," CNN, July 2, 2018.
Jordan Cohen, "Alliances Are a Net Gain, Not a Loss, for America," National Interest, June 28, 2018.
Bonnie S. Glaser, "America, Hold On to Your Allies. You'll Need Them," New York Times, June 5, 2018.
Doug Bandow, "Time to Terminate Washington's Defense Welfare," National Interest, August 30, 2017.
John Glaser, "Withdrawing From Overseas Bases, Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous," Cato Institute, July 18, 2017. (Policy Analysis 816).
Doug Irving, "Are America's Overseas Security Commitments Worth It?" RAND, July 7, 2017. (This post summarizes a RAND report—Daniel Egel, et al, Estimating the Value of Overseas Security Commitments, RAND Corporation, 2016, 81 pp. [Report RR-518]).
Hugh White, "China v US: Who Needs Allies?" Interpreter, May 29, 2017.
Kori Schake, "NATO Without America?" American Interest, May 25, 2017.
Christopher A. Preble, "Should the United States Wage War for Friends?" National Interest, December 15, 2016.
Barry R. Posen, "The High Costs and Limited Benefits of America's Alliances," National Interest, August 7, 2016.
Charles Lane, "The Logic Behind Our Alliances," Washington Post, July 28, 2016.
Jim Talent, "Why Alliances Matter," National Review, July 27, 2016.
Jeremy Shapiro and Richard Sokolsky, "How America Enables Its Allies' Bad Behavior," Order from Chaos (Brookings Institution), May 4, 2016.
Walter Russell Mead, "The Global Vote of No Confidence in Pax Americana," American Interest, April 5, 2016.
Frank Hoffman, "Manning the Frontier: Allies and the Unraveling of the World Order," War on the Rocks, March 7, 2016.
Citations for Footnote 61
For additional discussion of the question of whether a change of some kind in the U.S. role in the world is unavoidable, see, for example:
Douglas Macgregor, "Donald Trump Meets the End of the Empire; Trump Knows That the American Empire is Crumbling. What Is He Going to Do About It?" National Interest, October 24, 2018.
Steve LeVine, "How AI Helps Tyrants," Axios, October 8, 2018.
Stephen Grand, "America's Foreign Policy Power Is Changing Under Trump; No Other Country Can Yet Match America in Terms of Power, But Washington No Longer Possesses the Ability to Shape World Events As It Did in the Cold War's Aftermath," National Interest, September 30, 2018.
Weizhen Tan, "China's Military and Economic Power 'Cannot Be Denied' and US 'Has to Make Room," CNBC, September 18, 2018 (reports remarks made by Robert Kaplan).
Thomas Wright, "The Return of Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable; With Neo-Authoritarianism on the Rise, the Old Assumptions Undergirding a Common Set of Western Values Just Won't Do," Atlantic, September 12, 2018.
Yuval Noah Harari, "Why Technology Favors Tyranny," Atlantic, October 2018; Stephen M. Walt, "America's Anxiety of Influence, The Power of the United States Is Declining—and That's Nothing to Worry About," Foreign Policy, August 17, 2018.
Zeynep Tufekci, "How Social Media Took Us from Tahrir Square to Donald Trump," MIT Technology Review, August 14, 2018.
Bruno Macaes, "What the West Is Becoming; Countries That Were Once under Western Influence Are Beginning to Assert Themselves, Heralding a New, Democratic—or Chaotic—World Order," National Review, August 8, 2018.
Ivan Krastev, "3 Versions of Europe Are Collapsing at the Same Time," Foreign Policy, July 10, 2018.
Gordon Adams, "A New World Is Dawning, and the US Will No Longer Lead It," The Conversation, June 26, 2018.
Ali Wyne, "Is America Choosing Decline?" New Republic, June 21, 2018.
David M. Smick, "Who Unraveled the New World Order? It Wasn't Trump. The Global Economic Consensus Began Falling Apart Years Before He Entered Politics." Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2018.
Victor Davis Hanson, "The Post-War Order Is Over; And Not Because Trump Wrecked it." National Review, May 29, 2018.
Rana Dasgupta, "The Demise of the Nation State, After Decades of Globalisation, Our Political System Has Become Obsolete—and Spasms of Resurgent Nationalism Are a Sign of Its Irreversible Decline," Guardian, April 5, 2018.
Polina Sinovets, "The Decline of Cold-War-Era Regimes Could Lead to an International Security Crisis; The Decline of International-Security Regimes Is Inveitable—In Part Because the Majority of Them Were Created During the Cold War," National Interest, February 24, 2018.
Martin Wolf, "The Long and Painful Journey to World Disorder," Financial Times, January 5, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 69
See, for example:
Hans Binnendijk, "Despite Infighting, Here's How NATO Can Persevere," Defense News, September 20, 2018.
Ishaan Tharoor, "Trump's NATO Trip Shows 'America First' Is 'America Alone,'" Washington Post, July 11, 2018.
John Vandiver, "Ex-NATO Commander: Trump's Disdain for US-Led Alliance Leads to 'New and Dangerous' Situation," Stars and Stripes, July 3, 2018; \\.
Stephen M. Walt, "The EU and NATO and Trump—Oh My!" Foreign Policy, July 2, 2018.
Josh Rogin, "Trump Is Trying to Destabilize the European Union," Washington Post, June 28, 2018.
Alex Ward, "Trump Said 'NATO Is As Bad As NAFTA.' That's Scary," Vox, June 28, 2018.
David Ignatius, "Trump Hurls a Wrecking Ball at the Transatlantic Alliance," Washington Post, June 21, 2018.
Jim Stavridis, "Trump's Attack on Allies Are Widening the Atlantic," Bloomberg, June 14, 2018.
Walter Russell Mead, "Why Trump Clashes With Europe; Sharp Differences in Style and Substance Threaten the Trans-Atlantic Alliance." Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2018.
Krishnadev Calamur, "America Alone? A Bitter End to the G7 Summit Could Have Consequences for America's Alliances." Atlantic, June 10, 2018.
David Frum, "Trump Goes to War Against the Democracies," Atlantic, June 10, 2018.
David Leonhardt, "Trump Tries to Destroy the West," New York Times, June 10, 2018.
John Harwood, "Trump Is Helping Putin with a Key Goal When He spurns US Allies," CNBC, June 8, 2018.
James Goldgeier, "Less Whole, Less Free, Less at Peace: Whither America's Strategy for a Post-Cold War Europe?" War on the Rocks, February 12, 2018.
Citations for Footnote 77
See, for example:
Stephen M. Walt, "A Playbook for Training Donald Trump; Four Strategies That Other Countries Can Use to Deal with a Suddenly Unpredictable Superpower," Foreign Policy, August 13, 2018, which identifies the four strategies as "balancing," "balking," "bonding," and "delegitimization."
See also Stewart Patrick, "The World Order Is Starting to Crack; America's Allies and Adversaries Are Adapting to Donald Trump in Ways That Can't Easily Be Reversed," Foreign Policy, July 25, 2018, which identifies three approaches that other countries have taken, referred to as "aligning with China to defend globalization," "pursuing strategic autonomy," and "filling the void."
See also:
Uri Friedman, "The World Adjusts to Donald J. Trump," Atlantic, September 29, 2018.
Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, "U.N. Brief: Trump Manages to Untie the U.N.—Against His Isolationist Vision," Foreign Policy, September 26, 2018.
Uri Friedman, "UN Secretary-General: American Power Is in Decline, the World Is 'in Pieces,'" Atlantic, September 13, 2018.
Stewart Patrick, "The World Order Is Starting to Crack; America's Allies and Adversaries Are Adapting to Donald Trump in Ways That Can't Easily Be Reversed," Foreign Policy, July 25, 2018.
Yasmeen Serhan, "U.S. Allies Are Helping Trump Undermine Global Trade," Atlantic, June 11, 2018.
Peter Schechter, "On Trade, No One Is Waiting for Washington; Trump's Protectionism Hasn't Stopped Increasing Cooperation in the Rest of the World." National Review, April 23, 2018.
Bates Gill, "US Allies Aren't Buying Its New Strategies to Confront China," Diplomat, February 5, 2018.
Stewart Patrick, "How U.S. Allies Are Adapting to 'America First,'" Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2018.
Isobel Thompson, "'Catastrophic': World Leaders Fear the Worst As Trump Goes Rogue; Foreign-Policy Relationships Are Falling Apart as the White House Dismantles the Post-War Order," Vanity Fair, January 4, 2018.
Charles Kupchan, "Why Cozying Up to Trump Works; The Rest of the World May Not Like the U.S. President's Bluster, But Playing to His Ego Is a Pretty Good Strategy," Foreign Policy, November 16, 2017.
Krishnadev Calamur, "How the Rest of the World Heard Trump's UN Speech," The Atlantic, September 20, 2017.
Colum Lynch, "Before U.N. Summit, World Tells Trump His 'America-First Fun' Must End," Foreign Policy, September 16, 2017.
Richard Wike, et al., "U.S. Image Suffers as Publics Around World Question Trump's Leadership," Pew Research Center, June 26, 2017.
Citations for Footnote 88
See, for example:
"Spotlight: The Three Dimensions of Chinese Governance," Xinhuanet, October 23, 2018.
Martin Wolf, "How the Beijing Elite Sees the World, The Charms of Democracy and Free Markets Have Withered for China's Leaders," Financial Times, May 1, 2018.
David Runciman, "China's Challenge to Democracy," Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2018.
"Western Political Elections Degraded to Taking Power Instead of Actions: Experts," People's Daily Online, April 3, 2018.
Curtis Stone, "Op-Ed: The Western Model of Democracy Is No Longer the Only Game in Town," People's Daily Online, March 20, 2018.
Zhong Sheng, "Op-ed: China's New Type of Party System Enlightens World," People's Daily Online, March 12, 2018.
Zheping Huang, "Xi Jinping Says China's Authoritarian System Can Be a Model for the World," Quartz, March 9, 2018.
"Constitutional Amendment Responds to New Era," Global Times, February 26, 2018.
Brendon Hong, "The Shutdown Drama in D.C. Was Beijing's Cup of Tea," Daily Beast, January 22, 2018.
"Government Shutdown Exposes System Flaws," China Daily, January 22, 2018; "US Divisions Threaten Leadership Role," Global Times, January 13, 2018.
Curtis Stone, "Op-Ed: Trump's Fake News Mantra Speaks to a Larger Truth About Western Media," People's Daily Online, December 11, 2017.
Thomas Barker, "The Real Source of China's Soft Power; Chinese Soft Power Is Not Measured by Blockbuster Films, But By the Appeal of Its Development Model," Diplomat, November 18, 2017.
Curtis Stone, "Op-Ed: Yep, the World Has a New Role Model for Political and Economic Development," People's Daily Online, November 2, 2017.
Li Laifang, "Enlightened Chinese Democracy Puts the West in the Shade," China Daily, October 17, 2017.
See also John Keane, "Phantom Democracy: A Puzzle at the Heart of Chinese Politics," South China Morning Post, August 25, 2018.
Citations for Footnote 90
See, for example:
Stephen Grand, "America's Foreign Policy Power Is Changing Under Trump; No Other Country Can Yet Match America in Terms of Power, But Washington No Longer Possesses the Ability to Shape World Events As It Did in the Cold War's Aftermath," National Interest, September 30, 2018.
Robert Kagan, "'America First' Has Won; The Three Pillars of the Ideology—Isolationism, Protectionism and Restricting Immigration—Were Gaining Popularity Before Donald Trump Became President and May Outlast His Tenure," New York Times, September 23, 2018.
Ankit Panda, "The Damage Is Done: Trump and the Asia-Pacific; The President's Successor Will Need to Offer a Path Forward That Addresses Our Current Self-Serving American Approach," Diplomat, September 14, 2018.
Anne Gearan, "The Next Administration Should Revive Support of Democratic Values Abroad, New Report Says," Washington Post, September 5, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "Planning for the Post-Trump Wreckage," Foreign Policy, August 30, 2018.
Stewart Patrick, "The World Order Is Starting to Crack; America's Allies and Adversaries Are Adapting to Donald Trump in Ways That Can't Easily Be Reversed," Foreign Policy, July 25, 2018.
Ronald Brownstein, "Has Trump Irreversibly Altered the GOP's Foreign Policy?" Atlantic, June 14, 2018.
Appendix C. Recent Writings on Whether U.S. Role Should Change This appendix lists recent examples of writings on the question of whether the U.S. role in the world should change, with the most recent in top. See also the citations for footnote 52 (regarding proposals for a more restrained U.S. role in the world) in Appendix B.Nathan Gardels, "The U.S.-China Trade War May Kill the WTO. And That Is a Good Thing." Washington Post, August 24, 2018.
Hal Brands, "America's Global Order Is Worth Fighting For; The Longest Period of Great-Power Peace in Modern History Is Not a 'Myth.'" Bloomberg, August 14, 2018.
Emile Simpson, "There's Nothing Wrong With the Liberal Order That Can't Be Fixed by What's Right With It; Realists Need to Get a Lot More Realistic about the Global Legal System." Foreign Policy, August 7, 2018.
Dani Rodrik, "The WTO Has Become Dysfunctional," Financial Times, August 5, 2018.
Hal Brands, "Trump Can't Split Russia From China—Yet," Bloomberg, July 31, 2018.
Bruno Macaes, "Why We Need a New Transatlantic Alliance; Trump's Crudity is Unnecessary, But He's Right That Some Rethinking Is Needed." National Review, July 13, 2018.
Zalmay Khalilzad, "A Strategic Reset for NATO," National Interest, July 10, 2018.
Jay Cost, "Where Should America Stand on the World Stage? Self-Determination and the Liberal Order of Free Trade Must Be Balanced." National Review, June 11, 2018.
Dov S. Zakheim, "Clash of the Strategists," National Interest, April 15, 2018. (Review of three books on U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy by Robert D. Kaplan, Elliott Abrams, and Harlan K. Ullman.)
Hal Brands, "The Chinese Century? Regardless of How America Responds to the Chinese Challenge, Its Policy Must Be Rooted in Reality," National Interest, February 19, 2018.
David C. Hendrickson, "Is America an Empire?" National Interest, October 17, 2017.
Thomas Donnelly and William Kristol, "An Empire for Liberty," Weekly Standard, October 2, 2017.
Christopher A. Preble, "Why Isn't There a Debate About America's Grand Strategy?" National Interest, September 16, 2017.
James Jay Carafano, "America Desperately Needs a New Grand Strategy for its Role in the World," Heritage Foundation, September 11, 2017.
Andrew Beddow, "America Cannot Become a Global Rome," National Interest, July 25, 2017.
Enea Gjoza, "America Historically Had a Restrained Foreign Policy: It's Time to Return to It," National Interest, July 25, 2017.
Walter Russell Mead, "A Debate on America's Role—25 Years Late," Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2017.
Stephen Sestanovich, "The President Is Preventing the Foreign-Policy Debate America Needs To Have," Defense One, April 13, 2017.
Hal Brands, "U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress America and Its Alternatives," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2017, 73-93.
Stephen M. Walt, "The Donald versus 'The Blob,'" ISSF Policy Series, February 14, 2017.
David H. Petraeus, "America Must Stand Tall," Politico, February 7, 2016.
Robert Kagan, "Backing Into World War III," Foreign Policy, February 6, 2017.
Eliot Cohen, "5 Bad Reasons for Pulling Back From the World," Politico, January 24, 2017.
Richard Fontaine and Mira Rapp-Hooper, "If America Refuses to Lead," Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2017.
Eliot Cohen, "Should the U.S. Still Carry A 'Big Stick,'" Los Angeles Times, January 18, 2017.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Fear China Most, 'Flip' Russia, Beware Iran: CSBA," Breaking Defense, January 18, 2017.
Frank Hoffman, "The Case for Strategic Discipline During the Next Presidency," War on the Rocks, January 10, 2017.
Ali Wyne, "Did the United States Really Win the Cold War?" National Interest, January 8, 2017.
Robert D. Kaplan, "Why Trump Can't Disengage America From the World," New York Times, January 6, 2017.
Mina Pollmann, "Naval Strategy: Restraint Rather Than Hegemon," Maritime Executive, January 5, 2017. (Interview with Barry Posen)
Hal Brands, et al., Critical Assumptions and American Grand Strategy, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017, 57 pp.
Appendix D. Recent Writings on How Other Countries Are RespondingThis appendix lists recent examples of writings on the question of how other countries are responding to a possible change in the U.S. role in the world, with the most recent on top.
China, Russia, and Authoritarian and Illiberal Countries in General
China
Jane Perlez, "Japan and China, Asian Rivals, Are Trying to Get Along," New York Times, October 24, 2018.
Anna Fifield and Simon Denyer, "Japan's Prime Minister, a Trump Buddy, Now Tries to Cozy Up to China's President," Washington Post, October 22, 2018.
Hu Weijia, "Bilateral FTAs Can Be Beijing's Opportunity in New Era of Multipolar Trade World," Global Times, October 18, 2018.
"In a Divided U.N., China Blazes Quiet Path to Power," Japan Times, October 7, 2018.
Erik Khzmalyan and Armen Sahakyan, "Russia and China Aren't Full Allies—Yet; And Here's What Washington Can Do to Keep It That Way," National Interest, October 4, 2018.
John S. Van Oudenaren, "America's Iran Policy is Helping China Advance Its Vision of a Multipolar World; Beijing Is Using Washington's Maximalist Approach to Tehran as a Transatlantic Wedge," National Interest, October 1, 2018.
Yadong Liu, "How Trump's Policies Are Helping China; Beijing Still Can't Believe Its Luck," Foreign Affairs, September 28, 2018.
Josh Chin, "Trump's 'Meddling' Claim Plays Into China's Trade Narrative; By Alleging Without Proof That Beijing Is Interfering in the U.S. Midterms, the President Helped Bolster the Argument That His Real Aim Is to Stop China's Ascent as a Global Power," Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2018.
Anna Fifield, "China Thinks the Trade War Isn't Really About Trade," Washington Post, September 24, 2018.
Richard Gowan, "China Fills a Trump-Sized Vacuum at the U.N.," Politico, September 24, 2018.
Jane Perlez, "China Is Confronting New U.S. Hostility. But Is It Ready for the Fight?" New York Times, September 23, 2018.
Abigail Grace, "China and America May Be Forging a New Economic Order; It's Not a Cold War. But the Dispute Between the World's Largest Economies is Taking the World into Unknown Territory," Atlantic, September 20, 2018.
Elena Holodny, "Russia, China Embrace Uneasily, Aim for 'Desirable World Order,'" NBC News, September 20, 2018.
Gerry Shih, "In Trump's Trade Wars, China's Unexpected Win: More Friends," Washington Post, September 14, 2018.
Robert Sutter, "When Will Closer China-Russia Cooperation Impact US Policy Debate? Washington is Debating Russia and China Policy Separately. It Needs to Consider the Emerging Russia-China Axis." Diplomat, September 14, 2018.
Peter Landers, "Japan and China Find Common Ground in Trump's Tariffs as Leaders Meet," Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2018.
Anton Troianovski, Anna Fifield, and Paul Sonne, "War Games and Business Deals: Russia, China Sends a Signal to Washington, Washington Post, September 11, 2018.
John Van Oudenaren, "Why China Is Wooing Eastern and Central Europe," National Interest, September 4, 2018.
Peter Apps, "Commentary: Why China and Russia Are Obsessed with Vast New War Games," Reuters, August 29, 2018.
Owen Daniels, "How China Is Trying to Dominate the Middle East," National Interest, August 28, 2018.
Catherine Wong, "China Aims for 'Sustainable' Debt with Africa as Belt and Road Initiative Comes Under Fire from West," South China Morning Post, August 28, 2018.
Marc Champion, "What Does a Chinese Superpower Look Like? Nothing Like the U.S.," Bloomberg, August 27, 2018.
John Pomfret, "China's Debt Traps Around the World Are a Trademark of Its Imperialist Ambitions," Washington Post, August 27, 2018.
Mark Beeson, "China Rises, America Falters, and Geoeconomics Rears Its Head," War on the Rocks, August 23, 2018.
Wang Peng, "Opinion: China's Countermeasures to US Indo-Pacific Strategy," China Military Online, August 23, 2018.
Xie Tao, "How China Is Polarized by America," Diplomat, August 22, 2018.
Thorsten Benner, et al, "How to Fight China's Sharp Power," ChinaFile, August 20, 2018.
Eric X. Li, "The Rise and Fall of Soft Power, Nye's Concept Lost Relevance, But China Could Bring It Back," Foreign Policy, August 20, 2018.
Matthew Carney, "China and Russia Strengthening Relationship in Bid to Thwart US Dominance," ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation), August 19, 2018.
Bloomberg News, "China, Unsure of How to Handle Trump, Braces for 'New Cold War,'" Bloomberg, August 17, 2018.
Amanda Erickson, "China Has a New Message for the U.S.: Don't Be Alarmed, We're Not That Great," Washington Post, August 16, 2018.
Keith Bradsher and Steven Lee Myers, "Trump's Trade War Is Rattling China's Leaders," New York Times, August 14, 2018.
Jamil Anderlini, "China-Russia: A Dangerous Liaison," Financial Times, August 10, 2018.
Abigail Grace, "China Doesn't Want to Play by the World's Rules," Foreign Policy, August 8, 2018.
Joel Wuthnow, "PacNet #55—Why China Discounts the Indo-Pacific Quad," Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 7, 2018.
Daniel Kliman and Abigail C. Grace, "China Dreams of America Alone; Washington's Poor Treatment of Its Allies Isn't Helping Either," National Interest, August 6, 2018.
Timothy R. Heath, "China Prepares for an International Order After U.S. Leadership," Lawfare, August 1, 2018.
Nathan Gardels, "China Is Laying the Groundwork for a Post-American World Order," Washington Post, July 27, 2018.
Mark Leonard, "The Chinese Are Wary of Trump's Creative Destruction," Financial Times, July 25, 2018.
Huong Le Thu, "Has China Got Everyone Wrong? Beijing Is Wrong to Think Other Countries Will Roll Over When Confronted," National Interest, July 24, 2018.
Editorial Board, ANU, "China's Reform Momentum and Global Security," East Asia Forum, July 23, 2018.
Jonathan Hillman, "A Chinese World Order," Washington Post, July 23, 2018.
Elizabeth Economy, "Xi Jinping's Superpower Plans," Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2018.
Steven Erlanger and Jane Perlez, "Europe and Asia Move to Bolster Global Systems That Trump Has Attacked," New York Times, July 18, 2018.
Kevin Rudd, "Hi Jinping's Vision for Global Governance," Project Syndicate, July 11, 2018.
Nicholas Grossman, "As America Forfeits International Influence, China Takes Advantage; President Trump's Protectionist Foreign Policy Has Created Global Openings That Beijing Is Only Too Happy to Exploit." National Review, July 10, 2018.
"Xhi's World Order: July 2024; As America Defies and Dismantles the International Rules-Based Order, a Report from the Future Imagines What Might Replace It," Economist, July 7, 2018.
Richard Javad Heydarian, "China Is Making a Bid for Global Primacy," National Interest, July 1, 2018.
Barbara Demick and Ttracy Wilkinson, "Under Trump, America's Influence in the Western Pacific May Be on the Decline," Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2018.
Reuters Staff, "Xi Says China Must Lead Way in Reform of Global Governance," Reuters, June 23, 2018.
Kerry Brown, "China's Exceptionalism Rewrites the Western Political Playbook," Economist, June 13, 2018.
Hal Brands, "China's Master Plan: A Global Military Threat," Bloomberg, June 10, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "Bullies Don't Win at Diplomacy," Foreign Policy, June 7, 2018.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, "Is China Changing the Postwar Consensus or Enhancing It?" National Interest, May 14, 2018.
Andrew Polk, "China Is Quietly Setting Global Standards," Bloomberg, May 6, 2018.
Grant Newsham, "China-US Trade: A Long-Term Battle of System Versus System," Asia Times, May 5, 2018.
Chen Guangcheng, "Chinese Dissident: Trump, Don't Trade Away Democratic Values," Washington Post, May 3, 2018.
Martin Wolf, "How the Beijing Elite Sees the World, The Charms of Democracy and Free Markets Have Withered for China's Leaders," May 1, 2018.
Evan A. Feigenbaum, "Reluctant Stakeholder: Why China's Highly Strategic Brand of Revisionism is More Challenging than Washington Thinks," Macro Polo, April 27, 2018.
Jamie Tarabay, "China's Xi Has A Single-Mindedness Trump Can Only Dream Of," CNN, April 14, 2018.
Marcel Plichta, "China Is Filling the Africa-Sized Gap in US Strategy," Defense One, March 28, 2018.
Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "Living in Trump's World: The Global Reaction to 'America First,'" War on the Rocks, March 27, 2018.
Colum Lynch, "At the U.N., China and Russia Score Win in War on Human Rights," Foreign Policy, March 26, 2018.
Helena Legarda, "China Upgrades Diplomacy While the US Pulls Back," Diplomat, March 20, 2018.
Robert E. McCoy, "Beijing Testing the Fault Lines of US Support for Allies Across Asia," Asia Times, March 14, 2018.
Motoko Rich, "Trump's Unpredictability on Trade and North Korea Opens a Door for China," New York Times, March 10, 2018.
Max Fisher and Audrey Carlsen, "How China Is Challenging American Dominance in Asia," New York Times, March 9, 2018.
Gerry Shih and Christopher Bodeen, "China Eyes Greater Global Leadership Role, Downplays Fears," Associated Press, March 8, 2018.
Benjamin Carolson, "China Loves trump; The People Love a Winner. The Leadership Loves a Dupe." Atlantic, March 2018.
Jane Perlez, "Xi Jinping Extends Power, and China Braces for a New Cold War," New York Times, February 27, 2018.
Nadege Rolland, "Beijing's Vision for a Reshaped International Order," China Brief, February 26, 2018.
Tom Phillips, "While Trump Eyes Latin America with Malign Neglect, China Sees Opportunity," Guardian, February 9, 2018.
Bloomberg News, "As U.S. Culls Diplomats, China Is Empowering Its Ambassadors," Bloomberg, February 7, 2018.
Andreas Boje Forsby, "Trump, Xi, and the Eclipse of the Liberal World Order; As the United States Abdicates, an Illiberal China Steps onto the World Stage," DIIS (Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier), February 6, 2018.
David Pilling, "US Abdication in Africa Hands Political Opportunities to China," Financial Times, February 7, 2018.
Tobin Harshaw and Daniel Moss, "What Happens When China Eclipses the U.S. in Asia; A Q&A with Hugh White, a Former Top Australian Official Who Feels Beijing Has Already Filled the U.S. Leadership Void," Bloomberg, February 3, 2018.
Andrew Browne, "China Builds Bridges and Highways While the U.S. Mouths Slogans; The Marshall Plan Birthed a U.S.-Led Global Order—Now China is Building a New World," Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2018.
Keith Bradsher, "At Davos, the Real Star May Have Been China, Not Trump," New York Times, January 28, 2018.
Peter Baker, "Souring World Views of Trump Open Doors for China and Russia," New York Times, January 18, 2018.
Ishaan Tharoor, "China's Inexorable Rise Is Helped by Trump's Retreat," Washington Post, January 11, 2018.
Evan Osnos, "Making China Great Again; As Donald Trtump Surrenders America's Global Commitments, Xi Jinping Is Learning to Pick Up the Pieces," New Yorker, January 8, 2018.
Antonio C. Hsiang, "As America Withdraws From Latin America, China Steps In," Diplomat, January 4, 2018.
David Frum, "Trump's Bellicosity Is Ceding America's Influence to China," Atlantic, January 3, 2018.
Emily Rauhala and Andrew Roth, "China Left Wondering What 'America First' Foreign Policy Actually Means," Washington Post, December 19, 2017.
Andreas B. Forsby, "With the Liberal West in Decline, Will China Be Given Free Rein?" Diplomat, December 14, 2017.
Margaret Myers, "China's 'Period of Strategic Opportunity' in Mexico," National Interest, December 7, 2017.
Todd Royal, "How China and Russia are Teaming up to Degrade U.S. Influence in South America," National Interest, December 4, 2017.
Jeremy Lin, "Is Trump's Asia Tour Start of US Self-Containment?" Global Times, November 20, 2017.
Kirsty Needham, "'Xi and His Era': China Adopts a Triumphant Tone as US World Leadership Falters," Sydney Morning Herald, November 18 (updated November 22), 2017.
Amitai Etzioni, "China—A Reluctant Global Power; Trump Has Created a Global Power Vacuum. Is Beijing Ready to Fill It?" Diplomat, November 16, 2017.
Motoko Rich and Jane Perlez, "Seeing U.S. Retreat Under Trump, Japan and China Move to Mend Ties," New York Times, November 16, 2017.
Zachary Karabell, "China's Rise Did Have to Mean America's Fall. Then Came Trump." Washington Post, November 15, 2017.
Andrew Browne, "China of the U.S? Asian Nations' Answer: Neither," Wall Street Journal, Novermber 14, 2017.
Richard Heydarian, "Trump Humbled in China as Beijing Visit Underlines the New World Order in Asia," South China Morning Post, November 13, 2017.
Susan E. Rice, "Susan Rice: Trump Is Making China Great Again," New York Times, November 13, 2017.
Jane Perlez and Mark Landler, "Wooing Trump, Xi Jinping Seeks Great Power Status for China," New York Times, November 6, 2017.
Ben Westcott, "Why China Won 2017 and How Donald Trump Helped Them Do It," CNN, November 3, 2017.
Wing Thye Woo, "China's Struggle with the 'New Domestic Normal' and the 'New International Normal,'" East Asia Forum, October 30, 2017.
Simon Denyer, "Move Over America. China Now Presents Itself As the Model 'Blazing A New Trail' for the World," Washington Post, October 19, 2017.
Debra Killalea, "China's 30-Year Deadline to Rule the World," news.com.au, October 19, 2017.
Editorial Board, "China's President Just Laid Out a Worrying Vision for the World," Washington Post, October 18, 2017.
Philip Heijmans, "China's Plan to Buy Influence and Undermine Democracy," Atlantic, October 18, 2017.
Thomas Kellogg, "China Is Getting Better at Undermining Global Human Rights," Foreign Policy, October 18, 2017.
Helen Clark, "China's Soft Power Turns Hard in Australia," Asia Times, October 17, 2017.
Anja Manuel, "China Is Quietly Reshaping the World," Atlantic, October 17, 2017.
"China State Media Attacks Western Democracy Ahead of [Chinese Community Party] Congress," Reuters, October 17, 2017.
Graham T. Allison, "Behold the New Emperor of China," Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2017.
John Pomfret, "Xi Jinping's Quest to Revive Stalin's Communist Ideology," Washington Post, October 16, 2017.
"Xi Jinping Has More Clout Than Donald Trump. The World Should Be Wary," Economist, October 14, 2017.
Ian Johnson, "Xi Jinping and China's New Era of Glory," New York Times, October 13, 2017.
Sarah Cook, "Political Struggles at Home Shape Beijing's Meddling Abroad, Authoritarian Rule in China Poses a Growing Threat to Democracy Everywhere," Diplomat, October 10, 2017.
Wang Peng, "Reshaping Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics," China Daily, October 10, 2017.
Colum Lynch and Elias Groll, "As U.S. Retreats From World Organizations, China Steps in to Fill the Void," Foreign Policy, October 6, 2017.
Nafeesa Syeed, "U.S. Intelligence Sees China's Military Expanding Bases Globally," Bloomberg, October 5, 2017.
Anne-Marie Brady, "China's Foreign Influence Offensive in the Pacific," War on the Rocks, September 29, 2017.
Jia Wenshan, "Chinese Solutions to Governance Problems," China Daily, September 12, 2017.
He Yafei, "New World Order Is the Inevitable Trend," China Daily, August 21, 2017.
Matthew P. Goodman and Jonathan E. Hillman, "Is China Winning the Scramble for Eurasia?" National Interest, August 21, 2017.
He Yafei, "The 'American Century' Has Come to Its End," Global Times, August 20, 2017.
Koh Swee Lean Collin, "America: China Doesn't Care about Your Rules-Based Order," National Interest, August 17, 2017.
John Grady, "Expert: Beijing's Belt and Road Plan is About Building a New Chinese-Led Order for the 21st Century," USNI News, August 3, 2017.
Steven Erlanger, "China Sees Opening Left by Trump in Europe, and Quietly Steps In," New York Times, July 5, 2017.
"China, B&R [Belt and Road] Countries to Take Lead in Global Economic Governance: Foreign Experts," People's Daily Online, June 26, 2017.
Andrew Browne, "Fitting Into Beijing's New World Order," Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017.
Natalie Liu, "China Expands Globally Amid Concerns Over its Mercantilist Policies," VOA News, May 25, 2017.
Jane Perlez and Keith Bradsher, "Xi Jinping Positions China at Center of New Economic Order," New York Times, May 14, 2017.
Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, "Behind China's $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order," New York Times, May 13, 2017.
"Is China Challenging the United States for Global Leadership?" Economist, April 1, 2017.
Uri Friedman, "What a World Led by China Might Look Like," Atlantic, March 29, 2017.
Bjorn Jerden, et al., "Don't Call it the New Chinese Global Order (Yet)," Foreign Policy, March 7, 2017.
Zhao Minghao, "'Post-West' World Calls for New Structure," Global Times, February 28, 2017.
Zheping Huang, "Chinese President Xi Jinping Has Vowed to Lead the 'New World Order,'" Quartz, February 22, 2017.
Ross Terrill, "A Beijing Model? Xi Jinping's Version of Democracy," Weekly Standard, February 20, 2017.
Elizabeth C. Economy, "Beijing Is No Champion of Globalization," Council on Foreign Relations, January 22, 2017.
Robert Daly, "While the West Fiddles, China Races to Define the Future," Foreign Policy, January 20, 2017.
Russia
James J. Coyle, "Russian Influence Growing at American Expense," The Hill, October 9, 2018.
Erik Khzmalyan and Armen Sahakyan, "Russia and China Aren't Full Allies—Yet; And Here's What Washington Can Do to Keep It That Way," National Interest, October 4, 2018.
Elena Holodny, "Russia, China Embrace Uneasily, Aim for 'Desirable World Order,'" NBC News, September 20, 2018.
Zi Yang, "Vostok 2018: Russia and China's Diverging Common Interests," Diplomat, September 17, 2018.
Michael Hirsh, "How Putin's Syrian War Is Humbling Trump," Foreign Policy, September 19, 2018.
Robert Sutter, "When Will Closer China-Russia Cooperation Impact US Policy Debate? Washington is Debating Russia and China Policy Separately. It Needs to Consider the Emerging Russia-China Axis." Diplomat, September 14, 2018.
Anton Troianovski, Anna Fifield, and Paul Sonne, "War Games and Business Deals: Russia, China Sends a Signal to Washington," Washington Post, September 11, 2018.
Peter Apps, "Commentary: Why China and Russia Are Obsessed with Vast New War Games," Reuters, August 29, 2018; Matthew Bodner, "Russia, the Victim? Opposite NATO's Eastern Flank, It's an Expansionist West Causing Anxiety," Defense News, August 27, 2018.
Matthew Carney, "China and Russia Strengthening Relationship in Bid to Thwart US Dominance," ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation), August 19, 2018.
Kevin Ryan, "Trump Is Your Yeltsin, This Brief Analogy Speaks Volumes About How Russian Security Elites View the Trump Presidency," National Interest, August 19, 2018.
David Ignatius, "The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Disengagement in the Middle East," Washington Post, August 14, 2018.
Evelyn N. Farkas and James M. Ludes, "We Regret to Inform You That Russia Is (Probably) At It Again," Atlantic, August 16, 2018; Chuck Freilich, "In the Middle East the Russians Aren't Coming: They Are Back," National Interest, August 13, 2018.
Jamil Anderlini, "China-Russia: A Dangerous Liaison," Financial Times, August 10, 2018.
Harry J. Kazianis, "The Coming American-Russian Alliance Against Russia," American Conservative, July 16, 2018.
Anton Troianovski, "Putin's View Triumphs in Helsinki as Trump Questions U.S. Intelligence," Washington Post, July 16, 2018.
Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "Living in Trump's World: The Global Reaction to 'America First,'" War on the Rocks, March 27, 2018.
Colum Lynch, "At the U.N., China and Russia Score Win in War on Human Rights," Foreign Policy, March 26, 2018.
Peter Baker, "Souring World Views of Trump Open Doors for China and Russia," New York Times, January 18, 2018.
David D. Kirkpatrick, "In Snub to U.S., Russia and Egypt Move Toward Deal on Air Bases," New York Times, November 30, 2017.
Authoritarian and Illiberal Countries in General
Jackson Diehl, "Trump Understands Something That the World's Other Power-Hungry Leaders Don't," Washington Post, August 19, 2018.
Jen Kirby, "Top UN Human Rights Official Rebukes Trump's Press Attacks as 'Close to Incitement of Violence,'" Vox, August 13, 2018.
Rick Gladstone, "China and Russia Move to Cut Human Rights Jobs in U.N. Peacekeeping," New York Times, June 27, 2018.
Colum Lynch, "Russia and China See in Trump Era a Chance to Roll Back Human Rights Promotion at U.N.," Foreign Policy, June 26, 2018.
Ishaan Tharoor, "Washington Wakes Up to 'Authoritarian' Populism in the U.S. and Europe," Washington Post, May 10, 2018. (The article discusses reports entitled "Drivers of Authoritarian Populism in the United States: A Primer," and "Europe's Populist Challenge: Origins, Supporters, and Responses," released jointly by the American Enterprise Institute and the Center for American Progress.)
Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "Living in Trump's World: The Global Reaction to 'America First,'" War on the Rocks, March 27, 2018.
Henri J. Barkey, "Springtime for Autocrats," American Interest, March 19, 2018.
Stein Ringen, "Who in the World Will Defend Democracy?" Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2018.
Robin Wright, "The Rise of the World's New Emperors—With America's Help," New Yorker, February 27, 2018.
Steven Lee Myers, "With Xi's Power Grab, China Joins New Era of Strongmen," New York Times, February 26, 2018.
Vikram J. Singh and Danielle Pletka, "It's Time for the World's Democracies to Stand Up for What They Believe In," Washington Post, February 20, 2018.
Alan Dupont, "New World Order: Momentum Is Shifting in Favour of Dictators," Australian, February 10, 2018.
Ishaan Tharoor, "Trump Is Spreading the Global Erosion of Democracy, Watchdog Says," Washington Post, January 18, 2018.
Michael J. Abramowitz, Freedom in the World 2018, Democracy in Crisis, Freedom House, undated, released January 2018, 19 pp.
Uri Friedman, "The Real-World Consequences of 'Fake News,'" Atlantic, December 23, 2017.
Colum Lynch, "U.N. Human Rights Chief To leave, Citing 'Appalling' Climate for Advocacy," Foreign Policy, December 20, 2017.
Krishnadev Calamur, ""From Ttrump's Twitter Feed to Dictators' Mouths; A Partial List of the World Leaders Taking Their Cues from the U.S. President's Fight with the Press," Atlantic, December 14, 2017.
Steven Erlanger, "'Fake News,' Trump's Obsession, Is Now a Cudgel for Strongmen," New York Times, December 12, 2017.
Nikhil Sonnad, "Trump's Ally in His War on 'Fake News': the Chinese Communist Party," Quartz, December 12, 2017.
Anne Applebaum, "Why Neo-Fascists Are Making a Shocking Surge in Poland," Washington Post, November 13, 2017.
Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, "The Evolution of Autocracy: Why Authoritarianism Is Becoming More Formidable," IISS, September 18, 2017 (reprint of article published in Survival, October-November 2017: 57-68).
Asia and the Indo-Pacific
Japan
Jane Perlez, "Japan and China, Asian Rivals, Are Trying to Get Along," New York Times, October 24, 2018.
Anna Fifield and Simon Denyer, "Japan's Prime Minister, a Trump Buddy, Now Tries to Cozy Up to China's President," Washington Post, October 22, 2018.
Brad Glosserman, "PacNet #70—Japan's Search for Plan C," Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 22, 2018.
Simon Denyer, "Japan's Abe Stakes Out new Identity in Region: Stronger Leadership and Wider Military Reach," Washington Post, October 20, 2018.
Shiro Armstrong, "Japan's High Stakes Diplomacy with the US and China," East Asia Forum, October 14, 2018.
Peter Landers, "Japan and China Find Common Ground in Trump's Tariffs as Leaders Meet," Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2018.
Rupakjyoti Borah, "Japan's Indo-Pacific Defense Outreach Continues in Sri Lanka and India," Diplomat, August 27, 2018.
Associated Press, "Japan and EU Sign Trade Deal to Eliminate Nearly All Tariffs," Los Angeles Times, July 17, 2018.
Robin Wright, "Japan Stands to Gain as America Refuses Involvement in TPP-11 Trade Deal," National Interest, July 8, 2018.
Motoko Rich and Jane Perlez, "Seeing U.S. Retreat Under Trump, Japan and China Move to Mend Ties," New York Times, November 16, 2017.
Zeeshan Aleem, "Japan and Europe's Huge New Trade Agreement Shows That US Leadership Is Already Fading," Vox, July 6, 2017.
Australia
"Australia Is 'Sleepwalking into an Era of Unprecedented Danger', Warns Former ADF Member Cate McGregor," News.com.au, October 5, 2018.
Catherine McGregor, "We Are Sleepwalking into an Era of Unprecedented Danger," Sydney Morning Herald, October 4, 2018.
Greg Colton, "US National Defense Strategy May Force Australia to Get Off the Fence," Interpreter, January 23, 2018.
Hugh White, "Australia in the New Asia: Without America," Australian Outlook (Australian Institute of International Affairs), December 14, 2017. (Edited extract from speech by Hugh White on December 5, 2017, at launch of his essay "Without America: Australia in the New Asia," Quarterly Essay, Issue 68, November 2017.)
Jamie Tarabay, "China or the US? Australia's Tricky Balancing Act," CNN, December 6, 2017.
Jane Perlez and Damien Cave, "As China Rises, Australia Asks Itself: Can It Rely on America?" New York Times, December 3, 2017.
Robert A. Manning, "Australia Is Worried About America's Ability to Lead," Foreign Policy, November 30, 2017.
India
Tanvi Madan, "Between a Cold War Ally and an Indo-Pacific Partner: India's U.S.-Russia Balancing Act," War on the Rocks, October 16, 2018.
Editorial Board, ANU, "India's Cautious Courtship with the US-Led Order in Asia," East Asia Forum, September 24, 2018.
T.V. Paul, "How India Will React to the Rise of China: The Soft-Balancing Strategy Reconsidered," War on the Rocks, September 17, 2018.
Robert Farley, "The Question of the Decade: How Closely Will the US and India Align?" Diplomat, August 30, 2018.
Atman Trivedi and Aparna Pande, "India Is Getting Cold Feet About Trump's America," Foreign Policy, August 30, 2018.
Hamza Shad, "Can America and India Really Be Strategic Partners?" National Interest, August 29, 2018.
Oriana Skylar Mastro, "Can India Help the United States Against China?" Lawfare, August 26, 2018.
Derek Grossman, "India Is the Weakest Link in the Quad," Foreign Policy, July 23, 2018.
Asia and the Indo-Pacific in General
Richard Javad Heydarian, "Trump is Forcing China to Reassess its Strategy," National Interest, October 20, 2018.
Ankit Panda, "The Damage Is Done: Trump and the Asia-Pacific; The President's Successor Will Need to Offer a Path Forward That Addresses Our Current Self-Serving American Approach," Diplomat, September 14, 2018.
Shiro Armstrong, "Building a Coalition for Openness in Asia," East Asia Forum, August 19, 2018.
Scott D McDonald, "Wanted: A Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region; Indo-Pacific Leaders Fear That the United States Is Not Wholly Committed to a Role in the Region," National Interest, August 7, 2018.
Steven Erlanger and Jane Perlez, "Europe and Asia Move to Bolster Global Systems That Trump Has Attacked," New York Times, July 18, 2018.
Donald Kirk, "Trump Hands Xi Jinping A Win in Singapore—and May Have Handed All of Asia to China," South China Morning Post, June 15, 2018.
Motoko Rich, "Trump-Kim Summit Creates New Anxieties for Asian Allies," New York Times, June 13, 2018.
Simon Roughneen, "Shifting US Policy Leaves Asian Allies at Sea," Nikkei Asian Review, June 13, 2018.
Frederick Kempe, "Fighting the Wrong War? Reaching the Right Peace? Trump's Foreign Policy Unleashed," Atlantic Council, June 4, 2018.
Christopher Woody, "Countries in Asia Are Looking for Ways to Counter China's Growing Power—With and Without the US's Help," Business Insider, May 26, 2018.
Hal Brands, "Xi May Scare Asia Back Into Washington's Orbit," Bloomberg, March 4, 2018; Greg Sheridan, "Donald Trump's Team Making Headway in Asia," Australian, February 3, 2018.
Debra Killalea, "Why Australia and Asian Allies Are Turning Away from US to China," news.com.au, January 29, 2018.
Ben Westcott, "Asia Under Trump: How the US Is Losing the Region to China," CNN, January 29, 2018.
David Camroux, "Is Trump's America the 'Dispensable' Power in Asia?" East Asia Forum, December 31, 2017.
TJ Pempei, "Trump's Democratic Destruction and Asian Absenteeism," East Asia Forum, December 30, 2017.
Andrew Phillips, "Trump's Truancy in Asia Could Hasten a Hegemon's Demise," Interpreter, November 22, 2017.
See Sang Tan, "Can East Asian Regionalism Be a Bulwark Against a 'Post-Liberal' West?" East Asia Forum, November 18, 2017.
Mark Landler, "Trump's Mixed Messages Fail to Reassure Asian Allies," New York Times, November 14, 2017.
Foster Klug, "Asia Braces for Trump and His Unpredictable Foreign Policy," Associated Press, November 2, 2017.
Robert Dujarric, "US Allies in the Age of Trump; As Trump Prepares to Visit Asia, U.S. Allies in the Region Are Wondering How to Best Respond to His Administration," Diplomat, October 31, 2017.
Europe and Canada
Jacob M. Schlesinger, Paul Vieira, and Emre Peker, "WTO Members Work to Overhaul Trade Watchdog Amid Trump's Criticism; Failure to Meet U.S. Demands Could Leave Global Commercial Court in Limbo; 'Every Case Potentially Becomes a Trade War,' One WTO Official Says," Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2018.
"EU Builds Ties with Asia in Face of US Protectionism," Agence France-Presse, October 18, 2018.
Rick Noack, "Yes, World Leaders Laughed at Trump. But There Was Another, Less Obvious Sign of Diminishing U.S. Influence," Washington Post, September 26, 2018.
Agence France-Presse, "Macron at UN Rebukes Trump's 'Law of the Strongest,'" Daily Mail (UK), September 25, 2018.
Angela Charlton, "Trump and Macron: Realism Replaces Unlikely Bromance," Associated Press, September 25, 2018.
Frank Jordans and Angela Charlton, "AP Interview: NATO Chief Plays Balancing Act with Russia," Associated Press, September 25, 2018.
Amy J. Nelson and Emily Byrne, "To Improve Transatlantic Relations Look to History and Identity; Without Leadership by Example from Europe or America, the World Order Will Shift in China's Favor," National Interest, September 25, 2018.
Sten Running, "A Europeanized NATO? The Alliance Contemplates the Trump Era and Beyond," War on the Rocks, September 25, 2018.
Tim Ruhlig, "The EU's New China Resolution: Principled But Not Strategic," Diplomat, September 13, 2018.
Hans Binnendijk, "Despite Infighting, Here's How NATO Can Persevere," Defense News, September 20, 2018.
Kristin Huang, "Russia-China Military Cooperation 'Could Worry Europe,'" South China Morning Post, September 14, 2018.
Pierre Tran, "France Wonders: Can We Always Count on American Support?" Defense News, September 14, 2018.
Catherine Wong, "EU and China Need Closer Ties Urgently to Offset Trade Disruption, Says Bloc's New Ambassador in Beijing," South China Morning Post, September 14, 2018.
Ben Sills and Esteban Duarte, "Europe Pushing for Euro Dominance to Fend Off Trump, Spain Says," Bloomberg, September 13, 2018.
Pierre Tran, "French Joint Chiefs Call for Coordinated European Force," Defense News, September 11, 2018.
Keith Johnson, "The Buck Stops Here: Europe Seeks Alternative to U.S.-Dominated Financial System; German and France Complain That the U.S. Is Abusing Sanctions Power to Bully Even Its Allies," Foreign Policy, September 5, 2018.
John Van Oudenaren, "Why China Is Wooing Eastern and Central Europe," National Interest, September 4, 2018.
John Detrixhe, "The Divide Between the US and Europe Is Growing, Just as Putin Hoped," Quartz, September 1, 2018.
Anne Kauranen, "It's Time for Realism in EU-Russia Ties: France's Macron," Reuters, August 30, 2018.
Agence France-Presse, "German Foreign Minister Brands Trump's EU Policy 'Irritating,'" Agence-France-Presse, August 28, 2018.
Agence France-Presse, "French President Emmanuel Macron Insists EU Can No Longer Rely on US to Guarantee Its Security," South China Morning Post, August 27, 2018.
Angelique Chrisafis, "Europe Can No Longer Rely on US for Security, Says Emmanuel Macron, Guardian, August 27, 2018.
Remi Adekoya, "Europe's Donald Can Fight Dirty, Too," Foreign Policy, August 20, 2018.
Ilya Arkhipov and Arne Delfs, "Putin and Merkel, Pushed Together by Trump, Talk Syria, Pipeline," Bloomberg, August 18, 2018.
Melissa Eddy, "Another Surprise Meeting With Putin. This Time, It's Merkel," New York Times, August 13, 2018.
Ott Ummelas, "NATO's East Is Rearming, But It's Because of Putin, Not Trump," Bloomberg, August 13, 2018.
David M. Herszenhorn, "EU Vows to Thwart Trump's Sanctions on Iran," Politico, August 6, 2018.
Chrystia Freeland, "In Defence of the Rules-Based International Order: How Canada and Its Partners Must Fight Back, 32nd IISS Fullerton Lecture, August 2, 2018.
Derek, "Trump's Performance in Helsinki Shouldn't Have Come as a Surprise; U.S. Allies in Europe Are Resigned to a Trans-Atlantic Relationship That Keeps Getting Worse," Foreign Policy, July 19, 2018.
Steven Erlanger and Jane Perlez, "Europe and Asia Move to Bolster Global Systems That Trump Has Attacked," New York Times, July 18, 2018.
Associated Press, "Japan and EU Sign Trade Deal to Eliminate Nearly All Tariffs," Los Angeles Times, July 17, 2018.
Raf Casert, "EU, US Relations Sinking Further After Divisive Trump Tour," Associated Press, July 17, 2018.
Jack Ewing, "E.U. Courts New Partners With Japan Trade Deal," New York Times, July 17, 2018.
Michael Birnbaum, "Europe Fears Trump-Putin Summit Will Embolden Kremlin, Weaken Transatlantic Unity," Washington Post, July 16, 2018.
Michelle Goldberg, "'Evil Has Won'; Pro-American Germans Feel Betrayed," New York Times, July 13, 2018.
Abigail Tracy, "'He Chooses the Hammer Every Time': NATO Left Fuming As Trump Turns Toward Putin," Vanity Fair, July 13, 2018.
Zachary Cohen, Michelle Kosinski, and Barbara Starr, "Trump's Barrage of Attacks 'Beyond Belief,' Reeling NATO Diplomats Say," CNN, July 12, 2018.
Steven Erlanger, Julie Hirschfeld Davis, and Katie Rogers, "NATO Survives Trump, but the Turmoil Is Leaving Scars," New York Times, July 12, 2018.
Vanessa Gera, "Trump's Tough NATO Talk Plays Well on Eastern Flank," Associated Press, July 12, 2018.
Valentina Pop, Laurence Norman, and Robert Wall, "Trump Unsettles NATO Allies With Demands as He Backs Alliance," Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2018.
Reihan Salam, "The Coming Split in NATO; Trump Wants Our European Allies to Build Their Military Strength. What Will It Look Like If they Do?" Atlantic, July 12, 2018.
Richard Fontaine and Vance Serchuk, "The West Will Survive Trump," Atlantic, July 12, 2018.
Robert Burns, "Trump's Attacks on NATO Raise Questions About Its Future," Associated Press, July 10, 2018.
Ulrike Franke, "Watching for Signs of NATO's End of Times," War on the Rocks, July 10, 2018.
David M. Herszenhorn, "Trump's Neglect of Europe Goes Beyond Angry Tweets; Unfilled Positions, Truncated Communications, Lack of Policy Clarity Combine to Provoke Anger Across the Continent," Politico, July 10, 2018.
Phil Stewart, "As Trump Confounds, Mattis Seen as Quiet Champion Among NATO Allies," Reuters, July 9, 2018.
Michael Birnbaum, "Ahead of NATO Summit, Allies Wonder: Will NATO Survive Trump?" Washington Post, July 8, 2018.
Greg Jaffe, Josh Dawsey, and Carol D. Leonnig, "Ahead of NATO and Putin Summits, Trump's Unorthodox Diplomacy Rattles Allies," Washington Post, July 6, 2018.
Jimmy Quinn, "'America First' Is the EU's Greatest Opportunity," National Review, June 28, 2018.
Reuters Staff, "EU Leaders to Strengthen Defenses, Seek 'Strategic Autonomy' At Summit: Draft," Reuters, June 27, 2018.
Josh Rogin, "Biden: European Leaders Reeling from Trump's Hostile Behavior," Washington Post, June 26, 2018.
Daniel Boffey, "Nato Chief Warms Over Future of Transatlantic Relationship," Guardian, June 19, 2018.
Simon Nixon, "Europe Ponders New World Order as Trans-Atlantic Ties Fray," Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2018.
Stephen Collinson, "The West Is in Crisis, Despite Trump's Glowing Assessment," CNN, June 9, 2018.
Frederick Kempe, "Fighting the Wrong War? Reaching the Right Peace? Trump's Foreign Policy Unleashed," Atlantic Council, June 4, 2018.
Erik Brattberg, "Why Trump's Tariffs May Push Europe Toward China and Russia," National Interest, June 3, 2018.
Joergen Oerstroem Moeller, "The End of the Atlantic Alliance," National Interest, May 28, 2018.
Yasmeen Serhan, "Is the U.S. Bringing Europe and Russia Closer Together?" Atlantic, May 25, 2018.
Robbie Gramer, "NATO Chief Worried About Fissures Between United States and Europe," Foreign Policy, May 18, 2018.
Keith Johnson, Dan De Luce, Emily Tamkin, "Can the U.S.-Europe Alliance Survive Trump?" Foreign Policy, May 18, 2018.
James Traub, "RIP the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, 1945-2018; The Partnership with America Had a Long Life—But Europe Is Ready to Start Over." Foreign Policy, May 11, 2018.
Stephen M. Walt, "Europe Has No Clue How to Handle an American Bully," Foreign Policy, May 2, 2018.
Kevin Baron, "Macron Mic-Drops on Trump, Offers a New Call to Western Leadership," Defense One, April 25, 2018.
Steven Erlanger, "Europe Once Saw Xi Jinping as a Hedge Against Trump. Not Anymore." New York Times, March 4, 2018.
Doug Bandow, "Europe Still Doesn't Take Its Own Defense Seriously," National Interest, February 24, 2018.
Michael Birnbaum and Griff Witte, "German Defense Minister Slams Trump's Military-Heavy Approach to Security," Washington Post, February 16, 2018.
Teri Schultz, "Is Europe Bold Enough to Counter US Ambivalence?" Deutsche Welle, February 15, 2018.
Mercy A. Kuo, "What the EU Thinks of the US 'Indo-Pacific' Strategy, Insights from Bernt Berger," Diplomat, January 31, 2018.
Matt Peterson, "A Glimpse of a Canadian-Led International Order; The U.S. Ditched a Massive Trade Agreement—Which Turned Out Slightly Better Without It," Atlantic, January 24, 2018.
Freddy Gray, "The 'Special Relationship' Is in Trouble, And That's Bad News for London," National Interest, January 16, 2018.
Christiane Hoffmann and Claus Brinkbaumer, "'We Are Seeing What Happens When the U.S. Pulls Back,'" Spiegel, January 8, 2018. (Interview with German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel.)
Anna Sauerbrey, "Is the Trans-Atlantic Relationship Dead?" New York Times, January 3, 2018.
Anne Gearan and Souad Mekhennet, "Trump Policies Starting to 'Crumble' Traditional U.S.-Europe Ties, German Minister Warns," Washington Post, December 5, 2017.
Dov Zakheim, "Donald Trump Is Singlehandedly Wrecking the Special Relationship; America Has No Greater Friend Than Britain. Or Had." Foreign Policy, November 30, 2017.
Deidre Berger, et al, "'In Spite of It all, America,' " New York Times, October 11, 2017. (English translation of "In Spite of It All, America: A Trans-Atlantic Manifesto in Times of Donald Trump—A German Perspective.")
Steven Erlanger, "German Foreign Policy Experts Warn Against Anti-Americanism," New York Times, October 11, 2017. (News article reporting on the October 11, 2017, item above by Deidre Berger, et al.)
Zeeshan Aleem, "Japan and Europe's Huge New Trade Agreement Shows That US Leadership Is Already Fading," Vox, July 6, 2017.
Appendix E. Recent Writings on U.S. Role and World OrderThis appendix lists recent examples of writings on the question whether a changed U.S. role in the world is affecting world order in some way, with the most recent on top.
Andreas Illmer, "China Disappearances Show Beijing Sets Its Own Rules," BBC, October 17, 2018.
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, "Can the Chinese Be Trusted to Lead International Institutions?" Defense One, October 14, 2018.
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, "Can the Chinese Be Trusted to Lead Global Institutions? The Abduction of Interpol's President Shows That Beijing's Officials Will Be Subordinate to the Orders of the Communist Party," Atlantic, October 11, 2018.
Matt Stoller, "If the U.S. Doesn't Control Corporate Power, China Will; Laissez-Faire Economics Has left Firms Bending the Knee to Beijing," Foreign Policy, October 11, 2018.
Charlotte Gao, "Abrupt Detention of Meng Hongwei Further Damages China's International Reputation; Meng, Like All Other Chinese Citizens, Deserves Procedural Justice, One Core Value of the Rule of Law Which China Often Ignores," Diplomat, October 9, 2018.
Julian Ku, "Why China's Disappearance of Interpol's Chief Matters," Lawfare, October 9, 2018.
Sophie Richardson, "China Disappeared Interpol's Chief. The World Can't Pretend It's Business as Usual." Washington Post, October 9, 2018.
Timothy R. Heath, "PacNet #68—What Does China's Pursuit of a Global Coalition Mean for World Politics?" Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 3, 2018.
Bradley A. Thayer and John M. Friend," The World According to China; Understanding the World China Seeks to Create by 2049, When the PRC Turns 100," Diplomat, October 3, 2018.
William Dobson, "China Unbound: What An Emboldened China means For The World," NPR, October 2, 2018.
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman, "How Russia and China Undermine Democracy; Can the West Counter the Threat?" Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2018.
Amy J. Nelson and Emily Byrne, "To Improve Transatlantic Relations Look to History and Identity; Without Leadership by Example from Europe or America, the World Order Will Shift in China's Favor," National Interest, September 25, 2018.
Michelle Nichols, "U.N. Chief Warms Leaders of 'Increasingly Chaotic' World Order," Reuters, September 25, 2018.
Steven Erlanger, "Is the World Becoming a Jungle Again? Should Americans Care?" New York Times, September 22, 2018.
Abigail Grace, "China and America May Be Forging a New Economic Order; It's Not a Cold War. But the Dispute Between the World's Largest Economies is Taking the World into Unknown Territory," Atlantic, September 20, 2018.
Elena Holodny, "Russia, China Embrace Uneasily, Aim for 'Desirable World Order,'" NBC News, September 20, 2018.
Graham Allison, "The Truth About the Liberal Order," Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2018.
Jackson Janes and Peter S. Rashish, "The West's Greatest Challenge Lies in Washington, Not Moscow," National Interest, August 17, 2018.
Christopher A. Preble, "Is This the End of the Liberal World Order?" National Interest, August 3, 2018.
James Kirchick, "Trump Wants to Destroy the World Order. So What? Whatever the President's Intentions, His Efforts to Rock the Foundation of International Politics Are Hopeless," Foreign Policy, July 26, 2018.
Stewart Patrick, "The World Order Is Starting to Crack; America's Allies and Adversaries Are Adapting to Donald Trump in Ways That Can't Easily Be Reversed," Foreign Policy, July 25, 2018.
Uri Friedman, "The Rise of 'Revisionist America,'" Atlantic, July 19, 2018.
Christopher Cadelago, "Trump's Step Toward Putin Seals a New World Order; The President Has Upended the Global Definitions of Friends and Foes," Politico, July 16, 2018.
Max Fisher, "Trump Shakes the International Order. Could It Break?" New York Times, July 15, 2018.
Robert Kagan, "Things Will Not Be Okay," Washington Post, July 12, 2018.
Amitav Acharya, "Asia After the Liberal International Order," East Asia Forum, July 10, 2018.
David A. Graham, "Can Anyone Fill the U.S. Leadership Vacuum on Climate Change? American Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement Is a Test for the Future of the Globe, But Also for the International Order." Atlantic, June 25, 2018.
George Packer, "Donald Trump Goes Rogue; In Half a Week, Between Quebec and Singapore, Trump Showed That the Liberal Order Is Hateful to Him, and That He Wants Out," New Yorker, June 25, 2018.
Kori Schake, "The Trump Doctrine Is Winning and the World Is Losing," New York Times, June 15, 2018.
Graham Allison, "The Myth of the Liberal Order," Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2018.
Michael Hirsh, "The International System He Disdains Was Created by Americans—to Advance American Interests." Washington Post, June 14, 2018.
Robert Kagan, "Trump's America Does Not Care," Washington Post, June 14, 2018.
Fred Kaplan, "Demolition Donald, It's Undeniable That the President Is Wrecking the U.S.-Led International Oder. The Only Question Left Is Whether He's Doing It on Purpose." Slate, June 14, 2018.
Jeremy Diamond, "Trump Resets the World Stage," CNN, June 13, 2018.
Ben Steil, "The West Will Die So That Trump Can Win," Foreign Policy, June 12, 2018.
Zachary Karabell, "Trump's Creative Destruction of the International Order," Foreign Policy, June 11, 2018.
"Present at the Destruction; America's President Is Undermining the Rules-Based International Order. Can Any Good Come of It?" Economist, June 9, 2018: 18-20, 22.
Frederick Kempe, "Present at the Destruction?" Atlantic Council, June 9, 2018.
Aris Folley, "Top EU Figure: Trump Is 'Undermining' World Order US Created," The Hill, June 8, 2018.
Karebn DeYoung, "In Trump, Some Fear the End of the World Order," Washington Post, June 8, 2018.
Ana Campoy, "Trump Is a Globalist. Just a Chaotic One." Quartz, April 7, 2018.
Frerd Bauer, "To Preserve the 'Liberal World Order,' Reform It; The Political Establishment's Decisions Have Contributed Mightily to the Problems We Face." National Review, April 2, 2018.
Michael Brendan Dougherty, "The Endless Hysteria about the Liberal World Order," National Review, March 27, 2018.
Stewart M. Patrick, "China and Trump May Bury the Liberal International Order," Defense One, March 25, 2018.
Joseph S. Nye, "Human Rights and the Fate of the Liberal Order," Project Syndicate, May 9, 2018.
Richard N. Haass, "Liberal World Order, RIP," Strategist (ASPI), March 24, 2018.
Hal Brands, "The 'American Century' Is Over, and It Died in Syria," Bloomberg, March 8, 2018; Robert Farley, "How Can the US Manage a Rising China? The United States Needs to Rethink How It Approaches International Oder," Diplomat, February 27, 2018.
Eliot A. Cohen, "Witnessing the Collapse of the Global Elite," Atlantic, February 19, 2018.
Ash Jain, "Is the Democratic Order Doomed?" Atlantic Council, February 15, 2018.
Tunku Varadarajan, "Will China Impost a New World Order? When Pax Britannica Gave Way to Pax Americana, the Transition Was Peaceful. A Repeat Is unlikely, Says the Author of 'Safe Passage.'" Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2018.
Andreas Boje Forsby, "Trump, Xi, and the Eclipse of the Liberal World Order; As the United States Abdicates, an Illiberal China Steps onto the World Stage," DIIS (Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier), February 6, 2018.
Salvatore Babones, "America Has Little to Fear from a China-Centered World," Washington Post, January 25, 2018.
Aaron Friedberg, "China's Understanding of Global Order Shouldn't Be Ours," Foreign Policy, January 24, 2018; Matt Peterson, "A Glimpse of a Canadian-Led International Order; The U.S. Ditched a Massive Trade Agreement—Which Turned Out Slightly Better Without It," Atlantic, January 24, 2018.
Chengxin Pan, "Time to Worry About a Chinese-Led Global Order," Interpreter, January 10, 2018.
Isobel Thompson, " 'Catastrophic': World Leaders Fear the Worst As Trump Goes Rogue; Foreign-Policy Relationships Are Falling Apart as the White House Dismantles the Post-War Order," Vanity Fair, January 4, 2018.
Charlotte Gao, "2018: China Vows to Be the Keeper of International Order," Diplomat, January 2, 2018; Jennifer Lind, "Will the Liberal Order Destroy Itself? While cosmopolitan Americans Grieved on November 9, 2016, That Trump Would Ruin the Liberal International Order, the Order Was Already Straining Under Its Own Ambitions," National Interest, December 18, 2017.
H. Brands and C. Edel [Hal Brands and Charles Edel], "The Disharmony of the Spheres; The U.S. Will Endanger Itself If It Accedes to Russian and Chinese Efforts to Change the International System to Their Liking," Commentary, December 14, 2017.
Korber-Stiftung, "Yan Xuetong on How Germany and China Should Rethink the Global Order; 'The Current Norms Are No Longer Suitable,'" Diplomat, December 6, 2017.
Oliver Stuenkel, "No Need to Fear a Post-Western World," Global Times, November 28, 2017.
Richard Heydarian, "Trump Humbled in China as Beijing Visit Underlines the New World Order in Asia," South China Morning Post, November 13, 2017.
David Usborne, "Donald Trump's America First Doctrine Will Destroy the United Nations," Independent (UK), September 19, 2017.
Philip Zelikow, "Is the World Slouching Toward a Grave Systemic Crisis?" The Atlantic, August 11, 2017.
Fareed Zakaria, "Say Hello to a Post-America World," Washington Post, July 27, 2017.
Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, "America and the Geopolitics of Upheaval," National Interest, June 21, 2017.
George Fujii, "The End of American Liberal Internationalism?" ISSF Policy Series, March 30, 2017.
Uri Friedman, "What a World Led by China Might Look Like," The Atlantic, March 29, 2017.
Bjorn Jerden, et al., "Don't Call it the New Chinese Global Order (Yet)," Foreign Policy, March 7, 2017.
Kori Schake, "Will Washington Abandon the Order?" Foreign Affairs, January/February 2017.
See also the following RAND reports, written under RAND's "Building a Sustainable International Order" project:
Michael J. Mazarr, Summary of the Building a Sustainable International Order Project, RAND, 2018, 32 pp.
Michael J. Mazarr, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Andrew Radin, and Miranda Priebe, Building a Sustainable International Order, Summary of the First Workshop in the International Order Project Series, RAND, 2016, 8 pp.
Michael J. Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Understanding the Current International Order, RAND, 2016, 80 pp.
Michael J. Mazarr and Ashley L. Rhoades, Testing the Value of the Postwar International Order, RAND, 2018, 124 pp.
Michael J. Mazarr, et al, Measuring the Health of the Liberal International Order, RAND, 2017, 228 pp.
Kyle Lascurettes, The Concert of Europe and Great-Power Governance Today: What Can the Order of 19th-Century Europe Teach Policymakers About International Order in the 21st Century? RAND, 2017, 36 pp.
Michael J. Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Alternative Options for U.S. Policy Toward the International Order, RAND, 2017, 130 pp.
Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy and the Liberal Order: Continuity, Change, and Options for the Future, RAND, 2016, 40 pp.
Michael J. Mazarr, Timothy R. Heath, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, China and the International Order, RAND, 2018, 172 pp.
Andrew Radin and Clinton Bruce Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, RAND, 2017, 124 pp.
Appendix F. Background Information on U.S. Public Opinion About U.S. RoleThis appendix presents background information on U.S. public opinion relating to the U.S. role in the world.
October 2018 Chicago Council on Global Affairs Report
A 2018 Chicago Council on Global Affairs report on U.S. public opinion data regarding U.S. foreign policy that was released in October 2018 stated:
In the wake of the 2016 US presidential election, political analysts warned of a dark era ahead. Newly elected President Donald Trump had long expressed opposition to US security alliances, skepticism of free trade, and support for authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin. Since the American public generally relies on their political leaders for foreign policy decisions, many policy watchers cautioned that the country was headed for a populist, unilateralist, and protectionist retreat from global leadership.
While the Trump administration has taken action along this path—unilaterally withdrawing from the Paris and Iran agreements, pulling the United States out from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, and questioning the value of long-time alliances like NATO—the majority of the American public has not followed this lead.
To the contrary, most Americans have moved in the opposite direction. The largest majority since 1974—except for just after the September 11 attacks—now support active US engagement in world affairs. A solid majority supports multilateral diplomacy, underscored by public willingness to accept international decisions that are not the first choice for the United States. A record number of Americans now acknowledge the benefits of international trade. Even though the United States withdrew from both the Paris Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal, public support for these agreements has actually increased. And as the ultimate indicator of commitment to allies, increased majorities express support for sending US troops to defend both NATO and Asian allies if they are attacked.
Americans Want the United States to Remain Engaged
Despite attempts by the White House to pull the United States back from global engagement, seven in 10 Americans… favor the United States taking an active part in world affairs (70%). This reading is a 7 percentage point increase from the 2017 Chicago Council Survey and is the highest recorded level of support since 1974 except for 2002, the first Chicago Council Survey conducted after the September 11 attacks….
A Majority Wants Shared Action on Global Issues
The American public does not envision the United States working alone when playing an active role on the world stage. Rather, a striking majority (91%) say that it is more effective for the United States to work with allies and other countries to achieve its foreign policy goals. Just 8 percent say that it is more effective for the United States to tackle world problems on its own.
Sharing leadership on global issues may mean that the United States does not always achieve its preferred policy outcomes. Yet a majority support the United States making decisions with its allies even if it means the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice (66% agree, 32% disagree). Similarly, two-thirds of Americans believe that the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if it means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice (64% agree, 34% disagree)—the highest level of support on this question since it was first asked in 2004, when 66 percent agreed.
Support Is Up for the Iran Deal and the Paris Agreement
President Trump has broken away from several international agreements since taking office, including the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Iran nuclear deal. But the American public has not followed the president's cues. Majorities of the public say that the United States should participate in the Iran deal (66%) and the Paris Agreement (68%). In fact, support for US participation in both of these high-profile international agreements has risen 6 percentage points over the past year….
It's More Important to be Admired than Feared
The administration has attempted to change the nature of US influence around the world by using coercive rhetoric toward both allies and hostile actors. Perhaps reflective of this approach, more Americans think that the United States is now more feared (39%) than admired (20%) around the world today, though many volunteer an alternative response, ranging from "a joke" to "weak" to "falling apart." But almost three times as many Americans think admiration (73%) of the United States is more important than fear (26%) of the United States to achieve US foreign policy goals.
As interactions with US allies have strained over the course of the past year, majorities of Americans say that relations with other countries are worsening (56%) and that the United States is losing allies (57%). Just 12 percent of the public says that the United States is gaining allies and 31 percent state there has been no change.
US Public Wants to Maintain or Increase Commitment to NATO
While some administration officials have praised NATO, the president has repeatedly criticized European allies for not spending enough on defense. Yet his attacks do not seem to have dented public support for the transatlantic alliance. A majority of Americans continue to favor maintaining (57%) or increasing (18%) US commitment to NATO; in fact, a higher percentage of Americans now favor increasing the US commitment to NATO than ever before….
Support for Using US Troops to Defend Key Allies Has Grown
Americans continue to favor contributing to allies' security through bases and security commitments, and their willingness to do so has increased since last year. Majorities of Americans support maintaining long-term military bases in South Korea (74%) and Japan (65%); both responses are at record levels since the question was first asked in the 2002 Chicago Council Survey. As in past surveys, a majority continue to support maintaining US bases in Germany (60%). Further, two-thirds of Americans support sending US troops to defend South Korea (64%) and Japan (64%) if attacked by North Korea, and 54 percent support defending Baltic NATO allies with US troops if Russia invades. Each of these measures is at a peak since the Council began asking these questions.
Americans Are High on Trade
The White House is waging trade battles on multiple fronts, but the American public is more positive about the benefits of trade than ever before, surpassing even the previous record ratings of 2017…. Large majorities of Americans now say that trade is good for consumers like you (85%), the US economy (82%), and creating jobs in the United States (67%)….
While the president has criticized the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and withdrawn from the TPP trade agreement, 63 percent of Americans now say NAFTA is good for the US economy, up from 53 percent in 2017, and another record level in Chicago Council surveys. A majority of Americans (61%) also believe the United States should participate in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the CPTPP, a trade agreement formed by the 11 signatories to the original TPP after US withdrawal.
Americans face the possibility of serious trade disruptions, as the United States and China are currently exchanging several rounds of tariffs. While only four in 10 Americans consider a possible trade war with China a critical threat (42%), a combined seven in 10 Americans are very (31%) or somewhat (41%) concerned that a trade war with China will hurt their local economy.5 Trade disputes with Mexico, America's third-largest trading partner, are somewhat less concerning to the US public: just over half of the public are very (19%) or somewhat (33%) concerned about the impact of a trade war with Mexico on their local economy.
Conclusion
The Trump administration's bold attempts to reshape US foreign policy have not convinced many Americans to join the bandwagon. The past two years have given the American public a glimpse of President Trump's alternative vision for the role of the United States in the world. And while Trump's base continues to share his vision, the majority of Americans do not.
Instead, most Americans are more convinced about the benefits of active US engagement and the need to work with allies. They see US soft power as more effective than muscular intimidation in accomplishing US foreign policy goals and believe the United States is losing allies and world respect. On those specific issues where the White House has taken action—withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris Agreement, and the TPP agreement—Americans are less likely to see them as "wins" and more likely to endorse participating in these agreements. On traditional approaches to US foreign policy, including maintaining military bases abroad, defending key allies if attacked, and supporting trade, Americans have doubled down. The bottom line is that two years into the Trump administration, solid majorities of the American public have rejected the "America First" platform.94
June 2018 Chicago Council on Global Affairs Report
A 2018 Chicago Council on Global Affairs report on U.S. public opinion data regarding generational differences in U.S. public opinion regarding U.S. foreign policy stated that was released in June 2018 stated:
Since World War II the United States has maintained an active foreign policy agenda, deeply engaged in both the economic and military domains. Many observers over the past few years, however, have begun to voice doubts about public support for the critical pillars of American internationalism. Some have argued that the American public has lost its appetite for military intervention after more than 15 years at war in the greater Middle East. Others have suggested that Donald Trump's election revealed weakening support for free trade and for the global alliance system the United States built after World War II.
Many observers have worried, in particular, about whether younger Americans will be willing to take up the mantle of global leadership. This question matters a good deal in light of the fact that the Millennial Generation, those born between 1981 and 1996, is now the largest generation of Americans. Like the Baby Boomers before them, Millennials have already had an outsized impact on American culture. As they age and begin to take leadership positions in business, government, and across society, their views – not those of their parents and grandparents – will be decisive.
Those worried about Millennials' willingness to embrace the traditional liberal internationalism of the post-World War II era may find some evidence for their concerns in survey data. As the 2012 Chicago Council Survey report noted, "Millennials…are much less alarmed about major threats facing the country, particularly international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the development of China as a world power, and are less supportive of an activist approach to foreign affairs than older Americans."
In order to understand where foreign policy attitudes are headed, we employ a generational perspective to analyze a wide range of survey data collected by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs since 1974. The findings reveal that generations share many opinions about international threats, foreign policy goals, and the best approaches to engaging the world. Yet, each generation from the Silent Generation onward entered adulthood somewhat less supportive of expansive American internationalism, with more recent generations expressing lower support for militarized approaches to achieve foreign policy goals.
Today, each successor generation is less likely than the previous to prioritize maintaining superior military power worldwide as a goal of US foreign policy, to see US military superiority as a very effective way of achieving US foreign policy goals, and to support expanding defense spending. At the same time, support for international cooperation and free trade remains high across the generations. In fact, younger Americans are more inclined to support cooperative approaches to US foreign policy and more likely to feel favorably towards trade and globalization.
Key Findings
Each generation since the Silent Generation reports less support than its predecessors for taking an active part in world affairs, as measured by responses to the standard Chicago Council Survey question: "Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?"
Sometimes, this difference split Millennials from older Americans; at other times, Millennials and Gen Xers both differ from prior generations.
Long-term shifts in ideology and party identification mean that younger Americans today are more liberal than their elders, less likely to identify as Republican, but also more likely not to identify with either party.
Because ideology and partisanship exert such powerful influences on public opinion, these trends play a significant role in explaining the size and direction of generation gaps on foreign policy issues.
Yet even when the pull of partisanship and party loyalty is greatest, the differences across generations remain visible and large enough to be politically significant.
It is difficult to predict how much these generation gaps will influence the direction of US foreign policy. As younger Americans continue to replace older Americans, especially at the voting booth, shifting demographics and attitudes are likely to influence debates about how the United States should engage the world. As younger Americans move through the stages of life it will be interesting to see if these generational differences result in a permanent break from previous patterns of foreign policy attitudes.95
2017 Chicago Council on Global Affairs Report
A 2017 Chicago Council on Global Affairs report on U.S. public opinion data regarding the Trump Administration's theme of America First stated
President Trump's inaugural address, like his campaign, signaled a major departure from the past seven decades of American foreign policy and engagement with the rest of the world. While never fully parsed, the slogans "Make America Great Again," "America First," and "Americanism, not Globalism," along with the president's speeches and tweets, prescribed greater protectionism in trade, a new financial reckoning with our security allies, and a withdrawal from major international agreements.
The 2017 Chicago Council Survey, conducted roughly six months into the Trump administration, tested the appeal of these ideas among the American public. The results suggest their attraction remains limited. For now, public criticism of trade deals, support for withholding US security guarantees from allies, and calls for restricting immigration mainly appeal to a core group of Trump supporters (defined in this report as those Americans with a very favorable view of President Trump). Yet, aside from the president's core supporters, most Americans prefer the type of foreign policy that has been typical of US administrations, be they Republican or Democrat, since World War II.
Majorities continue to endorse sustaining American engagement abroad... as well as maintaining alliances, supporting trade, and participating in international agreements. Indeed, in key instances, Americans have doubled down on these beliefs. Public support has risen to new highs when it comes to willingness to defend allies, the perceived benefits of trade, and a desire to grant undocumented workers a path to citizenship.
Americans Value Allies and Are More Willing Than Ever to Defend Them
During the 2016 campaign and into his presidency, Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized allies of freeriding on America's security guarantee and argued that US alliances were not serving American interests. But the US public disagrees. Americans have repeatedly rated alliances as one of the most effective ways for the United States to achieve its foreign policy goals since the question was first asked in 2014. Today, the US public is more convinced than ever of their importance. Americans rate maintaining existing alliances as the most effective foreign policy tool, with 49 percent responding "very effective".... followed by maintaining US military superiority (47%) and building new alliances with other countries (36%)....
Americans also express confidence in Asian and European allies to deal responsibly with world problems, and solid majorities favor maintaining or increasing the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific (78%), Europe (73%), and the Middle East (70%). A slightly larger majority now (69%) compared with a year ago (65%) say NATO is essential to US security. And for the first time, majorities of Americans are willing to use US troops to defend South Korea if it is invaded by North Korea (62%) or if NATO allies like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia are invaded by Russia (52%).
The most specific wish that President Trump has for NATO is for allied countries to contribute more to collective defense; he and other administration officials have advocated for withholding US commitment to defend allies until they have paid more. But a majority of Americans think that NATO allies should be convinced to do their part through persuasion and diplomatic channels (59%) rather than threatening to withhold the US security guarantee to NATO allies to get them to pay more for defense (38%).
Given these views, it is clear that Americans appreciate the advantages that alliances bring. Majorities say that alliances with Europe and East Asia (60% each) are either mutually beneficial or mostly benefit the United States, and 48 percent say the same about alliances in the Middle East.
Core Trump supporters are the most skeptical of the benefits regarding alliances for the United States. Perhaps taking their lead from the president, a majority favor withholding US security guarantee from NATO allies until they pay more (60%); 51 percent of overall Republicans agree. But even core Trump supporters do not seem to believe the alliance is "obsolete," given that a majority (54%) think NATO is still essential to US security.
A Record Percentage of Americans Recognize Benefits of Trade
Americans are feeling more optimistic about the positive impact of trade. Compared with a year ago, record numbers of Americans now say that international trade is good for US consumers (78%), for the US economy (72%), and for job creation (57%)..... Additionally, the perceived benefits of trade are up across all party affiliations....
A majority of Americans believe that trade deals between the United States and other countries benefit both countries (50%) or mostly benefit the United States (7%). But a substantial percentage of Americans—including a majority of core Trump supporters and a plurality of Republicans overall—think other countries mostly benefit (34%) or neither country benefits (6%).
President Trump has blamed poor trade deals for the loss of American jobs, and on this point, Americans agree. A majority say that manufacturing job losses are due to outsourcing (56%) rather than increased automation (42%). Yet, more Americans say that the current administration's policies will harm (41%) rather than help (32%) US workers, and 24 percent say they will make no difference.
There are clear partisan divides on expectations for the new administration. Solid majorities of core Trump supporters (82%) and Republicans (64%) expect this administration's policies will do more to protect US workers, which may help explain why they are more optimistic about the overall benefits of international trade to the US economy, consumers, and job creation. For their part, Democrats may feel the need to underscore their support for international trade as a reaction against the trade-bashing rhetoric from both Republican and Democratic candidates in 2016.
Concern over Immigration at Lowest Point Yet
Immigration was a central issue during the 2016 presidential campaign, and it remains a key pillar in Donald Trump's America First platform. But the American public is less alarmed than last year by the potential threat of large numbers of immigrants and refugees entering the United States. Just 37 percent of Americans characterize immigration as a critical threat, down from 43 percent in 2016, marking a new low in concern for this issue.... There are, however, still large differences between Democrats (20%) and Republicans (61%), with core Trump supporters the most likely of all to consider immigration a critical threat (80%)....
As the overall perceived threat from immigration has gone down, support for providing an opportunity for illegal workers in the United States to become citizens has gone up. Among all Americans, two-thirds (65%) support providing illegal immigrants a path to citizenship either immediately or with a waiting period and a financial penalty—an increase of 7 percentage points since last year. Conversely, fewer Americans now say that illegal immigrants should be required to leave their jobs and the United States (22%, down from 28% in 2016).
A clear majority of Democrats (77%, up from 71% in 2016) favor a pathway to citizenship either immediately or with conditions. A smaller majority of Republicans now also favor the same solution as Democrats (52%, up from 44%), although 36 percent of Republicans favor deportation (down from 42% in 2016). Even core Trump supporters are divided in their views, with equal numbers supporting deportation (45%) and a path to citizenship (45%) for illegal immigrants.
Majority Continue to Support Paris Agreement
Conducted just weeks after President Trump kept his campaign promise to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change, the 2017 Chicago Council Survey reveals that 6 in 10 Americans (62%) continue to favor US participation in the agreement. However, overall public support of the Paris Agreement has declined since 2016 (when 71% favored participation) largely because of a 20-point drop in Republican support (37%, down from 57% in 2016), perhaps following the president's lead on this issue. Just 24 percent of core Trump supporters want the United States to participate in the agreement. In contrast, majorities of Democrats (83%) and Independents (60%) continue to support the Paris Accord, though also at slightly lower levels than in 2016 (when it was backed by 87% of Democrats and 68% of Independents).
Overall, 46 percent of Americans say that climate change is now a critical threat facing the United States; while still not a majority, this view reflects the highest point of concern recorded by the Chicago Council Survey. Yet, Republicans and Democrats markedly disagree on the gravity of this issue. Seven in 10 Democrats think that climate change is a critical threat, compared with just 16 percent of Republicans and 12 percent of core Trump supporters....
Fractures within the Republican Party Base
Headlines over the past year have proclaimed an internal battle within the Republican Party between President Trump's supporters and those who oppose his policies. The 2017 Chicago Council Survey data illustrate these fissures between self-described Republicans who have a very favorable view of President Trump ("Trump Republicans") and those who do not ("non-Trump Republicans").
Non-Trump Republicans align more with average US public opinion than they do with Trump Republicans. Non-Trump Republicans are closer to the overall public than to Trump Republicans in their views on NAFTA (53% overall public, 49% non-Trump Republicans, 20% Trump Republicans believe the agreement is good for the US economy). Non-Trump Republicans are also closer to the overall public when asked the best way to get US allies to pay more for their defense (61% Trump Republicans, 40% non-Trump Republicans, and 38% overall favor withholding the US security guarantee). And on immigration, the overall public (65%) and non-Trump Republicans (62%) are more aligned in supporting a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants than Trump Republicans (43%). Specific examples of other differences among Republicans are included in each chapter of this report....
Conclusion
Despite the politically charged environment over the past year, Americans express remarkably enduring support for an active US role in world affairs, for security alliances, and for trade relationships. They also favor offering illegal immigrants an opportunity to earn citizenship, either immediately or with conditions—a fact often overlooked by political leaders. Even though a portion of Americans have some questions about how much the United States gets out of security alliances and trade agreements, the American public as a whole seems to recognize clear value in maintaining them.
President Trump appears to have noticed, and he has begun to adjust some of his campaign positions since moving into the Oval Office. He has declared that NATO is no longer obsolete and has taken some steps to reassure allies that the United States will honor its defense commitments. Officials in Trump's administration, including the vice president and the secretaries of state and defense, hold more mainstream views on defense issues, and they have repeatedly traveled to allied nations to smooth ruffled feathers. President Trump has also moderated some of his anti-trade rhetoric, backing away from accusations of Chinese currency manipulation and seeking to renegotiate rather than abandon NAFTA. These moderated positions are closer to mainstream American views; they are also closer to the views of those Republicans who are not core supporters of Donald Trump.38
2016 Pew Research Center Survey
A May 2016 article by the Pew Research Center regarding a survey of U.S. foreign policy attitudes conducted in April 2016 states
The public views America's role in the world with considerable apprehension and concern. In fact, most Americans say it would be better if the U.S. just dealt with its own problems and let other countries deal with their own problems as best they can.
With the United States facing an array of global threats, public support for increased defense spending has climbed to its highest level since a month after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when 50% favored more defense spending.
Currently, 35% say the U.S. should increase spending on national defense, 24% say it should be cut back and 40% say it should be kept about the same as today. The share favoring more defense spending has increased 12 percentage points (from 23%) since 2013....
The new survey, conducted April 12 to 19 among 2,008 U.S. adults, finds the public remains wary of global involvement, although on some measures, support for U.S. internationalism has increased modestly from the historically low levels found in the 2013 study.
Still, 57% of Americans want the U.S. to deal with its own problems, while letting other countries get along as best they can. Just 37% say the U.S. should help other countries deal with their problems. And more Americans say the U.S. does too much (41%), rather than too little (27%), to solve world problems, with 28% saying it is doing about the right amount.
The public's wariness toward global engagement extends to U.S. participation in the global economy. Nearly half of Americans (49%) say U.S. involvement in the global economy is a bad thing because it lowers wages and costs jobs; fewer (44%) see this as a good thing because it provides the U.S. with new markets and opportunities for growth....
While Americans remain skeptical of U.S. international involvement, many also view the United States as a less powerful and important world leader than it was a decade ago. Nearly half (46%) say the United States is a less powerful and important world leader than it was 10 years ago, while 21% say it is more powerful, and 31% say it is about as powerful as it was then.
U.S. seen as leading economic, military power. The share saying the U.S. has become less powerful has declined since 2013, from 53% to 46%, but is among the highest numbers expressing this view in the past four decades. These attitudes also are divided along partisan lines: Republicans (67%) remain more likely than independents (48%) or Democrats (26%) to say that the U.S. has become less powerful and important.
However, although many Americans believe the U.S. has become less powerful than it was in the past, the predominant view among the public is that the United States is the world's leading economic and military power.
In a separate Pew Research Center survey conducted April 4 to 24 among 1,003 U.S. adults, a majority of Americans (54%) say the United States is the world's leading economic power, with China a distant second at 34%. This is the first time, in surveys dating back to 2008, that more than half of the public has named the United States as the leading economic power.39
2016 Chicago Council on Global Affairs Report
A 2016 Chicago Council on Global Affairs report on U.S. public opinion data regarding U.S. foreign policy stated
Over the past year, Donald Trump has been able to channel the anxieties of a significant segment of the American public into a powerful political force, taking him to the doorstep of the White House. These public anxieties stem from growing concerns about the effects of globalization on the American economy and about the changing demographics of the United States.
Although Trump has been able to mobilize many of those who are most concerned about these developments, their motivating concerns are not new. They existed before Donald Trump entered the race, and they are likely to persist even if he loses the election in November 2016. Yet, uniquely among the candidates running for president this cycle, Trump has given voice to this group of Americans, notably through his tough stances on immigration and trade.
At the same time, while this segment of the American public has given Donald Trump traction in the presidential race, his views on important issues garner only minority support from the overall American public. While they are divided on expanding a wall on the US border with Mexico, Americans overall support continued immigration into the United States and favor reform to address the large population of unauthorized immigrants already in the country. Americans overall think globalization is mostly good for the United States, and they see many benefits to free trade. And the American public as a whole—including the core supporters of Donald Trump—still favors the country's traditional alliances, a shared leadership role for the United States abroad, and the preservation of US military superiority....
While Trump's views on immigration and trade clearly resonate with his core supporters, some of his other criticisms of US foreign policy are less popular among his base. For example, core Trump supporters are somewhat more cautious than other Americans of alliances and an active US role in world affairs, but in most cases they continue to favor international engagement. This serves as a reminder that despite divides on issues such as immigration and trade, the American public finds a great deal of common ground on American leadership in the world and how to achieve American goals....40
2016 Charles Koch Institute and Center for the National Interest Survey
The Charles Koch Institute and the Center for the National Interest stated the following regarding the results of a December 2016 survey of U.S. public opinion regarding U.S. foreign policy:
The Charles Koch Institute and the Center for the National Interest today released a poll of 1,000 Americans that shows voters believe focusing on diplomacy and trade are better methods of improving U.S. security than military intervention.
"More than half of Americans think that U.S. foreign policy over the last 15 years has made us less safe," said William Ruger, vice president for research and policy at the Charles Koch Institute. "Americans want the next administration to take a different approach, with many favoring more caution about committing military forces abroad while preferring greater burden sharing by our wealthy allies and diplomacy over regime change. This poll is the second since October where the Charles Koch Institute and the Center for the National Interest have identified Americans' disenchantment with the status quo. The public's call for peace and change reflect the same views they held before the election. It's time that Washington listens to a public expressing greater prudence."
"Americans see trade and diplomacy as contributing more to U.S. national security than regime change in foreign lands," said Paul J. Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest. "Voters also support a strong military and more balanced alliances—though many have reservations about unconditional commitments, particularly to some new U.S. allies. The incoming administration and Congress have an important opportunity to define a new model of American leadership that moves beyond the mistakes of the last two decades."
Poll results show:
Americans Still Believe Recent U.S. Foreign Policy Has Made Them Less Safe:
• When asked if U.S. foreign policy over the last 15 years had made Americans more or less safe, a majority (52%) said less safe. Just 12% said more, while one quarter said U.S. foreign policy had no impact on their level of safety.
• When asked if U.S. foreign policy over the last 15 years had made the world more or less safe, 51% said less safe, 11% said more, and 24% said safety levels had stayed the same.
• These findings are largely the same as results from a joint CKI-CFTNI October [2016] poll.
Americans Favor Peaceful Engagement Over Military Intervention:
• More than two-thirds of respondents (70%) agreed with the statement, "The U.S. should work with existing governments and heads of state to try to promote peace" rather than seeking to oust government by force.
• When asked which of two options would make the United States safer, 49% said prioritizing diplomacy over military intervention while just 26% said prioritizing military power over diplomacy. Another 25% were not sure.
• When asked whether the U.S. government should increase U.S. military spending, decrease it, or keep spending the same, a plurality (40%) wanted to increase spending, while nearly half either wanted to keep it the same (32%) or cut it (17%). Another 12% were not sure.
• When asked which of two options would make the United States safer, only 20% said making more attempts at regime change would improve safety, while 45% said cutting the number of U.S. attempts at regime change would improve safety. 35% were not sure.
• More than half (54%) said working more through the United Nations would improve U.S. safety, while only 26% thought working less through the United Nations would be better. 24% were not sure.
• When asked broadly about what would make the United States safer, respondents preferred expanding U.S. alliance commitments (50%) to reducing U.S. alliance commitments (27%). However, Americans did not see U.S. commitments as necessarily unconditional. Only 26% of the respondents either somewhat or strongly agreed with the statement, "In a military conflict between Russia and Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, the United States should automatically defend that country with American military forces." Thirty-two percent either somewhat or strongly disagreed.
• Increased trade should be part of the United States' diplomatic efforts. More than half of respondents (55%) said increasing trade would improve U.S. safety. Only 22% said decreasing trade would make the country safer. Another 23% were not sure.
• Notwithstanding significant reservations about Russia, over half of voters see that country as a potential partner. When asked whether the United States should view Russia an adversary or as a potential partner, more than half either said Russia should be viewed as both (38%) or should be viewed as a potential partner (17%). Only 33% said Russia definitely should be viewed solely as an adversary. Another 12% said they were unsure.
• American voters are unsure about the U.S. relationship with China. When asked whether they viewed China as an ally, 93% of respondents said no. However, 89% also indicated they would not characterize China as an enemy. The most accepted term for China was "competitor"—42% of respondents said they agreed with that characterization.
Americans Want Washington to Exercise Restraint Abroad:
• When asked whether Congress should impeach a president who does not get congressional approval before committing the United States to military action abroad, a plurality (39%) said yes, while just 27% said no. Another 34% were not sure.
• When asked which of two options would make the United States safer, 45% of respondents said reducing U.S. military presence abroad, 31% said increasing it, and 24% said they did not know.
• When asked which of two options would make the United States safer, 40% of respondents said decreasing the use of U.S. military force for democracy promotion internationally, 31% said increasing it, and 29% were not sure.
• When asked about troop levels in Europe, three quarters said the United States should either keep levels the same as they are today (46%) or bring home at least some of the troops (28%). Only 12% said troop levels in Europe should be expanded. A plurality (44%) said the media had not provided enough information about recent U.S. troop deployments in Europe.
• When a sked whether the United States should deploy ground troops to Syria, 55% of Americans said no, 23% said yes, and 23% were not sure. Those opposing ground troops in Syria increased by 4 percentage points since the October survey.
• When asked whether the United States should increase its military presence in the Middle East, only 22% of respondents said yes, while 35% said they would reduce U.S. presence in the Middle East. Another 29% said they wouldn't change troop levels.
Voters Want President-Elect Donald Trump to Exercise Restraint and Audit the Military:
• When asked whether President-elect Trump should audit the Pentagon, 57% said yes, 28% weren't sure, and 15% said no.
• Americans think our allies should shoulder more of the burden. When asked whether President-elect Trump should encourage NATO countries to increase or decrease their defense spending, only 8% said decrease while 41% said increase, and another 33% said President-elect Trump should encourage NATO countries to keep spending levels stable.
• When asked whether the Trump administration should strengthen the U.S. military's relationship with Saudi Arabia, only 20% said it should while 23% suggested the United States should loosen its ties with Saudi Arabia. One third (33%) said the relationship should be kept as is, while another 24% were not sure.
• When asked whether President-elect Trump should respect, renegotiate, or walk away from the Iran deal that lifted international sanctions on Iran in exchange for more scrutiny of their nuclear facilities, 32% said renegotiate, 28% said respect, 17% said walk away, and 23% were not sure.41
Comments from Observers
In a June 2016 blog post, one foreign policy specialist stated
Few things make professors happier than thinking that the public has finally begun to agree with them. No surprise, then, that John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard open their article in Foreign Affairs42—in which they propose a new "grand strategy" for the United States—by observing that "[f]or the first time in recent memory, a large number of Americans" are saying they want the same thing. The ideas Mr. Mearsheimer and Mr. Walt propose—big cuts in defense spending, withdrawals from Europe and the Middle East, a focus on China as our only real rival—deserve the discussion they will surely get. But let's put the policy merits to one side. Are the professors right to say they've now got the people behind them?
The data say no. Mr. Mearsheimer and Mr. Walt rely on an April Pew poll that found that 57% of Americans want the U.S. "to deal with its own problems." But this is what most Americans always say, no matter what "grand strategy" their leaders follow. In 2013, 80% of Pew respondents wanted to "concentrate more on our own national problems." Twenty years earlier, 78% said the same thing. And 20 years before that, 73%. On this particular question, the number today (it's dropped to 69% since 2013) is lower than it has been "in recent memory," but it's always high....
Pew's pollsters, of course, ask many different questions, and the results don't always seem entirely consistent. Still, one trend is very clear: Fewer Americans are saying they want a less activist foreign policy. Three years ago, 51% said the U.S. did "too much in helping solve world problems." This year, 41% did. This pattern—a 10-point drop in three years—holds among Democrats, Republicans, and independents.
Ask questions with a sharper policy focus, and the result is steady—sometimes growing—support for a strong U.S. global role. Majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and independents favor policies that would keep the U.S. "the only military superpower." Mr. Mearsheimer and Mr. Walt, by contrast, want to cut defense spending. Only 24% of Americans agree. (That share, also, is down from five years ago, and support for an increase has almost tripled, from 13% to 35%.) The professors want to pull all U.S. forces out of Europe and let our allies handle Russia on their own. Fine, but 77% of the American public thinks that NATO is good for the United States, and almost as many Americans (42%) view Russia as a "major threat" as see China that way (50%).43
In an April 2017 blog post, this same foreign policy specialist stated
Every 20 years or so—the regularity is a little astonishing—Americans hold a serious debate about their place in the world. What, they ask, is going wrong? And how can it be fixed? The discussion, moreover, almost always starts the same way. Having extricated itself with some success from a costly war, the United States then embraces a scaled-down foreign policy, the better to avoid overcommitment. But when unexpected challenges arise, people start asking whether the new, more limited strategy is robust enough. Politicians and policy makers, scholars and experts, journalists and pundits, the public at large, even representatives of other governments (both friendly and less friendly) all take part in the back-and-forth. They want to know whether America, despite its decision to do less, should go back to doing more—and whether it can.
The reasons for doubt are remarkably similar from one period of discussion to the next. Some argue that the U.S. economy is no longer big enough to sustain a global role of the old kind, or that domestic problems should take priority. Others ask whether the public is ready for new exertions. The foreign-policy establishment may seem too divided, and a viable consensus too hard to reestablish. Many insist that big international problems no longer lend themselves to Washington's solutions, least of all to military ones. American "leadership," it is said, won't work so well in our brave new world....
Polls suggested [in 2016] that [the public], too, was open to new approaches—but unsure how to choose among them. In May 2016, the Pew Research Center reported that 70 percent of voters wanted the next president to focus on domestic affairs rather than foreign policy. In the same poll, Pew found that majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and independents favored policies that would keep the United States "the only military superpower." Not for the first time, it seemed that Americans wanted to have it all....
... the two halves of Trump's formula worked together better than critics appreciated. He sensed that the public wanted relief from the burdens of global leadership without losing the thrill of nationalist self-assertion. America could cut back its investment in world order with no whiff of retreat. It would still boss others around, even bend them to its will. Trump embraced Bernie Sanders's economics without George McGovern's geopolitics. Of self-identified conservative Republicans, 70 percent told Pew last year that they wanted the U.S. to retain its global military dominance. "Make America Great Again" was a slogan aimed right at them.
Trump's more-and-less strategy also helped him with those who wanted a bristly, muscular America but did not want endless military involvements. Rejecting "nation building" abroad so as to focus on the home front was Trump's way of assuring voters that he knew how to avoid imperial overstretch. He offered supporters the glow of a Ronald Reagan experience—without the George W. Bush tab.44
Commenting on the 2016 Charles Koch Institute-Center for the National Interest poll discussed earlier, a December 2016 blog post from staff of The National Interest stated
With the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, the American public opted for change. A new poll from the Charles Koch Institute and Center for the National Interest on America and foreign affairs indicates that the desire for a fresh start may be particularly pronounced in the foreign policy sphere. In many areas the responses align with what Donald Trump was saying during the presidential campaign—and in other areas, there are a number of Americans who don't have strong views. There may be a real opportunity for Trump to redefine the foreign policy debate. He may have a ready-made base of support and find that other Americans are persuadable.
Two key questions centering on whether U.S. foreign policy has made Americans more or less safe and whether U.S. foreign policy has made the rest of the world more or less safe show that a majority of the public is convinced that—in both cases—the answer is that it has not. 51.9 percent say that American foreign policy has not enhanced our security; 51.1 percent say that it has also had a deleterious effect abroad. The responses indicate that the successive wars in the Middle East, ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya, have not promoted but, rather, undermined a sense of security among Americans.
The poll results indicate that this sentiment has translated into nearly 35 percent of respondents wanted a decreased military footprint in the Middle East, with about 30 percent simply wanting to keep things where they stand. When it comes to America's key relationship with Saudi Arabia, 23.2 percent indicate that they would favor weaker military ties, while 24 percent say they are simply unsure. Over half of Americans do not want to deploy ground troops to Syria. Overall, 45.4 percent say that they believe that it would enhance American security to reduce our military presence abroad, while 30.9 percent say that it should be increased.
That Americans are adopting a more equivocal approach overall towards other countries seems clear. When provided with a list of adjectives to describe relationship, very few Americans were prepared to choose the extremes of friend or foe. The most popular term was the fairly neutral term "competitor." The mood appears to be similarly ambivalent about NATO. When asked whether the U.S. should automatically defend Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia in a military conflict with Russia, 26.1 percent say that they neither agree nor disagree. 22 percent say that they disagree and a mere 16.8 percent say that they agree. Similarly, when queried about whether the inclusion of Montenegro makes America safer, no less than 63.6 percent say that they don't know or are not sure. About Russia itself, 37.8 percent indicate they see it as both an adversary and a potential partner. That they still see it as a potential partner is remarkable given the tenor of the current media climate.
The poll results underscore that Americans are uneasy with the status quo. U.S. foreign policy in particular is perceived as a failure and Americans want to see a change, endorsing views and stands that might previously have been seen as existing on the fringe of debate about America's proper role abroad. Instead of militarism and adventurism, Americans are more keen on a cooperative world, in which trade and diplomacy are the principal means of engaging other nations. 49 percent of the respondents indicate that they would prioritize diplomacy over military power, while 26.3 percent argue for the reverse. 54 percent argue that the U.S. should work more through the United Nations to improve its security. Moreover, a clear majority of those polled stated that they believed that increasing trade would help to make the United States safer. In a year that has been anything but normal, perhaps Trump is onto something with his talk of burden sharing and a more critical look at the regnant establishment foreign policy that has prevailed until now.45
In December 2016, two Australian foreign policy analysts, stated
The 2016 presidential election demonstrated the rise of a "restraint constituency" in American politics that openly questions Washington's bipartisan post-Cold War pursuit of a grand strategy of primacy or liberal hegemony. This constituency has been animated by the return of the Jacksonian tradition of American foreign policy, most notably in the candidacy of Donald Trump, which directly questions the benefits of alliance relationships as well as U.S. underwriting of an open global economic system. It also stresses the need for the United States to act unilaterally in defense of its core foreign policy interests. The resurgence of the Jacksonian tradition will make it difficult for the next President to reestablish a foreign policy consensus and combat perceptions of American decline."46
Some scholars have suggested that the Jacksonian tradition in U.S. foreign policy mentioned in the quote above has had "a long history of political struggles with liberal internationalism...."47 Jacksonianism, in this view, embodies a tradition reflecting an idea of the United States and its people being freed from the burdens of global leadership.
Some commentators have suggested that in the United States a series of crises has "destroyed [public] confidence in the competence and probity of financial, economic, and policy-making elites," and that belief in the fairness of the postwar international system has been seriously eroded.48 In a May 2017 blog post, one foreign policy specialist stated
President Trump may not enjoy majority support these days, but there's good reason to believe that his "America First" approach to the world does. There has been no popular outcry against Mr. Trump's trade battles with Canada, Mexico and the European allies. Experts suggest we are in for a long international trade war, no matter who the next president may be. After all, even Hillary Clinton had to disown her support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the last election. The old free-trade consensus is gone.
Mr. Trump's immigration policies may be more popular with Republicans than with Democrats, but few Democratic politicians are running on a promise to bring more immigrants into the country. And just as in the 1920s, isolationism joins anti-immigration sentiment and protectionism as a pillar of America Firstism.
The old consensus about America's role as upholder of global security has collapsed in both parties. Russia may have committed territorial aggression against Ukraine. But Republican voters follow Mr. Trump in seeking better ties, accepting Moscow's forcible annexation of Crimea and expanding influence in the Middle East (even if some of the president's subordinates do not). They applaud Mr. Trump for seeking a dubious deal with North Korea just as they once condemned Democratic presidents for doing the same thing. They favor a trade war with China but have not consistently favored military spending increases to deter a real war.
Democrats might seem to be rallying behind the liberal order, but much of this is just opposition to Mr. Trump's denigration of it. Are today's rank-and-file Democrats really more committed to defending allies and deterring challengers to the liberal world order? Most Democratic politicians railing against Mr. Trump's "appeasement" of Moscow hailed Obama's "reset" a few years ago and chastised Republicans for seeking a new Cold War. Most Democratic voters want lower military spending and a much smaller United States military presence overseas, which hardly comports with getting tougher on Russia, Korea or China — except on trade.
Most Americans in both parties also agree with Mr. Trump that America's old allies need to look out for themselves and stop relying on the United States to protect them. Few really disagreed with the president's stated reluctance to commit American lives to the defense of Montenegro. Britons in the 1930s did not want to "die for Danzig," and Americans today don't want to die for Taipei or Riga, never mind Kiev or Tbilisi. President Obama was less hostile to the allies than Mr. Trump, but even he complained about "free riders."
In retrospect it's pretty clear that Mr. Obama was too internationalist for his party base. He expanded NATO, intervened in Libya, imposed sanctions on Russia and presided over the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Democrats may miss Mr. Obama for many reasons, but there's little evidence that the rank-and-file miss those policies. Mr. Trump's narrower, more unilateralist and nationalist approach to the world is probably closer to where the general public is than Mr. Obama's more cosmopolitan sensibility.
It would be comforting to blame America's current posture on Mr. Trump. But while he may be a special kind of president, even he can't create a public mood out of nothing. Now as always, presidents reflect public opinion at least as much as they shape it. Between the two world wars, and especially from 1921 through 1936, an American public disillusioned by World War I was averse to further overseas involvement, and it didn't matter whether the presidents were supposed "isolationists" like Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge or supposed "internationalists" like Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt. It took a lot more than fireside chats to turn public opinion around. It took Hitler's conquest of Europe, near-conquest of Britain and, finally, Pearl Harbor to onvince a majority of Americans that America First was a mistake.
In our own time, the trend toward an America First approach has been growing since the end of the Cold War. George H.W. Bush, the hero of the Gulf War, had to play down foreign policy in 1992 and lost to a candidate promising to focus on domestic issues. George W. Bush won in 2000 promising to reduce United States global involvement, defeating an opponent, Al Gore, who was still talking about America's indispensability. In 2008, Mr. Obama won while promising to get out of foreign conflicts for good. In 2016, Republican internationalists like Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio were trounced in the primaries. Hillary Clinton struggled to hold off Bernie Sanders, a progressive isolationist, and it was certainly not because of her foreign policy views.
Now we have Mr. Trump. Is he an aberration or a culmination? Many foreign policy experts, and most of the foreign leaders pouring into New York this week for the United Nation's General Assembly, have been counting on the former. They place their hopes on the 2020 elections to get America back on its old path. But they may have to start facing the fact that what we're seeing today is not a spasm but a new direction in American foreign policy, or rather a return to older traditions — the kind that kept us on the sidelines while fascism and militarism almost conquered the world.100
In a May 2017 blog post, one foreign policy specialist stated:
Over a period of decades, the American people and their elected representatives funded defense expenditures far greater than what would have been necessary simply to protect the continental United States. They faced up to the idea that American troops might fight and die to defend faraway frontiers. And they accepted—often reluctantly—the notion that Washington should take primary responsibility for leading the global economy, U.S. alliances, and international institutions, despite the myriad costs and frustrations involved.
Americans accepted these costs not out of any special altruism, of course, but because they believed the benefits of living in—and leading—a stable, prosperous, and liberal world order were ultimately greater. But if the postwar era was thus characterized, as G. John Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney write, by a "bipartisan consensus…on the paramount importance of American leadership," then the 2016 presidential election and its results surely called into question whether that consensus still exists....
So, was the 2016 election merely an aberration within the long history of American internationalism? Or does Trump's victory indicate deeper and perhaps more irrevocable changes in American attitudes on foreign affairs? As it turns out, there are two plausible interpretations of this issue, and they point in very different directions....
If political support for American internationalism was plummeting, one would expect to see unambiguous downturns in public opinion toward U.S. alliances, international trade, and other key initiatives. Yet while there certainly are signs of public alienation from American internationalism – as discussed subsequently – most recent polling data tells a different story.
According to public opinion surveys taken in the heat of the 2016 campaign, for instance, 65 percent of Americans saw globalization as "mostly good" for the United States, and 64 percent saw international trade as "good for their own standard of living." Even the Trans-Pacific Partnership – which Clinton disowned under pressure from Sanders, and which Trump used as a political punching bag – enjoyed 60 percent support. Reaching back slightly further to 2013, an overwhelming majority – 77 percent – of Americans believed that trade and business ties to other countries were either "somewhat good" or "very good" for the United States. In other words, if Americans are in wholesale revolt against globalization, most public opinion polls are not capturing that discontent.
Nor are they registering a broad popular backlash against other aspects of American internationalism. Although Trump delighted in disparaging U.S. alliances during the campaign, some 77 percent of Americans still saw being a member of NATO as a good thing. A remarkable 89 percent believed that maintaining U.S. alliances was "very or somewhat effective at achieving U.S. foreign policy goals."
Similarly, recent opinion polls have revealed little evidence that the American public is demanding significant military retrenchment. In 2016, three-quarters of respondents believed that defense spending should rise or stay the same. The proposition favoring more defense spending had actually increased significantly (from 23 percent to 35 percent) since 2013. Support for maintaining overseas bases and forward deployments of U.S. troops was also strong. And regarding military intervention, recent polls have indeed shown a widespread belief that the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not worth the cost, but these sentiments do not seem to have translated into a broader skepticism regarding the utility of military force. In 2016, for instance, 62 percent of Americans approved of the military campaign against the Islamic State, demonstrating broad agreement that the United States should be willing to use the sword – even in faraway places – when threats emerge.
Polling on other issues reveals still more of the same. For all of Trump's critiques of international institutions, international law, and multilateralism, nearly two-third of Americans (64 percent) viewed the United Nations favorably in 2016 and 71 percent supported U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement on combating climate change. And, although polls indicating that over 50 percent of Americans now prefer to let other countries "get along as best they can" on their own are far more troubling, here too the overall picture painted by recent survey data is somewhat brighter. As of 2016, more than half – 55 percent – of Americans believed that the United States either did too little or the right amount in confronting global problems. When asked if the United States should continue playing an active role in world affairs, nearly two-thirds answered affirmatively.
As one comprehensive analysis of the survey data thus concluded,49101 at present there is just not overwhelming evidence—in the polls, at least—to suggest a broad-gauged public rejection of internationalism: "The American public as a whole still thinks that the United States is the greatest and most influential country in the world, and bipartisan support remains strong for the country to take an active part in world affairs."...
... there is also a far more pessimistic – and equally plausible – way of reading the national mood. From this perspective, Trump's rise is not an aberration or a glitch. It is, rather, the culmination of a quiet crisis that has gradually but unmistakably been weakening the political foundations of American internationalism. That crisis may not yet be manifesting in dramatic, across-the-board changes in how Americans view particular foreign policy issues. But as Trump's election indicates, its political effects are nonetheless becoming profound....
After all, it was not Trump but Obama who first called for the country to shift from nation-building abroad to nation-building at home. Whatever their views on other parts of American internationalism, many Americans apparently agreed. Whereas 29 percent of Americans believed that promoting democracy abroad should be a key diplomatic priority in 2001, by 2013 the number was only 18 percent. When Trump slammed these aspects of American internationalism, he was pushing on an open door....
What Trump intuitively understood, however, was that the credibility of the experts had been badly tarnished in recent years.
As Tom Nichols has observed, the deference that experts command from the U.S. public has been declining for some time, and this is certainly the case in foreign policy....
These issues related to another, more fundamental contributor to the crisis of American internationalism: the rupturing of the basic political-economic bargain that had long undergirded that tradition. From its inception, internationalism entailed significant and tangible costs, both financial and otherwise, and the pursuit of free trade in particular inevitably disadvantaged workers and industries that suffered from greater global competition. As a result, the rise of American internationalism during and after World War II went hand-in-hand with measures designed to offset these costs by ensuring upward social mobility and rising economic fortunes for the voters—particularly working- and middle-class voters—being asked to bear them.... This bargain has gradually been fraying since as far back as the late 1970s, however, and in recent years it increasingly seems to have broken.
For the fact is that many Americans—particularly less-educated Americans—are not seeing their economic fortunes and mobility improve over time. Rather, their prospects have worsened significantly in recent decades....
Indeed, although there is plenty of public opinion polling that paints a reassuring picture of American views on trade and globalization, there are also clear indications that such a backlash is occurring. In 2016, a plurality of Americans (49 percent) argued that "U.S. involvement in the global economy is a bad thing because it lowers wages and costs jobs," a sentiment perfectly tailored to Trump's protectionist message....
More broadly, it is hard not to see concerns about economic insecurity looming large in the growing proportion of Americans who believe that the United States is overinvested internationally—and who therefore prefer for the "U.S. to deal with its own problems, while letting other countries get along as best they can." In 2013, 52 percent of Americans—the highest number in decades—agreed with a version of this statement. In 2016, the number was even higher at 57 percent.
In sum, American voters may still express fairly strong support for free trade and other longstanding policies in public opinion surveys. But it is simply impossible to ignore the fact that, among significant swaths of the population, there is nonetheless an unmistakable and politically potent sense that American foreign policy has become decoupled from the interests of those it is meant to serve.
And this point, in turn, illuminates a final strain that Trump's rise so clearly highlighted: the growing sense that American internationalism has become unmoored from American nationalism. American internationalism was always conceived as an enlightened expression of American nationalism, an approach premised on the idea that the wellbeing of the United States was inextricably interwoven with that of the outside world. But the inequities of globalization have promoted a tangible feeling among many voters that American elites are now privileging an internationalist agenda (one that may suit cosmopolitan elites just fine) at the expense of the wellbeing of "ordinary Americans." Likewise, insofar as immigration from Mexico and Central America has depressed wages for low-skilled workers and fueled concerns that the white working class is being displaced by other demographic groups, it has fostered beliefs that the openness at the heart of the internationalist project is benefitting the wrong people. "Many Jacksonians," writes Walter Russell Mead of the coalition that brought Trump to power, "came to believe that the American establishment was no longer reliably patriotic."
What does all this tell us about the future of American internationalism? The answer involves elements of both interpretations offered here. It is premature to say that a "new isolationism" is taking hold, or that Americans are systematically turning away from internationalism, in light of the idiosyncrasies of Trump's victory and the fact that so many key aspects of internationalism still poll fairly well. Yet no serious observer can contend that American internationalism is truly healthy given Trump's triumph, and the 2016 election clearly revealed the assorted maladies that had been quietly eroding its political vitality. American internationalism may not be slipping into history just yet, but its long-term trajectory seems problematic indeed.50
Later in May 2017, this same foreign policy specialist stated in a different blog post
thatOn the one hand, it is easy to make the case that Trump's election was more of a black-swan, anomalous event than something that tells us much about the state of public opinion on foreign policy. The election campaign was dominated not by deeply substantive foreign policy debates, in this interpretation, but by the historic unpopularity of both candidates. And of course, Trump was decisively defeated in the popular vote by a card-carrying member of the U.S. foreign policy establishment—and he might well have lost decisively in the electoral college, too, if not for then-FBI Director James Comey's intervention and a series of other lucky breaks late in the campaign.
There is, moreover, substantial polling data to suggest that American internationalism is doing just fine. According to surveys taken during the 2016 campaign, 65 percent of Americans believed that globalization was "mostly good" for the United States, and 89 percent believed that maintaining U.S. alliances was "very or somewhat effective at achieving U.S. foreign policy goals." Support for U.S. military primacy and intervention against threats such as the Islamic State also remained strong, as did domestic backing for the United Nations and the Paris climate change accords.
As an extensive analysis of this polling data by the Chicago Council concluded, there does not seem to be any wholesale public rejection of American internationalism underway: "The American public as a whole still thinks that the United States is the greatest and most influential country in the world, and bipartisan support remains strong for the country to take an active part in world affairs." And indeed, insofar as Trump has had to roll back some of the more radical aspects of his "America first" agenda since becoming president—tearing up the North American Free Trade Agreement, declaring NATO obsolete, launching a trade war with China—he seems to be adjusting to this reality.
That's the good news. But on the other hand, American internationalism simply cannot be all that healthy, because Trump did win the presidency by running on the most anti-internationalist platform seen in decades. American voters may not have been voting for that platform itself, but at the very least they did not see Trump's radical views on foreign policy as disqualifying. And as one digs deeper into the state of American internationalism today, it becomes clear that there are indeed real problems with that tradition—problems that Trump exploited on his road to the White House, and that are likely to confront his successors as well.
Trump's rise has highlighted five key strains that have been weakening the political foundations of American internationalism for years now.
First, since the end of the Cold War, it has become harder for Americans to identify precisely why the United States must undertake such extraordinary exertions to shape the global order. Without a pressing, easily identifiable global threat, in other words, it is harder to intuitively understand what American alliances, forward force deployments, and other internationalist initiatives are for.
Second, although U.S. internationalism has proven very valuable in shaping a congenial international system, it is undeniable that aspects of that tradition—such as nation building missions in Afghanistan and Iraq—have proven costly and unrewarding in recent years. Not surprisingly, many Americans are thus questioning if the resources that the country devotes to foreign policy are being used effectively. This disillusion has shown up in public opinion polling: Whereas 29 percent of Americans believed that promoting democracy should be a key foreign policy objective in 2001, only 18 percent thought so in 2013.
Third, the credibility of the U.S. foreign policy establishment has also been weakened over the past 15 years. This is because policy elites in both parties pursued policies—the Iraq War under President George W. Bush, the subsequent withdrawal from Iraq and creation of a security vacuum in that country under President Barack Obama—that led to high-profile disasters. As a result, when Trump—who actually supported the invasion of Iraq before later opposing it—answered establishment criticism by pointing out that the establishment had brought the United States the Iraq War and the Islamic State, his rejoinder probably made a good deal of sense to many voters.
Fourth, U.S. internationalism has been weakened by the declining economic fortunes of the working and middle classes—a phenomenon that has made those groups less enthusiastic about bearing the costs and burdens associated with U.S. foreign policy. The pursuit of globalization and free trade has not been the primary culprit here—issues like automation and the transition to a postindustrial economy have been more important. But it is undeniable that globalization has exacerbated economic insecurity for the working class in particular, and China's integration into the global economy has taken a significant toll on manufacturing and related employment in the United States. During the Republican primaries, in fact, 65 percent of Trump voters believed that U.S. involvement in the international economy was a bad thing. During the general election, Trump overperformed in areas hardest hit by competition from international trade.
Fifth, and finally, one can discern among many voters an amorphous but powerful sense that U.S. internationalism has become unmoored from U.S. nationalism—that America's governing classes have pursued an agenda that has worked nicely for the well-to-do, but brought fewer benefits to the ordinary Americans whom U.S. foreign policy is meant to serve. This dynamic is evident in the 57 percent of the population who believed in 2016 that the United States was focusing too much on other countries' problems and not enough on its own. Cracks are growing in the political consensus that has traditionally undergirded American internationalism—cracks through which Trump was able emerge in 2016.
The bottom line is that American internationalism is not dead yet, but that it faces serious longterm maladies that could, perhaps, ultimately prove fatal.51
Also in May 2017, a different foreign policy specialist stated
:When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the bipartisan foreign-policy establishment was united in seeing a historic opportunity to deepen the liberal order and extend it into the rest of the world. Yet the public had always been skeptical about this project. Jacksonians in particular believed that American global policy was a response to the Soviet threat, and that once the threat had disappeared, the U.S. should retrench.
After World War I, and again at the start of the Cold War, Americans had held great debates over whether and how to engage with the world. But that debate didn't happen after the Soviet collapse. Elites felt confident that the end of history had arrived, that expanding the world order would be so easy and cheap it could be done without much public support. Washington thus embarked on a series of consequential foreign-policy endeavors: enlarging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include much of Central and Eastern Europe, establishing the World Trade Organization in the mid-'90s, promoting a global democracy agenda whenever possible.
American voters have never shared the establishment's enthusiasm for a foreign policy aimed at transforming the post-Cold War world. When given the choice at the ballot box, they consistently dismiss experienced foreign-policy hands who call for deep global engagement. Instead they install untried outsiders who want increased focus on issues at home. Thus Clinton over Bush in 1992, Bush over Gore in 2000, Obama over McCain in 2008, and Trump over Clinton in 2016.
Today the core problem in American foreign policy remains the disconnect between the establishment's ambitious global agenda and the limited engagement that voters appear to support. As Washington's challenges abroad become more urgent and more dangerous, the divide between elite and public opinion grows more serious by the day.
The establishment is now beginning to discover what many voters intuitively believed back in the 1990s. Building a liberal world order is much more expensive and difficult than it appeared in a quarter-century ago, when America was king. Further, Washington's foreign-policy establishment is neither as wise nor as competent as it believes itself to be.
Meantime, the world is only becoming more dangerous.... And the U.S. still lacks a strong consensus on what its foreign policy should be.
Washington's foreign policy needs more than grudging acquiescence from the American people if it is to succeed. How to build broad support? First, the Trump administration should embrace a new national strategy that is more realistic than the end-of-history fantasies that came at the Cold War's conclusion. The case for international engagement should be grounded in the actual priorities of American citizens. Second, Mr. Trump and other political leaders must make the case for strategic global engagement to a rightfully skeptical public.
For much of the establishment, focusing on the Trump administration's shortcomings is a way to avoid a painful inquest into the failures and follies of 25 years of post-Cold War foreign policy. But Mr. Trump's presidency is the result of establishment failure rather than the cause of it. Until the national leadership absorbs this lesson, the internal American crisis will deepen as the world crisis grows more acute.52
In an April 2017 blog post, one foreign policy specialist stated:
Every 20 years or so—the regularity is a little astonishing—Americans hold a serious debate about their place in the world. What, they ask, is going wrong? And how can it be fixed? The discussion, moreover, almost always starts the same way. Having extricated itself with some success from a costly war, the United States then embraces a scaled-down foreign policy, the better to avoid overcommitment. But when unexpected challenges arise, people start asking whether the new, more limited strategy is robust enough. Politicians and policy makers, scholars and experts, journalists and pundits, the public at large, even representatives of other governments (both friendly and less friendly) all take part in the back-and-forth. They want to know whether America, despite its decision to do less, should go back to doing more—and whether it can.
The reasons for doubt are remarkably similar from one period of discussion to the next. Some argue that the U.S. economy is no longer big enough to sustain a global role of the old kind, or that domestic problems should take priority. Others ask whether the public is ready for new exertions. The foreign-policy establishment may seem too divided, and a viable consensus too hard to reestablish. Many insist that big international problems no longer lend themselves to Washington's solutions, least of all to military ones. American "leadership," it is said, won't work so well in our brave new world....
Polls suggested [in 2016] that [the public], too, was open to new approaches—but unsure how to choose among them. In May 2016, the Pew Research Center reported that 70 percent of voters wanted the next president to focus on domestic affairs rather than foreign policy. In the same poll, Pew found that majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and independents favored policies that would keep the United States "the only military superpower." Not for the first time, it seemed that Americans wanted to have it all....
... the two halves of Trump's formula worked together better than critics appreciated. He sensed that the public wanted relief from the burdens of global leadership without losing the thrill of nationalist self-assertion. America could cut back its investment in world order with no whiff of retreat. It would still boss others around, even bend them to its will. Trump embraced Bernie Sanders's economics without George McGovern's geopolitics. Of self-identified conservative Republicans, 70 percent told Pew last year that they wanted the U.S. to retain its global military dominance. "Make America Great Again" was a slogan aimed right at them.
Trump's more-and-less strategy also helped him with those who wanted a bristly, muscular America but did not want endless military involvements. Rejecting "nation building" abroad so as to focus on the home front was Trump's way of assuring voters that he knew how to avoid imperial overstretch. He offered supporters the glow of a Ronald Reagan experience—without the George W. Bush tab.105
Commenting on the 2016 Charles Koch Institute-Center for the National Interest poll discussed earlier, a December 2016 blog post from staff of The National Interest stated
With the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, the American public opted for change. A new poll from the Charles Koch Institute and Center for the National Interest on America and foreign affairs indicates that the desire for a fresh start may be particularly pronounced in the foreign policy sphere. In many areas the responses align with what Donald Trump was saying during the presidential campaign—and in other areas, there are a number of Americans who don't have strong views. There may be a real opportunity for Trump to redefine the foreign policy debate. He may have a ready-made base of support and find that other Americans are persuadable.
Two key questions centering on whether U.S. foreign policy has made Americans more or less safe and whether U.S. foreign policy has made the rest of the world more or less safe show that a majority of the public is convinced that—in both cases—the answer is that it has not. 51.9 percent say that American foreign policy has not enhanced our security; 51.1 percent say that it has also had a deleterious effect abroad. The responses indicate that the successive wars in the Middle East, ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya, have not promoted but, rather, undermined a sense of security among Americans.
The poll results indicate that this sentiment has translated into nearly 35 percent of respondents wanted a decreased military footprint in the Middle East, with about 30 percent simply wanting to keep things where they stand. When it comes to America's key relationship with Saudi Arabia, 23.2 percent indicate that they would favor weaker military ties, while 24 percent say they are simply unsure. Over half of Americans do not want to deploy ground troops to Syria. Overall, 45.4 percent say that they believe that it would enhance American security to reduce our military presence abroad, while 30.9 percent say that it should be increased.
That Americans are adopting a more equivocal approach overall towards other countries seems clear. When provided with a list of adjectives to describe relationship, very few Americans were prepared to choose the extremes of friend or foe. The most popular term was the fairly neutral term "competitor." The mood appears to be similarly ambivalent about NATO. When asked whether the U.S. should automatically defend Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia in a military conflict with Russia, 26.1 percent say that they neither agree nor disagree. 22 percent say that they disagree and a mere 16.8 percent say that they agree. Similarly, when queried about whether the inclusion of Montenegro makes America safer, no less than 63.6 percent say that they don't know or are not sure. About Russia itself, 37.8 percent indicate they see it as both an adversary and a potential partner. That they still see it as a potential partner is remarkable given the tenor of the current media climate.
The poll results underscore that Americans are uneasy with the status quo. U.S. foreign policy in particular is perceived as a failure and Americans want to see a change, endorsing views and stands that might previously have been seen as existing on the fringe of debate about America's proper role abroad. Instead of militarism and adventurism, Americans are more keen on a cooperative world, in which trade and diplomacy are the principal means of engaging other nations. 49 percent of the respondents indicate that they would prioritize diplomacy over military power, while 26.3 percent argue for the reverse. 54 percent argue that the U.S. should work more through the United Nations to improve its security. Moreover, a clear majority of those polled stated that they believed that increasing trade would help to make the United States safer. In a year that has been anything but normal, perhaps Trump is onto something with his talk of burden sharing and a more critical look at the regnant establishment foreign policy that has prevailed until now.106
In December 2016, two Australian foreign policy analysts stated:
The 2016 presidential election demonstrated the rise of a "restraint constituency" in American politics that openly questions Washington's bipartisan post-Cold War pursuit of a grand strategy of primacy or liberal hegemony. This constituency has been animated by the return of the Jacksonian tradition of American foreign policy, most notably in the candidacy of Donald Trump, which directly questions the benefits of alliance relationships as well as U.S. underwriting of an open global economic system. It also stresses the need for the United States to act unilaterally in defense of its core foreign policy interests. The resurgence of the Jacksonian tradition will make it difficult for the next President to reestablish a foreign policy consensus and combat perceptions of American decline."107
In a June 2016 blog post, one foreign policy specialist (the same one quoted above for the April 2017 blog post) stated:
Few things make professors happier than thinking that the public has finally begun to agree with them. No surprise, then, that John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard open their article in Foreign Affairs108—in which they propose a new "grand strategy" for the United States—by observing that "[f]or the first time in recent memory, a large number of Americans" are saying they want the same thing. The ideas Mr. Mearsheimer and Mr. Walt propose—big cuts in defense spending, withdrawals from Europe and the Middle East, a focus on China as our only real rival—deserve the discussion they will surely get. But let's put the policy merits to one side. Are the professors right to say they've now got the people behind them?
The data say no. Mr. Mearsheimer and Mr. Walt rely on an April Pew poll that found that 57% of Americans want the U.S. "to deal with its own problems." But this is what most Americans always say, no matter what "grand strategy" their leaders follow. In 2013, 80% of Pew respondents wanted to "concentrate more on our own national problems." Twenty years earlier, 78% said the same thing. And 20 years before that, 73%. On this particular question, the number today (it's dropped to 69% since 2013) is lower than it has been "in recent memory," but it's always high....
Pew's pollsters, of course, ask many different questions, and the results don't always seem entirely consistent. Still, one trend is very clear: Fewer Americans are saying they want a less activist foreign policy. Three years ago, 51% said the U.S. did "too much in helping solve world problems." This year, 41% did. This pattern—a 10-point drop in three years—holds among Democrats, Republicans, and independents.
Ask questions with a sharper policy focus, and the result is steady—sometimes growing—support for a strong U.S. global role. Majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and independents favor policies that would keep the U.S. "the only military superpower." Mr. Mearsheimer and Mr. Walt, by contrast, want to cut defense spending. Only 24% of Americans agree. (That share, also, is down from five years ago, and support for an increase has almost tripled, from 13% to 35%.) The professors want to pull all U.S. forces out of Europe and let our allies handle Russia on their own. Fine, but 77% of the American public thinks that NATO is good for the United States, and almost as many Americans (42%) view Russia as a "major threat" as see China that way (50%).109
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Other terms used to refer to the liberal international order include U.S.-led international order, postwar international order, rules-based international order, and open international order. Observers sometimes substitute world for international, or omit international or world and refer simply to the liberal order, the U.S.-led order, and so on. In the terms liberal international order and liberal order, the word liberal does not refer to the conservative-liberal construct often used in discussing contemporary politics in the United States or other countries. It is, instead, an older use of the term that refers to an order based on rule of law, as opposed to an order based on the arbitrary powers of hereditary monarchs.
See, for example, Nick Danforth, "What's So Disordered About Your World Order?" War on the Rocks, June 20 2018.
See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, "What Sort of World Are We Headed For?" Foreign Policy, October 2, 2018; George Friedman, "The Myth of the Liberal International Order; It's Dangerous to Pine for a Time That Never Really Was." Geopolitical Futures, September 19, 2018; Andrew J. Bacevich, "The 'Global Order' Myth; Teary-Eyed Nostalgia as Cover for U.S. Hegemony," American Conservative, June 15, 2017; Graham Allison, "The Myth of the Liberal Order," Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2018; Patrick Porter, "A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal Order," Cato Institute, June 5, 2018; Niall Ferguson, "The Myth of the Liberal International Order," Global Times, January 11, 2018.
See, for example, Hal Brands, "America's Global Order Is Worth Fighting For; The Longest Period of Great-Power Peace in Modern History Is Not a 'Myth.'" Bloomberg, August 14, 2018; Michael J. Mazarr, "The Real History of the Liberal Order; Neither Myth Nor Accident," Foreign Affairs, August 7, 2018; Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, "The Liberal Order Is More Than a Myth; But It Must Adapt to the New Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs, July 31, 2018; Emile Simpson, "There's Nothing Wrong With the Liberal Order That Can't Be Fixed by What's Right With It; Realists Need to Get a Lot More Realistic about the Global Legal System." Foreign Policy, August 7, 2018.
For more on the democractic peace theory, see, for example, "Democratic Peace Theory," Oxford Bibliographies, accessed August 17, 2018, at http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0014.xml.
For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10485, Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design, by [author name scrubbed].
See, for example, Alex Ward, "America's Declining Power, in One Quote; UN Chief Antonio Guterres Says the 'Attraction of American Society' Is Less Clear Today Than a Few Decades Ago," Vox, September 14, 2018; Peter Beinart, "Trump Is Preparing for a New Cold War," Atlantic, February 27, 2018; Joseph S. Nye, "Donald Trump and the Decline of US Soft Power," Strategist (ASPI), February 12, 2018; Jennifer Wilson, "Trump's Air War, Far From Being an Isolationist, the President Is One of the Country's Most Hawkish in Modern History," New Republic, October 17, 2017; Christian Caryl, "Donald Trump's Foreign Policy Is Already Undercutting Human Rights Around the World," Washington Post, March 8, 2017.
See, for example, Walter Russell Mead, "Pompeo on What Trump Wants; An Interview with Trump's Top Diplomat on America First and 'The Need for a Reset,'" Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2018; Gary J. Schmitt, "Trump's UN Speech: What Makes America First," American Enterprise Institute, September 20, 2017; Amber Phillips, "How Trump's 'America first' Doctrine Drives Everything He Does—Including Getting Elected," Washington Post, September 19, 2017. For more on the America First theme as applied to the U.S. role in the world, see, for example, pages 33-34 (relating to the Department of State, USAID, and Treasury International Programs) and pages 15-16 (relating to the Department of Defense) of, Office of Management and Budget, America First, A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again, undated, accessed August 17, 2018, at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2018_blueprint.pdf, and National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, pp. I-II, 1, 3-4, 37, 55.
For more on the TPP, see, for example, CRS Insight IN10646, The United States Withdraws from the TPP, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44278, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
For more on the Paris climate accord, see, for example, CRS In Focus IF10668, Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Insight IN10746, Paris Agreement on Climate Change: U.S. Letter to United Nations, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44761, Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed].
See, for example, Robin Wright, "Trump's New, Confrontational Foreign Policy and the End of the Iran Deal," New Yorker, May 21, 2018; Anne Applebaum "Trump Has Put America in the Worst of All Possible Worlds," Washington Post, May 11, 2018; Peter Beinart, "The Iran Deal and the Dark Side of American Exceptionalism," Atlantic, May 9, 2018. For more on the Iran nuclear agreement, see for example, CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44942, U.S. Decision to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44761, Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed]. See also Philip Bump, "Where the U.S. Has Considered Leaving or Left International Agreements Under Trump," Washington Post, June 29, 2018.
See, for example, Rick Gladstone, "U.S. Quits Migration Pact, Saying It Infringes on Sovereignty," New York Times, December 3, 2017. For more on the GCM, see CRS In Focus IF11003, The Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and Catherine L. Able-Thomas.
See, for example, "John Bolton Says U.S. Will Not Cooperate with International Criminal Court," CBS News, September 10, 2018; Elise Labott and Hilary Clarke, "US Threatens Sanctions Against International Criminal Court, Will Close PLO Office in Washington," CNN, September 11, 2018; Matthew Lee, "Bolton: International Criminal Court 'Already Dead to Us,'" Associated Press, September 11, 2018; Dan Boylan, "Bolton Bolsters Trump's 'America First' Foreign Policy with Robust Defense of U.S. Sovereignty," Washington Times, September 10, 2018.
See, for example, Roberta Rampton, Lesley Wroughton, and Stephanie van den Berg, "U.S. Withdraws from International Accords, Says U.N. World Court 'Politicized,'" Reuters, October 3, 2018. See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10206, The United States and the "World Court", by [author name scrubbed].
See, for example, Daniel Sargent, "RIP American Exceptionalism, 1776-2018," Foreign Policy, July 23, 2018; Andrew Sullivan, "Why Trump Has Such a Soft Spot for Russia," New York, July 20, 2018; Evelyn Farkas, "Trump Still Doesn't Take Russia Seriously, Rather Than Speaking Out Against Putin, the U.S. President Is Playing into Moscow's Hands," Foreign Policy, April 11, 2018; Joshua Keating, "The Only Pro-Russia Figure in the Trump Administration is Donald Trump," Slate, April 6, 2018.
For more on the situation in Syria, see, for example, CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], and CRS In Focus IF10849, Flashpoints in Syria and Iraq Create Challenges for U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed].
For more on the annual country reports, see, for example, Carol Morello, "Rex Tillerson Skips State Department's Annual Announcement on Human Rights, Alarming Advocates," Washington Post, March 3, 2017; CRS In Focus IF10795, Global Human Rights: The Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, by [author name scrubbed].
See, for example, Denis McDonough and Ryan Crocker, "The World's System for Resettling Refugees Benefits the United States; By Dismantling It, Trump Would Leave the Country—and Refugees—Worse Off," Foreign Policy, October 22, 2018.
Priscilla Alvarez, "The U.S. Sends an Unwelcoming Signal to Refugees," Atlantic, September 18, 2018; Priscilla Alvarez, "Canada May Soon Outpace the U.S. in Refugee Admissions," Atlantic, September 12, 2018; Priscilla Alvarez, "America's System for Resettling Refugees Is Collapsing," Atlantic, September 9, 2018. See also CRS In Focus IF10611, Global Refugee Resettlement: Selected Issues and Questions, by [author name scrubbed].
See, for example, Salvatore Babones, "Trump's Foreign Policy Successes Show Principled Realism in Action; Trump Has Overcome Internal Resistance and External Pressure to Deliver a Strong of Foreign Policy Successes," National Interest, September 26, 2018; Brett D. Schaefer, "President Trump at the UN: An Unapologetic Defense of 'Principled Realism'; Donald Trump's United Nations Speech Took Stock of the Results of Eighteen Months of 'Principled Realism' in American Foreign Policy. The Record of Achievement Is Surprisingly Strong." National Interest, September 26, 2018. For more on what the Trump Administration refers to as principled realism, see National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, pp. 1, 55. See also Gail Yoshitani, "Jeane Kirkpatrick and the Roots of Principled Realism," War on the Rocks, October 9, 2018.
See, for example, Dingding Chen, "The Trump Administration's National Security and National Defense Strategies Reveal a Change in Mindset Toward China," Diplomat, January 26, 2018.
See, for example, Joshua A. Geltzer, "Trump's Counterterrorism Strategy Is a Relief," Atlantic, October 4, 2018.
See, for example, Stephen Walt, "This Is America's Middle East Strategy on Steroids; Donald Trump Isn't Just Maintaining an Alliance with Saudi Arabia—He's Choosing it Over the Rest of the World," Foreign Policy, October 15, 2018; Micah Zenko, "How Donald Trump Learned to Love War in 2017," Foreign Policy, December 29, 2017.
See, for example, Gardiner Harris, "Pompeo Promises to Return 'Swagger' to the State Department," New York Times, May 1, 2018; John T. Bennet, "Pompeo Vows 'Tough Diplomacy,' Return of State's 'Swagger,'" Roll Call, May 2, 2018. See also Daniel R. DePetris, "'Swagger' Doesn't Make up for Bad American Foreign Policy; An Evaluation of Mike Pompeo's Four Months on the Job," National Interest, October 2, 2018.
See, for example, Harry J. Kazianis, "Trump's Sanctions on Russia Show His Strategic Kindness Isn't Sign of Weakness," Fox News, August 9, 2018; James Jay Carafano, "Donald Trump and the Age of Unconventional Diplomacy; Despite Donald Trump's Inability to Commit to Tough Talk, the Policies Coming Out if His Administration Have Been the Toughest on Russia Since the Reagan Administration," National Interest, July 17, 2018; Jonah Goldberg, "Trump Has Been Tough on Russia (Except Rhetorically)," National Review, February 20, 2018. Regarding sanctions that the Administration has imposed on various countries, see, for example, Carol Morello, "Trump Administration's Use of Sanctions Draws Concern," Washington Post, August 5, 2018.
This policy might be viewed as a change from a less confrontational policy pursued during the Obama Administration, and/or as a policy consistent with a U.S. policy dating further back of resisting the rise of regional hegemons, and somewhat similar to the U.S. policy of resisting the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For press accounts of this policy, see, for example, Jun Mai, "Picking a Fight: Is Trump's Hawkish Behavior Towards China the Start of a New Cold War?; With Washington Taking a New, Profoundly Aggressive Tack in Its Dealings with Beijing, Analysts Speak of 'Active Competition with Occasional Confrontation' as the New Normal," South China Morning Post, October 17 (updated October 18), 2018; Michael C. Bender, Gordon Lubold, Kate O'Keeffe, and Jeremy Page, "U.S. Edges Toward New Cold-War Era With China; A More Hard-Nosed Stance with Beijing Is Emerging from the Trump Administration as China's Help with North Korea wanes and Trade Talks Stall," Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2018; Walter Russel Mead, "Mike Pence Announces Cold War II; The Administration Is Orchestrating a Far-Reaching Campaign Against China." Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2018; Keith Johnson, "It's No Longer Just a Trade War Between the U.S. and China; Vice Persident Pence's Fierce Attack and Allegations of Tech Spying Escalate the Conflict." Foreign Policy, October 4, 2018; Josh Rogin, "The Trump Administration Just 'Reset' the U.S.-China Relationship," Washington Post, October 4, 2018.
See, for example, Glenn Thrush, "Trump Embraces Foreign Aid to Counter China's Global Influence," New York Times, October 14, 2018; Keith Johnson, "Trump Reaches for Checkbook Diplomacy to Counter China; Washington Ramps Up Development Finance to Offer Countries an Alternative to Beijing's Deep Pockets," Foreign Policy, October 8, 2018.
See, for example, Curt Mills, "Are Larry Kudlow and Donald Trump Secret Free Traders?" National Interest, August 17, 2018; Quinn Slobodian, "You Live in Robert Lighthizer's World Now; Trump Might Look Like He's Flailing on Trade—But It's All Going According to His Trade Czar's Plan, Which Has Been Years in the Making." Foreign Policy, August 6, 2018; Wilbur Ross, "Free-Trade is a Two-Way Street," Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2017; James M. Roberts, "Trump's High Stakes G-7 Gamble to Remake the World As It Is," Heritage Foundation," June 11, 2018. See also Milton Ezrati, "Trump Didn't Kill the Old Trade Order, but What Kind Is He Trying to Build?" National Interest, July 23, 2018.
See, for example, Curt Mills, "Can America's Foreign Policy Be Restrained?" National Interest, December 12, 2017; Curt Mills, "A Year on, Foreign Policy Restrainers Assess the Trump Administration," National Interest, November 7, 2017.
See, for example, Robert Kagan, "Believe It or Not, Trump's Following a Familiar Script on Russia," Washington Post, August 7, 2018. For a response, see Condoleezza Rice, "Russia Invaded Georgia 10 Years Ago. Don't Say America Didn't Respond." Washington Post, August 8, 2018.
See, for example, Hal Brands, "Foreign Officials See Bush and Obama in Trump," Foreign Policy, February 23, 2018; David Rothkopf, "How Bush, Obama and Trump Ended Pax Americana," Washington Post, June 27, 2017.
See, for example, Jerry Hendrix, "Donald Trump and the Art of Strategic Ambiguity; By Keeping Friends and Foes Alike Off Balance, He Upholds the United States' Interests." National Review, March 21, 2018.
Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge, undated, released January 19, 2018, p. 5.
As discussed in another CRS report, world events have led some observers, starting in late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the past 20 to 25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. See CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
The terms offshore balancing and offshore control refer in general to a policy in which the United States, in effect, stands off the shore of Eurasia and engages in the security affairs of Eurasia less frequently, less directly, or less expansively. The term retrenchment is more often used by critics of these proposed approaches.
Debate about this dimension of the U.S. role in the world is not limited to one between those who favor continued extensive engagement along the lines of the past 70 years and those who prefer some form of a more restrained role—other options are also being promoted. For example, one analyst and former White House aide advocates an approach that differs from both retrenchment and reassertion, an approach he labels "re-calibration" to the "geopolitical, economic, technological and other dynamics driving the 21st-century world." Such an approach, he argues, would entail a reappraisal of U.S. interests, a reassessment of U.S. power, and a repositioning of U.S. leadership. (See Bruce Jentleson, "Apart, Atop, Amidst: America in the World," War on the Rocks, January 2017.)
As another example, a different analyst argues in favor of a U.S. role based on "a better nationalism"—what he describes as a more benign and constructive form that "would not dismantle the post-war order and America's post war project, but would take a harder-edged and more disciplined approach to asserting U.S. interests." (Hal Brands, "U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress American and it Alternatives," Washington Quarterly, Spring 2017: 73-93.)
See, for example, Jeffrey Fields, "Op-ed: Saudi Arabia Is a Repressive Regime—and So Are a Lot of US Partners," Navy Times, October 22, 2018.
See, for example, Monica Duffy Toft, "The Dangerous Rise of Kinetic Diplomacy," War on the Rocks, May 14, 2018; Ian Hurd, "'Hawks As Far As the Eye Can See': America's Alarming Consensus on Foreign Intervention," Vox, April 25, 2018; Richard Fontaine, "Foreign Aid Has an Enormous ROI [return on investment] for the U.S. and Boosts Our National Security. Don't Cut It." Independent Journal Review, July 17, 2017; Dan Lamothe, "Retired Generals Cite Past Comments from Mattis While Opposing Trump's Proposed Foreign Aid Cuts," Washington Post, February 27, 2017; Michael Gerson and Raj Shah, "'America First' Shouldn't Mean Cutting Foreign Aid," Washington Post, February 24, 2017; Michael McFaul, "Dear Trump: Defending Democracy Is No Vice," Washington Post, January 17, 2017.
See also Christopher Walker, Shanthi Kalathil, and Jessica Ludwig, "Forget Hearts and Minds; Soft Power is Out; Sharp Power Is In. Here's How to Win the New Influence Wars." Foreign Policy, September 14, 2018.
Kori Schake, "National Security Challenges," ORBIS, Vol. 61 Issue 1, Winter 2017.
For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), earlier known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR), is China's major geopolitical initiative, first announced by China in 2013, to knit Eurasia and parts of Africa together in a Chinese-anchored or Chinese-led infrastructure and economic network. For more on the BRI, see CRS In Focus IF10273, China's "One Belt, One Road", by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
See, for example, Peter Zwack, "Three Questions from Last Month's Giant Vostok Exercise," Defense One, October 22, 2018.
See, for example, Max Boot, "Trump Has Given Every Despot on the Planet a License to Kill," Washington Post, October 17, 2018; Michael Gerson, "The Trump Era is Full of Cruelty Without Consequence," Washington Post, October 15, 2018; Anne Gearan, "'Don't Worry About Us': Critics Fault Trump's Hands-Off Response to Autocrat Abuses," Washington Post, October 10, 2018; Robert Kagan, "Welcome to the Jungle," Washington Post, October 9, 2018.
See, for example, Renato Cruz De Castro, "Duterte's China Policy Isn't Paying Off," East Asia Forum, September 18, 2018; JC Gotinga, "Philippines' Lacklustre Fight in the South China Sea," Al Jazeera, May 22, 2018. See also CRS In Focus IF10250, The Philippines, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is Southeast Asia's primary multilateral organization. The 10 members states of ASEAN are Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. For more on ASEAN, see CRS In Focus IF10348, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R40933, United States Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
See, for example, Jackson Diehl, "Can Latin America handle Venezuela's collapse without the U.S.?" Washington Post, September 30, 2018; Josh Rogin, "China Is Challenging the U.S. in the Horn of Africa—and Washington Is Silent," Washington Post, September 27, 2018; Franco Ordonez, "Latin America Says U.S. Has Itself to Blame for Chinese Entry Into Region That It Opposes," Miami Herald, September 10, 2018; Ismail Einashe, "Trump's Insults Will Nudge African Nations Closer to China," NPR, January 16, 2018. See also Pablo Vivanco, "The Trump Doctrine? US Working Overtime to Box China Out of Latin America," Asia Times, August 21, 2018; John Campbell, "Trump's Dangerous Retreat from Africa," Foreign Policy, November 3, 2017. See also Evan Wllis, "Latin America and the Emerging Ideological Struggle of the 21st Century," Global Americans, June 17, 2018; Evan Ellis, "It's Time to Think Strategically About Coutnering Chinese Advances in Latin America," Global Americans, February 2, 2018.
The articles states that the first basket of approaches includes five that treat America First as a crisis. These approaches are labeled as "replacing Atlas," "hugging and appeasing," "resisting the rogue superpower," "hedging their bets," and "riding out the storm." The second basket includes four approaches that treat America First as an opportunity. These approaches are labeled as "America First as a model," "exploiting the vacuum," "hijacking America First," and "defying America First."
Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "Living in Trump's World: The Global Reaction to 'America First,'" War on the Rocks, March 27, 2018.
These include the power to
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States;
regulate commerce with foreign nations;
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations;
declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;
raise and support armies;
provide and maintain a navy;
provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them that may be employed in the service of the United States; and
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution these and other powers granted in Article I, Section 8.
See also Ellyn Ferguson, "Trump's Threat to Leave the WTO Alarms Many, Even in Congress," Roll Call, August 3, 2018.
See, for example, Robbie Gramer, "Trump Stealthily Seeks to Choke Off Funding to U.N. Programs; Leaked Emails and Behind-the-Scenes Battles Show How the Administration, After Failing to Slash Congressional Aid, Used Bureaucratic Levers to Stifle Money Flows," Foreign Policy, October 2, 2018; Carol Morello and Karoun Demirjan, "Trump Administration Is Considering Pulling Back $3 Billion in Foreign Aid," Washington Post, August 16, 2018; Rachel Oswald, "Lawmakers Wary of Potential Trump Cuts to Foreign Aid," Roll Call, August 17, 2018; Fred Kaplan, "Maximum Override," Slate, August 15, 2018.
See, for example, Zachary Cohen, "Congress Still Doesn't Know What Trump Said to Putin in Helsinki," CNN, August 21, 2018; David Frum, "The Worst Security Risk in U.S. History; No One Knows What President Trump Told Vladimir Putin in Helsinki—Or Why Even His Own National-Security Advisor Was Excluded from the Room," Atlantic, July 19, 2018.
Charles Lane, "Sorry, Trump's Refugee Order Is Probably Legal," Washington Post, February 1, 2017.
For additional discussion, see, for example, John M. Donnelly, "GOP Congress Tries to Rein In Trump on Foreign Policy," Roll Call, August 6, 2018; Kathleen Claussen, "Trade War Battles: Congress Reconsiders Its Role," Lawfare, August 5, 2018; Ellyn Ferguson, "Trump's Threat to Leave the WTO Alarms Many, Even in Congress," Roll Call, August 3, 2018; Tommy Ross, "At A Crossroads, Part III: Reasserting Congress' Oversight Role in Foreign Policy," War on the Rocks, June 19, 2018; Tommy Ross, "At A Crossroads, Part II: No More Shadows: The Future of Intelligence Oversight in Congress," War on the Rocks, May 16, 2018; Tom Malinowski, "Congress Has Willfully Abdicated Its Responsibility Over War; It's Time for Legislators to Share in the Authority They Claim to Want," Foreign Policy, April 20, 2018; Tressa Guenov and Tommy Ross, "At A Crossroads, Part I: How Congress Can Find Its Way Back to Effective Defense Oversight," War on the Rocks, March 9, 2018.
For a general discussion of congressional staffing and how it has evolved over time, see Congressional Research Service, Congressional Staffing: The Continuity of Change and Reform, by [author name scrubbed], in CRS Committee Print CP10000, The Evolving Congress: A Committee Print Prepared for the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. See also Kathy Goldschmidt, State of the Congress: Staff Perspectives on Institutional Capacity in the House and Senate, Congressional Management Foundation, 2017, 38 pp.
For an example of a study effort focused on the issue of congressional capacity for dealing with various issues (foreign policy or otherwise), see the Legislative Branch Capacity Working Group (www.LegBranch.com) and the associated Congressional Capacity Project (https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/congressional-capacity-project/) of New America (aka New America Foundation) (https://www.newamerica.org/our-story/).See, for example, Jeffrey Mankoff, "American Ideals Beat the USSR. Why Aren't We Using Them Against Russia?" Defense One, January 4, 2018.
See CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
For additional discussion, see, for example, Daniel L. Davis, "Reagan's Powerful Legacy Is Being Squandered," National Interest, September 15, 2018; David Frum, "If America's Democracy Fails, Can Other Ones Survive?" Atlantic, March 4, 2018; Zack Beauchamp, "How the Government Shutdown Debacle Looked to the Rest of the World," Vox, January 22, 2018.
One strategist, reviewing a recent book about grand strategy (Lukas Milevski, The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought, Oxford University Press, 2016), states
The notion of grand strategy, albeit terribly hubristic sounding, is a decidedly practical art and a necessity for powers great and small. Such strategies are applied by accident or by deliberate rationalization in the pursuit of a country's best interests. Yet, there are few agreements about what constitutes a grand strategy and even what the best definition is....
... Ironically, I am partial to the definition postulated by Dr. Colin Gray, who defined it in The Strategy Bridge as "the direction and use made of any or all the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics." This definition is not limited to states per se, is mute on its relevance to peacetime competition or wartime, and explicitly refers to all of the power assets of a community, rather than just its military services.
[Milevski's] book is a wonderful and concise treatise that in some ways will remind readers of Edward Mead Earle's original Makers of Modern Strategy, which was published at the end of World War II.... While Earle focused on the key figures of strategy, Milevski's focus is narrower, uncovering the context and tracing the historiography of the term "grand strategy" over the past two centuries.
[Milevski] captures the varied insights among the giants (Mahan, Corbett, Edward M. Earle, Kahn, and Brodie) that have enriched our understanding of the apex of strategy. At the end of his journey, he incorporates the insights of major recent contributors to the literature and our basis for theory today: Edward Luttwak, Barry Posen, John Collins, Paul Kennedy, John Lewis Gaddis, and Hal Brands.
(Frank Hoffman, "The Consistent Incoherence of Grand Strategy," War on the Rocks, September 1, 2016.)
CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
For recent examples of articles discussing geopolitics as defined in the more specific sense, see Olivia Garard, "Geopolitical Gerrymandering and the Importance of Key Maritime Terrain," War on the Rocks, October 3, 2018; Robert D. Kaplan, "The Return of Marco Polo's World and the U.S. Military Response," Center for a New American Security, undated but posted at the CNAS website ca. May 12, 2017; Robert C. Rubel, "Exporting Security: China, the United States, and the Innovator's Dilemma," Naval War College Review, Spring 2017: 11-29; Robert Kaplan, "America Is a Maritime Nation," Real Clear World, January 24, 2017; John Hillen, "Foreign Policy By Map," National Review, February 23, 2015: 32-34; Alfred McCoy, "The Geopolitics of American Global Decline," Real Clear World, June 8, 2015; and Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers," Foreign Affairs, May-June 2014.
Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Lily Wojtowicz, America Engaged, American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2018, pp. 2-6.
Trevor Thrall, Dina Smeltz, Erik Goepner, Will Ruger, and Craig Kafura, The Clash of Generations? Intergenerational Change and American Foreign Policy Views, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, June 2018, pp. 1-2. See also Sophia Larson, "Polls Show Millennials Are More Skeptical of Foreign Wars," National Interest, August 14, 2018; Bruce Jentleson, "Millennials Are So Over US Domination of World Affairs," The Conversation, July 26, 2018; Christopher A. Preble, "A Clash of Generations over American Leadership? America's Generational Gap has the Potential to Redefine the Role That the United States Plays in the World," National Interest, June 27, 2018.
Appendix E.
Selected Articles: Debate over Future U.S. Role
This appendix presents some examples of articles dating back to January 2014 (with one additional citation from 2012) concerning the debate over the future U.S. role in the world, with the most recent on top. Some of the citations in this appendix that are dated January 20, 2017, and later are reactions to the statements from the Trump Administration that are presented in Appendix A. Citations below reacting to statements from the Trump Administration are often published the same day as the Trump Administration statement to which they are reacting, or in the days immediately afterward.
Articles from September 2017 Onward
David C. Hendrickson, "Is America an Empire?" National Interest, October 17, 2017.
David Ignatius, "Hey Foreign Leaders: Here's What You Need to Know About Trump," Washington Post, October 17, 2017.
Aaron David Miller and Richard Sokolsky, "Trump's Foreign Policy Is Neither Strategic Nor Competent," CNN, October 17, 2017.
Jennifer Wilson, "Trump's Air War, Far From Being an Isolationist, the President Is One of the Country's Most Hawkish in Modern History," New Republic, October 17, 2017.
"Xi Jinping Has More Clout Than Donald Trump. The World Should Be Wary," Economist, October 14, 2017.
Jason Zengerle," Rex Tillerson and the Unraveling of the State Department," New York Times, October 17, 2017.
Uri Friedman, "Donald Trump, Dealbreaker," The Atlantic, October 12, 2017.
Kingston Reif and Kelsey Davenport, "Trump's Threat to Nuclear Order," War on the Rocks, October 12, 2017.
Stephen M. Walt, "The Donald Trump-Kaiser Wilhelm Parallels Are Getting Scary," Foreign Policy, October 12, 2017.
James Jay Carafano, "Democracy Will Continue to Survive World's Political Turmoil," Heritage Foundation, October 11, 2017.
Deidre Berger, et al, " 'In Spite of It all, America,' " New York Times, October 11, 2017. (English translation of "In Spite of It All, America: A Trans-Atlantic Manifesto in Times of Donald Trump—A German Perspective.")
Steven Erlanger, "German Foreign Policy Experts Warn Against Anti-Americanism," New York Times, October 11, 2017. (News article reporting on the October 11, 2017, item above by Deidre Berger, et al.)
Mercy A Kuo, "US Leadership in Asia and the Future of Geopolitics, Insights from Jamie Fly," The Diplomat, October 11, 2017.
Paul R. Pillar, "The Operational Code of President Trump," National Interest, October 10, 2017.
Anna Simons, "Yes, Mr. President—Sovereignty!" American Interest, October 10, 2017.
Max Boot, "Three Cheers for Globalism!" Foreign Policy, October 6, 2017.
Matthew Kroenig and Miyeon Oh, A Strategy for the Trans-Pacific Century: Final Report of the Atlantic Council's Asia-Pacific Strategy Task Force, Washington, Atlantic Council, October 2017, 58 pp. (Atlantic Council Strategy Paper No. 12)
Irwin M. Stelzer, "Is Trump Rally Going to Protect American Trade?" Weekly Standard, September 30, 2017.
Dean Cheng, "Confronting the Eurasian Powers of Russia and China," Heritage Foundation, September 28, 2017.
Daniel L. Davis, "Is H. R. McMaster's Worldview Compatible with the President's?" National Interest, September 28, 2017.
Theodore R. Bromund, "Why United Nations Membership Means Little," Heritage Foundation, September 26, 2017.
Robert D. Kaplan, "The Problem with 'The Best of Intentions' Foreign Policy," National Interest, September 25, 2017.
Thomas Donnelly and William Kristol, "An Empire for Liberty," Weekly Standard, October 2, 2017.
Rich Lowry, "Sovereignty Is Not a Dirty Word," National Review, September 22, 2017.
Joseph Bosco, "Trump's 'Principled Realism,'" Real Clear Defense, September 21, 2017.
John Cassidy, "There Is No Trump Doctrine, Only Contradictions and Bluster," New Yorker, September 21, 2017.
Krishnadev Calamur, "How the Rest of the World Heard Trump's UN Speech," The Atlantic, September 20, 2017.
James Jay Carafano, "The Real Meaning Behind Trump's UN Speech," National Interest, September 20, 2017.
Nile Gardiner, "At the UN, Trump Ends the Era of Leading From Behind," Heritage Foundation, September 20, 2017.
Sahar Khan, "Here Are the 3 Takeaways from Trump's UN Speech," National Interest, September 20, 2017.
Hardin Lang and Michael Fuchs, "American Alone at the United Nations," National Interest, September 20, 2017.
William Saletan, "Our Demagogue," The Atlantic, September 20, 2017.
Gary J. Schmitt, "Trump's UN Speech: What Makes America First," American Enterprise Institute, September 20, 2017.
Marc A. Thiessen, "Why the Left Hated Trump's Speech," Washington Post, September 20, 2017.
Jonathan S. Tobin, "Trumpian Rhetoric and U.S. Imperatives," National Review, September 20, 2017.
Michael Warren, "White House Watch: Was Donald Trump's Speech to the United Nations a Success?" Weekly Standard, September 20, 2017.
Thomas Wright, "Trump's Indecisive, Ill-Prepared Debut at the United Nations," The Atlantic, September 20, 2017.
Philip Zelikow, "The Logic Hole at the Center of Trump's U.N. Speech," Foreign Policy, September 20, 2017.
Eliott Abrams, "Trump's Successful U.N. Speech," National Review, September 19, 2017.
Zeeshan Aleem, "Trump's Message to The World at The UN: Every Country Is on Its Own," Vox, September 19, 2017.
Kevin Baron, "In Fiery UN Speech, Trump Delivers The Far-Right Goods," Defense One, September 19, 2017.
Yochi Dreazen, "The UN Was Waiting for President Trump. Candidate Trump Showed Up Instead," Vox, September 19, 2017.
Erick Erickson, "Erick Erickson: The Best Speech by President Trump So Far," Fox News, September 19, 2017.
David French, "A Donald trump Speech, a Barack Obama Foreign Policy," National Review, September 19, 2017.
Max de Haldevang, "Trump Mentioned Sovereignty 21 Times in A Speech Heralding A New American Worldview," Quartz, September 19, 2017.
David Ignatius, "The Most Surprising Thing About Trump's U.N. Speech," Washington Post, September 19, 2017.
Greg Jaffe and Karen DeYoung, "In Trump's U.N. Speech, An Emphasis on Sovereignty Echoes His Domestic Agenda," Washington Post, September 19, 2017.
Fred Kaplan, "Trump's Dark Vision for the World," Slate, September 19, 2017.
Kirsten Korosec, "Here's What Donald Trump Didn't Say to the United Nations," Fortune, September 19, 2017.
Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Worst First Year of Foreign Policy Ever," Foreign Policy, September 19, 2017.
Rich Lowry, "'Holy Sh**': Trump at the U.N.,'" National Review, September, 19, 2017.
Amber Phillips, "How Trump's 'America first' Doctrine Drives Everything He Does—Including Getting Elected," Washington Post, September 19, 2017.
Ramesh Ponnuru, "Ignore the Bombast. Trump Gave a Conventional Speech," Bloomberg, September 19, 2017.
James Roberts and Brett Schaefer, "An Overhaul of America's Foreign Assistance Programs Is Long Overdue," Heritage Foundation, September 19, 2017.
Tom Rogan, "Trump's UN Speech Was A Grand Slam," Washington Examiner, September 19, 2017.
David Rothkopf, "Trump's First Speech to The United Nations Was A Disastrous, Nationalistic Flop," Washington Post, September 19, 2017.
Ashish Kumar Sen, "Trump's Debut at the United Nations," Atlantic Council, September 19, 2017.
Kori Scahke, "The Fatal Flaw in Trump's U.N. Speech Could Be Disastrous for American Power," Foreign Policy, September 19, 2017.
David Usborne, "Donald Trump's America First Doctrine Will Destroy the United Nations," Independent (UK), September 19, 2017.
Colum Lynch, "Before U.N. Summit, World Tells Trump His 'America-First Fun' Must End," Foreign Policy, September 16, 2017.
Christopher A. Preble, "Why Isn't There a Debate About America's Grand Strategy?" National Interest, September 16, 2017.
Eliot A. Cohen, "How Trump Is Ending the American Era," The Atlantic, October 2017.
Olivia Enos and Brett Schaefer, "State Department Reform Should Retain Emphasis on North Korean Human Rights," Heritage Foundation, September 14, 2017.
Robbie Gramer, "Tillerson Offers State Department Employees First Look at Redesign," Foreign Policy, September 14, 2017.
Ruby Mellen, "Foreign-Policy Uber Report Targets State Department Overhaul," Foreign Policy, September 14, 2017.
Daniel Benaim, "Here's How Congress Can Save the State Department," Foreign Policy, September 11, 2017.
James Jay Carafano, "America Desperately Needs a New Grand Strategy for its Role in the World," Heritage Foundation, September 11, 2017.
Daniel Kliman, "Wanted: A U.S. Strategic Response to China's Belt and Road Initiative," National Interest, September 7, 2017.
Austin Long, Linda Robinson, and Seth G. Jones, "Managing Chaos in an Era of Great Power Competition," War on the Rocks, September 5, 2017.
Sheila A. Smith, "Whither Trump's Asia Policy?" East Asia Forum, September 4, 2017.
Paul R. Pillar, "A President Without Purpose," National Interest, September 1, 2017.
Articles from July through August 2017
Mercy Kuo, "US Leadership as a Pacific Power: Trump and Beyond," The Diplomat, August 29, 2017.
Olivia Beavers, "Tillerson Moves to Eliminate Special Envoy Posts at State Dept.: Report," The Hill, August 28, 2017.
Dalibor Rohac, "The Great Global Governance Scare," American Interest, August 28, 2017.
Stephen M. Walt, "What Trump Got Right About Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, August 28, 2017.
Krishnadev Calamur, "'The President Speaks for Himself,'" The Atlantic, August 27, 2017.
Daniel Politi, "Did Secretary of State Rex Tillerson Just Turn on Trump?" Slate, August 27, 2017.
Andrew A. Michta, "The West Needs a Strategy," American Interest, August 25, 2017.
Joshua Keating, "Wait, Does the Trump Administration Care About Human Rights Now?" Slate, August 23, 2017.
Joshua Keating, "The Blob Are Donald Trump," Slate, August 22, 2017.
Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr., and Tom Harvey, "A Strategy for the Age of Trump," National Interest, August 20, 2017.
James Jay Carafano, "Trump and the Art of Rope-A-Dope Diplomacy," Heritage Foundation, August 14, 2017.
Kathy Gilsinan, "What Happens When No One Believes American Threats?" The Atlantic, August 14, 2017.
Robert D. Kaplan, "America's Darwinian Nationalism," National Interest, August 13, 2017.
Krishnadev Calamur, "Trump's Gratitude for the 'Bad Guys,'" The Atlantic, August 11, 2017.
James Jay Carafano, "Tillerson Is Trying to Replicate Jim Baker's State Department," Heritage Foundation, August 11, 2017.
Philip Zelikow, "Is the World Slouching Toward a Grave Systemic Crisis?" The Atlantic, August 11, 2017.
Reuben Fischer-Baum and Julie Vitkovskaya, "How Trump is Changing America's Foreign Policy," Washington Post, updated August 10, 2017.
Rukmani Bhatia, "Quietly Erasing Democracy Promotion at the U.S. State Department," Freedom House, August 8, 2017
Anne Applebaum, "If This Were the Cold War, America Would Be Poised to Lose," Washington Post, August 4, 2017.
James Kitfield, "Trump's Generals Are Trying to Save the World. Starting With the White House." Politico, August 4, 2017.
Joshua Muravchik, "What Trump and Tillerson Don't Get About Democracy Promotion," Washington Post, August 4, 2017.
Harvey M. Sapolsky, "America's Endless Search for a Strategy," National Interest, August 4, 2017.
Nicole Bibbins Sedaca, "What Trump and Tillerson Get Wrong About Democracy Promotion," Foreign Policy, August 4, 2017.
Hal Brands, "How to Diminish a Superpower: Trump's Foreign Policy After Six Months," War on the Rocks, August 1, 2017.
Kevin Quealy, "'The Lowest-Profile State Department in 45 Years,' in 2 Charts," New York Times, August 1, 2017.
Josh Rogin, "State Department Considers Scrubbing Democracy Promotion from Its Mission," Washington Post, August 1, 2017.
Robbie Gramer, Dan De Luce, and Colum Lynch, "How the Trump Administration Broke the State Department," Foreign Policy, July 31, 2017.
Wilbur Ross, "Free-Trade is a Two-Way Street," Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2017.
Leon Hadar, "Why Washington's Global Strategy Failed," National Interest, July 30, 2017.
Chris Patten, "The West's Decadent Foreign Policy," Asia Times, July 29, 2017.
Roger Cohen, "The Desperation of Our Diplomats," New York Times, July 28, 2017.
Elizabeth Rosenberg, "The War Over Who Controls U.S. Foreign Policy Has Begun," Foreign Policy, July 28, 2017.
Fareed Zakaria, "Say Hello to a Post-America World," Washington Post, July 27, 2017.
Andrew Beddow, "America Cannot Become a Global Rome," National Interest, July 25, 2017.
Enea Gjoza, "America Historically Had a Restrained Foreign Policy: It's Time to Return to It," National Interest, July 25, 2017.
Daniel Runde, "Trump Should Fix Foreign Aid, But Not at the Expense of U.S. Interests," Foreign Policy, July 24, 2017.
Michael Geron, "Trump's Breathtaking Surrender to Russia," Washington Post, July 20, 2017.
Richard Haass, "Donald Trump and the Danger of 'Adhocracy,'" The Atlantic, July 18, 2017.
Richard Fontaine, "Foreign Aid Has an Enormous ROI [return on investment] for the U.S. and Boosts Our National Security. Don't Cut It." Independent Journal Review, July 17, 2017.
Colum Lynch, "Tillerson to Shutter State Department War Crimes Office," Foreign Policy, July 17, 2017.
James Kirchick, "Germany's Not Such a Great Candidate to lead the Free World Either," Daily Beast, July 15, 2017.
Gary D. Cohn and H. R. McMaster, "The Trump Vision for America Abroad," New York Times, July 13, 2017.
Michael Auslin, "Trump Gives Beijing a Lesson in the Art of the Deal," Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2017.
Paul D. Miller, "Can Trump Reconcile Nationalism With Liberalism?" Foreign Policy, July 10, 2017.
Paul Kengor, "Trump's Excellent Speech in Poland, on Poland, and About Poland," American Spectator, July 9, 2017.
Josh Rubin, "Battle Emerging Inside Trump Administration Over Who Controls Immigration and Refugees," Washington Post, July 9, 2017.
Robert J. Samuelson, "Trump's Extraordinary Surrender of Power," Washington Post, July 9, 2017.
John O'Sullivan, "Trump Defends the West in Warsaw," National Review, July 8, 2017.
Steven Erlanger and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Once Dominant, the United States Finds Itself Isolated at G-20," New York Times, July 7, 2017.
Molly K. McKew, "Trump Handed Putin a Stunning Victory," Politico, July 7, 2017.
Zeeshan Aleem, "Japan and Europe's Huge New Trade Agreement Shows That US Leadership Is Already Fading," Vox, July 6, 2017.
Michael Barone, "Trump's 'Remarkable' Speech in Poland," Washington Examiner, July 6, 2017.
Robert Charles, "Trump Speech in Poland—Reagan Is Nodding," Fox News, July 6, 2017.
James P. Rubin, "Trump Is Huge in Poland. So, There's That." Politico, July 6, 2017.
Editorial board, "Trump's Defining Speech, In Poland, He Asks the West to Defense Its Values of Faith and Freedom," Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2017.
Editorial board, "Trump Wants Us to Defend 'Our Values.' Which ones?" Washington Post, July 6, 2017.
S. A. Miller, "Current Time Broadcasts into Russia, Eastern Europe," Washington Times, July 5, 2017.
Articles from April through June 2017
Andrew Restuccia and Nancy Cook, "Trump's trade Plan Sets Up Global Clash Over 'America First' Strategy," Politico, June 30, 2017.
Colum Lynch, "Nikki Haley and Trump's Doctrine of Diplomatic Chaos," Foreign Policy, June 28, 2017.
Andrew Natsios, "Tillerson Wants to merge the State Dept. and USAID. That's a Bad Idea." Washington Post, June 28, 2017.
Daniel Runde, "Foreign Aid Is About U.S. Interests," Foreign Policy, June 26, 2017.
Richard Wike, et al., "U.S. Image Suffers as Publics Around World Question Trump's Leadership," Pew Research Center, June 26, 2017.
Michael Gerson, "Trump's Embrace of Strongmen is a Very Bad Strategy," Washington Post, June 22, 2017.
Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, "America and the Geopolitics of Upheaval," National Interest, June 21, 2017.
Kate Bateman, "Wanted: A Trump Team Foreign-Policy Plan with Democratic Values," National Interest, June 5, 2017.
Andrew Sullivan, "Can the West Survive Trump?" New York, June 2, 2017.
H.R. McMaster and Gary D. Cohn, "America First Doesn't Mean America Alone," Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017.
Brett D. Schaefer, "Trump's Budget Grasps What Congress Doesn't: America's Global Leadership Doesn't Come Free," Heritage Foundation, May 29, 2017.
Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Beltway Foreign-Policy 'Blob' Strikes Back," American Conservative, May 26, 2017.
Colin Dueck, "This Is the Key to a Successful Trump Foreign Policy," National Interest, May 25, 2017.
Elliott Abrams, "Does Trump Care About Human Rights?" Politico, May 24, 2017.
Colin Powell, "Colin Powell: American Leadership—We Can't Do It for Free," New York Times, May 24, 2017.
Daniel Larison, "Realism Doesn't Need to Be 'Reclaimed'," American Conservative, May 23, 2017.
Ted R. Bromund, Michael Auslin and Colin Dueck, "Reclaiming American Realism," American Affairs, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 184-198. (Also published as Michael Auslin, Ted R. Bromund, and Colin Dueck, "Reclaiming American Realism," American Enterprise Institute, May 22, 2017.)
Walter Russell Mead, "A Debate on America's Role—25 Years Late," Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2017.
Robert D. Kaplan, "The Return of Marco Polo's World and the U.S. Military Response," Center for a New American Security, undated but posted at the CNAS website ca. May 12, 2017.
Eliot A. Cohen, "Rex Tillerson Doesn't Understand America," The Atlantic, May 5, 2017.
Anne Applebaum, "How trump Makes Dictators Stronger," Washington Post, May 4, 2017.
Joshua Keating, "Trump and Tillerson's Shortsighted Contempt for Human Rights," Slate, May 4, 2017.
"What Rex Tillerson Gets Right About American Values—and What He Gets Wrong," Washington Post, May 4, 2017.
Philip Rucker, "Trump Keeps Praising International Strongmen, Alarming Human Rights Advocates," Washington Post, May 1, 2017.
James M. Roberts and Brett D. Schaefer, "Panic Over Foreign Aid Budget Could Use Some Perspective," Heritage Foundation, April 28, 2017.
Karen DeYoung, "Trump Takes a Selective Approach to the Promotion of Human Rights," Washington Post, April 25, 2017.
Joseph S. Nye, "Trump Has Learned a Lot. But He's Neglecting a Huge Part of American Leadership," Washington Post, April 25, 2017.
Stephen Sestanovich, "The President Is Preventing the Foreign-Policy Debate America Needs To Have," Defense One, April 13, 2017.
Noam N. Levey, "Trump Pushes Historic Cuts in Global Health Aid, Stoking Fears of New Disease Outbreaks and Diminished U.S. Clout," Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2017.
Doyle McManus, "Has the United States Abandoned Its Commitment to Human Rights?" Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2017.
Shannon N. Green, "When the U.S. Gives Up on Human Rights, Everyone Suffers," Foreign Policy, April 4, 2017.
Peter Baker, "For Trump, a Focus on U.S. Interests and a Disdain for Moralizing," New York Times, April 4, 2017.
Articles from January through March 2017
Mercy A. Kuo, "Statecraft and Grand Strategy: Assessing the US and China," The Diplomat, March 31, 2017.
George Fujii, "The End of American Liberal Internationalism?" ISSF Policy Series, March 30, 2017.
Uri Friedman, "What a World Led by China Might Look Like," The Atlantic, March 29, 2017.
Theodore R. Bromund, "Donald Trump is Right To Cut the State Department's Budget," Heritage Foundation, March 27, 2017.
Tom Malinowski, "What America Stood For," The Atlantic, March 25, 2017.
Hal Brands, "U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress America and Its Alternatives," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2017, 73-93.
Robert C. Rubel, "Exporting Security: China, the United States, and the Innovator's Dilemma," Naval War College Review, Spring 2017: 11-29.
Nicolas Bouchet, "Is This the End of America's Role As a Defender of Freedom?" Washington Post, March 20, 2017.
James M. Roberts, "Why Trump's Budget Proposal for the State Department Makes Sense," Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2017.
Colum Lynch, "Trump's Budget Blueprint: Pulling Up the Diplomatic Drawbridge," Foreign Policy, March 16, 2017.
Heather Timmons, "The Trump Presidency is Systematically Destroying Any Global Moral High Ground the US Had left," Quartz, March 13, 2017.
Wahab Raofi, "U.S. Must Change Foreign Aid Tactics," Huffington Post, March 12, 2017.
Alissa J. Rubin, "Allies Fear Trump Is Eroding America's Moral Authority," New York Times, March 10, 2017.
Al Mariam, "Trump's Suspicion of Foreign Aid to Africa Is Right on The Money" The Hill, March 9, 2017.
Christian Caryl, "Donald Trump's Foreign Policy Is Already Undercutting Human Rights Around the World," Washington Post, March 8, 2017.
George Fujii, "This is What Nationalism Looks Like," ISSF Policy Series, March 8, 2017.
Bjorn Jerden, et al., "Don't Call it the New Chinese Global Order (Yet)," Foreign Policy, March 7, 2017.
James M. Roberts, "The US Needs a New Foreign Aid Model," Heritage Foundation, March 7, 2017.
Paul Miller, "Reassessing Obama's Legacy of Restraint," War on the Rocks, March 6, 2017.
David Shepardson, "Trump Administration to Propose 'Dramatic Reductions' in Foreign Aid," Reuters, March 4, 2017.
Nicholas Burns, "Trump's Cuts Would Cripple the Country's Diplomats When We Need Them Most," Washington Post, March 3, 2017.
Josh Rogin, "Tillerson Pushes Back on White House's Proposed Cuts to Statement Department and USAID," Washington Post, March 3, 2017.
Chris Edwards, "State Department Spending Triples," Cato Institute, March 1, 2017.
Susan B. Glasser, "Trump Takes on The Blob," Politico Magazine, March/April 2017.
Dan Lamothe, "Retired Generals Cite Past Comments from Mattis While Opposing Trump's Proposed Foreign Aid Cuts," Washington Post, February 27, 2017.
Michael Gerson and Raj Shah, "'America First' Shouldn't Mean Cutting Foreign Aid," Washington Post, February 24, 2017.
Stephen M. Walt, "The Donald versus 'The Blob,'" ISSF Policy Series, February 14, 2017.
Will Inboden, "A Strategic Human Rights Agenda for the Tillerson State Department," Foreign Policy, February 13, 2017.
Garry Kasparov and Thor Halvorssen, "Why the Rise of Authoritarianism Is a Global Catastrophe," Washington Post, February 13, 2017.
Brian Pawlowski, "Echoes from Fulton," Real Clear Defense, February 8, 2017.
Randall L. Schweller, "A Third-Image Explanation for Why Trump Now: A Response to Robert Jervis' 'President Trump and IR [international relations] Theory," ISSF Policy Series, February 8, 2017.
David H. Petraeus, "America Must Stand Tall," Politico, February 7, 2016.
Arch Puddington, "As Democracy Wavers, Will Authoritarians Fill the Void?" Freedom House, February 7, 2017.
Robert Kagan, "Backing Into World War III," Foreign Policy, February 6, 2017.
Andrew Krepinevich, "Why Mattis Headed East: Time For China Strategy," Breaking Defense, February 2, 2017.
Brett D. Schaefer, "Trump's Plan to Reduce UN Spending Is a Step in the Right Direction," Heritage Foundation, February 2, 2017.
Colin Kahl and Hal Brands, "Trump's Grand Strategic Train Wreck," Foreign Policy, January 31, 2017.
Nadia Schadlow, "Welcome to the Competition," War on the Rocks, January 26, 2017.
Richard Stengel, "The End of the American Century," The Atlantic, January 26, 2017.
Eliot Cohen, "5 Bad Reasons for Pulling Back From the World," Politico, January 24, 2017.
Robert Kaplan, "America Is a Maritime Nation," Real Clear World, January 24, 2017.
Richard Fontaine and Mira Rapp-Hooper, "If America Refuses to Lead," Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2017.
Eliot Cohen, "Should the U.S. Still Carry A 'Big Stick,'" Los Angeles Times, January 18, 2017.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Fear China Most, 'Flip' Russia, Beware Iran: CSBA," Breaking Defense, January 18, 2017.
Michael McFaul, "Dear Trump: Defending Democracy Is No Vice," Washington Post, January 17, 2017.
Robert "Jake" Bebber and Richard J. Harknett, "Thoughts on Grand Strategy," The Navalist, January 12, 2017.
Frank Hoffman, "The Case for Strategic Discipline During the Next Presidency," War on the Rocks, January 10, 2017.
Ali Wyne, "Did the United States Really Win the Cold War?" National Interest, January 8, 2017.
Robert D. Kaplan, "Why Trump Can't Disengage America From the World," New York Times, January 6, 2017.
Mina Pollmann, "Naval Strategy: Restraint Rather Than Hegemon," Maritime Executive, January 5, 2017. (Interview with Barry Posen)
Jerome Slater, "A Coming War With China?" Huffington Post, January 4, 2017.
Kori Schake, "Will Washington Abandon the Order?" Foreign Affairs, January/February 2017.
Hal Brands, et al., Critical Assumptions and American Grand Strategy, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017, 57 pp.
"Foreign Aid and Economic Development," Cato Institute, 2017 (Cato Handbook for Policymakers, 8th Edition (2017).
Articles in 2016
TNI [the National Interest] Staff, "Is Trump's Foreign Policy the New Mainstream?" National Interest, December 22, 2016.
Zalmay Khalilzad, "America Needs a Bipartisan Foreign Policy. Donald Trump Can Make It Happen." National Interest, December 21, 2016.
Christopher A. Preble, "Will Donald Trump Really Bring an End to America's Global Leadership?" National Interest, December 21, 2016.
Asle Toje, "A Sad Metaphor," American Interest, December 21, 2016.
Ian Bremmer, "The Era of American Global Leadership Is Over. Here's What Comes Next." Time, December 19, 2016.
Rod Lyon, "Why Is Assurance in Trouble?" The Strategist, December 16, 2016.
Zack Cooper, "Pacific Power: America's Asian Alliances Beyond Burden-Sharing," War on the Rocks, December 14, 2016.
Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "Stress-Testing the Foundations of American Grand Strategy," War on the Rocks, December 13, 2016. (For a longer version, see Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "Stress-Testing American Grand Strategy," Survival, vol. 58, 2016—Issue 6, published online November 21, 2016)
Philip Zelilkow, "The Art of the Global Deal," American Interest, December 13, 2016.
John Schaus, "U.S. Leadership in an Era of Great Power Competition," Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 2016.
Peter Feaver, "A Grand Strategy Challenge Awaits Trump," Foreign Policy, November 29, 2016.
Hugh White, "What's So Great About American World Leadership?" The Atlantic, November 23, 2016.
Eliot A. Cohen, "When President Trump Goes to War," Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2016.
Jeff Bergner, "What Good Is Military Force?" Weekly Standard, October 17, 2016.
Max Fisher and Amanda Taub, "Syria Provokes an American Anxiety: Is U.S. Power Really So Special?" New York Times, October 8, 2016.
Michael J. Mazarr, "The World Has Passed the Old Grand Strategies By," War on the Rocks, October 5, 2016.
Nick Turse, "Killing People, Breaking Things, and America's Winless Wars," Common Dreams, September 27, 2016.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "Free Nations of the World, Unite!" National Review, September 22, 2016.
Christopher Preble, "New Rules for U.S. Military Intervention," War on the Rocks, September 20, 2016.
Dani Rodrik, "Put Globalization to Work for Democracies," New York Times, September 17, 2016.
William Ruger, "The Myth of American Retreat," American Conservative, September 13, 2016 (review of Robert J. Lieber, Retreat and Its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order, Cambridge University Press)
Barry F. Lowenkron, Mitchell B. Reiss, "Pragmatic Primacy: How America Can Move Forward in a Changing World," National Interest, September 11, 2016.
Gregory R, Copley, "The Era of Strategic Containment is Over," Defense & Foreign Affairs, September 7, 2016.
Frank Hoffman, "The Consistent Incoherence of Grand Strategy," War on the Rocks, September 1, 2016.
Andrew J. Bacevich, "Ending Endless War," Foreign Affairs, September/October 2016.
Doug Bandow, "Why Washington Is Addicted to Perpetual War," National Interest, August 28, 2016.
Michael Lind, "Can America Share Its Superpower Status?" National Interest, August 21, 2016.
Barry F. Lowenkron and Mitchell B. Reriss, "Pragmatic Primacy," National Interest, August 11, 2016.
Ted Galen Carpenter and Eric Gomez, "East Asia and a Strategy of Restraint," War on the Rocks, August 10, 2016.
Christopher Preble, Emma Ashford and Travis Evans, "Let's Talk about America's Strategic Choices," War on the Rocks, August 8, 2016.
Robert D. Kaplan, "Is Primacy Overrated?" National Interest, August 7, 2016.
Schuyler Foerster and Ray Raymond, "Balanced Internationalism: 5 Core Principles to Guide U.S. National Security," National Interest, July 31, 2016.
James Holmes, "Why Offshore Balancing Won't Work," National Interest, July 18, 2016.
"Roundtable 8-16 on Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy," ISSF Forum, July 11, 2016 (reviews of Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, 2014, by Richard K. Betts, Jolyon Howorth, Robert J. Lieber, Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, with a response by Barry R, Posen).
Frank G. Hoffman, "Retreating Ashore: The Flaws of Offshore Balancing," Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 5, 2016.
Denny Roy, "A More-Selective US Grand Strategy," Pacific Forum CSIS, June 29, 2016 (PacNet #53).
Stephen Sestanovich, "Do Americans Want a New 'Grand Strategy' or less Overseas Engagement?" Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2016.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing," Foreign Affairs, June 13, 2016.
Joel Makower, Mark "Puck" Mykleby, and Patrick Doherty, "Why Sustainability Should Be America's 'Grand Strategy,'" GreenBiz, June 8, 2016.
Michael Mandelbaum, "America in a New World," American Interest, May 23, 2016.
Josef Joffe, "The New American Isolationism Will Outlive Barack Obama," Tablet, May 2, 2016.
Jennifer M. Harris, "America's Fatal Flaw in its Competition With China Is Thinking Militarily, Not Economically," Huffington Post, April 18, 2016.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Toward a Global Realignment," American Interest, April 17, 2016.
Seth Cropsey, "New American Grand Strategy," Real Clear Defense, April 13, 2016.
Zalmay Khalilzad, "4 Lessons about America's Role in the World," National Interest, March 23, 2016.
H. R. McMaster, "Probing for Weakness," Wall Street Journal, March 23, 2016.
Eliot Cohen, Eric S. Edelman, and Brian Hook, "Presidential Priority: Restore American Leadership," World Affairs, Spring 2016.
Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Unraveling America the Great," American Interest, March 15, 2016.
Craig Beutel, "Keen for a Strategy? George Kennan's Realism Is Alive and Well," Real Clear Defense, March 7, 2016.
Michael Auslin, "Asia's Mediterranean: Strategy, Geopolitics, and Risk in the Seas of the Indo-Pacific," War on the Rocks, February 29, 2016.
Max Boot, "Two Centuries of Police Work," Weekly Standard, February 22, 2016.
John E. McLaughlin, "US Strategy and Strategic Culture from 2017," Global Brief, February 19, 2016.
Holman W. Jenkins, "The U.S. Has No Global Strategy," Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2016.
Articles in 2015
David Petraeus, "A Grand Strategy for 'Greater' Asia," Lowy Institute, September 2, 2015 (Lowy Lecture 2015: general (Ret.) David Petraeus AO)
Hal Brands, "The Limits of Offshore Balancing," Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, September 2015.
Franklin Spinney, "One Presidential Debate You Won't Hear: Why It is Time to Adopt a Sensible Grand Strategy," Counterpunch, August 31, 2015.
Zalmay Khalilzad, "We Asked Zalmay Khalilzad: What Should Be the Purpose of American power?" National Interest, August 26, 2015.
Hal Brands, "Retrenchment Chic: The Dangers Of Offshore Balancing—Analysis," Eurasia Review, August 20, 2015.
Stephen Peter Rosen, "How America Can Balance China's Rising power in Asia," Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2015.
Mark R. Kennedy, "Dump Realism. It's Time For a Conservative Internationalism," Foreign Policy, April 30, 2015.
Francis P. Sempa, "George Kennan's Geopolitics of the Far East," The Diplomat, April 15, 2015.
David A. Shlapak, "Towards a More Modest American Strategy," Survival, April-May 2015: 59-78.
Colin Dueck, "The Strategy of Retrenchment and Its Consequences," Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 2015.
Ionut Popescu, "What Obama Gets Right and Wrong on Grand Strategy," War on the Rocks, March 19, 2015.
Jim Mattis, "A New American Grand Strategy," Defining Ideas (Hoover Institution), February 25, 2015.
Jerry Hendrix, "Avoiding Trivia: A Strategy for Sustainment and Fiscal Security," Center for a New American Security, February 2015, 36 pp.
Chris Miller, "State of Disunion: America's Lack of Strategy is its Own Greatest Threat," Cicero Magazine, January 27, 2015.
Articles in 2014
Joseph Sarkisian, "American Grand Strategy or Grand Illusion," Cicero Magazine, December 1, 2014.
Bryan McGrath, "Unconstrained Grand Strategy," War on the Rocks, October 28, 2014.
Michael Page, "Is 'Restraint' a Realistic Grand Strategy?" Cicero Magazine, October 21, 2014.
R.D. Hooker, "The Grand Strategy of the United States," National Defense University Press (INSS Strategic Monograph), October 2014, 34 pp.
Richard L. Russell, "A Troubling 'World Island' Grand Tour: A World on Fire," National Interest, September 4, 2014.
William Ruger, "A Realist's Guide to Grand Strategy," American Conservative, August 26, 2014 (review of Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, 2014)
Richard Rosecrance, "The Emerging Overbalance of Power," American Interest, August 22, 2014.
F. G. Hoffman, "Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations," Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 18, 2014.
David Adesnik, "Why America Fought," Weekly Standard, August 11, 2014.
Christopher A. Ford, "Ending the Strategic Holiday: U.S. Grand Strategy and a 'Rising China," Asia Policy, July 2014: 181-189.
Hal Brands, "Breaking Down Obama's Grand Strategy," National Interest, June 23, 2014.
William C. Martel, "America's Grand Strategy Disaster," National Interest, June 9, 2014.
Peter Beinart, "Putting Ukraine in Its Place," The Atlantic, May 21, 2014.
Robert Kaplan, "The Gift of American Power," Real Clear World, May 15, 2014.
Michael Lind, "The Case for American Nationalism," National Interest, April 22, 2014.
Aaron David Miller, "The Naiveté of Distance," Foreign Policy, March 31, 2014.
Chad Pillai, "The Return of Great Power Politics: Re-examining the Nixon Doctrine," War on the Rocks, March 27, 2014.
Adam Garfinkle, "The Silent Death of American Grand Strategy," American Review, 2014.
Bruce W. Jentleson, "Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, 125-136.
Article from 2012
William C. Martel, "Why America Needs a Grand Strategy," The Diplomat, June 18, 2012.
Appendix F.
Selected Articles: Allies and Alliances
This appendix presents some recent examples of articles, with the most recent on top, providing perspectives on the value of allies and alliances to the United States.
Doug Bandow, "Time to Terminate Washington's Defense Welfare," National Interest, August 30, 2017.
John Glaser, "Withdrawing From Overseas Bases, Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous," Cato Institute, July 18, 2017. (Policy Analysis 816)
Doug Irving, "Are America's Overseas Security Commitments Worth It?" RAND, July 7, 2017. (This post summarizes a RAND report—Daniel Egel, et al, Estimating the Value of Overseas Security Commitments, RAND Corporation, 2016, 81 pp. [Report RR-518])
Hugh White, "China v US: Who Needs Allies?" The Interpreter, May 29, 2017.
Kori Schake, "NATO Without America?" American Interest, May 25, 2017.
Christopher A. Preble, "Should the United States Wage War for Friends?" National Interest, December 15, 2016.
Barry R. Posen, "The High Costs and Limited Benefits of America's Alliances," National Interest, August 7, 2016.
Charles Lane, "The Logic Behind Our Alliances," Washington Post, July 28, 2016.
Jim Talent, "Why Alliances Matter," National Review, July 27, 2016.
Jeremy Shapiro and Richard Sokolsky, "How America Enables Its Allies' Bad Behavior," Order from Chaos (Brookings Institution), May 4, 2016.
Walter Russell Mead, "The Global Vote of No Confidence in Pax Americana," American Interest, April 5, 2016.
Frank Hoffman, "Manning the Frontier: Allies and the Unraveling of the World Order," War on the Rocks, March 7, 2016.
Appendix G.
Selected CRS Products: State Department, International Organizations, Foreign Assistance
This appendix presents a list of some CRS products providing overview discussions relating to the Department of State, U.S. participation in international organizations, and foreign assistance programs. These products include the following:
Additional CRS products not listed above provide discussions of specific issues relating to the Department of State and foreign assistance.
Appendix H.
Selected CRS Products: Trade and International Economic Policy
This appendix presents a list of some CRS products providing overview discussions relating to trade and international economic policy. Products relating to trade include the following:
Products relating to international economic policy include the following:
Additional CRS products not listed above provide discussions of specific issues relating to trade and international economic policy.
Appendix I.
Selected CRS Products: Defense Policy and Programs
This appendix presents a list of some CRS products providing overview discussions relating to defense policy and programs. These products include the following:
Additional CRS products not listed above provide discussions of specific issues relating to defense policy and programs.
Appendix J.
Selected CRS Products: Homeland Security, Border Security, Immigration, Refugees
This appendix presents a list of some CRS products providing overview discussions relating to homeland security, border security, immigration, and refugees. These products include the following:
Additional CRS products not listed above provide discussions of specific issues relating to homeland security, border security, and immigration.
Author Contact Information
1. |
One strategist, reviewing a recent book about grand strategy (Lukas Milevski, The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought, Oxford University Press, 2016), states The notion of grand strategy, albeit terribly hubristic sounding, is a decidedly practical art and a necessity for powers great and small. Such strategies are applied by accident or by deliberate rationalization in the pursuit of a country's best interests. Yet, there are few agreements about what constitutes a grand strategy and even what the best definition is.... ... Ironically, I am partial to the definition postulated by Dr. Colin Gray, who defined it in The Strategy Bridge as "the direction and use made of any or all the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics." This definition is not limited to states per se, is mute on its relevance to peacetime competition or wartime, and explicitly refers to all of the power assets of a community, rather than just its military services. [Milevski's] book is a wonderful and concise treatise that in some ways will remind readers of Edward Mead Earle's original Makers of Modern Strategy, which was published at the end of World War II.... While Earle focused on the key figures of strategy, Milevski's focus is narrower, uncovering the context and tracing the historiography of the term "grand strategy" over the past two centuries. [Milevski] captures the varied insights among the giants (Mahan, Corbett, Edward M. Earle, Kahn, and Brodie) that have enriched our understanding of the apex of strategy. At the end of his journey, he incorporates the insights of major recent contributors to the literature and our basis for theory today: Edward Luttwak, Barry Posen, John Collins, Paul Kennedy, John Lewis Gaddis, and Hal Brands. (Frank Hoffman, "The Consistent Incoherence of Grand Strategy," War on the Rocks, September 1, 2016.) |
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A spheres-of-influence world, like a multipolar world, is characterized by having multiple major world powers. In a spheres-of-influence world, however, at least some of those major world powers have achieved a status of regional hegemon, while in a multipolar world, few or none of those major world powers (other than the United States, the regional hegemon of the Western Hemisphere) have achieved a status of regional hegemon. As a result, in a spheres-of-influence world, international relations are more highly segmented on a regional basis than they are in a multipolar world. |
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For recent examples of articles discussing geopolitics as defined in the more specific sense, see Robert D. Kaplan, "The Return of Marco Polo's World and the U.S. Military Response," Center for a New American Security, undated but posted at the CNAS website ca. May 12, 2017; Robert C. Rubel, "Exporting Security: China, the United States, and the Innovator's Dilemma," Naval War College Review, Spring 2017: 11-29; John Hillen, "Foreign Policy By Map," National Review, February 23, 2015: 32-34; Alfred McCoy, "The Geopolitics of American Global Decline," Real Clear World, June 8, 2015; and Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers," Foreign Affairs, May-June 2014. |
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The term Eurasia is used in this report to refer to the entire land mass that encompasses both Europe and Asia, including its fringing islands, extending from Portugal on its western end to Japan on its eastern end, and from Russia's Arctic coast on its northern edge to India on its southern edge, and encompassing all the lands and countries in between, including those of Central Asia, Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Eurasia's fringing islands include, among others, the United Kingdom and Ireland in Europe, Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, and Japan and the archipelagic countries of Southeast Asia. There are also other definitions of Eurasia, some of which are more specialized and refer to subsets of the broad area described above. Opposing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia is also sometimes referred to as preserving a division of power in Eurasia. |
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See, for example, "Democratic Peace Theory," Oxford Bibliographies, accessed May 23, 2017, at http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0014.xml. |
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See, for example, Colin Willett, "Trump's Asia Policy Is More Confused Than Ever," Foreign Policy, June 12, 2017; Nahal Toosi, "The Trump Doctrine Is made of Mixed Messages," Politico, April 29, 2017; P.J. Crowley, "What We Have Here Is A Failure to Communicate," Politico, April 28, 2017; Erin Cunningham, et al., "Other Countries Are Still Trying to Figure Out What Trump Means to Them" Washington Post, April 28, 2017; William Inboden, "In A Tale of Two Trumps, Which Will Emerge as President Is Anyone's Guess," Dallas Morning News, Greg Miller, "On Russia, Trump and His Top National Security Aides Seem to Be At Odds," Washington Post, April 18, 2017; Kevin Sullivan and Karen Tumulty, "Trump Promised An 'Unpredictable' Foreign Policy. To Allies, It Looks Incoherent." Washington Post, April 11, 2017; Julie Pace, "Trump's Strike on Syria Has Many Wondering What the President's Foreign Policy Is," Business Insider, April 10, 2017; Peter Baker, "The Emerging Trump Doctrine: Don't Follow Doctrine," New York Times, April 8, 2017; Jim Hoagland, "The Mystery of Trump's Character Deepens," Washington Post, April 7, 2017 Robin Wright, "Trump's Flailing Foreign Policy Bewilders The World," New Yorker, February 17, 2017. |
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See, for example, Richard N. Haass, "Who Will Fill America's Shoes?" The Strategist, June 26, 2017; Lawrence Summers, "After 75 Years of Progress, Was Last Week A Hinge in History?" Washington Post, June 4, 2017; Jonathan Easley, "Trump Cements 'America First' Doctrine with Paris Withdrawal," The Hill, June 2, 2017; Fareed Zakaria, "Trump's Radical Departure from Postwar Foreign Policy," Washington Post, June 1, 2017; Carol Morello and John Wagner, "As the U.S. Laves Paris Climate Accord, Some See Shifts in Global Leadership," Washington Post, June 1, 2017; David Frum, "The Death Knell for America's Global Leadership," The Atlantic, May 31, 2017; Heather Timmons, "The Trump Presidency Is Systematically Destroying Any Global Moral High Ground the US Had Left," Quartz, March 13, 2017; Jessica T. Matthews, "What Trump Is Throwing Out the Window," New York Review of Books, February 9, 2017; Jeremi Suri, "How Trump's Executive Orders Could Set America Back 70 Years," The Atlantic, January 27, 2017; Karen DeYoung and Philip Rucker, "Trump Lays Groundwork to Change U.S. Role in the World," Washington Post, January 26, 2017; Charles Krauthammer, "Trump's Foreign Policy Revolution," Washington Post, January 26, 2017; Richard Stengel, "The End of the American Century," The Atlantic, January 26, 2017; John Cassidy, "Donald Trump's New World Disorder," New Yorker, January 24, 2017; Max Boot, "Will Trump Be the End of the Pax Americana?" Los Angeles Times, January 22, 2017; Zack Beauchamp, "Trump's Inaugural Address Showed That He's Serious About His Radical Foreign Policy," Vox, January 20, 2017; Fred Kaplan, "Donald Trump Really Believes All Those Things He Said During the Campaign," Slate, January 20, 2017. |
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8. |
See, for example, Elliott Abrams, "Trump the Traditionalist," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2017: 10-16; John T. Bennett, "Despite Campaign Pledges, Trump Plans Active Foreign Policy," Roll Call, May 4, 2017; James Jeffrey, "100 Days of Trump Foreign Policy: Chaos to Moderation," Cipher Brief, April 28, 2017; Danielle Pletka, "On Foreign Policy, Trump Has Become—Gasp—A Normal President," Washington Post, April 26, 2017; Eli Lake, "At 100 Days, Trump's No Russian Stooge or Fascist," Bloomberg, April 25, 2017; Matthew Lee and Josh Lederman, "Once Critical of Global Deals, Trump Slow to Pull Out of Any," Washington Times, April 20, 2017; Annie Karni, "Trump's Foreign Policy Goes Mainstream," Politico, April 10, 2017; Julie Pace and Vivian Salam, "Once Opposed to Intervention, Trump Says He Can Be Flexible," Military Times, April 10, 2017; Binyamin Applebaum, "President's Growing Trade Gap: A Gulf Between Talk and Action," New York Times, March 31, 2017; Julie Hirschfeld and Alan Rappeport, "After Calling Nafta 'Worst Trade Deal,' Trump Appears to Soften Stance," New York Times, March 30, 2017; Mark Landler, Peter Baker, and David E. Sanger, "Trump Embraces Pillars of Obama's Foreign Policy," New York Times, February 2, 2017. |
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See, for example, James Kirchick, "Why It's Hard to Take Democrats Seriously on Russia," Politico, July 24, 2017; Lawrence J. Haas, "Encouraging Putin's Recklessness," U.S. News & World Report, June 27, 2017; Eli Lake, "Obama Choked on Russia Long Before the 2016 Election," Bloomberg, June 27, 2017; Josef Joffe, "How Trump Is Like Obama," Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2017; John Vinocur, "Obama's European Legacy," Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2017; James Kirchick, "Who Killed the Liberal World Order,?" American Interest, May 3, 2017; Leon Wieseltier, "Aleppo's Fall is Obama's Failure," Washington Post, December 15, 2016. |
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As discussed in another CRS report, world events have led some observers, starting in late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the past 20 to 25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. See CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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The terms offshore balancing and offshore control refer in general to a policy in which the United States, in effect, stands off the shore of Eurasia and engages in the security affairs of Eurasia less frequently, less directly, or less expansively. The term retrenchment is more often used by critics of these proposed approaches. |
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For example, one analyst and former White House aide states: "For much of its history, the United States kept itself largely apart from the world ... During the Cold War and its aftermath, the United States sat atop the world. Militarily, economically, technologically, diplomatically, politically, and ideologically, the United States was dominant by almost every measure ... [Today] the United States finds itself neither apart nor atop but rather amidst the world, both shaping and being shaped by global events and forces.... " As a consequence, he argues, there is the need for a new approach that differs from both retrenchment and re-assertion, an approach he labels "re-calibration" to the "geopolitical, economic, technological and other dynamics driving the 21st-century world." Such an approach, he argues, would entail a reappraisal of U.S. interests, a reassessment of U.S. power, and a repositioning of U.S. leadership. (Bruce Jentleson, "Apart, Atop, Amidst: America in the World," War on the Rocks, January 2017.) As another example, a different analyst argues in favor of a U.S. role based on "a better nationalism"—what he describes as a more benign and constructive form that "would not dismantle the post-war order and America's post war project, but would take a harder-edged and more disciplined approach to asserting U.S. interests." (Hal Brands, "U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress American and it Alternatives," Washington Quarterly, Spring 2017: 73-93.) |
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These include the power to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; regulate commerce with foreign nations; define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy; provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them that may be employed in the service of the United States; and make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution these and other powers granted in Article I, Section 8. |
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As quoted in Russell Berman, "President Trump's 'Hard Power' Budget," The Atlantic, March 16, 2017. The article states that Mulvaney made the remarks in "a Wednesday [March 15] briefing previewing the [budget] proposal's release." In a March 16, 2017 White House press briefing, Mulvaney similarly stated Again, I come back to what the president said on the campaign, which is that he's going to spend less money overseas. To your question, though, because this came up the other day, which is the hard power versus soft power. There's a very deliberate attempt here to send a message to our allies and our friends, such as India, and our adversaries, other countries, shall we say, which is that this is a hard-power budget; that this administration intends to change course from a soft power budget to a hard power budget. And that's a message that our adversaries and our allies alike should take. (Transcript of White House regular news briefing, March 16, 2017, as posted at CQ.com.) |
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18. |
See Office of Management and Budget, America First A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again. |
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19. |
For example, at a June 15, 2017, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Department of the Navy's proposed FY2018 budget, the following exchange occurred: SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN (continuing): I want to quickly ask about the importance of our non-military agencies and programs to the Navy mission. Admiral Richardson, would a significant reduction in funding to the State Department and other non-defense security agencies and programs make the Navy's job easier or harder to do? ADMIRAL JOHN RICHARDSON, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS: If you—if you—harder, to be blunt about it, ma'am. WARREN: I'll take blunt. RICHARDSON: Yeah, that's—(inaudible). So, you know, the lack of diplomacy and those sorts of other elements of national power—if those aren't there, it makes our mission harder. (Transcript as posted at CQ.com.) Secretary of Defense James Mattis reportedly has stated: "If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately." (Alex Lockie, "Mattis Once Said If State Department Funding Gets Cut 'Then I Need to Buy More Ammunition,'" Business Insider, February 27, 2017.) Another article quotes Mattis as having said, while he was Commander of U.S. Central Command: "If you don't fully fund the State Department, then I need to buy more ammunition." (Dan Lamothe, "Retired Generals Cite Past Comments from Mattis While Opposing Trump's Proposed Foreign Aid Cuts," Washington Post, February 27, 2017.) |
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20. |
See, for example, Mark P. Lagon and Brian P. McKeon, "Donald Trump' Is Tarnishing America's Brand," Foreign Policy, March 1, 2017. |
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21. |
See, for example, Fu Ying, "China's Vision for the World: A Community of Shared Future," The Diplomat, June 22, 2017; Isaac Stone Fish, "Is China Becoming the World's Most Likable Superpower?" The Atlantic, June 2, 2017; David E. Sanger and jane Perlez, "Trump Hands the Chinese a Gift: The Chance for Global Leadership," New York Times, June 1, 2017; Elsa Kania, "China's War for Narrative Dominance," National Interest, May 28, 2017; "China to Continue Contributing to Global Stability, Growth, Peace, Governance," Xinhua, March 8, 2017. |
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22. |
Kori Schake, "National Security Challenges," ORBIS, Vol. 61 Issue 1, Winter 2017. |
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23. |
See, for example, Benjamin Jensen, "How the International System Shapes the Character of War: Order, Geography, and Networks, War on the Rocks, June 4, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/?s=How+the+International+System+Shapes+the+Character+of+War%3A+Order%2C+Geography%2C+and+Networks. |
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24. |
Charles Lane, "Sorry, Trump's Refugee Order Is Probably Legal," Washington Post, February 1, 2017. |
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25. | For a general discussion of congressional staffing and how it has evolved over time, see Congressional Research Service, Congressional Staffing: The Continuity of Change and Reform, by [author name scrubbed], in CRS Committee Print CP10000, The Evolving Congress: A Committee Print Prepared for the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. See also Kathy Goldschmidt, State of the Congress: Staff Perspectives on Institutional Capacity in the House and Senate, Congressional Management Foundation, 2017, 38 pp.
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26. |
For further discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10293, Foreign Relations Reauthorization: Background and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. See also pages 17-20 of Congressional Research Service, Changes in the Purposes and Frequency of Authorizations of Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed], in CRS Committee Print CP10000, The Evolving Congress: A Committee Print Prepared for the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. |
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27. |
CRS In Focus IF10485, Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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28. |
"Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces," accessed June 28, 2017, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/presidential-memorandum-rebuilding-us-armed-forces. |
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29. |
Remarks on "Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century," [by] Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State, [with] John J. Hamre, CEO for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, October 18, 2017, accessed October 19, 2017, at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/10/274913.htm. |
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30. |
Source: Transcript of speech posted at CQ.com, accessed September 19, 2017. The transcript as posted at cq.com includes some indications of audience applause that are not included in the reprinting of the transcript here. Versions of the transcript were also posted at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/19/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly and https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/19/16333290/trump-full-speech-transcript-un-general-assembly. |
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31. |
Wilbur Ross, "Free-Trade is a Two-Way Street," Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2017. |
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32. |
Gary D. Cohn and H.R. McMaster, "The Trump Vision for America Abroad," New York Times, July 13, 2017. |
|
33. |
Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland, July 6, 2017, accessed August 17, 2017, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/07/06/remarks-president-trump-people-poland-july-6-2017. The transcript as posted at www.whitehouse.gov includes numerous indications of audience applause that are not included in the reprinting of the transcript here. |
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34. |
H.R. McMaster and Gary D. Cohn, "America First Doesn't Mean America Alone," Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017. |
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35. |
Remarks to U.S. Department of State Employees, Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson Auditorium, Washington, DC, May 3, 2017, accessed June 27, 2017, at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/05/270620.htm. |
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36. |
"America First Foreign Policy," accessed September 19, 2017, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy. |
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37. |
The Inaugural Address, Remarks of President Donald J. Trump—As Prepared for Delivery, Inaugural Address, Friday, January 20, 2017, Washington, DC, accessed August 17, 2017, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address. |
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Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, and Craig Kafura, What Americans Think about America First, Results of the 2017 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2017, pp. 2-7. See also Jenna Johnson, "What Does 'America First' Really Mean?" Washington Post, April 27, 2018 |
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Pew Research Center, "Public Uncertain, Divided Over America's Place in the World," May 5, 2016. |
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Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, and Craig Kafura, America in the Age of Uncertainty, American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy, 2016 Chicago Council Survey, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2016, pp. 2, 6. |
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Charles Koch Institute and Center for the National Interest, "Poll: This Holiday, Americans Wish For A More Peaceful Approach to Foreign Policy, Results show voters favor an emphasis on diplomacy and trade and are skeptical of military intervention abroad," December 22, 2016, accessed June 21, 2017, at https://187ock2y3ejr34z8752m6ize-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/12.22.16-Charles-Koch-TNI.pdf. |
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42. |
This blog post at this point includes a link to John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016. |
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43. |
Stephen Sestanovich, "Do Americans Want a New 'Grand Strategy' or Less Overseas Engagement?" Wall Street Journal (Washington Wire/Think Tank), June 16, 2016. |
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44. |
Stephen Sestanovich, "The President Is Preventing the Foreign-Policy Debate America Needs To have," Defense One, April 13, 2017. |
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45. |
TNI [The National Interest] Staff, "Is Trump's Foreign Policy the New Mainstream?" National Interest, December 22, 2016. |
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46. |
Michael Clarke and Anthony Ricketts, "Understanding the Return of the Jacksonian Tradition," ORBIS, Vol. 61, Issue 1, Winter 2017: 13-26. (The quotation is from the article's abstract.) |
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47. |
See for example, Taeshuh Cha, "The Return of Jacksonianism: The International Implications of the Trump Phenomenon," The Washington Quarterly, 39:4, Winter 2017, pp. 83-97. |
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48. |
Martin Wolf, "The Long and Painful Journey to World Disorder," Financial Times, January 5, 2017. |
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101.
Robert Kagan, "'America First' Has Won; The Three Pillars of the Ideology—Isolationism, Protectionism and Restricting Immigration—Were Gaining Popularity Before Donald Trump Became President and May Outlast His Tenure," New York Times, September 23, 2018. |
The blog post at this point includes a hyperlink to the 2016 Chicago Council Survey report cited in footnote |
Hal Brands, "Is American Internationalism Dead?" War on the Rocks, May 16, 2017. |
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Hal Brands, "Can U.S. Internationalism Survive Trump?" Foreign Policy, May 25, 2017. Similarly, this same foreign policy specialist, along with a co-author, state in a June 21, 2017, that making such a commitment [i.e., a commitment to actively influence global affairs] requires confronting the question of whether the American public is willing to sustain such a role. There are many reasons it should be willing to do so; U.S. engagement has been vital to shaping an international order in which America has been relatively secure and enormously prosperous. Yet the public mood is nonetheless ambivalent. Whether a consensus in support of a robust American internationalism can be resolidified remains to be seen. What is clear is that supporters of that tradition will have to go back to first principles if they are to make a compelling case; they must once again articulate the basic logic of policies that American internationalists have long taken for granted. (Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, "America and the Geopolitics of Upheaval," National Interest, June 21, 2017.) |
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Walter Russell Mead, "A Debate on America's Role—25 Years Late," Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2017. |
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105. |
Stephen Sestanovich, "The President Is Preventing the Foreign-Policy Debate America Needs To have," Defense One, April 13, 2017. |
|
106. |
TNI [The National Interest] Staff, "Is Trump's Foreign Policy the New Mainstream?" National Interest, December 22, 2016. |
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107. |
Michael Clarke and Anthony Ricketts, "Understanding the Return of the Jacksonian Tradition," ORBIS, Vol. 61, Issue 1, Winter 2017: 13-26. (The quotation is from the article's abstract.) |
|
108. |
This blog post at this point includes a link to John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016. |
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109. |
Stephen Sestanovich, "Do Americans Want a New 'Grand Strategy' or Less Overseas Engagement?" Wall Street Journal (Washington Wire/Think Tank), June 16, 2016. |