Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

April 12, 2007 – September 18, 2020 RL33964

Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
September 18, 2020
Overview. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, largest economy, and leading oil
producer. Successive U.S. Administrations have described the U.S.-Nigeria relationship
Tomas F. Husted
as among the most important in sub-Saharan Africa: the country is the United States’
Analyst in African Affairs
second-largest trading partner and third-largest destination for U.S. foreign direct

investment in the region, and it routinely ranks among the top annual recipients of U.S.
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
foreign aid globally. Nigeria plays a major political and economic role in Africa and
Specialist in African Affairs
wields influence regionally. Nigerians make up the largest African-born population in

the United States, generating billions of dollars in annual remittance outflows.

Governance. Nigeria has been a multiparty democracy since 1999, after decades of
military rule. Governance conditions have broadly improved over the past two decades, yet corruption, ethno-
religious tensions, security force abuses, discrimination against women and sexual minorities, and government
harassment of political opponents and journalists remain key challenges. In 2015, Nigeria underwent its first
democratic transfer of power between political parties when former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari won office
on a groundswell of discontent over corruption, economic malaise, and rising insecurity. Buhari won reelection in
2019, in elections that featured historically low turnout, pervasive vote buying, and widespread violence and
heightened concerns over Nigeria’s democratic trajectory.
Security. Nigeria faces security challenges on several fronts. In the northeast, conflict between the military and
two U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)—Boko Haram and an Islamic State-affiliated
splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)—has killed tens of thousands over the past
decade, displaced millions, and caused a protracted humanitarian crisis. The conflict also has destabilized adjacent
areas of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in the wider Lake Chad Basin region. In Nigeria’s northwest, conflict
between pastoralists and farmers recently has escalated amid a broader deterioration in security conditions
involving cattle rustling, kidnapping, ethnic massacres, and emergent Islamist extremist activity. Farmer-herder
violence also has surged in the central Middle Belt, where disputes over resource access coincide with ethno-
religious cleavages between Christian and Muslim communities. In the south, criminality and militancy in the oil-
rich Niger Delta have impeded development and contributed to insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea for decades.
Economy. With massive oil reserves, extensive potential in the agriculture and service sectors, and a youthful,
rapidly growing population, Nigeria is equipped to emerge as a global economic powerhouse. Yet corruption,
infrastructure gaps, insecurity, and a failure to diversify the economy away from petroleum production have
constrained economic growth and development. The economy is poised to enter a deep recession in 2020—its
second contraction in five years—amid a global oil price collapse and disruptions linked to Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The International Monetary Fund projects Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP)
to decline by 5.4% in 2020, with severe implications for economic livelihoods and government finances. Nigeria
already ranks among the world’s least developed countries across a range of indicators: according to some
estimates, Nigeria is home to the world’s largest population living in extreme poverty.
U.S. Engagement. U.S.-Nigeria relations are extensive by regional standards, encompassing a U.S.-Nigeria
Binational Commission and other bilateral engagements, significant commercial linkages, and considerable
people-to-people ties. President Trump’s phone call to President Buhari in 2017 was his first to any sub-Saharan
African leader, and in 2018, Buhari became the first sub-Saharan African leader to meet with President Trump at
the White House. U.S. concerns over human rights conditions in Nigeria periodically have strained ties and
impeded security cooperation; in recent years, some Members of Congress have expressed particular concern with
military abuses against civilians, along with deteriorating press and religious freedoms. The State Department and
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated over $450 million in FY2020 bilateral foreign
assistance for Nigeria, supporting programs focused on health, good governance, agricultural development, and
law enforcement and justice sector strengthening. This does not include substantial emergency assistance
provided in response to the humanitarian crisis in the northeast, or funds administered by other U.S. federal
departments, such as the Departments of Defense, Justice, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security.
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Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Overview
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, largest economy, and leading oil producer. It plays a
major political and economic role in Africa and wields significant influence in regional bodies
such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The
country’s commercial center, Lagos, is among the world’s largest cities, with an annual economic
output surpassing that of many African countries. By 2050, Nigeria is poised to overtake the
United States as the world’s third most populous country, with a population projected to exceed
400 million.1 (At 216 million inhabitants as of mid-2020, Nigeria is currently the world’s sixth
most populous.) Few countries in Africa have the potential to make a larger global impact.
At the same time, Nigeria faces considerable economic, security, and social challenges. In 2020,
the twin shocks of a collapse in the global price of oil, Nigeria’s top export, and Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) are expected to push its economy into a deep recession, the country’s
second contraction in five years. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected in June 2020
that Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) would decline by 5.4% in 2020, with implications
for livelihoods, social programs, and state finances—and for a governance system that relies, to a
large extent, on the distribution of centrally collected oil revenues.2 The downturn is likely to
heighten development challenges in a country where roughly half the population lives in extreme
poverty. It also may draw attention and resources away from a number of pressing security
threats, notably including a decade-long insurgency by Islamist extremists in the northeast.
Recent congressional attention on Nigeria has centered on terrorist threats, elections and other
governance issues, human rights challenges, and humanitarian conditions. Nigeria routinely ranks
among the top global recipients of U.S. development aid, although U.S. concern over Nigerian
security force abuses periodically have strained bilateral ties and limited security cooperation.
State Department- and USAID-administered assistance totaled over $450 million in FY2020
allocations, excluding emergency humanitarian aid and other globally administered funds.3 A
particular emphasis of U.S. health aid has been efforts to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS; Nigeria is
home to the world’s second-largest population living with HIV/AIDS.4 Other U.S. federal
departments and agencies also administer assistance to Nigeria.
COVID-19 in Nigeria: Health Impacts and Nigerian and U.S. Responses
As of September 17, Nigeria had confirmed approximately 57,000 cases of COVID-19 (about 26.5 per 100,000
people), with roughly 1,100 deaths (1.9%).5 After the country recorded its first known case in late February 2020,
the Buhari administration imposed a lockdown in three zones—the Federal Capital Territory encompassing the
capital, Abuja, as well as Lagos and Ogun States—prohibiting public gatherings and closing schools, places of
worship, and most businesses. Authorities in other states introduced ful or partial lockdowns, and in mid-March,
the central government imposed a nationwide curfew and restrictions on non-essential travel into the country and
between states. Since early May, national and state authorities have gradually eased such measures, which imposed
a heavy economic burden in an economy already facing a contraction, despite a mounting COVID-19 caseload.
(The number of total confirmed cases doubled over a six-week period in mid-2020, from roughly 25,000 in late
June to over 50,000 in mid-August).

1 United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects 2019 Revision, 2019.
2 IMF, World Economic Outlook database, June 2020 update.
3 State Department, 653(a) report for FY2020.
4 Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UNAIDS Data 2019, 2019.
5 CRS calculation of incidence and death rates based on data from Johns Hopkins University COVID-19 map, at
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html, accessed September 10, 2020, and population data from CIA World Factbook.
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Nigeria has lagged behind some other African countries in testing for the virus. As of September 17, Nigerian
authorities had tested roughly 480,000 samples, as compared to nearly 4.0 mil ion tests conducted in fellow
economic powerhouse South Africa, which has a population one-quarter the size of Nigeria’s.6 Low testing rates
have raised fears that Nigeria’s official caseload may considerably understate the extent of the pandemic. Notably,
in April, the northern city of Kano experienced a spike in deaths due to unknown causes; a government inquiry
based on interviews with those in contact with the deceased estimated that some 60% of those deaths may have
been due to COVID-19. Other cities also reportedly have seen spikes in unexplained deaths due to respiratory
il ness.7 Meanwhile, the enforcement of lockdown orders in Nigeria has raised concerns in light of reported abuses
by security forces. According to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an independent government
agency, security forces kil ed nearly 30 people and unlawful y detained, extorted, or tortured dozens more over
the first five weeks of lockdown.8 Several journalists also have faced arrest while reporting on COVID-19.9
Nigerian authorities have requested roughly $7 bil ion from the IMF, World Bank, and other multilateral lenders
to help counter the virus and cushion its economic impacts. As of August 2020, the IMF had provided $3.4 bil ion
in emergency financing for Nigeria (see “The Economy,” below). As of August 21, the State Department had
announced roughly $42 mil ion in U.S. health and humanitarian assistance for Nigeria, separate from U.S. support
provided through multilateral institutions.10 In August, the Administration also donated 200 ventilators to Nigeria,
fulfil ing a pledge made by President Trump after an April 2020 call with President Buhari.11
Politics
Nigeria is a federal republic with 36 states. Its political structure is similar to that of the United
States, with a bicameral legislature comprising a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House
of Representatives. It became a multiparty democracy in 1999, after four decades of military rule
punctuated by repeated coups and intermittent attempts to establish civilian government.
Nigeria’s politics have been shaped by efforts to distribute power and state resources equitably in
a country that is home to over 250 ethnic groups and has witnessed recurrent conflict along ethno-
regional and religious lines. The “federal character” principle, enshrined in the 1999 constitution,
requires that appointments to government posts reflect the country’s diversity.12 By a de facto
system known as “zoning,” political parties rotate candidates for elected office on an ethno-
regional basis. Perceived violations of these arrangements have led to conflict: in 2011, for
instance, frustrated expectations that a northerner would retain the presidency contributed to post-

6 Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, COVID-19 Nigeria dashboard; South Africa National Department of Health,
COVID-19 dashboard, both accessed September 18, 2020.
7 Ruth Maclean, “Covid-19 Outbreak in Nigeria Is Just One of Africa’s Alarming Hot Spots,” New York Times, May
17, 2020.
8 NHRC, National Human Rights Commission Press Release on COVID-19 Enforcement So Far Report on Incidents of
Violation of Human Rights, April 15, 2020; NHRC, Report of Alleged Human Rights Violations Recorded Between
13th April to 4th May, 2020 Following the Extension of the Lockdown Period by Government, May 15, 2020.
9 See, e.g., Committee to Project Journalists (CPJ), "Nigerian journalist held under cybercrime act for COVID-19
coverage," June 10, 2020.
10 State Department, “Update: The United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” August 21,
2020.
11 White House, “Remarks by President Trump in Meeting with Governor DeSantis of Florida,” April 28, 2020.
12 Implementation of the “federal character” remains uneven. See Leila Demarest, Arnim Langer, and Ukoha Ukiwo,
“Nigeria’s Federal Character Commission (FFC): a critical appraisal,” Oxford Development Studies (2020).
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election riots in which hundreds died.13 Elections often serve as flashpoints for violence as
political office at all tiers of government yields access to oil earnings and other state resources.14
Figure 1. Nigeria at a Glance

Size: More than twice the size of California
Literacy: 62% (71% male, 53% female) (2015)
Capital: Abuja
Infant Mortality Rate: 60 deaths/1,000 live births
Population: 214 mil ion; 2.5% growth rate
Median Age / Life Expectancy: 18.6 years / 60 years
Languages: English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo
Prevalence of HIV: 1.5% (2018)
(Igbo), Fulani, over 500 other local languages
GDP Per Capita / Growth Rate: $1,168 / 2.2% (2019)
Religions: Muslim 54%, Roman Catholic 11%, other
Key exports: petroleum and petroleum products 95%,
Christian 35%, other 1% (2018)
cocoa, rubber (2012)
Source: CRS map with data from State Department and Esri. Fact information from CIA World Factbook and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 2020 data unless otherwise indicated. GDP per capita is adjusted to
international dol ars based on purchasing power parity.

13 The 2011 zoning controversy resulted from the 2010 death of incumbent President Umaru Yar’Adua, a northerner.
He was succeeded by southern-born Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, who won reelection in 2011. Many
northerners, including some prominent figures within Jonathan’s party, opposed Jonathan’s candidacy on the grounds
that a northerner should have held the presidency for two consecutive terms. For an account of this controversy and the
post-election violence, see Human Rights Watch (HRW), Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800, May 16, 2011.
14 For a study of corruption and oversight challenges related to government expenditures in Nigeria, see Matthew Page,
Camouflaged Cash: How ‘Security Votes’ Fuel Corruption in Nigeria, Transparency International, May 2018.
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The Buhari Administration (2015-Present)
President Muhammadu Buhari, a retired army major general, first won office in 2015 and was
reelected in 2019. He had previously served as military head of state after leading a coup d’état in
1983, before being overthrown in another coup in 1985. An ethnic Fulani Muslim from the
northwest, Buhari swept the north in both electoral cycles. His vice president, Yemi Osinbajo, is
an ethnic Yoruba Pentecostal pastor and former state attorney general from the southwest.
Approaching the 2015 polls, Buhari leveraged his military background and stoic reputation to
campaign on a platform of addressing mounting security challenges and rooting out graft. Upon
taking office, he earned praise for launching an anti-corruption campaign that resulted in charges
against several high-ranking former officials, and for intensifying the counterinsurgency against
Boko Haram, which had rapidly expanded its territorial control in 2014-2015.15 In contrast to his
predecessor, Buhari strengthened counterterrorism coordination with neighboring countries and
recorded a series of military victories against Boko Haram soon after taking office.
Boko Haram has nevertheless proven resilient, as the military has struggled to curb the group’s
attacks and reestablish state control in contested areas, notably in rural zones. The emergence and
growth of an Islamic State-affiliated splinter faction since 2016, alongside rising insecurity in
other parts of the country, have placed further strain on Nigeria’s overstretched security forces
(see “Security Conditions and Human Rights Concerns”). Meanwhile, several high profile
corruption cases have stalled in Nigeria’s slow-moving court system, and the country’s top anti-
corruption official has himself come under investigation for alleged graft.16 Critics accuse the
Buhari administration of targeting anti-corruption inquiries to sideline political opponents, even
as Buhari’s cabinet includes several ministers previously implicated in corrupt practices.17
Observers also have expressed concerns over human rights and democracy trends. According to
Amnesty International, attacks on the press have “continued unabated” since 2015, as authorities
have raided media offices and detained journalists on security and criminal defamation charges.18
Several Members of Congress have expressed alarm over the prosecution of U.S.-based journalist
and 2019 presidential candidate Omoyele Sowore, who faces treason charges for calling for anti-
Buhari protests after the election.19 Despite Buhari’s pledge to curb security force misconduct,
human rights groups have accused the police and military of torture, extrajudicial killings, and
other abuses (see “Security Sector Challenges and Accountability Concerns”). The 2019 elections
featured extensive violence and fraud, raising further questions about Nigeria’s democratic
trajectory as the country enters its third decade of continuous civilian rule (see Text Box).
The 2019 Elections and U.S. Engagement
Many observers described the 2019 general elections as a step backward in Nigeria’s democratic trajectory and a
missed opportunity to build on the successes of the 2015 pol s—widely considered the most credible in the

15 Zainab Usman, “Buhari's first 100 days: Does Nigerian president mean business?” CNN, September 4, 2015.
16 According to the State Department, Nigeria’s anticorruption agencies attribute the delays to “a lack of judges and the
widespread practice of filing for and granting multiple adjournments.” State Department, 2019 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices: Nigeria, 2019.
17 Ibid. For more on Nigeria’s leading anti-corruption agency, see Onyema et. al, The Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission and the politics of (in)effective implementation of Nigeria’s anti-corruption policy, SOAS University of
London: Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium Working Paper 007.
18 Amnesty International (AI), Endangered Voices: Attack on Freedom of Expression in Nigeria, October 2019.
19 In December 2019, Senators Booker, Coons, Menendez, and Schumer and Representatives Gottheimer and Pascrell
sent a joint letter to Nigeria’s Attorney General urging respect for Sowore’s due process rights.
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country’s history.20 The presidential contest pitted President Buhari against Atiku Abubakar, a former vice
president who defected from the ruling party in 2017. Buhari ultimately won with 56% of the vote. Voter turnout
for the presidential election was 36%, the lowest rate recorded since Nigeria’s democratic transition in 1999.21
The 2019 elections featured significant shortcomings. Disinformation, inflammatory rhetoric, and widespread
violence marred the pre-election period.22 Weeks before the election, Buhari replaced Nigeria’s chief justice
without support from the Senate, prompting the U.S. embassy to express concern that the decision could harm
the credibility of the pol s, given the judiciary’s role in resolving electoral disputes.23 A weeklong voting delay
announced hours before first-round pol s were to open created confusion among voters and may have dampened
eventual turnout. Election day concerns included “increasingly brazen” vote buying, ballot secrecy violations, and
irregularities in ballot col ation, according to U.S.-funded international election observers.24 According to the State
Department, state security forces intimidated voters and officials at some pol ing centers, dimming turnout and
reinforcing perceptions (particularly in the south) that “the army is a tool of the ruling party.”25
Nigeria’s elections have been a focus of congressional interest and U.S. foreign assistance. The House Foreign
Affairs Committee held a hearing ahead of the 2019 elections, and concurrent resolutions calling for credible
elections were introduced in the House and Senate.26 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo spoke with Buhari and
Atiku to underscore the importance of a credible election process. U.S. assistance included technical support for
Nigeria’s electoral commission, capacity-building programs to enhance civil society oversight of electoral
processes, and party strengthening activities.27 After the pol s, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on
unnamed individuals “believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining democracy in Nigeria.”28
Security Conditions and Human Rights Concerns
Boko Haram and the Islamic State-West Africa
Over the past decade, violence between government forces and Islamist insurgents based in the
northeast has killed an estimated 38,000 people in Nigeria and displaced over three million
throughout the Lake Chad Basin region comprising parts of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and
Niger.29 Founded in the early 2000s as a Salafist Muslim reform movement, Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna
Lidda’awati wal Jihad (JAS), known as Boko Haram (“Western education is forbidden” in the
Hausa language), has evolved and expanded since 2009 to become one of the world’s deadliest
terrorist groups. It espouses an “exclusivist” interpretation of Islam that rejects as sacrilegious the
more moderate Islam practiced in much of northern Nigeria, and has attracted some supporters by

20 See, for instance, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI), Nigeria
International Election Observation Mission Final Report, June 2019.
21 Ibid.
22 According to SB Morgen Intelligence, a Nigeria-based research group, over 600 people were killed during the 2019
election cycle. SBM Intel, Nigeria: 2019 Election Survey Report, 2019.
23 U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, “Statement on the Suspension and Replacement of the Chief Justice,” January 26, 2019.
24 NDI/IRI, Nigeria International Election Observation Mission Final Report, op. cit.
25 State Department, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria, March 2020.
26 The concurrent resolutions (S.Con.Res. 1/H.Con.Res. 4) were agreed to in the Senate but not in the House.
27 USAID, “Nigeria: Elections,” accessed May 19, 2020, available at https://www.usaid.gov/elections-0.
28 State Department, “Imposing Visa Restrictions on Nigerians Responsible for Undermining the Democratic Process,”
July 23, 2019.
29 Fatality figure from Council on Foreign Relations, “Nigeria Security Tracker,” at https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/
nigeria-security-tracker/p29483, accessed September 9, 2020. Displacement figure from International Organization for
Migration (IOM) and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). See UNHCR, “Operational Portal: Nigeria
Situation,” at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/nigeriasituation, accessed September 9, 2020.
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stoking a sense of state persecution and victimhood.30 Security force abuses appear to have fueled
recruitment by playing into such narratives, while economic motivations also may play a role.31
In 2015, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged loyalty to the Islamic State (IS, aka the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS), and Boko Haram subsequently rebranded as the
Islamic State’s West Africa Province (IS-WA, aka ISWAP or ISIS-WA). An ensuing leadership
dispute fractured the group; the Islamic State ultimately recognized a different leader of IS-WA,
while Shekau’s faction reassumed the group’s original name. (Observers generally refer to
Shekau’s faction as Boko Haram.) In contrast to Shekau’s Boko Haram, which gained notoriety
for its indiscriminate assaults on civilian centers and use of female and child suicide bombers, IS-
WA has focused attacks primarily on security forces and other state targets. IS-WA also reportedly
has sought to provide basic services and law enforcement in its areas of operation, building ties
with local communities that could further complicate counterinsurgency efforts.32 As of late 2019,
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) estimated IS-WA to have roughly 3,500 members, and
Boko Haram to have 1,500.33 In August 2020, the U.N. Secretary-General’s report on global
Islamic State operations noted that IS-WA “remains a major focus of ISIL global propaganda”
and described it as “one of the largest and most conspicuous of [ISIL’s] remote ‘provinces.’”34
Boko Haram and IS-WA are based in northeast Nigeria, though each remains capable of mounting
cross-border attacks in the wider Lake Chad Basin region. Regional counterinsurgency efforts are
coordinated under the African Union-authorized Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF),
which comprises troops from Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The MNJTF has
received U.S. and other donor support. MNJTF forces have mounted some successful operations,
notably in border zones and areas around Lake Chad, yet they continue to face capacity gaps and
coordination challenges, and security gains often have been short-lived.35
Boko Haram and IS-WA pose a threat to international targets and Western citizens in the region,
though no U.S. citizens are publicly reported to have been killed or kidnapped by either group.
The State Department has designated Boko Haram, IS-WA, and a separate splinter faction known
as Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (as amended) and as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) subject to

30 Alex Thurston, “The Disease is Unbelief’: Boko Haram’s Religious and Political Worldview,” Brookings
Institution, January 2016. For more on Boko Haram, see Jacob Zenn et. al, Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines:
Analyses of Africa’s Enduring Insurgency, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 9, 2018; Alex Thurston,
Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017);
and Brandon Kendhammer and Carmen McCain, Boko Haram (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2018).
31 On economic drivers of extremist recruitment, see Mercy Corps, Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former
Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth, February 2015. On the role of state abuses in driving enlistment into
extremist groups in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, see United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Journey to
Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, 2017.
32 According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), IS-WA “has cultivated a level of support among local civilians
that Boko Haram never enjoyed and has turned neglected communities in the area and islands in Lake Chad into a
source of economic support.” ICG, Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province, May 16, 2019.
33 Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, East Africa and North and West Africa
Counterterrorism Operations: October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019, February 2020.
34 U.N. Security Council, Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to
international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the
threat, U.N. doc. S/2020/774, August 4, 2020.
35 ICG, What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?, July 26, 2020; Omar S Mahmood
and Ndubuisi Christian Ani, Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and
Livelihoods, Institute for Security Studies, July 2018.
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U.S. financial sanctions under Executive Order 13224. The State Department also has designated
several individuals linked to Boko Haram and IS-WA as SGDTs.
As Nigeria’s Islamist insurgencies have persisted, non-state vigilante groups have emerged to
provide security in some zones. Known collectively as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), they
have, in some cases, received state support or participated in military operations; some also have
received U.N. training.36 The CJTF reportedly has helped stabilize some areas, including by
channeling information between community members and the military.37 At the same time, some
CJTF members reportedly have committed violence against civilians and other abuses.38
The Chibok and Dapchi Kidnappings and U.S. Responses
Boko Haram and IS-WA have abducted thousands of civilians, including several thousand children.39 Two mass
kidnappings—Boko Haram’s abduction of 276 girls from Chibok (Borno State) in 2014, and IS-WA’s abduction of
110 girls from Dapchi (Yobe State) in 2018—have drawn significant U.S. attention. Muslim communities in
northeast Nigeria have borne the brunt of kidnappings and other attacks by the two groups, yet the Chibok and
Dapchi abductions were notable, in part, for their targeting of Christians: many Chibok victims reportedly were
Christian, and of the students abducted from Dapchi, all but one, a Christian named Leah Sharibu, have been kil ed
or released. IS-WA reportedly has refused to free Sharibu as punishment for her refusal to convert to Islam.40
In response to the 2014 Chibok abduction, which gave rise to the international “#BringBackOurGirls” advocacy
movement, the Obama Administration sent an interagency team to Nigeria to support search efforts. President
Obama also deployed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and approximately 80 U.S. military personnel to
neighboring Chad to support recovery operations through surveillance activities.41 Though over half of the Chibok
students have escaped over the years, more than 100 remain missing. (The U.S. UAV mission reportedly ended in
late 2014; in early 2015, a Pentagon spokesperson stated that the number of surveillance missions requested by
Nigerian authorities "had dropped to the point that we were able to cover it through other means."42)
U.S. policymakers have shown an enduring interest in the victims of the Chibok and Dapchi kidnappings. Several
Members of Congress have met with or hosted Chibok survivors; in 2016, one testified before the House of
Representatives.43 President Trump hosted two Chibok survivors at the White House in 2017. Some Members
have considered Leah Sharibu’s ongoing captivity in the context of broader concerns over religious freedom in
Nigeria (see below). In the 116th Congress, S.Res. 170 and H.Res. 375 would recognize the fifth anniversary of the
Chibok abduction and call for the release of the remaining Chibok girls and of Sharibu.

36 U.N. Development Program (UNDP), “UNDP trains vigilantes and Civilian Joint Task Force members in human
rights and leadership,” July 9, 2019.
37 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Civilian Perceptions of the Yan Gora (CJTF) in Borno State, Nigeria¸ 2018.
38 Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Piero, “The Rise and Risks of Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force: Implications for
Post-Conflict Recovery in Northeast Nigeria,” Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’s Enduring
Insurgency, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 9, 2018.
39 ICG, Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria, April 12, 2018; Drew Hinshaw and Joe
Parkinson, “The 10,000 Kidnapped Boys of Boko Haram,” Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2016.
40 Bukola Adebayo, “Lone Dapchi schoolgirl in Boko Haram captivity begs for her freedom,” CNN, August 28, 2018.
41 White House, Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate, June 12, 2014.
42 Armin Rosen, "Almost a year after #BringBackOurGirls, they're still missing but the US pulled its 80 troops looking
for Boko Haram," Business Insider, March 11, 2015.
43 House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations, The U.S. Role in Helping Nigeria Confront Boko Haram and Other Threats in Northern Nigeria, 114th
Cong., May 11, 2016.
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Intercommunal Violence and Nigeria’s “Farmer-Herder” Conflicts
In the Middle Belt—a loosely defined region spanning Nigeria’s North Central geopolitical zone
and adjacent parts of the North East and North West (see map)—violence between sedentary
farmers and mobile livestock herders has surged in recent years. Precise statistics are unavailable
and fatality counts are contested, but one expert analysis estimated that farmer-herder conflicts in
the Middle Belt killed 2,000 Nigerians annually between 2011 and 2016.44 In the northwest, such
clashes have mounted in a context of escalating insecurity marked by armed banditry, kidnapping
for ransom, ethnic vigilantism, and intercommunal conflict that killed approximately 8,000
people and displaced 200,000 between 2011 and early 2020.45 More recently, Islamist extremist
groups reportedly have sought to establish themselves in the northwest, building ties with local
communities, criminal gangs, and herder-affiliated militia.46 In August 2020, the commander of
U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa stated that “we’re seeing al-Qaida starting to make
some inroads” in the northwest, but provided no further information about the assertion.47
Figure 2. Nigeria’s Geopolitical Zones

Source: Nigerian National Population Commission and ICF, Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2018, 2019.

44 ICG, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, July 26, 2018.
45 ICG, Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem, May 18, 2020.
46 Ibid.
47 State Department, “Digital Briefing on U.S. Efforts to Combat Terrorism in Africa during COVID,” August 4, 2020.
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Conflict between farmers and herders over access to resources, crop damage, and livestock theft
is not a new phenomenon, but mounting demographic, ecological, and socioeconomic pressures
have placed growing strains on intercommunal relations. A 2018 Reuters analysis found that a
decades-long expansion of farming activity in the Middle Belt had sharply reduced the amount of
land available for livestock grazing.48 Rising livestock prices have spurred organized cattle
rustling and other forms of criminality, prompting herders to heavily arm themselves for self-
defense and herd protection.49 Weapons used by all parties have grown more sophisticated, with
arms sourced from national defense stockpiles or trafficked into the country from abroad.50
Farmer-herder tensions in Nigeria often overlap with ethnic and religious cleavages, heightening
the risk of escalation and complicating attempts at conflict resolution. In the Middle Belt, much
of the violence has pitted largely Christian farmers of various ethnicities against predominately
Muslim, ethnic Fulani herders. (The Fulani are an expansive, diverse group that spans much of
Central and West Africa.) The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF, a
congressionally mandated independent body) finds that herder-farmer clashes in Nigeria “can
sometimes be framed as being between religious groups or can lead to reprisals that target
individuals based on their religion.”51 (In the northwest, however, much of the violence has pitted
Fulani herders against ethnic Hausa farmers, both predominately Muslim.)
Efforts to resolve farmer-herder violence and address resource access challenges have proven
ineffective to date. In 2018, the Buhari administration unveiled a ten-year National Livestock
Transformation Plan (NLTP) entailing the establishment of ranches for sedentary grazing and
other agriculture sector investments. The NLTP, which some critics portray as overly favorable to
herder communities, is being piloted in several states, yet its implementation has been slow.52
Meanwhile, political leaders have inflamed tensions through hate speech and prohibitions on
open grazing, which herders view as a threat to their livelihoods.53
Religious Freedom Issues, Sharia Law, and the Shia Minority
Islamist extremism in the north and farmer-herder clashes in the Middle Belt have heightened
U.S. concerns over religious freedom in Nigeria, whose population is roughly half Christian, half
Muslim. In 2019, the Trump Administration placed Nigeria on the “Special Watch List” pursuant
to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA, P.L. 105-292, as amended), finding that the
government had tolerated or engaged in “severe violations of religious freedom.”54 A downgrade
to Country of Particular Concern (CPC) status—a designation USCIRF has recommended for
Nigeria each year since 2009—could carry restrictions on certain kinds of U.S. foreign assistance.

48 Ryan McNeill and Alexis Akwagyiram, “The Fight for Nigeria’s heartland,” Reuters, December 19, 2018.
49 Matt Luizza, “Urban Elites’ Livestock Exacerbate Herder-Farmer Tensions in Africa’s Sudano-Sahel,” Wilson
Center New Security Beat, June 10, 2019; Chom Bagu and Katie Smith, Past is Prologue: Criminality & Reprisal
Attacks in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, Search for Common Ground (SFCG), 2017.
50 Conflict Armament Research, Nigeria’s Herder-Farmer Conflict: Domestic, Regional, and Transcontinental Weapon
Sources, January 2020.
51 USCIRF, Annual Report 2020, April 2020.
52 See, e.g., Adelani Adepegba, “NLTP is RUGA in disguise –SMBLF,” The Punch, September 27, 2019.
53 Chris M.A. Kwaja and Bukola I. Ademola-Adelehin, The Implications of the Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches
Establishment Law on Farmer-Herder Relations in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, SFCG, December 2017; USCIRF,
Central Nigeria: Overcoming Dangerous Speech and Ending Religious Divides, February 2019.
54 For more on country designations pursuant to the IFRA, see CRS In Focus IF10803, Global Human Rights:
International Religious Freedom Policy, by Michael A. Weber.
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U.S. religious freedom concerns partly center on the application of Sharia (Islamic) law in
Nigeria’s north. Sharia courts have operated in northern Nigeria since independence in 1960, yet
their jurisdiction was limited to civil law until 1999, when northern states began to extend Sharia
to criminal cases. Sharia criminal courts now operate in 12 northern states and the Federal Capital
Territory encompassing the capital. (The courts may not compel participation by non-Muslims,
though non-Muslims may elect to have cases tried in Sharia courts.55) The advent of Sharia
criminal law in Nigeria sparked alarm due in part to the potentially harsh sentences prescribed
under Sharia, which include amputation and death by stoning. Such concerns waned as Sharia
judges generally refrained from imposing these more severe sentences, but in 2020, a Kano State
Sharia court sentenced a Muslim singer to death for blasphemy, sparking outrage from human
rights groups.56 Also in 2020, Kaduna State authorities arrested a prominent atheist, reportedly for
blasphemy, and transferred him to Kano for prosecution, spurring further alarm over religious
freedom trends and raising questions about statutory protections for non-Muslims under Sharia.57
State repression of minority Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria, which is predominately Sunni, has
garnered growing attention in recent years. In 2015, the military killed nearly 350 members of the
Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shia movement led by Iranian-trained cleric Ibrahim
Zakzaky, and arrested Zakzaky and hundreds of his adherents.58 A state inquiry found the army
culpable for the massacre, but no soldiers have faced prosecution. Zakzaky remains in detention
on charges of unlawful assembly and homicide in connection with the death of a soldier during
the incident. Security forces have since violently suppressed a series of protests calling for his
release, killing dozens of IMN members with the use of live fire and arresting hundreds more.59
Niger Delta Insecurity: Militancy, Criminality, and Oil Theft
Political unrest, criminality, and intermittent bouts of armed militancy linked to grievances over
perceived exploitation and environmental degradation have afflicted the southern, oil-rich Niger
Delta region for decades.60 Despite massive petroleum reserves, the Niger Delta faces high rates
of poverty and unemployment. Decades of oil spills, which oil companies attribute to vandalism
and oil theft, but which human rights groups ascribe to negligent practices on the part of oil
operators, have devastated local livelihoods and contributed to stark ecological and health
challenges.61 A 2011 assessment by the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) called for the

55 Some non-Muslims report a preference for Sharia courts, considering them more to be more efficient and less corrupt
than common law courts. USCIRF, Shari’ah Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria: Implementation of Expanded Shari’ah
Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes in Kano, Sokoto, and Zamfara States, 2017-2019, December 2019.
56 AI, “Nigeria: Authorities must quash the conviction and death sentence imposed on Kano-based singer,” August 13,
2020.
57 USCIRF, “USCIRF Condemns Death Sentence for Yahaya Sharif-Aminu on Blasphemy Charges,” August 11, 2020
and “USCIRF Condemns Arrest of Prominent Nigerian Atheist, Mubarak Bala,” May 8, 2020.
58 USCIRF, Annual Report 2017, April 2017.
59 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: End Impunity for Killings of Shia,” December 12, 2018; Dionne Searcey and
Emmanuel Akinwotu, “Nigeria Says Soldiers Who Killed Marchers Were Provoked. Video Shows Otherwise,” The
New York Times, December 17, 2018.
60 In the early 1990s, activists from the Ogoni ethnic group drew international attention to the extensive environmental
damage done by oil extraction in the Niger Delta. Activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for the Survival
of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused in 1994 of involvement in the murder of several Ogoni
politicians. They pled not guilty, but Saro-Wiwa and eight others were convicted and executed. The executions sparked
outrage against the regime of military ruler Sani Abacha, and the United States recalled its ambassador in response.
61 Anna Bruederle and Roland Hodler, “Effect of oil spills on infant mortality in Nigeria,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 116, no. 12 (March 2019), pp. 5467-5471.
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rehabilitation of vast swathes of the Niger Delta, but such efforts have stalled as state agencies
mandated to coordinate the clean-up have faced allegations of corruption and mismanagement.
Human rights advocates claim the vast majority of UNEP-identified zones remain polluted.62
In 2009, in response to a wave of attacks on oil infrastructure that sharply reduced output, the
government launched an amnesty and monthly stipend for militants. The program has curbed
large attacks on oil facilities, but root causes of insecurity remain unaddressed and ex-militants
routinely threaten to resume violence. In 2016, renewed attacks on oil infrastructure pushed
production to a 30-year low, helping trigger an economic recession. Oil theft for black-market
sale is another key challenge, one implicating criminal networks, politicians, security personnel,
and oil workers.63 The Niger Delta also is the epicenter of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of
Guinea: for several years, waters off Nigeria have ranked among the world’s most dangerous for
attacks at sea.64 The region has become a hotspot for kidnappings targeting shipping personnel, as
attackers exploit vast river networks to hide abducted crew while negotiating ransoms.
Security Sector Challenges and Accountability Concerns
Several factors have undermined the government’s response to security challenges. A 2018
analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that “decades of unchecked
corruption have hollowed out the Nigerian military and security services and rendered them
unable to effectively combat Boko Haram or address ethno-religious and communal conflict.”65
Equipment shortages reportedly have hindered counterterrorism operations, as IS-WA and Boko
Haram have looted weaponry and other materiel in repeated raids on military facilities.66 Reports
suggest that personnel have deployed for extended periods without rotation, with implications for
troop morale and discipline.67 The Wall Street Journal and others have accused the military of
concealing evidence of mounting losses by burying soldiers without notifying their families.68
The State Department’s 2019 human rights report documented accounts of extrajudicial and
arbitrary killings by security forces, enforced disappearances, violence against journalists and
protesters, and arbitrary detention and torture of detainees.69 Attention has centered on abuses
committed during counterterrorism operations, in which Nigerian security forces allegedly have
executed hundreds of civilians, arbitrarily detained thousands more, and committed widespread
torture.70 Those captured in military sweeps or arrested after fleeing extremist-held territory may
be detained without charge for extended periods while undergoing interrogation: Amnesty
International estimates that “likely more than 10,000” people, including many children, have died
in custody due to overcrowding, heat, inadequate health and sanitation facilities, and insufficient

62 AI, No Clean-Up, No Justice: An Evaluation of the Implementation of UNEP’s Environmental Assessment of
Ogoniland, Nine Years On, June 2020.
63 Transparency International, Military Involvement in Oil Theft in the Niger Delta: A Discussion Paper, June 2019.
64 CRS In Focus IF11117, Gulf of Guinea: Recent Trends in Piracy and Armed Robbery, by Tomas F. Husted.
65 Matthew Page, A New Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2018.
66 Neil Munshi, “Under fire: why Nigeria is struggling to defeat Boko Haram,” Financial Times, December 6, 2018.
67 See, e.g., Obi Anyadike, “‘Year of the Debacle’: How Nigeria Lost Its Way in the War Against Boko Haram,” World
Politics Review, October 30, 2018.
68 Joe Parkinson, “Nigeria Buries Soldiers at Night in Secret Cemetery,” The Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2019.
69 State Department, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria, op. cit.
70 AI, Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on their Hands. War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military, 2015.
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food and water.71 Security personnel reportedly have raped and sexually exploited women and
girls, including detainees and displaced people.72 Impunity for such abuses remains widespread.
Security force abuses have hindered U.S. counterterrorism cooperation with the Nigerian military
(see “U.S. Relations and Assistance”), and may help drive extremist recruitment and discourage
demobilization.73 According to Amnesty International, the detention and abuse of individuals who
defect or escape from Boko Haram have led former detainees to report that they would not
encourage others to flee from Boko Haram, lest they undergo a similar experience.74
The Economy
Nigeria’s economy is the largest in Africa.75 The petroleum sector accounts for roughly half of
state revenues and a large share of foreign exchange earnings, though services, agriculture, and
manufacturing together employ a much larger segment of the labor force and contribute most of
GDP.76 Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial center, is among the world’s largest cities and has emerged
as a leading technology hub in Africa. With a youthful, rapidly growing population and abundant
natural resource reserves, Nigeria has the potential to become a global economic powerhouse.
According to various analyses, Nigeria’s economy continues to underperform. Infrastructure
gaps, policy uncertainty, chronic power shortages, and years of underinvestment in education
have impeded productivity.77 Pervasive corruption drains state resources and discourages private
investment.78 Longstanding government intervention measures such as fuel subsidies, foreign
exchange controls, import restrictions, and tax exemptions have created market distortions,
eroded state finances, and enabled graft.79 Due to poor non-oil tax administration and high non-
compliance, Nigeria has one of the world’s lowest ratios of tax revenues to GDP.80
Already in a period of low growth in the wake of a brief 2016 recession, Nigeria’s economy is
expected to face its sharpest contraction in decades amid a collapse in global oil prices and
economic disruptions brought on by COVID-19. As of June 2020, the IMF projected Nigeria’s
GDP to contract by 5.4% in 2020; according to Nigeria’s statistical agency, the economy shrank
by an annualized rate of 6.1% between April and June.81 Nigeria’s poorest households are likely
to endure the brunt of COVID-19’s economic shocks. According to the World Bank, the
downturn could push five million more Nigerians into poverty as compared to pre-pandemic

71 AI, “We Dried Our Tears”: Addressing the Toll on Children of Northeast Nigeria’s Conflict, May 2020.
72 Human Rights Watch, They Didn’t Know if I was Alive or Dead, September 10, 2019; and AI, “They betrayed us”:
Women who survived Boko Haram raped, starved and detained in Nigeria, May 24, 2018.
73 UNDP, Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, December 2017.
74 AI, “We Dried Our Tears”: Addressing the Toll on Children... op. cit.
75 Economy size ranking as of 2019. World Bank DataBank, “GDP (current US$),” accessed September 10, 2020.
76 Sarah Burns and Olly Owen, Nigeria: No Longer an Oil State?, Oxford Martin School Working Paper, August 2019.
77 World Bank, Jumpstarting Inclusive Growth: Unlocking the Productive Potential of Nigeria’s People and Resource
Endowments, Fall 2019.
78 State Department, 2020 Investment Climate Statements; Nigeria, September 2020.
79 Matthew Page, A New Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, op. cit.
80 IMF, Nigeria: Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the
Executive Director for Nigeria, April 2019; Brahima S. Coulibaly and Dhruv Gandhi, “Mobilization of tax revenues in
Africa: State of play and policy options,” Brookings, October 2018.
81 IMF, “Nigeria,” accessed August 14, 2020, available at https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/NGA; Oladeinde
Olawoyin, “Nigeria’s economy sees biggest decline in 10 years,” Premium Times, August 24, 2020.
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projections.82 Roughly half of Nigerians work in the informal labor force with sparse social safety
nets, leaving them especially vulnerable. Remittance inflows from Nigerian workers abroad,
valued at over 5% of GDP in 2019, have fallen sharply; half of Nigerians live in remittance-
receiving households.83
Plunging oil receipts are likely to have severe consequences for state finances. Allocations to
federal, state, and local governments from the Federation Account—a centrally administered fund
of oil earnings and other state revenues—dipped in mid-2020 and may decline further as Nigeria
seeks to come into compliance with production cuts mandated by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). The government has announced a stimulus package to cushion the
impacts of the downturn, and in April 2020, the IMF approved an emergency loan of $3.4 billion
through its Rapid Financing Instrument.84 Approval of requested support from the World Bank
reportedly has faced delays over demands for economic policy reforms on the part of the Nigerian
government.85 The Buhari administration has adjusted its official exchange rate downward, a key
request on the part of international lenders, and has eliminated a longstanding fuel subsidy and
raised electricity tariffs. The government’s future commitment to such cost-cutting measures,
which are highly unpopular among consumers, remains to be seen; Buhari’s predecessor also
sought to remove gasoline subsidies, but reversed the decision after nationwide protests.
Development Challenges and Humanitarian Conditions
According to the World Data Lab, a nongovernmental data analysis organization, roughly 102
million Nigerians live in extreme poverty—the largest extremely poor population in the world.86
The World Bank estimated in early 2020 that roughly half of Nigerians were living on less than
$1.90 per day.87 Needs are most acute in the conflict-affected northeast: according to U.N.
agencies, nearly 2.1 million Nigerians were displaced internally as of June 2020, largely due to
the Boko Haram/IS-WA conflict, with an additional 300,000 living as refugees in Chad,
Cameroon, and Niger.88 In early 2020, the U.N. estimated that nearly ten million people in the
Lake Chad Basin region required aid, including eight million Nigerians.89 Much of the northeast
faces crisis- or emergency-level food insecurity, with a risk of famine in some areas.90
Nigeria has made notable progress in combating fatal diseases in recent years, significantly
reducing HIV/AIDS prevalence and declaring itself polio-free in 2020 following a prolonged
immunization campaign. Still, as of 2015 (latest data), 30% of Nigerians lacked access to
improved water, while 70% lacked access to basic sanitation facilities.91 Roughly 37% of children
under five are “stunted,” or too short for their age (a risk indicator of impaired development),

82 World Bank, Nigeria in Times of COVID-19: Laying Foundations for a Strong Recovery, June 2020.
83 Ibid.
84 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Approves US$ 3.4 Billion in Emergency Support to Nigeria to address the COVID-19
Pandemic,” April 28, 2020.
85 Chijioke Ohuocha and Libby George, “Exclusive: Nigeria's $1.5 billion World Bank loan delayed over reforms, say
sources,” Reuters, August 17, 2020.
86 See, e.g., World Data Lab, World Poverty Clock, at https://worldpoverty.io/map, accessed September 8, 2020.
87 World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook: Spring Meetings 2020, April 2020.
88 Data from the IOM and UNHCR. See UNHCR, “Operational Portal: Nigeria Situation,” available at
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/nigeriasituation, accessed August 27, 2020.
89 USAID, “Lake Chad Basin – Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #2 (FY2020), March 31, 2020.
90 FEWS NET, “Increase in conflict and continued COVID-19,” op. cit.
91 World Bank, Nigeria Biannual Economic Update: Water supply, sanitation & hygiene—a wake-up call, April 2019.
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with higher proportions in the north.92 Among Nigerians aged 15-49, some 35% of women and
22% of men have no formal education; literacy is lowest in the northeast and northwest.93
Relative to GDP, Nigeria’s public spending on health and education ranks among the lowest
globally.94 Nigeria places among the worst performing countries on the World Bank’s Human
Capital Index, a survey of health and education indicators.95 Endemic corruption diverts resources
away from social services, heightening barriers to poverty reduction and development promotion.
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Investment
As of 2019, Nigeria was the United States’ second-largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa
(after South Africa) and third-largest beneficiary of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
region (after Mauritius and South Africa).96 Nigerian exports to the United States are dominated
by crude oil, which at $4.4 billion accounted for 88% of U.S. imports from Nigeria in 2019.97
According to U.S. International Trade Commission data, Nigeria consistently ranks as the top
source of exports to the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA,
P.L. 106-200, as amended) trade preference program; crude oil accounts for nearly all such
exports. U.S. imports of Nigerian crude have fallen sharply since 2011 as U.S. domestic energy
production has increased.
Nigeria is a major regional destination for U.S. exports of motor vehicles and refined petroleum
products (e.g., gasoline), which are among the fastest-growing U.S. exports to Africa.
Agricultural products and machinery are other top U.S. exports to the country. Nigerian demand
also has driven growing U.S. petroleum exports to nearby Togo, a regional transshipment hub.98
U.S. FDI is concentrated in the oil and gas sectors.99 Investors in Nigeria cite foreign exchange
risk and policy uncertainty as key concerns.100 Import restrictions and local content requirements
intended to foster domestic industry may deter U.S. investment, though the State Department
reports that “corruption and lack of transparency in tender processes has been a far greater
concern to U.S. companies than discriminatory policies based on foreign status.”101 Inadequate
power supply, infrastructure gaps, and poor intellectual property protections also may constrain
U.S. and other investor interest.102

92 Nigeria National Population Commission and ICF. 2019. Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2018, 2019.
93 Ibid.
94 IMF, Staff Report for the 2019 Article IV Consultation, March 13, 2019.
95 World Bank Human Capital Index, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/human-capital.
96 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “International Trade and Investment Country
Factsheets,” accessed September 10, 2020.
97 CRS estimate based on data from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) Dataweb, accessed September
10, 2020.
98 Togo recently has ranked among the top destinations for U.S. petroleum product exports in Africa. Per the USITC,
“Nigeria is actually the main source of petroleum product demand in West Africa, but high rates of piracy in Nigerian
waters and congestion at Lagos, Nigeria’s largest port, have encouraged traders to operate out of Togo instead.”
USITC, U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and New Developments, March 2020.
99 State Department, 2020 Investment Climate Statements; Nigeria, op. cit.
100 KPMG, Top 10 Business Risks in 2020/21, April 2020.
101 State Department, 2020 Investment Climate Statements; Nigeria, op. cit.
102 USITC, U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, op. cit.; State Department, 2019 Investment Climate
Statements; Nigeria, op. cit.
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U.S. Relations and Assistance
U.S.-Nigeria ties improved after Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in 1999, and they remain
robust. President Trump’s phone call to President Buhari in 2017 was his first to any sub-Saharan
African leader; in April 2018, Buhari became the first sub-Saharan African leader to meet with
President Trump at the White House. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy
visited Nigeria during his first official trip to the region, in 2018. He expressed interest in seeing
Nigeria play a larger role in peacekeeping and democracy promotion in Africa, and described
Nigeria as a focus country for efforts to increase U.S. commercial activity in the region.103
Bilateral engagements include the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC), a mechanism for
convening high-level officials for strategic dialogue that was launched in 2010. The most recent
BNC, held in January 2020 in Washington, D.C., centered on bolstering U.S.-Nigeria commercial
ties.104 A separate U.S.-Nigeria Commercial and Investment Dialogue (CID) aims to enhance
bilateral trade and investment, with an initial focus on “infrastructure, agriculture, digital
economy, investment, and regulatory reform.”105 The United States maintains an embassy in
Abuja and a consulate in Lagos, and the State Department supports “American Corners” in
libraries throughout Nigeria to share information on U.S. culture. Nigerians comprise the largest
African-born population in the United States, according to U.S. Census data, and remittances
from the United States are a source of income support for many Nigerian households.106
U.S. human rights and governance concerns periodically have raised challenges for bilateral ties.
As noted above (see “Politics”), the State Department imposed visa restrictions on individuals
found responsible for undermining the conduct of the 2019 general elections. In September 2020,
the State Department imposed additional sanctions on unnamed Nigerians for “undermining the
democratic process,” citing gubernatorial elections in Kogi and Bayelsa States in late 2019 that
featured reports of violence and fraud as well as forthcoming gubernatorial polls in Edo and Ondo
States, which have seen rising tensions ahead of elections scheduled for late 2020.107
In 2019, as noted above (see “Religious Freedom Issues, Sharia Law, and the Shia Minority”), the
State Department placed Nigeria on the Special Watch List pursuant to the IFRA for governments
that tolerate or engage in severe violations of religious freedom. In its 2020 Trafficking in Persons
(TIP) report, the State Department additionally designated Nigeria pursuant to the Child Soldiers
Prevention Act (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457) as having government or state-supported armed
forces that use child soldiers, a designation that could carry restrictions on U.S. aid in FY2021,
subject to a presidential waiver and exceptions.108 The State Department also downgraded Nigeria
to the Tier 2 Watch List (from Tier 2) in the 2020 TIP report, meaning the country does not meet
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. A
further downgrade to Tier 3 status could carry restrictions on certain types of U.S. assistance.109

103 Assistant Secretary Nagy, “The Enduring Partnership between the United States and Nigeria,” November 9, 2018.
104 State Department, “U.S. Department of State to Host the 2020 U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission Meeting,”
January 31, 2020.
105 State Department, 2019 Investment Climate Statements; Nigeria, op. cit.
106 U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2018 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
107 State Department, “Imposing Visa Restrictions on Nigerians Responsible for Undermining the Democratic Process,”
September 14, 2020.
108 State Department, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2020.
109 Ibid.
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In January 2020, President Trump issued Proclamation 9983, which added Nigeria to the list of
countries whose nationals are subject to restrictions on entry to the United States introduced
under Executive Order (EO) 13780 (the “Travel Ban”). Proclamation 9983 stated that Nigeria
“does not adequately share public-safety and terrorism-related information” required for U.S.
immigration screening.110 The action suspends the entry of Nigerian immigrants except as Special
Immigrants, subject to waivers and exceptions, and does not apply to U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents. In August 2020, President Buhari stated that his administration had made
progress toward addressing U.S. concerns, but that it would require “enormous resources” to fully
implement the recommendations of a Nigerian commission established to resolve the matter.111
U.S. Justice Sector Engagement: Cybercrime and “Abacha Loot” Repatriation
Nigeria is globally notorious for cybercrimes, including advance-fee “419 scams,” named for the article in Nigeria’s
penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails. Recent attention has focused on the role of Nigerian nationals in
“romance scams,” whereby conspirators defraud victims through fake social media profiles, including by posing as
U.S. military personnel. The U.S. government has supported Nigerian authorities in cracking down on such crimes,
and joint U.S.-Nigerian law enforcement operations have led to hundreds of arrests in the United States and
Nigeria for fraud and cybercrimes.112 In June 2020, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on six Nigerian
nationals for email and romance scams under EO 13694 (as amended), pertaining to malicious cyber activities.113
The United States also has supported efforts to repatriate the proceeds of corruption by former dictator Sani
Abacha, who embezzled bil ions of dol ars in public funds during his time in office (1993-1998). In 2014, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that a federal court in the District of Columbia had ordered forfeited to
the United States roughly $500 mil ion in ill-gotten Abacha assets laundered through U.S. banks and held in foreign
bank accounts.114 DOJ has authority to pay restitution to the victims of the corruption out of the forfeited
funds.115 The Bailiwick of Jersey, a British Crown dependency, subsequently enforced the ruling against roughly
$310 mil ion held in its jurisdiction; the DOJ transferred those funds to the Nigerian government in May 2020.116
DOJ efforts to enforce the ruling against funds held in other jurisdictions remain ongoing.
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns over the restitution of corruption proceeds directly to the
Nigerian government. Ahead of the May 2020 transfer of assets from Jersey, several lawmakers issued letters to
the DOJ expressing concern over the potential misuse of repatriated funds, demanding clarification regarding the
oversight of returned assets, and raising alarm over broader governance trends under President Buhari.117 Past
analyses have identified challenges with tracking the use of restituted Abacha funds.118 Some foreign governments
have sought to ensure that recovered funds be used to support development objectives; for instance, Switzerland
recently repatriated $321 mil ion in Abacha funds through a cash assistance project managed by the World Bank.

110 White House, “Proclamation on Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry,” January 31, 2020.
111 State House Abuja, “Nigeria Making Progress to Reverse U.S Visa Restriction- President Buhari,” August 13, 2020.
112 See, e.g., U.S. Attorney’s Office, Central District of California, “Massive International Fraud and Money
Laundering Conspiracy Detailed in Federal Grand Jury Indictment that Charges 80 Defendants,” August 22, 2019;
DOJ, “281 Arrested Worldwide in Coordinated International Enforcement Operation Targeting Hundreds of
Individuals in Business Email Compromise Schemes,” September 10, 2019.
113 Treasury Department, “Treasury Sanctions Nigerian Cyber Actors for Targeting U.S. Businesses and Individuals,”
June 16, 2020.
114 DOJ, “U.S. Forfeits Over $480 Million Stolen by Former Nigerian Dictator in Largest Forfeiture Ever Obtained
Through a Kleptocracy Action,” August 7, 2014.
115 28 C.F.R. pt. 9 (2018).
116 DOJ, “U.S. Repatriates over $311.7 Million in Assets to the Nigerian People that were Stolen by Former Nigerian
Dictator and His Associates,” May 4, 2020.
117 See letter from Senator Charles Grassley to Deborah Connor, Chief of the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery
Section at DOJ, April 1, 2020; and letter from Representatives Steve Shabot and Chris Smith to Attorney General
William Barr and Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, April 15, 2020.
118 World Bank, Utilization of Repatriated Abacha Loot: Results of the Field Monitoring Exercise, December 2006.
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link to page 20 Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
Nigeria routinely ranks among the top recipients of U.S. foreign assistance globally. The State
Department and USAID allocated $451.4 million in bilateral aid for Nigeria in FY2020, nearly
90% of which supported health programs (see Table 1). The Administration requested $472.1
million for Nigeria for FY2021, a rare case in Africa in which the Trump Administration’s aid
proposal exceeded the previous year’s allocation. These totals exclude emergency humanitarian
assistance and other aid provided through global programs—those not allocated by country in
annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications—or funds managed by other U.S.
agencies. The State Department and USAID allocated $468.6 million in humanitarian funding in
response to the Lake Chad Basin crisis in FY2019, including $346.9 million for Nigeria.119
Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Administered Assistance to Nigeria
selected non-humanitarian accounts, current $ in millions, allocations by year of appropriation
Account
FY2017 (act.)
FY2018 (act.)
FY2019 (act.)
FY2020 (act.)
FY2021 (req.)
DA
80.5
92.0
74.5
50.0
-
ESF/ESDF
45.5
0
0
0
34.0
FMF
0.5
0
0
0
0
GHP-State
224.8
199.6
353.4
181.2
300.0
GHP-USAID
203.5
199.0
222.5
212.0
134.1
IMET
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.2
1.0
INCLE
5.0
6.0
7.0
7.0
3.0
TOTAL
560.8
497.7
658.4
451.4
472.1
Source: State Department, Congressional Budget Justifications for FY2019-FY2021 and 653(a) report.
Notes: DA=Development Assistance; ESDF=Economic Support and Development Fund; ESF=Economic Support
Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; GHP=Global Health Programs; IMET=International Military Education and
Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement. The ESDF account, which the Trump
Administration has proposed in successive budget requests, would merge various economic assistance accounts,
including DA and ESF. To date, Congress has maintained the existing economic assistance account structure.
Nigeria is a focus country under the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) as well as Feed the
Future, an agriculture development program. U.S. assistance under the Power Africa initiative has
supported gas and solar power generation, off-grid energy projects, and regulatory reform.120
U.S. Security Assistance and Military Sales
U.S. security assistance to Nigeria has sought to bolster peacekeeping capacity, enhance maritime
and border security, combat transnational crime, support civilian law enforcement, and strengthen
counterterrorism efforts. Nigeria participates in the State Department’s Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP, an interagency effort to build regional counterterrorism
capabilities and coordination), but has not been a top recipient of funds under the program.
Nigeria also has benefitted from the provision of U.S. training and equipment to the Multi-
National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) coalition in the Lake Chad Basin. In addition to funds

119 USAID, “Lake Chad Basin – Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #5, FY2019, September 30, 2019.
120 USAID, “Nigeria: Power Africa Fact Sheet,” accessed June 22, 2020.
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Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

administered by the State Department, DOD has notified Congress of roughly $50 million in
planned security assistance for Nigeria under its “global train and equip” program, currently
authorized under 10 U.S.C. 333—considerably less than amounts provided to other Lake Chad
Basin countries.121 Nigeria has received additional DOD assistance through regional programs.
U.S. concerns with human rights abuses by Nigerian security personnel have constrained U.S.
security assistance, including counterterrorism aid.122 In 2014, the Obama Administration blocked
a transfer of U.S.-manufactured military helicopters from Israel to Nigeria due to human rights
concerns. U.S. security cooperation increased after the 2015 inauguration of President Buhari,
who pledged to curtail and investigate abuses, and the following year, the Obama Administration
sought congressional approval for the sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano attack aircraft to Nigeria.
The Obama Administration froze the sale in early 2017, however, after a Nigerian jet struck a
camp for displaced people during a bombing raid. The Trump Administration revisited that
decision, and in late 2017 approved the sale, over opposition from some Members of Congress.123
President Trump has appeared to downplay human rights concerns regarding the Nigerian
military.124 The aircraft are now in development, and are due for delivery in 2021.
Outlook and Issues for Congress
Despite vast potential, Nigeria faces steep security, economic, and governance challenges. A
protracted Islamist conflict in the northeast and mounting intercommunal violence in the Middle
Belt have strained a security apparatus weakened by decades of unchecked corruption and
spurred massive humanitarian needs. The collapse of global oil prices and disruptions linked to
COVID-19 have dimmed Nigeria’s economic prospects. Constrained by a limited fiscal space, the
government may struggle to cushion the impacts of these shocks, which observers expect to hit
hardest among the most vulnerable households. It is unclear whether the twin crises may hasten
or impede longstanding efforts to diversify the economy away from hydrocarbons. In the near
term, rising unemployment and other economic hardships appear likely to aggravate social and
political tensions, particularly among Nigeria’s youthful and rapidly growing labor force.
How Nigerian authorities respond to mounting security challenges and political pressures may
have consequences for U.S. policy and engagement. Notwithstanding the Trump Administration’s
approval of a military aircraft sale in 2017, its designation of Nigeria pursuant to the IFRA and
CSPA and imposition of sanctions surrounding flawed elections attest to growing U.S. concerns
with human rights and governance conditions in Nigeria. Several Members of Congress also have
expressed alarm over deteriorating press and religious freedoms in the country. At the same time,
Nigeria remains a critical U.S. security, development, and economic partner in Africa and a top
U.S. aid recipient globally. Some Members may assess whether U.S. engagement and assistance
reflect an appropriate ranking and balance of priorities in Nigeria. Congress also may debate the
relative effectiveness of various tools for advancing U.S. interests in Nigeria, including legislative
action, diplomacy, foreign assistance (and restrictions thereof), and punitive measures.

121 CRS calculation based on DOD congressional notifications.
122 In 2014, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations held a hearing on abuses by Nigerian security forces and U.S. vetting pursuant to the
"Leahy Laws," which prohibit U.S. security assistance to security forces credibly accused of gross human rights
violations. House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations, Human Rights Vetting: Nigeria and Beyond, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., July 10, 2014.
123 Letter from Senators Cory Booker and Rand Paul to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, June 8, 2017.
124 White House, “Remarks by President Trump and President Buhari of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Joint Press
Conference,” April 30, 2018.
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Author Information

Tomas F. Husted
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Analyst in African Affairs
Specialist in African Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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Congressional Research Service
RL33964 · VERSION 46 · UPDATED
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