Nigeria: Elections and Issues for CongressCurrent Issues and U.S. Policy
Lauren Ploch
AnalystSpecialist in African Affairs
January 19July 18, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33964
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress
Summary
Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Summary
The U.S. government considers its strategic relationship with Nigeria, Africa’s largest producer of
oil and its second largest democracy, is one of the U.S. government’s
key strategic partners on the continent. It is economy, to be among the most important on continent. Nigeria is
Africa’s most populous country, with over 155more than 170 million
people, roughly half Muslim and half Christian, and its second-largest economy. Diplomatic
relations with Nigeria, which is among the top five oil exporters to the United States, are strong,
and the country is a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. After 16 years of military rule,
Nigeria made the transition to civilian governance in 1999, and emerged as a powerful actor in
African politics. Nigeria’s government has mediated disputes in several African countries, and the
country ranks fourth among troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Nigeria faces serious social and economic challenges, however, that some analysts contend
threaten the stability of both the state and the region, and which have the potential to affect global
oil markets. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises since
independence. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, religious, and geographic
lines, and misrule has undermined the authority and legitimacy of the state. Nigeria’s annual oil
and natural gas revenues are estimated at over $60 billion, but its people, roughly divided between
Muslims and Christians. U.S. diplomatic relations with Nigeria, which is among the top five
suppliers of U.S. oil imports, have improved since the country made the transition from military
to civilian rule in 1999, and Nigeria is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The country is an
influential actor in African politics, having mediated disputes in several African countries and
ranking among the top five troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Nigeria is a country of significant promise, but it also faces serious social, economic, and security
challenges that have the potential to threaten the stability of both the state and the region, and to
affect global oil prices. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises
since independence. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and
religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the authority and legitimacy of the
state. Despite its extensive oil and natural gas resources, Nigeria’s human development indicators
are among the world’s lowest, and a majority of the population suffers from extreme poverty. The
government relies on the oil sector for over 85% of revenues. By some estimates, Nigeria could
rank among the world’s top five exporters of oil within a few years, but social
Social unrest, criminality,
and corruption in the country’s oil-producing Niger Delta region have hindered production as
well as development.
Inter-communal conflicts in parts of the country are common. Resentment between the northern
and southern regions, and among communities in central Nigeria, has led periodically to
considerable unresthave hindered oil
production and impeded the southern region’s economic development. Perceived neglect and
economic marginalization have also fueled resentment in the north.
Inter-communal conflicts are common in parts of Nigeria. Thousands have been killed in periodic
ethno-religious clashes in the past
decade. The attempted terrorterrorist attack on an American airliner
by a Nigerian in December 2009 and
the resurgence of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, have also heightened concerns
regarding the possible radicalization of Nigerian Muslims. While Boko Haram has remained
primarily focused on a domestic agenda, there are reports that some of its members may be
expanding ties with more developed
have also heightened concerns about extremist recruitment in Nigeria, which has one of the
world’s largest Muslim populations. Boko Haram has increasingly targeted churches, sometimes
triggering retaliatory violence and threatening to inflame religious tensions in the country. While
the group has remained primarily focused on a domestic agenda, some U.S. officials state that its
members are expanding ties with other violent Islamist groups on the continent.
Nigeria’s most recent elections, held in April 2011, were viewed by many as a critical test of the
government’s commitment to democracy. The State Department had deemed the previous
elections to be deeply flawed, and some observers contended that, by some accounts, Nigeria had not held a free and
fair general
election since the return to civilian rule in 1999. Election observer groups
characterized the 2011
elections as a significant improvement over previous polls, althoughbut not
without problems. Post-electionPostelection protests and violence across the north highlighted lingering communal
tensions,
grievances, and mistrust of the government in the northern states. President Goodluck Jonathan, who was re-elected, faces
mounting, and at times competing, internal and external pressure to implement reforms deemed
critical to addressing corruption and other development and securitya
southerner, was re-elected and faces multiple, sometimes competing pressures to implement
reforms deemed critical to addressing the country’s security and development challenges.
The Obama Administration has been supportive of Nigeria’s recent reform initiatives, including
anti-corruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs
to promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Administration established the
U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual concern.
Congress regularly monitors Nigerian political developments and has expressed concerns with
corruption and, human rights abuses. Congress provides oversight for over $600 million in U.S.
foreign , and environmental damage in the Delta, as well as with the
threat of violent extremism in Nigeria. Congress oversees more than $600 million in U.S. foreign
assistance programs in Nigeria—one of the largest U.S. bilateral assistance packages in Africa.
Congressional Research Service
Nigeria: Elections and Issues for CongressCurrent Issues and U.S. Policy
Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Context .............................................................................................................................. 2
Previous Elections ..................................................................................................................... 2
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges................................................................... 3
Violence Surrounding and Following the 2011 Elections ................................................... 72
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives ............................................................................ 8
Reforms to the Petroleum and Energy Sectors .......................................................................... 9
Financial Sector Reforms ........................................................................................................ 105
Efforts to Combat Corruption.................................................................................................. 11
Social Issues and Security Concerns ........ 6
Petroleum and Power Sector Reforms....................................................................................... 13
Islamic Sharia Law.7
Financial Sector Reforms ................................................................................................................. 13
Sectarian Violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt .................... 8
Social Issues and Security Concerns ....................................................... 13
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria ............................................................................. 14
Conflict in the Niger Delta ................................................................................. 9
Islamic Sharia Law..................... 16
Background of the Struggle............................................................................................... 16
Criminality and Violence........9
Religious and Communal Tensions ........................................................................................... 16
Amnesty Offer for Delta Militants ...9
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria ................................................................................. 18
Efforts to Address Environmental and Development Challenges 10
Conflict in the Niger Delta .......................................... 18
Effects on the Oil Industry and the World Market ............................................................ 2013
Abuses by Security Forces ...................................................................................................... 2014
HIV/AIDS, Education, and Population Growth ...................................................................... 2014
International Relations................................................................................................................... 2115
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 2115
Administration Policy on Nigeria............................................................................................ 2115
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues............................................................. 2216
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability and Counterterrorism Efforts .................................. 2317
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria................................................................................................. 23
Recent 17
Congressional ActionEngagement ............................................................................................ 25... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election ......................................................................... 64
Figure 2. Map of Nigeria ............................................................................................................... 2719
Tables
Table 1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Nigeria ....................................................... 2419
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 2820
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Nigeria: Elections and Issues for CongressCurrent Issues and U.S. Policy
Overview
Nigeria is considered a key power on the African continent, not only because of its size, but but also
because of its political and economic role in the region. One in five people in Sub-Saharan Africa
call Nigeria home. The country’s commercial center, Lagos, is among the world’s largest cities.
Nigeria’s economy is Sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest, and it is one of the
world’s major
sources of high-quality sweet crude oil and natural gas. Nigerian leaders have
mediated conflicts throughout Africa, and
Nigerian troops have played a critical role in peace and
stability operations on the continent. The
country ranks fourth amongamong the top five troop contributors to United
Nations peacekeeping missions. Nigeria, roughly twice the size of California, is also home to
world’s second-largest HIV/AIDS-infected population and has Africa’s highest tuberculosis
burden. Nations peacekeeping missions.
Few countries in Africa have the capacity to make a more decisive impact on the region.
Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria
however, Nigeria remains highly underdeveloped.
Poor governance has limited
infrastructure development and
social service delivery, hindering
economic growth and leaving much
of the country mired in poverty.
The country is composed of over
250 ethnic groups, of which 10
account for nearly 80% of the total
population. The Poor governance and
corruption have limited
Nigeria at a Glance
infrastructure development and
social service delivery, hindering
Population; Pop. Growth Rate: 170 million; 2.553%
economic growth and keeping much
Independence:
October 1960
of the country mired in poverty.
Nigeria is also home to the world’s
Capital:
Abuja
second-largest HIV/AIDS-infected
Comparative Area:
More than twice the
population and has Africa’s highest
size of California
tuberculosis burden.
The country hosts over 250 ethnic
groups, but the northern Hausa and
Fulani, the southwestern Yoruba,
and the southeastern Ibo have
traditionally been the most
politically active and dominant.
Almost half the population, some 75
million people who primarily reside
in the northern half of the country,
are Muslim. Southern Nigeria is
predominantly Christian.
Nigeria at a Glance
Population:
155 million
Pop. Growth Rate:
1.935%
Independence:
October 1960
Comparative Area:
Slightly larger than twice the
size of CaliforniaRoughly half the population,
primarily residing in the north, are
Muslim. Southern Nigeria is
predominantly Christian.
Religions:
50% Muslim, 40% Christian,
10% indigenous beliefs
Languages:
English (official), 250 local languages
Literacy:
68%
Infant Mortality:
91.5474.36 deaths/1,000 live births
Life Expectancy:
47.5652 years
Prevalence of HIV:
3.16%
Real GDP Growth:
8.4% (2010 estimate)6.9%
Nominal GDP Per Capita:
$1,191545
Unemployment:
4.9%
Exports:
$45.4 billion21%
Ethnic and religious strife have been Imports:
$42.1External Debt:
$12 billion
common in Nigeria. Divisions
External Debt:
$9.689 billionSource: CIA World FactBook 2012; International Monetary Fund
among ethnic groups, between north
and south, and between Christians
Source: CIA World Fact Book, International Monetary Fund
and Muslims, often stem from issues relating to access to land,
jobs, and socioeconomic often stem from
perceived differences in access to land and socio-economic development, and are sometimes
fueled by political elites. More than 15,000 Nigerians are believed to have been have been killed
in local clashes sparked by these tensions in the last decade, and millions have been periodically
displaced. An increasingly active militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, has contributed to
deteriorating security conditions in the northeast. Recent attacks attributed to the group against
Christian targets have the potential to inflame sectarian tensions across the country. Its purported
ties with regional terrorist groups are also of concern. In the southern Niger Delta, simmering
conflict and criminality have been fueled by regional grievances related to oil production in the
area, although the government has had some recent success negotiating with local militant
groups.
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Political Context
Nigeria, which gained its independence from Britain in 1960, is a federal republic composed of
36 states; its political structure is similar to that of the United States. The country has a bicameral
legislature with a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Its president,
legislators, and governors are elected on four-year terms. The country was ruled by the military
for much of the three decades after independence before making the transition to civilian rule in
1999. Elections held in the decade after the transition were deemed by Nigerians and the
international community to be flawed, with each poll progressively worse than the last, according
to many domestic and international observers. In the wake of the 2007 elections, which were
marred by fraud and political violence, the U.S. State Department expressed its view that the
country remained in political transition.1 Human Rights Watch contended at that point that
“Nigeria has not held a free and fair general election since the end of military rule.”2
Nevertheless, expectations were high for the most recent round of elections, held in April 2011 fueled by politicians. By some
estimates, 15,000 Nigerians have died in localized clashes driven by such tensions in the last
decade, including more than 800 people killed in 2011 in post-election clashes. That violence
highlighted growing dissatisfaction with the government in the northern states. An increasingly
active violent Islamist group, Boko Haram, has contributed to deteriorating security conditions in
the north and seeks to capitalize on local frustrations and discredit the government. U.S.
policymakers are concerned with Boko Haram’s reported ties with transnational terrorist groups
and with its attack on the U.N. compound in Abuja in 2011. Further, the group’s recent attacks
against churches have the potential to inflame sectarian tensions across Nigeria. In the southern
Niger Delta region, local grievances related to oil production in the area have fueled simmering
conflict and criminality for over a decade. The government’s efforts to negotiate with local
militants have quieted the restive region, but the peace is fragile and violent criminality continues.
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Political Context
Nigeria, which gained its independence from Britain in 1960, is a federal republic with 36 states;
its political structure is similar to that of the United States. It has a bicameral legislature with a
109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Nigeria’s president, legislators,
and governors are directly elected on four-year terms. The country was ruled by the military for
much of the four decades after independence before making the transition to civilian rule in 1999.
Elections held in the decade after the transition were deemed by Nigerians and the international
community to be flawed, with each poll progressively worse than the last. The most recent
elections, in April 2011, showed serious improvements, but also highlighted outstanding issues.
The contest for power between north and south that has broadly defined much of Nigeria’s
modern political history can be traced, in part, to administrative divisions instituted during
Britain’s colonial administration.31 Northern military leaders dominated Nigerian politicsthe political scene from
independence until the transition to democracy just over a decade ago. Since the election of
President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999,4 there has been a de-facto power sharing arrangement,
often referred to as “zoning,” between the country’s geopolitical zones, through which the
presidency was expected to rotate among the regions every two terms. President Obasanjo was
from the southwest, and with his retirement pending in 2007, the ruling People’s Democratic
Party (PDP), which has dominated Nigerian politics for more than a decade, chose a northern
regions. As President Obasanjo, a previous military
ruler from the southwest, approached retirement in 2007, the ruling People’s Democratic Party
(PDP) chose a northern governor, Umaru Yar’Adua, as its presidential candidate. The other main
leading presidential contenders
in the April 2007 election were also northerners. Upon from the north. Upon
President Yar’Adua’s death in office in
2010,2 his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, a southernerformer
governor from the southern Niger Delta, took office for the remainder of
Yar’Adua’s first term,
raising questions as to whether the ruling party would chosechoose another
northern candidate to run in
2011 or support a run for the office by the sitting president. President
Jonathan ultimately secured
the party nomination. His subsequent electoral victory leaves the
future of the zoning arrangement unclear.
Previous Elections
Nigeria’s third national elections since the return to civilian rule were held in April 2007, amid
widespread allegations of electoral mismanagement and fraud. The Nigerian Senate had rejected a
bid by Obasanjo supporters in 2006 to amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term.
Facing retirement, President Obasanjo backed Umaru Yar’Adua, largely unknown to many
Nigerians, as the ruling party’s presidential candidate.5 Yar’Adua’s running mate, Goodluck
1
U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2008.
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Election or ‘Selection’? Human Rights Abuses and Threats to Free and Fair Elections
in Nigeria, April 2007, and “Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, Violence,” April 24, 2007.
3
Britain administered the north and south separately from the late 19th century until 1947, when it introduced a federal
system that divided the country into three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western.
4
Obasanjo, a former military head of state from 1976-1979, won 62.8% of the votes in 1999; his challenger received
37.2%. In 2003, Obasanjo won 62% of the votes, while his nearest rival, General Muhammadu Buhari, won 32%.
5
Yar’Adua, a former chemistry professor, was elected governor of Katsina in 1999. His better-known older brother, the
(continued...)
2
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Jonathan, had served as governor of Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta. Yar’Adua was declared the
winner with over 70% of the votes cast. The two largest opposition parties, the All Nigeria
Peoples Party (ANPP) and the Action Congress (AC), rejected the poll results.
The ruling PDP won the majority of the state and federal elections. Opposition gubernatorial
candidates won in seven states, including the two most populous states, Lagos and Kano. Many
election results were challenged in the courts, based on allegations of fraud, threats of violence, or
the inability of voters to cast their ballots. Ultimately, the results of almost a third of the
gubernatorial races were annulled, although many of the candidates who won in the first round
won again when elections were rerun. A tribunal hearing the challenges to President Yar’Adua’s
win reached its verdict in February 2008, finding insufficient evidence to overturn his election.
Nigeria’s Supreme Court upheld that verdict in late 2008.
Domestic and international observer groups were highly critical of the 2007 elections.6 According
to the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) delegation, “in many places, and in a
number of ways, the electoral process failed the Nigerian people. The cumulative effect ...
substantially compromised the integrity of the electoral process.”7 The International Republican
Institute (IRI) called the elections “below acceptable standards,” noting that the resolution of
election disputes would be “critical” to restoring the credibility of the democratic process.8
President Obasanjo acknowledged some electoral irregularities, notably “logistical failures,”
violence, and ballot box theft, but declared that “the magnitude does not make the results null and
void.”9 World oil prices rose the week after the election amid concerns surrounding the disputed
polls,10 but opposition calls for mass protests went largely unheeded.
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges
Conceding that the 2007 elections were flawed, President Yar’Adua appointed a panel of
government officials, former judges, and civil society representatives to recommend changes to
the country’s electoral institutions. The panel issued its findings in December 2008, but the
government was slow to commence reforms until mid-2010, when the parliament approved the
first of several amendments to the electoral laws. Among the most significant of the reforms were
those designed to increase independence and fiscal autonomy of the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC), whose credibility had been badly damaged by the 2003 and 2007
elections.11 President Jonathan won praise for replacing the sitting INEC chairman with a
(...continued)
late General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, served as Vice President under Obasanjo in the first military regime to transfer
power to civilian rule, and he was reported to be one of Nigeria’s wealthiest and most powerful men. Shehu died in
prison in 1997 after having been sentenced by a military tribunal for treason after calling for dictator Sani Abacha to
reestablish civilian rule. Yar’Adua’s father was a prominent minster in the first government after independence.
6
“Nigeria: Elections Fraudulent; EU, Others,” Daily Trust (Abuja), April 24, 2007.
7
The National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Statement of the National Democratic Institute International Election
Observer Delegation to Nigeria’s April 21 Presidential and National Assembly Elections,” April 23, 2007.
8
The International Republican Institute (IRI), “Nigeria’s Elections Below Acceptable Standards: Preliminary Findings
of IRI’s International Election Observation Mission,” April 22, 2007.
9
“Obasanjo Appeals to Nigerians Over Election Results,” Radio Nigeria-Abuja, April 23, 2007, and “Nigerian
President Olusegun Obasanjo Says Elections Flawed, But Not Fatally,” Associated Press, April 25, 2007.
10
“Landslide Win for Yar’Adua is ‘Flawed,’” Financial Times, April 23, 2007.
11
International Crisis Group (ICG), “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis,” Africa Report No. 123, March
(continued...)
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respected academic and civil society activist, Professor Attahiru Jega. Despite lingering concerns
about the independence of some state-level electoral officials,12 Nigerians were optimistic that the
2011 polls would be more credible than the last, according to a survey conducted in late 2010.13
Turnout was high for the voter registration exercise, launched in January 2011 to compile a more
credible register. INEC reported over 870,000 cases of multiple registration, raising concerns
about “widespread but not yet systemic fraud.”14 The exercise nevertheless appeared to increase
voter confidence and many observers generally deemed the register an improvement over
previous efforts, although not without problems.
A delayed rerun in January 2011 of one of the flawed 2007 gubernatorial elections was viewed as
another test for INEC’s new management. Observer reports suggest that, while rigging and voter
intimidation occurred, the poll was an improvement in a state heavily controlled by the PDP. By
one account, the rerun “demonstrated both the potential for INEC to administer improved
elections with the support of communities and the risk that political actors can still overwhelm
reforms with systematic fraud.”15 As April approached, analysts argued that Jega’s INEC had
demonstrated the will, if not necessarily the capacity, to overcome problems in the 2011 polls.
Observers noted positive developments prior to the elections, but also raised concerns about
electoral preparedness and other areas deemed problematic in previous polls, including ballot
secrecy, intimidation, and transparency in the counting of ballots and tabulation of results.16
Previous instances of electoral fraud included the falsification of voter information, bribery, theft,
incitement, and intimidation. Some civil society groups suggested that these practices were likely
to occur in the 2011 elections, but that there might be a shift “from blatant fraud with state
acquiescence to a pattern of suppressing opposition voting areas while inflating strongholds.”17
The International Crisis Group declared the party primaries to be “as manipulated as ever,”
resulting in court challenges to the parties’ candidate lists.18 Last minute court rulings related to
the lists required ballots to be reprinted and caused delays in the delivery of voting materials.
As mentioned above, there has been an unwritten agreement that the presidency should rotate
among the country’s regions, and there was considerable debate on whether Jonathan’s decision
to vie for the presidency would lead the ruling party to split. Prior to the party primaries, many
northerners argued that since Yar’Adua, a northerner, had only served one term, a candidate from
their region should hold the office for another term, given that Obasanjo, a southerner, had two
terms in office. Some reports suggest that a lack of consensus among the PDP elite on the zoning
(...continued)
28, 2007, p. 14.
12
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Africa Briefing No.79, February 24, 2011; Breaking the
Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria, U.S. Institute for Peace, December 2010.
13
A poll conducted by IRI in late 2010 indicated that over 60% of Nigerians had confidence in the new electoral
commission, and that 74% of Nigerians thought the 2011 polls would be more credible that the last.
14
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid.
15
Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun: Signposts and Storm Warnings for the 2011
Elections, February 24, 2011.
16
See, e.g., IRI, “Statement of IRI’s Pre-Election Assessment Mission,” March 3, 2011; NDI, “Nigeria Election
Watch,” Issue 3, March 15, 2011.
17
Stakeholder Democracy Network, The Delta Governorship Rerun, Ibid.
18
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Ibid; NDI, “Nigeria Election Watch,” Issue 3, Ibid.
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issue contributed to the apparent reluctance by Yar’Adua’s cabinet to formally transfer power to
Jonathan in early 2010 (see below). Jonathan ultimately won the support of key PDP leaders,
including a majority of the northern governors, for his candidacy, winning the primary
overwhelmingly with over 2,700 votes against roughly 800 for his northern rival, Atiku Abubakar.
President Jonathan, along with his running mate, Vice President Namadi Sambo (a northerner),
was among almost 20 candidates contesting the presidency, including former military leader
Muhammadu Buhari,19 representing the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC); former head of
Nigeria’s anti-corruption authority Nuhu Ribadu, representing the Action Congress of Nigeria
(ACN); and a northern state governor, Ibrahim Shekaru, representing the ANPP. These three
leading opposition contenders all hailed from the north and chose running mates from the south.
With over 73 million registered voters, almost 120,000 polling stations, and more than 50
political parties, the challenges facing INEC were daunting. The 2011 elections were scheduled to
be held on three successive Saturdays in April; however, logistical delays in the delivery of
materials to polling stations across the country resulted in all three elections being delayed by a
week. 20 For some, the delay reinforced concerns regarding the polls’ credibility. Others argued
that the “trial run” allowed INEC the opportunity to identify and address some deficiencies.
The ruling PDP maintained its dominant position in Nigerian politics in the 2011 elections,
retaining the presidency, a majority of the seats in the National Assembly, the gubernatorial posts
and state assemblies. The CPC and ACN made some significant regional gains, however. The
ACN dominated state elections in the southwest, where the PDP retained a majority in only one
of the state assemblies and lost all gubernatorial positions. Nationally, opposition parties now
control 13 governors’ posts and hold a majority in 10 state assemblies.21 Incumbent President
Goodluck Jonathan won 59.6% of the vote, taking a majority in 23 states and gaining enough
support nationwide to avoid a run-off.22 Buhari, who followed with 32.3% of the votes, led in
one-third of the states, notably in the north. Ribadu came in third with 5.5% of the votes.
19
General Buhari also ran for the presidency in 2003 and 2007.
Gubernatorial elections were not held in 10 states 2007 election results were overturned or rerun.
21
Opposition candidates took Ogun, Oyo, and Lagos in the southwest (ACN), Yobe in the north (ANPP), and Imo in
the southeast (APGA). ANPP retained control in Borno and Zamfara. The CPC won Nasarawa from the ANPP. Osun,
Ekiti, Ondo, Edo, and Anambra were already held by the opposition.
22
A candidate must win at least 25% in at least two-thirds of the states and the Federal Capital Territory to avoid a
runoff. Jonathan gained at least 25% in 31 states. Buhari gained 25% in 18 states.
20
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Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election
Source: BBC, adapted by CRS.
U.S. government comments on the conduct of the 2011 elections were largely positive. Secretary
of State Clinton declared, “This historic event marks a dramatic shift from decades of failed
elections and a substantial improvement” over the 2007 election, but noted that “while this
election was a success for the people of Nigeria, it was far from perfect.”23 Another senior State
Department official called the polls “the most successful elections since [Nigeria’s] return to
multiparty democracy, ... despite some technical imperfections,” and argued that “this reverses a
downward democratic trajectory and provides the country a solid foundation for strengthening its
electoral procedures and democratic institutions.”24 When President Obama called to congratulate
President Jonathan, he stated that “the success of the elections was a testament to Nigerian voters
who...were determined that these elections mark a new chapter in Nigerian history.”25
23
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Press Release: Election in Nigeria, April 19, 2011.
Special Briefing by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, “The Recent Elections in Nigeria,” April 28, 2011.
25
The White House, Statement by President Obama on Elections in Nigeria, May 4, 2011.
24
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International observers also generally noted significant improvements in the electoral process in
the National Assembly and presidential polls, but most stopped short of calling the elections “free
and fair.” The IRI and NDI delegations both termed the 2011 elections a key step forward.26 The
African Union called the legislative and presidential elections “credible and creditable and
reflect(ing) the will of the Nigerian people.”27 The Commonwealth declared that “previously held
notions that Nigeria can only hold flawed elections are now being discarded and this country can
now shake off that stigma and redeem its image.”28 The European Union (EU) was also generally
positive, but raised concerns with presidential results from some states in the Niger Delta and the
southeast, where turnout appeared to be near 100%.29 This echoes the findings of some domestic
groups, who reported the largest number of electoral incidents in the “south-south” (i.e., the Niger
Delta) and southeast, including intimidation, harassment, and in some cases, violence.30 Underage voting was cited as a common concern by observers, and most suggested that over-crowding
at polling stations and complicated vote collation procedures vulnerable to error or malfeasance
remained a problem during the polls. The EU delegation, one of the few groups to observe the
state elections, found that they “did not resemble the quality of the process and environment of
the elections for President and National Assembly,” and noted increased attempts to influence
voters.31 Domestic observer reports suggest harassment increased in the state elections.
Various parties filed legal suits challenging the results of the 2011 elections. Nigeria’s Supreme
Court upheld a verdict rejecting the CPC’s challenge to President Jonathan’s win in December
2011. Nigeria’s next elections are scheduled for 2015.
Violence Surrounding and Following the 2011 Elections
Despite generally positive preliminary statements on the conduct of the April 2011 legislative and
presidential elections, election-related violence surrounding the polls was higher than in previous
years, highlighting lingering communal tensions. Rioting that broke out in the north in protest of
President Jonathan’s win reflected grievances that many in that region feel had been left
unaddressed by the ruling party.
Violence had accompanied previous elections in Nigeria. Over 150 people were estimated to have
been killed in violence related to the 2003 elections, and by some estimates, as many as 350
people were killed in violence related to the 2007 polls.32 Violence prior to the 2011 elections
included clashes between party supporters and several assassinations. Poll-related security
concerns were further heightened by a spate of bombings during political rallies, predominantly
in Bayelsa state in the Delta. There were at least six bombings in April in the northeast state of
Borno, where Boko Haram, a local militant Islamist group, has been most active. Boko Haram
claimed responsibility in January 2011 for the assassination of the state’s leading gubernatorial
candidate and several of his supporters. On the eve of the legislative elections, a bombing at the
26
IRI, “Nigerian Election Major Step Forward,” April 18, 2011; NDI, “Statement of the National Democratic
Institute’s International Election Observer Mission to Nigeria’s April 16 Presidential Election,” April 18, 2011.
27
Preliminary Statement of the AU Observer Mission on the 2011 Presidential Election in Nigeria, April 16, 2011.
28
Interim Statement by the Chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group, April 18, 2011.
29
Preliminary Statement of the European Union Election Observation Mission, April 18, 2011.
30
Project 2011 Swift Count (www.pscnigeria.org) and the Transition Monitoring Group (www.tmgelection2011.org).
31
EU Election Observation Mission, Press Release: EU EOM on the Elections of 26 and 28 April, April 29, 2011.
32
HRW, “Nigeria: Pass Bill to Prosecute Electoral Abuses,” March 13, 2011.
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state election commission headquarters in Niger state killed at least 10 people. President Jonathan
and Chairman Jega pledged to increase security during the elections, and observers generally
commented positively on the presence and behavior of security forces during the polls.
Protests erupted in the northern states the day after the presidential election, with Buhari
supporters alleging that the ruling party had rigged the election. The protests devolved into
violent riots and, in some areas, killings, largely along religious and ethnic lines. In some parts of
the north, the violence lasted for several days until soldiers were deployed to enforce stability. At
least 800 people were killed in a three-day period, according Human Rights Watch, and as many
as 65,000 displaced. An independent panel led by a prominent Islamic scholar who was appointed
to conduct an official government inquiry into the post-election violence submitted a final report
in October 2011, faulting the failure of successive administrations to act on the recommendations
of previous commissions on communal and political violence. The panel also suggested that
statements made by politicians such as Buhari for voters to “guard their votes” may have fueled
popular frustrations and inadvertently sparked acts of violence.33
The Death of President Yar’Adua and the Transition of Power
Questions about President Yar’Adua’s health plagued his administration throughout his tenure (2007-2010). Many
speculate that he suffered from a chronic kidney condition, and his hospitalization in Saudi Arabia in November 2009,
reportedly with acute pericarditis, threatened to spark a political crisis. His prolonged absence spurred rumors of his
death, and several groups launched legal suits suggesting that Yar’Adua had violated the constitution by not
transferring power during his absence. Some observers contend that the president was completely incapacitated, and
that close advisors, including his wife, were making decisions for him.34 President Yar’Adua’s absence also raised
concerns regarding a tenuous ceasefire with Niger Delta militants.35
Pressure for presidential authority to be transferred to Vice President Jonathan increased in early 2010, despite the
cabinet declaring Yar’Adua fit for office in late January and a court ruling that there was no need for a formal transfer
of power during a “medical vacation.” Under pressure from influential state governors, the National Assembly passed
resolutions recognizing Jonathan as the acting head of state. The cabinet accepted the National Assembly’s decision.
Although the resolutions were not legally binding, the move allowed Jonathan to conduct critical government
business. In June 2010, in response to the ambiguity surrounding Jonathan’s role as acting president, the National
Assembly amended the constitution to address procedures for the temporary transfer of presidential powers in the
event of the president’s absence or inability to discharge his duties.
On May 5, 2010, the Nigerian government announced the death of President Yar’Adua at age 58. Goodluck Jonathan
was sworn in as Nigeria’s new president the following day, choosing as his vice president Namadi Sambo, a former
architect and governor of the northern state of Kaduna.
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives
Nigeria generates over $60 billion a year in oil and gas revenue, but despite its large economy its
population is among Africa’s poorest. As many as 70% of Nigerians live beneath the poverty line,
and the average life expectancy is less than 48 years. Nigeria also has the world’s second-largest
HIV/AIDS population (after South Africa). Access to clean water remains a major challenge—
33
“Post-Election Violence – FG Panel Report Indicts Buhari,” Vanguard, October 11, 2011.
John Campbell, “Nigeria Fragmented and Unstable,” Huffington Post, March 5, 2010, and “On Her Majesty’s Secret
Service,” Africa Confidential, March 5. 2010.
35
“MEND’s Fresh Resurgence as Yar’Adua’s Absence Enters 2nd Month,” AllAfrica, January 4, 2010.
34
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almost half the population has no access to improved sources of water and less than one-fifth of
households are served by piped water. Sanitation is also a problem, with 30% of people lacking
access to adequate sanitation. Diarrhea remains the second-leading cause of death among
Nigerian children, and the country ranks second only to India in the number of diarrhea-related
child deaths globally. The country ranks 156th out of 187 countries on U.N. Development
Program’s (UNDP) 2011 Human Development Index.36 Due to decades of economic
mismanagement, political instability, and widespread corruption, Nigeria’s education and social
services systems have suffered from lack of funding, industry has idled, and Africa’s largest oil
producer suffers periodically from severe fuel and electricity shortages.
When Goodluck Jonathan assumed power in February 2010 from the ailing President Yar’Adua,
he made public commitments to “restoring Nigeria’s image” abroad, both by continuing to act as
a key partner in regional peace and counterterrorism efforts, and by ending the “culture of
impunity” in Nigeria in terms of corruption and human rights concerns.37 He vowed to continue
President Yar’Adua’s various reform initiatives. Those efforts are discussed below.
Reforms to the Petroleum and Energy Sectors
Nigeria’s economy depends heavily on its oil sector, and for decades, as the country’s extractive
industries grew, many of its other industries stagnated or declined. According to the World Bank,
oil and gas production accounts for almost 80% of government revenues and 95% of export
earnings. Despite increased deepwater oil production, persistent conflict and criminality in the
oil-producing Niger Delta region and swings in world oil prices have threatened Nigeria’s fiscal
outlook for much of the past decade. Economists suggest that the economy continues to
underperform because of poor infrastructure and electricity shortages, although the performance
of the manufacturing and telecommunications sectors is improving. Agricultural production
contributes over one-third of GDP, but less than 5% of exports.
President Jonathan has stressed his commitment to reforming the oil and gas industry. In 2007,
the government announced plans to restructure the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC), which oversees regulation of the industry and has been criticized for its lack of
transparency. Nigeria’s oil and gas sector has long been a focal point for corruption charges, and
numerous government officials have been accused of taking bribes in exchange for approving
deals with foreign firms. President Yar’Adua appointed a committee to review Nigeria’s contracts
with foreign oil companies, a process through which the committee chair suggested, “We may
have to reconsider some of our generous terms.”38 President Jonathan appointed Nigeria’s first
female oil minister, Diezani Allison-Madueke, a former executive with Royal Dutch Shell, in
2010. She is leading the administration’s efforts to press parliament to pass the ambitious
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which would restructure the NNPC and reportedly increase
transparency within the industry. Nigeria was designated compliant with the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global standard for transparency in the oil, gas, and mining
sectors, in March 2011.
36
The UNDP index is a composite measure of life expectancy, adult literacy and school enrollment, and income.
President Jonathan has referred to Nigeria’s “culture of impunity” in several speeches, including one quoted in
“Again, We’ve Succeeded in Moving Nigeria Forward - Jonathan,” Daily Champion (Lagos), February 10, 2010.
38
Matthew Green, “Nigeria Considers Oil Contracts Review,” Financial Times, October 23, 2007.
37
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Despite its position as one of the world’s largest exporters of oil, Nigeria imports an estimated
$10 billion in refined fuel annually, and it continues to face a nationwide power crisis. In an effort
to increase its refining capacity, the government has granted permits for the construction of
several independently owned refineries. The government aims to halt oil imports by 2020. In
2010, with two of Nigeria’s existing four oil refineries running at only 60% capacity, the NNPC
signed a $23 billion agreement with China for the construction of three new refineries.39
In addition to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world and
the largest in Africa, but to date they have provided little benefit to the Nigerian economy. Many
of Nigeria’s oil fields lack the infrastructure to produce natural gas. The government has
repeatedly set deadlines for oil companies to stop flaring gas at oil wells, estimated at roughly
one-third of annual production and $2.5 billion in lost revenue, but significant flaring has
continued.40 In March 2011, President Jonathan announced a series of new agreements to develop
gas processing facilities as part of a “gas revolution” designed to create new jobs and revenues
and to end flaring.41 Nigeria is in the process of increasing its liquefied natural gas (LNG)
exports, which could surpass revenues derived from oil exports in the next decade. Nigeria now
exports natural gas to Benin, Togo, and Ghana through the new West Africa Gas Pipeline. The
initiative, led by Chevron, had been delayed due to supply shortages resulting from sabotage to
production facilities in the Niger Delta. Reports suggest that gas supplies have increased as
pipelines have been repaired since 2009.
A decision by the Jonathan Administration in late 2011 to remove a fuel subsidy, which totaled
almost $8 billion annually (roughly one-quarter of the government’s 2012 budget), was
controversial domestically. In removing the subsidy, fuel prices doubled in early January 2012,
leading to mass protests. The subsidy benefit has long been deemed unsustainable by economists,
but in the face of a nationwide strike by unions, the government was forced to compromise and
reinstate a partial subsidy. The Jonathan Administration plans to refocus funds from the subsidy
cut on improving health, education, and the nation’s power supply.
The Jonathan Administration has pledged to increase Nigeria’s electricity generation tenfold over
the next decade; President Jonathan emphasized this as a key priority in his campaign. Efforts to
privatize power stations and distribution companies are underway, despite objections from the
country’s trade unions, but are behind schedule. The Obama Administration has praised the
government for its progress thus far in rehabilitating the power sector,42 but its ability to deliver
on its promises of improved supply will be a key test for President Jonathan.
Financial Sector Reforms
Successive Nigerian administrations have made commitments to economic reform, but their track
record is mixed. According to the IMF, reforms initiated under the Obasanjo Administration and
continued by his successors, most importantly the policies of maintaining low external debt and
budgeting based on a conservative oil price benchmark to create a buffer of foreign reserves,
39
“Two Nigerian Refineries Running at 60 Pct Capacity,” Reuters, March 30, 2010.
U.S. Energy Information Administration
41
“Jonathan Sets Agenda for Ending Gas Flaring,” BusinessDay, March 25, 2011.
42
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Commends Nigerian Authorities on Power Sector Reforms,” January 14, 2011.
40
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lessened the impact of the recent global economic crisis on Nigeria’s economy.43 Oil revenues
above the benchmark price have been saved since 2003 in an Excess Crude Account (ECA),
although the government drew substantially from the account in 2009-2010 in an effort to
stimulate economic recovery. The ECA’s balance fell from $20 billion in early 2009 to less than
$500 million in September 2010, but Nigerian officials report that the rise in the price of oil
brought the ECA back above $2 billion at the end of 2010, and it has since risen to over $4
billion.44 The Jonathan Administration’s efforts to create a sovereign wealth fund, which would
draw seed money from the ECA, have met with some resistance from the state governors. The
country has made significant gains in the past decade in paying down its external debt, which
declined from 36% of GDP in 2004 to under 3%, freeing funding for programs aimed at poverty
reduction and reaching the country’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Like his predecessors, President Jonathan has committed his Administration to reforms that aim
to fuel development. In mid-2011 he appointed World Bank managing director Ngozi OkonjoIweala, who led efforts to reduce Nigeria’s debt while serving as finance minister under President
Obasanjo, to resume her former post at the finance ministry. Jonathan has retained Lamido Sanusi
as governor of Central Bank of Nigeria. He has led efforts to modernize the country’s banking
system, pushing reforms to tighten banking supervision. In late 2009 he instituted new regulations
that require banks to report large cash transactions between accounts if one of the account holders
is considered to be “politically exposed.” Bank audits ordered by Sanusi in 2009 found 10 banks
near collapse due to reckless lending; most of the banks’ top executives were fired. The
government provided $4 billion in 2009 to rescue the banks, and in late 2010, under pressure
from Sanusi, the legislature approved the establishment of the Asset Management Company of
Nigeria (AMCON) to buy bad bank loans in exchange for government bonds, in an effort to get
the banks lending again. AMCON is jointly funded by the central bank and the finance ministry.
Some Nigerian legislators believe the central bank overstepped its authority in rescuing the banks.
By some estimates it may take a decade for AMCON to divest its toxic assets.45
Efforts to Combat Corruption
According to the U.S. State Department, corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and
pervasive.”46 Nigeria’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index has
consistently worsened in the past three years, after momentarily improving in 2008 following
President Yar’Adua’s victory.47 Human Rights Watch suggests that the country’s political system
rewards rather than punishes corruption, which has been fueled by oil revenues for decades.48
Nigeria also has one of the world’s highest incidences of cyber crime, including “419 scams,” sonamed for the country’s penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails. Observers suggest that the
43
International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation with Nigeria,” January 27, 2011. The
price benchmarks set by the Nigerian government are $58/barrel for 2011, $60 for 2012, and $62 for 2013.
44
EIU, “Nigeria,” Country Reports, March 2011 and November 2011.
45
AMCON bought non-performing loans from 9 rescued banks and margin loans from 12 other domestic banks.
46
U.S. State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009, March 2010.
47
The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceptions of business people and country analysts regarding the
degree of corruption among public officials and politicians. A high score indicates greater levels of corruption.
48
HRW, Corruption on Trial?, August 25, 2011.
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country’s development will continue to be hampered until it can reverse its perceived “culture of
impunity for political and economic crimes.”49
According to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a Nigerian law
enforcement agency created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, more than $380 billion has
been expropriated by the country’s political and military leaders since oil sales began in the
1970s.50 Former dictator Sani Abacha reportedly stole more than $3.5 billion during his five years
in power. Switzerland was the first country to repatriate stolen funds to Nigeria, some of which
have been used by the government toward meeting the country’s Millennium Development Goals.
The Nigerian government has recovered other funds stolen by Abacha and his family from several
European countries, but some Abacha funds remain frozen in other European accounts.
The Obasanjo Administration won praise for its efforts to combat corruption, but some observers
suggest that the former head of state also used corruption charges to sideline critics and political
opponents. EFCC investigations resulted in the arrest of more than 2,000 Nigerians for illegal
email scams and in over 130 convictions for fraud during Obasanjo’s tenure.51 The International
Crisis Group suggests that the EFCC was “used as a political weapon to whip political foes,
especially state governors likely to stand for the presidency and their supporters, into line.”52
President Yar’Adua, reportedly a devout Muslim, campaigned on an anti-corruption platform; in
1999 he became the first governor to publicly declare his assets. Upon taking the presidency, he
ordered the review of all privatization agreements approved by former President Obasanjo, amid
charges of corruption associated with the sales, and subsequently reversed several contracts.
President Yar’Adua moved to distance himself from the former president, dismissing many of
Obasanjo’s political appointees and military leaders in late 2008 and overturning several key
government contracts made by the former administration. In December 2008, he proposed that
the National Assembly amend the constitution to remove the immunity clause that prevents the
president, vice president, governors, and deputy governors from being prosecuted for corruption
while in office. His proposal was not adopted.
Human Rights Watch has called on the Jonathan Administration to reform the EFCC to increase
its independence. According to the group, the anti-corruption body has suffered from executive
interference that has undermined its investigations and derailed prosecutions, and the EFCC
chairman “remains deeply vulnerable to the whims of the president and lacks security of
tenure.”53 The transfer and eventual dismissal of the EFCC’s first chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, in late
2007, drew widespread criticism from the international donors. 54 Ribadu’s successor, a former
high-ranking police officer, Farida Waziri, was dismissed by President Jonathan in late 2011.
49
International Crisis Group, “Want in the Midst of Plenty,” Africa Report No. 113, July 19, 2006.
“Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anticorruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
51
“Strong Convictions: Nigeria’s First Anti-Corruption Czar,” Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 2007.
52
ICG, “Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding A Political Crisis,” Ibid.
53
HRW, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, August 2011.
54
Matthew Green, “Nigerian Anti-Graft Police Arrest Governor,” Reuters, January 22, 2008. Some questioned whether
Ribadu’s removal from office was linked to effort to prosecute former Delta State Governor James Ibori, one of
Yar’Adua’s primary financial contributors. Ibori’s case was dropped by a federal judge in late 2009.The EFCC
obtained a new warrant for his arrest in April 2010, charging that he had embezzled over $250 million. Ibori eluded
capture and fled Nigeria for Dubai, where he was arrested by Interpol in May 2010. He was extradited in April 2011 to
the United Kingdom, where he has been charged with money laundering.
50
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Several multinational corporations have been investigated for paying bribes in Nigeria. In 2007,
the German telecom giant Siemens was found guilty in a German court of paying an estimated 10
million euro in bribes to Nigerian officials. Bribes allegedly paid in relation to a Nigerian natural
gas project by the U.S. firm Halliburton, France’s Total, and Italy’s Eni are being investigated in
several countries, including France, Nigeria, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Halliburton and its
subsidiary Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc. (KBR) reached a $177 million settlement with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2009 related to the case; KBR paid a $402 million fine
to settle Justice Department charges.55 Nigeria’s EFCC brought charges against former U.S. Vice
President Dick Cheney in early December 2010 based on his tenure as chief executive of
Halliburton, but later dropped them after the company agreed to pay $250 million in fines.
Social Issues and Security Concerns
Islamic Sharia Law
Nigeria is home to Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest Muslim population. The north is predominately
Sunni Muslim, and 12 northern states have adopted Islamic sharia law since 1999 to adjudicate
criminal and civil matters for Muslims.56 Non-sharia based common law and customary law
courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these states, and sharia-based criminal law
courts are elective for non-Muslims. In some states, the introduction of sharia was a flashpoint
between Muslims and Christians. The State Department reports that sharia “technically does not
apply to non-Muslims in civil and criminal proceedings,” although observers note that Islamic
mores are often enforced in public without regard for citizens’ religion. In some areas, statefunded vigilante groups known as hisbah patrol public areas and attempt to enforce sharia-based
rulings. Many analysts nonetheless see the interpretation and implementation of Nigerian sharia
as moderate in comparison to that of some other Muslim-majority countries.
Sectarian Violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has recommended since 2009 that
Nigeria be classified as a “Country of Particular Concern” for religious freedom violations. It is
not currently designated as such by the Secretary of State. According to the Commission, as many
as 13,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1999 in sectarian violence, and the commissioners
have based their recommendation on their belief that the Nigerian government is tolerating the
violence. The Commission’s 2011 report notes some progress by the government, however, citing
the first prosecutions, in late 2010, against perpetrators of religious violence in more than a
decade.57 The State Department, in its annual Religious Freedom report, states that “the
government generally respected religious freedom in practice, although some local political actors
stoked communal and sectarian violence with impunity.”58
55
“Halliburton, KBR Paying $547 Million in Bribery Settlement,” Market Watch, February 11, 2009.
Nigerian law protects freedom of religion and permits states to establish courts based on common law or customary
law systems. Non-sharia based common law and customary law courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these
states, and sharia-based criminal law courts are elective for non-Muslims.
57
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2011, May 2011.
58
U.S. Department of State, July-December 2010 International Religious Freedom Report, September 13, 2011.
56
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Sectarian violence continues to be a particular problem in Jos, the capital of Plateau State in
central Nigeria, which sits between the predominately Muslim north and Christian south. Clashes
among communities in this culturally diverse “Middle Belt” in the past decade reflect tensions
that are both religious and ethnic, and which have been exacerbated by some local politicians.
These tensions stem from a competition over resources—land, education, government jobs—
between ethnic groups classified as settlers or “indigene” (original inhabitants of the state), a
designation that conveys political and economic benefits. In Jos, the mostly Christian Berom are
considered indigene, and the predominately Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who were traditionally
nomadic and pastoralist, are not. In 2010, the Nigerian government established a special task
force composed of both military and police to restore stability in the state; periodic outbreaks of
violence have nonetheless continued.
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria59
Boko Haram, a violent Islamist group in northern Nigeria, has grown increasingly active. While
its attacks have not exclusively focused on Christian targets, actions attributed to the group are
fueling religious tensions in Nigeria, and may more broadly have the effect of delegitimizing the
state. Some observers have also raised concerns that Boko Haram members may be expanding
ties with more developed violent Islamist groups on the continent. The group emerged in the early
2000s as a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect that advocated a strict interpretation and
implementation of Islamic law for Nigeria. Calling itself Jama’a Ahl as-Sunna Li-da’wa wa-al
Jihad (JASLWJ; roughly translated from Arabic as “People Committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”), the group is more popularly known as Boko Haram (“Western
education is forbidden”), a nickname given by local Hausa-speaking communities to describe its
view that western education and culture have been corrupting influences. It engaged in periodic
skirmishes with police during its formative years, but the group’s activities were limited in scope
and contained within several highly impoverished states in the predominately Muslim northeast.
In July 2009, the Nigerian government’s attempts to stop Boko Haram’s attacks on police stations
and other government buildings resulted in at least 700 deaths. In the course of that violence, the
group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic young cleric who had studied in Saudi Arabia,
60
was killed while in police custody. A sizeable number of Yusuf’s followers were also killed or
arrested. The group appeared to dissipate after the heavy-handed security crackdown, but
reemerged a year later, orchestrating a large-scale prison break in September 2010 that freed 700
prisoners, including more than 100 of its own members. The group’s attacks have since increased
substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality, now occurring almost daily in northeast Nigeria,
and periodically beyond. It has primarily focused its attacks on state and federal targets, but has
also targeted civilians in churches, mosques, and beer halls. Bank robberies have also been
attributed to the group and may contribute to its financing, although Nigerian authorities warn
that criminal groups may also be opportunistically posing as Boko Haram militants.
By most accounts, Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization. According to U.S. government
sources, the core group of Boko Haram militants may number in the hundreds, but the group also
draws support from a broader following of several thousand Nigerians, primarily from the
59
For more information on Boko Haram, see Congressional Research Service testimony before a hearing of the House
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, “Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S.
Homeland?” November 30, 2011.
60
“Islamic Death ‘Good for Nigeria’,” BBC, July 31, 2009.
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northeast. Some observers suggest that attacks attributed to Boko Haram may actually be the
work of several different groups, noting variations in the tactics and bomb-making styles
employed in recent attacks. Others suggest Boko Haram may be susceptible to fracturing, with a
segment of the leadership working to build ties with the international Al Qaeda franchise while
most other elements of the group remain focused exclusively on a local agenda.
Since its reemergence, Boko Haram has appeared increasingly committed to acts that aim to
discredit and delegitimize the Nigerian state by exposing the weakness of its security apparatus
and creating generalized insecurity. Attacks attributed to the group since 2010 have increasingly
featured improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, and, more recently, suicide attacks.
According to Human Rights Watch, more than 425 people, including politicians, community and
religious leaders, members of the security forces, and civilians have been killed in attacks
61
attributed to Boko Haram.
The bombing of the U.N. building in Abuja on August 24, 2011 has put Boko Haram under
increased international scrutiny. The targeting of the United Nations marks a major departure
from the group’s previous focus on domestic targets. It was also Boko Haram’s first clearly
intentional suicide bombing. Spokesmen for the group claimed the attack was retribution for the
state’s heavy-handed security response against its members, referencing U.S. and international
“collaboration” with the Nigerian security apparatus as rationale for targeting the U.N. The
bombing may indicate an aspiration by some in Boko Haram to move beyond local politics
toward an international jihadist agenda, or it may be part of an effort to elicit backing from
international jihadists for the group’s domestic agenda. Boko Haram currently appears to pose
more of a threat to local stability than to the country as a whole. Nevertheless, there are concerns
that it may seek to align itself with more developed violent Islamist groups. The regional AQ
affiliate Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has publicly offered the group assistance.62
The attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian passenger, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, on December 25, 2009 has also contributed to concerns regarding the possible
radicalization of Nigerian Muslims. According to reports, Abdulmutallab, son of a respected
Nigerian banker and former government minister, became “radicalized” while living abroad, most
recently in Yemen, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims to have sponsored his
attempt to detonate an explosive device while onboard a flight bound from Amsterdam to Detroit.
The attempted bombing, allegedly scheduled to coincide with Christmas Day, raised questions
regarding airport security in both the Netherlands and Nigeria, where Abdulmutallab’s journey
began. Both countries began using full body scanners in their international airports in 2010. The
attempt also led to increased screening measures at airports around the world. In January 2010,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced that passengers flying to the United
States who are citizens of 14 countries deemed to be either “state sponsors of terrorism” or
“countries of interest” would be subject to additional screening, including compulsory “patdowns.” Nigeria was among five African countries, including Algeria, Libya, Sudan, and
Somalia, included in the new regulation, and the Nigerian government protested the rule as
discriminatory.63 In April 2010, DHS announced new security measures for screening all
61
Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Indefensible,” November 8, 2011.
“Fertile Ground: The Potential for Jihad in Nigeria,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2010.
63
“Nigeria Criticizes ‘Unfair’ US Air Passenger Screening,” BBC, January 4, 2010.
62
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passengers on international flights to the United States, superseding the regulations that
specifically targeted Nigerians for further screening.64
Abdulmutallab’s actions are considered by most to be an isolated incident. Many observers stress
that, by all accounts, his radicalization and training took place outside Nigeria. Nevertheless, the
expansion of conservative Sunni Islamist movements and clashes between security forces and
Islamist sects in northern Nigeria have raised concerns among some observers and officials that
other Nigerians may be susceptible to recruitment by Al Qaeda or other groups hoping to use
violence against government or civilian targets in Nigeria or abroad. Many Nigerian experts
caution, however, that a heavy-handed security response to the Boko Haram threat in the
northeast may further alienate local communities and possibly facilitate extremist recruitment.
Conflict in the Niger Delta
Background of the Struggle
Oil from the southern Niger Delta region has accounted for over 75% of the country’s oil
production since the 1970s, and the area’s political history has been one of conflict and
marginalization. The Delta is home to more than 30 million people. Among them are the Ogoni,
an ethnic minority whose members have received international attention for their efforts to
highlight the extensive environmental damage done by oil extraction in the region. In 1994,
author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused of involvement in the murder of several prominent
Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but Saro-Wiwa and eight others were convicted and
sentenced to death in 1995. Their executions sparked international outrage against the regime of
dictator Sani Abacha, who was accused of extensive human rights abuses. The United States
recalled its ambassador in response. In 2009, Shell established a trust fund to benefit the Ogoni
people, part of a $15.5 million settlement in a New York court case related to the 1995
executions. The company maintains that it played no role in the executions or other abuses.
Criminality and Violence
Nigeria’s oil wealth has been a source of continuing political tension, protest, and criminality in
the Delta, where most of the country’s oil presently originates. The conflict has been linked to the
vandalism of oil infrastructures; massive, systemic production theft known as “oil bunkering,”
often abetted by state officials; protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil
operations; hostage taking; and public insecurity and communal violence. Several thousand
people have been killed in pipeline explosions in southeast Nigeria since the late 1990s. These
explosions are triggered when people siphon off oil from holes punched in the above-ground
pipeline for personal use, resulting in a reported loss of some 100,000 barrels of oil per day.
In 1998, militants from the Delta’s largest ethnic group, the Ijaw, initiated “Operation Climate
Change,” triggering violent conflict between the Ijaw and the Nigerian military and disrupting oil
production in the region. Threats of an “all out war” against the government and the oil
companies by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, one of the leaders of that group, reportedly played a role in
64
DHS, “Secretary Napolitano Announces New Measures to Strengthen Aviation Security,” April 2, 2010.
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an unprecedented rise in the world price of oil in 2004.65 The group later called off the threat after
negotiations with the government. Dokubo-Asari then led a new rebel movement, the Niger Delta
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), in a series of attacks against government forces and threats
against foreign oil workers. The NDPVF demanded autonomy for the region and a share of oil
revenues. An estimated 500 people were reportedly killed in the ensuing violence, according to
Amnesty International. Dokubo-Asari was arrested in 2005 and charged with plotting to
overthrow the government. He was released on bail in 2007, allegedly because of failing health,
and upon his release he reportedly denounced the practice of hostage-taking and subsequently
assisted in the government’s negotiations with militants. Militants in the Delta also rallied around
former Bayelsa State Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, who was impeached in late 2005.
British authorities had charged Alamieyeseigha with money laundering when he visited London
earlier that year. The former governor, who returned to Nigeria, was found guilty of money
laundering and embezzlement in 2007, but was later released by President Yar’Adua on a plea
bargain to help advance peace talks. The British government has returned over $2 million in
assets allegedly stolen by Alamieyeseigha to Nigerian authorities.
A new rebel group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), emerged in
late 2005, using kidnappings to bring international attention to its cause and to demand that the
government release various regional figures, including Dokubu-Asari and Alamieyeseigha.
Conflict between the Delta’s militants and the Nigerian military subsequently escalated, and the
kidnapping of foreign oil workers increased exponentially. Media reports suggest over 300
foreigners, including several American citizens, were kidnapped between 2006 and 2009.
Attacks on oil facilities by militant groups like the MEND have periodically cut Nigeria’s oil
production by as much as 25%, and analysts partially blame supply disruptions in Nigeria for
periodically raising the world price of oil.66 According to the State Department’s Coordinator for
International Energy Affairs, “If Nigeria was to produce oil at capacity, it would play a major role
in helping to lower and stabilize world oil prices.”67 Nigeria’s deep-water production has proven
vulnerable to militant attacks as well, and the threat of sea piracy is high. According to some
estimates, up to 10% of Nigeria’s oil is stolen every year, and criminal activities in the region
have reportedly been used to fund local political campaigns.68
From 2007 through mid-2009, militant activity in the Delta was punctuated with periodic
ceasefires and negotiations with the government. Acts of sabotage by the MEND and other
militant groups increased in early 2009, cutting oil production by approximately 273,000 barrels
per day. In May 2009, Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF), a special combined military and police
unit established in 2004 to restore order in the Delta, launched a new offensive against the
militants. The ensuing fight, combined with JTF air and land strikes against militant camps,
displaced thousands, according to Amnesty International.69 Armed conflict between security
forces and militia has decreased in the aftermath of an amnesty program, although periodic
skirmishes continue.
65
“Pumping Up the Oil Price; the Price of Oil,” The Economist, October 1, 2004.
See, for example, “Oil Steady Over 70 USD as Concerns about US Gasoline Supply, Nigeria Continue,” AFX News
Limited, May 22, 2007, and “Assault at Gas Pumps Related to Attacks on Nigerian Pipelines,” CNN, May 23, 2008.
67
David L. Goldwyn, testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Washington, D.C., September 24, 2008.
68
HRW, Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, Vol. 19, No. 16(A), October 2007.
69
Amnesty International, “Hundreds Feared Dead and Thousands Trapped in Niger Delta Fighting,” May 22, 2009.
66
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Amnesty Offer for Delta Militants
In June 2009, President Yar’Adua extended an offer of amnesty to Delta militants; those who
surrendered their weapons, renounced violence, and accepted rehabilitation by October 2009
would be granted a presidential pardon, along with cash and job training. Within days, five
militant groups had announced their intention to accept amnesty. MEND initially rejected the
president’s gesture, but in July, after jailed MEND leader Henry Okah, who had been arrested in
2007 in Angola and extradited to Nigeria, was pardoned, the group announced a ceasefire. While
MEND has not collectively accepted the amnesty offer, several of its purported leaders have.
According to Nigerian government estimates, 15,260 “militants” accepted the amnesty and turned
in weapons by the October 2009 deadline; almost 20,200 self-declared militants had been
demobilized by late 2011. President Jonathan has pursued efforts to establish job training centers
in the Delta, a key pledge in the second phase of the amnesty and reconciliation plan, which
focuses on the rehabilitation of militia members. The government’s ability to deliver on promised
infrastructure improvements and job creation will be critical to addressing regional grievances.
Security in the Delta has improved in the wake
of the amnesty offer, and oil output has
increased to over 2.4 million barrels per day,
but observers warn that unless the root causes
of the conflict are addressed, the region will
remain volatile.71 MEND, citing outstanding
grievances, has continued to periodically
claim responsibility for attacks, including
explosions in Abuja in October 2010 that
killed 10 people. A MEND spokesman
claimed that the group had warned officials
prior to the bombings to avoid loss of life.
Who are the MEND?
The identity and composition of MEND has changed
since it first emerged in 2005. Various militant groups in
the Niger Delta have claimed actions under the name of
MEND, and analysts suggest that it is now an umbrella
group with a decentralized structure. Several high-profile
militant commanders, including Soboma George, Ateke
Tom, and Government Ektemupolo (alias Tompolo),
who were rumored to be among MEND’s senior
leadership, accepted the President Yar’Adua’s amnesty
offer in 2009, raising questions about the group’s current
cohesiveness.70
Efforts to Address Environmental and Development Challenges
Oil production in the Delta has caused major damage to the area’s fragile riverine ecosystem, and
ultimately to the livelihoods of its inhabitants.72 Reports on the amount of crude leaked into the
Delta’s fragile ecosystem vary significantly and there is no accurate measure, but millions of
barrels of oil are believed to have been spilled since oil production began in Nigeria.73 Gas flares,
which burn unwanted natural gas during oil drilling, have plagued the Delta with acid rain and air
pollution. This pollution has severely limited locals’ access to clean water, and has largely
destroyed the fishing stocks the majority of Delta inhabitants depended on to make a living.74 In
2006, Shell Oil, which has the largest production capacity of the oil companies in Nigeria, was
ordered by a Nigerian federal court to pay $1.5 billion to compensate local communities for
70
Soboma George was killed in August 2010, reportedly by men he had hired to kill two politicians in the region.
“In Niger Delta, Uneasy Peace as Rebel Disarmament Dates Nears,” Washington Post, July 27, 2009.
72
Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009.
73
Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, Ibid.; UNDP, Niger Delta Human
Development Report, 2006; Jonathan Brown, “Niger Delta Bears Brunt After 50 Years of Oil Spills,” The Independent
(London), October 26, 2006; Popken, Ben, “BP Gulf-Sized Spilling Occurs in Nigeria Annually, but Nobody Cares,”
The Consumerist.com, June 15, 2010.
74
ICG, “Fueling the Niger Delta Crisis,” Africa Report No. 118, September 28, 2006.
71
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environmental damage. President Yar’Adua announced in 2008 that Shell would be replaced by
another company in the oil fields of Ogoniland.75 The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to
consider a suit filed by Ogoni residents against Shell for complicity in torture and other crimes
against humanity in 2012; their case is based a 200-year-old law used in recent years to sue
corporations for alleged abuses abroad.
Under President Yar’Adua, the government took several important initial steps to engage the
Delta’s disaffected communities, efforts that activists hope the Jonathan Administration will
expand. An unprecedented 20% of Yar’Adua’s first federal budget proposal, for 2008, was
allocated for security and development projects in the Delta, although activists expressed concern
that the amount allocated for security far outweighed funds for development.76 The government
has continued to allocate significant financing for “post-amnesty” interventions and development
projects in the region, targeting transport, education, and health infrastructure. Concerns remain
regarding the government’s ability to spend the funds effectively.
Most observers agree that the crisis in the Delta must ultimately be solved politically, rather than
militarily, but there is considerable disagreement on the details of such a solution. The current
federal system provides states with a 13% share of local revenues (predominately from oil sales).
Groups like MEND argue that the states should receive a 50% share, as was stipulated in the 1960
constitution. A technical committee nominated by President Yar’Adua to identify policies to
stimulate development and improve security in the Delta region issued a report in December
2008. In the report, the committee advocated raising the share of oil revenues allocated to the oilproducing states to 25%. Some analysts suggest that corruption within the state governments is so
high that the local populations would see little improvement even if the state share were raised.
Some of the oil-producing states have reported revenues of $1 billion per year but have dismal
records of development or service delivery.77 Other analysts question what effect a change in
revenue allocation might have on the northern states, several of which have lower development
indicators than those in the Delta. In late 2009, President Yar’Adua proposed transferring 10% of
the revenues from the government’s oil and gas joint ventures to local Delta communities.
In September 2008, President Yar’Adua created a new cabinet-level Ministry for Niger Delta
Affairs. The position was intended to build on development plans started under the Obasanjo
Administration in 2007 under the auspices of the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC),
established in 2000 to improve social and environmental conditions in the Delta. Improvements in
infrastructure and education were identified as areas of major focus for Obasanjo’s 15-year, $50
billion plan.78 In his first year in office, President Yar’Adua doubled the budget for the NNDC, to
$566 million. Some observers have raised concerns that the ministry’s programs and those of the
NDDC, which is intended to be a part of the ministry, may be duplicative. Some analysts suggest
that given the level of corruption endemic in the Delta, the international community should work
with the Nigerian government to establish a new development fund that would have independent
oversight. New opportunities for foreign investment in the Delta could also contribute to
improvements in the region, although unrest may deter investors.
75
“Nigeria’s Removal of Shell Hailed,” BBC News, June 5, 2008.
“Nigeria’s Pledge to Increase Niger Delta Spending Elicits Skeptical Response,” VOA News, November 11, 2007.
77
“Blood and Oil,” The Economist, March 15, 2007.
78
“Nigeria Launches New Development Plan for Niger Delta,” Voice of America, March 27, 2007, and “New Hope for
Old ‘Master Plan’ on Niger Delta,” IRIN, November 19, 2007.
76
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Effects on the Oil Industry and the World Market
Nigeria has an estimated oil production capacity of three million barrels per day (bpd), but output
has struggled to meet capacity. Instability, criminality, and oil leaks in the Delta have cut output
by one-fifth since 2006. Nigeria’s production now averages 2.4 million bpd, but prior to the 2009
amnesty offer output fell below two million bpd. The threat of a renewed militant campaign
against oil targets in the Delta could affect the price of oil on the world market. A longer and
more sustained disruption of Nigeria’s oil supply, particularly if combined with the disruption of
another major supplier’s product, could have a significant impact on the world economy.
Abuses by Security Forces
Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, have been accused of serious human rights
abuses, and activists suggest that the government has done little to address issues of impunity and
corruption within the Nigerian Police Force.79 In 2007, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
reported that “torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services operate within the
country,” and called on the Nigerian government to criminalize the practice.80 The State
Department’s annual human rights reports on Nigeria document numerous instances of
“politically motivated and extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions
… torture, rape and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and
criminal suspects,” and a variety of other offenses. In its reporting, the State Department noted
serious abuses by both police and soldiers related to the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising and
referenced “credible media reports” claiming that police executed the group’s leader. Nigerian
officials have acknowledged some abuses; in 2010 the country’s police minister called the
situation “condemnable and unacceptable.”81 Nigeria’s prison system has also drawn criticism;
Amnesty International has alleged that more than half of the country’s inmates had never been
convicted of a crime, some awaiting trial for up to 10 years.82
HIV/AIDS, Education, and Population Growth
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 3.6% is relatively low in comparison to Southern African
nations with adult seropositivity rates of 10 to 25%. However, the West African nation comprises
nearly one-tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons with an estimated 3.3 million infected
people, the largest HIV-positive population in the world after South Africa. Nigeria’s population
is expected to double by the year 2025, which is likely to multiply the spread of HIV. In addition
to the devastation HIV/AIDS continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult population, over 40% of
the current population is under the age of 15. With almost a third of primary-school-aged children
not enrolled in school and a large number of HIV/AIDS-infected adults, Nigeria faces serious
challenges and significant obstacles in the education and health care sectors.
79
Recent reports on abuses include Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces, by Human Rights Watch; Killing at Will:
Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria, by Amnesty International; and Criminal
Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigerian Police Force, by the Open Society Justice Initiative
and the Network of Police Reform in Nigeria.
80
United Nations Press Release, “Special Rapporteur on Torture Concludes Visit to Nigeria,” March 12, 2007.
81
“Nigeria Condemns Police ‘Killing’,” BBC, March 5, 2010.
82
Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Criminal Justice System Utterly Failing Nigerian People; Majority of Inmates Not
Convicted of Any Crime,” February 26, 2008.
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International Relations
Nigeria has been an important player in regional and international affairs since the 1990s,
although domestic challenges may distract the Jonathan Administration from playing a more
robust regional role in the near term. The government has mediated political disputes in Togo,
Mauritania, Liberia, Sudan and Cote d’Ivoire. Nigeria was critical of the international community
for “contradictions” in its reaction to the recent crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, questioning the
comparatively robust Western response to protect civilians in Libya.83 Nigerian troops have
played a vital role in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Nigerian police,
military observers, and experts are also deployed in U.N. missions in Cote d’Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Timor-Leste, Sudan, South Sudan, and Western Sahara.
The country is one of 12 members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), and Nigeria is a key member of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). The United States is the top destination for Nigerian exports, followed by India,
Brazil, Spain and France. China is the lead source for Nigerian imports, followed by the United
States, the Netherlands, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.84 Nigeria has become a top
destination for Chinese investment on the continent.
Issues for Congress
Administration Policy on Nigeria
After a period of strained relations in the 1990s, when Nigeria was under a military dictatorship,
U.S.-Nigeria relations steadily improved under President Obasanjo, and they have remained
strong under Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan. The Bush Administration praised the Nigerian
government’s improved budget practices, banking sector reforms, and efforts to eliminate the
country’s foreign debt, although it remained critical of the country’s human rights record and
questioned its commitment to ensuring free and fair elections. President George W. Bush visited
the country in 2003, and First Lady Laura Bush visited Nigeria in 2006. Following the 2007
elections, though, the Bush Administration expressed concern with what it termed “a flawed
election, and in some instances, deeply flawed.”85 Nevertheless, the State Department stressed the
need to “engage,” rather than isolate, Nigeria to “nurture Nigeria’s fragile democracy.”86
President Barack Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, has
referred to Nigeria as “probably the most important country in Sub-Saharan Africa.”87 President
Obama has reiterated the importance of the U.S.-Nigeria relationship. He formally acknowledged
the country’s role as a regional leader during a meeting with then-Acting President Goodluck
Jonathan at the White House in April 2010. Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Nigeria in August
83
“Nigeria Lashes at World’s Focus on Libya While I. Coast Burns,” AFP, March 22, 2011.
CIA, “Nigeria”, The World Factbook, last updated November 10, 2011.
85
“Governing Party Wins in Nigeria, but Many Claim Fraud,” New York Times, April 23, 2007.
86
Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer before the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global
Health, June 7, 2007.
87
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks by Ambassador Carson on Secretary Clinton’s Africa Trip,” July 30, 2009.
84
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2009 on her first visit to the continent as Secretary of State. Clinton’s discussions in Nigeria
focused on regional security, democracy, corruption, and economic development. She stressed the
need for electoral reform and expressed support for the government’s political approach toward
resolving the conflict in the Niger Delta.88
The United States and Nigeria agreed in January 2010 to establish a binational commission on
areas of mutual concern, as called for by Members of the House of Representatives in H.R. 2410,
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011. The first meetings of the
commission, formally established in April following then-Acting President Jonathan’s
participation in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, were held in late May 2010.
The commission is composed of four working groups that meet regularly: Good Governance,
Transparency, and Integrity; Energy and Investment; Food Security and Agriculture; and Niger
Delta and Regional Security Cooperation.
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues
Nigeria is an important trading partner for the United States and is the largest beneficiary of U.S.
investment on the continent. The country is eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA). AGOA-eligible exports, nearly all of which are petroleum
products, account for over 90% of Nigeria’s exports to the United States. Nigeria vies with
Venezuela to be the United States’ fourth-largest source of imported oil (behind Canada, Mexico,
and Saudi Arabia), depending on how much of its oil production is shut-in in any given month.
U.S. imports account for over 40% of Nigeria’s total crude oil exports, making the United States
Nigeria’s largest trading partner. U.S. energy companies may face increasing competition for
rights to the country’s energy resources; China, for example, has offered Nigeria favorable loans
for infrastructure projects in exchange for oil exploration rights. The NNPC signed an agreement
with Russia’s Gazprom in 2009 to create a joint venture for oil and gas exploration. Nigeria has
also signed an agreement in 2009 with Algeria and Niger to build a 2,500-mile pipeline across
their territories to deliver gas to Europe, though its prospects are uncertain. Nigeria exports
natural gas to neighboring countries through the new West Africa Gas Pipeline.
Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria’s
proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East oil-producing countries makes its oil
particularly attractive to U.S. interests. In 2005, the United States, Nigeria, and other interested
partners initiated the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy, a forum through which
participants would work to address challenges to oil production. Other regional and international
initiatives focused on maritime security in the Gulf have followed.89 Nigeria’s waters have been
named among the most dangerous in the world; the country ranked first in global pirate attacks
until it was overtaken by Somalia in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau.
Maritime piracy in Nigerian waters remains a major concern. Nigeria is also considered a
growing transshipment hub for narcotics trafficking, and several Nigerian criminal organizations
have been implicated in the trade. The U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the Gulf of
Guinea in recent years to enhance security in the region and in 2007 launched a new initiative, the
African Partnership Station (APS).90 APS deployments have included port visits to Nigeria and
88
U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe,” August 12, 2009.
For further information on maritime and port security issues in the region, see, e.g., the Atlantic Council, Advancing
U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain, November 30, 2010.
90
Under APS, U.S. and partner naval ships deploy to the region for several months to serve as a continuing sea base of
(continued...)
89
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joint exercises between U.S., Nigerian, European, and other regional navies. Nigerian military
personnel have also embarked as trainees, and a Nigerian naval captain has served as the APS
Deputy Commander. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has maintained increased focus on
maritime security in the region.91
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability and Counterterrorism Efforts
Nigeria plays a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa, as noted above,
and the United States provides it with military training with an emphasis on professionalization
and respect for human rights and civilian authority through a range of security assistance
programs, including those focused on enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities. Bilateral
cooperation on counterterrorism reportedly improved in the aftermath of the December 2009
airliner bombing attempt, although some government officials remain sensitive to perceived
intrusion in domestic affairs. The Nigerian government has coordinated with the Department of
Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the International Civil Aviation
Organization to strengthen its security systems. Nigeria is also a participant in the State
Department’s Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that
aims to increase border protection and regional counter-terrorism capabilities. The Nigerian
parliament adopted new anti-terrorism legislation in February 2011 after a series of bombings in
the country. The Obama Administration has urged the Nigerian government to balance its security
response to the emerging threat of Islamic extremism with efforts to address some of the
legitimate grievances voiced by northern communities.
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
Nigeria is the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in Africa, following another
strategic partner, Kenya, whose population is less than a third the size of Nigeria. The United
States is the largest bilateral donor in Nigeria, providing it with over $616 million in foreign aid
in FY2010 and $632 million in FY2011. Democratic governance, agriculture and economic
reform, improved education and health services, professionalization and reform of the security
services, and HIV/AIDS have been the main focus for U.S. assistance programs in recent years.
Nigeria is a focus country under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and
the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI). The State Department’s FY2012 foreign aid request for
Nigeria, which totals $660.5 million, includes approximately $588 million (89% of the total) in
funding for HIV/AIDS and related health programs.92 In 2008, the State Department’s Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) reported that:
Exceptionally high funding levels for HIV/AIDS create a clear imbalance in the embassy
program mix and present a skewed picture of U.S. policy priorities. In addition, this level of
HIV/AIDS funding has unintended consequences for Nigeria’s broader health infrastructure,
(...continued)
operations and a “floating schoolhouse” to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focuses on
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation,
search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
91
For more information on AFRICOM and Nigeria’s response to the command’s creation, see CRS Report RL34003,
Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
92
Congress passed H.R. 2055, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), in December 2011. The
legislation cuts $6.15 billion from the President’s request. Final country-specific allocations have yet to be announced.
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monopolizing the country’s supplies of medical goods and services, including the qualified
health professionals needed to meet Nigeria’s other health needs.93
Although AIDS-related interventions have composed the majority of health funding for Nigeria,
the funds also target other health concerns, including maternal and child health, malaria, and
tuberculosis. U.S. health assistance focused on tuberculosis aims to double the case detection rate
and halve Nigeria’s incidence in the next decade.
In addition to health programs, the State Department’s FY2012 foreign assistance request for
Nigeria includes funding for an array of programs focused on economic growth, education, and
good governance. U.S. economic and agriculture assistance supports programs that will increase
productivity and build trade and investment capacity. This funding also aims to address climate
change, including through efforts to increase the production of clean energy and reduce gas
flaring. As the FY2012 request points out, one-third of Nigeria’s 30 million school-aged children
are not enrolled in school, and the request includes over $15 million in basic education funding.
The FY2012 request would further increase assistance for programs aimed at strengthening
democratic governance in Nigeria, up from $9.5 million in FY2008, $16 million in FY2009, and
$21 million in FY2010, to over $27 million for the upcoming fiscal year. USAID provided over
$14 million to support the 2011 elections, which included funding for technical assistance to
increase INEC capacity. The Administration has requested funding in FY2012 for new conflict
mitigation programs to address extremism in the north and conflict in the Niger Delta. USAID
has paired with Chevron on a four-year, $50 million program (of which USAID is contributing
half) to improve agricultural development as well as civil society and governance capacity in the
Delta. The State Department maintains 10 “American Corners,” located in libraries throughout
the country, to share information on American culture and values with Nigerians.
Table 1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Nigeria
($ in thousands)
FY2010
Actual
FY2011
Actual
FY2012
Request
Development Assistance
70,967
55,791
70,276
Foreign Military Financing
1,850
1,212
1,000
Global Health and Child Survival - State
471,227
471,227
471,227
Global Health and Child Survival - USAID
69,100
101,971
117,000
International Military Education and Training
1,016
940
950
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
500
1,250
0
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs
1,520
0
0
TOTAL
616,180
632,391
660,453
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations.
USAID is implementing several “flagship” programs designed to concentrate resources and
achieve maximum impact. They are focused on two northern Nigerian states: Bauchi and Sokoto
(within Nigeria, human development indicators are lowest in the north). USAID’s flagship
93
U.S. Department of State Office of the Inspector General, Report on Inspection: Embassy Abuja and Consulate
General Lagos, Nigeria, Report Number ISP-I-08-25A, July 2008.
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education project, the Northern Education Initiative (NEI), is being implemented in the two focus
states to strengthen state and local government systems for the delivery of education services.
USAID’s flagship peace and democratic governance project in these two states is known as
Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development (LEAD). The project is designed to
build partnerships between state and local governments, civil society, and the private sector to
improve governance, accountability, and service delivery. A third flagship program, the five-year,
$85 million Targeted States High Impact Project (TSHIP) is being implemented in the same two
states to reduce maternal and child deaths. The project aims to build the states’ health systems to
effectively deliver primary health care, and to support overall improvement of the primary health
care delivery system through capacity building and institutional strengthening.
U.S. security assistance to Nigeria was suspended from FY2003 until 2006, when the State
Department restarted a modest International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.94
Security cooperation has increased since then, and the State Department’s FY2012 security
assistance request, which focuses on military professionalization, peacekeeping support and
training, and land and maritime border security, includes $1 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and almost $1 million for IMET. Nigeria has also received maritime security assistance
through the U.S. Navy’s Africa Partnership Station and the State Department’s African Coastal
and Border Security (ACBS) program.95 As an important troop contributor to peacekeeping
missions, Nigeria continues to receive U.S. support through the African Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. The country also participates in security cooperation
activities with the California National Guard through the National Guard State Partnership
Program. U.S. counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria includes programs coordinated through
TSCTP. Nigeria has also received security assistance through Department of Defense funds,
including $2.2 million in “Section 1206” funding for the development of a counterterrorism
infantry company and $6.2 million aimed at building the capacity of a counterterrorism unit and
its tactical communications interoperability. Nigeria also received coastal radar and
communications training and equipment through regional Section 1206 programs. U.S. support
for Nigerian law enforcement has been limited due to human rights concerns.
Recent Congressional Action
The United States Congress continues to monitor political developments in Nigeria. Congress
also continues to monitor Nigeria’s energy sector and its role in world oil supplies, as well as
humanitarian and human rights issues in the country. Congressional hearings have examined the
attempted terrorist attack by a Nigerian citizen on a U.S. airliner in December 2009, raising
concerns with the State Department’s visa process and with “systematic failures across the
Intelligence Community (IC), which contributed to the failure to identify the threat.”96
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), during February 2011 hearings by the House and
Senate intelligence communities on worldwide threats, highlighted a range of security concerns in
Nigeria in his testimony, including political and sectarian violence and militancy in the Niger
94
U.S. security cooperation with Nigeria was suspended in the early 2000s when Nigeria hosted exiled Liberian
President Charles Taylor.
95
For more information on APS, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of
the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
96
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Unclassified Executive Summary of the Committee Report on the
Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253,” May 18, 2010.
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Delta and the northeast. The DNI suggested that although the group Boko Haram appeared to be
focused on local issues, “it may be pursuing interests it shares with” regional Al Qaeda affiliate
AQIM. As international media attention on Boko Haram grew in the wake of the August 2011
U.N. bombing, the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence held a hearing to examine the group’s potential to commit acts of terrorism against
U.S. interests or against the United States. In a related report, the committee raised concerns
about the dearth of information available on the group and the potential to underestimate Boko
Haram’s potential threat to U.S. interest. The report suggested that the U.S. government expand
military and intelligence support, as well as diplomatic engagement with Nigeria, and examine
whether Boko Haram should be designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).97
Congressional attention to these and other issues is expected to continue during the second
session of the 112th Congress.
97
Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, Report of the House of Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, November 30, 2011.
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Figure 2. Map of Nigeria
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Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
Congressional Research Service
28 future of the zoning arrangement unclear.
The 2011 Elections: Opportunities and Challenges
Nigeria’s ability to weather the potential political crisis of President Yar’Adua’s hospitalization
and eventual death in office, and to manage the leadership transition without the military playing
an apparent role, was viewed by many as positive sign of its democratic progress. Under
President Yar’Adua, the government had commenced electoral reforms and increased the
autonomy of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), whose credibility had been
badly damaged by previous elections. President Jonathan continued these reform efforts, winning
praise for replacing the sitting INEC chairman with a respected academic and civil society
activist, Professor Attahiru Jega, a move that increased public confidence in the commission.3
1
Britain administered the north and south separately from the late 19th century until 1947, when it introduced a federal
system that divided the country into three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western. Today, Nigeria is comprised of six
geopolitical zones: north-west, north-east, north-central, south-west, south-east, and south-south (the Niger Delta).
2
Many speculate that Yar’Adua suffered from a chronic kidney condition. His hospitalization abroad in late 2009 and
prolonged absence threatened to spark a political crisis in early 2010, amid rumors of his death, allegations that his wife
and close advisors were making decisions for him, and legal challenges related to his failure to transfer power during
his convalescence. After several months of uncertainty, the National Assembly recognized Jonathan as the acting head
of state in February 2010, allowing him to conduct critical government business. In May 2010, the government
announced President Yar’Adua’s death at age 58, and Jonathan was sworn in as the new president.
3
International Crisis Group, “Nigeria’s Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?” Africa Briefing, February 24, 2011.
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With over 73 million registered voters, almost 120,000 polling stations, and more than 50
political parties, the challenges facing INEC in 2011 were daunting. Observers noted positive
developments prior to the elections, including efforts to compile a more credible voter register,
but also raised concerns about electoral preparedness and other areas deemed problematic in
previous polls, including ballot secrecy, intimidation, and transparency in the counting of ballots
and tabulation of results. Last minute court rulings on the parties’ candidate lists delayed the
delivery of voting materials, resulting in the election period being postponed by a week.
Given Nigeria’s unwritten “zoning” arrangement, there was considerable debate on whether
Jonathan’s decision to vie for the presidency would lead the ruling party to split prior to the 2011
elections. Many northerners argued that since Obasanjo had served two terms and Yar’Adua had
served only one, a candidate from their region should hold the office for another term. Jonathan,
who notably is from a minority ethnic group (the Ijaw), ultimately gained the support of key PDP
leaders, including a majority of the northern governors, for his candidacy, and he won the PDP
primary by a wide margin. The leading opposition parties chose northern presidential
candidates—former military leader Muhammadu Buhari, who had run in 2003 and 2007, for the
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and Nuhu Ribadu, the former head of Nigeria’s anticorruption authority, for the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN).
The PDP remained the dominant party in the elections, retaining the presidency and a majority in
the House of Representatives and most state legislatures. Voters expressed their dissatisfaction,
however, by voting out two-thirds of the incumbents in the House and Senate. Opposition
candidates made significant gains in the southwest and the north.4 President Jonathan won 59.6%
of the vote, gaining a majority in 23 states and enough support nationwide to avoid a run-off.
Buhari followed with 32.3% of the votes, leading in one-third of the states (see Figure 1). Given
Buhari’s electoral success in the north, Jonathan’s victory was seen by some northern youth as
evidence that the results had been rigged, triggering protests that, in some areas, turned deadly.
U.S. government views on the elections were positive, despite the violence. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton declared, “This historic event marks a dramatic shift from decades of failed
elections,” but stated that “while this election was a success for the people of Nigeria, it was far
from perfect.”5 Another senior official noted “technical imperfections,” but argued that “this
reverses a downward democratic trajectory and provides the country a solid foundation for
strengthening its electoral procedures and democratic institutions.”6 President Obama remarked
that “the success of the elections was a testament to Nigerian voters who ... were determined that
these elections mark a new chapter in Nigerian history.”7
Election observers generally noted significant improvements in the legislative and presidential
polls, calling them a key step forward, but most stopped short of terming the elections “free and
fair.” Some raised concerns with presidential results from certain states in the Niger Delta
(President Jonathan’s home region) and the southeast, where turnout appeared to be near 100%
amid reports of intimidation, harassment, and violence.8 Nationally, under-age voting was a
4
The ACN dominated state elections in the southwest, where the PDP lost all governors’ races and kept a majority in
only one state assembly. Nationally, out of 36 states, opposition parties now have 13 governors and 10 state assemblies.
5
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Press Release: Election in Nigeria, April 19, 2011.
6
Special Briefing by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, “The Recent Elections in Nigeria,” April 28, 2011.
7
The White House, Statement by President Obama on Elections in Nigeria, May 4, 2011.
8
Preliminary Statement of the European Union Election Observation Mission, April 18, 2011; Project 2011 Swift
(continued...)
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common concern of observers, and overcrowding at polling stations and complicated vote
collation procedures vulnerable to error or malfeasance remained a problem.9 Some of the state
elections were deemed to be less credible by observers.10 Various parties filed legal suits
challenging the results of the 2011 elections, with varying success. Nigeria’s Supreme Court
upheld a verdict rejecting the CPC’s challenge to President Jonathan’s win in December 2011.
Nigeria’s next elections are scheduled for 2015. Donors, including the United States, and
advocacy groups have stressed the need for the Jonathan Administration to continue to improve
electoral procedures and to prosecute those responsible for electoral fraud.11
Figure 1. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election
Source: BBC, adapted by CRS.
(...continued)
Count (http://www.pscnigeria.org) and the Transition Monitoring Group (http://www.tmgelection2011.org).
9
The author served as an election observer in Lagos for the parliamentary elections and Sokoto for the presidential.
10
EU Election Observation Mission, “Press Release: EU EOM on the Elections of 26 and 28 April,” April 29, 2011.
11
See, e.g., ICG, Lessons From Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, Africa Briefing No. 81, September 15, 2011.
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Election-Related Violence in 2011
Despite generally positive reviews of the April 2011 elections, the level of election-related violence was higher than in
previous years. Deadly clashes that followed the presidential vote highlighted lingering communal tensions,
disaffection, and mistrust of the state in the under-developed north—issues that may have been considered a
secondary priority for the national government in the past decade as it grappled with militant activity in the oilproducing Niger Delta.
Violence prior to the 2011 elections included clashes between party supporters and several assassinations, and some
politicians deployed “thugs” to intimidate opponents and voters. Security concerns were further heightened by a
spate of bombings during political rallies, primarily in the Delta, that were linked to local politics. There were at least
six bombings in the northeast state of Borno, where Boko Haram has been most active. Boko Haram was linked to
the assassination of that state’s leading gubernatorial candidate, as well as to the bombing of a state election
commission headquarters not far from the national capital, Abuja. The government increased security during the polls,
and election observer comments were generally positive regarding security forces’ behavior during the elections.
The worst violence in 2011 came almost immediately after the presidential poll, with supporters of Muhammadu
Buhari leading protests in the northern states, alleging that the PDP had rigged the vote. The protests devolved into
violent riots and, in some areas, killings, largely along religious and ethnic lines. In some parts of the north, the clashes
lasted for several days until soldiers were deployed to enforce stability. At least 800 people were killed in a three-day
period, according Human Rights Watch, and as many as 65,000 displaced. An independent panel, tasked with
conducting an official government inquiry into the violence and led by a prominent Islamic scholar, faulted successive
administrations for failing to act on the recommendations of previous inquiries into communal and political violence.
The panel viewed the zoning arrangement as having politicized ethno-religious tensions and also suggested that
statements made by politicians such as Buhari for supporters to “guard their votes” may have fueled popular
frustrations and (possibly inadvertently) sparked acts of violence. Some observers caution that the 2015 elections
could again spark protests in the north if President Jonathan decides to run for another term.
Development Challenges and Reform Initiatives
Despite its oil wealth and large economy, Nigeria’s population is among Africa’s poorest, and the
distribution of wealth is highly unequal. As many as 70% of Nigerians live below the poverty
line, and the average life expectancy is 52 years. Nigeria has the world’s second-largest
HIV/AIDS population, after South Africa. Access to clean water remains a major problem—
almost half the population has no access to improved sources of water and less than one-fifth of
households have piped water. Thirty percent of people lack access to adequate sanitation.
Diarrhea is the second-leading cause of death among children, and Nigeria ranks second only to
India in the number of diarrhea-related child deaths globally.
Decades of economic mismanagement, instability, and corruption have hindered investment in
Nigeria’s education and social services systems and stymied industrial growth. The economy
depends heavily on the oil and gas sector, which according to the World Bank accounts for almost
80% of government revenues and 95% of export earnings, making the country particularly
vulnerable to swings in global oil prices, as well as to conflict and criminality in the Niger Delta.
Nigeria has averaged real annual GDP growth of almost 7% in the past six years, but economists
suggest that the economy continues to underperform, held back by poor infrastructure and
electricity shortages. The manufacturing and telecommunications sectors are growing, however,
and the banking sector has been a strong performer. Agricultural production contributes over onethird of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs more than two-thirds of the workforce.
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Nigeria is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa,12 and it aims to be
among the world’s top 20 economies by 2020, although rising insecurity in the north, persistent
corruption, and a challenging business environment threaten long-term growth.
When Goodluck Jonathan assumed power in February 2010 from the ailing President Yar’Adua,
he vowed to continue his predecessor’s various reform initiatives and made public commitments
to “restoring Nigeria’s image” abroad, both by continuing to act as a key partner in regional peace
and counterterrorism efforts, and by ending the “culture of impunity” in Nigeria in terms of
corruption and human rights concerns. Those initiatives are discussed briefly below.
Efforts to Combat Corruption
Corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and pervasive,” according to the U.S. State
Department, and by many accounts, the country’s development will be hampered until it can
address the perception of impunity for corruption and fraud.13 Human Rights Watch suggests that
Nigeria’s political system rewards rather than punishes corruption, which has been fueled by oil
revenues for decades.14 Nigeria’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index has consistently worsened in the past three years, after transiently improving in 2008
following President Yar’Adua’s election.15
According to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a Nigerian law
enforcement agency created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, billions of dollars have been
expropriated by political and military leaders since oil sales began in the 1970s.16 The country’s
central bank governor recently estimated that Nigeria may lose more than 10% of its annual GDP
through fraud.17 Several international firms have been implicated in Nigerian bribery scandals,
including German telecom giant Siemens and the U.S. firm Halliburton and its subsidiary
Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc. (KBR).18 Nigeria is known globally for cyber crimes, including
“419 scams,” so-named for the article in the country’s penal code that outlaws fraudulent e-mails.
Successive presidents have taken a public stance against corruption, but some observers suggest
that they have also used corruption charges to sideline critics and political opponents. President
Yar’Adua campaigned on an anti-corruption agenda; in 1999 he was the first governor to publicly
declare his assets. Upon assuming the presidency, he distanced himself from his predecessor,
dismissing many of Obasanjo’s political appointees and security chiefs and overturning several of
the privatization agreements approved by the former president, amid charges of corruption
associated with the sales. Yar’Adua also proposed, unsuccessfully, that the constitution be
12
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2012, May 7, 2012.
State Department, “Nigeria,” Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2011, May 2012.
14
HRW, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, August 2011.
15
The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceptions of business people and country analysts regarding the
degree of corruption among public officials and politicians. A high score indicates greater levels of corruption.
16
Former dictator Sani Abacha reportedly stole more than $3.5 billion during his five years as head of state (19931998). Some stolen funds have been repatriated, but other Abacha assets remain frozen abroad.
17
“Nigeria: Dazzling Statistics,” Africa Confidential, Vol. 53 No. 14, July 6, 2012.
18
Halliburton and KBR have paid several hundred million dollars in U.S. and Nigerian fines, and in 2012 the former
head of KBR was sentenced to prison in the United States, for bribing Nigerian officials in exchange for contracts
worth over $6 billion. The EFCC brought charges against former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney in 2010 based on
his tenure as Halliburton’s chief executive; the charges were dropped after the company agreed to a $250 million fine.
13
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amended to remove an immunity clause that prevents the president, vice president, governors, and
deputy governors from being prosecuted for corruption while in office.
Nevertheless, critics contend that executive interference with the EFCC continued during
Yar’Adua’s tenure, undermining the entity’s investigations and derailing prosecutions. Donors
were highly critical of the transfer and eventual dismissal of the EFCC’s first chairman, Nuhu
Ribadu, in late 2007.19 President Jonathan fired Ribadu’s successor, who was implicated in
corrupt practices, in late 2011, replacing her with Ribadu’s former deputy, Ibrahim Lamorde.
Advocacy groups welcomed Lamorde’s appointment, but have called on Jonathan to increase the
EFCC’s independence, suggesting that the EFCC chairman “remains deeply vulnerable to the
whims of the president and lacks security of tenure.”20 The U.S. government has also signaled its
support for Lamorde, and has welcomed other recent anti-corruption initiatives by the
government, including the passage of a Freedom of Information law in 2011, a recent
parliamentary inquiry into fraud associated with the country’s fuel subsidy program (see below),
and the appointment of Ribadu to lead an independent audit of the oil and gas sector. The
Jonathan Administration has also pledged to expand budget transparency by requiring legislators
and other senior officials to publicly declare their assets.21
Petroleum and Power Sector Reforms
President Jonathan has pledged to reform the oil and gas industry, which has long been plagued
by corruption. Nigeria’s first female oil minister, Diezani Allison-Madueke, a former Royal Dutch
Shell executive, is leading the government’s efforts to pass and implement the ambitious
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which is aimed at increasing transparency in the industry,
attracting investors, and creating jobs. Progress on the legislation has been halting. The PIB
would restructure the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the parastatal that
oversees regulation of the industry and has been criticized for its lack of transparency. Nigeria
was designated compliant with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global
standard for transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, in 2011, indicating that Nigeria had
fulfilled the minimum criterion of annually declaring its extractive sector revenues. This does not
necessarily suggest that Nigeria has taken aggressive steps to curb corruption in the sector. The
United States and other donors have welcomed Jonathan’s appointment in 2012 of former EFCC
Chairman Nuhu Ribadu to lead a new task force to audit oil revenues.
Despite its status as one of the world’s largest crude oil exporters, Nigeria imports an estimated
$10 billion in refined fuel annually for domestic consumption, and it suffers periodically from
severe fuel and electricity shortages. In an effort to increase its refining capacity and halt oil
imports by 2020, the government has granted permits for several new independently owned
refineries. In 2010, Nigeria signed an agreement with China worth a reported $23 billion for new
refineries, and in July 2012 the government signed a memorandum of understanding with U.S.based Vulcan Petroleum Resources for a $4.5 billion project to build six refineries.
19
There was speculation that Ribadu’s removal from office was linked to his effort to prosecute former Delta State
Governor James Ibori, one of Yar’Adua’s primary financial contributors, who may have embezzled over $200 million
while in office. First arrested in 2007 and later acquitted, Ibori was indicted again in 2010 but eluded capture and fled
to Dubai, where he was arrested by Interpol. He was extradited in April 2011 to the United Kingdom, where he owned
property and kept some of his assets; he was convicted in April 2012 on money laundering and fraud charges.
20
HRW, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, August 2011.
21
U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, Joint Communique, June 2012.
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For years, the Nigerian government has subsidized the price its citizens pay for gasoline (roughly
70% of which is imported), and economists have long deemed the subsidy benefit unsustainable.
The subsidy’s cost—roughly $8 billion in 2011—was steep, comprising almost one-quarter of the
government’s annual budget. At the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund and
others, in late 2011 President Jonathan cut the subsidy, causing the price of fuel for consumers to
double in early January 2012 and sparking strong domestic opposition. In the face of mass
protests and a nationwide strike, the government backtracked and reinstated a partial subsidy.22
Public scrutiny of the program has since increased, and in May a legislative inquiry revealed that
an estimated $7 billion allocated for the subsidy may have been misappropriated. The scandal
prompted President Jonathan to replace several senior executives at the national petroleum
company, which was implicated in the scandal. The lawmaker who led the probe, Farouk Lawan,
was subsequently accused of taking a bribe from one of the companies involved in the fraud;
Lawan claims he took the bribe as evidence.
The government plans to refocus funds saved by decreasing the fuel subsidy on improving health,
education, and the nation’s power supply. Jonathan has pledged to increase electricity generation
tenfold over the next decade, and efforts to privatize power stations and distribution companies
are underway, albeit behind schedule, despite objections from the country’s trade unions.
In addition to its oil reserves, Nigeria has the ninth-largest natural gas reserves in the world and
the largest in Africa, but they have provided comparatively little benefit to the country’s economy.
Many of Nigeria’s oil fields lack the infrastructure to capture and transport natural gas. The
government has repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, set deadlines for oil companies to stop “flaring”
gas at oil wells (burning unwanted gas during oil drilling), a practice estimated to destroy roughly
one-third of annual production and to constitute more than $2 billion in lost revenue annually.23 In
2011, President Jonathan announced a series of new agreements to develop gas processing
facilities as part of a “gas revolution” designed to create new jobs and revenues, and to end
flaring. Nigeria is in the process of increasing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, which
could surpass revenues derived from oil exports in the next decade.
Financial Sector Reforms
Successive Nigerian administrations have made commitments to economic reform, but their track
record is mixed. According to the IMF, reforms initiated under the Obasanjo Administration and
continued by his successors, most importantly the policies of maintaining low external debt and
budgeting based on a conservative oil price benchmark to create a buffer of foreign reserves,
lessened the impact of the recent global economic crisis on Nigeria’s economy.24 Oil revenues
above the benchmark price have been saved since 2003 in an Excess Crude Account (ECA),
although the government drew substantially from the account in 2009-2010 in an effort to
stimulate economic recovery. The Jonathan Administration’s efforts to create a sovereign wealth
fund, which would draw seed money from the ECA, have met with some resistance from state
governors, who benefit from the distribution of national oil revenues to state governments. The
22
See, e.g., “Removal of Fuel Subsidies in Nigeria: An Economic Necessity and a Political Dilemma,” The Brookings
Institute, January 10, 2012.
23
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria, August 2011.
24
International Monetary Fund, “Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation with Nigeria,” January 27, 2011. The
price benchmarks set by the Nigerian government are $58/barrel for 2011, $60 for 2012, and $62 for 2013, far lower
than current and projected global prices..
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country has made significant gains in the past decade in paying down its external debt, which
constituted more than one-third of GDP a decade ago, freeing funding for programs aimed at
poverty reduction and reaching the country’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Like his predecessors, President Jonathan has committed to reforms that aim to attract foreign
investment, create jobs, and fuel development, and the U.S. government has been publicly
supportive of his economic team.25 In mid-2011, he appointed World Bank managing director
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who led efforts to reduce Nigeria’s debt as finance minister under
President Obasanjo, to resume her former post. Jonathan has retained Lamido Sanusi as governor
of the central bank. Sanusi has led efforts to modernize the country’s banking system, pushing
reforms to tighten banking supervision.26
Social Issues and Security Concerns
Islamic Sharia Law
Nigeria is home to one of the world’s largest Muslim populations, vying with, and likely
outpacing, Egypt as the largest on the continent. The north is predominately Sunni Muslim, and
12 northern states have formally adopted Islamic sharia law since 1999 to adjudicate criminal and
civil matters for Muslims.27 In some states, the introduction of sharia was a flashpoint between
Muslims and Christians. The State Department reports that sharia “technically does not apply to
non-Muslims in civil and criminal proceedings,” although observers note that Islamic mores are
often enforced in public without regard for citizens’ religion. In some areas, state-funded vigilante
groups known as hisbah patrol public areas and attempt to enforce sharia-based rulings. Many
analysts nonetheless see the interpretation and implementation of Nigerian sharia as moderate in
comparison to that of some other Muslim-majority countries.
Religious and Communal Tensions
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has recommended since 2009 that
Nigeria be classified as a “Country of Particular Concern” for “severe, ongoing, and egregious
religious freedom violations.”28 It is not currently designated as such by the Secretary of State.
According to the Commission, as many as 14,000 Nigerians have been killed since 1999 in
sectarian violence, and the commissioners argue that the Nigerian government has tolerated the
25
Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, “Nigeria, One Year After Elections,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, April 9, 2012.
26
In 2009 Sanusi instituted regulations that require banks to report large cash transactions between accounts if one of
the account holders is considered to be “politically exposed.” Bank audits ordered by Sanusi that year found 10 banks
near collapse due to reckless lending. The government provided $4 billion to rescue the banks, and in late 2010, under
pressure from Sanusi, the legislature approved the establishment of the Asset Management Company of Nigeria
(AMCON) to buy bad bank loans in exchange for government bonds, in an effort to get the banks lending again. By
some estimates it may take a decade for AMCON to divest its toxic assets. AMCON bought non-performing loans from
9 rescued banks and margin loans from 12 other domestic banks.
27
Nigerian law protects freedom of religion and permits states to establish courts based on common law or customary
law systems. Non-sharia based common law and customary law courts adjudicate cases involving non-Muslims in these
states, and sharia-based criminal law courts are elective for non-Muslims.
28
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2012, May 2012.
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violence, creating a culture of impunity that has emboldened Boko Haram and its sympathizers.
The Commission’s 2012 report notes the religious nature of the 2011 post-election violence, Boko
Haram’s attacks against Christians, and rising religiously-charged rhetoric as areas of significant
concern. Other experts point to increasingly well armed militias, loosely organized along
religious lines, in central and northern Nigeria.29 The State Department, in its annual Religious
Freedom report, states that “the government generally respected religious freedom in practice,
although some local political actors stoked communal and sectarian violence with impunity.”30
Sectarian violence continues to be a particular problem in the central Nigerian city of Jos, the
capital of Plateau State, which sits between the predominately Muslim north and Christian south.
Tensions among communities in this culturally diverse “Middle Belt” are both religious and
ethnic, and they stem from competition over resources—land, education, government jobs—
between ethnic groups classified as settlers or as “indigenes” (original inhabitants of the state),
with the latter designation conveying certain political and economic benefits. In Jos, the mostly
Christian Berom are considered indigenes, and the predominately Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who
were traditionally nomadic and pastoralist, are viewed as the settlers. In 2010, the Nigerian
government established a special task force composed of both military and police to restore
stability in the state; periodic outbreaks of violence have nonetheless continued, and have been
exacerbated by attacks on churches attributed to Boko Haram.
Boko Haram and Militant Islam in Nigeria31
Boko Haram, a violent Salafist movement in the north, has grown increasingly active and deadly
in its attacks against state and civilian targets in Nigeria, drawing on a narrative of vengeance for
state abuses to elicit recruits and sympathizers. While its attacks have not exclusively, or even
primarily, targeted Christians, attacks attributed to the group on churches in several north and
central states are fueling existing religious tensions. The church bombings, which usually occur
on Sundays or religious holidays to achieve maximum effect, have sparked deadly reprisal attacks
by Christians against Muslim civilians. Such attacks may be part of a deliberate effort to foment
instability, with the aim of discrediting and delegitimizing the government in these regions by
exposing the weakness of its security apparatus and justice mechanisms.
Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s as a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect that advocated a
strict interpretation and implementation of Islamic law for Nigeria. Calling itself Jama’a Ahl asSunna Li-da’wa wa-al Jihad (JASLWJ; roughly translated from Arabic as “People Committed to
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”), the group is more popularly known as
Boko Haram (“Western education is forbidden”), a nickname given by local Hausa-speaking
communities to describe its view that Western education and culture have been corrupting
influences. It engaged in periodic skirmishes with police during its formative years, but the
group’s activities were limited in scope and contained within several highly impoverished states
in the predominately Muslim northeast.
29
Testimony of Darren Kew, in U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, The
Crisis in Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria, 112th Cong., July 10, 2012.
30
State Department, July-December 2010 International Religious Freedom Report, September 13, 2011.
31
For more information on Boko Haram, see, e.g., Andrew Walker, What is Boko Haram? USIP, May 2012; Peter J.
Pham, “Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat,” Africa Security Brief No. 20, April 2012; and Testimony of CRS Specialist
Lauren Ploch, in U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Boko
Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland?, 112th Cong., November 30, 2011.
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In July 2009, the government’s attempts to stop Boko Haram’s attacks on police stations and
other government buildings resulted in the death of at least 700 people, a figure that likely
includes not only militants, but also security personnel and bystanders. In the course of that
violence, the group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic young cleric who had studied in
32
Saudi Arabia, was killed while in police custody. A sizeable number of Yusuf’s followers were
also killed or arrested. The group appeared to dissipate after the heavy-handed security
crackdown, but reemerged a year later, orchestrating a large-scale prison break in September 2010
that freed hundreds, including its own members. Some reports suggest that a small number of
Boko Haram militants may have fled to insurgent training camps in the Sahel during this period.
Boko Haram’s attacks have since increased substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality, now
occurring almost daily in northeast Nigeria, and periodically beyond. Attacks attributed to the
group since 2010 have increasingly featured improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs,
and suicide attacks. Boko Haram has primarily focused on state and federal targets, such as police
stations, but has also targeted civilians in schools, churches, markets, and beer halls. The group
has also conducted assassinations of local political leaders and moderate Muslim clerics. Bank
robberies attributed to the group may contribute to its financing, although authorities warn that
criminal groups may also be opportunistically posing as Boko Haram militants.
The bombing of the U.N. building in Abuja on August 24, 2011 marked a major departure from a
previously exclusive focus on domestic targets. It was also Boko Haram’s first clearly intentional
suicide bombing. Boko Haram spokesmen claimed the attack was retribution for the state’s
heavy-handed security response against its members, referencing U.S. and international
“collaboration” with the Nigerian security apparatus. The bombing may indicate an aspiration by
some in Boko Haram to move beyond local politics toward an international jihadist agenda, or it
may have been an effort to elicit foreign backing for the group’s domestic agenda. The Nigerian
government has also linked Boko Haram to the May 2011 kidnapping of two Europeans in
northwest Nigeria; the two men were killed in a rescue attempt in early 2012.
By most accounts, Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization. According to U.S. officials, core
Boko Haram militants may number in the hundreds, but the group also appears to draw support
from a broader following of several thousand Nigerians, primarily young men from the northeast,
who have expressed frustration with the lack of development, jobs, and investment in the north,
and with the heavy-handed response of security forces to Boko Haram. Some analysts suggest
that Boko Haram may be susceptible to fracturing, with a segment of the leadership working to
build ties with the international Al Qaeda franchise, while others remain focused exclusively on a
domestic agenda. The public emergence of a purported splinter faction in early 2012 has led some
to contend that there are divisions among the hardliners. Efforts by various interlocutors to
facilitate government negotiations with Boko Haram have, to date, been unsuccessful.
While Boko Haram currently appears to pose more of a threat to local stability, its expansion has
amplified concerns among some observers and officials that Nigerians may be susceptible to
recruitment by Al Qaeda or other groups aiming to use violence against government or civilian
targets in Nigeria or abroad.33 Potential ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are of
32
“Islamic Death ‘Good for Nigeria’,” BBC, July 31, 2009.
Prior to Boko Haram’s reemergence, a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to detonate an explosive
device onboard an American airliner bound from Amsterdam to Detroit on December 25, 2009. Abdulmutallab, son of
a respected banker and former government minister, reportedly became radicalized while living abroad. Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims to have sponsored the effort.
33
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particular concern—the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, who has identified Boko Haram
as a “threat to Western interests,” referenced indications in mid-2012 that the two groups “are
likely sharing funds, training, and explosive materials.”34 The increasing lethality and
sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks, as demonstrated in the killing of an estimated 200 people
in coordinated bomb and gun attacks in the northern city of Kano on January 20th, has further
raised the group’s profile among U.S. national security officials.
Some in Congress have pressed the State Department to designate Boko Haram as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO), arguing that greater intelligence and security resources should be
focused on the group.35 Many Nigeria experts caution that the Nigerian government’s own
response to Boko Haram has been, to date, heavy-handed and may actually fuel radical
recruitment. Some argue that an FTO designation might be seen, by both the Nigerian
government and the northern population, as an endorsement by the United States of “excessive
use of force at a time when the rule of law in Nigeria hangs in the balance.”36 Others suggest that
Boko Haram’s shift toward Christian targets may be tactical, and caution that U.S. policymakers
avoid taking positions that fuel perceptions that the United States has “taken sides” among
Christians and Muslims.37 State Department officials have acknowledged these concerns and
called on the Nigerian government to “change their strategy with regard to Boko Haram from a
primarily military response to one that also addresses the grievances felt by many in northern
Nigeria.”38 President Jonathan replaced his National Security Advisor and Minister of Defense in
June 2012, citing the need for new tactics against the group. His appointment of a northerner as
the new National Security Advisor may bring a different perspective to the government’s
counterterrorism strategy and tactics in the north, although changes may meet with resistance
from senior military officials.39 Additional arguments against an FTO designation focus on
concerns that the label would enhance Boko Haram’s status among international extremist groups
and internationalize its standing, potentially serving as a fundraising and recruitment tool. In June
2012 the State Department designated three individuals linked to Boko Haram as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists. It has yet to make a determination on a possible designation for the
organization as a whole, but in doing so will weigh the potential benefits of an FTO designation
against possible consequences for U.S. policy goals in the country and the wider region.
34
Testimony of General Carter Ham, in U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Proposed FY2013 Defense
Authorization as it Relates to the U.S. European and Africa Commands, March 1, 2012; and Remarks by General
Carter Ham at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies Senior Leaders Seminar, June 25, 2012.
35
The FTO designation derives from authorities granted to the Secretary of State in the Immigration and Nationality
Act, as amended. The designation triggers the freezing of any assets in U.S. financial institutions, bans FTO members’
travel to the United States, and criminalizes transactions (including material support) with the organization or its
members. It is unclear, given the current lack of public information available on Boko Haram’s possible ties abroad, if
these measures would have any impact on the group. FTO status might serve to prioritize greater U.S. security and
intelligence resources toward the group, although this is not a legal requirement of the designation. Legislation in the
112th Congress, including S. 3249, H.R. 5822 and H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization for FY2013, would
each require the Secretary of State to report on whether Boko Haram meets the criteria to be designated as an FTO.
36
Letter to Secretary Clinton by 21 American academics with Nigeria expertise on May 2012.
37
D. Kew, op. cit.
38
Testimony of State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin, in U.S. Congress, House Foreign
Affairs Committee, LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa, April 25, 2012.
39
Jonathan’s former National Security Advisor, who, like Jonathan, was from the Niger Delta, was seen by some as out
of touch with northern perceptions of the Boko Haram crisis. The new appointee, retired Col. Sambo Dasuki, is a
cousin of an influential Muslim leader in Nigeria, the Sultan of Sokoto, and has close ties to senior northern politicians.
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Conflict in the Niger Delta
Nigeria’s oil wealth has long been a source of political tension, protest, and criminality in the
Niger Delta region, where most of the country’s oil is produced.40 Compared to Nigeria’s national
average, the region’s social indicators are low, and unemployment is high. Millions of barrels of
oil are believed to have been spilled in the region since oil production began, causing major
damage to the fragile riverine ecosystem, and ultimately to the livelihoods of many of the Delta’s
30 million inhabitants.41 Gas flares have further plagued the Delta with acid rain and air pollution,
limiting locals’ access to clean water and destroying fishing stocks that the majority of Delta
inhabitants depended on to make a living.
Conflict in the Niger Delta has been marked by the vandalism of oil infrastructures; massive,
systemic production theft locally known as “oil bunkering,” often abetted by state officials;
protests over widespread environmental damage caused by oil operations; kidnapping for ransom;
and public insecurity and communal violence. The demands of the region’s various militant
groups have varied, but often include calls for greater autonomy for the region and a larger share
of oil revenues. Militant groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND) have used the kidnapping of oil workers and attacks on oil facilities to bring
international attention to the Delta’s plight. These attacks have periodically cut Nigeria’s oil
production by as much as 25%, and have been blamed for spikes in the world price of oil.
Nigeria’s deep-water production has also proven vulnerable to militant attacks, and the threat of
sea piracy is high. By some estimates, up to 10% of Nigeria’s oil has been stolen annually, and
local politicians have reportedly financed their campaigns through such criminal activities.42
Successive Nigerian governments have pledged to engage the Delta’s disaffected communities,
but few of their efforts met with success until 2009, when President Yar’Adua extended an offer
of amnesty to Delta militants. Under the offer, those who surrendered their weapons, renounced
violence, and accepted rehabilitation were granted a presidential pardon, along with cash and job
training. According to Nigerian government estimates, more than 20,000 have benefitted from the
program, which is costing the government roughly $400 million a year, though it is unclear
whether all were directly involved in militancy. The activities of criminal gangs have continued.
President Jonathan has continued to allocate significant financing for “post-amnesty”
interventions and development projects in the Delta, targeting transport, education, and health
infrastructure. Concerns remain regarding the government’s ability to spend the funds effectively
in a region where corruption is, at all levels, endemic, and some Nigerian politicians from other
regions have criticized the cost of the program.43 Some of the oil-producing states have reported
40
In the early 1990s, activists from the Ogoni ethnic group drew international attention to the extensive environmental
damage done by oil extraction in the Niger Delta. Author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of the Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and 14 others were accused in 1994 of involvement in the murder of
several prominent Ogoni politicians. They pled not guilty, but Saro-Wiwa and eight others were convicted and
sentenced to death. Their executions sparked international outrage against the regime of dictator Sani Abacha, and the
United States recalled its ambassador in response.
41
For more information, see UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, 2011; UNDP, Niger Delta Human
Development Report, 2006; Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009;
and Paul Francis, Deirdre Lapin, and Paula Rossiasco, Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta, Woodrow
Wilson Center for Scholars, 2011.
42
HRW, Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria, Vol. 19, No. 16(A), October 2007.
43
Xan Rice, “Nigerian Rebels Swap Weapons for Welding,” Washington Post, July 5, 2012.
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revenues of over $2 billion per year but have dismal records of development or service delivery.44
The federal government’s commitment and ability to deliver on promised infrastructure
improvements and job creation will be critical to addressing regional grievances. Observers
caution that unless the root causes of conflict are addressed, the Delta will remain volatile.
Abuses by Security Forces
Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, have been accused of serious human rights
abuses, and activists suggest that the government has done little to address issues of impunity and
corruption within the Nigerian Police Force.45 In 2007, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
reported that “torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services operate within the
country,” and called on the Nigerian government to criminalize the practice.46 The State
Department’s annual human rights reports document numerous instances of “politically motivated
and extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions … torture, rape and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and criminal suspects,” and
a variety of other offenses. The 2011 report notes the use of excessive and sometimes deadly
force by security personnel, both military and police, to stem civil unrest and interethnic violence.
The prison system has also drawn criticism; Amnesty International alleges that more than half the
country’s inmates had never been convicted of a crime, some awaiting trial for up to 10 years.47
In May 2009, Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF), a special combined military and police unit
established in 2004 to restore order in the Delta, launched a new offensive against the militants.
The ensuing fight, combined with JTF air and land strikes against militant camps, displaced
thousands, according to Amnesty International.48 Armed conflict between security forces and
militia has decreased with the amnesty program, although periodic skirmishes continue. The JTF
has also been deployed to the northeast to address the Boko Haram threat, and has been
implicated in the deaths of civilians and extrajudicial killings there. In its reporting, the State
Department notes serious abuses by both police and soldiers related to the 2009 Boko Haram
uprising and “credible media reports” that police executed the group’s leader. Nigerian officials
have acknowledged some abuses; in 2010 the country’s police minister called the situation
“condemnable and unacceptable,” but few security personnel have been prosecuted for abuses.49
HIV/AIDS, Education, and Population Growth
Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 3.6% is relatively low in comparison to Southern African
nations with adult seropositivity rates of 10 to 25%. However, the West African nation comprises
nearly one-tenth of the world’s HIV/AIDS infected persons with more than three million people
44
Francis, Lapin, and Rossiasco, Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta, Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011.
Recent reports on abuses include Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces, by Human Rights Watch; Killing at Will:
Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria, by Amnesty International; and Criminal
Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigerian Police Force, by the Open Society Justice Initiative
and the Network of Police Reform in Nigeria.
46
United Nations Press Release, “Special Rapporteur on Torture Concludes Visit to Nigeria,” March 12, 2007.
47
Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Criminal Justice System Utterly Failing Nigerian People; Majority of Inmates Not
Convicted of Any Crime,” February 26, 2008.
48
Amnesty International, “Hundreds Feared Dead and Thousands Trapped in Niger Delta Fighting,” May 22, 2009.
49
“Nigeria Condemns Police ‘Killing’,” BBC, March 5, 2010.
45
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infected, the largest HIV-positive population in the world after South Africa. Nigeria’s population
is expected to double by the year 2025, which is likely to multiply the spread of HIV. In addition
to the devastation HIV/AIDS continues to cause among Nigeria’s adult population, over 40% of
the current population is under the age of 15. With almost a third of primary-school-aged children
not enrolled in school and a large number of HIV/AIDS-infected adults, Nigeria faces serious
challenges and significant obstacles in the education and health care sectors.
International Relations
Nigeria has been an important player in regional and international affairs since the 1990s,
although domestic challenges may distract the Jonathan Administration from playing a more
robust regional role in the near term. The government has mediated political disputes in Togo,
Mauritania, Liberia, Sudan, and Cote d’Ivoire, and has been engaged in regional efforts to resolve
the political crisis in Mali. Nigeria was critical of the international community for
“contradictions” in its reaction to the recent crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, questioning the
comparatively robust Western response to protect civilians in Libya.50 Nigerian troops played a
vital role in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Nigerian police, military
observers, and experts are also deployed in U.N. missions in Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Haiti, Timor-Leste, Sudan, South Sudan, and Western Sahara.
The country is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The United States is the top
destination for Nigerian exports, followed by India, Brazil, Spain, and France. China is the lead
source for Nigerian imports, followed by the United States, the Netherlands, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom.51 Nigeria has become a top destination for Chinese investment on the continent.
Issues for Congress
Administration Policy on Nigeria
After a period of strained relations in the 1990s, when Nigeria was under a military dictatorship,
U.S.-Nigeria relations steadily improved under President Obasanjo, and they have remained
robust under Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan. Diplomatic engagement is sometimes tempered,
however, by Nigerian perceptions of U.S. intrusion in regional or domestic affairs, and by U.S.
concern with human rights, governance, and corruption issues. President Barack Obama’s
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs has often referred to Nigeria as “probably the most
strategically important country in Sub-Saharan Africa,” and the Administration considers Nigeria
to be a key ally.52 In addition the strategic role their country plays in the region and in global
forums, Nigerians comprise the largest African diaspora group in the United States.
50
“Nigeria Lashes at World’s Focus on Libya While I. Coast Burns,” AFP, March 22, 2011.
CIA, “Nigeria”, The World Factbook 2012.
52
State Department, “Remarks by Ambassador Carson on Secretary Clinton’s Africa Trip,” July 30, 2009; Remarks by
Assistant Secretary Carson, “Promise and Peril in Nigeria: Implications for U.S. Engagement,” at CSIS, April 9, 2012.
51
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The United States has been supportive of Nigerian reform initiatives, including anti-corruption
efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote
peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Obama and Jonathan Administrations
established the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC), a strategic dialogue to address issues
of mutual concern; its working groups meet regularly. The State Department maintains 10
“American Corners,” located in libraries throughout the country, to share information on
American culture and values with Nigerians, and it plans to expand its presence in the country,
possibly through a new consulate in the northern city of Kano to increase outreach in the north,
although security concerns may slow the move.
U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Maritime Security Issues
Nigeria is an important trading partner for the United States and is the largest beneficiary of U.S.
investment on the continent. Given Nigeria ranking as one of Africa’s largest consumer markets
and its affinity for U.S. products and American culture, opportunities for increasing U.S. exports
to the country, and the broader West Africa region, are considerable, although U.S. imports from
Nigeria, totaling more than $33 billion in 2011, currently far outweigh exports, estimated at
almost $5 billion in 2011.53 The Obama Administration aims to double U.S. exports to Nigeria by
2015 through the President’s National Export Initiative. The country is eligible for trade benefits
under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). AGOA-eligible exports, nearly all of
which are petroleum products, account for over 90% of exports to the United States.
Nigeria vies with Venezuela to be the United States’ fourth-largest source of imported oil (behind
Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia). U.S. imports account for over 40% of Nigeria’s total crude
oil exports, making the United States Nigeria’s largest trading partner. U.S. energy companies
may face increasing competition for rights to the country’s energy resources; China, for example,
has offered Nigeria favorable loans for infrastructure projects in exchange for oil exploration
rights. The U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank signed an agreement in October 2011 with the
Nigerian government that aims to secure up to $1.5 billion in U.S. exports of goods and services
to support power generation reforms. A U.S. trade delegation composed of government officials,
Ex-Im Bank executives, and energy companies traveled to Nigeria in February 2012 to discuss
the participation of American companies in the development of Nigeria’s energy infrastructure.
Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria’s
proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East countries makes its oil particularly
attractive to U.S. interests. The United States has coordinated with Nigeria through various
regional forums and maritime security initiatives.54 Nigeria’s waters have been named among the
most dangerous in the world; the country ranked first in global pirate attacks until it was
overtaken by Somalia in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau. Nigeria is also
considered a growing transshipment hub for narcotics trafficking, and several Nigerian criminal
organizations have been implicated in the trade. The U.S. Navy has increased its operations in the
Gulf of Guinea in recent years and in 2007 launched the African Partnership Station (APS).55 APS
53
U.S. Commercial Service, Doing Business in Nigeria: 2011 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies.
For further information on maritime and port security issues in the region, see, e.g., the Atlantic Council, Advancing
U.S., African, and Global Interests: Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain, November 30, 2010;
and CDR Michael Baker, “Toward an African Maritime Economy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, Spring 2011.
55
Under APS, U.S. and partner naval ships deploy to the region for several months to serve as a continuing sea base of
operations and a “floating schoolhouse” to provide assistance and training to the Gulf nations. Training focuses on
(continued...)
54
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deployments have included port visits to Nigeria and joint exercises between U.S., Nigerian,
European, and other regional navies.
Nigeria’s Role in Regional Stability and Counterterrorism Efforts
Nigeria plays a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa, and the United
States provides the country with security assistance focused on enhancing its peacekeeping
capabilities. Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation has reportedly improved in the aftermath of
the December 2009 airliner bombing attempt, although some Nigerian officials remain sensitive
to perceived U.S. interference in internal affairs. The Nigerian government has coordinated with
the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the International
Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen its security systems, and the country now uses full body
scanners in its international airports. Nigeria is a participant in the State Department’s Trans
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that aims to increase
regional counter-terrorism capabilities and coordination. A recent anti-terrorism capabilities
assessment conducted by the State Department deemed Nigeria “at high or critical risk” of
terrorist threat in more than a dozen categories, including land and maritime border security,
critical infrastructure security, and explosive incident countermeasures. The Obama
Administration has committed through the BNC dialogue to support Nigerian efforts to increase
public confidence in the military and police to respond more effectively to the threat posed by
extremists. As noted above, the State Department has designated three individuals linked to Boko
Haram as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.56
U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
Nigeria is the second largest recipient of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance in Africa, following
another strategic partner, Kenya. In Nigeria, the United States is the largest bilateral donor,
providing roughly $600 million annually (see Table 1).57 Improved health and education services,
democratic governance, agriculture and economic reform, improved education and health
services, professionalization and reform of the security services, and HIV/AIDS have been the
main areas of focus for U.S. assistance programs in recent years. Governance aid focuses on the
justice and electoral systems, on advancing anti-corruption efforts, and on initiatives to make
governance structures more responsive and accountable. U.S. economic growth assistance
supports programs that aim to increase agricultural productivity and build trade and investment
capacity. This funding also aims to address climate change, including through efforts to increase
the production of clean energy and reduce gas flaring. Nigeria is a focus country under the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative
(PMI), and Nigerian farmers benefit from agriculture programs under the Feed the Future (FtF)
initiative that focus on building partnerships with the private sector to expand exports and
generate employment. In the Niger Delta, USAID has paired with Chevron on a four-year, $50
(...continued)
maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, seamanship/navigation,
search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
56
These individuals are Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s most visible leader, and Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar
Adam Kambar, both of whom have ties to Boko Haram and close links to AQIM, according to the State Department.
57
For further information on current U.S. assistance programs, see, e.g., Testimony of USAID Assistant Administrator
for Africa Earl Gast, in U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, U.S. Policy
Toward Nigeria: West Africa’s Troubled Titan, July 10, 2012.
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million program (of which USAID is contributing half) to improve agricultural development as
well as civil society and governance capacity. In the north, USAID is implementing “flagship”
education, health, peace, and governance programs designed to concentrate resources, build
partnerships, and achieve maximum impact in two states: Bauchi and Sokoto.
Security cooperation has increased since the mid-2000s,58 and the State Department’s FY2013
security assistance request, which focuses on military professionalization, peacekeeping support
and training, and land and maritime border security, includes $1 million in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) and almost $1 million for military education and training. U.S. officials have
stressed the importance of civilian oversight of the military, and respect for human rights and the
rule of law, in their engagements with Nigerian military officials.59 In addition to peacekeeping
support provided through the State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) program, Nigeria also benefits from security cooperation activities with the
California National Guard through the National Guard State Partnership Program. U.S.
counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria includes programs coordinated through TSCTP and other
regional State Department initiatives, as well as through Department of Defense funds. U.S.
support for Nigerian law enforcement has been limited due to human rights concerns.
Congressional Engagement
Terrorism-related concerns have dominated congressional action on Nigeria in the 112th Congress,
although Members also continue to monitor human rights and humanitarian issues, developments
in the Niger Delta, and Nigeria’s energy sector in the context of world oil supplies. As
international media attention on Boko Haram grew in the wake of the August 2011 U.N.
bombing, the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence held
a hearing to examine the group’s potential to commit acts of terrorism against U.S. interests or
against the United States. In a related report, the committee raised concerns about the dearth of
information available on the group and the potential to underestimate Boko Haram’s potential
threat to U.S. interest. The report suggested that the U.S. government expand military and
intelligence support, as well as diplomatic engagement with Nigeria, and examine whether Boko
Haram should be designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).60 Subsequent legislation
has been introduced to press the State Department on the FTO issue. In congressional testimony
on worldwide threats, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) declared Nigeria to be “critical
to U.S. interests,” highlighting three key challenges the country faces in 2012—“healing political
wounds” from the 2011 election, “managing the chronic unrest” in the Niger Delta, and
addressing the threat posed by Boko Haram, the last of which he identified as “most pressing.”
He expressed concern that Boko Haram may be interested in hitting additional Western targets in
Nigeria.61 The Africa subcommittees in both houses held hearings on Nigeria in 2012 to consider
U.S. policy on governance, security and trade issues in the country. Congressional attention to
these and other issues is expected to continue through the remainder of the 112th Congress.
58
U.S. security cooperation with Nigeria was restricted until the transition to civilian rule, and it was suspended in the
early 2000s when Nigeria hosted exiled Liberian President Charles Taylor.
59
Remarks by Ambassador Terence P. McCulley at the National Defense College in Abuja, April 26, 2012.
60
U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Boko Haram:
Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, committee print, 112th Cong., November 30, 2011.
61
Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, January 31, 2012.
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Table 1. State Department and USAID Assistance to Nigeria
($ in thousands)
FY2011
Actual
FY2012
Estimate
FY2013
Request
Development Assistance
55,791
50,291
50,200
Foreign Military Financing
1,212
1,000
1,000
Global Health and Child Survival - State
471,227
441,227
438,600
Global Health and Child Survival - USAID
101,971
132,000
108,900
International Military Education and Training
1,013
870
750
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
1,250
0
0
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs
0
0
0
TOTAL
632,464
625,388
599,450
Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations.
Figure 2. Map of Nigeria
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Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch
Specialist in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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